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Dear Reader:
This year’s Trafficking in Persons Report sends a strong message to the world that global 
crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, climate change, and enduring discriminatory 
policies and practices, have a disproportionate effect on individuals already oppressed by 
other injustices.  These challenges further compound existing vulnerabilities to exploitation, 
including human trafficking.  We must break this inhumane cycle of discrimination and 
injustices if we hope to one day eliminate human trafficking.  
The U.S. Department of State strives to advance around the world the security, prosperity, 
and values that U.S. citizens share.  We know recent events have led our country to grapple 
with unequal treatment and racism here at home that has reverberated around the world. 
As a government and society, we strive to correct past wrongs and advance racial equity in 
the United States and abroad.  We commit to bringing this dedication to our efforts to fight 
human trafficking as well.  We will seek to use our year-round engagement with governments, 
advocates, and the private sector to build a more effective anti-trafficking strategy rooted in 
equity.  This must include coming to terms with our role in having perpetuated violence and 
dehumanized people, and we must work to right these past wrongs.
Systemic discrimination creates inequities between communities, whether the discrimination targets perceptions of 
race, ethnicity, sexual orientation and gender identity, or any other social identities.  It manifests in societal exclusion 
and prejudices against those communities, which help perpetuate an imbalance of opportunity and support.  These 
inequities undercut our goal of combating human trafficking and embolden traffickers. We have seen, for instance, how 
deeply held racial biases and stereotypes inappropriately influence outcomes for those in our criminal justice system as 
they lead to racially disparate assumptions about who is identified as a trafficker and who is identified as a victim.  This 
is not a new truth, but it is a somber, unacceptable reality.  
Through this report, we call on governments to join the United States in improving our collective efforts to 
comprehensively address human trafficking.  Doing so requires us to mitigate harmful practices and policies that cause 
socioeconomic or political vulnerabilities that traffickers often prey on.  Part of this work requires us to acknowledge 
we will never be able to understand the full scope of what is needed without the expertise of those affected by systemic 
inequality.  Representation and diversity of experience and thought matter.  Therefore governments, including the 
United States, must foster an inclusive environment that allows for a thriving, diverse workforce at all levels. 
I have said before, building a “more perfect union” is both an acknowledgement of our imperfection and a commitment 
to continue striving toward progress in a transparent way.  I believe that is true here.  I look forward to the work ahead, 
knowing there is much still to accomplish, and we will be more successful when we work together to achieve the goals 
of combating human trafficking and creating a more fair, equitable world.




If there is one thing we have learned in the last year, it is that human trafficking does 
not stop during a pandemic.  The concurrence of the increased number of individuals at 
risk, traffickers’ ability to capitalize on competing crises, and the diversion of resources 
to pandemic response efforts has resulted in an ideal environment for human trafficking 
to flourish and evolve. Yet, despite the added challenges and risks that the pandemic has 
presented, we have also witnessed the adaptability among those continuing to combat human 
trafficking and their dedication to ensuring the continuation of anti-trafficking efforts to 
minimize the effects of the pandemic on victims and the broader anti-trafficking community. 
This year, the TIP Report introduction examines the emerging trends, challenges, and 
adaptations to global anti-trafficking efforts as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic.  
With this year’s Report we celebrate the efforts of anti-trafficking professionals who 
continued to serve and identify victims as well as prosecute traffickers amidst the pandemic’s 
devastating effects on the world’s most vulnerable populations.  We salute the survivor 
leaders––those with lived experience of human trafficking––who have demonstrated 
resilience and reaffirm that employing trauma- and survivor-informed approaches is essential, crisis or not.  While 
acknowledging these leaders, we recognize that many of us have also been touched by trauma, whether through loss 
of a loved one, our own illness, or dealing with large-scale lockdowns and extreme uncertainty.  A trauma-informed 
approach is needed now more than ever.  We must ensure that our commitment to victim-centered and trauma- and 
survivor-informed approaches when serving victims and survivors is uninterrupted.  We must also extend this approach 
to our interactions with our colleagues throughout the anti-trafficking field. 
While hopeful that we’re turning the corner on the pandemic, we know that different countries are at different stages 
in their pandemic response and recovery.  We call on governments and anti-trafficking actors to draw inspiration from 
the innovation and leadership this Report highlights to continue and improve the response to combat trafficking even 
amidst the necessary recovery efforts.  We should also consider the lessons learned over the course of this global health 
crisis.  It is through collaboration and collective understanding of both the nuances of our profoundly changed world 
and the needs of those affected most by the compounding effects of both human trafficking and the COVID-19 pandemic 
that a path forward emerges. 
I look forward to once again engaging in-person with government counterparts, NGO representatives, and individuals 
with lived experience to continue the two decades of progress that was celebrated and recognized last year in the 
twentieth TIP Report.  Through collaboration, learning, and embracing innovation, I am confident that global anti-
trafficking efforts will emerge stronger than ever.
MESSAGE FROM THE ACTING DIRECTOR
Sincerely,

A worker casts molten aluminum into 
molds. In Bangladesh, adults and 
children work long hours in factories 
under unsafe and harsh conditions that 
cause respiratory issues.
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HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE CONTEXT  
OF A GLOBAL PANDEMIC
The COVID-19 pandemic is a health crisis with unprecedented repercussions for human rights and economic 
development globally, including in human trafficking. COVID-19 generated conditions that increased the 
number of people who experienced vulnerabilities to human trafficking and interrupted existing and planned 
anti-trafficking interventions. Governments across the world diverted resources toward the pandemic, often 
at the expense of anti-trafficking efforts, resulting in decreased protection measures and service provision for 
victims, reduction of preventative efforts, and hindrances to investigations and prosecutions of traffickers. At 
the same time, human traffickers quickly adapted to capitalize on the vulnerabilities exposed and exacerbated 
by the pandemic. 
Despite the significant disruptions to efforts to combat this crime, the anti-trafficking community found ways 
to adapt and forged new relationships to overcome the challenges. Some governments and organizations 
conducted in-depth assessments to identify the changing trends. Others leveraged technology to drive 
innovative solutions. Many aligned policies and practices to current realities. Nonetheless, the challenges 
uncovered by COVID-19 are monumental and may be long lasting, requiring sustained collaboration among 
governments, civil society organizations, private sector leaders, survivor leaders, and other anti-trafficking 
actors to adjust and respond aptly to overcome these challenges. As a result, this year’s TIP Report introduction 
highlights human trafficking issues related to COVID-19, with special focus on how anti-trafficking stakeholders 
adapted in rapidly changing environments. It reflects on the lessons learned from practitioners and offers 
considerations to rebuild momentum through coordinated anti-trafficking strategies. The introduction also 
illustrates collaborative ways to reimagine anti-trafficking efforts with an emphasis on preparedness to prevent 
compounding effects of future crises on trafficking victims and vulnerable individuals, as well as efforts to 
combat the most recent emerging human trafficking trends. 
CHANGING HUMAN TRAFFICKING TRENDS AMID THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC 
A Growing Number of People Experiencing Economic and Social Vulnerabilities
The economic and social distress generated by the pandemic and related mitigation efforts exacerbated 
risks for vulnerable and marginalized populations. These included women and children, people affected 
by travel restrictions and stay-at-home orders, communities in areas of food insecurity, and survivors of 
“I will make it a priority to combat this terrible crime, protect 
those vulnerable to trafficking, and empower survivors to 
rebuild their lives with safety, dignity, and opportunity.”
President Joseph R. Biden, Jr.
The victim stories and photographs included in this report are meant to be 
illustrative.  They characterize the many—though not all—forms of human 
trafficking and the wide variety of situations and location in which they 
occur.  Each victim story is based on real experiences, and the victims’ 
names have been changed as a result.  In many cases, the photographs 
of individuals used in this report are not images of confirmed human 
trafficking victims.  When victims or survivors are in a photo, identifying 
features have been removed or the photographer took the photo in 
collaboration with the individual pictured.
VICTIM STORIES & PHOTOGRAPHS
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trafficking, as well as persons directly and indirectly affected by the disruption of economic activities and 
reduced livelihood options. Due to school closures, some children lacked access to education, shelter, and/
or food. Survivors of trafficking faced an increased risk of potential re-victimization due to financial and 
emotional hardships during the crisis. A survey by the Office of Security and Co-operation in Europe’s OSCE 
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and UN Women highlights that almost 70 
percent of trafficking survivors from 35 countries reported that their financial well-being was heavily impacted 
by COVID-19, and more than two-thirds attributed a decline in their mental health to government-imposed 
lockdowns triggering memories of exploitative situations. Many survivors had to close shops or leave jobs due 
to lockdowns and some were pressured by former traffickers when other employment options dried up. Some 
survivors had to sell their cell phones to purchase food, further isolating them from potential assistance from 
case workers. Additionally, COVID-19 mitigation efforts, such as stay-at-home orders and travel limitations, 
increased rates of gender-based violence and substance abuse, both of which put individuals at a higher risk 
of human traffickers exploiting them. Individuals in underserved communities faced barriers to accessing 
healthcare, while foreigners were stigmatized as carriers and spreaders of the virus, placing them at higher 
risk for exploitation and violence. Substantial changes in financial situations, such as the reduction of wages 
and work hours, closure of workplaces, rising unemployment, and reduced remittances, coupled with the rise 
in costs of living and disruptions to social safety networks, created newly precarious situations for those not 
previously vulnerable and even more precarious situations for those who were already at risk of exploitation. 
Low-wage and migrant workers and those in the informal economy faced riskier employment conditions, including 
restricted movement, minimal oversight mechanisms, withheld wages, and increasing debts—all indicators or 
flags for human trafficking. During stay-at-home orders, workers who lived at their worksites became particularly 
vulnerable to sex trafficking and forced labor while being restricted in their ability to seek assistance or leave their 
situation of exploitation. With minimal oversight mechanisms, many of these worksites remained unmonitored, 
resulting in fewer opportunities for victim identification. In the Gulf States, an IST Research survey of 6,000 
migrant workers concluded employers were 36 percent more likely to confine migrant domestic workers to their 
workplace and were 240 percent more likely to force those workers to work on rest days than any other migrant 
workers. In the same survey, more than 50 percent of migrant workers reported bearing new debts because 
of the pandemic. According to UNODC, migrant workers whose plans were disrupted by COVID-19 travel 
restrictions, either to travel home or to the workplace, were likely to have already paid recruitment fees or travel 
costs, placing them at risk of debt bondage. Similarly, a study by the Government of the Philippines also found 
many overseas Filipino workers were stranded with their savings exhausted during 2020. Sinking demand also 
led major global retailers to cancel orders and, in many cases, refuse to pay for products their supplier factories 
had already produced. Pennsylvania State University’s Center for Global Worker Rights and the Worker Rights 
Consortium reported that this resulted in shutdowns of thousands of factories in producing countries that sent 
home millions of factory workers, often without legally mandated pay.
“We must intensify our efforts and revitalize our role 
as a leader in the global fight to end human trafficking, 
reaffirming our pledge to engage meaningfully with survivors 
and combat human trafficking in all its forms.”
Antony Blinken, 
U.S. Secretary of State
Many children are forced to work 
in dangerous and hazardous 
conditions across India, often 
alongside family members in a 
situation of debt bondage where 
the trafficker’s primary means 
of control is the manipulation of 
debt.  In some cases, traffickers 
force entire families to pay off the 
debt “inherited” from relatives. 
For this photo, the photographer 
worked to ensure the identity of 
the child was protected.
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Traffickers Quickly Adapt and Exploit COVID-19-related Risks 
As COVID-19 caused a global economic downturn and increased the number of individuals vulnerable to 
human trafficking, traffickers adapted their existing tactics to take advantage of the unique circumstances of 
the pandemic. Human traffickers targeted the growing number of people unable to mitigate, adapt to, or build 
resilience against the worsening economic and social effects; they also exploited situations where screening 
and identification of victims became even more difficult. This included individuals confined to their homes 
or workplaces, households in dire need of financial support, and workers in the informal sector. Traffickers 
targeted families experiencing financial difficulties and offered false promises and fraudulent job offers to 
recruit their children, while other families exploited or sold their children to traffickers to financially support 
themselves. Business owners and landlords pressured individuals to take out loans in exchange for cheap 
labor or commercial sexual exploitation. Additionally, traffickers sought to re-exploit survivors who became 
financially unstable and vulnerable to revictimization.
Some examples include: 
 ∙ In India and Nepal, young girls from poor and rural areas were often expected to leave school to help 
support their families during the economic hardship—some were forced into marriage in exchange 
for money, while others were forced to work to supplement lost income. 
 ∙ Reports from the United States, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay illustrate that landlords forced their 
tenants (often women) to have sex with them when the tenant could not pay rent. 
 ∙ During lockdown, traffickers in the Amazon in Brazil changed their patterns by sending child sex 
trafficking victims to the perpetrators’ private quarters or specific locations instead of the usual places 
where children were sold to perpetrators. 
 ∙ In Haiti, Niger, and Mali, gangs operating in IDP camps took advantage of reduced security and limited 
protection to force residents at the camp to perform commercial sex acts. 
 ∙ In Burma, families experienced drastic declines in household incomes, with 94 percent of households 
surveyed reporting a reduction of incomes, 81 percent reporting at least one family member losing 
a job, and 69 percent reporting having to take loans making these families vulnerable to trafficking. 
In Indonesia and Malaysia, 
traffickers exploit workers on oil 
palm plantations.  Workers face 
harsh and dangerous conditions on 
isolated plantations, often working 
seven days a week to meet company 
quotas.  Palm oil produced by forced 
labor has been identified in many 
products consumed worldwide, from 
medication to food and cosmetics.
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While the number of individuals at risk of trafficking grew during the pandemic, so did the conditions 
under which traffickers thrive. Traffickers capitalized on the reduced capacity and shifting priorities of law 
enforcement resulting in greater anonymity and impunity to pursue their crimes. Disruptions to public justice 
systems and diversion of resources from anti-trafficking efforts during the pandemic increased impunity for 
traffickers and lowered the odds of their arrest.
An Increase in Forms of Online Sexual Exploitation
Pandemic mitigation efforts forced many people to shift online, including human traffickers. Online recruitment 
and grooming increased as children spent more time online for virtual learning due to school closures, often 
with little parental supervision. Reports from several countries demonstrated drastic increases in online 
commercial sexual exploitation and sex trafficking, including online sexual exploitation of children (OSEC), 
and demand for and distribution of child sexual exploitation material (CSEM), including content that involved 
human trafficking victims. The Philippine Department of Justice noted an increase of nearly 300 percent in 
referrals for potential online sex trafficking and OSEC cases from March to May 2020, the period during which 
the Philippines was under lockdown or quarantine measures. In India, there was a reported 95 percent rise 
in online searches for CSEM, and India ranked among the highest countries in the world for material related 
to child sexual abuse found online with a total of 11.6 percent of a global compilation of reports in 2020. The 
U.S. National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) reported a 98.66 percent increase in online 
enticement reports between January and September 2020 compared to the same period in 2019, and reports 
to their CyberTipline doubled to 1.6 million. While traffickers used the opportunity of increased numbers of 
children online to expand their operations, it should be noted that a portion of the increase resulted from the 
recirculation of sensationalized trafficking-related stories and misinformation on social media platforms. This 
included individuals who reshared CSEM content in hopes of helping the victim and raising awareness, but 
inadvertently contributed to reporting spikes leaving less time and resources to pursue every incident. With 
enough time for traffickers to establish effective methods to recruit and groom their victims and insufficient 
avenues to prosecute various forms of online sexual exploitation, the pandemic accelerated and accrued the 
challenges to combating online sex trafficking.
IMPACTS OF COVID-19 ON THE ANTI-TRAFFICKING COMMUNITY
Governments, donors, and civil society organizations faced practical and ethical dilemmas reconciling pandemic 
mitigation strategies with the implementation of anti-trafficking activities.  In the resulting absence of adequate 
anti-trafficking responses around the world, victims went unidentified, survivors were underserved, and 
traffickers were not held accountable. 
“Today, due to COVID-19 restrictions, young people are spending more time 
online, and evidence suggests a huge spike in predators’ access to children 
on the internet and the rise of online grooming and sexual exploitation 
while children are isolated and ‘virtually’ connected to the world.” 
U.S. Congressman Chris Smith
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Competing Priorities and Reduced Capacity
Throughout the COVID-19 crisis, governments faced the predicament of shifting priorities to focus on growing 
health and economic concerns, which drew attention and resources away from anti-trafficking efforts. Prevention 
efforts decreased as some governments suspended awareness campaigns, which often focused on areas less 
frequented during the pandemic, including airports, border crossings, bus and train stations, schools, and 
venues for large gatherings. Conversations related to human trafficking typically held by community, tribal, and 
religious leaders were often cancelled or postponed. Stay-at-home orders and travel restrictions made it more 
difficult for front-line officials to protect individuals through proper identification and screening techniques, 
leaving officials to rely on victims to self-identify during the pandemic, which already occurs rarely. In many 
countries, law enforcement agencies reassigned personnel responsible for investigating human trafficking to 
enforcing lockdowns and public health measures. Since the declaration of a national state of emergency in 
Peru, the assignments of police units, including those focused on anti-trafficking efforts, shifted to enforcing 
the government-imposed isolation measures. This, coupled with a shortage of protective equipment to supply 
police, resulted in many law enforcement officers and other specialized anti-trafficking officials becoming 
infected with COVID-19, some of whom died. 
It is undeniably essential for governments to execute effective, coordinated public health responses to prevent 
further loss of life and economic damage as a result of the pandemic. But, it also is important to maintain 
political will and capacity to focus on other priorities to avoid backsliding on progress made in the anti-
trafficking field or contributing to challenges in combating the crime. As vulnerabilities increase and human 
traffickers quickly adapt, governments must take steps to address anti-trafficking efforts in their COVID-19 
strategies, including by supporting and cooperating with the anti-trafficking community as it adjusts to the 
pandemic operating environment. 
Decreased Financial and Human Resources
Anti-trafficking actors experienced an all-around decrease in resources and operations. NGOs from various 
countries separately reported significant funding cuts due to COVID-19, which forced some to halt all assistance 
or cancel certain victim-support services. In 2019, official development assistance (ODA) made up one-tenth 
of external financial flows to developing countries, according to the OECD, which further predicted a decline 
of up to 8 percent in 2020 due to the impacts of COVID-19 on economies. In the first seven months of the 
pandemic, the International Aid Transparency Initiative noted a reduction of 17 percent in bilateral donor 
commitments between 2019 and 2020, which included a five percent decline in ODA. Within this decrease in 
obligated funds, donors shifted support to humanitarian and health sectors, consequently resulting in lower 
commitments to prevent conflict and support peace, security, and human rights. This has had cascading effects 
for local anti-trafficking organizations and their efforts, as many donors reneged on promised funds and funding 
opportunities diminished across the sector. According to the joint survey by OSCE and UN Women, only 24 
percent of the 385 anti-trafficking organizations that responded to the survey could remain fully operational 
during the pandemic. 
Challenges Facing Victims and Survivors 
Victims and survivors faced obstacles accessing assistance and support as lockdowns, social distancing protocols, 
and a lack of resources caused service providers to close shelters and reduce services. Providers struggled not 
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HUMAN TRAFFICKING DEFINED
The Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, as amended (TVPA), defines “severe forms of trafficking in persons” as: 
• sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced 
to perform such an act has not attained 18 years of age; or 
• the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the 
use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjection to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, 
or slavery.
A victim need not be physically transported from one location to another for the crime to fall within this definition. 
A trans woman applies 
makeup in her home in 
Spain.  Members of the 
LGBTQI+ community face 
stigma, violence, and 
persecution around the 
world and are vulnerable 
to human trafficking.
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only to maintain services for identified individuals, but also to create safe spaces in accordance with capacity 
and social distancing protocols to allow service provision for future identified individuals. Other traditional 
emergency response and support services, such as shelters, hospitals, and clinics, where victims might be 
identified were overburdened, at reduced capacity, or closed due to COVID-related restrictions or surges. 
Self-disclosing one’s trafficking experience also became riskier, especially for victims quarantined with their 
trafficker, given reduced opportunities for movement and the risk of COVID-19 infection posed by fleeing 
into the community. Moreover, the OSCE/UN Women survey concluded that only 14 percent of national 
referral mechanisms were fully operational, due in part to “government employees working from home” 
and low technological literacy and capacity. For foreign national trafficking victims, closed borders meant 
repatriation remained a key challenge, resulting in service providers supporting victims for longer periods 
with dwindling resources. In Nigeria, IOM and the Nigerian government supported the repatriation of more 
than 7,000 trafficking survivors in both 2018 and 2019 but were only able to repatriate 620 individuals from 
January to July 2020. Regardless of whether the process was delayed or expedited, repatriation of trafficking 
victims had the potential to lead to serious health and protection risks in the countries of return, as well as 
increased costs and added difficulty due to quarantine requirements upon arrival.
The OSCE/UN Women survey demonstrated the overall plight of survivors during the pandemic, noting that 
access to employment decreased by 85 percent, medical services by 73 percent, social services by 70 percent, 
legal assistance and access to food and water by 66 percent, psychological assistance by 64 percent, and access to 
safe accommodation by 63 percent. With limited access to wraparound services that, in many cases, are integral 
to survivors’ independence and well-being, trafficking survivors are at an increased risk of re-victimization. 
Many COVID-19 mitigation measures, such as mask wearing, virtual engagements, and self-isolation, could 
re-traumatize survivors. Masks and other personal protective equipment, as well as virtual engagements, 
reduce the ability to read facial and non-verbal cues and body language, which can be a survival mechanism 
for survivors. Survivors might associate stay-at-home orders and self-isolation with movement restrictions 
and feeling there are fewer places to which to “flee,” which may induce or exacerbate a trauma response for 
some survivors. Overall, the intensified impact on the mental health and physical well-being of trafficking 
victims and survivors from long-term isolation, reduced access to services, and general COVID-related risks 
reaffirms the need for comprehensive, trauma- and survivor-informed, and victim-centered anti-trafficking 
responses during the pandemic. 
Prosecution Challenges
Criminal justice systems often delayed and suspended overall prosecution efforts while law enforcement 
officials worked to manage COVID-19 outbreaks, even within their own units. Law enforcement officers were 
unable to conduct proper investigations and interviews with individuals to obtain the necessary evidence to 
prosecute human trafficking cases. When investigations and prosecutions did proceed, the coordination of 
extra safety precautions that met the victims’ and the prosecution team’s level of comfort further delayed the 
process in some cases. In other cases, the default method of conducting interviews virtually may not have been 
optimal for victims, who have reported feeling more comfortable developing a relationship with investigators 
before sharing their experience. Members of prosecution teams were obliged to think creatively to meet the 
victims’ needs while considering their own health and safety. Whether in-person or virtual interviews were 
held, prosecutors often avoided interviewing the victims multiple times, limiting the ability of investigators to 
“Everyone failed to ask me a simple question: what do you need?” 
Suamhirs Piraino-Guzman, LCP, MPsy. Survivor Advocate
Liam and Jakob were experiencing homelessness in northern Europe when 
a person they thought was a prospective employer offered them a job in 
construction, along with room and board, in a neighboring country.  They 
left their country with fake passports and worked hard laying asphalt and 
stone in residential neighborhoods.  Their “employer” forced the men to 
work long hours, continually reduced their wages, and physically abused 
them.  They were routinely moved around and often unsure of where they 
were located.  When their “employer” abruptly left, the men were able to 
seek assistance at their national embassy.  Eventually, their “employer” 
was arrested and convicted of human trafficking.
EUROPE
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follow-up and confirm details. Access to information and translation services for trafficking victims was also 
a challenge, as victim support networks reduced services to a minimum. Further, judicial officials postponed 
prosecutions and court proceedings due to delays in investigations, efforts to maintain safe social distancing 
regulations, and focus on competing priorities. Court closures at the onset of the pandemic also delayed 
prosecutions, contributing significantly to judicial systems’ backlog of cases. While many countries shifted to 
conducting court proceedings virtually, limited to no internet connectivity and cost-related barriers to internet 
access for rural or underserved communities in some countries, such as The Gambia, made it challenging for 
victims to participate in virtual courts. These delays decreased victims’ access to justice and legal assistance, 
which hampered victims’ emotional well-being, recovery, and repatriation, while allowing traffickers to 
continue their criminal activities and intimidate victims from pressing charges. 
The multi-faceted challenges generated by the COVID-19 pandemic continue to evolve and expose vulnerability 
in individuals, as well as systemic gaps. Overcoming and adapting to these broad impacts of the pandemic 
remain critical to an effective response against human trafficking. 
ADAPTATIONS TO ANTI-TRAFFICKING EFFORTS IN RESPONSE TO COVID-19 
In response to emerging challenges, governments and civil society organizations conducted in-depth research 
assessments on the impacts of COVID-19, leveraged technology as a method to address emerging trends, adapted 
policy approaches, and sought to expand protections for victims. There were and continue to be survivor-led 
and -informed innovative solutions not only to ensure the continuation of anti-trafficking efforts but also to 
promote safety and security during the pandemic. The anti-trafficking community pivoted to address new 
circumstances during the COVID-19 pandemic, demonstrated resilience, and produced advanced solutions 
that could be beneficial even after the pandemic, but many challenges still exist and continue to emerge. 
Fact-Finding and Research Assessments
Throughout the COVID-19 crisis, a lack of credible and accurate data posed a challenge to effective and efficient 
anti-trafficking efforts around the world. It was clear that COVID-19 exacerbated the vulnerabilities of millions 
of individuals and adversely affected efforts to combat human trafficking, but little concrete information 
existed to confirm the trends, understand the impacts, and shape the anti-trafficking response. International 
organizations conducted and produced most of the initial comprehensive assessments of the impact of COVID-
19 on anti-trafficking efforts and highlighted areas in which to adapt policy approaches and target resources. 
For example:
 ∙ The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GIATOC) published a policy brief in 
May 2020 highlighting initial trends in human trafficking during the pandemic and challenges to 
traditional responses. 
 ∙ OSCE/UN Women conducted a robust survey shining a light on the issues victims and service 
providers faced. 
 ∙ IOM conducted rapid assessments in various countries to address the multiple effects of the pandemic 
on populations vulnerable to trafficking, such as the socio-economic impacts of COVID-19 on labor 
migration in the Pacific Region. 
 ∙ UNODC’s partner NGOs that work on human trafficking reported that pandemic-related measures led 
their beneficiaries to lose income and access to food.
“The word freedom holds so much beauty.   
It was like my eyes were open to something I had  
never seen before that moment.” 
Jessa Crisp,  
Co-founder and CEO of BridgeHope
“In dealing with the COVID-19 emergency, we must not forget the invisible 
victims of trafficking and exploitation in our country.  Unfortunately, 
traffickers have quickly managed to change the forms of sexual exploitation 
and have made victims even more isolated and difficult to reach.”
Raffaela Milano, Director of Italy-Europe Programmes of Save the Children 
With an anticipated increase in poverty rates for the first time in two decades, further research on the economic 
effects of COVID-19 remains essential to understanding the ensuing large-scale unemployment, particularly 
in the informal job sector, and how it will drive known and new forms of trafficking.
Technological Innovations
As seen in most fields during the pandemic, technology has become a powerful means to connect people and 
collect information, while limiting individuals’ exposure to the virus. Despite widespread challenges adapting 
to a remote, digital work environment, anti-trafficking stakeholders leveraged technology to identify victims, 
support victims and survivors, and increase collaboration. 
Although the pandemic resulted in the reduction or suspension of many support networks for victims, service 
providers shifted to online and virtual platforms to continue supporting victims as much as possible. A service 
provider in Colombia ensured that all trafficking victims they served had access to the internet and a smartphone 
to receive online counseling services and mobile vouchers for food and hygienic products. In addition, some 
service providers offered telephone and online counseling and legal aid sessions, including filing temporary 
protection orders by email and providing legal representation via online platforms. 
Civil society organizations collaborated to promote information sharing and the availability of COVID-related 
service provision and anti-trafficking guidance remotely. Many organizations consolidated lists of resources 
and online guidance on promising practices to provide support services to victims and survivors during the 
pandemic. 
A survivor sews cane, bamboo, and straw together to 
create a large mat to sell at a local market.  NGOs often 
offer skills-based training for survivors to support their 
independence and ability to generate income, and 
to reduce their vulnerability to revictimization.  This 
survivor gave her consent for this photo to be taken as 
part of a project on labor trafficking.
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Some examples of online collaboration between anti-trafficking stakeholders include: 
 ∙ The Human Trafficking Foundation started a Google group, and the Freedom Collaborative initiated 
a COVID-19 Response Facebook group. 
 ∙ In Uganda, the Human Trafficking Institute (HTI) developed a forum via WhatsApp to establish 
communication among police and prosecutors during the shutdown. The WhatsApp forum allowed 
the nearly 350 police and prosecutor participants to share tips and resources on effective methods 
for trafficking investigations and prosecutions. It also allowed the Office of the Director of Public 
Prosecutions’ Trafficking Prosecutor and HTI’s legal expert to provide mentorship and technical 
assistance on trafficking cases to forum participants across the country.
 ∙ In Kosovo, Terre des Hommes, along with partners, organized and conducted webinars on case 
management, challenges, and sustainability of delivering services to victims of trafficking during the 
COVID-19 pandemic.
Some organizations leveraged technology to innovate systems for victim identification and referrals while 
others, even some governments, expanded access to training to national and global audiences. For example: 
 ∙ IOM adapted its existing MigApp for migrant workers in the Americas to include a new section to 
highlight official health recommendations to prevent the spread of the virus, capture changes across 
countries—such as border restrictions, COVID-19 hotlines, or migration status changes—and produce 
surveys to better understand the COVID-related challenges migrants faced. In Colombia, IOM also 
designed a geo-referencing, GPS-based mobile application for members of the counter-trafficking 
national taskforce to detect trafficking victims and activate immediate direct assistance. 
A migrant fisherman keeps watch on a fishing 
boat.   Forced labor in the fishing sector remains 
a significant concern where workers, including 
migrants, report harsh conditions, excessive hours, 
and stolen identity documents, as well as beatings, 
starvation, and murder.
A woman carries corn leaves in 
Guatemala.  Traffickers often use 
child and forced labor to produce 
high volumes of product at low 
prices to meet demand.
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 ∙ UNODC’s Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling Section (HTMSS) began providing alternative 
methods to deliver technical assistance by establishing an online center of excellence that will allow 
for delivery of trainings, webinars, and blended and self-paced learning, as well as interaction among 
practitioners to foster HTMSS’ community of practice.
 ∙ Estonia launched a nationwide e-learning initiative in schools, led by law enforcement organizations 
and anti-trafficking experts, to combat and raise awareness of the rise of online sex trafficking and child 
exploitation during the pandemic. 
In some countries, prosecutors and courts utilized technology to safely continue prosecution efforts while 
employing a victim-centered approach. Prosecutors typically conducted interviews with victims virtually 
and less frequently to prevent re-traumatization. Judges admitted virtual victim testimony via livestream in a 
separate room to allow victims to feel safer and prevent the potential spread of COVID-19. Some governments 
expanded protective services, such as admitting live teleconference testimony in court or providing victims 
the option to testify remotely to avoid interacting with their traffickers. In June 2020, Mexico secured its first 
trafficking in persons conviction from a virtual court session; however, the risk of traffickers and other abusers 
intercepting victims’ phone calls, text messages, or other forms of communication has been heightened in a 
remote environment in which victims and prosecutorial investigators are unable to develop a relationship. This 
emphasizes the importance of prioritizing safety, privacy, and informed use of technology when facilitating 
virtual trafficking assessments, investigations, and coordination of services with trafficking victims. 
While technology allowed the anti-trafficking community to navigate more easily the myriad challenges caused 
by the pandemic, its expanded use highlighted the importance of ensuring victims’ access to technology and 
online services, as well as their safety and privacy when using technology to receive victim assistance. Anti-
trafficking approaches should continue to incorporate technological innovations responsibly to improve 
anti-trafficking responses. Collaboration between the technology industry and the anti-trafficking field should 
also be encouraged to promote the development of technologies designed to better support anti-trafficking 
missions and meet the needs of victims and survivors.
Survivor-led and Survivor-informed Solutions
Survivor leaders and their organizations were resilient and essential throughout the pandemic. Since traditional 
forms of community outreach were less accessible or no longer possible, survivor leaders leveraged their 
networks and expertise to engage with vulnerable populations and victims through informal channels to share 
information on available support in a given area. Survivors also supported broader community responses to 
COVID-19. In Lesotho, a group of trafficking survivors in a shelter produced masks for themselves and the 
local community, contributing to the fight against the pandemic. Likewise, Sewing New Futures, a nonprofit 
social enterprise that employs women and girls who have survived sex trafficking in northern India, expanded 
their product line to include cloth face masks. The organization also donated proceeds from the production 
of artisan goods, including the masks, towards medical care and social services for survivors. 
“During the whole time, I was getting doctor’s appointments 
and I was sitting in school and I was going to the grocery 
store, standing, like, behind normal people and nobody 
knew.  Nobody had any idea that I was being trafficked.”
Kat Wehunt, Survivor Leader and Founder, 
Executive Director of The Formation Project
A member of the Little Shell Chippewa 
tribe of Montana participates in an 
event and wears red paint on her face 
to raise awareness for missing and 
murdered Indigenous women and 
girls at the Missoula fair in Montana. 
Indigenous women and girls are 
among the populations that are highly 
vulnerable to human trafficking.
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“Our data shows that 
people are exploited 
because traffickers know 
that there are certain 
groups of people that 
don’t have the support, 
that don’t have the ability 
to get accountability, or 
justice for themselves.”
Robert Beiser, 
Strategic Initiatives Director 
for Sex Trafficking, Polaris
Facing extreme poverty in India due to COVID-19, Aarav’s parents sold 
him for US $21 to the owner of a bangle factory. The owner locked the 
12-year-old in a dirty room with several other children and forced them 
to make bangles for 15 hours a day, using lacquer melted over dangerous 
burning coal and making only US $0.70 a week. The owner kept Aarav 
from communicating with his family and threatened physical abuse if 
he tried to leave.  After receiving a tip from child rights activists, police 
conducted a raid to remove the children from the factory and arrest the 
trafficker.  The government provided Aarav and the other victims support 
in the aftermath of the raid.
INDIA
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Many anti-trafficking organizations also responded to the pandemic 
by emphasizing staff wellness, especially for employees with lived 
experience of human trafficking who are at risk of heightened 
responses to the stress caused by the pandemic. Acknowledging 
the emotional weight of bringing trafficking-related casework into 
one’s home, survivor-led and survivor-informed organizations 
were mindful of staff needs when managing cases remotely, offering 
resources and opportunities to support the staff’s emotional 
well-being. This application of trauma-informed principles 
during a time of collective trauma reflects the success—and the 
necessity—of the push from survivors in recent years for the anti-
trafficking movement as a whole to become more survivor- and 
trauma-informed. 
Increased Assistance and Protections
Governments and anti-trafficking organizations responded to the 
increased vulnerabilities due to the pandemic through efforts to 
reduce the risk of trafficking and expand protection measures for victims. Some countries automatically 
extended temporary and transitory visas for migrant workers, while others suspended fines for unauthorized 
stays or extended medical coverage to anyone awaiting a decision on their immigration status. The Government 
of Thailand issued a Cabinet Resolution in August 2020 that made it easier to obtain new work permits and 
provided extensions for migrants working in Thailand. The Government of Maldives incorporated questions 
on labor exploitation and unethical recruitment into health screenings and COVID-19 contact tracing for 
all foreign workers. In June 2020, the Government of Sri Lanka approved a National COVID-19 Response 
Plan for Migrant Workers that covered prevention and the protection of trafficking victims, while the UK 
government extended public-funded safe accommodation for current victims and survivors for an additional 
three months. Similarly, the Australian Border Force issued an information sheet on modern slavery and 
COVID-19 that provided guidance on how to reduce the risk of workers becoming more vulnerable to human 
traffickers as a result of the pandemic. In Zimbabwe, local anti-trafficking organizations developed isolation 
cabins at three shelters to continue supporting individuals waiting for their COVID-19 test results without 
putting existing shelter residents at risk. The tendency of this pandemic to aggravate hardship requires the 
responsible implementation of increased protection measures that are responsive to the needs of individuals 
with coexisting vulnerabilities to human trafficking and COVID-19 infection.
Building Upon Crisis Frameworks
Crises disproportionately affect the most vulnerable, exacerbating the conditions for victims of human 
trafficking and increasing the risk of human trafficking for others. Successful counter-measures often require 
anti-trafficking actors to build upon existing crisis frameworks and promising practices to include anti-
trafficking responses that are trauma-informed and victim-centered. The Jordanian police counter-trafficking 
unit worked with UNODC to implement a coordinated COVID-19 mitigation plan to protect first responders by 
procuring sanitation materials, protective equipment, medical kits, and COVID-19 testing units. In response to 
This Syrian woman’s life was threatened if she did not comply with the demands of 
her trafficker.  As part of this photographer’s photo story, the women shared how they 
would like to be photographed.  In this picture, the woman requested the use of a veil 
to protect her identity.
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the risks of carrying out in-person research activities in communities that are vulnerable to both COVID-19 and 
trafficking, Freedom Fund drew on multisectoral best practices and guidance to create criteria for determining 
whether in-person research during COVID-19 can be safely conducted, as well as health and safety procedures 
to ensuring safe interactions. The criteria and procedures were designed to minimize risks to project team 
members and research participants by considering the best-available national and project-level information and 
the latest public health recommendations for COVID-19 mitigation. Other collaborative efforts have provided 
anti-trafficking stakeholders, including service providers, investigators, prosecutors, and first responders, with 
the tools, equipment, and guidance to protect themselves against and screen for the virus, which is essential 
to ensuring the health and safety of victims, survivors, and vulnerable populations. 
Navigating not only the continuation of but also the increased need for anti-trafficking responses during a 
global health crisis proved to be exceptionally challenging. Despite this, the successes, the failures, and even 
the unknown results of the anti-trafficking response to COVID-19 allowed for new insights and solutions to 
pave a better path forward. 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE ANTI-TRAFFICKING  
FIELD’S RESPONSE TO COVID-19 AND BEYOND 
The anti-trafficking community made a concerted effort to incorporate anti-trafficking efforts into broader 
crisis responses in the past through building capacity, developing guidance and trainings, and supporting 
coordination of actors in the field. This has been seen through other crisis situations, such as the Darfur 
Genocide in 2003, the emergence of Boko Haram in Nigeria in 2009, the Philippines Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, 
the Ebola outbreak in West Africa in 2014, the emergence of the migrant crisis in Europe in 2015, and the 
Rohingya exodus in Burma in 2017, to name a few. As the world endures its second year fighting the global 
pandemic, the anti-trafficking community must emphasize learning and collaboration to deliver a continued 
and improved response to combating trafficking in this challenging environment. Drawing on lessons learned 
from the pandemic response thus far, there are four main considerations that aim to mitigate impacts of crises 
and guide the path forward for the anti-trafficking community: 
1. The value of collaboration between anti-trafficking actors.
2. The need to incorporate anti-trafficking efforts into existing responses in other contexts, such 
as in humanitarian settings. 
3. The importance of proactive response and crisis mitigation planning to anti-trafficking activities.
4. The application of equity-based approaches.
Addressing human trafficking during a global pandemic requires the full range of actors in the anti-trafficking 
community to bridge the gap and establish a comprehensive coordinated response. Governments should 
continue working with neighbors and NGOs to address cross-border trafficking issues and support strong 
collaboration at the borders to identify and prevent trafficking. Service providers should continue information-
sharing efforts to develop and promote promising practices for supporting identified victims and vulnerable 
populations during the pandemic. Many organizations have published collaborative reports, such as Road 
to Recovery produced by Restore NYC, a U.S.-based service provider, in partnership with eight other anti-
trafficking organizations, many of which were survivor-led and from various regions of the country, to present 
“When people are struggling with their finances, struggling with poverty, loss of 
work, childhood trauma and abuse, homeless or a young person who’s not safe 
at home and ends up on the streets or couch surfing, all those things can lead 
to you being exploited by a trafficker—and those people are in every town.”
Rebecca Ayling, Project Director, New Hampshire Human Trafficking Collaborative Task Force
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shared experiences and findings from service provision and organizational adaptations during COVID-19, as 
well as forward-looking takeaways. Anti-trafficking actors in all sectors should increase collaboration with 
the private sector to strengthen anti-trafficking efforts that encourage and support prevention of forced labor 
in supply chains, especially as companies aim to make up for pandemic-related production disruptions and 
widespread unemployment drives vulnerability. For example, Winrock International’s How to Build Cross-
Sectoral Collaboration to Protect Workers in the Age of COVID-19, seeks to initiate cross-sector collaboration and 
provide guidance for the private sector and anti-trafficking organizations to address increased vulnerability to 
human trafficking, particularly forced labor, for job seekers, migrant workers, and individuals from vulnerable 
communities. In the long term, private-sector collaboration should aim to improve the ability of companies to 
withstand shocks from crises that could leave portions of their workforce vulnerable to trafficking. 
To navigate the challenges posed by stretched resources, competing priorities, and reduced capacity or political 
will of governments to combat trafficking, governments and NGOs should consider systemically integrating anti-
trafficking efforts into existing response plans and practices in humanitarian and crisis contexts. Governments 
and other anti-trafficking organizations are already taking action to weave anti-trafficking measures into crisis 
responses. For example, IOM has developed resources for its staff to incorporate anti-trafficking into its own 
work in humanitarian and other emergency settings. In addition, IOM developed free, publicly available 
tools, such as its online course, Countering Human Trafficking in Humanitarian Settings and its publication, 
Counter-Trafficking in Emergencies: Information Management Guide, to encourage humanitarians, government 
staff, anti-trafficking experts, and others to integrate anti-trafficking into their response work routinely. When 
responding to the impacts of the COVID-19 virus, it is important that those working on safety and security 
measures are equipped with the knowledge and resources to identify and refer cases of human trafficking. For 
example, training on trafficking indicators should be expanded to healthcare workers, such as those supporting 
COVID-19 testing and vaccination efforts as they might be the few people a victim could interact with in public. 
The response to the impacts of the pandemic on anti-trafficking efforts thus far has largely been reactive as 
stakeholders work to understand the effects and adapt. To continue responding in the long term—whether 
amid the COVID-19 pandemic or other future crises—stakeholders should consider proactive planning for 
adaptation and flexibility to future crises through extensive risk mitigation and management tools. This includes 
conducting awareness raising campaigns when stay-at-home orders remain in place, providing services to 
identified victims when there are no safe spaces available, and intervening in stalled public justice systems to 
ensure minimal disruption and deter traffickers from expanding their activities. A crucial step for combating 
human trafficking in and out of the pandemic context is establishing specialized trafficking committees, offices, 
and/or units committed to ensuring anti-trafficking efforts are maintained and resources are less likely to be 
diverted. Anti-trafficking actors from all sectors should develop concrete risk mitigation and management 
plans to effectively respond to a variety of crises, including natural disasters, conflict scenarios, health crises, 
or a combination of emergencies that could exacerbate vulnerabilities to trafficking and the experiences of 
victims. Effective risk mitigation and management plans should responsibly incorporate survivor-informed, 
trauma-informed, and victim-centered approaches to meet the needs of survivors and minimize the chances 
of re-traumatization during crises. 
“And yet in these difficult times, we see the best of humanity: frontline 
heroes, men and women risking their lives and going above and 
beyond to provide essential support for human trafficking victims.”
Ghada Waly, 
Executive Director, UN Office on Drugs and Crime
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VENEZUELA-GUYANA 
Given the disproportionate effects of the pandemic on marginalized communities, an equity-based approach 
is critical to reducing vulnerabilities. Applying an equity-based lens involves evaluating and understanding 
how individual organizations perpetuate the marginalization of vulnerable populations, including persons 
with disabilities, LGBTQI+ persons, indigenous peoples, and members of racial, ethnic, and religious minority 
groups. Governments can enhance efforts to reduce disparities that widened during the pandemic—which also 
contributed to trafficking risks and emboldened traffickers—by formulating policies and programs that meet 
the needs of underserved communities. Service providers should examine how they can more meaningfully 
engage and collaborate with historically underserved populations to achieve inclusive and culturally responsive 
service delivery. Likewise, law enforcement should address biases to improve identification and protection 
efforts for victims from marginalized communities while preventing re-traumatization. Indeed, in many 
places the diversion of law enforcement attention from human trafficking toward enforcing pandemic-related 
measures has resulted in other community actors carrying out identification efforts, often in ways that are more 
culturally responsive and less likely to re-traumatize victims. As the pandemic taught anti-trafficking actors 
to adapt and view challenges from new perspectives, it is apparent that an equity-based approach is essential 
to the remainder of the pandemic response, as well as the future of the anti-trafficking field. 
In the face of this crisis and future crises, it is the responsibility of the international community to work 
together toward the shared goal of preventing and combating human trafficking, protecting victims, and 
empowering survivors. Though difficult work remains ahead, the past year has already demonstrated 
stakeholders’ unwavering determination and promising innovations amid exceptional challenges. With 
continued collaboration, adaptation, and commitment to serving the needs of victims, survivors, and vulnerable 
populations, anti-trafficking efforts will emerge stronger in the post-pandemic era.
Katherin paid US $1,500 to escape Venezuela and find security 
and opportunity in Guyana. Within a month, a man hired her as a 
bilingual attendant at his store in the capital city of Georgetown. 
When she arrived, she learned her boss owned a roadside stall 
instead of a store.  She also learned she would not have the rent-
free apartment he promised.  Instead, Katherin’s boss forced her 
to stay in his home.  After three weeks of work, she was only paid 
US $23, far below the promised salary.
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UNDERSTANDING HUMAN TRAFFICKING
“Trafficking in persons,” “human trafficking,” and “modern slavery” are umbrella terms—often used 
interchangeably—to refer to a crime whereby traffickers exploit and profit at the expense of adults or children 
by compelling them to perform labor or engage in commercial sex. When a person younger than 18 is used to 
perform a commercial sex act, it is a crime regardless of whether there is any force, fraud, or coercion.
The United States recognizes two primary forms of trafficking in persons: forced labor and sex trafficking. The 
basic meaning of these forms of human trafficking and some unique characteristics of each are set forth below, 
followed by several key principles and concepts that relate to all forms of human trafficking.
More than 175 countries have ratified or acceded to the UN TIP Protocol which defines trafficking in 
persons and contains obligations to prevent and combat the crime.
The United States’ TVPA and the UN TIP Protocol contain similar definitions of human trafficking. The 
elements of both definitions can be described using a three-element framework focused on the trafficker’s 
1) acts; 2) means; and 3) purpose. All three elements are essential to form a human trafficking violation.
FORCED LABOR
Forced labor, also referred to as “labor trafficking,” encompasses the range of activities involved when a person 
uses force, fraud, or coercion to obtain the labor or services of another person.
The “acts” element of forced labor is met when the trafficker recruits, harbors, transports, provides, or obtains 
a person for labor or services.
The “means” element of forced labor includes a trafficker’s use of force, fraud, or coercion. The coercive 
scheme can include threats of force, debt manipulation, withholding of pay, confiscation of identity documents, 
psychological coercion, reputational harm, manipulation of the use of addictive substances, threats to other 
people, or other forms of coercion.
Traffickers often use misleading job advertisements to lure prospective 
victims abroad with the promise of a better life.  In many cases, 
migrants feel pressured to undertake additional risks seeking out such 
opportunities, including by going into debt to pay steep recruitment 
fees.  This woman, a survivor of sex trafficking whose trafficker used a 
similar scheme, collaborated with the photographer to create a photo 
that both concealed her identity and allowed her to be creative in how 
she was presented.
26 | 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report
The “purpose” element focuses on the perpetrator’s goal to secure labor or services. There is no limit on the 
location or type of industry. Traffickers can commit this crime in any sector or setting, whether legal or illicit, 
including but not limited to agricultural fields, factories, restaurants, hotels, massage parlors, retail stores, 
fishing vessels, mines, private homes, or drug trafficking operations.
All three elements are essential to constitute the crime of forced labor.
There are certain types of forced labor that are frequently distinguished for emphasis or because they are 
widespread:
Domestic Servitude
“Domestic servitude” is a form of forced labor in which the trafficker requires a victim to perform work in a 
private residence. Such circumstances create unique vulnerabilities. Domestic workers are often isolated and 
may work alone in a house. Their employer often controls their access to food, transportation, and housing. 
What happens in a private residence is hidden from the world—including from law enforcement and labor 
inspectors—resulting in barriers to victim identification. Foreign domestic workers are particularly vulnerable 
to abuse due to language and cultural barriers, as well as a lack of community ties. Some perpetrators use 
these types of conditions as part of their coercive schemes to compel the labor of domestic workers with little 
risk of detection.
Forced Child Labor
The term “forced child labor” describes forced labor schemes in which traffickers compel children to work. 
Traffickers often target children because they are more vulnerable. Although some children may legally engage 
in certain forms of work, forcing or coercing children to work remains illegal. Forms of slavery or slavery-like 
practices—including the sale of children, forced or compulsory child labor, and debt bondage and serfdom of 
children—continue to exist, despite legal prohibitions and widespread condemnation. Some indicators of forced 
labor of a child include situations in which the child appears to be in the custody of a non-family member and 
the child’s work financially benefits someone outside the child’s family; or the denial of food, rest, or schooling 
to a child who is working.
SEX TRAFFICKING
Sex trafficking encompasses the range of activities involved when a trafficker uses force, fraud, or coercion to 
compel another person to engage in a commercial sex act or causes a child to engage in a commercial sex act.
The crime of sex trafficking can also be understood through the “acts,” “means,” and “purpose” framework. 
All three elements are required to establish a sex trafficking crime (except in the case of child sex trafficking 
where the means are irrelevant).
The “acts” element of sex trafficking is met when a trafficker recruits, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, 
patronizes, or solicits another person to engage in commercial sex.
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The “means” element of sex trafficking occurs when a trafficker uses force, fraud, or coercion. Coercion in 
the case of sex trafficking includes the broad array of nonviolent means included in the forced labor definition. 
These can include serious harm, psychosocial harm, reputational harm, threats to others, and debt manipulation.
The “purpose” element in every sex trafficking case is the same: to engage in a commercial sex act. Sex 
trafficking can take place in private homes, massage parlors, hotels, or brothels, among other locations, as 
well as on the internet.
Child Sex Trafficking
In cases where an individual engages in any of the specified “acts” with a child (under the age of 18), the means 
element is irrelevant regardless of whether evidence of force, fraud, or coercion exists. The use of children in 
commercial sex is prohibited by law in the United States and most countries around the world.
KEY PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS
These key principles and concepts relate to all forms of trafficking in persons, including forced labor and sex 
trafficking.
Consent
Human trafficking can take place even if the victim initially consented to providing labor, services, or commercial 
sex acts. The analysis is primarily focused on the trafficker’s conduct and not that of the victim. A trafficker 
can target a victim after a victim applies for a job or migrates to earn a living. The trafficker’s coercive scheme 
is what matters, not a victim’s prior consent or ability to meaningfully consent thereafter. Likewise, in a sex 
trafficking case, an adult victim’s initial willingness to engage in commercial sex acts is not relevant where a 
perpetrator subsequently uses coercion to exploit the victim and cause them to continue engaging in the same 
acts. In the case of child sex trafficking, the consent of the victim is never relevant as a child cannot legally 
consent to commercial sex.
Movement
Neither U.S. law nor international law requires that a trafficker or victim move across a border for a human 
trafficking offense to take place. Trafficking in persons is a crime of exploitation and coercion, and not movement. 
Traffickers can use schemes that take victims hundreds of miles away from their homes, or exploit them in 
the same neighborhoods where they were born.
Debt Bondage
“Debt bondage” is focused on human trafficking crimes in which the trafficker’s primary means of coercion is 
debt manipulation. U.S. law prohibits perpetrators from using debts as part of their scheme, plan, or pattern to 
compel a person to work or engage in commercial sex. Traffickers target some individuals with an initial debt 
assumed willingly as a condition of future employment, while in certain countries traffickers tell individuals 
they “inherited” the debt from relatives. Traffickers can also manipulate debts after the economic relationship 
begins by withholding earnings or forcing the victim to assume debts for expenses like food, housing, or 
transportation. They can also manipulate debts a victim owes to other people. When traffickers use debts as 
a means to compel labor or commercial sex, they have committed a crime.
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Non-Penalization
Consistent with the definition of human trafficking, governments should not penalize or prosecute victims 
of trafficking in persons for the unlawful acts their trafficker compelled them to commit. This principle aims 
to protect victims from being held legally responsible for conduct that was not their choice, but rather was 
driven by their trafficker. If a government has penalized or punished a victim in such a way, the government 
should vacate the conviction and/or expunge the victim’s record.
State-Sponsored Human Trafficking
While the TVPA and UN TIP Protocol call on governments to proactively address trafficking crimes, some 
governments are part of the problem, directly compelling their citizens into sexual slavery or forced labor 
schemes. From forced labor in local or national public work projects, military operations, and economically 
important sectors, or as part of government-funded projects or missions abroad, officials use their power to 
exploit their nationals. To extract this work, governments coerce by threatening the withdrawal of public 
benefits, withholding salaries, failing to adhere to limits on national service, manipulating the lack of legal 
status of stateless individuals and other minority groups, threatening to punish family members, or conditioning 
services or freedom of movement on labor or sex. In 2019, Congress amended the TVPA to acknowledge that 
governments can also act as traffickers, referring specifically to a “government policy or pattern” of human 
trafficking, trafficking in government-funded programs, forced labor in government-affiliated medical services 
or other sectors, sexual slavery in government camps, or the employment or recruitment of child soldiers.
Unlawful Recruitment or Use of Child Soldiers
Another manifestation of human trafficking occurs when a governmental armed group (including police or other 
security forces), paramilitary organization, rebel group, or other non-state armed group unlawfully recruits 
or uses children—through force, fraud, or coercion—as combatants or in support roles. Such support roles 
include children serving as cooks, porters, guards, messengers, medics, servants, or spies. Children are also 
used as sex slaves. Sexual slavery, as referred to here, occurs when armed groups force or coerce children to 
“marry” or be raped by commanders or combatants. Both male and female children are often sexually abused 
or exploited by members of armed groups and suffer the same types of devastating physical and psychological 
consequences associated with sex trafficking.
Accountability in Supply Chains
Forced labor is well documented in the private economy, particularly in agriculture, fishing, manufacturing, 
construction, and domestic work; but no sector is immune. Sex trafficking occurs in several industries as 
well. Most well-known is the hospitality industry, but the crime also occurs in connection with extractive 
industries where activities are often remote and lack meaningful government presence. Governments should 
hold all entities, including businesses, accountable for human trafficking. In some countries, the law provides 
for corporate accountability in both the civil and criminal justice systems. The TVPA provides such liability 
for any legal person, including a business that benefits financially from its involvement in a human trafficking 
scheme, provided that the business knew or should have known of the scheme. 
At the age of 10, Salih and his schoolmates went outside 
to play soccer after the school day finished.  While kicking 
a ball in an abandoned field outside of Marib, Yemen, 
Houthi rebels came charging for the boys.  The rebels 
kidnapped and took Salih and his peers to the Houthi 
home base. 
The Houthi rebels gave the boys weapons and forced 
them to fight and guard checkpoints.  During a raid, 
Salih managed to run away to a displaced persons 
camp.  Salih still suffers from hearing loss due to 
explosions and airstrikes.  Many former child soldiers 
suffer from panic attacks due to trauma. 
YEMEN 
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Navigating the Unique Complexities  
 in Familial Trafficking
The following is a product of the Human Trafficking Expert Consultant Network (the Network)  funded by the TIP Office. The purpose 
of the Network is to engage experts, particularly those with lived experience of human trafficking, to provide expertise and input on 
Department of State anti-trafficking policies, strategies, and products. The author has a range of expertise related to human trafficking, 
familial trafficking, marginalized communities, trauma and resiliency, education, and survivor leadership. Additionally, the author 
holds a Master’s degree in Intercultural Studies with Children at Risk and a Bachelor’s degree in Education. 
In 2017, IOM estimated that 41 percent of child trafficking experiences are facilitated by family members and/or caregivers. 
Notably, governments and anti-trafficking stakeholders overlook familial trafficking, which is when a family member or guardian 
is the victim’s trafficker or the one who sells the child to a third-party trafficker. The anti-trafficking field has identified and 
delineated the recruitment, grooming, and exploitation practices traffickers use in various scenarios of both sex and labor 
trafficking. Based on this knowledge, the field has adapted anti-trafficking efforts to support survivors in specific, appropriate, 
and effective ways. However, familial trafficking, which is unique and just beginning to be understood in the field, is difficult 
to identify because it takes place within family networks and victimizes children, many of whom are under 12 years of age, 
who may not realize they are victims. Because of this, the indicators for familial trafficking are different than indicators for 
other types of trafficking. 
In these cases, the trafficker may begin grooming the victim at an early age, using their close proximity to take advantage 
of the child’s developmental stage and inability to verbally express concerns or safety issues. One study estimates that the 
trafficker is a family member in about 31 percent of child sex trafficking cases. In these cases, the child’s inherent loyalty 
to and reliance on the family structure make familial trafficking difficult to identify and challenging to prosecute. Harmful 
misperceptions about where and how familial trafficking happens, such as the belief that familial trafficking only occurs 
within neighborhoods, communities, or countries of low socioeconomic status, contributes to challenges to prosecution, 
prevention, and protection efforts. Addressing familial trafficking requires an interdisciplinary approach to ensure recovery 
of mental and physical health, trauma-informed investigation and prosecutorial efforts, survivor-led and -centered practices 
and interventions, and larger societal education and awareness.
When the family member is the trafficker, the exploitation is often normalized and accepted within the family culture, 
sometimes spanning generations. This normalization of exploitation may also occur when the familial trafficking is tied to 
economic and cultural factors, such as in some cases of forced child labor in agriculture. If another family member notices the 
exploitation of the child, there is a strong incentive to look the other way to protect the family, both physically and in reputation, 
from outside interventions. Family members entrusted with caring for the children are often the ones grooming, manipulating, 
abusing, and exploiting them. In many of these cases, children may simply have no other trusted adults actively engaged in 
their lives. They also may not have the physical and mental development to identify coercive tactics being used by an individual 
they have bonded with, trust, and love. Because children are dependent on their families for their basic needs, such as food, 
shelter, and clothing, they are often faced with having basic needs unmet or physical violence if they don’t comply with the 
trafficker. The traumatic impacts are severe because children have little psychological recourse for protecting themselves from 
the trafficker, who may also wield significant power by nature of the familial relationship alone.
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When the family member or guardian is the victim’s trafficker, it may not be apparent that human trafficking is occurring, 
especially because the victim lives with or near the perpetrator. Whether the parent or guardian is the trafficker or sells the 
child who is then placed in the care of another trafficker, the trafficker is both that child’s exploiter and caregiver. In either case, 
a missing person’s report would not be filed, and child protective services or other welfare agencies would not be notified. 
Because a child in this situation is often trained not to report what is happening, interactions with adults who might otherwise 
notice a problem or identify the child as vulnerable, such as teachers, neighbors, doctors, and other adults in the community, 
instead see the child as shy or failing to thrive. Furthermore, victims of familial trafficking might not be able to comprehend 
or identify with the indicators featured in most public awareness and outreach campaigns that share information on how to 
seek help. These campaigns typically target audiences who are much older than those exploited in familial trafficking. The 
reality is that abuse, pain, torture, and exploitation is the only existence these survivors may have known.
The impacts of familial trafficking, both visible and not, and subsequent needs of survivors are often severe and complex, 
and they can be exacerbated by the onset of trauma during key childhood developmental stages. When children experience 
familial trafficking, they may develop educational and social delays, physical health problems, and psychological disorders, 
such as complex post-traumatic stress disorder and attachment disorders. Survivors may encounter a large number of health 
indicators and somatic complaints due to having to endure trauma for a long period of time at an early age, including head, 
stomach, and body aches; throat and urinary tract infections; interrupted sleep due to nightmares and flashbacks; difficulty 
concentrating; asthma; and more. Survivors of familial trafficking have a range of responses to the traditional educational 
system: some are reported to have learning challenges, including illiteracy and processing challenges. Other children excel, 
whether because school is where they feel safe or because they have been conditioned to please adults in their lives or 
developed resiliency and survival skills early in life. Furthermore, familial trafficking situations may have prevented survivors 
from developing key healthy social skills, including how to make and maintain friends, relate to other children and adults, 
ask for assistance, and recognize their own self-worth. Having a family member as the main perpetrator and trafficker may 
also result in many victims feeling unable to speak about the experiences they endured due to the shame it may bring upon 
their families, communities, and themselves. Regardless of socioeconomic background, child survivors of familial trafficking 
situations often have limited avenues for resources when seeking assistance. 
Frequently, service providers use the same approaches and resources for familial trafficking that are used for all types 
of human trafficking, which can be inappropriate and even harmful. Few resources have been developed to address the 
particularities of familial trafficking. The ways in which a service provider would engage with an eight-year-old child exploited 
by a family member will need to be different than when engaging with a child who has a safe home with a trusted adult. A 
child who has been exploited by a family member will mostly likely need services to address complex trauma, attachment, 
and severe exploitation. While awareness of familial trafficking is increasing, more research is needed. 
Still, the specific and long-term needs of survivors of familial trafficking can be met in a variety of ways. For example, many 
children would benefit from having one-on-one support to develop an individualized program with the survivor and meet with 
them several times a week. Most importantly, age- and culturally appropriate comprehensive programs need to be developed 
with consideration of each unique survivor in mind. Positive connection, the freedom to experience developmentally appropriate 
activities, and even fun, sometimes for the first time, are healing elements that should be emphasized in these programs. 
Through programs with an increased focus on familial trafficking, survivors learn they are not alone in their journey and that 
someone is there to walk beside them through every step.
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Unifying Trauma-Informed Practices  
 and Voices of Survivor Leadership
This narrative was written by a consultant for the Network funded by the TIP Office.  The purpose of the Network is to engage experts, 
particularly those with lived experience of human trafficking, to provide expertise and input on Department of State anti-trafficking 
policies, strategies, and products.  The author has a range of expertise related to human trafficking, marginalized communities, trauma 
recovery, education, mental health care, and survivor leadership. 
Over the past decade, two of the most highlighted conversations in the anti-trafficking movement have centered on the 
need to incorporate trauma-informed practices into anti-trafficking work and to invite survivors into leadership positions within 
organizations. As the anti-trafficking community has grappled with how to integrate these ideals, it often conflates them. 
For example, organizations will prioritize hiring a survivor as a staff member or consultant and then equate that action with 
becoming a fully trauma-informed entity, while failing to use a trauma-informed approach to care, which often retraumatizes 
individuals receiving services. This limited approach to realizing both goals causes harm, especially when those organizations 
then claim they are “survivor-informed” but only focus on the survivor’s story or benefits to the organization and decline to 
implement the survivors’ recommendations or consider their feedback. Disrespecting survivor leaders and their experiences 
hurts and further exploits survivors, who are key stakeholders in the anti-trafficking movement, and it ultimately perpetuates a 
harmful and deficient understanding of what it means to be survivor-informed. These dual harms raise the need for additional 
trainings to teach organizations how to properly incorporate survivor feedback and adopt a comprehensive, trauma-informed 
approach in practice. 
Organizations must incorporate the voices of multiple survivors into their trauma-informed practices. Outlined below is 
a description of what it means to be both trauma- and survivor-informed, as well as recommendations on integrating both 
approaches as one, comprehensive effort. 
TRAUMA-INFORMED
Trauma-informed practices build upon understanding the impact of trauma not only on individuals seeking services but 
also on all staff members and consultants working within an organization. As such, vicarious trauma and the mental health 
needs of all consultants and staff members should also be prioritized, as opposed to singling out survivor leaders as the 
only individuals affected by trafficking or other sources of trauma. Because trauma-informed practices assume that every 
human being has experienced trauma of some kind, organizational structures should reflect the need for sensitivity and care 
surrounding all interactions and communications. 
According to the U.S. Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), a trauma-informed lens 
upholds each person as an active agent of their own recovery process, the ability of individuals to recognize symptoms of 
trauma in others, and the integration of a “do no harm” approach into the creation of policies, procedures, and practices. 
In addition, SAMHSA’s Six Key Principles of a Trauma-Informed Approach refers to the necessity of creating and protecting 
psychological and physical safety within the organization, fostering trust through transparency, providing peer support, and 
leveling power differences through collaboration, empowerment, and cultural humility.
SURVIVOR-INFORMED
In 2013, the United States’ Federal Strategic Action Plan on Services for Victims of Human Trafficking in the United States 
(Plan) identified the importance of engaging with survivors in decision-making processes as anti-trafficking leaders. Federal 
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agencies responded by sharing plans to apply a survivor-informed approach for human trafficking. In 2015, the U.S. Advisory 
Council on Human Trafficking was established to advise federal agencies on their anti-trafficking policies and programs, 
including on the application of this approach to their efforts. Despite the attention towards and growth in understanding of a 
survivor-informed approach, gaps arose in how different agencies and organizations in various settings applied it. To address 
these gaps, the 2017 Human Trafficking Leadership Academy fellows, organized by the Department of Health and Human 
Services’ National Human Trafficking Training and Technical Assistance Center (NHTTAC), defined a survivor-informed practice 
as the “meaningful input from a diverse community of survivors at all stages of a program or project, including development, 
implementation and evaluation.” 
The integration of survivor leadership and trauma-informed practices requires inclusive interactions with survivors of all forms 
of human trafficking with a diversity of perspectives, such as gender, national origin, race, and sexuality. It is essential to have 
various survivor voices lending feedback into all areas of an organization’s work. Organizations must listen to survivors and 
determine how best to adapt practices that honor and incorporate their input. This process includes evaluating programs and 
policies with humility and commitment to change wherever possible, even where those changes will be difficult to implement. 
It also must include supporting additional research on the brain’s response to trauma and on the ways traffickers adapt their 
criminal enterprises to societal changes. Organizations can set themselves up for success in a manner that is adaptive—not 
stagnant—to meet the evolving challenges of anti-trafficking efforts by mindfully weaving together survivor-leadership and 
trauma-informed approaches for the collective good of all who engage in anti-trafficking spaces. 
Organizations might be in different stages of understanding and implementing trauma-informed and survivor-centered 
processes. The following recommendations may be applicable for organizations at multiple stages of integration. 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONTINUED GROWTH IN THE INTEGRATION PROCESS
Hiring Survivors and Ensuring a Trauma-informed Work Environment
∙ Invite a diversity of lived experience experts to be part of organizational staffing, not only because of what they have 
survived but also for the professional skills and expertise they offer. When asking for the opinions and suggestions of 
these voices, be a conscious listener and follow through with implementing changes. Communicate updates on the 
progression of these changes.
∙ Create protocols for what all staff should do if they feel exploited by the organization or individuals within the organization. 
∙ Recognize that trauma is not unique to an individual who identifies as a survivor leader; it has affected the entire team 
in distinct ways. The way survivors in leadership positions are treated should mirror the way that staff members without 
lived experience of human trafficking are treated, and vice versa. 
∙ Implement intentional self-care as part of organizational culture to build resilience and help mitigate vicarious trauma, 
including executive leadership modeling self-care best practices and encouraging staff to engage in healthy coping skills 
and take care of their emotional and physical health. Organizations can also implement paid mental health days, self-care 
plans as part of employee reviews, and organization-wide education encompassing individual wellness.
Empowering Survivors in the Workplace 
∙ Never ask survivors in leadership, or in any other role, to share their story and never share their story for them.
∙ Empower survivors to outgrow the label of only a survivor. Treat them as more than the trauma they have experienced and 
foster their strengths so, if they desire, they could successfully run the organization or get a job in the field of their choice. 
∙ Design opportunities for survivors in the organization to receive continuing education on leadership and professional 
development. 
Establishing Administrative Processes for a Trauma-informed Workplace
∙ Ensure that benefits include mental health care for all staff members, including any survivors that are hired.
∙ Prioritize and institutionalize survivor engagement by creating a budget line within the organization for consultations 
with lived experience experts.
∙ Compensate survivors in leadership commensurate with other leadership. 
∙ Employ a third-party reviewer to assess the organization’s integration of survivor leadership and trauma-informed 
approaches.
For tips on how to build a survivor-informed organization, please see the NHTTAC toolkit on this topic.  If looking for more 
information on survivor-informed best practices, please see NHTTAC’s Survivor-Informed Practice: Definition, Best Practices, 
and Recommendations.
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The Negative Impacts of  
 Human Trafficking Misinformation
For many people, human trafficking evokes images of women and children being forcibly taken and sold into sexual slavery 
by strangers, or of people locked in rooms or vehicles far from home. These images, however, do not capture the reality of most 
cases of sex and labor trafficking. Human trafficking is typically not so simple or salacious. Most victims are not kidnapped 
by strangers or secretive syndicates. Instead, it is often their neighbors, relatives, romantic partners, or other acquaintances 
who exploit them. Traffickers often use fraudulent, psychologically manipulative, or coercive recruitment methods so they 
need not kidnap or even physically restrain their victims. 
Unfortunately, enduring misconceptions about human trafficking have helped misinformation and rumors about the crime 
spread rapidly throughout communities and through social media, particularly in the United States. In recent years, participants 
in online forums have spread a number of false and misleading claims about child sex trafficking, sometimes deliberately 
deceiving the public through disinformation efforts connected to conspiracy theories unrelated to human trafficking. This 
content often becomes viral on mainstream social media platforms, taking advantage of well-intentioned members of the 
public, including those who want to take action to make a difference. Rumors and theories that a global cabal of politicians 
and celebrities are exploiting children, that companies selling furniture or other high-priced items online are also selling 
missing children, or that phishing texts are tricking people into human trafficking schemes are all unfounded and perpetuate 
false narratives about the realities of human trafficking. 
More concerning, this spread of misinformation has real and detrimental impacts on the ability of the anti-trafficking 
community to protect those who have or are currently experiencing human trafficking and to bring traffickers to justice. It is 
imperative that the public fully understand the negative effects that spreading and acting on these rumors and misinformation 
can have on service providers, victims and survivors, and the broader anti-trafficking field. 
When false or misleading rumors about human trafficking quickly spread online and through social media, concerned 
individuals may want to take action because they genuinely believe the information. While the help of the public is a crucial 
part of anti-trafficking efforts, the public can inadvertently interfere when its actions are based on false information or on tips 
from individuals with no direct knowledge of human trafficking situations. Such interference can have damaging effects on the 
ability of law enforcement, NGOs, and other victim service providers to respond to real cases. For example, law enforcement 
may become inundated with false information they are required to follow up on or investigate, especially when reports relate 
to children, stretching already limited time and resources. 
In addition, a barrage of calls and tips related to misinformation about human trafficking online can overwhelm systems 
of intervention and care that have been established to respond to potential and confirmed cases of human trafficking. Under 
such a deluge, someone with information about a case or who may be a victim in real crisis will face longer service wait 
times and may miss their momentary chance to connect to a service provider. Advocates and service providers must take all 
reports of human trafficking seriously, which means that increased reports based on false information make it more difficult 
for responders to provide support to victims of human trafficking.
TOPICS OF SPECIAL INTEREST
 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report | 35
The spread of misinformation about human trafficking also means that anti-trafficking experts and organizations need 
to allocate time and resources to re-educate the public. Allocating resources to debunk myths and misinformation about 
human trafficking takes time away from critical services including responding to survivors seeking help. Resources for these 
organizations are often already strained and should be directed towards evidence-based solutions to combat human trafficking. 
NGOs have also reported experiencing cyberattacks and threats on social media when they post statements debunking 
misinformation. Some employees of NGOs that help identify and provide services to survivors of human trafficking have even 
faced threats of violence by followers of these theories. These attacks and threats may require that the organizations divert 
even more resources away from victim services to improve cyber security and personal security for NGO staff. Another serious 
concern is the emotional strain and trauma experienced by staff at these NGOs. Individuals working to support survivors of 
human trafficking, including those who have dedicated their lives to this work, can become discouraged as the spread of 
misinformation distracts from providing services. 
Survivors report having seen stories based on false information and feeling re-exploited because the trauma they faced 
is now being questioned or used for nefarious, and sometimes political, purposes. Privacy intrusions are also a concern and 
occur when information or images about people mistakenly believed to be trafficking victims, or those of actual victims, are 
shared in connection to conspiracy misinformation or disinformation.
Of further concern, experts have identified the strategic production and dissemination of false narratives about sex trafficking 
by white supremacists and other extremists, including violent extremists, in the United States as a means of recruiting 
new members. These groups have found success in exploiting the public’s concerns about child sex trafficking, using false 
information as a gateway to radicalize members. Thus, it is imperative to stop the spread of misinformation, including conspiracy 
theories, both to combat sex and labor trafficking and to prevent violent extremism and counter threats to U.S. national security.
It is easy to understand why individuals would see something online about human trafficking, especially when it involves 
children, and feel the need to share or act on the information. At first, it may not be apparent that acting on this information 
could have any harmful consequences. The recent scale of misinformation about human trafficking, however, distracts from 
the real crime, and may have long-lasting negative effects on efforts to combat it and to aid actual victims of human trafficking. 
Individuals who wish to learn more about what human trafficking looks like in their own communities should seek out 
resources from established organizations and government agencies that use evidence-based solutions to address the crime. 
Many reputable sources publish information online to help the public understand when information being shared about 
human trafficking is misleading or false. Often the people in the best position to identify a potential case of human trafficking 
are neighbors, family members, friends, or others close to victims or traffickers. An important component of any successful 
anti-trafficking strategy is a well-informed public that understands the real indicators of the crime and can identify it when 
it happens in their own communities.
“In the longer term, this disinformation campaign is profoundly dangerous to the 
anti-trafficking movement.  It threatens the hallmark bipartisan support the field has enjoyed since 
the passage of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000.  It will result in already extremely 
limited resources being directed toward interventions that respond to myths and misperceptions 
and are potentially harmful to victims and survivors.  It will lead to ineffective and even dangerous 
policies and practices driven by rumors instead of evidence-based expertise.  Ultimately, it 
will harm trafficking victims and survivors whose voices are drowned out in the noise.”
Polaris Report, 
Countering QAnon: Understanding the Role of Human Trafficking in the Disinformation-Extremist Nexus
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The Role of the Financial Sector:
 Promising Practices in the Eradication of Trafficking in Persons
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Human trafficking is a widespread and highly profitable crime that generates an estimated $150 billion worldwide per year 
with a significant portion of those profits passing through legitimate financial services businesses. The illicit financial activity 
that human trafficking generates includes, but is not limited to: payments associated with the transport of victims and other 
logistics such as hotels or plane tickets; collection of proceeds generated by the exploitation of trafficking victims and by 
the sale of goods produced through their exploitation; movement of proceeds; and bribery and corrupt dealings to facilitate 
human trafficking. 
One of the most effective ways to identify broader criminal networks and take the profit out of this crime is to follow the 
financial trail human traffickers leave behind. With proper training and guidance, financial institutions and designated 
non-financial businesses are able to identify illicit finance related to human trafficking and report potential cases. In addition, 
legal experts state that taking a “financial crimes approach” to human trafficking is highly effective in generating financial 
evidence that allows law enforcement to differentiate the traffickers from their victims, document the traffickers’ motives and 
knowledge, corroborate victim testimony, and assist in identifying affiliates. Proactive partnerships between governments, 
financial institutions, law enforcement, civil society, and survivor experts are critical to identifying illicit financial activity 
associated with human trafficking. Removing the ability to profit from the crime disincentivizes traffickers and serves as a 
crucial deterrent to prevent the crime altogether. 
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS AND THE FINANCIAL SECTOR
The UN TIP Protocol, which is widely ratified, mandates the criminalization of money laundering when proceeds are derived 
from human trafficking and encourages signatories to promote international cooperation between their respective national 
authorities addressing money laundering. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is the global standard-setting body for anti-
money laundering (AML), countering the financing of terrorism, and countering proliferation financing. More than 200 countries 
have agreed to implement the FATF Recommendations, which require member countries to identify, assess, and understand 
money laundering and illicit finance risks and to mitigate those risks. The FATF Recommendations provide a useful framework 
for jurisdictions to address illicit finance related to human trafficking by strengthening their national AML laws and policies 
and by improving coordination and information sharing domestically and internationally. The FATF Recommendations also 
encourage jurisdictions to undertake proactive parallel financial investigations, including by collaborating with public and 
private financial institutions, as a standard practice when investigating and prosecuting human trafficking crimes, with a view 
to tracing, freezing, and confiscating proceeds acquired through this crime. 
In the United States, the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) mandates that financial institutions monitor and report suspected illegal 
activity, such as human trafficking, as well as certain high-dollar cash transactions. The BSA permits financial institutions 
to share information relevant to money laundering and terrorist financing under the legal safe harbor provided by the USA 
PATRIOT Act Section 314(b). This reporting and information sharing can be highly useful in tracking and tracing proceeds 
related to human trafficking.
It is essential that financial institutions train staff on techniques human traffickers use to launder money and the behavioral 
and financial red flag indicators of human trafficking. Trained customer-facing staff can recognize, document, and report 
behavioral indicators of human trafficking. Financial institutions are required to comply with law enforcement processes 
seeking to identify traffickers’ assets, which can be seized, forfeited, and used toward restitution for victims. Further, financial 
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institutions can engage with survivors of human trafficking to inform their efforts, including on the development of training 
programs to enhance the ability of frontline staff and other industry professionals to detect transactions connected to human 
trafficking, how and when to intervene, and how to determine when a third party is benefitting from the exploitation of another. 
Consulting with survivors to review existing AML protocols and systems could help to identify gaps and possible improvements. 
In 2020, the Government of Canada launched Project PROTECT to increase awareness of sex trafficking, as well as the quantity 
and quality of suspicious transaction reporting. Canadian financial institutions, FINTRAC (Canada’s Financial Intelligence 
Unit), financial regulators, law enforcement, non-profit organizations, and technology companies collaborated to develop 
indicia of suspicious transactions of money laundering from sex trafficking. As a result, there was a significant increase in 
suspicious transaction reports filed by financial institutions related to this activity. FINTRAC disclosed this information to law 
enforcement to help expand or refine the scope of their cases, uncover new targets, obtain search warrants, and identify 
assets for seizure or forfeiture. Canadian authorities provided disclosures to counterparts in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Portugal, Jamaica, and Brazil, demonstrating the transnational nature of human trafficking and 
the importance of international cooperation to end it.
THE ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY
Perpetrators use technology in human trafficking schemes. Human trafficking rings often use instant and secure 
communication mechanisms to facilitate activities among members and employ GPS location applications as one way to 
remotely control victims. Technology also can play a critical role in combating these crimes, increase law enforcement’s ability 
to identify victims and perpetrators, and help deliver financial assistance and other victim support services to victims as they 
work to rebuild their lives. 
While human trafficking actors and organizations typically generate illicit proceeds in cash or through the traditional financial 
system, they sometimes use cryptocurrency. Cryptocurrency transactions, including those involving human trafficking, are 
recorded on public blockchains. Depending on whether and to what extent anonymizing technologies are applied, blockchain 
transactions can be analyzed to identify patterns indicative of criminal activity. For example, experts have developed techniques 
to link some cryptocurrency transaction records to online commercial sex advertisements, which can provide additional 
information on human trafficking networks. Innovative AML compliance solutions that use big data, advanced analytics, network 
analysis, and, increasingly, artificial intelligence to monitor transactions and identify and report suspicious transactions can 
assist governments and the private sector in identifying and combating human trafficking networks. 
Traffickers also exploit financial sector innovations, such as prepaid cards and mobile payment applications, to accept 
payments or move funds through the financial system. Authorities have detected the use of third-party payment processors 
(TPPPs) by traffickers and their facilitators to wire funds, which gives the appearance that the TPPP is the originator or beneficiary 
of the wire transfer and conceals the true originator or beneficiary. The use of these innovations leaves digital footprints, which 
may be detected as these transactions pass through the financial system. 
SUPPORTING SURVIVORS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING
Survivors of human trafficking often discover that human traffickers have taken control of their financial identity or banking 
products and limited or prevented their access to the financial system, spoiling their credit record and hindering their financial 
reintegration. Financial institutions and civil society can play an important role in assisting survivors in the recovery process 
by providing them access to digital financial services, such as online microcredit, without requiring traditional identity 
documentation. Governments can also play a role by supporting the use of digital financial services and innovative tools to 
assist victims who have been harmed financially. Digital identity solutions and access to digital financial services can help 
victims securely obtain financial assistance from governments or NGOs, access victim support services, repair their credit, 
and receive restitution payments when appropriate and available. 
Enabling human trafficking survivors’ participation in the regulated financial sector is critical. The Liechtenstein Initiative 
for Finance Against Slavery and Trafficking is a public-private partnership launched in September 2018 to respond to calls from 
the G7, the G20, the UN General Assembly, and the UN Security Council for governments to partner with the private sector to 
address human trafficking. Its Survivor Inclusion Initiative works to facilitate survivor access to basic banking services, such 
as checking and savings accounts by connecting survivors to financial institutions. To support survivors in rebuilding their 
lives and preventing further exploitation, the financial sector can offer account qualification exception programs and low-to-no 
fee second chance accounts. Governments, investors, researchers, and civil-society actors should explore how microfinance 
and other forms of social finance can support survivors. 
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In many ways, the United States and other governments face human trafficking challenges and trends today that reflect the 
living legacy of the systemic racism and colonization globalized during the transatlantic slave trade through chattel slavery 
and regional practices of indigenous dispossession. U.S. and global data show human traffickers disproportionately target 
those in positions of socioeconomic or political vulnerability due to discriminatory policies, who are often people of color 
or part of a racial minority. While U.S. efforts to combat human trafficking have grown in magnitude and sophistication over 
the years, the United States still struggles with how to address the disparate effects of human trafficking on racial minority 
communities. To be truly effective, a comprehensive approach to prosecution, protection, and—most of all—prevention must 
embed racial justice and equity across its policies and programs. The U.S. Department of State leads the U.S. government’s 
global engagement to combat human trafficking and chairs the federal interagency anti-trafficking task force. As part of this 
work, it commits to engaging with its interagency, civil society, private sector, multilateral, and survivor leader partners to 
better understand systemic racism’s effects on the human trafficking field and to integrate racial equity more intentionally 
into the U.S. anti-trafficking response. 
Years of studies, data, and the direct knowledge of those with lived experience of human trafficking demonstrate that systemic 
racism undercuts the intended goals of prosecuting traffickers, protecting those victimized, and preventing human trafficking in 
significant ways. This body of information provides a strong foundation from which to learn. For instance, advocates, survivors, 
and other experts have found that ingrained racial biases and stereotypes, which were created as a way to dehumanize certain 
racial communities to justify their exploitation and exclusion, hinder progress in anti-trafficking efforts because they lead to 
racially disparate assumptions about who is a trafficker and who should have access to victim protection and services. These 
stereotypes may affect, for example, which communities law enforcement target for anti-trafficking operations, which victim 
witnesses the criminal justice system deems credible, and which individuals process their experiences as exploitation and 
seek help. Traffickers, in turn, factor these racial biases and stereotypes into schemes and strategies aimed at reducing their 
own risk of getting caught while increasing the risk of law enforcement improperly penalizing victims. 
Another powerful way systemic racism has perpetuated human trafficking and hindered anti-trafficking efforts is through 
discriminatory government policies and private practices that create disparities in access to economic means or opportunities, 
which traffickers exploit to compel victims in sex trafficking or forced labor. Predatory and exclusionary practices that keep certain 
racial communities from attaining financial stability and building generational wealth provide traffickers ample opportunity 
to offer tempting alternatives. These harmful practices include redlining, lending discrimination, unequal distribution of 
government subsidies and services, restricted entry into white collar or higher paying jobs, and intentional exclusions of 
certain professions from worker protections. 
The inequities created by systemic racism have survived in part because of the intentional destruction of certain racial 
groups’ social support networks. Traffickers often seek out individuals with weaker community or family connections, knowing 
they have fewer safeguards. The chattel slavery system relied on the separation of family units during auctions and trading of 
enslaved people. It restricted where and how enslaved people could gather or socialize to weaken communal bonds to avoid 
a unified rebellion for freedom. This pattern of fracturing families and communities has led to an unjust overrepresentation of 
Black individuals in other systems, like prisons, runaway and homeless youth services, and foster or institutional care, that 
exacerbate the social isolation and vulnerability on which traffickers prey. Similar family separation policies were used to 
weaken or destroy indigenous families and communities, including forcibly removing Native children from their families and 
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tribes to send them to “boarding schools” with the intention of forcing them to assimilate and no longer identify with their 
culture. Such policies have resulted in an ongoing disproportionate number of Native children in the child welfare system, 
increasing their vulnerability to human trafficking. 
These are only a few of the many manifestations of systemic racism that inhibit an effective anti-trafficking response. 
The following excerpts highlight the reflections of some who have directly experienced the ways in which systemic racism 
intersects with human trafficking in the United States and provide insight and guidance on how best to move forward. 
“It was only when I decided to escape my trafficker that I realized how pronounced racial injustice was in my 
community, particularly against human trafficking survivors with previous arrest records.... Human trafficking 
continues to be a critical threat to Black communities. We need better support that doesn’t criminalize survivors 
but protects our rights instead. Standing in solidarity with Black lives also means speaking up for the injustices 
plaguing Black communities that are overwhelmed with trafficking victims. First, we must understand the 
disparities that disproportionately affect Black trafficking survivors. Then, we must do a better job supporting 
survivors when they escape. Many victims struggle with a long list of criminal offenses that follow them for 
the rest of their lives.”
- Lyresh Magee, 
Entrepreneur, Cosmotologist, Graduate from the Coalition to Abolish Slavery and Trafficking (Cast), Los Angeles
“Racism has made Black trafficking survivors and other survivors of color feel invisible. It has 
exacerbated our isolation, increased our stress, and undermined our efforts to recover from trauma…. 
Survivors have known that the justice system is flawed: just ask the victims arrested and prosecuted for their 
traffickers’ crimes.”
- Fainess Lipenga, 
Training Advisor to The Human Trafficking Legal Center
“We were sold for a certain amount of money for 30 minutes or an hour. Allow me to repeat myself: we 
were SOLD. In my case, being a person of color sold by a white person to other white people was painful on 
multiple levels. It wasn’t until my adult years that I was able to process how closely this aligned with racial 
oppression. I can’t compare one victim’s experience to another’s, but I will say that race can add an additional 
layer of oppression.”
- A survivor’s account, 
as featured by Yvette Young, Bree’Ana Johnson, Christopher Bidorini, and Erin Williamson
“There are many jurisdictions that are predominantly White yet the most being exploited, arrested and 
children taken into custody are women of color. There is a big problem of Black and Brown bodies being 
treated differently from White bodies. It’s not that people of color do more drugs, are more engaged in 
criminal behavior, it’s that they are more vulnerable, more targeted by the police for prostitution and other 
crimes. There is a connection and a disparity from police profiling, arrest, incarceration rates, sentencing, and 
recidivism. When a White person goes missing, you hear about it every five minutes. In contrast, when Black 
and Brown bodies go missing you don’t hear about their disappearance anywhere near as often, if at all.”
- Autumn Burris, 
Founding CEO, Survivors for Solutions, featured in ECPAT-USA’s “Survivor Perspective” blog series
Building a just world, where traffickers can no longer capitalize on and abuse systemic inequities, requires addressing the 
underlying causes of those inequities by first acknowledging the structures of power and historical context behind unequal 
distribution of privilege and protection, including the government’s role. While the racial dimensions of human trafficking 
manifest in different ways in each country, human trafficking still mirrors—and thrives because of—widespread inequities 
between racial groups. This is seen, for example, in the overrepresentation of human trafficking victims among Black populations 
in some parts of South America, the lack of protections afforded to migrant workers in the Gulf that creates a dependence 
on others that traffickers can exploit, and the intentional targeting of Roma communities through law enforcement anti-
trafficking operations in Eastern Europe. For the United States, this means confronting its history of chattel slavery, indigenous 
dispossession, and the centuries-long racial campaigns of violence, fear, and trauma that followed. As the United States 
strives to grapple with its past and increasingly root its anti-trafficking work in racial equity, it must also draw from the courage, 
expertise, and leadership of communities harmed by the interlocking cruelties of systemic racism and human trafficking. We 
invite other governments and global partners to join in this effort and hold each other accountable.
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Child-Friendly Spaces for  
 Survivors of Human Trafficking
The needs of child trafficking victims and the related legal reporting requirements differ significantly from those of adult 
victims. Government authorities and service providers should take special measures to ensure appropriate and tailored support 
and care are available to them. Children should receive immediate support and assistance in a safe and comfortable setting 
that is not intimidating or retraumatizing. Child-friendly spaces are an essential component to holistic victim-centered and 
trauma-informed care for child survivors of human trafficking. 
Child-friendly spaces have traditionally been used in refugee camps or after natural disasters, but increasingly those in 
the anti-trafficking field are using them to provide comprehensive assistance and support to child trafficking victims in other 
settings. These spaces, which can be a separate room or even just a corner of a regular interview room, are typically located in 
existing structures such as police stations or hospitals and are administered by the government or an NGO. The use of child-
friendly spaces reflects a multidisciplinary approach, providing a place for children to feel safe in the wake of trauma and for 
social workers, medical professionals, law enforcement, and others to conduct victim interviews, psychosocial counseling, and 
medical care all in the same location. In addition to putting a child trafficking victim at ease by providing a safe and structured 
environment for play and learning, such spaces also can help facilitate the prosecution of human traffickers by offering critical 
support to children as they provide information to law enforcement to help hold perpetrators accountable. 
While they may look slightly different depending on their particular function, the country in which they operate, or the level of 
resources available, effective child-friendly spaces often share common features that can be replicated as promising practices. 
First, child-friendly spaces provide a calm and reassuring physical environment. This is accomplished by providing 
age-appropriate furniture and decorations, painting the walls in calming colors, and displaying children’s artwork or murals. 
Toys, art supplies, and age-appropriate books are also provided. A comforting environment and informal play can assist 
survivors in expressing their feelings of fear and distress while also supporting their resiliency. 
Second, ensuring that a child feels safe is crucial, which means that the physical space must be easily accessible, ideally 
through its own entrance and exit, and separates the survivor from the perpetrator to prevent further trauma. A safe space 
affords children privacy so they can talk about their experiences more freely. Staff and relevant stakeholders should be able 
to observe the child from a separate room, where appropriate. 
Third, a multidisciplinary child-friendly space provides survivors with an array of comprehensive services and referral 
networks in one place. In addition to addressing immediate needs by providing food, water, and sanitary facilities, a child-
friendly space should address longer-term needs through the provision of medical screening and services, psychosocial 
counseling, referrals, and information about legal proceedings. Receiving various services in one place and during the same 
timeframe shields the survivor from having to repeat the story of what happened to them multiple times. 
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Finally, all services provided in the space should be trauma-informed, age-appropriate, and culturally and linguistically 
sensitive. This means that service providers can recognize signs of trauma in individuals and respond by integrating knowledge 
about trauma into policies, procedures, practices, and settings. This approach considers the vulnerabilities and experiences of 
trauma survivors and places priority on restoring a survivor’s feelings of safety, choice, and control. Service providers should 
make sure children understand their rights and are empowered to make decisions about their own care, where appropriate. A 
trauma-informed approach should ultimately build trust and transparency between survivors and service providers, and it must 
also be responsive to gender, age, ethnic, and cultural differences. This last component is crucial, as interviewing and service 
provision that is not trauma-informed or in the best interest of the child can be retraumatizing and inhibit a successful recovery.
Given constraints around physical space and financial resources, service providers and NGOs may need to develop creative 
ways to establish a child-friendly space. If a separate room is not available, a child-friendly corner of a larger interview room 
can also serve as a designated section that is welcoming to children. When assessing needs, a child-friendly waiting room 
might take priority. 
The COVID-19 pandemic increases children’s vulnerability to trafficking for several cross-cutting reasons. Families may 
require children to find work due to lost income, government and NGO protection services may be reduced, and children might 
not be attending school where they have access to trusted adults. Because of this increased vulnerability, establishing and 
maintaining child-friendly spaces is critical to prioritize during the pandemic; they can even be a safe place where children 
learn about public health protections such as social distancing, mask wearing, and proper hygiene.
Fishing boats docked on the beach in Southeast Asia.  Despite the extent of forced labor in the fishing sector 
globally, the vast majority of victims remain unidentified and their traffickers operate with impunity. 
42 | 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report
Every year adults and, to a lesser extent, children migrate voluntarily to countries in the Middle East to work in a variety 
of sectors, such as agriculture, construction, and domestic service. Many of these migrant workers must abide by the kafala 
system, in effect mostly in the Gulf states (Bahrain, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates), Jordan, 
and Lebanon. 
The kafala system is a sponsorship-based visa category that gives employers full control over the migrant workers’ residency 
permits, movements in and out of the country, and ability to change employers. Under this sponsorship system, migrant 
workers who leave their place of employment without permission from their employer forfeit their legal status and thereby 
increase their risk of arrest and deportation. 
The kafala system’s rules and limitations enable abusive employers’ to use unscrupulous employment practices that 
can constitute forced labor; including excessive work hours; retention of passports and travel documents by the employer; 
non-payment of wages; and physical, psychological, and sexual abuse or threats of abuse. These trafficking victims have little 
or no recourse; they are coerced either to remain in an exploitative position or leave their sponsor and face arrest, detention, 
or deportation for immigration offenses, or even punishment for unlawful acts their traffickers compelled them to commit. 
REFORMING THE KAFALA SYSTEM 
Allowing migrant workers to have full freedom of movement and to switch employers without penalty would help 
prevent human trafficking. In addition, providing migrant workers with information on their rights and obligations, on 
complaint mechanisms in case of abuse, and on how to access assistance and remedies, would empower them to identify 
and leave exploitative situations. Efforts to reform the kafala system and develop non-exploitative policies would benefit from 
input and recommendations from survivors who experienced forced labor under this system. 
In addition to reforming the kafala system, governments should also consider ratifying the  ILO Domestic Workers 
Convention, 2011 (No. 189) and draw on its Recommendation (R201), which offers concrete actions to help prevent domestic 
servitude. States can take additional measures to address the vulnerabilities to human trafficking created by the kafala system, 
such as those described below. 
LABOR-SENDING COUNTRIES AND PRE-DEPARTURE MEASURES: 
 ∙ Public Outreach: Use information and communication technologies, such as websites, digital links, and apps, to provide 
information to prospective workers in languages they understand on labor and immigration laws in the destination 
country, jobs available, the rights and responsibilities of workers and employers, model or standard government-approved 
contracts, indicators of human trafficking, contact information for relevant hotlines or missions abroad, and reputable 
recruitment agencies. 
 ∙ Prevention through Responsible Recruitment: Provide adequate government oversight of recruitment agencies and provide 
prospective applicants with information on means to verify recruitment agencies’ legitimacy and licensing. Migrant workers 
should be provided with their own copy of a work contract, clearly outlining the terms and conditions of employment and 
residency, including their wages, hours of work and rest, and mode of payment. To avoid debt manipulation, workers 
should not be subject to recruitment or work visa fees by their recruiters or employers—all costs associated with getting 
the job should be paid by the employer—nor should the cost of their live-in accommodation and work-related items, such 
as uniforms or tools, be deducted from their remuneration.
 ∙ Visa Application: Encourage in-person visa applications on the part of destination countries, including for domestic workers. 
During visa processing, provide applicants with information pamphlets on their rights and obligations, and those of 
The  
 Kafala System
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employers, as well as their entitlements to retain a copy of their contract and original travel and identity documents. 
Inform visa applicants about available legal protections against crimes such as violence, trafficking in persons, and 
deprivation of liberty, including complaint mechanisms and hotline numbers.
MEASURES IN LABOR-RECEIVING COUNTRIES:
 ∙ Visa Sponsorship: Reform the kafala system to allow all workers to have full freedom of movement and to change their 
sponsor or employer voluntarily and without prior sponsor permission, fees, penalties, or loss of residency status. Provide 
migrant workers with information on their rights and obligations, as well as on access to grievance mechanisms and to 
appropriate and effective remedies, such as compensation. Provide protection to victims, including temporary or permanent 
residency status to foreign victims along with access to services such as food, shelter, and medical and psycho-social 
assistance, while giving them the option to remain in the country and switch employers or return to their home country, 
or a third country for those who cannot return home. 
 ∙ Hotlines: Provide workers information on their rights and obligations, including access to help and information on labor 
rights, grievance mechanisms, and proper reporting channels. Inform workers about the availability of hotlines operated 
24 hours every day, staffed with Arabic and English interpreters, and with on-call contractors for languages spoken by 
foreign workers’ most common nationalities. 
 ∙ Identification and Prosecution: Proactively and effectively identify victims of forced labor and investigate, prosecute, and 
convict those who commit or facilitate forced labor under anti-trafficking laws, rather than treating instances of forced 
labor as administrative violations. Punish perpetrators and facilitators with significant prison terms under anti-trafficking 
laws and deny or restrict unscrupulous employers and sponsors from hiring migrant workers, including domestic workers. 
Ensure domestic workers are included in anti-trafficking and labor law protections.
 ∙ Prevention through Responsible Recruitment: Provide adequate government oversight of recruitment agencies, including 
through registration, licensing, and monitoring. Governments should publish the names and contact details of all licensed 
and registered recruiters, as well as those under investigation for non-compliance or whose licenses have been revoked. 
Recruitment agencies should be held accountable in a manner to deter their engaging in activities that exacerbate workers’ 
vulnerability to human trafficking—such as visa trading, charging workers for the cost of recruitment, and contract switching.
 ∙ Specialized Units: Establish specialized units in concerned ministries and agencies focused on human trafficking, including 
forced labor, and provide training to law enforcement, labor, and judicial officials on trafficking indicators and victim-
centered and trauma-informed approaches. Empower units with mandates to proactively investigate labor exploitation 
cases and conduct parallel financial investigations with a view to identify human trafficking and related money laundering. 
Encourage collaboration across directorates and ministries, including labor, as well as public and private financial 
institutions, to facilitate criminal prosecution of forced labor cases.
 ∙ Screening and Assistance: Implement formal identification, referral, and assistance procedures, including in detention 
centers and among vulnerable populations, using a victim-centered approach that is also informed by the input and 
recommendations of survivors. Facilitate access to complaint mechanisms and dispute resolution, arbitration, and pro-bono 
representation to help victims pursue legal civil and criminal remedies. Allow victims to submit testimony in written form 
or via recording to protect them. Advise them on how to secure restitution and payment of back wages. 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: 
 ∙ Memoranda of Understanding with Governments: Strengthen and enforce bilateral labor agreements with labor sending 
countries to include provisions on minimum wages, recruitment oversight, and entitlements such as work hours, mandatory 
time off, and in-home living and working conditions. Agreements could also include methods of coordination and 
cooperation on active cross-border human trafficking cases that involve victims and perpetrators from both countries. 
Governments should actively implement these agreements and ensure their offered protections are implemented in practice.
 ∙ Diplomatic Households: Increase efforts to inform and train diplomatic personnel about the crime of human trafficking and 
the applicable anti-trafficking law in the country of residence. Institute a system of in-person registration and interviews 
for domestic workers of diplomatic personnel, so as to regularize communication, monitor their treatment, and potentially 
identify instances of abuse or human trafficking. 
 ∙ Cross-country Collaboration: Investigate allegations of forced labor reported by repatriated victims, offer judicial assistance 
such as providing remote statements from victims to be used in court proceedings, and extradite traffickers. Facilitate 
accreditation and monitoring of recruitment agencies between countries of origin and destination. Cooperate with the 
corporate business sector to encourage and facilitate ethical sourcing in supply chains. Establish a regional research and 
training center to train frontline stakeholders on human trafficking case identification and management.
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Dear Reader,
 It was the winter after my 19th year; my mother was informed that I was seeing a boy. The conversation started, “I have 
never been so humiliated; how was I supposed to maintain my composure?” After a few moments of inquiring, I was informed 
of what was so humiliating to her, me. I knew my family loathed gays. I had grown up in the United States during the AIDS 
pandemic, hearing “the only good [expletive] is a dead one,” or “it is their punishment for being how they are, they deserve 
it.” My family openly praised my uncle’s contraction of HIV and waited for his death. When the tables turned onto me, I already 
knew their opinions. When I was told, “you will either be a child of mine or gay,” I simply said fine and walked out the door 
with the few items I could carry. That was the year Matthew Shepard was beaten and left for dead hanging on a fence.
That first month I was learning the ‘safe’ spots to park my car to sleep. I was cleaning up in bathrooms and going to college 
and work. Then the church started the process of ex-communication to revoke my college scholarships because they believed 
I was willingly living my life in sin. I finished out the semester and decided I would wait for a bit to finish college. After four 
years and three promotions at work, I was told, “you are too gay; if you want to continue working here, you will go back in the 
closet.” I figured within the previous two months I had already lost my house, my family, and my college scholarship—at that 
point, what was my job? I went to the city north of my hometown and started couch surfing with people from the clubs I went to. 
I then started working in escorting services through a bar where I didn’t know the rates charged, didn’t handle the money, 
and had little to no control over refusing clients who were violent or wouldn’t use condoms. Some of us were there to pay off 
the debts owed to the bar owner. We were given drugs that kept us numb. Our debts were too high. We paid daily for a bed, for 
the space at the bar, for the help the bar owners gave us. When we couldn’t pay, we slept on subways, in empty warehouses, 
in cars, or on couches. We traveled a lot; we were always on the road between cities, between states, and wherever we were 
told to go. Thankfully, a bar owner friend would stitch us up without a hospital visit when we were hurt, so we didn’t have 
another bill. There were always lies, and it was never as glamorous as we were promised. Do you get to choose to be abused 
in a society where death is the alternative? 
Living in abandoned places meant our cars were taken, we were mugged, we had our modest apartments broke into—life 
was hard. In three years, I had slept with over 500 people. When there was an error at the local health clinic, and my blood 
got mixed up with another person’s, I tested false positive for AIDS. I always expected to test positive, so when I retested, I 
was in shock when it came back negative. I left the escort service at that point. I knew I was playing with fire.
The Department of State received the following letter in response to its annual “Federal Register” notice requesting information 
relevant to countries’ progress in addressing human trafficking.  By publishing it, with the author’s consent, the Department seeks to 
shine a light on a population particularly vulnerable to human trafficking that is often misunderstood and overlooked.  The Department 
has highlighted the vulnerability of LGBTQI+ individuals, the trafficking risks they face, and the challenges associated with victim 
identification and protection around the world.  The circumstances of LGBTQI+ individuals, including threats of public disclosure of 
their sexual orientation or gender identity, are not isolated to foreign countries.
Letter on LGBTQI+  
 Vulnerability to Human Trafficking
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Many of us loathe the churches that allowed us to be abused with their hatred of us from the pulpit. Many of us are sexually 
assaulted by family, peers in schools, our ministers, or coaches. Over half of us on the streets are there because we were 
thrown out for being ourselves. Forty percent of those on the streets are LGBTQI+. We are the unwanted, the forgotten, the 
lost kids of the streets that no one misses or looks for. We aren’t victims because we “chose” this life. We are trafficked to 
survive; we are abused because we are unwanted, and we have to fight to be heard in the society we live in. Our bodies are 
lying in alleys and warehouses unnoticed; we are pawns in a system that doesn’t care about us. We need to overcome the 
years of institutional bias and discrimination by politicians trying to criminalize our use of bathrooms or marriages. We need 
to be seen as people. We need to be seen as people experiencing victimization. We need to be told this isn’t normal and that 
we are experiencing victimization. 
 Nat Paul 
Subject Matter Expert with Lived Experience of Human Trafficking
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When the Government is the Trafficker:  
 State-Sponsored Trafficking in Persons
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While the TVPA and the UN TIP Protocol call on governments to proactively address trafficking crimes, some governments are part 
of the problem, directly compelling their citizens into sex trafficking or forced labor.  From forced labor in local or national public 
work projects, military operations, economically important sectors, or as part of government-funded projects or missions abroad 
to sexual slavery on government compounds, officials use their power to exploit their nationals.  To extract this work or service, 
governments coerce by threatening the withdrawal of public benefits, withholding salaries, failing to adhere to limits on national 
service, manipulating the lack of legal status of stateless individuals and other minority groups, threatening to punish family members, 
or conditioning services, food, or freedom of movement on labor or sex.  
In 2019, Congress amended the TVPA to acknowledge that governments can also act as traffickers, referring specifically to a 
“government policy or pattern” of human trafficking, human trafficking in government-funded programs, forced labor in government-
affiliated medical services or other sectors, sexual slavery in government camps, or the employment or recruitment of child soldiers. 
While the TVPA already directs the Secretary to consider the extent to which officials participated in, facilitated, condoned, or were 
otherwise complicit in trafficking when determining tier rankings, this new section more directly links government involvement in 
trafficking crimes to a Tier 3 ranking.  
The 2020 Trafficking in Persons Report marked the first time the U.S. Department of State applied this new provision, finding 12 
governments had a “policy or pattern” of trafficking, including:  Afghanistan, Belarus, Burma, China, Cuba, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, 
Russia, South Sudan, Syria, and Turkmenistan.  
The 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report includes the following 11 governments with a documented “policy or pattern” of human 
trafficking, trafficking in government-funded programs, forced labor in government-affiliated medical services or other sectors, 












The 2021 narratives provided detailed examples to justify this assessment, such as:    
∙ The Government of Burma had a policy or pattern of use of children for forced labor by the military.  The international 
monitor-verified use of children in labor and support roles by certain military battalions increased in conflict zones, 
predominantly in Rakhine and Kachin States.  Additionally, the military continued to rely on local communities to source 
labor and supplies, thereby perpetuating conditions enabling the forced labor of adults and children.  
∙ The Chinese government had a government policy or pattern of widespread forced labor, including through the continued 
mass arbitrary detention of more than one million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, ethnic Kyrgyz, and other Muslims in the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang).  Authorities continued to implement these policies in other provinces, 
targeted other religious minorities under their auspices, and sought the coerced repatriation and internment of religious 
and ethnic minorities living abroad through the use of surveillance, harassment and threats against them and their 
family members, and extradition requests.  The government also reportedly placed ethnic Tibetans in vocational training 
and manufacturing jobs as part of an ostensible “poverty alleviation” and “labor transfer program” that featured overt 
coercive elements.   
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Forced Labor in China’s Xinjiang Region
Over the last four years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has carried out a mass detention and political indoctrination 
campaign against Uyghurs, who are predominantly Muslim, and members of other ethnic and religious minority groups in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang), a large region in western China.  The courageous voices of survivors, their family members 
abroad, researchers, and international advocacy groups have thoroughly documented the PRC’s discriminatory use of surveillance 
technologies and trumped-up administrative and criminal charges to abduct and detain more than one million Muslims, including 
Uyghurs, ethnic Hui, ethnic Kazakhs, ethnic Kyrgyz, ethnic Tajiks, and ethnic Uzbeks, in as many as 1,200 state-run internment camps 
throughout Xinjiang.  Detention in these camps is intended to erase ethnic and religious identities under the pretext of “vocational 
training.”  Forced labor is a central tactic used for this repression. 
In Xinjiang, the government is the trafficker.  Authorities use threats of physical violence, forcible drug intake, physical and sexual 
abuse, and torture to force detainees to work in adjacent or off-site factories or worksites producing garments, footwear, carpets, 
yarn, food products, holiday decorations, building materials, extractives, materials for solar power equipment and other renewable 
energy components, consumer electronics, bedding, hair products, cleaning supplies, personal protective equipment, face masks, 
chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and other goods—and these goods are finding their way into businesses and homes around the world. 
International outcry has grown since these abuses were first made public.  The PRC initially denied all allegations, dismissing them 
as international “interference” in its domestic affairs.  Confronted, however, with eyewitness testimony and thoroughly researched 
reporting from multiple sources, the PRC eventually admitted the existence of the camps.  PRC officials then defended the facilities 
as necessary measures to counter “terrorism,” while also claiming that many of them had already been closed.  In reality, they had 
grown in number and in size, with hundreds of thousands of victims “graduating” and being sent to larger and more technologically 
advanced prisons under false terrorism-related charges.  The government also began transferring many thousands of camp detainees 
elsewhere in Xinjiang and to other provinces throughout the country under the guise of a “poverty alleviation” program in which 
companies and local governments received subsidies for forcing them to labor in manufacturing.  
With so many disappeared into and abused within this system, entire communities in Xinjiang—communities with rich histories 
and immeasurable cultural significance—have become ghost towns.  Those who have managed to avoid detention are still at risk 
of state-sponsored forced labor and other abuses.  The PRC government’s Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (Bingtuan), 
an economic and paramilitary organization with administrative control over several areas in the region comprising nearly three 
million personnel, forces members of prison populations and local communities alike to work in hazardous mining, construction, 
manufacturing, food processing, and—for many thousands of Uyghur adults and children—cotton harvesting.  These products and 
raw materials are injected into international supply chains, spreading the PRC’s forced labor complicity around the globe. 
The international community has taken tough action to promote accountability for the PRC’s actions and strengthen market 
defenses against the import of these goods.  For example, in the United States, the Departments of State, the Treasury, Commerce, and 
Homeland Security released the Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory to alert businesses and other entities to the reputational, 
economic, and legal risks of involvement with entities in or linked to Xinjiang.  In addition, since 2019 the Department of Homeland 
Security’s Customs and Border Protection has issued 10 Withhold Release Orders against goods and companies connected to forced 
labor in Xinjiang to block their entry into the United States.  Likewise, many companies have taken a stand against the use of forced 
labor in China by cutting ties with suppliers in Xinjiang or those connected to the PRC’s campaign of repression—at times earning 
them heavy consumer and state-run media backlash within the Chinese domestic market. 
Governments should protect and serve their citizens—not terrorize and subjugate them for profit.  Around the world, governments, 
companies, and consumers committed to eliminating human trafficking from global supply chains can all play a role in demanding 
an end to the use of forced labor in Xinjiang and beyond.
∙ The Government of Russia had a government policy or pattern of trafficking.  The government was actively complicit in the forced 
labor of North Korean workers.  The government did not screen North Korean workers for trafficking indicators or identify any 
North Korean trafficking victims, despite credible reports in previous years that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) 
operated work camps in Russia and exploited thousands of North Korean workers in forced labor.  Although the government 
took steps to repatriate North Korean workers in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs), citizens from the 
DPRK continued to arrive throughout the year, many of whom likely engaged in informal labor.  While the Russian government 
reported the number of North Korean workers in Russia declined in 2020, the government issued almost 3,000 new tourist 
and student visas to North Koreans in 2020 in an apparent attempt to circumvent the UNSCRs.
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Section 402 of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act, as amended (CSPA) requires publication in the annual TIP 
Report of a list of foreign governments identified during the previous year as having governmental armed forces, 
police, or other security forces, or government-supported armed groups that recruit or use child soldiers, as 
defined in the CSPA. These determinations cover the reporting period beginning April 1, 2020 and ending 
March 31, 2021.
For the purpose of the CSPA, and generally consistent with the provisions of the Optional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, the term “child 
soldier” means: 
i. any person under 18 years of age who takes a direct part in hostilities as a member of governmental armed 
forces, police, or other security forces;
ii. any person under 18 years of age who has been compulsorily recruited into governmental armed forces, 
police, or other security forces;
iii. any person under 15 years of age who has been voluntarily recruited into governmental armed forces, 
police, or other security forces; or
iv. any person under 18 years of age who has been recruited or used in hostilities by armed forces distinct 
from the armed forces of a state.
The term “child soldier” includes any person described in clauses (ii), (iii), or (iv) who is serving in any capacity, 
including in a support role, such as a “cook, porter, messenger, medic, guard, or sex slave.”
Governments identified on the list are subject to restrictions, in the following fiscal year, on certain security 
assistance and commercial licensing of military equipment. The CSPA prohibits assistance to governments that 
are identified in the list under the following authorities: International Military Education and Training, Foreign 
Military Financing, Excess Defense Articles, and Peacekeeping Operations, with exceptions for some programs 
undertaken pursuant to the Peacekeeping Operations authority. The CSPA also prohibits the issuance of licenses 
for direct commercial sales of military equipment to such governments. Beginning October 1, 2021, and effective 
throughout Fiscal Year 2022, these restrictions will apply to the listed countries, absent a presidential waiver, 
applicable exception, or reinstatement of assistance pursuant to the terms of the CSPA. The determination 
to include a government in the CSPA list is informed by a range of sources, including first-hand observation 
by U.S. government personnel and research and credible reporting from various UN entities, international 
organizations, local and international NGOs, and international and domestic media outlets.
CHILD SOLDIERS 
PREVENTION ACT LIST 
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THE 2021 CSPA LIST INCLUDES GOVERNMENTS OF THE FOLLOWING COUNTRIES:
Afghanistan
Burma














A former child soldier from South 
Sudan holds her child and looks 
off into the distant hills.  Female 
child soldiers are often used as 
soldiers, cooks, messengers, 
suicide bombers, or sex slaves. This 
survivor collaborated with a local 
NGO and the photographer to take 
this image, and she provided verbal 
and written consent for its use.
A survivor of sex trafficking looks 
out his window in the Netherlands. 
The survivor reported that he was 
experiencing homelessness when 
he was recruited into commercial 
sex and a trafficker later took 
advantage of him and forced him 
to continue in the commercial sex 
trade.  As part of a photo story, the 
photographer collaborated with 
this survivor to understand how he 
would like to be presented.
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METHODOLOGY
The Department of State prepared this Report using information from U.S. embassies, government officials, 
nongovernmental and international organizations, published reports, news articles, academic studies, 
consultations with authorities and organizations in every region of the world, and information submitted to 
tipreport@state.gov.  This email address provides a means by which organizations and individuals can share 
information with the Department of State throughout the year on government progress in addressing human 
trafficking.  
U.S. diplomatic posts and domestic agencies reported on the human trafficking situation and governmental 
action to fight trafficking based on thorough research that included meetings with a wide variety of government 
officials, local and international NGO representatives, officials of international organizations, journalists, 
academics, and survivors.  U.S. missions overseas are dedicated to covering human trafficking issues year-
round.  The 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report covers government efforts undertaken from April 1, 2020 
through March 31, 2021.
TIER PLACEMENT
The Department places each country in this Report onto one of four tiers, as mandated by the TVPA.  This 
placement is based not on the size of a country’s problem but on the extent of government efforts to meet the 
TVPA’s minimum standards for the elimination of human trafficking (see page 56-58), which are generally 
consistent with the Palermo Protocol.
While Tier 1 is the highest ranking, it does not mean that a country has no human trafficking problem or that 
it is doing enough to address the crime.  Rather, a Tier 1 ranking indicates that a government has made efforts 
to address the problem that meet the TVPA’s minimum standards.  To maintain a Tier 1 ranking, governments 
need to demonstrate appreciable progress each year in combating trafficking.  Tier 1 represents a responsibility 
rather than a reprieve.  
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Tier rankings and narratives in the 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report reflect an assessment of the following: 
 ∙ enactment of laws prohibiting severe forms of trafficking in persons, as defined by the TVPA, and 
provision of criminal punishments for trafficking crimes;
 ∙ criminal penalties prescribed for human trafficking crimes with a maximum of at least four years’ 
deprivation of liberty, or a more severe penalty;
 ∙ implementation of human trafficking laws through vigorous prosecution of the prevalent forms of 
trafficking in the country and sentencing of traffickers;
 ∙ proactive victim identification measures with systematic procedures to guide law enforcement and 
other government-supported front-line responders in the process of victim identification;
 ∙ government funding and partnerships with NGOs to provide victims with access to primary health care, 
counseling, and shelter, allowing them to recount their trafficking experiences to trained counselors 
and law enforcement in an environment of minimal pressure;
 ∙ victim protection efforts that include access to services and shelter without detention and with legal 
alternatives to removal to countries in which victims would face retribution or hardship;
 ∙ the extent to which a government ensures victims are provided with legal and other assistance and that, 
consistent with domestic law, proceedings are not prejudicial to victims’ rights, dignity, or psychological 
well-being;
 ∙ the extent to which a government ensures the safe, humane, and to the extent possible, voluntary 
repatriation and reintegration of victims;
 ∙ governmental measures to prevent human trafficking, including efforts to curb practices identified as 
contributing factors to human trafficking, such as employers’ confiscation of foreign workers’ passports 
and allowing labor recruiters to charge fees to prospective migrants; and
 ∙ governmental efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts and international sex tourism. 
Tier rankings and narratives are NOT affected by the following:
 ∙ efforts, however laudable, undertaken exclusively by nongovernmental actors in the country; 
 ∙ general public awareness events—government-sponsored or otherwise—lacking concrete ties to the 
prosecution of traffickers, protection of victims, or prevention of trafficking; and 
 ∙ broad-based law enforcement or developmental initiatives.
A GUIDE TO THE TIERS
Tier 1
Countries whose governments fully meet the TVPA’s minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. 
Tier 2
Countries whose governments do not fully meet the TVPA’s minimum standards but are making significant 
efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards. 
Tier 2 Watch List
Countries whose governments do not fully meet the TVPA’s minimum standards but are making significant 
efforts to bring themselves into compliance with those standards, and for which: 
 ∙ the estimated number of victims of severe forms of trafficking is very significant or is significantly 
increasing and the country is not taking proportional concrete actions; or
 ∙ there is a failure to provide evidence of increasing efforts to combat severe forms of trafficking in 
persons from the previous year, including increased investigations, prosecutions, and convictions of 
trafficking crimes, increased assistance to victims, and decreasing evidence of complicity in severe 
forms of trafficking by government officials.
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Tier 3
Countries whose governments do not fully meet the TVPA’s minimum standards and are not making significant 
efforts to do so.  
The TVPA, as amended, lists additional factors to determine whether a country should be on Tier 2 (or Tier 
2 Watch List) versus Tier 3:  
 ∙ the extent to which the country is a country of origin, transit, or destination for severe forms of trafficking; 
 ∙ the extent to which the country’s government does not meet the TVPA’s minimum standards and, in 
particular, the extent to which officials or government employees have been complicit in severe forms 
of trafficking;  
 ∙ reasonable measures that the government would need to undertake to be in compliance with the 
minimum standards in light of the government’s resources and capabilities to address and eliminate 
severe forms of trafficking in persons; 
 ∙ the extent to which the government is devoting sufficient budgetary resources to investigate and 
prosecute human trafficking, convict and sentence traffickers; and obtain restitution for victims of 
human trafficking; and 
 ∙ the extent to which the government is devoting sufficient budgetary resources to protect victims and 
prevent the crime from occurring.
When Mei returned to Xinjiang Province in China to visit her ill father, 
Chinese officials stopped her at the border with Kazakhstan and seized 
her passport. They told her she could not go see her father, and that she 
must participate in 15 days of “education” because she was Muslim and 
an ethnic Kazakh. Mei instead spent more than a year in Chinese detention 
facilities where the authorities subjected her to political indoctrination 
and forced her to work in a factory making gloves for US $0.02 a pair. The 
Chinese authorities also made Mei stay in cells that were equipped with 
cameras and a loudspeaker. Eventually, they released Mei and allowed 
her to go back to Kazakhstan.
KAZAKHSTAN-CHINA
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In addition, the TVPA directs the Secretary of State to consider, as proof of a country’s failure to make significant 
efforts to fully meet the TVPA’s minimum standards, a government policy or pattern of: trafficking; trafficking 
in government-funded programs; forced labor (in government-affiliated medical services, agriculture, forestry, 
mining, construction, or other sectors); sexual slavery in government camps, compounds, or outposts; or 
employing or recruiting child soldiers.  
The TVPA also provides that any country that has been ranked Tier 2 Watch List for two consecutive years 
and that would otherwise be ranked Tier 2 Watch List for the next year will instead be ranked Tier 3 in that 
third year.  The Secretary of State is authorized to waive this automatic downgrade only once, in that third 
year, based on credible evidence that a waiver is justified because the government has a written plan that, 
if implemented, would constitute making significant efforts to meet the TVPA’s minimum standards for the 
elimination of trafficking and is devoting sufficient resources to implement the plan.  The following year, a 
country must either go up to Tier 2 or down to Tier 3.  Finally, the TVPA limits a country to one year on Tier 2 
Watch List after that country received a waiver to stay on the Watch List and was subsequently downgraded 
to Tier 3.
FUNDING RESTRICTIONS FOR TIER 3 COUNTRIES
Pursuant to the TVPA, governments of countries on Tier 3 may be subject to certain restrictions on foreign 
assistance, whereby the President may determine not to provide U.S. government nonhumanitarian, nontrade-
related foreign assistance as defined in the TVPA.  In addition, the President may determine to withhold 
funding for government official or employee participation in educational and cultural exchange programs 
in the case of certain Tier 3 countries.  Consistent with the TVPA, the President may also determine to 
instruct the U.S. Executive Director of each multilateral development bank and the International Monetary 
Fund to vote against and use their best efforts to deny any loans or other uses of the institutions’ funds to a 
designated Tier 3 country for most purposes (except for humanitarian, trade-related, and certain development-
related assistance).  Alternatively, the President may waive application of the foregoing restrictions upon a 
determination that the provision to a Tier 3 country of such assistance would promote the purposes of the 
TVPA or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States.  The TVPA also authorizes the President to 
waive these restrictions if necessary to avoid significant adverse effects on vulnerable populations, including 
women and girls, and children.
Applicable assistance restrictions apply for the next Fiscal Year, which begins October 1, 2021.
No tier ranking is permanent.  Every country, including the United States, can do more.  All countries must 
continually increase efforts to combat trafficking
Benilda was 12 when her neighbor, Joriz, offered to provide her with an 
education and a job to pay her siblings’ school fees if she moved with 
him to Manila.  Benilda’s parents trusted Joriz, so they allowed her to go 
with him.  At first when she arrived in Manila, nothing seemed wrong; 
Benilda enjoyed a comfortable life and went to a good school.  That all 
changed when, after a few months, Joriz took a nude photo of Benilda and 
then forced her to pose naked in front of a webcam.  Joriz began sexually 
abusing Benilda on camera, live-streaming it to the internet for money. 
From there, Joriz exploited Benilda in another form of sex trafficking 
by forcing her to engage in commercial sex acts at local hotels.  Law 
enforcement officers eventually identified Benilda, and social workers 
assisted her in getting the help she needed. 
PHILIPPINES
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TVPA MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE 
ELIMINATION OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, Div. A of Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 108, as amended.
1. The government of the country should prohibit severe forms of trafficking in persons and punish acts 
of such trafficking.
2. For the knowing commission of any act of sex trafficking involving force, fraud, coercion, or in which 
the victim of sex trafficking is a child incapable of giving meaningful consent, or of trafficking which 
includes rape or kidnapping or which causes a death, the government of the country should prescribe 
punishment commensurate with that for grave crimes, such as forcible sexual assault.
3. For the knowing commission of any act of a severe form of trafficking in persons, the government of 
the country should prescribe punishment that is sufficiently stringent to deter and that adequately 
reflects the heinous nature of the offense.
4. The government of the country should make serious and sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms 
of trafficking in persons.
Indicia of “Serious and Sustained Efforts” 
1. Whether the government of the country vigorously investigates and prosecutes acts of severe forms 
of trafficking in persons, and convicts and sentences persons responsible for such acts, that take place 
wholly or partly within the territory of the country, including, as appropriate, requiring incarceration of 
individuals convicted of such acts. For purposes of the preceding sentence, suspended or significantly 
reduced sentences for convictions of principal actors in cases of severe forms of trafficking in persons 
shall be considered, on a case-by-case basis, whether to be considered an indicator of serious and 
sustained efforts to eliminate severe forms of trafficking in persons. After reasonable requests from 
the Department of State for data regarding investigations, prosecutions, convictions, and sentences, a 
government which does not provide such data, consistent with a demonstrably increasing capacity of 
such government to obtain such data, shall be presumed not to have vigorously investigated, prosecuted, 
convicted or sentenced such acts.
A woman dries textiles by hanging 
them to bamboo rods.  In many 
countries, women and children 
are forced by factory owners to 
work in the textile industry, often 
under dangerous conditions.  Many 
garments sold around the world are 
produced in whole or in part with 
forced labor. 
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2. Whether the government of the country protects victims of severe forms of trafficking in persons 
and encourages their assistance in the investigation and prosecution of such trafficking, including 
provisions for legal alternatives to their removal to countries in which they would face retribution or 
hardship, and ensures that victims are not inappropriately incarcerated, fined, or otherwise penalized 
solely for unlawful acts as a direct result of being trafficked, including by providing training to law 
enforcement and immigration officials regarding the identification and treatment of trafficking victims 
using approaches that focus on the needs of the victims.
3. Whether the government of the country has adopted measures to prevent severe forms of trafficking 
in persons, such as measures to inform and educate the public, including potential victims, about the 
causes and consequences of severe forms of trafficking in persons, measures to establish the identity of 
local populations, including birth registration, citizenship, and nationality, measures to ensure that its 
nationals who are deployed abroad as part of a diplomatic, peacekeeping, or other similar mission do 
not engage in or facilitate severe forms of trafficking in persons or exploit victims of such trafficking, 
a transparent system for remediating or punishing such public officials as a deterrent, measures to 
prevent the use of forced labor or child labor in violation of international standards, effective bilateral, 
multilateral, or regional information sharing and cooperation arrangements with other countries, and 
effective policies or laws regulating foreign labor recruiters and holding them civilly and criminally 
liable for fraudulent recruiting.
4. Whether the government of the country cooperates with other governments in the investigation and 
prosecution of severe forms of trafficking in persons and has entered into bilateral, multilateral, or 
regional law enforcement cooperation and coordination arrangements with other countries. 
5. Whether the government of the country extradites persons charged with acts of severe forms of 
trafficking in persons on substantially the same terms and to substantially the same extent as persons 
charged with other serious crimes (or, to the extent such extradition would be inconsistent with the 
laws of such country or with international agreements to which the country is a party, whether the 
government is taking all appropriate measures to modify or replace such laws and treaties so as to 
permit such extradition).
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6. Whether the government of the country monitors immigration and emigration patterns for evidence 
of severe forms of trafficking in persons and whether law enforcement agencies of the country respond 
to any such evidence in a manner that is consistent with the vigorous investigation and prosecution of 
acts of such trafficking, as well as with the protection of human rights of victims and the internationally 
recognized human right to leave any country, including one’s own, and to return to one’s own country. 
7. Whether the government of the country vigorously investigates, prosecutes, convicts, and sentences 
public officials, including diplomats and soldiers, who participate in or facilitate severe forms of 
trafficking in persons, including nationals of the country who are deployed abroad as part of a diplomatic, 
peacekeeping, or other similar mission who engage in or facilitate severe forms of trafficking in persons 
or exploit victims of such trafficking, and takes all appropriate measures against officials who condone 
or enable such trafficking. A government’s failure to appropriately address public allegations against 
such public officials, especially once such officials have returned to their home countries, shall be 
considered inaction under these criteria. After reasonable requests from the Department of State for 
data regarding such investigations, prosecutions, convictions, and sentences, a government which 
does not provide such data, consistent with a demonstrably increasing capacity of such government 
to obtain such data, shall be presumed not to have vigorously investigated, prosecuted, convicted, or 
sentenced such acts.
8. Whether the percentage of victims of severe forms of trafficking in the country that are non-citizens 
of such countries is insignificant.
9. Whether the government has entered into effective, transparent partnerships, cooperative arrangements, 
or agreements that have resulted in concrete and measurable outcomes with -
a. domestic civil society organizations, private sector entities, or international nongovernmental 
organizations, or into multilateral or regional arrangements or agreements, to assist the 
government’s efforts to prevent trafficking, protect victims, and punish traffickers; or
b. the United States toward agreed goals and objectives in the collective fight against trafficking.
10. Whether the government of the country, consistent with the capacity of such government, systematically 
monitors its efforts to satisfy the criteria described in paragraphs (1) through (8) and makes available 
publicly a periodic assessment of such efforts.
11. Whether the government of the country achieves appreciable progress in eliminating severe forms of 
trafficking when compared to the assessment in the previous year.
12. Whether the government of the country has made serious and sustained efforts to reduce the 
demand for –
a. commercial sex acts; and
b. participation in international sex tourism by nationals of the country.
Vicente was thrilled when he was recruited and offered an educational visa 
to attend community college in the United States.  The college program 
promised free tuition for a two-year degree program in Culinary Arts, free 
room and board, and an internship.  After arriving in the United States, 
Vicente and several other Chilean students learned their program had been 
changed from a two-year program to a one-year program in food services. 
Instead of an internship, the school required the Chilean students to work 
40 hours per week in a meat processing plant to pay off a debt for the 
academic program—that they had been told would be tuition-free—and 
pay for food and housing out of their wages.  The school administrators 
forced Vicente and the other students to adhere to an exhausting work 
and academic schedule and threatened deportation and legal action if 
they failed to comply or skipped a work shift.  When the school closed 
the educational visa program after complaints were filed, it encouraged 
students to self-deport.
CHILE-UNITED STATES
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GLOBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT DATA 
The above statistics are estimates derived from data provided by foreign governments and other sources and reviewed by the Department of State. Aggregate data 
fluctuates from one year to the next due to the hidden nature of trafficking crimes, dynamic global events, shifts in government efforts, and a lack of uniformity in national 
reporting structures. The numbers in parentheses are those of labor trafficking prosecutions, convictions, and victims identified.
YEAR PROSECUTIONS CONVICTIONS VICTIMS IDENTIFIED NEW OR AMENDED LEGISLATION
2014 10,051 (418) 4,443 (216) 44,462 (11,438) 20
2015 19,127 (857) 6,615 (456) 77,823 (14,262) 30
2016 14,939 (1,038) 9,072 (717) 68,453 (17,465) 25
2017 17,471 (869) 7,135 (332) 96,960 (23,906) 5
2018 11,096 (457) 7,481 (259) 85,613 (11,009) 5
2019 11,841 (1,024) 9,548 (498) 118,932 (13,875) 7
2020 9,876 (1,115) 5,271 (337) 109,216 (14,448) 16
Countries in the 2021 TIP Report that are not Party to the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking In Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
Between April 2020 and March 2021,  
Comoros and Nepal became States Parties to the Protocol.
Bhutan













The 2003 reauthorization of the TVPA added to the original law a new requirement that foreign governments provide the 
Department of State with data on trafficking investigations, prosecutions, convictions, and sentences in order to fully meet the 
TVPA’s minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking (Tier 1). The 2004 TIP Report collected this data for the first time.  
The 2007 TIP Report showed for the first time a breakout of the number of total prosecutions and convictions that related to labor 
trafficking, placed in parentheses.
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2021 TIP REPORT HEROES
Each year, the Department of State honors individuals around the world who have devoted their lives to the fight against human 
trafficking. These individuals include NGO workers, lawmakers, government officials, survivors of human trafficking, and concerned 
citizens. They are recognized for their tireless efforts – despite some working in challenging environments where human trafficking 
concerns remain pervasive and facing resistance, opposition, or threats to their lives – to protect victims, punish offenders, and 
mitigate the underlying factors that cause vulnerabilities traffickers often target.  
For more information about current and past TIP Report Heroes, please visit the TIP Report Heroes Global Network at
www.tipheroes.org.
A worker pauses amidst arduous work at a 
recycling factory.  Workers handling waste 
and recyclables are exposed to hazardous 
materials such as pesticides, medical 
waste, and household cleaners placing 
them at risk of harm, injury, and infection. 
Meager factory salaries make workers 
vulnerable to traffickers.
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Josiane Lina Bemaka-Soui has developed the Central 
African Republic’s national anti-trafficking response from 
the ground up.  In her role as Presidential Advisor and the 
national Disarmament, Demobilization, and Repatriation 
program’s Strategic Focal Point for Children, Bemaka-Soui 
operationalized the government’s nascent anti-trafficking 
interagency committee and led the development and 
implementation of the country’s first national action plan on 
human trafficking.  Bemaka-Soui’s tireless leadership and her 
efforts to forge these institutional frameworks resulted in the 
critical foundation for the government to steadily improve its 
efforts to combat human trafficking.
While facing pre- and post-election crises and an ongoing 
strain on resources, Bemaka-Soui has steadfastly made sure 
the interagency committee remains consistently engaged on 
the issue, and she has played a pivotal role in marshalling 
assistance from key partners and developing key training 
and outreach programs.  In February 2021, Bemaka-Soui 
spearheaded and oversaw the launch of  the government’s first 
radio campaign to raise awareness about human trafficking in 
the local language of Sango, thereby allowing the government 
to reach key communities.  
 Bemaka-Soui is also sensitive to the effects that human 
trafficking has on individuals and their communities. She has 
gone out of her way to meet with individuals in facilities for 
internally displaced persons, who may have been exploited, 
and made sure they were aware of their rights under the 
country’s laws.  Equally notable, she has personally assisted 
former child soldiers released from prison and used her own 
money to help cover expenses for necessities.  
Sister Imelda Poole’s leadership in the fight against human 
trafficking extends far beyond her own work to inspire others. 
A force of nature, she has prioritized achieving systemic 
change through grassroots action and effective networking.  At 
the local and regional levels, she is persistent in advancing 
advocacy, outreach, and rehabilitation services to combat 
human trafficking.  
Poole is a member of the Institute of the Blessed Virgin 
Mary (Mary Ward) congregation and serves as president 
of the Religious in Europe Networking Against Trafficking 
and Exploitation (RENATE), a network of European women 
religious from 21 countries combating human trafficking.  
She has traveled throughout Europe, mentoring and training 
others and becoming a leading spokesperson for anti-
trafficking initiatives in Europe.   
Always discerning the needs of the moment, Poole adapts 
to meet new challenges.  When her ministry moved to 
Albania in 2005, she quickly established the anti-trafficking 
NGO Mary Ward Loreto (MWL) in Albania.  Under Poole’s 
strategic direction, MWL addresses the root causes of human 
trafficking, focusing on communities where Roma, migrants, 
women, and children are most vulnerable.  Poole and her 
staff have worked with more than 3,000 women.  They have 
set up 16 economic empowerment businesses throughout 
Albania, which aim to decrease women’s risk of exploitation 
by providing opportunities to participate in entrepreneurial 
projects in tourism, design, and education, among others.  In 
the past year, the MWL team has fervently worked to reduce 
the vulnerability of individuals and families in Albania affected 
by the COVID-19 pandemic to human trafficking. 
Because of her passion for the cause to which she has 
committed her life, Poole works across borders to cultivate 




JOSIANE LINA BEMAKA-SOUI 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
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Shoichi Ibusuki has been an unrelenting champion 
of protecting foreign workers’ rights, and he has worked 
tirelessly for years on behalf of foreign technical trainees to 
assist victims of forced labor and prevent abuse within Japan’s 
Technical Intern Training Program.  He is the Co-President 
of the Lawyers’ Network for Technical Intern Trainees, the 
President of the Lawyers Network for Foreign Workers, and 
a prominent legal expert in foreign labor issues.  Ibusuki’s 
advocacy, along with his unwavering and admirable dedication 
to helping foreign nationals enduring labor exploitation and 
protecting their human rights, have brought these issues to 
the forefront and raised their profile within Japan and around 
the world.
Ibusuki has sought justice on behalf of countless foreign 
workers by providing legal representation for those who 
are taking action against former employees for labor law 
violations.  Ibusuki not only has represented trafficking 
victims, many of whom participated in Japan’s Technical 
Intern Training Program, but also has been an outspoken 
advocate about the presence of forced labor in the program. 
These courageous efforts have pushed the government to start 
identifying these individuals as human trafficking victims. 
Ibusuki has gone further by advocating for the government to 
prohibit employers from retaining foreign workers’ passports 
and for Japan to impose tighter control on exploitation and 
human rights violations by labor brokers and intermediaries 
in sending countries. These measures will go a long way to 
preventing labor abuse and exploitation, especially forced 
labor.
Chantal Sagbo Sasse has been at the forefront of Gabon’s 
anti-trafficking movement for more than two decades.  She 
launched one of the country’s preeminent NGOs dedicated 
to combating child trafficking, Service International de la 
Formation des Enfants de la Rue (SIFOS), in 2000 and has 
led the organization since its founding.  
Under Sagbo Sasse’s courageous leadership and vision, 
SIFOS offers critical education to children who have 
experienced human trafficking, homelessness, or residential 
institutionalization.  She has diligently worked with 
community members, law enforcement and government 
officials, and other NGOs to ensure the country is proactively 
identifying victims and referring them to care.  Through her 
early work, Sagbo Sasse frequently interacted and established 
a deep connection with children who had survived human 
trafficking, many who were coming from Benin, her country 
of origin.  She and her team have developed anti-trafficking 
monitoring cells throughout the country’s capital composed 
of community members, whom SIFOS has trained and 
empowered to identify human trafficking within vulnerable 
populations, and to safely report suspected cases to authorities. 
From 2000 to 2020, SIFOS helped identify 578 child trafficking 
victims and reintegrate 9,039 children into local society. 
Sagbo Sasse was also a crucial member of Gabon’s anti-
trafficking inter-ministerial committee and remains the 
country’s foremost leader on this issue.  In this committee, 
she played a major role in promoting victim identification 
and protections for child trafficking victims.  While the 
government disbanded the committee in 2019 due to a lack 
of funding, Sagbo Sasse continued to give her time to be a 
key advisor to government officials, closely coordinating with 
relevant ministries on victim identification and referral efforts. 
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Guillermina Cabrera Figueroa is the specialized prosecutor 
for human trafficking for the State of Mexico.  In addition to 
her anti-trafficking accomplishments in her current position, 
she has a track record of championing the rights of trafficking 
victims and providing them with services.    
With her determination, endless work, and leadership 
while working in the federal government’s Specialized 
Investigations Office on Organized Crime, Mexico obtained 
its first criminal sentencing for crimes involving human 
trafficking and organized crime in June 2011.  In March 2013, 
Cabrera accepted the position of specialized prosecutor for 
human trafficking at the State of Mexico Attorney General’s 
Office.  In this position, Cabrera plays a pivotal role in 
advancing the office’s ability to investigate and prosecute 
human trafficking cases.  Since joining the Attorney General’s 
Office, her team has obtained 73 human trafficking convictions, 
issued 152 indictments for human trafficking, and initiated 
941 human trafficking investigations.  She continues to be a 
guiding force, bringing out the best in her team.  
Throughout her longstanding and impressive career in law 
enforcement, she has led multiple trainings for government 
personnel.  In an environment with extremely limited access 
to critical protection services, Cabrera and her office led 
efforts to secure funding for the creation of three victim 
shelters in Toluca, Huixquilucan, and Texcoco, which can 
now house up to 210 victims of trafficking.  Her office oversees 
the three shelters and partners with the inter-secretarial 
human trafficking commission, civil society organizations, 
among others to keep them running and provide services to 
the residents.   
Shakhnoza Khassanova is the director of the Legal Center 
for Women’s Initiatives, “Sana Sezim.”  She has more than 
a decade of impressive experience raising awareness about 
human trafficking, advocating for greater victim protections, 
and aiding migrants and victims of human trafficking from 
across Central Asia.  Founded in 2001, Sana Sezim has been a 
premier anti-trafficking organization in Kazakhstan and has 
greatly advanced efforts within the country to end human 
trafficking and help labor migrants. 
Led by Khassanova, Sana Sezim has worked tirelessly 
throughout the COVID-19 pandemic to keep its shelter open 
for trafficking victims and to raise awareness about safe 
migration and human trafficking.  Khassanova and Sana Sezim 
have bravely remained on the front lines to continue assisting 
migrants stranded at the Kazakhstan-Uzbekistan border due 
to pandemic closures, and who thus faced increased risk to 
human trafficking.  Sana Sezim also negotiated and partnered 
with government agencies in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and 
Tajikistan to open repatriation channels for more than 100,000 
stranded migrants amid government-mandated lockdowns 
and public health emergencies.  
Under the unparalleled leadership and direction of 
Khassanova, Sana Sezim continues to provide access to 
justice for victims of trafficking by building the organizational 
capacity of civil society organizations and the judicial system 
to combat trafficking in persons.  Khassanova also works 
closely with local police to assist victims of trafficking who 
choose to participate in criminal proceedings.
Khassanova is highly respected by government officials 
and partners from international organizations. She 
trains government officials regularly, sharing important 
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Mohammed al-Obaidly is one of the most important Qatari 
figures advocating for labor and human trafficking reforms in 
Qatar.  As an Assistant Undersecretary within the Ministry 
of Administrative Development, Labor, and Social Affairs, he 
has initiated or executed many of the policies and programs 
that have had significant impacts for trafficking victims. 
These include the creation of Labor Dispute Resolution 
Committees, the opening of the first and only shelter in the 
country for human trafficking victims, the removal of exit 
permit requirements for migrant workers, implementation 
of the minimum wage, and abolishment of the No Objection 
Certificate (migrant workers were previously required to 
obtain these certificates from their employer to transfer to 
another employer).
Qatar remains a difficult place for many migrant workers, 
and forced labor remains a serious concern in the country. 
Al-Obaidly has not solved Qatar’s human trafficking or labor 
rights problems, and he would admit it.  However, he and 
his team at the Ministry have continued to strive toward the 
goal of increasing transparency and protections against forced 
labor for migrant workers.
Al-Obaidly and his team have been strategic and persistent 
in the drive to instill real change, even when the task at hand 
seemed impossible.  Despite facing resistance and, at times, 
criticism, he and his team continue to work toward the 
implementation of labor reforms and improvement of workers’ 
lives.  Most striking, al-Obaidly empowers his team and takes 
every opportunity for them to engage and share information 
with the public, including vulnerable communities, slowly 
building a passion for labor reforms within the Ministry.
For 26 years, Rocío Mora-Nieto has dedicated her efforts to 
combat the sexual exploitation of women and, since the 1990s, 
sex trafficking in Spain through her work as director of the 
Association for the Prevention, Reintegration and Assistance 
to Prostituted Women (APRAMP).  An outstanding and 
passionate activist, she has led APRAMP to be a pioneer in the 
implementation of strategies aimed at improving coordination 
between the judiciary, state security forces, and the national 
government, which has resulted in an effective blow against 
criminal organizations responsible for sex trafficking in Spain.
As APRAMP’s director, Mora has implemented a 
comprehensive victim-centered approach, which is reflected 
in APRAMP’s mobile unit.  Those with lived experience 
help run the mobile units, and they are able to effectively 
identify and approach potential trafficking victims.  In 
addition, APRAMP has a 24-hour hotline, short-term shelters, 
multidisciplinary care centers, witness protection resources, 
legal advice, psychological support, a job education center, 
and self-employment workshops.
During the three months of Spain’s lockdown due to the 
COVID-19 pandemic, under Mora’s leadership, APRAMP 
quickly redirected its efforts toward the detection of new 
spaces where commercial sex was happening.  Doing so 
allowed the organization to continue connecting with potential 
trafficking victims, now hidden in private apartments and 
clandestine areas instead of clubs and brothels, which had 
been ordered to close due to the lockdown along with all 
other public spaces.  As a result, APRAMP was able to remain 
active in reporting on sex trafficking trends, thus providing 
strategic information to other relevant stakeholders.  During 
the pandemic, APRAMP also created intervention guides that 
set the standard for recent government guidelines for serving 





A survivor stands in front of a door 
at a shelter.  Short-term and long-
term care shelters are a necessary 
component to comprehensive 
protection services for survivors of 
human trafficking.  Governments and 
NGOs often work in partnership to 
provide specialized, trauma-informed 
care for trafficking survivors.
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Occupied by the 
Soviet Union in 1945, 
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africa
Boundary representation is not authoritative.
TIER PLACEMENTS
SPECIAL CASETIER 1 TIER 2 TIER 2 WATCH LIST TIER 3
YEAR PROSECUTIONS CONVICTIONS VICTIMS IDENTIFIED
NEW OR AMENDED  
LEGISLATION
2014 811 (49) 317 (33) 9,523 (1,308) 4
2015 1,517 (53) 719 (8) 12,125 (3,531) 6
2016 1,293 (54) 1,120 (21) 18,296 (13,205) 4
2017 1,325 (98) 515 (34) 26,517 (5,902) 2
2018 1,253 (37) 1,190 (29) 24,407(3,749) 2
2019 955 (71) 2,122 (32) 42,517 (1,284) 2
2020 1,493 (251) 382 (107) 28,538 (6,947) 8
The above statistics are estimates derived from data provided by foreign governments and other sources and reviewed by the Department of State. Aggregate 
data fluctuates from one year to the next due to the hidden nature of trafficking crimes, dynamic global events, shifts in government efforts, and a lack of 
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TIER PLACEMENTS
TIER 1 TIER 2 TIER 2 WATCH LIST TIER 3
east asia  
& pacific
Boundary representation is not authoritative.
YEAR PROSECUTIONS CONVICTIONS VICTIMS IDENTIFIED
NEW OR AMENDED  
LEGISLATION
2014 1,938 (88) 969 (16) 6,349 (1,084) 3
2015 3,414 (193) 1,730 (130) 13,990 (3,533) 10
2016 2,137 (51) 1,953 (31) 9,989 (310) 7
2017 2,949 (77) 3,227 (72) 4,915 (669) 0
2018 2,351 (63) 1,275 (16) 5,466 (291) 1
2019 3,276 (86) 3,662 (20) 14,132 (7,687) 2
2020 1,838 (70) 1,502 (12) 2,884 (691) 1
The above statistics are estimates derived from data provided by foreign governments and other sources and reviewed by the Department of State. Aggregate 
data fluctuates from one year to the next due to the hidden nature of trafficking crimes, dynamic global events, shifts in government efforts, and a lack of 
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YEAR PROSECUTIONS CONVICTIONS VICTIMS IDENTIFIED
NEW OR AMENDED  
LEGISLATION
2014 4,199 (197) 1,585 (69) 11,910 (3,531) 5
2015 4,990 (272) 1,692 (245) 11,112 (3,733) 8
2016 2,703 (201) 1,673 (40) 13,349 (3,192) 3
2017 2,548 (179) 1,257 (53) 12,750 (3,330) 0
2018 2,394 (234) 1,379 (80) 16,838 (2,675) 1
2019 2,896 (106) 1,346 (41) 17,383 (1,369) 2





*  Islands in the Caribbean Sea—although 
part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 
Aruba, Curaçao, and Sint Maarten are 
covered by the Department’s Bureau of 
Western Hemisphere Affairs.
Islands not shown to scale  
or relative position.
The above statistics are estimates derived from data provided by foreign governments and other sources and reviewed by the Department of State. Aggregate 
data fluctuates from one year to the next due to the hidden nature of trafficking crimes, dynamic global events, shifts in government efforts, and a lack of 
uniformity in national reporting structures. The numbers in parentheses are those of labor trafficking prosecutions, convictions, and victims identified.
Boundary representation is not authoritative.
TIER PLACEMENTS
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The above statistics are estimates derived from data provided by foreign governments and other sources and reviewed by the Department of State. Aggregate 
data fluctuates from one year to the next due to the hidden nature of trafficking crimes, dynamic global events, shifts in government efforts, and a lack of 
uniformity in national reporting structures. The numbers in parentheses are those of labor trafficking prosecutions, convictions, and victims identified.
YEAR PROSECUTIONS CONVICTIONS VICTIMS IDENTIFIED
NEW OR AMENDED  
LEGISLATION
2014 320 (5) 144 (25) 3,388 (2,460) 0
2015 480 (31) 343 (31) 6,068 (156) 0
2016 996 (591) 1,187 (582) 3,292 (185) 4
2017 974 (112) 104 (11) 1,834 (53) 0
2018 738 (10) 155 (7) 2,675 (83) 0
2019 788 (44) 419 (22) 3,619 (35) 0
2020 533 (106) 677 (84) 3,461 (1,827) 0
near east
Boundary representation is not authoritative.
TIER PLACEMENTS




































































72 | 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report
YEAR PROSECUTIONS CONVICTIONS VICTIMS IDENTIFIED
NEW OR AMENDED  
LEGISLATION
2014 1,839 (12) 958 (10) 4,878 (1,041) 3
2015 6,930 (225) 1,468 (16) 24,867 (1,191) 0
2016 6,297 (72) 2,193 (19) 14,706 (464) 5
2017 8,105 (264) 1,063 (48) 40,857 (11,813) 2
2018 3,102 (41) 2,465 (9) 24,544 (1,841) 1
2019 2,602 (616) 1,156 (349) 28,929 (3,227) 1
2020 2,747 (532) 831 (74) 45,060 (3,275) 3
south &  
central asia
Boundary representation is not authoritative.
The above statistics are estimates derived from data provided by foreign governments and other sources and reviewed by the Department of State. Aggregate 
data fluctuates from one year to the next due to the hidden nature of trafficking crimes, dynamic global events, shifts in government efforts, and a lack of 
uniformity in national reporting structures. The numbers in parentheses are those of labor trafficking prosecutions, convictions, and victims identified.
TIER PLACEMENTS




























































































































































































































ST. VINCENT AND GRENADINES
ST. LUCIA
VENEZUELA
 2021 Trafficking in Persons Report | 73
western 
hemisphere
YEAR PROSECUTIONS CONVICTIONS VICTIMS IDENTIFIED
NEW OR AMENDED  
LEGISLATION
2014 944 (67) 470 (63) 8,414 (2,014) 5
2015 1,796 (83) 663 (26) 9,661 (2,118) 6
2016 1,513 (69) 946 (24) 8,821 (109) 2
2017 1,571 (139) 969 (114) 10,011 (2,139) 1
2018 1,252 (72) 1,017 (177) 11,683 (2,370) 0
2019 1,324 (101) 843 (34) 12,352 (273) 0
2020 910 (55) 588 (27) 11,100 (626) 2
Boundary representation is not authoritative.
The above statistics are estimates derived from data provided by foreign governments and other sources and reviewed by the Department of State. Aggregate 
data fluctuates from one year to the next due to the hidden nature of trafficking crimes, dynamic global events, shifts in government efforts, and a lack of 
uniformity in national reporting structures. The numbers in parentheses are those of labor trafficking prosecutions, convictions, and victims identified.
TIER PLACEMENTS
TIER 1 TIER 2 TIER 2 WATCH LIST TIER 3
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The Government of X does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making 
significant efforts to do so. These efforts included undertaking 
awareness raising efforts and reaffirming its commitment to 
enact anti-trafficking legislations. However, the government 
did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared to 
the previous reporting period. The government did not show 
evidence of overall progress in prosecuting and punishing 
trafficking offenders and identifying victims of trafficking. 
Therefore, X remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the second 
consecutive year.
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Enact the draft comprehensive anti-trafficking legislation 
• Significantly increase efforts to investigate and prosecute 
trafficking offenses, and convict and punish trafficking offenders 
• Institute and consistently apply formal procedures to identify 
victims of trafficking among vulnerable groups, such as those 
arrested for immigration violations or commercial sex • Collect, 
disaggregate, analyze and disseminate counter-trafficking law 
enforcement data.
PROSECUTION
The Government of Country X decreased efforts to investigate 
and prosecute trafficking offenses during the reporting period. 
Country X does not prohibit all forms of trafficking, but 
it criminalizes slavery under Section 321 and forced labor 
under Section 322 of its criminal law. The prescribed penalty 
for forced labor—up to six months’ imprisonment—is not 
sufficiently stringent. Article 297 prohibits forced or coerced 
prostitution, and the prostitution of a child below age 15 even 
if there was no compulsion or redress; the prescribed penalty 
is up to 15 years’ imprisonment, which is commensurate with 
penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. 
Draft revisions to the penal code have not yet been enacted. 
An unconfirmed report indicates that four traffickers were 
charged with fraudulently issuing visas to workers who they 
then exploited.  Two were reportedly deported, and two were 
reportedly convicted. The government did not confirm nor 
deny the existence of this case. The government did not report 
any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government 
employees complicit in human trafficking offenses.
PROTECTION
Country X maintained minimal efforts to protect victims 
of trafficking during the reporting period. Although health 
care facilities reportedly refer suspected abuse cases to the 
government anti-trafficking shelter for investigation, the 
government continues to lack a systematic procedure for law 
enforcement to identify victims of trafficking among vulnerable 
populations, such as foreign workers awaiting deportation 
and women arrested for involvement in commercial sex; as a 
result, victims may be punished and automatically deported 
without being identified as victims or offered protection. 
 The government reported that the Ministry of the Interior has 
a process by which it refers victims to the trafficking shelter; 
however, this process is underutilized in practice. The trafficking 
shelter assisted 24 individuals during the reporting period and 
provided them with a wide range of services,including full 
medical treatment and legal and job assistance. 
Country X commonly fines and detains potential trafficking 
victims for unlawful acts their traffickers forced them to 
commit, such as immigration violations and leaving from 
their sponsors, without determining whether the individuals 
are  victims of trafficking. 
Country X sometimes offers temporary relief from deportation 
so that victims can testify as witnesses against their employers. 
However, victims were generally not permitted to leave the 
country if there is a pending case. The government did not 
routinely encourage victims to assist in trafficking investigations 
or consistently offer victims alternatives to removal to countries 
where they may face retribution or hardship.
PREVENTION
Country X increased efforts to prevent trafficking in persons 
during the reporting period. While the government made 
no apparent effort to amend provisions of Country X’s 
sponsorship law to help prevent the forced labor of migrant 
workers, the government did start to enforce other parts of the 
law to the benefit of migrant workers. One provision in the 
sponsorship law continues to require foreign workers to request 
exit permits from their sponsors in order to leave Country X. 
Although this may increase migrant workers’ vulnerability to 
forced labor, the law created a new process through which a 
laborer who was not granted an exit permit due to a sponsor’s 
refusal or other circumstances can seek one by other means. 
The Ministry of Labor sponsored media campaigns and 
organized informational workshops for officials, NGOs, and 
labor recruitment agencies. However, the government did not 
provide anti-trafficking training or guidance to its diplomatic 
personnel during the reporting period. The government has 
a national plan of action to address trafficking in persons, 
but did not publicly disseminate the plan or take steps to 
implement it during the reporting period.  The government 
did not implement any public awareness campaigns aimed at 
reducing the demand for commercial sex acts in Country X, but 
it convicted two of its nationals for soliciting children for sex in 
other countries and sentenced them to 10 years’ imprisonment. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
domestic and foreign victims in Country X, and traffickers 
exploit victims from Country X abroad. Men and women 
from South and Southeast Asia, East Africa, and the Middle 
East voluntarily travel to Country X as laborers and domestic 
servants, but some subsequently face conditions indicative 
of involuntary servitude. These conditions include threats of 
serious harm, including threats of legal action and deportation; 
withholding of pay; restrictions on freedom of movement, 
including the confiscation of passports and travel documents 
and physical, mental, and sexual abuse. In some cases, arriving 
migrant workers have found that the terms of employment 
in Country X are wholly different form those they agreed to 
in their home countries. Individuals employed as domestic 
servants are particularly vulnerable to trafficking since they 
are not covered under the provisions of the labor law. A small 
number of foreign workers transit Country X and are forced to 
work on farms in Country Y. Country X is also a destination 
for women who migrate and become involved in commercial 
sex, but the extent to which these women are subjected to sex 
trafficking is unknown.  
COUNTRY X: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
HOW TO READ A COUNTRY NARRATIVE
This page shows a sample country narrative. The tier ranking justification appears in the first paragraph of each country narrative and 
includes language that explicitly highlights the factors supporting a given tier ranking. The Prosecution, Protection, and Prevention sections 
of each country narrative describe how a government has or has not addressed the relevant TVPA minimum standards (see pages 56-58), 
during the reporting period. This truncated narrative gives a few examples.
The country’s tier ranking is based on the government’s efforts 
to combat trafficking as measured against the TVPA minimum 
standards and compared to its efforts in the preceding year.
Prioritized 
recommendations 
for how the 
government can 
better meet the 
TVPA minimum 
standards.
Synopsis of key 
developments 
that support the 
country’s tier 
ranking.
Summary of the 
government’s 
anti-trafficking 
laws and law 
enforcement 
efforts.
Summary of the 
government’s 
efforts to ensure 
trafficking victims 
are identified and 
provided adequate 
protection.








whether the government 
is making adequate efforts 




whether the government 
prohibits all forms of 





the government vigorously 
investigates and prosecutes 
trafficking offenses; convicts 
and punishes trafficking 
offenders; and provides 
data on these actions. TVPA Minimum 
Standard 4(7)—whether 
the government has made 
a equate efforts to d r ss the 
involvement in or facilitation 




the government has made 
efforts to reduce the demand 
for commercial sex acts, and, 
if applicable, participation in 
international sex tourism by 
its nationals.
Overview of human 
trafficking in 
the country and 
factors affecting 
vulnerability to 





the government adequately 
protects victims of trafficking 
by identifying them and 




the government ensures 
victims are not penalized for the 
unlawful acts their traffickers forced 
them to commit and encourages victim 
participation in investigations and 
prosecutions, including by providing 
legal alternatives to their removal 
from the country.
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A Somali refugee poses for 
a self-portrait.  Refugees 
and other displaced 
populations are vulnerable 
to exploitation, including 
from traffickers, due to a 
lack of identity documents, 
basic necessities, and 








The Government of Afghanistan does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making 
significant efforts to do so, even considering the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity. During the 
reporting period there was a government pattern of sexual slavery in 
government compounds (bacha bazi—a practice in which men exploit 
boys for social and sexual entertainment) and recruitment and use 
of child soldiers; therefore Afghanistan remained on Tier 3. Despite 
the lack of significant efforts, the government took some notable 
steps to address trafficking, including prosecuting and convicting 
members of the security services for bacha bazi, removing some 
child soldiers from armed forces, and indicting the chief of the Major 
Crimes Task Force for trafficking crimes. A school headmaster was 
also indicted in connection with the 2019 Logar case, which included 
bacha bazi, and was the first government employee to be charged 
in relation to the case. The government increased anti-trafficking 
trainings for security officials, the judiciary, and prosecutors and 
finalized a national referral mechanism to increase the identification 
of trafficking victims and refer them to proper services. However, 
the government did not investigate or prosecute many high-level 
security officials or government employees for bacha bazi, despite 
continuing reports of complicity. The government reported limited 
efforts to address other trafficking crimes that were not bacha bazi. 
An international organization reported that the government or 
government-affiliated armed groups recruited and used at least 
24 children during the reporting year. The government has never 
prosecuted any military or police officials for recruitment or use of 
child soldiers. Authorities continued to arrest, detain, penalize, and 
abuse many trafficking victims, including punishing sex trafficking 
victims for “moral crimes” and sexually assaulting victims who 
attempted to report trafficking crimes to law enforcement officials. 
Due to inadequate victim protection, some NGOs would not assist 
trafficking victims in reporting their traffickers to law enforcement. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Continue to prioritize criminal investigations and prosecutions 
of suspected traffickers, including law enforcement and military 
officials irrespective of rank, and convict and adequately sentence 
perpetrators. • Cease the unlawful recruitment and use of children 
by Afghan security forces, including for bacha bazi, and demobilize 
children from all armed groups with adequate protection and 
reintegration support. • Increase proactive identification of trafficking 
victims and ensure victims are protected during interactions with law 
enforcement. • Empower the National Child Protection Committee 
to identify and suggest the removal of public servants implicated 
in perpetrating or facilitating bacha bazi. • Cease penalization and 
abuse of victims for unlawful acts traffickers forced them to commit, 
including “moral crimes.” • Train justice system officials on the 
anti-trafficking provisions in the penal code and the prohibition 
against mediation in sex trafficking cases per the 2009 Elimination 
of Violence Against Women Act. • Cease support to nonstate armed 
groups that recruit and use child soldiers. • Provide clear guidance 
to security personnel on identification and protection of child 
trafficking victims and train them on it. • Approve, disseminate, and 
conduct widespread training on the SOPs for victim identification 
and referral to services. • Strengthen law enforcement’s capacity to 
address trafficking, including increased training and resources for 
the Ministry of Interior’s provincial anti-trafficking/smuggling units. 
• Dedicate resources for trafficking victim shelters and services, 
including for male victims. • Amend Chapter 5 of the penal code to 
increase the penalties for bacha bazi in line with penalties prescribed 
for other forms of trafficking. • Raise awareness of trafficking at the 
local level, including its definition, law enforcement and social service 
resources available, and community prevention efforts. • Support 
the High Commission for Combating Trafficking in Persons and its 
data collection efforts.  
PROSECUTION
The government increased law enforcement efforts, including on bacha 
bazi; however, official complicity in the recruitment and use of child 
soldiers continued with impunity. The 2017 Law to Combat Crimes 
of Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants criminalized 
sex trafficking and labor trafficking, including bacha bazi. The law 
prescribed penalties between five and eight years’ imprisonment. 
These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with those for other serious crimes. 
Aggravating factors increased the maximum sentence to between 10 
and 15 years’ and the imposition of the death penalty if exploitation 
for armed fighting resulted in the victim’s death. Article 510 of the 
2018 criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking, 
including bacha bazi. Article 511 prescribed penalties of five to 10 years’ 
imprisonment for trafficking offenses involving adult male victims 
and 10 to 16 years’ imprisonment if the victim was a woman or child 
or exploited in bacha bazi. These penalties were sufficiently stringent 
and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those for 
other serious crimes, such as rape. Article 512 outlined aggravating 
factors and increased penalties to 16 to 20 years’ imprisonment for 
sex trafficking or forced armed fighting and between 20 to 30 years’ 
imprisonment if the victim who was forced to fight died while 
subjected to trafficking. While the 2018 penal code also specifically 
criminalized more crimes related to bacha bazi, some of which would 
constitute trafficking offenses, it also prescribed lower penalties for 
certain acts constituting bacha bazi than those prescribed under 
Article 510. Most of these penalties were not sufficiently stringent, 
nor commensurate with the penalties prescribed for other serious 
crimes, such as rape. The government also used the 2009 Law on 
the Elimination of Violence Against Women (EVAW) to prosecute 
and convict sex traffickers. 
Despite growing political will to hold perpetrators accountable, the 
government’s lack of resources and a deteriorating security situation 
diminished enforcement of anti-trafficking laws. The judiciary 
remained underfunded, understaffed, undertrained, and in some 
cases ineffective, and judicial officials were often intimidated by 
perpetrators or corrupt officials. In urban areas, if judges or prosecutors 
did not assess that a clearly defined legal statute applied or they 
were unaware of the statutory law, then they enforced customary 
law, which often resulted in outcomes that discriminated against 
women. While the EVAW law expressly prohibited mediation, and 
other Afghan laws neither permitted nor prescribed mediation in 
criminal cases, police and judges often referred trafficking victims 
to mediation. In some areas, anti-government forces such as the 
Taliban instituted their own customary justice practices, including 
for trafficking victims. In some cases involving sexual abuse, the 
Taliban executed both perpetrator and victim. 
As in the previous year, ministries provided limited data, which 
made it difficult to compare to previous years. The Ministry of 
Interior (MOI) reported referring 237 cases of bacha bazi to the 
Attorney General’s Office (AGO), with 185 of these cases under 
police investigation at the end of the reporting period, compared 
with the investigation of 16 suspects in 14 trafficking-related cases 
in 2019. The government separately reported additional statistics 
on combined human trafficking and migrant smuggling efforts. 








an unknown number of cases. It was unclear how many of these 
investigations and prosecutions were for human trafficking. 
In addition, the MOI’s Major Crimes Task Force chief Abdul Razaq 
Ahmadzai was indicted for trafficking offenses; he is the highest-
ranking government official to face such charges. The AGO initiated 
prosecution of 19 suspects in four bacha bazi-related cases. In one 
of the cases, the government charged four suspects in connection to 
a network of child sexual abuse, including bacha bazi, uncovered in 
November 2019 within the Logar public high school system. One 
of the four suspects was a high school headmaster and the first 
government employee to face charges of child sexual assault related 
to the case. The judiciary convicted seven Afghan National Police 
(ANP) officers of bacha bazi, murder, rape, assault, and sodomy in 
one case and separately, two Afghan National Army (ANA) officers 
for bacha bazi during the reporting period. These were the first 
known cases where the government charged uniformed police officers 
directly with bacha bazi and did not solely charge the trafficker with 
the related crimes. Courts sentenced one ANP officer to death, two 
received 30-year prison sentences, and the remaining four received 
24-year prison sentences. Courts sentenced the two ANA officers to 
18 months’ imprisonment. In addition, the court convicted nine 
individuals of child sexual assault for their involvement in the 
2019 Logar bacha bazi case involving the sexual abuse of 165 male 
students. Courts sentenced the perpetrators to between five and 22 
years’ imprisonment. According to the High Commission, at the 
close of the reporting period, 47 trafficking cases were currently 
with the primary court, 35 with the appellate court, and 76 with the 
supreme court. Thirteen cases involving bacha bazi were with the 
primary court and eight with the appellate court. Courts convicted 
seven traffickers under the anti-trafficking and EVAW laws in the 
previous reporting period. 
While the government took action to investigate, prosecute, and 
convict government officials allegedly complicit in bacha bazi in 
the above cases, disregard for the rule of law and official complicity 
in trafficking, especially bacha bazi, remained widespread. Afghan 
security forces, in particular the ANP and Afghan Local Police (ALP—
disbanded in late 2020), continued to recruit boys for bacha bazi. Local 
authorities acknowledged that some police, especially checkpoint 
commanders, recruited boys for sex trafficking in bacha bazi. An 
international organization reported Afghan security forces or pro-
government militias perpetrated seven cases of sexual violence and 
rape, including possible bacha bazi, during the reporting period; this 
included three cases by the ANP, one by the ALP, one by the ANA, 
one by the Afghan National Army-Territorial Force, and one by a 
pro-government armed group. The government reported prosecution 
and conviction of the officials involved in one ANP and one ANA 
case and is investigating the remaining cases. Additionally, the 
international organization noted the reported cases did not reflect the 
full extent of the problem given the obstacles victims and witnesses 
faced in reporting, as well as the organization’s challenges in verifying 
these cases due to the sensitivities around victim stigmatization 
and gender and concerns for victim and witness protection. Some 
Afghan security forces and pro-government militias—some of whom 
may have received direct financial support from the government—
recruited boys specifically for use in bacha bazi. In some instances, 
ANA officials reportedly used promises of food and money to entice 
boys into bacha bazi. 
Afghan security forces, including the ANA, ANP, and the now-
disbanded ALP, continued to recruit and use children in combat and 
non-combat roles. MOI and the Ministry of Defense (MOD) continued 
to rely on past directives they had issued to prevent the recruitment 
and sexual abuse of children. An international organization stated 
the government made notable progress on combating the recruitment 
and use of child soldiers through its Child Protection Units (CPUs) 
in ANP recruitment centers. Beginning in 2018 the government 
established one CPU in each of the 34 provinces; all 34 remained 
active during the reporting period. According to the Office of the 
President, MOD prevented the recruitment of more than 5,050 
children into Afghan national defense and security forces during 
the year. However, in 2020, an international organization reported 
the ALP and pro-government armed groups jointly recruited and 
used eight children, the ANP recruited and used five, the Afghan 
National Army-Territorial Force recruited and used four, and pro-
government armed groups recruited and used seven children. This 
is similar to previous years, though experts stressed recruitment and 
use of child soldiers remained underreported, often due to safety 
concerns. The government has never prosecuted any military or 
police official for recruitment or use of child soldiers, though it did 
investigate some claims. Some officials accepted bribes to produce 
identity documents for boys stating they were at least 18 years old. 
In addition, media reported the ANP and pro-government militias 
forced some civilians to defend isolated outposts in the north of 
country against insurgents; untrained civilians arrived at these 
locations often through the fraudulent promise of work and were 
left isolated with limited supplies for months at a time. 
Widespread official complicity in human trafficking continued outside 
of the Afghan security forces, often with impunity. Observers noted 
perpetrators of bacha bazi often paid bribes to, or had relationships 
with, law enforcement, prosecutors, or judges who protected them 
from prosecution. In the past, a public health official who conducted 
forensic exams for criminal cases reported state prosecutors pressured 
him not to report confirmed evidence of abuse, including in cases 
of bacha bazi. In 2019, activists spent six months investigating 
and interviewing hundreds of boys ages 14-20 in Logar province 
across three high schools and found evidence that at least 165 
were sexually abused by teachers, principals, vice principals, fellow 
students, and at least one local law enforcement official. Some youth 
were required to have sex in exchange for passing grades. Officials 
dismissed one school manager accused of bacha bazi from his job 
but later gave him a job at Logar’s provincial Education Department. 
After an international outcry, several government bodies—including 
the AGO, Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission 
(AIHRC), Ministry of Education (MOE), Parliament, and the Logar 
provincial government—investigated the allegations, but the quality 
and thoroughness of the investigations varied, and the results were 
inconsistent with victim reports. The AGO investigation identified 
20 suspected perpetrators, 10 of whom the government had arrested 
by the end of the reporting period, including a school headmaster, 
resulting in nine convictions. Separately, in previous reporting periods, 
female sex trafficking victims alleged prosecutors and judicial officials 
sought sexual favors in exchange for continuing investigations and 
prosecutions of their cases. 
Law enforcement and judicial officials continued to have a limited 
understanding of trafficking. While the 2017 law used separate 
terms and definitions for trafficking and smuggling, Dari, the most 
widely spoken language in Afghanistan, historically used the same 
word for human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and officials 
conflated the two crimes. The High Commission developed and 
implemented awareness classes for an unknown number of officials 
and the government, with funding from a foreign government, also 
developed its first Countering Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling 
of Migrants Training Manual with the help of an international 
organization. The National Directorate of Security (NDS) Human 
Rights Department conducted 89 seminars on child protection 
and the prevention of trafficking, including bacha bazi, in 2020. 
The President directed the government to improve the quantity 
and quality of trafficking prosecutions, which subsequently led 
government legal experts to provide a three-day training on trafficking 
laws to provincial judicial officials. Separately and in partnership 
with a foreign government, the AGO, Supreme Court, and the 
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) provided training to approximately 
300 prosecutors, judges, and legal aid attorneys on sections of 
the Afghan penal code covering bacha bazi from October 2019 
through November 2020. MOD’s Human Rights Unit provided 
awareness training for 2,925 officers, noncommissioned officers, 




and the prevention of child soldiers. MOI continued to operate 
dedicated trafficking/smuggling units in each of the 34 provinces 
and in Kabul, with two officers in each province. NDS, the Afghan 
Border Police (ABP), and a Kabul-based INTERPOL unit also had 
mandates to address human trafficking. The agencies did not have a 
clear delineation of responsibilities, and therefore, NDS investigated 
most human trafficking cases. While ABP was the best positioned 
to identify and investigate trafficking at the borders and some of its 
officers received anti-trafficking training during the reporting period, 
many officials still lacked anti-trafficking training and the force as 
a whole lacked the resources to identify and investigate trafficking. 
Officials acknowledged personnel, resources, and knowledge of 
trafficking remained inadequate across all units. Law enforcement 
lacked cooperation with neighboring countries, which impeded 
investigation of transnational trafficking cases.
PROTECTION
The government maintained inadequate protection efforts and 
continued to penalize and abuse trafficking victims. The High 
Commission reported identifying 550 potential trafficking victims 
in 2020, compared with 493 in 2019, although NGOs continued to 
express concern about the validity of the figures. The government 
separately reported it identified 20 children as child soldiers in 
the military and referred them to child protection centers, as well 
as 35 children in civilian security forces in Uruzgan province who 
were returned to their families. The MOJ approved the national 
referral mechanism (NRM), drafted in previous reporting periods in 
partnership with a foreign government. While the NRM was designed 
to help officials identify and refer victims of trafficking to protective 
services, the government did not report to what extent, if at all, it was 
utilized during the reporting period. An international organization 
continued to train officials on a victim identification manual. Afghans 
continued to both voluntarily return and be deported from Iran and 
Pakistan, and traffickers abroad reportedly forced some Afghans into 
labor prior to their return or deportation. At the border, government 
agencies such as the Department of Refugees and Returnees, ABP, 
NDS, and AIHRC engaged in some screening of Afghan returnees 
for migrant smuggling and referred some Afghans to care. It was 
unclear if officials also screened returnees for trafficking or referred 
suspected trafficking victims to services. 
Police did not consistently refer trafficking victims to shelters, and the 
dearth of shelters impeded victim protection. International donors 
and NGOs provided nearly all victim care. NGOs operated, and 
international donors funded, approximately 27 women’s shelters 
in 20 provinces that provided protection, legal, medical, and social 
services to female victims of violence, including trafficking. The 
shelters did not report how many trafficking victims they assisted. 
NGOs operated two shelters for boy victims of crime that could assist 
male trafficking victims younger than 18. No government shelters 
could accommodate adult male trafficking victims. At times, the 
government placed child trafficking victims in orphanages, and some 
orphanages subjected children to trafficking. Additionally, in the 
absence of sufficient shelters for boys, authorities detained abused 
boys and placed them in juvenile rehabilitation centers. Authorities 
sometimes placed male and female victims in prison if they could 
not accommodate them in shelters. The High Commission reported 
that during 2020, 600 victims of trafficking or smuggling of migrants 
received a mix of medical, psychological, and educational care, and 
family reunification. In theory, the Ministry of Women’s Affairs 
(MOWA) would provide services for female trafficking victims and 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA) would provide 
services for boy trafficking victims; in practice, neither MOWA nor 
MOLSA offered victims much support. Family guidance centers in 
19 provinces provided non-residential legal and social services for 
women and children, including trafficking victims. The government 
employed 250 social workers, including those specifically trained to 
assist child victims of crime. The Child Protection Action Network 
(CPAN), a conglomerate of NGOs, civil society, and government 
entities overseen by MOLSA, was active in 170 districts and could 
provide shelter and some services to child victims of crime. CPAN 
was the only entity that addressed child protection issues, including 
child trafficking, outside of Kabul. 
In cases of parental complicity in child trafficking, authorities often 
returned children to their parents without sufficient efforts to ensure 
parents would not subject their children to trafficking again. MOI 
reported it returned 35 children removed from child soldiering to their 
families in Uruzgan province; it did not report if it had determined 
if the child’s home was safe for their return. The government took 
some steps to enhance child protection mechanisms, which could 
assist child trafficking victims. In the previous reporting period, 
the President ordered several ministries to create a National Child 
Protection Committee to address bacha bazi with representatives 
from AGO, AIHRC, MOE and other bodies; the government later 
decided the CPAN and High Commission were effective enough 
without the parallel body. 
Government investigators did not always interview suspected victims 
of trafficking and in some cases did not provide adequate support 
or security for victims to safely speak about what had happened. 
Victims, especially of bacha bazi, feared abuse and penalization by 
law enforcement, threats of retaliation from traffickers and one’s 
community, and even for their lives. The stigma associated with 
trafficking also prevented the vast majority of trafficking victims from 
bringing cases forward to law enforcement or seeking care. Multiple 
bacha bazi victims reported police sexually abused them when they 
tried to report their exploitation and then treated them as criminals, 
sometimes detaining and penalizing them. In the previous reporting 
period, in two high-profile investigations into sex trafficking by a 
high-ranking sports official and Afghan school teachers and police 
in Logar state, victims reported widespread retaliation from alleged 
perpetrators and, due to a lack of victim protection, fled Afghanistan. 
Also reported in the past, due to a lack of victim protection, family 
members and the Taliban murdered at least eight child sex trafficking 
victims, including some as young as 13 years old, for dishonor. 
Observers reported they did not recommend trafficking victims 
report their traffickers to law enforcement or participate in trials due 
to the significant risk of threats and reprisals and complete lack of 
protection. Afghan law allowed prosecutors to seek restitution for 
trafficking victims, but not all did so, and the ones who did were 
often unsuccessful. There were no reports that any trafficking victims 
received restitution during the reporting period. Foreign victims had 
the same limited access to services as Afghan victims, and Afghan 
law allowed foreign victims to remain in Afghanistan for at least 
six months. The High Commission did not report if it identified 
any foreign victims.
The penal code explicitly prohibited penalization of trafficking 
victims for crimes their traffickers compelled them to commit. 
Nevertheless, the formal justice system and informal, customary 
justice administered in rural areas and by the Taliban all routinely 
arrested, imprisoned, and penalized adult and child trafficking victims. 
Some female trafficking victims could not access the formal justice 
system because cultural norms precluded their engagement with 
male judicial officials. When female sex trafficking victims did access 
formal justice, officials penalized some of them for “moral crimes” 
such as sex outside of marriage. In rural areas, the lack of access to 
the formal justice system also disproportionately affected women. 
Male community leaders in some cases settled both criminal and 
civil disputes and penalized female sex trafficking victims for “moral 
crimes.” Through its customary justice practices, the Taliban detained 
and forced into labor some child and adult sex trafficking victims 
charged with “moral crimes.” Authorities equally penalized male sex 
trafficking victims. Authorities prosecuted bacha bazi victims as equally 
responsible “criminals” as their adult traffickers. Authorities remanded 
boy sex trafficking victims to Juvenile Rehabilitation Centers (JRCs) 
on criminal charges and detained them for several years. Multiple 
organizations reported JRCs lacked adequate food and education 
and reported allegations of sexual violence, including against child 








presumed detained children to be guilty and did not provide them 
with knowledge of the charges against them or access to lawyers. 
Officials sometimes prosecuted victims for possessing forged identity 
documents. Following their interception by government forces, all 
child soldiers from militia groups are initially placed into an NDS 
detention facility and are sometimes transferred to juvenile JRCs 
and later to a shelter for child victims of trafficking, conflict-related 
violence, abandonment, and other issues, run by MOLSA and 
located in Kabul. An estimated 125 children were held at the NDS 
detention facility during 2020, 30 were held at the shelter, and there 
was no reliable estimate of how many children were held in JRCs. 
The government operated a total of five shelters for children, with 
two more under construction. The government arrested, detained, 
and prosecuted for terrorism-related crimes children younger than 
12 years old that nonstate armed groups had forcibly recruited. 
PREVENTION
The government made increased efforts to adopt anti-trafficking 
prevention plans, but the government’s implementation remained 
inadequate to prevent trafficking. The High Commission, the 
government’s autonomous inter-ministerial anti-trafficking committee 
under the MOJ, met twice in 2020, and its Technical Committee met 
more than a dozen times. The High Commission’s working-level 
committee lacked resources and influence over member ministries 
and relied heavily on NGOs to coordinate and fund meetings. The 
High Commission formally petitioned the government for a budget, 
increased staff, greater cooperation among ministerial-level members, 
and additional capacity building, but it did not receive any of these 
requests during the reporting period. Provincial-level anti-trafficking 
commissions operated in 16 provinces, chaired by the respective 
provincial governors, with plans for commissions to operate in 
all 34 provinces. There were no reports as to how frequently these 
commissions met or how effective they were. In addition, the office of 
the President reported the presence of anti-trafficking focal points in 
33 provinces. The government had an anti-trafficking national action 
plan (NAP) that covered 2018-2021. During the reporting period, 
the Office of the National Security Council led the development of a 
new NAP which outlined specific actions for MOI, MOD, MOJ, and 
other ministries. The Cabinet approved the NAP, but it awaited final 
approval by the President at the end of the reporting period. The MOJ 
continued to refuse to share data with an international organization 
to publish an annual national report on human trafficking. The High 
Commission, in partnership with international organizations and 
NGOs, continued public awareness programs that reached more than 
8,000 citizens, government officials, and security force personnel. 
Separately, several agencies also conducted anti-trafficking awareness 
sessions for vulnerable groups: during 2020, Ministry of Public Health 
awareness programs reached more than 13,500 Afghans repatriated 
from Iran, Pakistan, Greece, Turkey, and European countries; MOWA’s 
trafficking awareness programs reached more than 100 government 
and NGO officials, as well as district and village elders across Kabul. 
MOE introduced a policy on the prevention of sexual harassment and 
abuse in schools in response to the Logar case in 2019. MOE officials 
worked with Logar legal advocates to reform school regulations and 
curriculum, emphasizing the safety of children and the need for 
awareness of anti-trafficking laws, such as those outlawing bacha 
bazi, and providing protections for survivors. Legal advocates also 
worked with Ministry of Higher Education officials to develop and 
implement guidelines and protocols to address trafficking, sexual 
harassment, and abuse on university campuses. MOD, MOI, and NDS 
completed their common child protection policy for their forces in 
the field and began disseminating it among rank-and-file personnel. 
The government had some existing migrant labor agreements with 
Gulf countries but did not implement them during the reporting 
period. The AGO noted that it did not receive any child labor cases 
during the reporting period, neither from other ministries nor 
NGOs. Given the lack of reported cases, experts assessed there was 
not a functioning referral mechanism between criminal authorities 
and social services.
MOI operated CPUs in all 34 provinces to prevent the recruitment of 
children into the ANP. According to an international organization, 
these units prevented 187 underage applicants from joining the ANP. 
MOD reported it prevented the recruitment of 90 children during 
2020. Additionally, an MOD review of former ALP personnel slated 
for MOD service triggered by the forces’ dissolution revealed 131 boys, 
who were refused enlistment. For the ANP, some NGOs reported 
CPUs were not sufficiently equipped, staffed, or trained to provide 
adequate oversight. The government did not have a sufficient referral 
pathway for children identified by CPUs and prevented from joining 
the security forces to provide shelter, services, and family reintegration; 
thus, the children remained highly vulnerable to recruitment and 
use, as well as other forms of forced labor. The government did not 
make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts or provide 
anti-trafficking training for diplomatic personnel.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Afghanistan, and traffickers exploit victims 
from Afghanistan abroad. Internal trafficking is more prevalent 
than transnational trafficking. Traffickers exploit men, women, 
and children in bonded labor, a form of forced labor by which 
traffickers offer loans and manipulate the debts to coerce workers 
into continued employment. The pandemic increased the risk of 
exploitation by traffickers, especially bonded labor, as individuals 
took out loans to cover expenses. Traffickers compel entire families 
to work in bonded labor in the brickmaking industry, predominately 
in eastern Afghanistan, and in carpet weaving countrywide. Most 
Afghan trafficking victims are children forced to work in carpet 
making, brick kilns, domestic servitude, commercial sex, begging, 
poppy cultivation and harvesting, salt mining, transnational drug 
smuggling, and truck driving. Some Afghan families force their 
children into labor with physical violence or knowingly sell their 
children into sex trafficking, including bacha bazi. Opium-farming 
families sometimes sell their children to settle debts with opium 
traffickers, and some drug-addicted parents subject their children 
to sex trafficking or force them into labor, including begging. Some 
orphanages run by NGOs and overseen by the government subjected 
children to trafficking. During the previous reporting period, multiple 
former government officials alleged high-level officials forced women 
to have sex in exchange for jobs and promotions. Victims alleged 
some law enforcement and judiciary officials requested sexual 
favors in exchange for pursuing cases. In 2019, 165 boys in Logar 
province reported widespread sexual abuse by government teachers, 
principals, and local law enforcement, including requiring children 
to have sex in exchange for passing grades and subjecting boys to sex 
trafficking in bacha bazi. Some boys who reported sexual abuse and 
sex trafficking to police reported police officers then raped them. 
Afghan security forces and nonstate armed groups continue to 
unlawfully recruit and use children in combat and non-combat 
roles. Insurgent groups, including the Taliban and the Islamic State 
in Khorasan Province, use children in direct hostilities, to plant 
and detonate improvised explosive devices (IEDs), carry weapons, 
spy, and guard bases. The Taliban recruits child soldiers from its 
madrassas in Afghanistan and Pakistan that provide military training 
and religious indoctrination, and it sometimes provides families cash 
payments or protection in exchange for sending their children to these 
schools. Armed groups target children from impoverished and rural 
areas, particularly those under Taliban control. The Taliban abducts 
and forces adult women into labor. The Taliban maintains illegal 
detention facilities in which it forces detainees, including child and 
adult sex trafficking victims charged with “moral crimes,” into labor. 
ANA, ANP, and ALP use children in combat and non-combat roles, 
including to carry weapons and as personal servants, support staff, 




may receive direct financial support from the government recruited 
and used child soldiers, primarily in support roles and for bacha bazi. 
Traffickers’, including government and military officials’, exploitation 
of children as young as 9 in bacha bazi remained pervasive nationwide. 
In the northern provinces, many bacha bazi traffickers were community 
elders or private citizens. In southern provinces, by contrast, bacha 
bazi perpetrators were more commonly police, military, and local 
government officials. Local authorities overwhelmingly acknowledged 
that many police, especially checkpoint commanders, recruited 
boys for sex trafficking in bacha bazi nationwide but especially 
in Kandahar province. Bacha bazi survivors reported to NGOs an 
“overwhelming understanding that bacha bazi is committed by the 
powerful,” including military commanders and community leaders. 
International organizations reported cases of bacha bazi by nearly all 
groups. ALP, ANA, and pro-government militias reportedly recruited 
some children specifically for bacha bazi. Perpetrators of bacha bazi 
sometimes offer bribes or use relationships with law enforcement, 
prosecutors, and judges to evade punishment. 
In 2020, Afghanistan received approximately 865,793 returns of 
undocumented Afghan migrant workers from Iran and Pakistan. 
Traffickers specifically targeted returnees for forced labor in agriculture, 
brick kilns, and carpet weaving. In 2019, Turkey deported nearly 24,000 
Afghans; while most were migrant smuggling victims, traffickers had 
previously forced some to work in Iran or to fight in militias in Syria. 
Traffickers targeted Afghans residing in Pakistan – including 1.4 
million Afghan Proof of Registration (POR) card holders, 880,000 
Afghan Citizen Card (ACC) holders, and an estimated 300,000 to 
500,000 undocumented Afghans. The Pakistani government allowed 
the ACC and POR registration to expire, further increasing Afghans’ 
vulnerability to exploitation. International organizations documented 
cases of IDPs selling their children to local shopkeepers in servitude 
to repay debts. Some traffickers targeted indebted IDPs for forced 
labor and sex trafficking.
Afghan men, women, and children pay intermediaries to assist 
them in finding employment abroad, primarily in Iran, Pakistan, 
and Europe; some intermediaries and employers force Afghans into 
labor or sex trafficking. Some Afghan women and girls who are sold 
to husbands in Afghanistan, India, Iran, and Pakistan are exploited 
in sex trafficking and domestic servitude by their new husbands. 
According to an international organization, during the reporting 
period, the economic effects of pandemic as well as other conditions, 
such as drought in several provinces, exacerbated the problem of 
families selling girls into marriage. Some Afghan parents forcibly send 
boys to Iran to work to pay for their dowry in an arranged marriage. 
Afghan boys and men are subjected to forced labor and debt bondage 
in agriculture and construction, primarily in Iran, Pakistan, Greece, 
Turkey, and the Gulf states. Traffickers in Iran, including Iranian 
criminal groups, exploit Afghan children in forced labor as beggars 
and street vendors and forced criminality, including drug trafficking 
and smuggling of fuel and tobacco. Iranian police sometimes detain, 
torture, and extort Afghan child trafficking victims before deportation. 
The Iranian government and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps 
continue to force and coerce Afghan migrants, including children as 
young as 12 years old, to fight in Iranian-led-and-funded Shia militias 
deployed to Syria by threatening them with arrest and deportation to 
Afghanistan. Trafficking networks smuggle Afghan nationals living 
in Iran to Europe and subject them to sex trafficking and force them 
to work in restaurants to pay off debts incurred by smuggling fees. 
Some Afghan traffickers have subjected Afghan boys to bacha bazi in 
Germany, Hungary, Macedonia, and Serbia. Traffickers have subjected 
women and girls from China, Iran, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
and Tajikistan to sex trafficking in Afghanistan. Under the pretense 
of high-paying employment opportunities, some labor recruiting 
agencies lure foreign workers to Afghanistan from South and Central 
Asia and subject them to forced labor after arrival.
ALBANIA: TIER 2
The Government of Albania does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Albania remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
prosecuting more defendants and significantly increasing resources 
to the government-run shelter. The government transferred resources 
to a fund of seized criminal assets for victim support services, and the 
Development Center for Criminal Justice for Minors (DCCJ) produced 
documents to strengthen child protection and standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) for authorities working with child victims. The 
government appointed a new national coordinator to the Office of 
the National Anti-Trafficking Coordinator (ONAC). However, the 
government did not meet the minimum standards in several key 
areas. The government did not convict any traffickers, identified 
fewer victims, and decreased resources to NGO-run shelters. The 
government lacked screening efforts for vulnerable populations—
particularly migrants, asylum-seekers, individuals in commercial 
sex, and children—and mobile victim identification units (MIU) 
remained underfunded and staffed despite identifying most of the 
victims every year. 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers—including 
complicit officials—under Articles 110(a) and 128(b) of the criminal 
code. • Increase efforts to screen vulnerable populations and train 
police, labor inspectors, and other front-line officials on proactive 
identification of victims. • Institutionalize and provide training for 
law enforcement, prosecutors, and judicial officials, particularly 
district prosecutors, on investigating and prosecuting trafficking 
cases, including guidance on issues of consent and coercion in the 
context of labor and sex trafficking. • Increase funding and create 
funding mechanisms that allocate adequate funding and resources on 
a consistent and regular basis to the NGO-run shelters for trafficking 
victims. • Improve the sustainability of, and law enforcement 
participation in, mobile trafficking victim identification units. • 
Expand the jurisdiction of labor inspectors to inspect businesses that 
are not legally registered. • Increase reintegration services, including 
access to mental health services for victims and education for child 
victims. • Implement victim-centered approaches and victim-witness 
protection measures during investigation, prosecution, and court 
proceedings. 
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. Articles 110(a) 
and 128(b) of the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and 
labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of eight to 15 years’ 
imprisonment for a trafficking offense involving an adult victim, 
and ten to 20 years’ imprisonment for an offense involving a child 
victim. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to 
sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other serious 
crimes, such as rape. The Albanian State Police (ASP) investigated 
31 cases with 32 suspects (41 cases with 62 suspects in 2019); 22 
cases with 27 suspects for adult trafficking and nine cases with five 






for “knowingly soliciting or patronizing a sex trafficking victim to 
perform a commercial sex act” (two in 2019). The General Prosecution 
Office (GPO) investigated 43 cases with 16 defendants (25 cases with 
eight defendants in 2019); 30 cases with four defendants for adult 
trafficking and 13 cases with 12 defendants for child trafficking. GPO 
prosecuted two cases with 12 defendants (three cases with three 
defendants in 2019); one defendant for adult trafficking and eleven 
defendants for child trafficking. Courts did not convict any traffickers 
(five in 2019). The appeals court reviewed and confirmed decisions 
on three traffickers (three in 2019). The government suspended courts 
from March to April 2020 due to pandemic mitigation efforts and 
suspended activities when judicial staff tested positive for COVID-19.
ASP maintained an Anti-Trafficking Unit, which investigated trafficking 
in persons in addition to drug and contraband trafficking. The 
government continued judicial reforms that changed prosecutorial 
jurisdiction for trafficking cases; the Special Structure against 
Corruption and Organized Crime (SPAK) and the Special Court 
of Appeals on Corruption and Organized Crime have jurisdiction 
over trafficking cases related to organized crime, while district 
courts prosecuted trafficking cases without an organized crime 
nexus. However, GRETA, prosecutors, and other observers reported 
that district prosecutors did not have the specialized experience 
and capacity to prosecute trafficking cases successfully. GRETA and 
observers reported that authorities confused overlapping elements of 
exploitation of prostitution and trafficking and at times applied the 
lesser charge, because it required less specialization and time or due to 
the false belief that trafficking crimes required a transnational element. 
Limited resources and constant turnover within law enforcement 
created additional obstacles to maintaining capacity to investigate 
trafficking. The government, at times in cooperation with NGOs 
and international organizations, trained police officers, judges, 
prosecutors, and victim coordinators on various anti-trafficking 
issues. The government suspended five police officials, including 
the Director of the Border and Emigration Directorate of Tirana and 
three chiefs of units, after media reported a story that alleged their 
complicity in an organized trafficking operation. The government 
conducted an investigation into the officers involved but did not report 
prosecuting or convicting these officials or any other government 
employees complicit in human trafficking crimes. GPO executed three 
international arrest warrants, sent ten rogatory letters, and received 
five rogatory letters from foreign authorities. GPO continued a joint 
investigation with Italian authorities and received one request to 
extradite a suspected trafficker and asked a foreign government to 
extradite a suspected trafficker to Albania. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained victim protection efforts. The government 
and NGOs identified 81 potential victims and five officially recognized 
victims (96 potential victims and seven officially recognized victims 
in 2019). Of these, 48 were sex trafficking victims, 27 forced labor, 
and six forced criminality; 62 were female and 24 were males; 58 were 
children; three were foreign victims from The Gambia, Philippines, 
and Serbia. The government maintained a multidisciplinary national 
referral mechanism (NRM) and updated SOPs for identifying and 
referring victims to services. First responders referred potential victims 
to law enforcement and state social services, who conducted joint 
interviews to determine officially recognized victim status. The law 
provided equal services for both potential and officially recognized 
victims. MIUs in eight regions, consisting of social workers from 
NGOs and police officers, identified most of the victims every 
year, but the units’ sustainability was uncertain due to the lack of 
permanent staff, formalization, and resources; MIUs identified 45 
potential victims (42 potential victims in 2019). Experts reported 
that police did not participate consistently in the MIUs despite 
signing a memorandum of understanding that formalized their 
participation. Experts also stated that law enforcement rarely initiated 
cases when civil society identified a potential victim, but ASP noted 
that definitional differences with civil society on what constituted 
trafficking caused obstacles in identification. Observers continued 
to report that border police lacked resources, interpreters, and 
knowledge to screen consistently or implement SOPs for irregular 
migrants and asylum-seekers. As in previous years, ASP did not screen 
individuals in commercial sex for indicators of trafficking during 
raids and investigations of commercial sex establishments, and the 
Labor Inspectorate lacked the training to identify victims of forced 
labor. Observers also reported that the absence of a standardized 
database created confusion among relevant government agencies 
on who was responsible for providing support. 
The government operated one specialized shelter and supported three 
specialized NGO-run shelters. The government allocated 17.6 million 
leks ($175,390), compared with 21.5 million leks ($214,250) in 2019 
to NGO-run shelters to support 29 staff salaries. The government 
provided an additional 6.8 million leks ($67,760) for food support to 
NGO-run shelters in 2019 and 2020. The government allocated 29.3 
million leks ($291,980) to the government-run shelter, a significant 
increase compared with 20.9 million leks ($208,270) in 2019. The 
government also transferred 4.6 million leks ($45,840) to a fund 
of seized criminal assets for victim support services (none in 2019). 
NGO-run shelters continued to operate under financial constraints and 
relied on outside sources for operating costs. Additionally, funding 
delays hindered shelter operations, and the government decentralized 
funding mechanisms for all social programs to municipal governments 
in 2019. Municipality grants prioritized NGOs that provided local 
assistance rather than the national scope needed for trafficking 
shelters, and experts alleged solicitation and bidding procedures at the 
municipal level were rife with corruption. The four shelters constituted 
the National Coalition of Anti-Trafficking Shelters (NCATS); victims 
who required services not available in one shelter were referred to 
another shelter within the coalition. NCATS and the government 
provided assistance to all 86 officially recognized and potential 
victims (115 in 2019), including food, mental health counseling, 
legal assistance, health care, educational services, employment 
services, assistance to victims’ children, financial support, long-term 
accommodation, social activities, vocational training, and post-
reintegration follow-up. The Ministry of Health and Social Protection 
issued an order to improve information sharing among institutions 
during the pandemic and offered residential services for vulnerable 
populations, including trafficking victims. The government provided 
vocational training for 20 officially recognized and potential victims; 
however, experts reported a lack of resources for long-term care 
and reintegration efforts, particularly for child victims and victims 
with children. NGO-run shelters allowed adult victims to leave the 
shelter voluntarily; the state-run shelter required victims to receive 
permission from the shelter director for their security. One NGO-
run shelter provided specialized services for victims under the age 
of 18 and rented apartments for male victims, where they received 
assistance from NGOs. Observers reported the shelters in the NCATS 
had professional staff and good quality of care; however, experts 
reported victim assistance measures for victims with mental health 
issues were not sufficient. National Employment Services offices 
prioritized jobseekers from vulnerable groups, including trafficking 
victims; 60 potential and officially recognized victims registered with 
the employment office for employment opportunities. 
Foreign victims had access to the same services as domestic victims; 
the law provided foreign victims a three-month “reflection period” 
with temporary residency status and authorization to work for up to 
two years. While the government granted or renewed residency to two 
foreign victims (one in 2019), NGOs reported facing difficulties in 
obtaining temporary residence permits for their beneficiaries. Unlike 
previous years, there were no reports the government penalized victims 
for crimes their traffickers compelled them to commit; however, due 
to a lack of formal identification procedures, the government may 
have detained or deported some women in commercial sex, irregular 
migrants, and asylum seekers. The government did not report the 
number of victims that cooperated in investigations and prosecutions 
(14 in 2019). SPAK possessed equipment that allowed testimony via 
video conferences, which was used in one case (the same number as 
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in 2019). Victims who testified against traffickers had access to the 
witness protection program; one victim continued to participate in 
the program. The government maintained the DCCJ with four part-
time prosecutors and a judicial police officer responsible for child 
protection in criminal proceedings. DCCJ, in cooperation with a 
foreign government, produced documents on rights of children in 
conflict with the law, rights of child victims, and SOPs for officers and 
prosecutors dealing with cases involving children. The government 
maintained 22 victim assistance coordinators, who provided legal 
assistance and guided victims in accessing services. Judges did not issue 
restitution in criminal cases and no victims pursued compensation 
through civil suits. Authorities assisted in the voluntary repatriation 
of two Albanian victims and also repatriated one foreign victim to 
The Gambia and one to Serbia. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
government continued implementation of the 2018-2020 national 
action plan (NAP) and allocated 488.9 million leks ($4.87 million) 
for its implementation. The State Committee against Trafficking in 
Persons, composed of relevant ministry representatives, monitored 
and implemented various anti-trafficking efforts. The government 
also maintained the National Anti-trafficking Task Force, composed of 
ministry officials, civil society representatives, and other participants 
that monitored the NRM. The government allocated 8.2 million leks 
($81,710) to ONAC, compared with 9.5 million leks ($94,670) in 
2019. The national coordinator led ONAC and overall anti-trafficking 
efforts; the government dismissed the national coordinator in July 
2020 but appointed a deputy interior minister as the new coordinator. 
ONAC produced a report assessing the implementation of the NAP 
and published periodic newsletters on anti-trafficking activities. Twelve 
regional anti-trafficking committees comprising local officials and 
NGOs worked on local victim assistance and referrals mechanisms. 
NCATS and ONAC signed a memorandum of understanding, which 
set up the Advisory Board of Victims of Trafficking consisting of three 
survivors; the board met once in 2020, though the pandemic made 
meetings and activities difficult. ONAC, in cooperation with civil 
society, conducted awareness campaigns for students, government 
officials, and the general public. The government also conducted 
informational meetings with representatives from the Romani and 
Balkan Egyptian communities. The government did not make efforts 
to regulate or punish labor recruiters for illegal practices that increased 
migrant vulnerability to exploitation abroad. Labor inspectors did 
not have authority to inspect informal work activities, including 
unregistered businesses. The Assembly enacted amendments to the 
law on public procurement to disqualify companies—including 
administrative personnel, leadership, or supervisory bodies—
convicted of trafficking or exploitation of children from competition 
for public contracts. The government reported the State Police 
Directorate’s hotline did not function in 2020. The government did 
not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Albania, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Albania abroad. Traffickers exploit Albanian women and children in 
sex trafficking and forced labor within the country, especially during 
tourist season. Traffickers use false promises such as marriage or 
employment offers to exploit victims in sex trafficking. Traffickers 
commonly force children to beg or perform other types of compelled 
labor, such as selling small items. Traffickers exploit Albanian children, 
mainly from the Romani and Balkan-Egyptian communities, for 
seasonal work and forced begging.  Isolated reports stated that 
traffickers exploit children through forced labor in cannabis fields in 
Albania, and some traffickers are likely involved in drug trafficking. 
Traffickers exploit Albanian victims in sex trafficking in countries 
across Europe, particularly Kosovo, Greece, Italy, Belgium, Germany, 
Switzerland, North Macedonia, Norway, the Netherlands, and the 
United Kingdom (UK).  Albanian migrants who seek employment 
in Western Europe are vulnerable to exploitation in forced labor 
and forced criminality, particularly in the UK.  Foreign victims from 
European countries, The Gambia, and Philippines are exploited in 
sex trafficking and forced labor in Albania.  Middle Eastern, Central 
Asian, and African migrants transit Albania to reach Western Europe 
and are vulnerable to trafficking, particularly unaccompanied children. 
ALGERIA: TIER 3
The Government of Algeria does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making 
significant efforts to do so, even considering the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Algeria remained on Tier 3. Despite the lack of significant efforts, 
the government took some steps to address trafficking, including 
convicting five traffickers, partnering with international organizations 
to organize virtual training workshops for officials, and drafting 
a 2022-2024 national anti-trafficking action plan. However, the 
government did not report any new trafficking investigations 
or prosecutions and did not proactively identify any trafficking 
victims. Due to the government’s ineffective screening measures for 
trafficking victims among vulnerable populations, such as African 
migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers, and individuals in commercial 
sex, authorities continued to punish some potential unidentified 
victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit. 
The government’s ongoing measures to deport undocumented 
migrants deterred some victims among this population from reporting 
trafficking crimes to the police or seeking much-needed assistance. 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Finalize and implement standardized procedures for victim 
identification and screening for use by border, security, and 
law enforcement officials who come in contact with vulnerable 
populations, such as undocumented foreign migrants, asylum-seekers, 
refugees, and persons in commercial sex. • Increase investigations, 
prosecutions, and convictions of sex and labor trafficking offenders 
and punish them with adequate penalties, which should involve 
significant prison terms. • Amend the trafficking provision of the 
penal code to remove the requirement of a demonstration of force, 
fraud, or coercion for child sex trafficking offenses. • Finalize and 
implement a formal national victim referral mechanism to refer 
victims to appropriate care. • Train law enforcement, judiciary, 
labor inspectorate, health care officials, and social workers on 
victim identification and referral procedures. • Create a mechanism 
to identify trafficking victims among vulnerable populations for 
unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit before arresting, 
prosecuting, deporting, or otherwise punishing them. • Ensure 
victims of all forms of trafficking are referred to and receive protection 
services, including appropriate shelter, adequate medical and psycho-
social care, and legal assistance. • Ensure the safe and voluntary 
repatriation of foreign victims, including through collaboration with 
relevant organizations and source country embassies, and provide 
foreign victims with legal alternatives to their removal to countries 
where they may face retribution or hardship. • Continue efforts to 
raise public awareness on the indicators and risks of trafficking. • 
Dedicate sufficient resources to and implement the national anti-






labor indicators in Cuban medical missions and Chinese nationals 
on Chinese government projects, screen Cuban medical professionals 
and Chinese nationals and refer them to appropriate services. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained uneven law enforcement efforts. Algeria 
criminalized most forms of sex trafficking and all forms of labor 
trafficking under Section 5 of its penal code and prescribed penalties 
of three to 10 years’ imprisonment and fines of 300,000 to 1 million 
Algerian dinar ($2,270-$7,560). These penalties were sufficiently 
stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent 
with international law, Section 5 required a demonstration of force, 
fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex trafficking offense, and 
therefore did not criminalize all forms of child sex trafficking. Article 
143 of Law 12-15 stated that crimes committed against children, 
including those involving sexual exploitation, would be vigorously 
penalized; it generally referenced other penal code provisions that 
could potentially be applied to child sex trafficking offenses that did 
not involve force, fraud, or coercion. Article 319 bis of the penal code, 
which criminalized the buying and selling of children younger than 
the age of 18, prescribed penalties of five to 15 years’ imprisonment 
and a fine for individuals convicted of committing or attempting 
to commit this crime; however, this law could be interpreted to 
include such non-trafficking crimes as migrant smuggling or illegal 
adoption. Since 2018 and throughout the reporting period, the 
government coordinated with an international organization to draft 
a standalone anti-trafficking law that would remove the requirement 
of a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion for child sex trafficking 
offenses and institutionalize victim protection measures; at the end 
of the reporting period the Prime Minister’s Office was reviewing the 
legislation before referring it to the Council of Ministers and legislature 
for consideration. During the reporting period, the government revised 
Algeria’s constitution and added a provision condemning trafficking, 
with the goal of focusing government attention on trafficking cases.
The General Directorate of National Security (DGSN) maintained 
seven police brigades to combat human trafficking and illegal 
immigration based in Bechar, Tamanrasset, Illizi, Souk-Ahras, 
Tlemcen, Adrar, and Annaba; five additional brigades in Algiers, 
Oran, Constantine, Ouargla, and Ghardaia supported the brigades as 
necessary. The Gendarmerie maintained 50 special brigades dedicated 
to managing children’s issues, including child trafficking. In 2020, 
the Gendarmerie and the DGSN dismantled 190 human smuggling 
groups and networks, but the ministries reported there were no 
incidents of human trafficking crimes allegedly committed by these 
groups. The government did not report investigating any trafficking 
cases for the second consecutive year. In 2020, the government did not 
report prosecuting any forced labor or sex trafficking cases; in 2019, 
the government prosecuted 13 alleged traffickers. The government 
convicted five traffickers – four for forced begging and one for sex 
trafficking – during the reporting period in two cases started in 2016 
and 2019; this was an increase compared to the previous reporting 
period when the government did not convict any traffickers. Two 
of the convicted traffickers were Algerian and three were Nigerien. 
Sentences ranged from three years imprisonment and a 300,000 
dinar ($2,270) fine to 20 years imprisonment and a 1 million dinar 
($7,560) fine. In addition, the government convicted three Algerians 
for failing to report the sex trafficking case; the government sentenced 
one to four years’ imprisonment and a 500,000 dinar ($3,780) fine 
and the other two Algerians to a one-year suspended sentence and 
a 100,000 dinar ($756) fine. The government did not report any 
investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government officials 
complicit in trafficking offenses during this reporting period. The 
government maintained four courts—based in Algiers, Constantine, 
Oran, and Ouargla—dedicated to cases involving transnational 
organized crime, under which it classified trafficking within the 
Algerian judicial system; these courts adjusted to the pandemic by 
limiting in-person participation in court processes and allowing video 
testimony. Government officials acknowledged one of the biggest 
obstacles to prosecuting cases is identifying trafficking crimes, which 
remains difficult because of a lack of well-trained investigators and 
judicial officials as well as limited public awareness.
Due to the pandemic, the government canceled most trainings 
for officials planned during the reporting period. However, the 
government, at times in coordination with international organizations, 
conducted eight virtual anti-trafficking trainings for law enforcement, 
judicial officials, and labor inspectors during the reporting period. 
Algerian officials also participated in virtual workshops hosted by 
international organizations, multilateral organizations, and foreign 
governments during the reporting period. The government continued 
to contribute to INTERPOL’s databases on organized crime and human 
trafficking. The government also reportedly prioritized building 
police-to-police cooperation with other countries in Africa, including 
through AFRIPOL, to combat all crimes, including human trafficking.
PROTECTION
The government made negligible efforts to identify and provide 
services to trafficking victims. Authorities continued to penalize 
unidentified victims. Government officials and civil society partners 
acknowledged that authorities’ lack of understanding about 
the crime of trafficking continued to be a challenge for victim 
identification efforts throughout the reporting period. While NGOs 
and international organizations reported identifying and assisting at 
least 26 trafficking victims and 19 potential trafficking victims during 
the reporting period, the government did not report proactively 
identifying any victims. In 2019, the government identified 14 
victims. The government did not report systematically screening 
for trafficking among vulnerable migrants, including those that it 
deported throughout the year, nor among individuals in commercial 
sex, refugees, or asylum-seekers—populations highly vulnerable to 
trafficking. The government did not have comprehensive standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) or a formal mechanism to identify and 
refer victims to protection services. The government reported that 
individual agencies used their own victim identification SOPs and an 
informal referral system to ensure victims received access to medical 
and psychological services and shelter; however, the government did 
not report how often relevant authorities used this system during 
the reporting period. Recognizing this deficiency, the government 
continued cooperating with an international organization to develop 
a formal national victim referral mechanism. The government did 
not finalize the referral mechanism or the SOPs by the end of the 
reporting period.
Unidentified victims continued to face punishment—such as arrest, 
detention, prosecution, and deportation—for illegal migration, 
prostitution, and other unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to 
commit. For example, border and other security authorities continued 
to regularly deport African migrants—a population highly vulnerable 
to trafficking—and they lacked the manpower and capability to 
systematically screen each migrant for trafficking indicators. In 
October 2020, an NGO reported that authorities deported some 
refugees and asylum-seekers, some of whom were potential trafficking 
victims, due to a lack of effective screening measures. In addition, an 
NGO reported that authorities expelled migrants outside of official 
deportation procedures, at times leaving migrants in the desert at 
the Mali and Niger borders. Officials continued to rely on victims 
to report abuses to authorities, yet civil society groups observed that 
most trafficking victims in Algeria were undocumented migrants who 
typically did not report trafficking crimes to the police or file lawsuits 
against their traffickers. Although public services, such as healthcare 
and education, were available and free for foreigners in Algeria, many 
undocumented migrants avoided seeking public services, including 
out of fear of deportation. The government’s deportation operations 
further discouraged foreign trafficking victims from making their 
presence known to authorities.
Victim protection services remained inadequate. The government did 
not provide shelter or other protection services specifically tailored to 
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the needs of trafficking victims, nor did it track the specific resources it 
allocated to protection services during the reporting period. However, 
the government continued to report the Ministries of Health and 
National Solidarity, as well as other ministries, could provide foreign 
and domestic trafficking victims with free services as needed, to 
include shelter, food, medical services, interpretation services, legal 
consultations, psychological counseling, and repatriation assistance. 
The government reported five victims received these services during the 
reporting period but did not provide specific details. The government 
reported it allowed relief from deportation for identified trafficking 
victims for an indefinite period of time and allowed all foreign victims 
to stay in Algeria temporarily; however, it did not grant work permits 
to trafficking victims while under temporary residency status. The 
government did not report encouraging victims to participate in the 
investigation and prosecution of traffickers; however, it reported it 
could provide victims with access to a lawyer, police protection, and 
video testimony during trial. Trafficking victims were legally entitled 
to file civil suits against their offenders, but the government did not 
report cases in which victims did so during the reporting period. The 
government reported it would provide restitution to victims if the 
courts found the perpetrator guilty, but it did not provide an instance 
in which this occurred during the reporting period. The government 
did not report providing foreign victims with legal alternatives to 
their removal to countries where they faced retribution or hardship 
during the reporting period.
PREVENTION
The government maintained weak efforts to prevent human trafficking. 
The pandemic and prolonged political paralysis stalled government 
progress on a range of governance initiatives, including anti-trafficking 
efforts. The government postponed most activities planned under 
the national anti-trafficking action plan for 2019-2021 for 2020 due 
to pandemic-related restrictions. However, the government began 
drafting a 2022-2024 national anti-trafficking action plan. The 
national inter-ministerial anti-trafficking committee had an annual 
budget of 12 million dinars ($90,760) that it could use to implement 
the action plan, but it did not provide a breakdown of resource 
allocation for implementation. The presidential decree that formally 
institutionalized the anti-trafficking committee required it to submit 
a report to the president on the trafficking situation in Algeria and 
the 2019-2021 national action plan required the committee to submit 
quarterly factsheets on activities; however, it did not provide a report or 
factsheets in 2020. The government organized a public awareness event 
in collaboration with an international organization on World Day 
against Trafficking in Persons in July 2020; the government delayed 
other planned public awareness activities due to the pandemic. The 
National Council on Human Rights, which monitored and evaluated 
human rights issues in Algeria, continued to lead a sub-committee 
dedicated to human trafficking issues. The government continued 
to operate three hotlines, which were operational 24 hours a day, 
and a public website to report abuse and other crimes, including 
potential trafficking crimes; none of the hotlines reported receiving 
trafficking allegations in 2020. The government did not make efforts 
to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Algeria, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Algeria abroad. Undocumented sub-Saharan migrants, primarily 
from Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, Liberia, and 
Nigeria are most vulnerable to labor and sex trafficking in Algeria, 
mainly due to their irregular migration status, poverty, and in 
some cases language barriers. Unaccompanied women and women 
traveling with children are particularly vulnerable to sex trafficking 
and forced domestic work. Refugees and asylum-seekers are also 
vulnerable to trafficking either before or during their migration to 
Algeria. In some instances, traffickers use false promises of work, 
such as in a beauty salon or restaurant, to recruit migrants to Algeria 
where they ultimately exploit them in sex trafficking or forced labor. 
More often, Sub-Saharan African adults, often en route to Europe 
or in search of employment, enter Algeria voluntarily but illegally, 
frequently with the assistance of smugglers or criminal networks. 
Many migrants, impeded in their initial attempts to reach Europe, 
remain in Algeria and work in Algeria’s informal job market until 
they can continue their journey. While facing limited opportunities 
in Algeria, many migrants illegally work in construction and some 
engage in commercial sex acts to earn money to pay for their onward 
journey to Europe, which puts them at high risk of sex trafficking and 
debt bondage. Traffickers often use restaurants, houses, or informal 
worksites to exploit victims, making it difficult for authorities to 
locate traffickers and their victims. Some migrants become indebted 
to smugglers, who subsequently exploit them in forced labor and 
sex trafficking upon arrival in Algeria. For example, some employers 
reportedly force adult male and child migrants to work in the 
construction sector to pay for smuggling fees for onward migration, 
where employers restrict migrants’ movement and withhold their 
salaries; some migrants on these construction sites report being afraid 
to seek medical assistance for fear of arrest by Algerian authorities. 
Female migrants in the southern city of Tamanrasset—the main 
transit point into Algeria for migrants—are exploited in debt bondage 
as they work to repay smuggling debts through domestic servitude, 
forced begging, and sex trafficking. Some migrants also fall into debt 
to fellow nationals who control segregated ethnic neighborhoods 
in Tamanrasset; these individuals pay migrants’ debts to smugglers 
and then force the migrants into bonded labor or commercial 
sex. Tuareg and Maure smugglers and traffickers in northern Mali 
and southern Algeria force or coerce men to work as masons or 
mechanics; women to wash dishes, clothes, and cars; and children 
to draw water from wells in southern Algeria. Victims also report 
experiencing physical and sexual abuse at the hands of smugglers 
and traffickers. Civil society and international organizations reported 
in 2019 that migrant women pay smuggling networks to transport 
them internally within the country from Tamanrasset to Algiers and 
they sometimes experience sexual violence during the journey; in 
some cases, once arriving in Algiers, the networks force the women 
into domestic servitude or commercial sex in informal brothels in 
order to pay the smuggling fees.
Foreign women and girls, primarily Sub-Saharan African migrants, are 
exploited in sex trafficking in bars and informal brothels, typically by 
members of their own communities nationwide, including in cities 
such as Tamanrasset and Algiers. In 2019, civil society organizations 
reported anecdotally that criminal networks exploit young adult 
women from sub-Saharan Africa, aged 18-19, in sex trafficking in 
Algeria. Many sub-Saharan migrant women in southern Algeria 
willingly enter into relationships with migrant men to provide 
basic shelter, food, income, and safety, in return for sex, cooking, 
and cleaning. While many of these relationships are purportedly 
consensual, these women are at risk of trafficking, and migrants in 
Tamanrasset reported instances of women prevented from leaving the 
home and raped by their “partner.” In 2019, an NGO reported that 
Algerian women and girls are also vulnerable to sex trafficking rings, 
often as a result of financial difficulties or after running away from 
their homes; these incidents are reportedly clandestine in nature and 
therefore difficult for authorities and civil society actors to identify. 
Criminal begging rings are common and were reportedly increasing 
in Algeria over the past several years. Media sources suggest leaders 
of begging networks coerce or force Sub-Saharan African migrant 
children to beg through the use of punishment. In 2020, a civil 
society organization estimated criminal begging networks exploit 
more than 6,000 unaccompanied migrant children in Algeria. Local 
leaders suggest migrant children may also be coerced into work by 
their parents as a result of extreme economic pressures. According to 
credible sources in 2017, Nigerien female migrants begging in Algeria, 
who often carry children—sometimes rented from their mothers 
in Niger—may be forced labor victims. Furthermore, according to 
observers in 2017, Nigerien children, ranging from four to eight years 
old, are brought to Algeria by trafficking networks with the consent 
of their parents and forced to beg for several months in Algeria 






period, media reported alleged traffickers fraudulently recruited 55 
Bangladesh workers for work in Spain and instead exploited them 
in forced labor in the Algerian construction sector. Cuban medical 
professionals working in Algeria may have been forced to work by 
the Cuban government. Chinese nationals may have been forced to 
work by Chinese-owned enterprises. 
ANGOLA: TIER 2
The Government of Angola does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Angola remained on Tier 2. These efforts included convicting 
multiple traffickers, including five complicit officials, and sentencing 
all to imprisonment; offering long-term protective services that 
incentivized victims to participate in trials against their traffickers; 
dedicating funds specifically for anti-trafficking efforts, including for 
implementation of the national action plan (NAP); and conducting 
public awareness campaigns against trafficking. However, the 
government did not meet the minimum standards in several key 
areas. The government did not investigate some serious allegations 
of official complicity in trafficking, and while all convicted traffickers 
received sentences of imprisonment, some sentences were very short 
compared to the severity of the crime. The government substantially 
decreased victim identification efforts and did not report referring 
any identified victims to care. While the government launched a new 
hotline that received reports of trafficking, it did not yet have the 
staff or resources to investigate the claims. Finally, the government 
remained without procedures to oversee and regulate most domestic 
labor sectors and the labor recruitment process.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Implement and train front-line officials on standardized procedures 
for the proactive identification of victims among vulnerable groups, 
including foreign nationals, such as North Korean and Cuban workers, 
and refer victims to appropriate services. • Sentence convicted 
traffickers to prison terms. • Increase efforts to investigate and 
prosecute trafficking crimes, especially sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking in the construction sector and in animal herding. • Amend 
Article 178 to criminalize all forms of internal sex trafficking. • 
Increase efforts to provide shelter, counseling, and medical care for 
trafficking victims either directly or in partnership with NGOs. • 
Institute referral mechanisms for hotlines to report alleged trafficking 
cases to law enforcement. • Utilize the regional data collection tool 
to improve efforts to collect, synthesize, and analyze nationwide law 
enforcement and victim protection data. • Increase the proactive 
engagement of the inter-ministerial commission in anti-trafficking 
efforts and allocate funding for its activities. • Train law enforcement 
officials on the anti-trafficking provisions in Angolan law.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts 
and increased efforts to hold officials accountable for complicity in 
human trafficking. In November 2020, the government amended the 
anti-trafficking articles of the penal code, taking effect in February 2021. 
Laws 38/20 and 39/20 revoked the prior anti-trafficking legislation, the 
2014 Law on the Criminalization of Infractions Surrounding Money 
Laundering, slightly increasing the penalties for some trafficking 
offenses. Article 177 criminalized slavery with penalties of seven to 
15 years’ imprisonment and the buying or selling of a child under 
the age of 14 for the purpose of adoption or slavery with penalties 
of five to 10 years’ imprisonment. Article 178 criminalized the labor 
trafficking of adults and children and prescribed penalties of four 
to 10 years’ imprisonment. Article 189 criminalized some forms of 
domestic adult sex trafficking and prescribed penalties of one to eight 
years’ imprisonment. Article 190 criminalized transnational adult sex 
trafficking and prescribed penalties of two to 10 years’ imprisonment. 
Article 196 criminalized child sex trafficking and prescribed penalties 
of five to 15 years’ imprisonment. These penalties were all sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those 
prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. The 2020 amendment 
removed “sexual exploitation” as a purpose of a trafficking crime 
in Article 178. Because the other anti-trafficking articles did not 
criminalize all forms of internal sex trafficking, Angola law no longer 
criminalized all forms of sex trafficking. During the reporting period 
and before the passage of the new laws, the government continued 
to use the 2014 law to prosecute traffickers. 
During the pandemic, government offices, including investigative 
agencies and courts, operated at reduced hours with reduced staff. 
Nevertheless, the government initiated 10 trafficking investigations, 
compared with 15 potential trafficking investigations in the previous 
reporting period. One case involved the sex trafficking of Congolese 
women in Cabinda province, and all other cases involved child forced 
labor across multiple provinces. The government also continued 
13 investigations initiated in previous reporting periods, including 
several child forced labor cases and a Luanda sex trafficking case with 
11 Vietnamese and Chinese victims. The government prosecuted and 
convicted 13 suspected traffickers in three cases, a decrease from 
prosecution of 27 potential traffickers but an increase from conviction 
of 10 traffickers in the previous reporting period. The government 
convicted and sentenced five labor traffickers to between six and 
10 years’ imprisonment for child forced begging, three Congolese 
traffickers to more than eight years’ imprisonment for child and 
adult sex trafficking of Congolese women in Angola, and five police 
officers to between three and 10 years’ imprisonment for sending 
children abroad for forced labor. 
There were numerous reports of official complicity in human 
trafficking offenses, and the government took strong action in some 
cases. During the previous reporting period, the government charged 
five officers from a specialized police unit with trafficking in persons, 
forced labor, organized crime, and falsification of documents for 
allegedly conspiring to force six Angolan children to beg in Portugal, 
Italy, and France. In July 2020, it convicted all five for trafficking 
of minors to foreign countries. Three of the officials received six-
year sentences, one received a three-year sentence, and the leader, 
convicted in absentia, received a 10-year sentence. During the reporting 
period, the government uncovered and began investigating additional 
officials from the civil registration office and migration and foreigners 
service who were also allegedly involved. In the past, well-connected 
individuals confiscated land from members of the San indigenous 
group, which forced many San to work as indentured servants on the 
land they had previously owned. The government has not reported 
whether it investigated or resolved the disputes, including whether 
the land was returned to the San. In the previous reporting period, the 
government charged an Angolan border guard in Cunene province for 
conspiracy to force a woman and five boys into exploitative labor and, 
in a second case, began investigating a possible trafficking nexus in 
the investigation of an Angolan army officer charged with smuggling; 
the government did not report any updates on these cases during the 
reporting period. Systemic corruption among labor officials prevented 
effective enforcement of labor laws, including against forced labor. 
Law enforcement did not consistently or effectively enforce laws 




Multiple law enforcement agencies had mandates that included 
trafficking. In addition to the police, the Criminal Investigation 
Services and Court of Minors could investigate child trafficking. The 
National Police Academy continued to train officers on the 2014 
law, and an international organization trained 155 police officers on 
identification of trafficking. The government acknowledged officials 
at the northern Angolan-Congolese border had insufficient training 
to identify cross-border trafficking, which was reportedly prevalent. 
The Ministry of Justice and Human Rights (MJHR) trained 50 airport 
officials on identification of human trafficking. 
PROTECTION
The government decreased protection efforts. Through its 
investigations, the government identified at least 19 trafficking 
victims, including both adults and children, victims of sex and labor 
trafficking, and victims from Angola and the DRC. This is a significant 
decrease from identifying and referring to care 36 trafficking victims in 
the previous reporting period. Government officials generally referred 
identified victims to religious- or NGO-run shelters for food, clothing, 
education, and medical care; however, it did not report whether it 
referred any victims to these shelters during the reporting period. 
The government provided limited financial support to some of these 
shelters. The National Institute of Children (INAC) ran separate child 
support centers in all 18 provinces that could provide food, shelter, 
basic education, and family reunification for crime victims younger 
than age 18. Additionally, the Ministry of Social Action, Family, 
and the Promotion of Women managed a national network of safe 
houses for women, counseling centers, and children’s centers, which 
trafficking victims could access. The government could also provide 
foster care and family tracing services for child trafficking victims, 
as well as legal representation, social workers, and counseling to all 
victims. It continued to provide a social worker to two child trafficking 
victims identified in a previous reporting period. 
Law enforcement continued to report it used anti-trafficking manuals 
for proactive victim identification, including best practices for 
interviewing potential victims, screening vulnerable groups, assessing 
risk, and referring victims to protective services. During the reporting 
period, the government trained 22 officials on the national referral 
mechanism to direct trafficking victims to shelter and services. 
Nevertheless, 12 of Angola’s 18 provinces continued to lack formal 
guidelines to refer trafficking victims to care. Foreign trafficking 
victims could return to their home country regardless of ongoing 
court proceedings. While trafficking victims remained in the country, 
Angolan law provided for access to immigration relief, including 
temporary residence documents, the right to seek asylum, government-
provided legal representation, immunity from trafficking crimes, 
medical and mental health services, some financial support, family 
tracing assistance, and access to education. The immigration-related 
benefits, however, were contingent upon the commencement of a 
criminal investigation and the victim’s testimony. The government 
did not report providing any of these benefits to foreign victims 
identified during the reporting period. The government encouraged 
victim cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking 
cases. Angolan law allowed for live teleconference testimony, which 
permitted victims to pursue repatriation and participate in trials 
against their traffickers from their home countries. The government did 
not report whether any victims used this option during the reporting 
period. Despite laws that permitted judges to order restitution to 
trafficking victims, none did so during the reporting period. While 
transnational trafficking across the Angolan-Congolese border was 
prevalent, law enforcement routinely detained and deported those 
illegally crossing the border without screening for trafficking. As a 
result, authorities may have detained and deported trafficking victims 
for unlawful immigration offenses their traffickers compelled them 
to commit.
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent human trafficking. 
The anti-trafficking inter-ministerial commission, led by MJHR and 
the Ministry of Social Assistance and Reintegration, met five times 
during the reporting period. For the second consecutive year, the 
government funded the commission’s 2020-2025 NAP, and the 
commission implemented it, in collaboration with international 
organizations and NGOs. The government did not report whether 
it contributed data to the regional data collection tool during the 
reporting period. The government did not have procedures to oversee 
and regulate labor recruitment beyond periodic labor inspections. It 
did not report how many labor inspections it conducted, compared 
with 5,461 in the previous reporting period. Personnel and financial 
deficiencies continued to hamper efforts to identify forced and 
child labor. Labor inspectors did not have enough funding to cover 
transportation expenses, and when they did conduct inspections, 
they targeted the formal sector, where only one-quarter of Angolans 
work. In addition, despite the presence of young children in forced 
and child labor, labor inspectors focused on children aged 14-17 
who had the legal authority to work. 
The government demonstrated mixed efforts to document individuals 
within the country. It continued its mass registration campaign and, 
in 2020, issued more than one million Angolans their first identity 
documents. The program did not include stateless individuals. 
Separately, the government, supported by an international 
organization, commenced a program to locally integrate more than 
3,600 Rwandan, Liberian, and Sierra Leonean former refugees with a 
temporary residence permit. NGOs reported some police confiscated 
and destroyed refugees’ documents during roundups. MJHR operated 
a hotline for potential victims of crime and public reporting, but it 
did not report how many calls it received or whether the government 
identified any victims via the hotline. In July 2020, INAC and the 
Integrated Center for Public Safety launched a separate hotline for 
crimes against children. While the hotline received 140 complaints 
of child trafficking from July 2020 through December 2020, hotline 
workers did not have the capacity to disseminate or investigate 
reported complaints; thus, the government did not investigate any 
of the 140 potential cases. The government did not make efforts to 
reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government did 
not provide anti-trafficking training for its diplomatic personnel.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Angola, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Angola abroad. Traffickers exploit Angolans, including children as 
young as 12 years old, in forced labor in the brick making, domestic 
service, construction, agriculture, fisheries, and artisanal diamond 
mining sectors. Angolan girls as young as 13 years old are victims of 
sex trafficking, and girls in domestic work within private homes in 
Angola are vulnerable to labor trafficking. Angolan adults use children 
younger than 12 in forced criminal activity because children cannot 
be criminally prosecuted. As a result of the pandemic, “handlers” 
increasingly bring poor children to Luanda for street work, including 
begging, shoe shining, car washing, and parking assistance, where 
they are vulnerable to forced labor from their handlers and other 
traffickers. The provinces of Luanda, Benguela, and the border 
provinces of Cunene, Lunda Norte, Namibe, Uige, and Zaire are 
the most high-threat areas for trafficking activities. In response to 
widespread droughts in Cuene, some villages force children to drop 
out of school to gather water, dig wells, and herd cattle.
Transnational traffickers take advantage of Angola’s numerous 
unsecured, informal, and heavily used border crossings. Traffickers 
take some Angolan boys to Namibia for forced labor in cattle herding 
and force others to serve as couriers to transport illicit goods as part 
of a scheme to skirt import fees in cross-border trade with Namibia. 
Other recruiters take Angolan adults and children to Namibia for 
work in agriculture, construction, mineral extraction, and unlicensed 
street vending, where they may be in exploitative labor relationships. 
Traffickers exploit Angolan women and children in forced labor in 
domestic service and sex trafficking in South Africa, Namibia, and 





Trafficking networks recruit and transport Congolese girls as young 
as 12 years old from Kasai Occidental in the DRC to Angola for labor 
and sex trafficking. Undocumented Congolese migrants, including 
children, enter Angola for work in diamond mining districts, where 
traffickers exploit some in forced labor or sex trafficking in mining 
camps. Traffickers also exploit adult and child Congolese economic 
migrants in forced labor in construction. Women from Brazil, Cuba, 
DRC, Namibia, and Vietnam in commercial sex in Angola may be 
victims of sex trafficking, including in massage parlors. Due to the 
closure of businesses during the pandemic, commercial sex occurred 
more in clandestine settings, such as homes and hotel rooms. 
Chinese companies that have large construction or mining contracts 
bring Chinese workers to Angola; some companies do not disclose 
the terms and conditions of the work at the time of recruitment. 
There are reports that Chinese-owned and -operated construction 
companies exploit Brazilian, Chinese, Kenyan, Namibian, Southeast 
Asian, and possibly Congolese migrants in forced labor, including 
through withholding passports, threats of violence, denial of food, 
and confinement. These companies also, at times, coerce workers to 
operate in unsafe conditions, which sometimes reportedly resulted in 
death. The North Korean and Cuban governments may have forced 
their respective citizens to work in Angola, including at least 256 
Cuban doctors sent to Angola to combat the pandemic. 
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA: TIER 2
The Government of Antigua and Barbuda does not fully meet 
the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is 
making significant efforts to do so. The government demonstrated 
overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, 
considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-
trafficking capacity; therefore, Antigua and Barbuda remained on Tier 
2. These efforts included creating a new anti-trafficking unit; working 
with an international organization to develop preventative measures 
for migrants; and continuing anti-trafficking awareness campaigns. 
However, the government did not meet the minimum standards in 
several key areas. The government did not identify any victims. It did 
not initiate any investigations or prosecute or convict any traffickers. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, convict, and punish traffickers, 
including complicit officials. • Increase efforts to identify victims 
through proactive screening of vulnerable populations, such as 
migrants, individuals in commercial sex, and Chinese and Cuban 
workers on foreign government-sponsored programs. • Implement 
standard operating procedures government-wide on proactive 
identification and referral of victims and train front-line agencies 
in indicators of forced labor and sex trafficking. • Increase trauma-
informed training on trafficking for NGO, shelter, and social services 
staff to improve their ability to care for potential trafficking victims. • 
Target police, prosecutor, and judicial training on improved trafficking 
case evidence collection that is acceptable in court and police hearings. 
• Reduce delays in court proceedings. • Provide adequate funding to 
implement the national action plan across all agencies. • Develop 
formal agreements with international organizations and countries 
for cooperation and information sharing, including on evidence 
and data collection, as well as victim assistance. 
PROSECUTION
The government decreased prosecution efforts. The 2010 Trafficking 
in Persons (Prevention) Act criminalized sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to 20 years’ imprisonment 
and a fine of up to 400,000 Eastern Caribbean dollars ($148,150) for 
offenses involving an adult victim, and up to 25 years’ imprisonment 
and a fine of up to 600,000 Eastern Caribbean dollars ($222,220) 
for those involving a child victim. These penalties were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
those for other serious crimes, such as rape. 
The government did not report any new investigations during 
the reporting period, compared to ten cases investigated in 2019 
and seven in 2018. Authorities continued to investigate one sex 
trafficking case and one forced labor case initiated in previous 
reporting periods. The government did not report investigations of 
suspected child trafficking in domestic service and the retail sector. 
There were anecdotal reports of parents and caregivers exploiting 
children in sex trafficking. The government did not report initiating 
any prosecutions during the reporting period, compared to three 
prosecutions in the previous reporting period. Authorities continued 
to prosecute three suspected traffickers from 2018 who still awaited 
trial at the end of the reporting period. The government did not 
report convicting any traffickers for the second consecutive year. 
The government reported that police and the courts revised their 
operating procedures to address pandemic-related health concerns, 
resulting in limitations on investigations and judicial proceedings. 
The government reported that serious criminal cases, including 
trafficking cases, required in-person jury trials unless the defendant 
was pleading guilty or in rare instances where the case involved no 
witnesses. As jury trials by law could not take place remotely, no 
trafficking or other serious criminal cases were prosecuted for the 
entire reporting period after jury trials ceased in March 2020 due to 
the pandemic. The government reported this led to substantial court 
backlogs, exacerbating already existing substantial delays. During 
the reporting period and in cooperation with a foreign donor, the 
government created the ability to hold virtual hearings for civil cases, 
case management hearings, bail applications, and criminal cases with 
no witnesses or where the defendant plead guilty. 
The Trafficking in Persons (Prevention) Committee (TPPC) oversaw 
the Trafficking in Persons Prevention Unit (TIP Unit), created during 
the reporting period, which included four full-time staff and an 
unspecified number of law enforcement officers drawn from the police, 
immigration, Coast Guard, and the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy who were knowledgeable about human trafficking, victim 
services, and investigations. The TIP Unit served as the investigative 
arm of the TPPC and was solely responsible for investigating 
trafficking, implementing the national human trafficking prevention 
objectives, and increasing anti-trafficking awareness efforts to improve 
overall efficiency. The government conducted random inspections 
of businesses suspected of being involved in commercial sex. The 
government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government employees complicit in trafficking offenses. 
There were reports of trafficking-related complicity by police officers 
who tended to receive administrative sanctions instead of being 
tried under the trafficking law. The government did not provide anti-
trafficking training to law enforcement due to pandemic restrictions 
that halted in-person training; the Police Academy’s training manual 
included trafficking crimes. Authorities approached one country in 
the region for assistance with a trafficking investigation. 
PROTECTION
The government decreased protection efforts. The government did 
not identify or refer to care any victims during the reporting period, 
compared to two victims in 2019 and five victims in 2018. The 
government had formal written procedures to guide law enforcement, 
immigration, and social services officials in the screening and 
identification of potential victims, although observers noted the 
government used them inconsistently with forced labor victims. 
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While the government did not identify victims or report providing 
care to victims during the year, services remained available and may 
have served potential victims. Under the TPPC, a senior police officer 
chaired the Cases Task Force, which was responsible for screening and 
identifying victims of human trafficking and referring victims to an 
assigned victim care officer for care and protection. The government 
reported that the pandemic-related restrictions including curfews 
and business closures reduced the Cases Task Force’s activities. The 
TPPC provided an on-call consultant physician to provide medical 
care to victims. The country did not utilize shelters for trafficking 
victims, but rather a long/short-term safe space option for adults 
and children. The safe spaces consisted of privately owned properties 
from corporate citizens, which the Cases Task Force and selected law 
enforcement agencies manned and secured based on needs. A child 
would receive additional services from the Family and Social Services 
Division. Safe spaces were solely for victims of human trafficking. The 
government reported there was no time limit to victim care services. 
The government could provide temporary residency status as an 
alternative to removal to countries where victims may face hardship 
or retribution by traffickers; this assistance was not contingent on 
assisting law enforcement. Victims could obtain a work permit or 
leave the country after the Cases Task Force approved a satisfactory 
risk assessment. The government reported that when victims sought 
housing in a safe space, they all wished to return home. In these 
cases, the government contacted an international organization and 
the relevant local human trafficking unit in the country of origin for 
reintegration. The government informed potential victims of their 
rights and that their participation in investigations and prosecutions 
was voluntary; victims could decline any or all assistance offered. 
The government had a policy of not disclosing a victim’s location, 
providing security at the victim’s location and in transit, allowing for 
testimony via video link, and not disclosing a victim’s identity to the 
public or media. However, the government did not report using any 
of these methods during the reporting period. The government did 
not report any cases where a victim had sought restitution, although 
the law allowed for a victim to do so. 
PREVENTION 
The government maintained prevention efforts. The pandemic 
impacted the country’s economy and severely limited the government’s 
capacity to meet its commitments and obligations. The Solicitor 
General led the TPPC, which served as the national coordinating 
body for anti-trafficking efforts with representatives from across 
the government and one NGO; the TPPC carried out enforcement, 
research, and victim advocacy functions. The TPPC met monthly 
during the reporting period. The TPPC continued implementation 
of the 2019-2021 National Action Plan. The government did not 
report specific budget data related to its anti-trafficking efforts but 
reported its anti-trafficking budget provided funding for the national 
action plan. However, government financial resources including 
salaries for anti-trafficking officials were under severe strain in 2020 
as a result of the pandemic, and prior to the pandemic government 
agencies cited lack of funding as a key deficiency. NGOs participated 
in the implementation of the national action plan. The government 
published an annual report containing general information on 
human trafficking and a summary of its anti-trafficking efforts as it 
had done in prior years.
The government maintained public awareness efforts, despite the 
pandemic. Authorities funded and carried out an anti-trafficking 
awareness campaign via billboards, national television, and other 
media. The awareness campaign targeted schools, community 
groups, NGOs, churches, and college students that reached at least 
122 individuals in comparison to 800 individuals in the previous 
reporting period. The government also organized an “Awareness 
Week” with social partners that included a street fair that reached 65 
individuals, radio programs, and an awareness walk on preventing 
trafficking; the awareness week in the previous reporting period 
reached 400 individuals. The government maintained a hotline for 
domestic abuse and gender-based violence that could receive calls 
regarding trafficking but received no such calls out of the 55 total 
calls received during the reporting period; people preferred to call 
other emergency numbers or individual members of the TPPC with 
whom they were familiar. 
The government did not report whether labor recruiters charged 
fees. The government implemented new procedures for the issuance 
of work permits to foreign nationals to strengthen labor laws, the 
economic migration process, and protection for workers including 
against trafficking; foreign nationals could not enter the country 
until the Ministry of Labor (MOL) approved a work permit and MOL 
interviewed all applicants for renewal permits. To raise awareness 
among migrant laborers on the risks of human trafficking, the 
government, in coordination with an international organization, 
posted labor laws and regulations on government and other websites, 
posted signage at all ports of entry, and conducted awareness training 
for front-line workers (immigration, police, customs, and labor 
officers) on how to interview and communicate with migrant workers. 
Authorities closed all sea and air traffic from March until June 2020 
to control the spread of the COVID-19 virus, limiting migration to 
the country. When the borders re-opened, external transportation 
links remained extremely limited, and strict ongoing travel health 
protocols restricted cross-border movement. The government did 
not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The 
government did not report on efforts to prevent sex tourism. The 
government did not provide anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic 
personnel. The government did not enter into any new agreements 
with other countries. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
domestic and foreign victims in Antigua and Barbuda, and traffickers 
exploit victims from Antigua and Barbuda abroad. Documented 
and undocumented migrants from the Caribbean region, notably 
Jamaica, Guyana, and Dominican Republic, were identified as victims 
of sex trafficking and forced labor. Authorities reported an increased 
number of trafficking victims in multiple-destination trafficking, 
arriving in Antigua and Barbuda for a few months before their 
traffickers exploited them in other Caribbean countries such as St. 
Kitts and Nevis and Barbados. Sex trafficking occurs in bars, taverns, 
and brothels, including with girls. There are anecdotal reports of 
parents and caregivers subjecting children to sex trafficking. Forced 
labor, including of children, occurs in domestic service and the retail 
sector, particularly in family-owned businesses. Cubans working in 
Antigua and Barbuda may have been forced to work by the Cuban 
government. Chinese nationals working in Antigua and Barbuda may 
have been forced to work, including by PRC state-owned enterprises. 
ARGENTINA: TIER 1
The Government of Argentina fully meets the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued to 
demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting 
period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its 
anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Argentina remained on Tier 1. These 
efforts included issuing a new national action plan; offering specialized 
training courses to public prosecutors’ offices on investigating and 
prosecuting traffickers, including how to prosecute trafficking cases 
during the pandemic; and developing new guidelines for labor 
inspectors to identify victims. Although the government meets the 
minimum standards, it investigated, prosecuted, and convicted fewer 
traffickers and identified fewer victims in 2020. Official complicity 
in trafficking crimes remained a concern. The government did not 
allocate a dedicated budget to anti-trafficking efforts or provide 
dedicated shelters for male victims, and the national anti-trafficking 
law considered force, fraud, or coercion to be aggravating factors 













2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Strengthen efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers. • 
Sentence convicted traffickers to adequate penalties, which should 
involve significant prison terms. • Document and address official 
complicity in trafficking through prosecution and conviction. • 
Improve victim assistance to include more specialized shelters and 
dedicated shelters for male victims. • Provide dedicated funding 
to fully implement the national action plan. • Restructure the 
witness protection program to address trafficking victims’ needs 
and prevent abuse by agents. • Revise the human trafficking law 
to make force, fraud, or coercion essential elements of the crime, 
rather than aggravating factors, as established under the 2000 UN 
TIP Protocol. • Strengthen coordination among the federal and 
provincial governments and NGOs. • Revitalize efforts to address 
labor trafficking, including prosecuting and convicting labor traffickers 
and proactively identifying victims. • Increase availability of mid- 
to long-term assistance for victims, including legal, medical, and 
employment services. • Increase the number of labor inspections 
and ensure that inspections are conducted in informal sectors and 
rural areas. • Consistently implement victim restitution procedures. 
• Improve efforts to collect and integrate data on law enforcement 
statistics and victim assistance. 
PROSECUTION
The government decreased prosecution efforts. Law 26.842 of 2012 
criminalized labor trafficking and sex trafficking and prescribed 
punishments of four to eight years’ imprisonment for offenses 
involving an adult victim, and 10 to 15 years' for those involving 
a child victim. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with 
respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for 
other serious crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent with the definition 
of trafficking under international law, the law established the use of 
force, fraud, or coercion as aggravating factors rather than essential 
elements of the crime; penalties were increased to five to 10 years’ 
imprisonment if such factors were involved. The law also defined 
trafficking broadly to include facilitating or profiting from the 
prostitution of others and the illegal sale of organs without the use 
of force, fraud, or coercion. Due to these inclusions, it was unknown 
how many of the cases prosecuted under Law 26.842 involved 
trafficking offenses as defined by international law.
The special prosecutor’s Human Trafficking and Exploitation 
Unit (PROTEX) opened 220 trafficking investigations (130 for sex 
trafficking and 90 for labor trafficking) in 2020, compared with 252 
in 2019. The government prosecuted 26 suspected traffickers (19 for 
sex trafficking and seven for labor trafficking) in 21 cases (14 for sex 
trafficking, five for labor trafficking, and two for both sex and labor 
trafficking) under the trafficking law, compared with prosecuting 78 
alleged traffickers in 2019 and 106 in 2018. The government convicted 
26 traffickers (22 for sex trafficking and four for labor trafficking) in 
15 cases in 2020, compared with 53 traffickers in 29 cases in 2019 
and 71 traffickers in 48 cases in 2018. Authorities further reported 
convicting five traffickers for “subjection to servitude,” a form of 
labor exploitation that carried similar penalties to the trafficking 
statute of the Argentine penal code and could amount to trafficking 
under international law. The courts sentenced convicted traffickers 
to between two years’ and 10 years and six months’ imprisonment. 
In Corrientes province, courts convicted and sentenced a Paraguayan 
woman to six years’ imprisonment for sex trafficking her three 
daughters. In an investigation leading to the identification of seven 
victims, officials in Salta province arrested three alleged traffickers 
suspected of fraudulently recruiting young women on social media 
and forcing them into commercial sex. In one high-profile case, 
law enforcement in several cities raided 24 properties associated 
with an evangelical church suspected of trafficking, leading to 
the arrest of six alleged traffickers and the identification of more 
than sixty victims of labor trafficking; officials expected to identify 
more victims as investigation continued. Due to guidance from the 
Supreme Court during the pandemic, federal courts operated under 
modified protocols, reducing the number of decisions handed down 
in trafficking and other cases between March and July 2020. Similar 
mitigation efforts slowed investigation and prosecution processes, 
as well, although these resumed normal operations in the latter half 
of the reporting period. The government diverted law enforcement 
officers from regular duty, including investigating trafficking crimes, 
to enforce pandemic-related restrictions. Although the government’s 
federal trafficking investigations database, the Integrated Criminal 
Information System on the Crime of Trafficking in Persons (SISTRATA), 
was meant to include input from nearly all provincial governments, 
it remained difficult to obtain comprehensive data and analyze 
trends across reporting periods, as federal and provincial authorities 
still commonly compiled law enforcement statistics separately. The 
government continued to train law enforcement officials to use the 
database.
Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained 
significant obstacles to anti-trafficking efforts, particularly at the local 
and regional levels, and hindered law enforcement action during the 
year. Although prosecutors opened at least two new trafficking cases 
involving current or former public officials, the government did not 
report convicting any complicit officials for the second consecutive 
year. In one of these cases, authorities in Cordoba province charged 
a member of the local public prosecutor’s staff with sex trafficking, 
alleging he exploited a young woman’s drug dependence and forced 
her to engage in commercial sex. The government did not report the 
status of investigations and prosecutions involving complicit officials 
initiated in previous years. However, in a prosecution initiated in 2019, 
courts extended pre-trial detention for a former police chief accused of 
exploiting approximately 20 victims in sex trafficking; media reports 
linked more than one dozen officers to the case, but the government 
did not report prosecuting any additional officers. The First Sergeant 
indicted for trafficking in persons in 2019 remained in police custody 
throughout 2020; his case was expected to return to trial in 2021. 
There were no updates in a 2019 case where prosecutors initiated 
a criminal probe for seven accused traffickers who benefitted from 
police protection and political connections in the management of 
two Buenos Aires brothels. Similarly, there were no new developments 
in a fourth ongoing case, the result of investigations dating to 2010, 
involving trafficking charges brought against two public officials 
connected to the commercial sexual exploitation of victims in private 
residences. Authorities prosecuted only a small number of cases 
involving official complicity in trafficking; official complicity appeared 
infrequently in media reporting. The government conducted its anti-
trafficking trainings for prosecutors, law enforcement, and judicial 
officials virtually due to the pandemic. Notable training opportunities 
covered topics such as conducting successful investigations during the 
pandemic, for staff of the public prosecutors’ offices; on confiscating 
traffickers’ assets and coordinating with PROTEX, for members of 
the federal police force; and the characteristics of labor trafficking, 
for judges working at the provincial level. PROTEX did not report 
cooperating in any international investigations during the year. 
However, the government coordinated with officials in the United 
States to arrange the extradition of a trafficker who fled the country 
after a 2018 conviction; separately, a 2019 extradition request 
concerning an alleged trafficker arrested overseas remained pending 





The government decreased protection efforts. The Rescue Program 
was the government office responsible for coordinating short-term 
emergency victim services; a separate entity, the National Secretariat 
for Childhood, Adolescence, and Family (SENAF), assisted foreign 
victims and victims identified in the autonomous city of Buenos 
Aires. In 2020, the Rescue Program reported assisting 933 victims, 
compared with 1,438 victims in 2019 and 1,501 victims in 2018. Of 
the victims assisted, 644 were victims of labor trafficking, 235 were 
victims of sex trafficking, and seven were victims of ‘subjection to 
servitude;’ the government was unable to specify a form of trafficking 
for the remaining 47 victims. More than 70 percent of victims in 
2020 were Argentine nationals; foreign national victims (245) hailed 
predominantly from Latin America and the Caribbean, including 
Paraguay, Bolivia, and Venezuela, but the government also reported 
assisting victims from China, Peru, Russia, South Korea, and the 
United States, among other countries. The government funded 
repatriation for 10 Argentine victims exploited in trafficking abroad 
between January and July 2020; it did not report repatriation statistics 
for the second half of 2020. The National Directorate of Migration 
established a new anti-trafficking unit to promote identification 
and referral of trafficking victims amongst migrant populations. 
The government, with the support of an international organization, 
expanded use of the virtual platform to compile victim assistance 
data from both the national and provincial levels, first launched in 
2019; the database recorded victims’ biographical information and 
their use of applicable services. 
Federal officials had formal procedures for victim identification and 
assistance; however, in practice, the procedures to identify victims 
among vulnerable populations varied by province. Some front-line 
responders had a limited understanding of trafficking. SENAF and 
each provincial government were responsible for mid- and long-term 
assistance for foreign and domestic victims; experts noted the need 
for more integrated and comprehensive victim assistance. Regional 
governments in 10 provinces operated anti-trafficking centers that 
provided psychological, social, medical, and judicial assistance to 
trafficking victims. The government reportedly had 10 shelters spread 
across various provinces that trafficking victims could access; however, 
only two were specialized shelters. SENAF reported operating one 
federal shelter specifically for foreign victims, regardless of gender 
or age. Shelters modified their services to comply with pandemic 
mitigation recommendations, providing staff with personal protective 
equipment, distributing alcohol gel, and retrofitting vehicles to 
reduce circulation between driver and passenger spaces. Critically, 
many shelter facilities reduced occupancy to maintain safe distancing 
between residents; officials reported these measures greatly increased 
shelter operating costs during the pandemic. The government did 
not operate or fund specialized trafficking shelters for male victims; 
consequently, the government often placed male victims in other 
government-funded shelters or in hotels for temporary housing. NGOs 
reported a need for specialized shelters, long-term housing, skills 
training and employment, childcare, legal assistance, and financial 
assistance for victims after testifying in court cases. Certain assistance 
programs required victims to complete complex renewal procedures 
to maintain eligibility. NGOs expressed concerns for the welfare of 
trafficking victims in the Undersecretariat of Criminal Policy’s witness 
protection program. Some government officials acknowledged that 
the program, which was primarily designed for witnesses of drug 
trafficking, terrorism, and extortive kidnapping, was ill-suited to 
the needs of human trafficking victims; in past years, the Ministry 
of Justice dismissed at least one program administrator accused of 
sexually harassing protected witnesses, including trafficking victims. 
Foreign victims had the same access to care as Argentine nationals; 
however, foreign victims were sometimes unaware of available 
services. The government did not report funding allocations to 
support victim assistance. 
The government encouraged victim participation in trafficking 
trials through an assistance framework whereby victims had access 
to psychological and legal support while preparing to testify. The 
courts offered victims participating in trials the option to provide 
testimony via live video, recordings, or written statements. The 
Rescue Program provided tribunals with reports on the psychological 
state of victims and what requirements they might have to assist in 
the prosecution of their traffickers. The government maintained a 
trust fund for trafficking victims, comprised of traffickers’ forfeited 
assets and required criminal courts to award victim restitution at 
the time of traffickers’ convictions. Victims could also file civil suits 
against their traffickers to receive additional compensation, although 
victims had limited success in securing compensation through civil 
suits. Courts granted between 550,000 and 600,000 pesos ($6,160 
to $6,720) each in restitution to 10 victims in 2020 and, although 
a verdict had not been reached, ordered the auction of assets in 
another case to ensure funds for victim restitution. Despite these 
cases, observers reported prosecutors and judges inconsistently 
prioritized financial restitution in trafficking cases. The government 
struggled to identify and refer victims of forced labor in rural zones. 
In 2020, the government produced new guidelines to facilitate labor 
inspectors’ recognition of trafficking indicators and identification of 
labor trafficking victims; the Ministry of Labor trained its inspectors 
in accordance with these guidelines in October 2020.
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. The Federal Council 
for Human Trafficking and the Executive Committee oversaw the 
government’s national action plan to combat trafficking in persons 
and began implementing a new plan for 2020-2022 in December 
2020. The new plan outlined 100 specific activities to combat 
trafficking, including 22 activities left unfinished at the expiration of 
the previous action plan. The Federal Council incorporated three civil 
society organizations in its regular meetings and in the development 
of the 2020-2022 plan. The Federal Council required civil society 
participants be legally recognized as NGOs in Argentina; observers 
noted some NGOs found the costs associated with maintaining 
this status prohibitive. The government did not allocate a specific 
budget for the plan and observers remained concerned about the 
government’s ability to fund its anti-trafficking programs through 
contributions from participating ministries; the pandemic exacerbated 
these funding concerns. Authorities had the ability to penalize foreign 
labor recruiters for fraudulent recruiting, but the government did 
not report assessing any penalties during the reporting period. Given 
the increased vulnerability of migrants due to widespread job loss 
and movement restrictions during the pandemic, the government 
extended expiration dates and deadlines associated with several visa 
categories, which decreased their vulnerability to trafficking.
The government produced three new federal trafficking awareness 
campaigns—two focused on labor trafficking and one on sex 
trafficking—which it made available, along with existing awareness 
materials, on its website. PROTEX officials presented at several 
trafficking awareness webinars hosted by domestic and international 
civil society groups; these virtual events were accessible to wide 
audiences. NGOs and experts remained concerned by child 
sex tourism, although there were no reported investigations or 
prosecutions in the reporting period related to this crime. The 
Secretariat of Tourism led a regional working group on combating 
sex tourism. The Ministry of Justice and Human Rights operated the 
nationwide 1-4-5 trafficking hotline with response assistance from 
the Rescue Program. There were 1,340 calls during the year, compared 
with 1,809 in 2019; of these, authorities referred 514 trafficking-related 
reports to the federal courts. PROTEX conducted an evaluation of 
trafficking-related calls to the national hotline, to understand the 
impact of the pandemic on reporting tendencies; officials reported 
a greater share of hotline complaints came from victims, rather than 
witnesses, in 2020. The Federal Council for Human Trafficking released 
its Annual Report, which retrospectively assessed the government’s 
success in completing the 2018-2020 national action plan based on 
indicators laid out therein. The government did not make efforts to 








As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Argentina, and Argentine adults and children 
are victims of sex and labor trafficking in other countries. Traffickers 
exploit victims from other Latin American and Caribbean countries 
in Argentina, particularly the Dominican Republic, Paraguay, Peru, 
Bolivia, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Brazil. Transgender Argentines are 
exploited in sex trafficking within the country and in Western Europe. 
Officials indicate traffickers may exploit the additional vulnerabilities 
of individuals with mental illnesses or instabilities. Adults and 
children from Argentina, particularly the northern provinces; Bolivia; 
Paraguay; Peru; and other countries are exploited in forced labor in 
a variety of sectors, including the garment sector, agriculture, street 
vending, charcoal and brick production, domestic work, and small 
businesses. Traffickers exploit victims from China and South Korea; 
Chinese citizens working in supermarkets are vulnerable to debt 
bondage. Traffickers exploit children participating in youth sports 
clubs in sex trafficking. Revelations in 2018 of an active child sex 
trafficking ring in Argentina’s minor soccer league that victimized 
youth athletes raised concerns about child sex trafficking in domestic 
sports and athletic clubs. Religious sects and other organizations 
serve as fronts for traffickers. Traffickers compel trafficking victims to 
transport drugs across the country’s borders. Traffickers increasingly 
utilize social media and other online platforms to recruit victims. 
Official complicity, mainly at the sub-national level, is pervasive and 
continues to hinder the government’s efforts to combat trafficking. 
ARMENIA: TIER 2
The Government of Armenia does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so.  The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking 
capacity; therefore Armenia was upgraded to Tier 2.  These efforts 
included investigating more suspects, convicting a sex trafficker, and 
identifying more victims.  The government developed a manual for 
local police on monitoring businesses for trafficking and engaging 
vulnerable communities and adopted a law that restricted interviews 
for children to 90 minutes in the presence of a psychologist. The 
Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) created a working group to review 
all trafficking cases from 2018-2019 to identify legal or procedural 
issues and law enforcement added trafficking curriculum to train the 
new patrol police. The government significantly increased resources 
to the NGO-run shelter, developed screening indicators for social 
workers, and strengthened procedures to identify child victims. The 
government allocated funds to repatriate victims for the first time, 
and it adopted the 2020-2022 national action plan (NAP) and 
allocated resources to its implementation. The Health and Labor 
Inspection Body (HLIB) conducted labor inspections for the first time 
since 2015. However, the government did not meet the minimum 
standards in several key areas. The government has not convicted 
a labor trafficker since 2014. PGO continued to drop or reclassify 
trafficking cases referred by local police due to a lack of evidence. 
First responders did not have standard indicators to screen vulnerable 
populations and continued to rely on victims to self-identify. Law 
enforcement officers in some remote areas lacked information and 
training to inform victims of their rights and victims continued to 
face low access to justice, including an absence of victim-centered 
procedures and formal victim-witness protection measures. HLIB 
did not have jurisdiction to conduct inspections of “non-legal” 
employers such as small farms or illegal businesses.






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers under 
Articles 132 and 132-2. • Increase proactive identification efforts, 
such as developing standard operating procedures for screening 
trafficking victims and training officials on screening for trafficking 
among individuals in commercial sex, migrants, refugees, and 
other at-risk populations. • Implement legal authorities for labor 
inspectors to conduct regular inspections, including non-legal 
employers, and identify victims through unannounced visits. • Provide 
advanced training to investigators and prosecutors on trafficking 
investigations and prosecutions, including evidence collection and 
victim-centered interview techniques. • Establish and implement 
preventative measures for child labor and potential child trafficking 
in state childcare institutions. • Increase access to justice during 
court proceedings, such as establishing victim-centered policies to 
reduce re-traumatization, strengthen confidentiality, and provide 
victim-witness protection. • Increase resources for reintegration 
services for victims. • Establish formal procedures for repatriating 
trafficking victims from abroad. • License, regulate, and educate 
local employment agencies and agents so they can help prevent the 
forced labor of Armenians abroad.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Articles 132 
and 132-2 of the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and 
labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of five to eight years’ 
imprisonment, which were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to 
sex trafficking, commensurate with those for other serious crimes, 
such as rape. The government investigated 16 cases (11 in 2019); 13 
were forced labor cases and three sex trafficking cases (eight forced 
labor cases and three sex trafficking cases in 2019). The government 
prosecuted two defendants for forced labor (three defendants for 
forced labor and one for sex trafficking in 2019). The government 
continued to prosecute three defendants from previous years. Courts 
convicted one sex trafficker and sentenced the trafficker to ten years’ 
imprisonment (no convictions in 2019). The government has not 
issued a forced labor conviction since 2014. The government reported 
an ongoing investigation of a human resource officer and the head 
of a psychiatric institution that opened an unregistered store in the 
psychiatric hospital and coerced a patient to work in the store from 
2002 to 2018. Due to the pandemic, the government reported delays 
in court proceedings, including delays due to hospitalizations of 
victims, and witnesses unable to attend proceedings. Prosecutors 
and investigators working on trafficking cases and witnesses in 
trafficking prosecutions enlisted or volunteered to serve in military 
units fighting in and around Nagorno-Karabakh, which further 
delayed court proceedings. 
The Armenian Police (AP) maintained an Anti-Trafficking Unit 
(ATU) that conducted initial investigations and referred cases to the 
Investigative Committee (IC) for in-depth investigation. Local police 
units designated an officer as the main point of contact for trafficking 
within their jurisdiction. The government developed a manual for local 
police on monitoring risky businesses and interviewing vulnerable 
communities; however, law enforcement did not proactively pursue 
investigations and relied on victims to self-identify. In January 
2020, the government reorganized ATU from the Organized Crime 
Department to the Department of Crimes against Human Beings and 




called to assist in non-trafficking cases. Observers continued to report 
an absence of victim-centered approaches within law enforcement 
procedures, and local investigators in some remote areas lacked 
the skills to properly interview victims, resulting in inadmissible 
evidence and dropped prosecutions. Guidelines restricted interviews 
to four hours for adults; the government adopted a law, which 
took effect in January 2021, that restricted interviews for children 
to 90 minutes in the presence of a psychologist. In previous years, 
observers reported police repeatedly interrogated victims for long 
hours, including children for up to 10 hours, increasing the risk of 
re-traumatization. Additionally, investigations did not incorporate 
gender-sensitive approaches, such as the use of female medical 
professionals for forensic examinations of female victims. While the 
IC or PGO continued to drop or reclassify trafficking cases referred 
by local police due to a lack of evidence, PGO created a working 
group to review all trafficking cases from 2018-2019 to identify any 
legal or procedural issues, but no results were published during the 
reporting period. Authorities dropped seven forced labor cases and 
one sex trafficking case due to a lack of evidence and reclassified one 
sex trafficking case to “involving a person in prostitution,” compared 
with reclassifying one sex trafficking case and dropping four forced 
labor cases in 2019.
The Police Academy and Justice Academy maintained classes on 
trafficking for police, judges, prosecutors, and investigators. ATU 
trained officers designated as trafficking points of contact in local 
police units and added a trafficking component to the curriculum for 
new patrol officers. The government did not conduct any international 
investigations or extraditions in 2019 or 2020. Prosecution of 
forced labor cases involving Russia remained limited, as Armenian 
investigators continued to face difficulties collaborating with Russian 
law enforcement. Similarly, the absence of diplomatic relations with 
Turkey continued to hinder law enforcement and victim protection 
efforts for cases involving Turkey.
PROTECTION
The government modestly increased protection efforts. The 
government identified nine victims (eight in 2019). Of these, 
nine were victims of forced labor, including five victims of forced 
begging; five were children; three were female and six male; and 
one was a foreign victim from Iran. The 2014 Law on Identification 
and Assistance to Victims of Human Trafficking and Exploitation 
prescribed identification, referral, and assistance procedures for 
relevant actors. The government developed screening indicators 
for social workers and adopted procedures to identify child victims 
among children not enrolled in school; however, experts continued 
to report that officials did not proactively identify victims and instead 
relied on victims to self-identify. Observers continued to report that 
first responders did not consistently screen vulnerable populations 
for trafficking indicators, particularly individuals in commercial sex 
and foreign migrant workers. The government provided temporary 
shelter, emergency medical services, and psychological aid to potential 
trafficking victims during the “pre-identification stage,” a stage where 
the government collected information on a potential victim within a 
maximum of 10 days. The Victim Identification Commission (VIC), 
which consists of representatives from the Ministry of Labor and 
Social Affairs (MOLSA), PGO, police, and NGOs, officially recognized 
victims based on information collected during the “pre-identification 
stage;” the VIC officially recognized five victims in 2020 and five 
additional victims from January to March 2021 (eight in 2019). Civil 
society continued to report the referral procedures functioned well, 
and they had positive cooperation with the government. 
The government allocated 40.2 million drams ($78,060) for victim 
protection efforts, including operational costs for an NGO-run 
shelter, an increase compared with 19 million drams ($36,890) 
in 2019. The government and local NGOs jointly provided legal, 
medical, and psycho-social support; housing; a one-time monetary 
compensation of 250,000 drams ($490); and access to social, 
educational, and employment projects. One victim received free 
health care (three in 2019), and one victim received the one-time 
monetary compensation (six in 2019). In 2019, the government 
amended the law to allow legal guardians of child victims to receive 
the one-time monetary compensation. The government maintained a 
cooperation agreement and partially funded one specialized NGO-run 
shelter to provide services to victims; the NGO-run shelter assisted 
10 identified victims during the reporting period (four in 2019). The 
NGO-run shelter required adult victims to notify staff when they left 
shelters unescorted, but victims were free to leave if they no longer 
wanted assistance. Additionally, the NGO-run shelter provided male 
victims with separate rooms or rented apartments; one male victim 
received accommodation (none in 2019). The government provided 
vocational training classes to victims, but civil society continued to 
provide the bulk of reintegration and long-term support services 
without government funding. Additionally, the government did not 
include trafficking victims in the list of vulnerable people eligible 
for state housing. The NGO-run shelter and childcare institutions 
accommodated child victims, but experts reported a shortage of 
accommodation and foster families for children, which resulted in 
some cases where authorities returned children to family members 
who were involved in their exploitation. In previous years, the 
government did not have established procedures or funds to cover 
logistical costs for the repatriation of victims. For the first time the 
government allocated funds for repatriation in 2020, although no 
victims required repatriation in 2019 or 2020. The government 
provided foreign victims the same services as Armenian victims. The 
law entitled foreign victims to a 30-day reflection period in which 
victims could recover before deciding whether to cooperate with 
law enforcement. The law also entitled foreign victims to receive 
a permanent residence permit, but applications required evidence 
of employment; no foreign victim received a permit in 2020 (one 
in 2019). 
There were no reports the government penalized victims for crimes 
their traffickers compelled them to commit; however, due to a lack 
of consistent identification procedures for trafficking indicators, 
authorities may have detained and deported individuals in commercial 
sex and foreign migrant workers who were unidentified victims. 
According to experts, law enforcement officers in some remote areas 
may lack information and training to inform victims of their rights 
to protection or assistance. Victims hesitated to assist in prosecutions 
due to a lack of confidentiality in public testimonies creating a fear of 
retaliation from traffickers and stigmatization from their family and 
community. Authorities did not fully protect victims’ rights during 
court proceedings and victims, including children, appeared in front 
of their traffickers in court, which may have caused re-traumatization. 
The government lacked a formal victim-witness protection program. 
The Criminal Procedure Code and a 2016 decree mandated some 
victim-witness protection measures, but none were used in 2019 and 
2020. Judges did not issue restitution during criminal proceedings 
and victims did not file civil suits for compensation in 2019 or 
2020. In previous years, judges did not issue damages in civil suits, 
asserting that victims did not substantiate the financial damages 
they had suffered. The law allowed investigators to place defendants’ 
property in custody to fund potential civil claims, but this rarely 
occurred in practice. 
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. The Anti-trafficking 
Ministerial Council and the Inter-Agency Working Group against 
Trafficking in Persons (IWGTP) monitored and carried out anti-
trafficking efforts during the reporting period; the Ministerial Council 
met once (none in 2019) and IWGTP met once (none in 2019). During 
the previous reporting period, the government failed to pass the 2019-
2021 NAP; however, the Ministerial Council and IWGTP updated the 
NAP, and the government adopted the 2020-2022 NAP and allocated 
78.9 million drams ($153,200) in 2020 for its implementation. 






in 2020 (none in 2019). The government produced one radio and 
two television shows and funded a public service announcement on 
trafficking. Additionally, the Ministry of Education, Science, Culture, 
and Sports funded an anti-trafficking website and hosted an annual 
award ceremony for journalists publishing trafficking stories. The 
government did not regulate or monitor labor recruitment agencies. 
The Ministry of Health formed the Health Inspection Body (HIB) 
in 2017, but its mandate was limited to workplace health and safety 
inspections, and it did not have authority to conduct unannounced 
inspections. However, the government passed legislative amendments 
in December 2019 to reform the HIB as the HLIB with a strengthened 
authority and mandate, including the authority to conduct labor 
inspections. In 2020, HLIB conducted labor inspections for the first 
time since 2015 but did not have jurisdiction to conduct inspections 
of “non-legal” employers such as small farms or illegal businesses. 
AP and MOLSA both maintained a 24-hour hotline for trafficking, 
and the Ombudsman operated a 24-hour hotline for human rights-
related issues, including trafficking; the government did not report 
the number of calls, potential victims identified, or investigations 
resulting from calls. The government did not make efforts to reduce 
the demand for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Armenia, as well as victims from Armenia 
abroad. Traffickers exploit some of the Armenian migrants who seek 
employment in Russia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Turkey 
in forced labor, often through recruitment fraud and exorbitant 
recruitment fees charged by labor brokers. Armenian women may 
also be exploited in sex trafficking in the UAE and Turkey. Armenian 
women may be exploited in sex and labor trafficking and forced 
begging within the country. Some children work in agriculture, 
construction, and service provision within the country, where they 
are vulnerable to labor trafficking. Ukrainian, Belarusian, and Russian 
women working as dancers in Armenian nightclubs are vulnerable 
to sex trafficking. Traffickers may target Iranian and Indian migrants 
who willingly seek employment in the informal sector for exploitation 
in forced labor. Men in rural areas with little education and children 
staying in childcare institutions remain highly vulnerable to labor 
and sex trafficking.
ARUBA: TIER 2 WATCH LIST* 
The Government of Aruba does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to 
do so. These efforts included identifying more victims, investigating 
more trafficking cases, and providing anti-trafficking training for 
officials. However, the government did not demonstrate overall 
increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, even 
considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its 
anti-trafficking capacity. The government did not prosecute or convict 
any traffickers for the second consecutive year and officials relied on 
victims to report their exploitation, rather than proactively screening 
vulnerable populations. Anti-trafficking efforts lacked a dedicated 
budget and were largely dependent on ad hoc funding allotments. 
In addition, officials conflated trafficking in persons and migrant 
smuggling, hindering the effectiveness of prosecution, prevention, 
and protection efforts. Therefore Aruba remained on Tier 2 Watch 
List for the second consecutive year.






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers. • Proactively 
identify victims among all vulnerable groups, including women in 
commercial sex, detained migrants, domestic workers, and migrants 
working in construction, supermarkets, and retail. • Train law 
enforcement officials, prosecutors, judges, coast guard officers, and 
labor inspectors on victim-centered and trauma-informed approaches 
to trafficking cases. • Establish dedicated funding for anti-trafficking 
efforts, including for full-time staff members. • Sentence convicted 
traffickers to significant prison terms. • Complete the construction 
of the multipurpose shelter for victims of crimes, including human 
trafficking. • Improve coordination and information-sharing with 
anti-trafficking counterparts across the Kingdom of the Netherlands. 
• Implement guidelines for proactive victim identification and 
increase referral of possible trafficking victims among Venezuelan 
migrants and refugees. • Formalize agreements with local NGOs and 
private sector accommodations to shelter adult and child victims. • 
Promote awareness of trafficking in persons, separately from migrant 
smuggling, through trafficking-specific materials and campaigns. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained prosecution efforts. Article 2:239 of 
the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and 
prescribed penalties of up to eight years’ imprisonment or a fine for 
offenses involving a victim 16 years of age or older and up to 12 
years’ imprisonment or a fine for those involving a victim under 
the age of 16. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with 
respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for 
other serious crimes, such as kidnapping. The government drafted 
an amendment to the anti trafficking law to increase penalties for 
trafficking offenses, which remained under review with the advisory 
council, a final stage before submission to parliament, at the end 
of the reporting period.
Due to pandemic-related movement restrictions, officials reported 
a significant reduction in migrant smuggling cases involving 
Venezuelans in 2020; similar cases required significant investigative 
resources and overwhelmed the government’s ability to investigate 
possible human trafficking crimes in the previous reporting period. 
Authorities reported conducting 13 preliminary investigations, 
resulting in two full trafficking investigations in 2020, compared 
with one investigation in 2019 and three in 2018. Officials did not 
report prosecuting or convicting any traffickers in 2020, compared 
with zero prosecutions or convictions in 2019 and one prosecution 
and one conviction under smuggling charges in 2018. In 2020, 
authorities continued to prosecute one case of labor trafficking 
involving two suspects, initiated in 2018. Authorities halted or 
investigated under related criminal statutes nine additional potential 
trafficking crimes where victims did not self-identify as such and 
declined to participate. The government did not report investigating, 
prosecuting, or convicting any government employees complicit in 
trafficking offenses. 
The joint Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling Unit (UMM), 
comprised of law enforcement officials from the Aruban Police Force 
and the Royal Dutch Military Police, led trafficking investigations. 
During the reporting period, authorities provided anti-trafficking 
ARUBA
*  Aruba is a semi-autonomous entity of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. For the purpose of this report, Aruba is not a “country” to which the minimum standards for the 
elimination of trafficking in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act apply. This narrative reflects how Aruba would be assessed if it were a separate, independent country.  
However, the Kingdom is an important contributor to the Government of Aruba’s anti-trafficking efforts.
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training to 38 new and veteran law enforcement officials through 
the Academy for Justice and Security. While senior government 
officials distinguished between trafficking and human smuggling, 
non-specialized law enforcement officials did not demonstrate 
an understanding of trafficking; across the government, Aruba 
addressed trafficking in persons and migrant smuggling via the same 
institutions. Officials issued training participants “Quick Reference 
Cards” (QRCs), funded by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, that 
included relevant criminal articles; a list of trafficking indicators; 
standard operating procedures to use following identification of 
a potential trafficking case; and contact information to use when 
referring victims. Aruban authorities cooperated in two investigations 
coordinated by international law enforcement agencies and continued 
to collaborate with the Indian government in an ongoing prosecution.
PROTECTION
The government slightly increased protection efforts. Multidisciplinary 
teams consisting of police, labor, and immigration officials continued 
to operate. The government reported identifying four trafficking 
victims in 2020, compared with zero in 2019, two in 2018, and 71 
in 2017. Of the four victims identified, all were adults exploited in 
labor trafficking; one was male, one female, and two were anonymous 
reports made without specifying gender. Authorities screened ten 
additional individuals as possible trafficking victims but determined 
them to be victims of other crimes. The government established a 
new protocol to encourage identification of trafficking victims among 
vulnerable migrant groups by allowing potential victims to remain 
anonymous and receive services from civil society organizations 
during the initial investigation. In 2020, the government implemented 
the new protocol in one case, allowing two victims without legal 
residency status to report their exploitation and receive services 
anonymously; an international organization provided shelter and 
other services to these two victims. The anti trafficking task force 
continued to provide law enforcement and social services officials 
with a checklist of the most common signs of trafficking, which was 
used in concert with the government’s QRCs. Although authorities 
reportedly screened detained migrants for trafficking indicators ahead 
of deportation, observers expressed concern detention center officials 
were not equipped to identify trafficking. The Coordination Center 
on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling (CMMA) developed 
a set of questions to guide officials screening detained migrants but 
did not report training officials on the new materials. The government 
had a basic victim referral mechanism to guide officials; however, 
the government did not report referring victims to services in 2020.
The government maintained informal verbal agreements with local 
NGOs and private sector accommodations to shelter adult and child 
victims of trafficking. Through these arrangements, the government 
could secure emergency short-term shelter for victims and longer-term 
shelter for adult female victims, despite a lack of trafficking-specific 
shelters. Authorities could place unaccompanied child victims in 
foster care centers or foster homes and adult male victims could 
be accommodated by civil society organizations or local churches. 
Officials conducted risk assessments before deciding whether victims 
could leave shelters unchaperoned; authorities restricted victims’ 
movement if their lives were threatened. The government reported 
a longstanding plan to expand shelter capacity for male victims and 
families via new facilities was fully funded through a Kingdom of 
the Netherlands grant but stalled due to complications related to the 
pandemic; officials stated the government would begin construction in 
2021. Authorities did not report any victims assisting the government 
in the prosecution of their traffickers during the reporting period. 
Although foreign victims were entitled to the same rights and 
protection as Arubans, the government did not report how many 
received benefits in 2020. The law authorized the extension of 
temporary immigration relief for foreign victims for three to six 
months on a case by-case basis and allowed foreign victims to change 
employers if they were suspected of exploiting workers. Authorities did 
not report any victims received these benefits but confirmed trafficking 
victims were not at risk of deportation during the reporting period as 
a result of a government-wide halt on removal proceedings during the 
pandemic. The criminal code enabled victims to file civil suits against 
traffickers, and, if the trial resulted from a criminal investigation, 
the victim could seek compensation not to exceed 50,000 florin 
($27,800) for financial and emotional damages, although none did 
so in 2020. The Bureau of Victim Assistance operated a hotline for 
potential victims of all crimes, including trafficking; the government 
reported eight trafficking-related calls to the hotline, leading to the 
identification of two trafficking victims, compared with zero victims 
identified via the hotline in 2019 and 2018.
PREVENTION
The government maintained minimal prevention efforts. The 
National Coordinator on Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling 
continued to lead the government’s anti-trafficking efforts, with 
support from a national task force and the CMMA. All three entities 
had dual responsibility for both anti-trafficking and anti-smuggling 
efforts. Authorities continued to implement the 2018-2022 national 
action plan, which continued to lack dedicated resources for its 
implementation. Instead, anti-trafficking activities were financed via 
ad hoc allotments, including periodic infusions from the Kingdom 
of the Netherlands, which limited the capacity and stability of these 
efforts across prosecution, protection, and prevention. In 2020, the 
government hired a project manager for the CMMA, the four-year-
old institution’s first dedicated staff member, with funding from 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands. However, the Aruban government 
had not approved dedicated funding for the project manager role 
in the national budget, leaving the future of the position uncertain. 
Officials raised awareness of human trafficking and the hotline 
in multiple languages via social media, posters, and flyers, as well 
as a new airport-based campaign supported by an international 
organization. Authorities continued to utilize awareness materials 
produced in a 2011 campaign aimed to inform migrants of general 
risks, including trafficking. The government provided trafficking-
awareness training to 120 government officials and civil society 
stakeholders. In 2020, the government converted many events to 
virtual delivery, including an annual anti trafficking awareness 
conference funded by the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which the 
CMMA reformatted as a week-long webinar series that reached more 
than 300 participants.
Officials had procedures to screen adult entertainers, primarily from 
Colombia; but, the government closed adult entertainment venues 
during the pandemic, and all adult entertainment visa holders 
returned to their countries of origin. Thus, few inspections were 
performed. Normally, individuals on adult entertainment visas were 
required to meet with consular officers to ensure the applicants knew 
their rights and had a copy of their work agreement before picking 
up their in-flight letter at the Kingdom of the Netherlands embassy 
in Colombia. Upon arrival, such visa recipients normally received 
information about their rights, risks, and resources. The government 
did not report efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Aruba. Traffickers exploit Venezuelan women in 
sex trafficking and foreign men and women in forced labor in Aruba’s 
service and construction industries. Arriving Venezuelans commonly 
overstay their visas, leaving many with expired documentation and a 
corresponding increased risk for trafficking. Families, business owners, 
and criminals exploit some of these Venezuelans in forced labor in 
domestic service, construction, and commercial sex, respectively. 
Supermarket managers subject Chinese men and women to forced 
labor in grocery stores; business owners and families subject Indian 
men to forced labor in the retail sector and domestic service, 
respectively; and Arubans force Caribbean and South American 
women into domestic servitude. Women in regulated and unregulated 





shops are most at risk of trafficking. Managers of Chinese-owned 
supermarkets and restaurants may subject children to sex trafficking 
and forced labor. There were reports foreigners visited Aruba to 
exploit children in sex tourism.
AUSTRALIA: TIER 1
The Government of Australia fully meets the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued to 
demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting 
period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on 
its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Australia remained on Tier 
1. These efforts included more than doubling funding for victim 
protection services; updating, adopting, and funding a new five-year 
national action plan; and creating a publicly available registry of 
annual modern slavery statements from more than 250 businesses 
on their efforts to reduce the risk of forced labor in their supply 
chains. Although the government meets the minimum standards, 
its trafficking convictions remain low in comparison to the number 
of trafficking cases identified and the overall broader scope of the 
crime. Additionally, while courts convicted one trafficker during the 
reporting year, the trafficker received three years’ probation; such 
lenient sentences weaken deterrence and may undercut broader 
efforts to fight trafficking. The government also did not adequately 
screen vulnerable groups traffickers may target, including domestic 
workers, international students, and migrant workers, which at times 
may have resulted in the government’s detention or deportation of 
unidentified victims. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Significantly strengthen efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking 
crimes pursuant to trafficking laws, with increased focus on pursuing 
labor trafficking crimes instead of labor or employment violations, 
and sentence convicted traffickers to significant prison terms. • 
Significantly strengthen efforts to proactively identify trafficking 
victims among vulnerable groups, such as undocumented migrants, 
agricultural and hospitality industry workers, and domestic workers; 
and to refer those victims to appropriate government authorities. • 
Further de-link the provision of services from participation in the 
criminal justice process and increase services available to victims 
unable or unwilling to participate in the criminal justice process. 
• Ensure the statutory definition of trafficking under the criminal 
code does not require movement of the victim as an element of the 
crime. • Increase efforts to train police, immigration officials, and 
other front-line officers, both offshore and onshore, to recognize 
indicators of trafficking and respond to suspected cases of both 
sex and labor trafficking. • Establish the National Labour Hire 
Registration Scheme with sufficient compliance tools. • Increase 
training for prosecutors and judges on Australian trafficking laws. 
• Conduct initial screening interviews with potential victims in a 
safe and neutral location and in the presence of a social service 
professional. • Consider establishing a national compensation scheme 
for trafficking victims. • Implement or fund awareness campaigns, 
particularly among rural communities and migrant populations 
(including international students) vulnerable to forced labor. • 
Strengthen efforts to prosecute and convict Australian child sex 
tourists. • Increase efforts to investigate and hold accountable foreign 
diplomats posted in Australia suspected of complicity in trafficking. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Divisions 270 
and 271 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code, when read together, 
criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking. Inconsistent with 
international law, the definition of “trafficking” under Division 271 
required the element of movement of a victim. However, Division 
270, which criminalized “slavery,” “servitude,” and “forced labor” 
offenses, could be utilized to prosecute trafficking crimes that did 
not involve victim movement. Division 271 prescribed penalties of 
up to 12 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving an adult victim, 
and up to 25 years’ imprisonment for those involving a child victim. 
These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other serious 
crimes, such as rape. Division 270 prescribed penalties of up to 25 
years’ imprisonment for slavery, up to 15 years’ imprisonment for 
servitude, and up to nine years’ imprisonment for forced labor. These 
penalties were all sufficiently stringent.
In 2020, the government referred 212 suspected cases of trafficking for 
possible investigation, compared with 213 in 2019 and 179 in 2018, 
and initiated prosecutions against four defendants, compared with 
nine in 2019 and two in 2018. Authorities continued prosecutions from 
previous reporting periods against 20 defendants. The government 
convicted one trafficker for forced labor under section 270.6A(1) of 
the criminal code, compared with two convictions in 2019 and zero 
in 2018. The forced labor case involved one defendant convicted 
of forced labor of an employee; courts sentenced the trafficker 
to one year and six months’ imprisonment. However, the prison 
sentence was reduced to a three-year probation. The government 
also prosecuted 38 defendants for planning or engaging in sexual 
activity with children overseas; some of these cases were initiated in 
prior reporting periods. These efforts led to one conviction, compared 
with 30 prosecutions with 10 convictions reported in 2019 and 11 
prosecutions with no convictions in 2018. Authorities continued to 
pursue labor or employment violations in lieu of trafficking charges, 
resulting in potential labor traffickers receiving only fines and other 
civil penalties that were inadequate to deter trafficking crimes. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, 
or convictions of government employees complicit in trafficking 
crimes. The government reported pandemic-related delays in some 
court cases that required a jury; the courts allowed for remote court 
appearances and focused on facilitating early resolution of cases 
to address these delays. The government funded and facilitated 
training on trafficking investigations, legal provisions, and victim 
support for approximately 120 Australian Federal Police (AFP), 
prosecutors, and other law enforcement officers, and approximately 
450 immigration officials. In addition, the AFP conducted 25 victim 
identification training presentations for 496 law enforcement and 
other government officials. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained efforts to protect victims. Authorities 
identified 65 potential victims, including 25 for sex trafficking and/
or forced labor—compared with 54 sex trafficking and/or forced 
labor victims identified in 2019 and 41 in 2018; for the remainder of 
victims, the form of exploitation was unclear. Eleven of the potential 
victims were younger than 18 years old. Authorities referred all 65 
potential victims to the Australian government’s NGO-implemented 
Support for Trafficked People Program (support program). The 
government also assisted 11 potential Australian trafficking victims 
abroad, compared with 17 in 2019 and 25 in 2018; however, it was 
not clear how many of these individuals were victims of trafficking as 
defined by international law compared to victims of forced marriage or 
individuals vulnerable to forced marriage. Authorities identified most 
victims through the efforts of joint agencies, health care facilities, task 
forces, and cooperative action with foreign governments. Authorities 
continued to utilize a list of indicators to identify trafficking victims 
and refer them to services, and during the reporting period, the AFP 
updated the list in consultation with NGOs and other government 
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agencies. However, authorities often linked trafficking to migration 
and continued to inadequately screen for indicators of trafficking 
in the agricultural and hospitality industries and among offshore 
migrants. The government continued to not report screening for 
trafficking indicators among individuals smuggled via sea before 
forcing intercepted boats back outside of Australian territorial waters 
or among refugees and asylum-seekers held in offshore detention 
centers. Civil society has reported some victims may have been 
reluctant to communicate with law enforcement officers due to fear 
of detention and deportation. Government policy sought to prevent 
victims from being held in immigration detention or otherwise 
arrested for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit; 
however, due to a lack of formal identification procedures, authorities 
may have deported or detained some unidentified victims. 
Authorities provided formally identified trafficking victims with 
accommodation, living expenses, legal advice, health services, 
vocational training, and counseling through the support program. 
The government allocated 4.1 million Australian dollars ($3.17 
million) from the federal budget to the support program in the 2020-
2021 funding year, as well as an additional 2.7 million Australian 
dollars ($2.09 million) for pandemic-related needs, an increase 
compared with 2.25 million Australian dollars ($1.74 million) 
during the 2019-2020 funding year. Only the AFP had the legal 
authority to refer victims to the support program; experts reported 
this requirement prevented some victims from accessing needed 
support services. The support program had five “streams” that were 
tailored to the needs of the particular victim. The assessment and 
intensive support stream within the support program assisted victims 
for up to 45 days irrespective of whether they were willing or able to 
assist with the investigation or prosecution of a human trafficking or 
slavery-related crime. The extended intensive support stream allowed 
for an additional 45 days of access to the program on a case-by-case 
basis for victims willing to assist with investigation or prosecution 
but not yet able to do so due to age, ill health, trauma, or a practical 
impediment. Children were automatically entitled to the extended 
support program if it was in their best interest. The temporary trial 
support stream assisted victims giving evidence pertaining to a 
human trafficking related prosecution. The justice support stream 
aided victims until the finalization of their case investigation and/
or prosecution. The forced marriage support stream provided those 
in or at risk of forced marriage—who may or may not have been 
trafficking victims—with up to 200 days of support without being 
required to participate in a criminal investigation or prosecution 
against perpetrators. NGOs continued to report some support services 
for victims were contingent on participation in law enforcement 
investigations and the government would cease provision of services 
when investigations ended. The government did not report how it 
provided services to adults unable or unwilling to participate in law 
enforcement investigations. The government created an interagency 
working group to focus on operational issues and information-sharing 
in relation to the support program; the interagency group met several 
times throughout the reporting period and reported meeting about 
pandemic-related impacts on trafficking victims. 
The government provided temporary and permanent “referred 
stay” visas to eligible victims. In 2020, the government provided 
28 temporary stay visas to foreign trafficking victims, compared 
with an unspecified number of victims in 2019 and 12 in 2018. 
Fewer than five individuals were granted permanent “referred stay” 
visas, the same as in 2019 and 2018; this included victims and their 
immediate family members, although some of these cases may have 
been victims of forced marriage rather than trafficking. In the previous 
reporting period, the government increased funding and staffing 
levels within the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions’ 
Witness Assistance Service, which provided support to victims of 
human trafficking during the court process; the government did not 
report any changes to these levels during the reporting period. The 
government did not report whether prosecutors requested restitution 
or if courts provided restitution for victims. The government did not 
have a centralized victim compensation system, and victims relied 
on civil proceedings to access compensation. 
PREVENTION
The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking. The Australian 
Interdepartmental Committee on Human Trafficking and Slavery 
continued to coordinate the government’s anti-trafficking efforts, 
while the Modern Slavery and Human Trafficking Branch within 
the Australian Border Force led the government’s domestic response 
to trafficking. In December 2020, the government finalized and 
launched its updated five-year national action plan (NAP) to combat 
trafficking. During the drafting of the NAP, the government invited 
public consultation on its development and held workshops with 
community stakeholders. The NAP focused on five national strategic 
priorities and continued to fund research projects and civil society 
organizations; facilitate awareness sessions for the public, government 
agencies, and civil society groups; and train law enforcement and 
government officials. The government allocated 10.5 million 
Australian dollars ($8.11 million) to the implementation of the 
NAP. In addition to funding multiple research projects conducted 
by an academic institution, the government funded the institution 
to review the implementation of the previous NAP; this report was 
publicly available. In 2020, the government announced availability 
of almost 393,380 Australian dollars ($304,000) for four NGOs to 
implement community prevention programs in Australia, compared 
with 400,000 Australian dollars ($309,120) for the 2019-2020 period. 
NGOs implementing these programs focused on forced labor, migrant 
worker rights, and increasing trafficking awareness and community 
collaboration of anti-trafficking activities. The government, through 
the AFP, continued to operate a national hotline to report victims 
of trafficking. 
The government established an interagency advisory group, which met 
four times in 2020, to provide strategic advice on the implementation 
of the Modern Slavery Act, which required businesses and entities 
with annual revenue of 98 million Australian dollars ($75.73 million) 
or greater to publish an annual modern slavery statement detailing 
their efforts to combat modern slavery in their supply chains and 
operations, among other provisions. In 2020, the government 
published its first Modern Slavery statement, in compliance with the 
act, and created a publicly available online registry of all submitted 
statements. The government posted more than 250 statements 
from businesses, covering nearly 500 entities operating in over 21 
different industries on the registry during the reporting period, 
which was the first submission period under the act. The government 
disseminated three additional guidance documents, including on 
how the pandemic may increase supply chain risks to forced labor, to 
assist businesses with the implementation of the act’s requirements 
during the reporting period. In addition, the government participated 
in more than 50 educational engagements with businesses to support 
the understanding and completion of the act’s requirements. The Fair 
Work Ombudsman continued to prioritize prevention of potential 
labor exploitation—including human trafficking—amongst migrant 
workers, focusing on awareness in domestic workers and among 
international students. 
In the previous reporting period, the government established a 
Migrant Workers’ Interagency Group to implement recommendations 
from the February 2019 Migrant Workers Taskforce Report. One 
recommendation from the report was to create a national Labour Hire 
Registration Scheme to require recruitment agencies in designated 
high-risk industries to register with the government and employers to 
use only these registered agencies. While this recommendation had 
still not been implemented nationally at the close of the reporting 
period, similar registration schemes had been implemented in 
Queensland and South Australia in 2018, Victoria in 2019, and the 
Australian Capital Territory in 2021. An NGO reported concern that 
the government did not effectively monitor and enforce labor laws in 
rural parts of Australia, heightening risks of forced labor. Domestic 







those lacking a contract, or residing within diplomatic households—
remained extremely vulnerable to exploitation due to the lack of 
clear protective oversight mechanisms relevant to these populations. 
However, in the previous reporting period, an NGO reported that 
Western Australia authorities began reviewing its industrial relations 
framework to consider including domestic work in the definition of 
“employee” to bring such work under state regulation; the government 
did not report an update to this definition change. 
The government continued to make efforts to reduce the demand 
for participation in international sex tourism of its citizens. It did so 
by continuing to publish materials for passport applicants outlining 
the application of Australian child sex trafficking laws to Australians 
overseas. The government cancelled 64 passports and denied five to 
registered child sex offenders during the reporting period, which was 
the second year these authorities were implemented. In addition, 
authorities provided 100 notifications to foreign law enforcement 
regarding traveling Australian child sex offenders. The government 
reported pandemic restrictions reduced the overall number of 
individuals leaving the country and, therefore, reduced the number 
of notifications and cancelled or denied passports for this reporting 
period. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand 
for commercial sex acts within Australia. The Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade provided pre-departure training to diplomatic 
personnel in compliance with Australia’s anti-trafficking legislation, 
and Home Affairs distributed a training package to its overseas staff 
and visa service providers. The government continued to work with 
international governments by engaging in anti-trafficking dialogue, 
conducting trainings, and sharing technical assistance.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the last five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in every state and territory in Australia. Traffickers 
primarily exploit women and men in forced labor, and to a lesser 
extent, women and girls in sex trafficking. Traffickers exploit a small 
number of children, primarily teenage Australian and foreign girls, 
in sex trafficking within the country. Some women from Asia and, 
to a lesser extent, Eastern Europe and Africa, migrate to Australia to 
work legally or illegally in a number of sectors, including commercial 
sex. After their arrival, traffickers compel some of these women to 
enter or remain in commercial sex in both legal and illegal brothels, 
as well as massage parlors and private apartments. Traffickers hold 
some foreign women—and sometimes girls—in captivity, subject 
them to physical and sexual violence and intimidation, manipulate 
them through illegal drugs, and force them to pay off unexpected or 
inflated debts. Traffickers attempt to evade authorities by allowing 
victims to carry their passports while in brothels and frequently move 
the victims to different locations to prevent them from establishing 
relationships with civil society or other victims. Some victims of sex 
trafficking and some women who migrate to Australia for arranged 
or forced marriages are exploited by their husbands or families in 
domestic servitude. Unscrupulous employers and labor agencies 
subject some men and women from Asia and several Pacific Islands 
who are recruited to work temporarily in Australia to forced labor 
in agriculture, cleaning, construction, hospitality and tourism, and 
domestic service. An investigation by the Fair Work Ombudsman 
found that some fraudulent foreign contracting companies exploit 
farm workers in bonded labor. There are reported cases of forced labor 
and other forms of exploitation in the agriculture and horticulture 
sectors, where victims (often foreign migrants and often from Asia) 
are threatened against leaving their jobs or seeking help. Traffickers 
may exploit temporary migrants and international students in forced 
labor, especially when based in remote regions with limited access 
to support. Some identified victims are foreign citizens on student 
visas who pay significant placement and academic fees. Unscrupulous 
employers coerce students to work in excess of the terms of their 
visas, making them vulnerable to trafficking by exploiting fears of 
deportation for immigration violations. Some foreign diplomats 
allegedly subject domestic workers to forced labor in Australia. 
Recent changes to entitlements for diplomats in Australia may 
reduce slightly the overall number of foreign domestic workers in the 
country; however, instances of forced labor in domestic service are 
frequently undetected or unacknowledged by authorities and thus 
not captured in official statistics. Some fishing vessels that transit or 
dock at Australian ports use physical abuse to force men to perform 
labor. Victims of domestic servitude in Australia work in extremely 
isolated circumstances with little to no oversight or regulation. 
AUSTRIA: TIER 1
The Government of Austria fully meets the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued to 
demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting 
period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on 
its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Austria remained on Tier 1. 
These efforts included increasing cooperation with foreign law 
enforcement and proactively and strategically following protocols in 
counter-narcotic operations by law enforcement to identify victims 
and ensure they were not punished for unlawful acts their traffickers 
compelled them to commit. Although the government meets the 
minimum standards, the government prosecuted and convicted 
fewer traffickers and some gaps remained in the referral process for 
potential victims of trafficking among migrants and asylum-seekers.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Increase efforts to identify victims among vulnerable groups—
including children, asylum-seekers, and individuals in commercial 
sex—and ensure all victims have access to services. • Increase efforts 
to identify victims of labor trafficking, such as by expanding training 
to help front-line responders recognize indicators of labor trafficking, 
including subtle means of fraud or coercion. • Thoroughly investigate 
and prosecute traffickers and sentence convicted traffickers to adequate 
penalties, which should involve significant prison terms, consistent 
with those imposed for other serious crimes such as rape. • Thoroughly 
investigate and prosecute traffickers and sentence convicted traffickers 
to adequate penalties, which should involve significant prison terms, 
consistent with those imposed for other serious crimes such as rape. 
• Strengthen efforts to guarantee effective access to compensation 
for victims, including by enforcing court compensation orders. • 
Continue to increase efforts to identify potential victims among 
Austrian citizens. • Uniformly apply the non-punishment provision 
for unlawful acts traffickers compel victims to commit and codify in 
law the non-punishment of victims. • Standardize the government 
law enforcement database on investigations, prosecution, convictions, 
and sentencing to include all cases of trafficking and disaggregate 
information on convictions and sentencing where defendants have 
committed multiple crimes. • Appoint an independent national 
anti-trafficking rapporteur. 
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. Article 104a of the 
criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and 
prescribed penalties of six months’ to five years’ imprisonment for 
offenses involving an adult victim, and one to 10 years’ imprisonment 
for those involving a child victim. These penalties were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those 
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prescribed for other serious crimes, such as kidnapping. Authorities 
also prosecuted sex trafficking under Article 217, which criminalized 
all transnational prostitution and prescribed penalties of one to 10 
years’ imprisonment when a trafficker induced a foreign individual 
to engage in prostitution by force, fraud, or coercion. 
The Federal Crime Office’s (FCO) human trafficking and smuggling 
service led the government’s efforts to investigate trafficking crimes 
and coordinated joint investigations with foreign law enforcement 
when necessary. Many public prosecutors’ offices had specialized 
anti-trafficking divisions and some courts had specialized judges. The 
government conducted 61 investigations involving at least 102 suspects 
under Article 104a, compared with 66 investigations of 102 suspects 
in 2019. The government initiated prosecutions under Article 104a 
against one defendant and continued 12 ongoing prosecutions in 
2020, compared with 21 total prosecutions in 2019. Courts convicted 
four traffickers under Article 104a, compared with 10 in 2019. 
Authorities attributed the decrease in the number of prosecutions 
and convictions to a higher frequency of cases being rejected due to 
insufficient evidence. Moreover, due to pandemic-related restrictions, 
courts were unable to secure witness testimony in some cases. The 
government prosecuted 10 defendants and convicted three under 
Article 217, but it did not specify how many involved trafficking 
offenses. In contrast to the Austrian court register, the government 
statistics agency published comprehensive data on criminal cases, 
including convictions and sentences, but it classified multi-offense 
convictions by the crime that carried the most severe punishment; 
some trafficking crimes may have been recorded as other offenses. 
The most recent data the agency published on prison sentences was 
from 2019, when courts sentenced nine traffickers under Article 104a. 
Courts sentenced one trafficker to six years’ imprisonment, two to five 
years’, one to four years’, one to three and a half years’, one to two 
years’, one to a partially suspended sentence of three years’, one to a 
suspended sentence of two years’, and one to a suspended sentence 
of 20 months’. Additionally, under Article 217, courts sentenced 
one individual to a prison term of 39 months’, one to a suspended 
sentence of 10 months’, and one to a suspended sentence of six 
months’. Despite the lack of comprehensive data for 2020, individual 
case reports provided some sentencing information. In a landmark 
case, law enforcement arrested traffickers from Serbia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina who forced nationals from those countries to be “street 
runners” in drug trafficking. Specialized anti-trafficking police units 
worked with counter-narcotic police units to ensure they identified 
victims and did not punish them for crimes their traffickers forced 
them to commit. In May 2020, law enforcement collaborated with 
international authorities to disband an organized international sex 
trafficking operation that had exploited Romanian women in Vienna. 
An international organization expressed concern that authorities were 
sometimes confused about whether to charge a suspected trafficker 
under Article 104a or Article 217, as the transnational prostitution 
statute pre-dated the trafficking law but still applied to trafficking 
crimes. The international organization noted this confusion could 
lead to gaps in data collection, including with respect to data on 
victim identification.
The government, assisted by an NGO, provided specialized training 
to authorities, including law enforcement, border control, labor 
inspectors, diplomatic, consular, and judicial personnel. Law 
enforcement officials received mandatory training on trafficking as part 
of their basic training and had opportunities for additional training 
and seminars throughout their careers. The FCO increased efforts to 
train law enforcement on digital methods of combating trafficking 
in response to a rising trend in traffickers’ use of social media and 
online recruitment. National and provincial authorities cooperated 
with authorities from other countries, including neighboring EU 
countries, to investigate and prosecute trafficking cases. In 2020, 
the government requested mutual legal assistance in 50 cases and 
executed 16 requests for mutual legal assistance from foreign officials, 
whereas in 2019 there were 22 cases and six executed requests. 
Authorities reported no new cases of forced labor in diplomatic 
households; one case from 2019 was ongoing at the end of the 
reporting period. The government did not report any investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in 
human trafficking offenses. 
PROTECTION
The government modestly increased protection efforts. The 
government continued to implement a referral mechanism in practice, 
launched in November 2018, for law enforcement to identify adult 
victims and refer them to care. Authorities used guidelines and 
checklists to screen potential victims for indicators of trafficking 
and referred identified victims to NGOs for assistance. However, 
experts noted the government lacked a formalized national referral 
mechanism that includes a wide variety of stakeholders that may 
come into contact with a potential trafficking victim. Government-
funded NGOs provided shelter, medical and psychological care, legal 
assistance, and German language classes to adult victims, including 
specialized services for victims with disabilities. A separate referral 
mechanism for children guided local authorities in identifying and 
providing services to child victims. One government-funded NGO 
reported it provided services to 314 female victims and their children 
in 2020 (336 in 2019), of whom police referred 117 and other 
government agencies referred 36. Some of these victims may have 
been children, as the organization provided assistance to women 
and girls age 15 years and older. Another NGO, which provided 
government-funded services for male victims, reported assisting 
62 victims in 2020, although it did not specify how many of these 
were government referrals. The government identified 13 Austrian 
victims under Article 104a and four Austrian victims under Article 
217 in 2020; the government identified 34 Austrian victims in 2019. 
Although identification statistics did not disaggregate labor and sex 
trafficking cases, the majority of identified victims were exploited 
in sex trafficking. Experts noted, however, that the relatively low 
number of identified forced labor cases could be attributed to 
authorities’ failure to recognize labor trafficking indicators rather 
than to low prevalence. Authorities reported victim identification 
was constrained in 2020 due to pandemic-related restrictions on the 
commercial sex industry; authorities were unable to conduct regular 
health inspections and provide counseling services, limiting their 
ability to identify potential victims of trafficking. 
The government allocated €1.43 million ($1.76 million) to specialized 
anti-trafficking NGOs to provide shelter, services, and legal support 
to victims in 2020, compared with €988,110 ($1.2 million) in 2019. 
However, the government also allocated €274,590 ($336,920) 
between April 2019 and December 2019 to an NGO providing 
specialized services for male victims and €410,000 ($503,070) between 
June 2018 and December 2019 to support NGO-run counseling 
centers for male victims and undocumented migrants. Government 
funding accounted for the bulk of support for these organizations. The 
city of Vienna funded a government-run center for unaccompanied 
migrant children, including child trafficking victims, offering legal, 
medical, psychological, social, and language assistance; the center 
reported it did not provide assistance to any child trafficking victims 
in 2020. The government’s anti-trafficking task force published 
annual guidelines on child victim identification and included these 
in brochures on children’s rights that were distributed throughout the 
country in 2020. The government provided training to NGOs working 
with migrants and asylum-seekers to help them identify trafficking 
victims among these groups. Law enforcement personnel screened 
individuals in commercial sex, including in brothels and massage 
parlors, for indicators of trafficking and monitored websites selling 
commercial sex to identify victims. The government funded NGOs to 
provide training on victim identification for law enforcement, labor 
inspectors, detention and asylum center authorities, border control, 
revenue officials, and military, diplomatic, and consular personnel. 
The law provided for the protection of victims’ rights during criminal 
proceedings. NGOs were permitted to accompany victims to hearings 






presenting evidence and testimony when victims needed protection 
from traffickers during the investigation and prosecution phases. 
Victim protection procedures granted victims a 30-day reflection 
period to decide whether to assist in the prosecution of their traffickers; 
some NGOs reported concerns about inconsistencies in the reflection 
period and noted victims were not always informed of this right. 
Victims’ access to services was not dependent on their willingness to 
participate in the criminal process. The Ministry of Justice reported 
providing, via NGOs, psycho-social and legal assistance during 
criminal proceedings to 150 trafficking victims in 2020 – the same 
number as in 2019. The provision of legal aid was constrained by 
gaps in the identification of victims; experts noted cases in which 
victims were not properly identified and therefore unable to access 
specialized legal assistance. Foreign trafficking victims from outside 
the EU had the right to temporary residency, with possible annual 
extensions, which allowed access to employment; victims from EU 
member states did not require residence permits. The government 
granted seven residence permits and extended 18 permits to trafficking 
victims in 2020, compared with 13 new permits and 24 extensions in 
2019. Victims who chose to return to their country of origin received 
repatriation assistance from government-funded NGOs. 
Victims could file civil suits against traffickers for damages and 
compensation, even in the absence of a criminal prosecution, and 
could still pursue civil suits in the event of an acquittal in a criminal 
case. Courts could award restitution upon criminal conviction; in 
2020, courts awarded restitution to eight victims in trafficking cases, 
compared to 25 in 2019. Experts expressed concern that access to 
compensation and restitution remained rare in trafficking cases; 
furthermore, compensation awards were unevenly enforced, as it 
was the victim’s responsibility to enforce the order through a claim 
with legal authorities. Compensation was also negatively impacted 
by the return to the victim’s country of origin. The government 
included the topic of victim compensation in its trainings and 
seminars for prosecutors and judges. The Ministry of Justice published 
guidelines for the non-punishment of victims for unlawful acts 
traffickers compelled them to commit. Administrative fines for 
illegal commercial sex or immigration violations were forgiven if 
the individual was found to be a victim of trafficking. However, gaps 
in victim identification may have left some victims unidentified in 
the law enforcement system. Observers noted the non-punishment 
provision was infrequently applied and cited the lack of a specific legal 
provision on the non-punishment of victims of trafficking. Experts 
noted gaps in the government’s referral process for suspected cases 
of exploitation among asylum-seekers; some migrants who showed 
signs of trafficking may have been sent to other countries in the EU 
without receiving services due to the government’s enforcement of 
EU regulations on asylum-seekers. 
PREVENTION
The government modestly increased efforts to prevent trafficking. 
A national anti-trafficking task force led the government’s efforts 
and included representatives from federal ministries, provincial 
governments, NGOs, business and labor interest groups, and civil 
society. The task force included working groups to address issues of 
particular concern, including child trafficking, labor exploitation, and 
non-punishment of victims. The working group on child trafficking 
started drafting a concept for a national center for child trafficking 
victims, while the working group on labor exploitation began a project 
to compile informational material for foreign childcare workers to 
increase their knowledge of their rights. The government did not 
finalize its 2021-2023 national action plan prior to the end of the 
reporting period; the Ministry of Interior commissioned a study in 
August 2020 on trafficking in Austria and completed it in March 
2021 in preparation for drafting the 2021-2023 plan. Civil society 
representatives who were not official members of the task force 
were periodically invited to attend task force meetings, and regional 
human rights coordinators covering anti-trafficking issues were 
regularly represented in the task force. The government finalized an 
implementation report assessing its progress in combating trafficking 
under its 2018-2020 national action plan but did not submit it to 
parliament during the reporting period. Despite pandemic-related 
restrictions, the task force held four of its five planned plenary 
meetings in 2020. A senior foreign ministry official headed the task 
force and served as the national anti-trafficking coordinator; Austria 
did not have an independent anti-trafficking rapporteur to evaluate 
the effectiveness of government efforts. 
The government organized and funded public awareness events 
and programs, including a virtual conference for approximately 
500 participants from civil society, international organizations, and 
members of the diplomatic and consular corps. It also continued 
its program to raise awareness in schools, subsidized anti-trafficking 
publications and television programming, and funded outreach 
activities to individuals in commercial sex. In August 2020, the 
government launched an awareness campaign through billboards 
and online platforms to educate the public. The Ministry of Labor 
provided an online resource for migrant workers that was available in 
seven languages and included information on labor laws, minimum 
wage standards, collective agreements, and rights of workers. The 
government-funded counseling center for undocumented workers 
continued an information campaign for seasonal agricultural 
workers and held workshops to raise awareness. The government 
trained labor inspectors to identify trafficking victims using a set of 
guidelines developed by the national task force’s labor trafficking 
working group. Authorities required a quality certificate for agencies 
employing nursing care personnel to prevent them from engaging 
in labor exploitation. Observers noted the labor inspectorate’s 
mandate was limited to addressing health and safety conditions, 
which they claimed hindered inspectors’ ability to respond to other 
exploitative work conditions; however, Austrian authorities stated 
inspectors received training on identifying labor exploitation and 
were required to report suspected cases to police. Austrian embassies 
and consulates in source countries informed visa applicants of 
the potential dangers of trafficking. The FCO operated a 24-hour 
trafficking hotline that received 500-600 calls and emails annually, 
with interpretation available in multiple languages. The foreign 
ministry continued efforts to prevent trafficking among employees 
of diplomatic households by holding events to inform them of 
their rights and by requiring them to obtain identification cards in 
person. The government continued partnering with neighboring 
governments and regional organizations to combat transnational 
trafficking; the FCO continued programs with China and Nigeria 
to combat cross-border trafficking and improve and expand joint 
investigations. The government provided funding for projects to 
combat trafficking in a range of countries in the EU and Africa, as 
well as Cambodia and Nicaragua. 
The government maintained efforts to reduce the demand for 
commercial sex acts by continuing to distribute awareness materials 
on the possibility of sex trafficking in commercial sex. The government 
continued efforts to reduce the demand for participation in 
international sex tourism by its citizens, including by airing an 
awareness video in places such as airports and hotels, as well as 
on outbound flights, and by raising awareness within the tourism 
industry. The government continued to enforce public procurement 
guidelines for the elimination of labor trafficking in the purchase 
of goods and services; the government funded a project to analyze 
the use of tools and initiatives to counter trafficking in international 
supply chains and a study on the effects of the pandemic on working 
conditions in global supply chains.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit foreign 
victims in Austria. Traffickers exploit women and girls from Eastern 
Europe (especially Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia), 
Southeast Asia, China, Nigeria, and South America in sex trafficking. 
More than 95 percent of identified victims are foreign women 
subjected to sex trafficking, and approximately 65 percent of trafficking 
victims come from EU member states. Traffickers exploit women from 
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Nigeria and China in sex trafficking in massage parlors and brothels; 
many of the Nigerian victims arrive in Austria as asylum-seekers. Some 
Austrian women engage in activities such as commercial sex, which 
leave them vulnerable to trafficking. Sex trafficking is concentrated 
in urban areas but also occurs in smaller towns. Traffickers working 
in well-developed networks recruit sex trafficking victims with 
fraudulent offers of employment in restaurants and domestic service 
or by posing as potential romantic partners. Most traffickers are 
Austrian men or men from the same country as their victim; many 
are members of international organized crime groups. Observers note 
an increasing trend in labor trafficking. Traffickers exploit men and 
women from Eastern Europe, Southeast Asia, and China in forced 
labor, primarily in restaurants, construction, agriculture, health care, 
and domestic service, including in diplomatic households. Seasonal 
migrants are especially vulnerable to labor trafficking, particularly 
during the harvest seasons. Traffickers exploit children, physically and 
mentally disabled persons, and Roma in forced begging. Children, 
especially Romani girls, are also exploited in forced criminality. 
Traffickers use Austria as a transit point in moving victims to other 
European countries.
AZERBAIJAN: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Azerbaijan does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included imposing more stringent 
sentences to convicted traffickers and identifying more victims, 
including victims of internal trafficking. The government slightly 
increased funding for victim assistance, continued to provide robust 
victim assistance through Victim Assistance Centers (VAC), and 
adopted the 2020-2024 National Action Plan (NAP). However, the 
government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared 
to the previous reporting period, even considering the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity. The government 
investigated and prosecuted fewer suspects and convicted fewer 
traffickers. The government lacked proactive identification efforts, 
resulting in victims likely penalized for unlawful acts their traffickers 
compelled them to commit. The government continued to lack 
interagency cooperation on anti-trafficking efforts and continued 
its moratorium on scheduled and unannounced labor inspections 
through 2021. Because the government has devoted sufficient resources 
to a written plan that, if implemented, would constitute significant 
efforts to meet the minimum standards, Azerbaijan was granted a 
waiver per the Trafficking Victims Protection Act from an otherwise 
required downgrade to Tier 3. Therefore Azerbaijan remained on 
Tier 2 Watch List for the third consecutive year. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers. • Sentence 
convicted traffickers to adequate penalties, which should involve 
significant prison terms. • Increase proactive identification efforts, 
particularly for internal trafficking, forced labor, and child trafficking. 
• Develop and implement standard operating procedures and 
indicators for screening trafficking victims and train officials on 
screening for trafficking among individuals in commercial sex, 
migrants, children begging, and other at-risk populations. • Train 
investigators, prosecutors, and judges on victim-centered approaches 
to trafficking cases, including for children, and provide advanced 
training on trafficking investigations and prosecutions. • Increase 
and allocate adequate funding to NGO-run shelters providing 
victim support services. • Lift the moratorium on scheduled and 
unannounced labor inspections. • Strengthen the capacity of the 
Labor Inspectorate to identify and refer victims of forced labor. • 
Adopt and implement specific procedures to protect potential child 
victims, including identification and referral procedures, indicators, 
and interview questions. 
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. The 2005 Law 
on the Fight against Trafficking in Persons and Article 144-1 of the 
criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and 
prescribed penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment for offenses 
involving adult victims and eight to 12 years’ imprisonment for 
offenses involving child victims. These penalties were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Law enforcement 
investigated 18 cases with 20 suspects, compared with 25 cases with 
27 suspects in 2019. Of the 18 cases, 16 were for sex trafficking and 
two for forced labor with 17 female and three male suspects. The 
government prosecuted 21 defendants, compared with 30 in 2019. 
Courts convicted 15 traffickers, a significant decrease from 42 in 
2019. Of those convicted in 2020, 11 were females convicted for sex 
trafficking, and one female and three males were convicted for forced 
labor. Judges issued stronger sentences in 2020 with three traffickers 
sentenced to three to five years’ imprisonment and nine traffickers 
sentenced to eight to nine years and six months’ imprisonment. 
Judges also issued fewer suspended sentences; three traffickers 
received suspended sentences, compared with 28 in 2019. Officials 
reported judges issued suspended sentences to traffickers due to the 
“2018 decree on humanization of punishment,” which required 
judges to issue more alternative punishments to imprisonment; 
however, in 2020, the government disseminated additional guidelines 
clarifying that the decree did not include trafficking. Due to pandemic 
mitigation efforts, the government postponed court cases, and law 
enforcement partially suspended inspections on locations associated 
with sex trafficking. However, law enforcement prioritized serious 
crimes, including trafficking, and continued investigations during 
the pandemic. 
The Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) maintained an Anti-Trafficking 
Department (ATD) that investigated most trafficking cases. Authorities 
often failed to recognize psychological coercion as a means of 
control or required a transnational element for trafficking, which 
led to internal sex trafficking cases reclassified as lesser offences. In 
previous years, GRETA and international organizations reported 
most investigations were reactive and lacked corroborative evidence 
for victim testimony; law enforcement noted standard procedures 
required a complaint from a victim to initiate an investigation, 
which hindered the ability to conduct proactive investigations. 
Observers reported low-level police solicited bribes from individuals 
in commercial sex and brothels operated under the purview of district 
police chiefs. The government did not report any investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit 
in human trafficking offenses. In previous years, observers reported 
an absence of victim-centered approaches within law enforcement, 
including local police insulting and dismissing a potential trafficking 
victim who attempted to self-identify. The government trained 
police, judges, border guards, and State Migration Service (SMS) 
officials on various anti-trafficking issues. ATD also held training for 
approximately 70 police officers and conducted virtual trainings for 
new prosecutors. The government did not provide information on 
international investigations or extraditions. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained victim protection efforts. The government 







trafficking victims, five were female forced labor victims, and four 
were male forced labor victims (85 female sex trafficking victims 
and six male forced labor victims in 2019); one was a foreign victim 
from Russia (two foreign victims from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan 
in 2019); and two were child victims (one in 2019). Most officially 
identified victims were Azerbaijani victims identified in destination 
countries or foreign victims exploited in Azerbaijan; officials identified 
eight Azerbaijani victims of internal trafficking (one in 2019). The 
government did not report information on identified children 
and parents “involved in begging for the purpose of helping their 
parents” in 2019 or 2020 (450 children and 207 parents in 2018) 
but observers reported police declined to investigate potential 
forced child begging cases and returned most children to their 
parents without investigating the role of the family in the children’s 
exploitation, leaving these children vulnerable to further harm. The 
government had standard operating procedures (SOPs) for victim 
identification but first responders, including law enforcement, 
immigration, and social services personnel, were either unaware of 
the procedures or did not consistently follow or understand them. 
Observers continued to report the lack of screening of vulnerable 
populations for trafficking indicators, including women, children, 
LGBTQI+ persons in commercial sex, and foreign migrant workers. 
Additionally, the government lacked policies tailored to children, 
such as interview questions, indicators, and referral procedures. SOPs 
required first responders to refer potential victims within 24 hours 
to ATD, which officially identified victims based on an investigation. 
NGOs and the government provided support services to some 
potential victims; however, individuals without official recognition 
did not receive the one-time government-provided allowance and 
did not have the ability to bring a civil claim against the alleged 
traffickers. Civil society referred two potential victims to ATD in 
2020 but none of the potential victims were determined by ATD as 
trafficking victims. 
The government allocated 119,000 manat ($70,000) for victim 
assistance, compared with 110,000 manat ($64,710) in 2019. The 
government also allocated 113,350 manat ($66,670) for the MIA-
run shelter, compared with 84,700 manat ($49,820) in 2019. The 
State NGO Council provided 172,000 manat ($101,180) for 19 
civil society projects, including 30,000 manat ($17,650) for two 
NGO-run shelters, compared with 209,000 manat ($122,940) for 
20 projects, including 57,000 manat ($33,530) for two NGO-run 
shelters in 2019. MIA provided a land grant in October to an NGO 
to construct a new shelter, but government funding overall was 
still inadequate for NGO-run shelters. NGO-run shelters remained 
severely underfunded and restrictive legislation governing foreign 
grants limited NGOs’ ability to receive funding from external donors. 
Most NGO-run shelter staff who provided support services worked on 
a voluntary basis. The MIA operated a shelter for trafficking victims, 
which provided accommodation, financial assistance, legal assistance, 
and medical and psycho-social support; 80 officially identified 
victims received support at the shelter (78 in 2019). The MIA-run 
shelter had separate areas for women, men, and children but limited 
freedom of movement and required victims to submit an application 
to leave the shelter. The MIA-run shelter accommodated potential 
victims for up to one month but longer stays required victims to 
cooperate with law enforcement. The MIA-run shelter provided the 
only accommodation for male victims. The government provided a 
resettlement allowance of 700 manat ($412) for officially identified 
victims; 91 officially identified victims received the resettlement 
allowance, the same number as in 2019. The VAC in Baku and 
Goychay provided legal, psychological, medical, and employment 
assistance to officially recognized and potential victims. VACs assisted 
32 officially identified victims (85 in 2019), including 19 victims 
and four of their children with medical aid, 14 with psychological 
assistance, and 11 with legal aid. The government did not provide 
data on the number of potential victims who received assistance from 
VACs in 2019 or 2020. The government aided 12 officially identified 
victims to find employment (14 in 2019) and 25 with vocational 
training (45 in 2019). The government provided in-kind support and 
assistance to children of victims; 27 children received school supplies 
(56 in 2019), 14 children received identity documents (14 in 2019), 
and 27 children were enrolled in preschool education (22 in 2019). 
Observers reported that low pay for VAC employees led to high staff 
turnover and decreased service quality due to inexperienced staff 
assisting victims. In previous years, the government awarded some 
contracts to organizations with no experience and jeopardized victim 
safety and assistance quality. The government referred 80 victims 
to NGO-run shelters (67 in 2019). NGO-run shelters operated at 
full capacity despite pandemic mitigation efforts but one NGO-run 
shelter in Ganja suspended operations after shelling in the armed 
conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh damaged its facility. The SMS did 
not report data on the number of temporary residence permits issued 
to foreign victims in 2019 or 2020 but the government assisted a 
foreign victim in obtaining a passport.
Observers reported that law enforcement’s attitude towards victims 
improved, but authorities may have penalized sex trafficking victims 
with administrative fines for prostitution crimes due to an absence 
of screening efforts. In previous years, an international organization 
referred foreign migrant workers who displayed indicators of 
trafficking, but ATD did not recognize any as a victim and authorities 
subsequently deported some. Authorities did not use victim-witness 
protection measures for trafficking victims. In previous years, GRETA 
and other international organizations reported prosecutors believed 
such measures were unnecessary for trafficking victims and noted 
the lack of licensed attorneys providing legal assistance to victims 
due to low pay. Children testified without a child psychologist or 
attorney to communicate legal terminology in a child-friendly 
manner, which may have caused further trauma to these children. 
Judges did not issue restitution in criminal cases and did not provide 
information on compensation in civil suits. The government reported 
confiscating property, cash, securities, and other assets from traffickers 
and transferring it to a victim assistance fund.
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. The government 
consulted NGOs, international organizations, and government 
agencies to draft the 2020-2024 NAP and adopted the NAP in 
July 2020. The national coordinator led government-wide anti-
trafficking efforts but the lack of cooperation between agencies 
hindered interagency coordination. While civil society reported 
the government did not consider trafficking as a high priority, it 
highlighted good communication with ATD, including responsiveness 
to recommendations and concerns. The ATD recognized 18 NGO 
leaders with monetary awards of 1,000 manat ($588) for their anti-
trafficking efforts in 2019 and 2020. The government postponed 
awareness campaigns targeting children and students due to the 
pandemic but distributed brochures and flyers on the risks of 
trafficking at public awareness events and to citizens traveling. The 
government publicly released an annual assessment of the country’s 
anti-trafficking efforts, including prosecution data and protection 
efforts. ATD operated the “152” hotline, which received 5,705 calls 
(6,845 calls in 2019). These calls helped identify 10 victims and 
initiate three investigations. The government did not make efforts to 
reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. A presidential decree in 
2015 prevented the Labor Inspectorate from conducting spontaneous 
employment inspections, which restricted proactive investigations 
and victim identification efforts. In 2017, the government extended 
its moratorium on scheduled and unannounced labor inspections 
through 2021. Although inspectors were permitted to request 
information from employers and relevant employees in order to 
investigate complaints, complaint response did not include worksite 
inspections. The Ministry of Labor and Social Protection reported 
that it investigated 8,512 complaints in 2020.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Azerbaijan, and traffickers exploit victims 
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from Azerbaijan abroad. Traffickers exploit Azerbaijani men and 
boys in forced labor within the country and in Qatar, Russia, Turkey, 
and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Traffickers exploit women 
and children from Azerbaijan in sex trafficking within the country 
and in Iran, Malaysia, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, Turkey, and the UAE. 
Azerbaijan is a destination country for sex and labor trafficking 
victims from China, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and 
Uzbekistan. In previous years, Azerbaijan has been used as a transit 
country for victims of sex and labor trafficking from Central Asia to 
Iran, Turkey, and the UAE. Within the country, some children are 
exploited in forced begging and forced labor as roadside vendors 
and at tea houses and wedding facilities but there were no reports 
of forced begging or forced labor at wedding facilities in 2020, 
which were not operational due to pandemic mitigation measures. 
Oil workers are vulnerable to forced labor with lengthy shifts at sea 
due to pandemic-related restrictions. Civil society and government 
officials reported no instances of forced labor in the 2019 and 
2020 cotton harvest due to widespread use of affordable harvesting 
machinery. In 2018, there were isolated reports that local officials 
mobilized and forced some public-sector employees to participate 
in the autumn cotton harvest. 
BAHAMAS, THE: TIER 1
The Government of The Bahamas fully meets the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued to 
demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting 
period considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its 
anti-trafficking capacity; therefore The Bahamas remained on Tier 1. 
These efforts included convicting one trafficker, awarding restitution 
to a victim for the first time in the amount of 10,000 Bahamian 
dollars ($10,000), continuing to prosecute alleged traffickers, and 
increasing training of government officials. Although the government 
meets the minimum standards, it identified fewer victims; did not 
comprehensively implement its victim identification protocol, 
especially among vulnerable groups; and did not have a dedicated 
shelter for trafficking victims. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase efforts to prosecute, convict, and sentence convicted 
traffickers, including officials complicit in sex or labor trafficking. • 
Comprehensively train officials to implement the victim identification 
and referral protocol to identify victims of sex trafficking and forced 
labor, especially among vulnerable groups such as stateless persons; 
vulnerable migrants from Haiti, Venezuela, and other countries; and 
LGBTQI+ individuals. • Provide a dedicated shelter for trafficking 
victims and continue funding comprehensive victim services. • Reduce 
delays in court proceedings. • Take steps to eliminate recruitment 
fees charged to workers in The Bahamas by labor recruiters and ban 
employee paid recruitment fees. • Provide vulnerable individuals 
with trauma-informed assistance and interpretation in their language 
prior to, during, and after screening for trafficking, including through 
the hotline. • Strengthen the capacity of labor inspectors to identify 
and refer victims of labor trafficking. • Increase outreach to potential 
trafficking victims among vulnerable groups in partnership with 
NGOs. • Develop, execute, and publish a robust monitoring and 
evaluation framework for anti-trafficking policies and efforts. • 
Engage further with officials involved in anti-trafficking activities in 
other countries in the region to exchange best practices in trafficking 
investigations and screening. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. The Trafficking 
in Persons (Prevention and Suppression) Act 2008 criminalized sex 
trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties up to life 
imprisonment. These penalties were sufficiently stringent, and with 
regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for 
other serious crimes, such as rape. 
The government initiated investigation of 13 cases (11 for sex 
trafficking and two for labor trafficking) during the reporting period, 
compared with 16 investigations in 2019 and two investigations in 
2018. One of the investigations resulted in the prosecution of two 
individuals—a Bahamian male and a Bahamian female—in two cases 
for sex trafficking, compared to two cases in 2019 and one in 2018. 
Two investigations, involving three suspects, led to prosecutions 
for crimes other than trafficking. The government continued one 
sex trafficking investigation initiated in a previous reporting period. 
Authorities arrested 12 individuals on suspicion of trafficking during 
the reporting period. The Magistrate’s Court handled the charges in 
all cases. The government convicted one trafficker in 2020 in the 
Magistrate’s Court through a plea agreement, compared with no 
convictions in 2019 and one each in 2018 and 2017. The trial for 
the convicted individual, a female sex trafficker from the Dominican 
Republic, started in January 2020, but the pandemic delayed its 
completion until December 2020; courts sentenced the trafficker to 
two years’ imprisonment. The convict, who did not have legal status 
to reside in The Bahamas, completed her sentence and was deported 
after receiving the required reduction as provided for in the majority 
of cases of persons convicted and sentenced in The Bahamas; the 
convict served a total of 16 months. However, the sentence indicated 
two years, despite the reduction in actual time served. The Supreme 
Court continued to hear two cases from previous reporting periods 
involving a total of two Bahamian male defendants and one female 
Bahamian defendant; both trials were ongoing at the end of the 
reporting period. The Magistrate’s Court also continued the trial of 
a female Jamaican alleged trafficker initiated in a previous reporting 
period; the trial was ongoing at the end of the reporting period and 
authorities continued to monitor the movements of the defendant. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government officials complicit in trafficking offenses. 
The pandemic forced the suspension of all criminal court proceedings 
from April to November 2020, although many civil cases proceeded 
virtually. However, the government reported police, defense, health, 
and immigration officials continued to execute the government’s 
trafficking response despite the pandemic, including by screening 
potential victims. The government did not divert any resources 
from anti-trafficking efforts as a direct result of the pandemic, and 
there was no interruption to law enforcement efforts. The National 
Trafficking in Persons Inter-Ministerial Committee (TIP Committee) 
Task Force maintained an investigative unit. The government did 
not assign any courts specifically to handle human trafficking cases. 
Experts reported concerns about excessive pretrial detention due 
to criminal justice system delays preventing even the most serious 
criminal cases from advancing in a timely manner. Observers noted 
the lack of judges and prosecutors in the country contributed to 
significant backlogs in all cases; courts easily granted bail (due in 
part to prison overcrowding) even to defendants accused of violent 
crimes, and law enforcement did not have the resources to fully 
uphold the law. Immigration officials may have solicited Haitian 
migrants for bribes to prevent detention. The government provided 
in-person anti-trafficking training for 98 police recruits in April 2020, 
24 police detectives in July 2020, and 147 members of the military 
from April-July 2020 on their roles regarding suspected trafficking 
crimes. Authorities also held a virtual training for 90 members of 








opening remarks from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the 
Attorney General, the Minister of National Security, the Chair of the 
(TIP Committee), and a foreign judge. The Royal Bahamas Police 
Force provided human trafficking training for 48 officers and two 
Masonic lodges on February 27 both virtually and in person. The 
Royal Bahamas Defense Force held a human trafficking training 
in March 2021 for 122 military personnel covering an overview 
of the crime, the role of the police, and the role of social services. 
The government did not enter into any new agreements or conduct 
any trafficking-focused law enforcement cooperation with other 
governments. However, two draft memoranda of understanding 
(MOU) to assist in human trafficking investigations and information 
sharing with Mexico and Colombia remained pending at the end 
of the reporting period. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained efforts to protect victims. Authorities 
continued to implement a formal victim-centered protocol to guide 
front-line responders in identifying both sex and labor trafficking 
victims and referring them to services. However, concerns remained 
on the thoroughness of their application, especially with vulnerable 
populations such as undocumented migrants and stateless children. 
The government identified two Bahamian child victims during the 
reporting period, down from five victims in 2019 and the same 
as in 2018. NGOs did not identify any victims, the same as in the 
previous reporting period. The two identified victims, both 16 years 
old, returned to their families, and the Department of Social Services 
provided financial support both to the victims and to their families. 
Authorities provided care for five victims identified during previous 
reporting periods, including two victims still receiving support at 
the end of the reporting period, although efforts to provide care to 
victims stopped temporarily from late March to mid-April due to 
pandemic lockdown restrictions. The government’s actual spending 
on trafficking victims’ care and prevention activities apart from the 
pandemic was 41,351 Bahamian dollars ($41,351). The government 
also provided 47,651 Bahamian dollars ($47,651) for four victims 
for needs resulting from the pandemic, including emergency food 
assistance, financial assistance for basic needs, and temporary shelter. 
In 2019, the government gave 69,509 Bahamian dollars ($69,509) 
to four NGOs that offered services to trafficking victims, among 
other vulnerable groups, compared to 240,000 Bahamian dollars 
($240,000) in 2018, with the decrease due to emergency costs 
incurred to address the destruction caused by Hurricane Dorian. 
In December 2020, a court awarded a Venezuelan victim 10,000 
Bahamian dollars ($10,000) in restitution in a civil suit for the 
first time. As of the end of the reporting period, the government 
was still arranging the logistics to deliver the award to the victim, 
who was in Venezuela. Authorities reported screening individuals 
for trafficking indicators during routine checks of nightclubs. The 
government reported it had a formal process to guide officials in 
transferring victims to institutions that offered short- or long-term 
care, and it screened all migrants arriving by sea individually upon 
arrival; normally, migrants apprehended on land were observed 
for indicators that might warrant further investigation. However, 
experts reported authorities did not use formal protocols to screen 
all migrants and continued abuse of migrants—particularly those of 
Haitian descent—by officials was a cause of concern. The country has 
an SOP with a detailed, victim-centered approach to the screening 
process, including the use of qualified interpreters of the same gender 
to assure reporting and comprehension of all communication. 
However, reports of inconsistent training of staff on screening for 
trafficking indicators, and lack of implementation of identification 
protocols in migrant languages indicated that authorities did not 
screen all vulnerable individuals, consequently failing to identify 
and protect any trafficking victims. 
The Department of Social Services oversaw the support for 
identified and potential victims by service providers, attorneys, 
and law enforcement. The Department provided shelter, food, 
clothing (inclusive of school uniforms for dependent children), 
rent, furniture, payment of utility bills, placement in school, medical 
care, psychological and psychiatric attention as needed, counseling, 
transportation, assistance with shopping, securing legal documents, 
résumé preparation, job placement assistance, facilitation of payment 
of stipends, and wiring of money abroad. The government typically 
provided most services for victims, but NGOs have in the past assisted 
in providing services to victims, including meals and water, hygiene 
supplies, and a non-threatening, neutral environment for authorities 
to conduct interviews. An NGO could provide counseling, while 
another NGO could be called upon for short-term accommodations 
for female victims. The government did not provide a dedicated shelter 
for trafficking victims; however, the government did provide short-
term and long-term accommodations and partnered as needed with 
an NGO for use as a temporary safe house. Authorities continued 
to place victims in NGO-managed shelters shared with domestic 
violence victims. The government reported that it considered victim 
preference when determining the appropriate shelter, and that victims 
could choose not to reside in a shelter. The government did not report 
any cases of victims with disabilities; however, the national anti-
trafficking budget included resources to make accommodations, if 
those services were necessary. Shelters did not restrict the movements 
of trafficked victims, allowed victims to leave for employment, and 
provided advisory services. Protection services were not time-limited. 
The government tailored victim care services to the needs of the 
victim upon assessment. 
Victim participation in human trafficking investigations and 
prosecutions was voluntary and the law granted the victim immunity 
from prosecution. As a matter of policy, courts closed trafficking trials 
and—as the law mandated non-disclosure of victims’ names, under 
penalty of prosecution—the media could not publish the identity of 
a victim. Bahamian law permitted victim testimony via live television 
links and for the reading of written statements into evidence, but this 
did not happen during the reporting period. Authorities reported 
they advised victims of their rights with respect to the law, appointed 
a designated caseworker who provided support for the victim, and 
provided witness protection. The government additionally gave a 
police security detail for foreign victims moving to and from the 
airport and for victims moving to and from the designated shelter, 
including for court appearances, during which a police officer stayed 
with the victim. The government also conducted periodic visits to 
the safe house. The government reported it encouraged victims 
returning from abroad for trial to bring a family member with 
them for additional support. The country lacked a visa classification 
for victims of crime, but foreign victims were entitled to the same 
assistance and services provided to Bahamian victims. Authorities 
did not tie benefits to foreign victims’ willingness to cooperate with 
law enforcement or to testify in court and the outcomes of legal 
proceedings did not affect victims’ temporary immigration status. 
Foreign nationals had the option to remain in the jurisdiction with 
legal status or to return to their country of origin; the government 
reported it did not deport victims. Foreign victims who decided to 
stay in the country received assistance in obtaining legal residency for 
humanitarian purposes, which included a standardized certificate that 
resembled the asylum certificate but did not identify the holder as a 
trafficking victim and enabled the holder to work legally. However, 
foreign victims—particularly irregular migrants—may not have felt 
comfortable enough to report crimes to law enforcement officers who 
could identify them as victims. During the reporting period, there 
were no reported cases of Bahamians being exploited in trafficking 
abroad and the Bahamian government did not identify any exploited 
nationals requiring funding for repatriation. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. Ministry of National 
Security officials led the government’s overall efforts to combat 
trafficking and chaired the TIP Committee, whose membership 
included the Ministry of National Security (including the Royal 
Bahamas Police Force, the Royal Bahamas Defense Force, the 




Attorney General/ Department of Public Prosecutions (DPP) (a DPP 
Prosecutor); the Ministry of Social Services & Community Support 
(the Department of Social Services Chief Welfare Officer responsible 
for victim care); the Ministry of Health (the Department of Public 
Health); the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (two Foreign Service Officers); 
three NGOs; and the Task Force. The Task Force comprised the 
same members and activated in response to individual cases. The 
TIP Committee Secretariat consisted of three full-time, seconded 
government officials dedicated to efforts against human trafficking: 
the Chair from the Ministry of National Security, plus one official 
each from the Royal Bahamas Police Force and the Department of 
Social Services. The government reported it planned to double the size 
of the Secretariat to include officials from the Department of Labor, 
the Department of Immigration, and the Royal Bahamas Defense 
Force, but had not done so by the end of the reporting period. The 
TIP Committee, which continued to meet virtually every other week 
during the entirety of the pandemic, briefed the Minister of National 
Security weekly on anti-trafficking developments. The government 
had a national action plan, running from 2019-2023. 
The Bahamian government funded anti-trafficking initiatives through 
the national anti-trafficking annual budget, which was included within 
the Ministry of National Security’s annual budget. The Task Force had 
a dedicated budget of 95,000 Bahamian dollars ($95,000), which was 
the same budget as in 2019; funding remained available during the 
pandemic. Funding for trafficking-related work in other ministries 
came from the general budgets for those ministries or departments. 
The government did not employ any specific methodology to research 
and assess human trafficking during the reporting year apart from 
information sharing within the TIP Committee. Government-imposed 
lockdowns and curfews due to the pandemic during the first half 
of the reporting period forced the TIP Committee to postpone or 
cancel numerous awareness-raising activities, including workshops, 
discussions with the public, and presentations. However, the Task 
Force was able to continue virtual awareness events. In July 2020, 
authorities held a press conference to outline the government’s efforts 
to combat human trafficking in the country. Authorities provided 
anti-trafficking awareness sessions for 35 nurses in January 2021, 24 
new staff from the Department of Public Health in February 2021, 
and 31 individuals including staff from the Accident and Emergency 
Department in February 2021. In July 2020, authorities provided a 
virtual awareness session for 35 members of the Bahamian/Jamaican 
Kiwanis Club and in October 2020 for 31 university students. In 
February 2021, members of the Secretariat provided a virtual awareness 
session for 48 lodge members on the human trafficking law, indicators, 
and prevention and reporting strategies. Authorities also provided 
sessions for tourism front-line staff and tourism “ambassadors.” 
An officer with the Criminal Investigation Department, assisted by 
an interpreter, met with members of a Haitian church as a form of 
outreach on human trafficking to the Haitian community. Members 
of the Secretariat appeared on a radio talk show in November 2021 
to discuss The Bahamas’s strategy to combat human trafficking. 
The Ministry of National Security maintained a dedicated 24/7/365 
English-speaking trafficking hotline, funded by the national security 
budget, while an NGO had its own emergency hotline to report all 
forms of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse. The government’s 
hotline remained fully operational during the reporting period, 
receiving two calls regarding suspected trafficking that did not result 
in the identification of any victims. The government advertised 
the hotline through English media and some Mandarin, Creole, 
and Spanish brochures placed in public spaces. The government 
disseminated multiple public service announcements via radio 
and television broadcasts and constructed a billboard with the 
hotline number. A Ministry of National Security vehicle displaying 
the trafficking hotline number circulated the streets in areas with 
vulnerable populations. The Department of Immigration, in 
conjunction with the Royal Bahamas Police Force, disseminated 
brochures with the trafficking hotline number to residents including 
school students, the local bank, food stores, and government offices. 
The constitution prohibits forced labor. Bahamian trafficking and 
labor laws did not explicitly prohibit charging workers recruitment 
fees, switching contracts, and withholding wages to compel 
service. The Department of Labor did not train labor inspectors 
in trafficking or report whether surprise inspections resulted in 
trafficking investigations, but the trafficking screening questionnaire 
for labor inspectors asked them to determine if an employee’s job 
situation was different from what was promised or expected and 
if payment was withheld or deducted. The government reported 
the Department of Immigration granted work permits that were 
very specific in nature, and that the Immigration Board reviewed 
applications for every job over six months to prevent the issuance 
of unqualified permits and to protect against exploitation. The 
Department of Labor, through the Public Employment Services Unit, 
worked with private sector organizations to recruit Bahamians for 
specific projects. When an employer submitted a request for a work 
certificate for a non-Bahamian to work in the country, authorities 
issued anti-trafficking brochures to the employer, but staff rarely 
interacted with the prospective employee prior to arrival in the 
country. During the reporting period, the government received no 
reports of workers recruited through knowingly fraudulent job offers, 
contract switching, and confiscating or otherwise denying workers 
access to their identity documents. At the onset of the pandemic, the 
government gave migrant workers a choice to stay or return to their 
country of origin. However, the emergency lockdown restrictions, 
in effect during much of the reporting period, hindered the ability 
of many migrant workers to continue earning an income. Anyone 
temporarily out of work due to the pandemic was eligible to apply 
for unemployment benefits. Authorities began discussions with an 
international organization to establish an MOU on multiple issues 
relating to migration, including human trafficking and its impact 
on immigrants. The government did not undertake specific efforts 
to reduce demand for commercial sex. The government required all 
new diplomats to have anti-trafficking training and junior officers 
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rotated and sat on the TIP 
Committee for a minimum of six months.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in The Bahamas, and traffickers exploit victims 
from The Bahamas abroad. Traffickers recruit migrant workers, 
especially those from Haiti, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, China, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Colombia, Venezuela, the Philippines, and the 
United States, through false offers of employment, both through 
advertisements in foreign newspapers and social media; upon 
arrival, traffickers subject them to sex trafficking and forced labor, 
including in domestic service and in sectors with low-skilled labor. 
The profile of human traffickers prosecuted for human trafficking 
have been primarily female in the past five years. Individuals born 
to a non-Bahamian father in The Bahamas, to a female citizen, or 
to foreign born parents do not automatically receive Bahamian 
citizenship or documentation and are at heightened risk of trafficking. 
Unaccompanied migrant children, individuals lured for employment, 
those involved in commercial sex and exotic dancing, irregular 
migrants, stateless persons, LGBTQI+ individuals (particularly from 
poor communities), and migrants displaced by Hurricane Dorian 
have been trafficked or are particularly vulnerable to trafficking. In 
particular, irregular migrants living in informal settlements on the 
Hurricane Dorian-ravaged islands of Abaco and Grand Bahama, 
and those who fled to New Providence after the storm, exist in 
what observers call “dark spaces,” which deter reporting abuse. The 
high unemployment rate—reported to have exceeded 40 percent—










The Government of Bahrain meets the minimum standards for the 
elimination of trafficking. The government continued to demonstrate 
serious and sustained efforts during the reporting period, considering 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Bahrain remained on Tier 1. These efforts included 
establishing a specialized trafficking Public Prosecutor’s Office 
and High Court, convicting a complicit government official for 
sex trafficking, and reporting more sex trafficking convictions. The 
government also increased efforts to prevent vulnerability of migrants 
who lost immigration status due to pandemic-related job loss through 
implementing a series of measures to protect migrant workers and 
reduce instances of forced labor. Although the government meets the 
minimum standards, it did not prosecute or, for the third consecutive 
year, convict any traffickers for forced labor. The government did not 
proactively identify victims of all forms of trafficking, specifically 
victims of forced labor, and it identified significantly fewer victims 
overall. It did not routinely employ its proactive identification and 
referral mechanism, which resulted in the penalization of some 
potential and unidentified victims, specifically those arrested for 
immigration violations or engaging in commercial sex and those 
fleeing forced labor. In addition, authorities sometimes treated 
forced labor—including cases of unpaid or withheld wages, passport 
retention, and related abuses—as labor law violations, rather than 
potential trafficking crimes. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, 
particularly suspects of labor trafficking, including domestic servitude, 
and allegedly complicit officials. • Expand and actively enforce labor 
law protections for domestic workers and to all workers holding 
flexi-work permits and permanently allow domestic workers to 
self-sponsor through flexible work permits. • Increase investigations 
and prosecutions of potential forced labor cases involving passport 
retention, non-payment of wages, and other indicators as trafficking 
crimes. • Strengthen and expand sponsorship reforms to domestic 
workers, such as allowing domestic workers to change jobs at any time 
without employer consent. • Implement the new Wage Protection 
System (WPS) and ensure it covers all migrant workers, including 
domestic workers and flexi-permit holders. • Continue to train 
officials, particularly law enforcement and prosecutors, on the anti-
trafficking law and victim identification, particularly for victims of 
forced labor. • Ensure that victims of all forms of trafficking receive 
equal access to protection services and that receiving shelter and 
other provisions does not depend on confirmation of a trafficking 
crime from the Public Prosecutor. • Increase proactive identification 
of trafficking victims among vulnerable groups, such as domestic 
workers, migrant workers, Cuban medical missions, Chinese nationals 
working on projects managed by state-owned enterprises, and 
individuals in commercial sex. • Train officials on and routinely 
use the two labor trafficking-focused directorates to identify labor 
trafficking victims and investigate labor traffickers. • Continue to 
conduct national anti-trafficking awareness campaigns, strategically 
targeting migrant and domestic workers. 
PROSECUTION
The government demonstrated varied law enforcement efforts during 
the reporting period, as it built greater capacity to prosecute trafficking 
cases under the anti-trafficking law and convicted a complicit 
government official for sex trafficking but did not prosecute or convict 
any traffickers for forced labor crimes. The anti-trafficking law, No. 1 
of 2008, criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking. It prescribed 
penalties ranging from three to 15 years’ imprisonment, plus a fine 
of between 2,000 and 10,000 Bahraini dinar (BD) ($5,310-$26,530) 
and the cost of repatriating the victim(s), which were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. 
The government continued to maintain a police unit dedicated 
to investigations of trafficking crimes. In an effort to increase 
investigations and prosecutions under the anti-trafficking law, 
Bahrain’s Attorney General issued Order 34 that established a 
specialized Trafficking in Persons Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) and 
the First High Criminal Court for Trafficking in Persons during the 
reporting period. The government created the specialized PPO office 
to give prosecutors the full investigatory mandate to prosecute all 
trafficking crimes under the 2008 anti-trafficking law and ensure that 
potential victims of trafficking had greater access to legal recourse and 
adequate protection services and assistance. Both the prosecutor’s 
office and court included staff specially trained by the Labor Migration 
Regulatory Authority (LRMA) and two international organizations 
on human trafficking. 
The Ministry of Interior (MOI) reported investigating 19 potential 
trafficking cases (33 individual arrests) during the reporting period, 
of which 15 were for sex trafficking and four for forced labor, 
marking an overall decrease compared with 29 sex trafficking and 
12 labor trafficking investigations during the previous reporting 
period. Calls to the government-run national trafficking hotline 
resulted in two of these investigations, as staff alerted the police who 
subsequently investigated the allegations. Officials prosecuted 27 
alleged sex traffickers and zero individuals for alleged forced labor 
crimes, down from 53 and seven, respectively, the year prior. The 
government convicted 22 individuals for sex trafficking under the 
anti-trafficking law and handed down sentences between three and 
15 years’ imprisonment plus a fine in accordance with the law; it 
convicted 14 sex traffickers and administered similar sentences the 
previous reporting cycle. Courts sentenced two of the 22 traffickers 
to life in prison and ordered their deportation from Bahrain upon 
completion of their sentences. As in the previous two years, officials 
did not achieve any forced labor convictions. Also, as in the previous 
two years, the government required convicted traffickers to pay all 
costs associated with the repatriation of the victims. The government 
planned to deport all non-Bahraini trafficking offenders upon 
the completion of their sentences. In April 2020, a Bahraini court 
convicted eight traffickers to seven years’ imprisonment and a fine 
of 5,000 BD ($13,260) in a case initiated in the previous reporting 
period; the case involved Bahraini cooperation with the Government 
of the Philippines and involved two Filipino nationals who were 
forced into commercial sex upon arrival in Bahrain. The government 
also convicted a Bahraini police officer for complicity in the sex 
trafficking ring. In another case initiated in the previous reporting 
period and involving 21 Kazakhstani females forced into commercial 
sex in Manama, the LMRA, Ministry of Justice (MOJ), and MOI 
worked closely with the Kazakh Embassy in Saudi Arabia and with 
police officials in Kazakhstan to obtain testimony from the victims 
during the initial stages of the investigation before they departed 
Bahrain. The case resulted in the conviction of three traffickers and 
the repatriation of all 21 victims through funds from the government’s 
victim assistance fund. 
NGOs and civil society reported that although the government 
provided training to officials on identifying cases and victims of forced 
labor, frontline authorities, nevertheless, sometimes recorded instances 
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of non-payment of wages and passport confiscation as labor violations 
and rarely referred these cases to the PPO for investigation as potential 
trafficking cases. The government reported workers continued to 
be able to file a grievance against an employer in a labor court if 
arbitration was unsuccessful. The LMRA reported it began providing 
pro bono legal services through the Labor Case Submission Office for 
migrant workers and screened each of the 1,277 submitted cases for 
indicators of human trafficking. The government previously improved 
prospects for criminal prosecution of labor trafficking cases. The 
LMRA established two directorates in the previous reporting period 
and housed them within the MOJ’s Labor Case Coordination section. 
The first directorate was the Protective Inspection Directorate (PID), 
which had the mandate to identify, investigate, and document all 
forms of labor exploitation with a focus on those with a prospective 
nexus to trafficking; it was staffed by labor inspection officers trained 
by two international organizations. The second directorate was 
the Grievances and Protections Directorate (GPD), which was 
able to receive, register, and document all labor-related criminal 
cases. The government incorporated both directorates into the 
government’s broader national referral mechanism (NRM) with the 
goal of increasing laborers’ access to the justice system, reducing the 
time for courts to render an official decision, and examining labor 
disputes from a trafficking, victim-centered lens. The government 
reported PID investigators could submit their findings directly to the 
PPO or the High Criminal Court for Trafficking in Persons; however, 
the government did not report whether the PID referred any cases 
in this manner during the reporting period. However, none of these 
referrals resulted in prosecutions for forced labor crimes. During the 
reporting period, the government provided training to nearly 2,000 
judges, lawyers, police officers, government officials, and LMRA 
officials on topics related to trafficking, including victim-centered 
and trauma-informed approaches, NRM design and management, 
and challenges related to victim identification. Beginning in February 
2020, the government shifted all training efforts to online platforms 
due to the pandemic. 
PROTECTION
The government made varied efforts to protect victims; it continued to 
provide strong protection services to confirmed victims, but it did not 
routinely identify victims of forced labor, rendering some potential 
trafficking victims unable to receive government provided shelter and 
other protective services. The government identified and provided 
robust protective services to 19 adult female sex trafficking victims 
(one of which was identified and referred via the trafficking hotline), a 
decrease compared with the 39 victims it assisted during the previous 
reporting period. All of the victims were from Indonesia, India, 
Thailand, Morocco and Kazakhstan. In total, 74 individuals received 
assistance at the government’s trafficking shelter during the reporting 
period, including one adult male and five children. The government 
continued to employ its NRM to proactively identify trafficking 
victims, ensure proper documentation of cases, refer cases to the 
MOI and PPO for an official determination as a trafficking case, and 
provide adequate protective provisions to victims until case resolution 
or voluntary repatriation. Officials provided 30-page, bilingual 
English-Arabic NRM booklets to all relevant ministries and NGO 
stakeholders. The LMRA’s digitized case management process under 
the NRM continued to increase in speed and overall effectiveness 
in case management and coordination of support to victims. Police 
stations, other government entities, NGOs, and foreign embassies 
provided direct referrals to the LMRA. The government reported many 
individuals who received assistance were not confirmed trafficking 
victims, but rather vulnerable workers involved in labor disputes 
and employees requiring temporary shelter prior to repatriation. 
Further, the LMRA reported that its shelter served both male and 
female workers regardless of their legal status in the country and 
hosted presumed trafficking victims, severe cases of forced labor, and 
potential victims who may be in exploitable situations. Conversely, 
one NGO reported the government provided protection services, 
such as shelter, food, interpretation, legal assistance, and medical 
assistance only to trafficking victims confirmed by the PPO; however, 
a local NGO refuted the assessment that victims of forced labor may 
not have received the full assistance and protection services from 
the government since authorities rarely identified forced labor as a 
trafficking crime. Per the NRM, in instances where authorities did not 
identify an individual as a trafficking victim but rather part of a labor 
or exploitation case, the government offered that individual shelter 
depending on the severity of the case. The National Committee to 
Combat Trafficking in Persons (NCCTIP) shelter provided 16 of the 
19 identified trafficking victims with shelter, food, clothing, medical 
care, religious support, psychosocial counseling, rehabilitation, 
transportation, familial reunification, translation assistance, legal 
counsel, and repatriation or job placement in Bahrain; the government 
reported that the remaining three victims chose not to reside in the 
shelter, but received full assistance from the government otherwise. In 
addition, the government provided all confirmed trafficking victims 
with monthly financial compensation—93 BD ($250)—via its victim 
assistance fund for those who remained in Bahrain for the duration 
of trial; additional funding was available through the LMRA’s budget 
to cover the costs of victim repatriation and daily GPD expenditures, 
such as payroll and operational expenses. Embassies of labor-source 
countries reported providing housing on a temporary basis for some 
potential victims involved in labor disputes or abusive situations 
who refused to go to the NCCTIP shelter or were unable to reach it. 
Articles 19 and 40 of the Labor Law established some protections for 
domestic workers, which include agricultural workers, home security 
guards, nannies, drivers, and cooks who work for the employer or 
family members, requiring employers to provide a labor contract 
specifying working hours, annual leave, bonuses, and that such 
workers must be paid at least monthly. However, Article 22, which 
prohibited contract switching or changes to preset work conditions 
outlined in the contract, was not applicable to domestic workers, 
effectively increasing their vulnerability to forced labor. Labor 
inspectors faced difficulties conducting unannounced inspections of 
domestic workers’ accommodations and investigating allegations of 
abuse in the absence of an official complaint due to cultural norms 
surrounding privacy in homes, which may have left some victims at 
risk of exploitation and without protection. The LMRA continued 
to disseminate to all registered recruitment agencies in Bahrain 
copies of the standard tripartite labor contract, which required 
domestic workers to sign, prior to their arrival, a comprehensive work 
agreement that outlined labor rights and employment obligations. 
The contract aimed to strengthen protections for domestic workers 
by requiring employers to disclose the nature of the job, hours to be 
worked, salary, and other information. Domestic workers brought 
to Bahrain by recruitment agencies were able to accept or reject an 
employment contract in their respective countries of origin, and 
the LMRA maintained copies of signed contracts to assist in any 
future labor disputes. The LMRA maintained streamlined processes 
for obtaining initial visas and visa renewals for domestic workers. 
The inclusion of domestic workers in the Expatriate Management 
System, along with all other expatriate workers, increased the LMRA’s 
oversight capacity by standardizing the application process and 
retaining all worker-employee documents on the LMRA’s electronic 
systems. The government mandated all applications for domestic 
workers, whether received through a licensed recruitment office or 
directly from the employer, must be accompanied by the standard 
tripartite labor contract.
There were no reports that the government penalized victims for 
unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit; however, 
there were reports that it did not universally employ its proactive 
identification mechanism among vulnerable groups, such as domestic 
workers, migrant workers who fled employers, and individuals 
in commercial sex, meaning some potential victims may have 
remained unidentified and unprotected. Further, an NGO reported 
that in interviews with migrant men and women in deportation 
centers and others who were deported during the reporting period, 
authorities did not screen all arrested individuals for trafficking 






government did not identify potential trafficking victims during raids, 
and commercial sex workers were generally detained and deported 
without being screened for trafficking indicators. Bahraini officials 
provided comprehensive protective assistance to trafficking victims 
regardless of their willingness to participate in investigations and 
court proceedings of their traffickers and relieved them from all legal 
and financial penalties related to actions committed as a result of 
being subjected to trafficking. The government reported it shared 
with all victims a full evaluation of their cases and their legal right to 
restitution in the event of a conviction. During the reporting year, the 
government amended the Judicial Authority Law 42/2002 to allow 
the use of foreign languages in courts and permit the appointment 
of “non-Arab” judges in Bahraini courts, which allowed the court to 
hear testimony from non-Arabic-speaking witnesses directly, versus 
through a sworn translator as the original law stated, to have judges 
who could understand the witnesses in their native language. The 
government reported victims could testify via written correspondence, 
video recording, a closed-circuit live video, or in private, but it did 
not report if any victims utilized this option during the reporting 
period. Some migrant workers who fled abusive situations chose 
not to contact police to report abuse due to being a “free visa” 
holder—laborers in violation of the local labor law because they 
worked for a non-sponsor employer after leaving the employment 
of the sponsor that facilitated their entry into the country. Workers 
infrequently filed complaints against employers due to distrust of 
the legal system, protracted court processes, inability to afford legal 
representation, lack of interpretation and translation services, concern 
over potential loss of residence permits during proceedings, and fear 
of additional mistreatment due to employer reprisal. During the 
reporting period, the government repatriated at least 21 trafficking 
victims to their countries of origin at the victims’ request.
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. In 2020, the 
government finalized a three-year, 377,000 BD ($1 million) agreement 
with an international organization to provide technical expertise 
to the Center of Excellence and Training for Trafficking in Persons, 
established in partnership with two international organizations during 
the previous reporting period, for the purpose of capacity building of 
victim assistance among government and regional stakeholders. The 
government was unable to offer training courses due to the pandemic. 
During the reporting period, high-level government officials and 
the LMRA participated in the second Inter-Governmental Forum 
on Combating Trafficking in Persons in the Middle East, hosted by 
the United Arab Emirates, and the forum appointed Bahrain as its 
permanent Secretary General in October 2020. High-level officials 
from across the region and two international organizations attended 
the forum to share anti-trafficking efforts during the pandemic, 
specifically related to increasing capacity to protect potential victims 
of trafficking. 
The government also made significant efforts to address the increased 
vulnerability of migrant workers, regardless of residency status, due 
to pandemic-related job-loss or extended absence from work due to 
illness. These efforts included an amnesty period from April 2020 to 
December 2020 for all out-of-status workers (including those that 
lost legal status due to job loss), the elimination and/or reduction 
in costs associated with new and renewal work permits, including 
the “flexible (or flexi) work permit,” and the establishment of an 
online marketplace to allow workers who had experienced job loss 
to be re-hired by another employer in Bahrain as an alternative to 
returning to their home countries. The government also provided 
food, medical services, and financial relief to migrant workers 
throughout the pandemic. 
Since its inception in July 2017, the LMRA’s “flexi” permit program 
has served to regularize thousands of undocumented workers while 
simultaneously permitting previously exploited and irregular laborers 
to sponsor themselves independent of an employer. From April 2020 
to June 2020, the government eliminated all fees associated with 
residency visas and the “flexi” permit program, gradually increasing 
the fees to previous, pre-pandemic levels in September 2020. Likely 
due to the lower cost of the program, the number of “flexi” permit 
holders significantly increased from about 23,000 to 46,000 during 
the reporting period, allowing workers that had lost jobs or were part 
of the amnesty to regularize their residency status. The government 
reported around 40,000 migrant workers experienced pandemic-
related job loss during the reporting period; however, by providing 
the “flexi” permit visa at a reduced cost and launching an online 
marketplace to allow workers to be re-hired in Bahrain, the LRMA 
reported 51,000 migrant workers had re-entered the workforce and 
reduced their vulnerability to trafficking. Under the “flexi” permit, 
foreigners could reside and work in Bahrain without a sponsor, 
thereby reducing trafficking vulnerabilities inherent in the kafala or 
sponsorship-based employment system. Successful applicants could 
work any full- or part-time job with any chosen employer—including 
multiple jobs concurrently with various employers—and were able to 
directly negotiate wages and working hours. From November 2018 
to June 2019, the government temporarily extended eligibility for 
the “flexi” permit to domestic workers who absconded from their 
employers or had expired work visas to allow them to regularize their 
residency and work status. During the pandemic, the government 
renewed this policy and allowed domestic workers to apply for flexi-
permits during the amnesty period that ended at the end of 2020. 
However, as of 2021, the government again removed domestic worker 
eligibility for the program, rendering domestic employees vulnerable 
to the plight of the kafala system. Legal workers were also eligible to 
enroll in the program without the consent of their employer after the 
termination or expiry of their work permit. The “flexi” permit—which 
cost 432 BD ($1,150) for one year—included a work permit, health 
care coverage, a refundable deposit for travel tickets, an extension 
of residency timeframes, and waived immigration fines incurred 
while in irregular status. Some NGOs and labor rights organizations 
continued to express concerns that the “flexi” program was not a 
suitable alternative for low-income workers who may not be able 
to afford the high cost of the permit each month and in some cases 
must find daily work to keep up with the costs of the visa. Rights 
groups also expressed the need to ensure protections for flexi-permit 
holders; as holders who work on a freelance basis or in short-term 
employment are not required to have a contract with their employer, 
and rarely do, heightening their vulnerability to wage disputes or 
other issues with a temporary employer without protection under 
the labor law. Further, because the labor law does not explicitly cover 
flexi-permit holders (as they do not have an employer or sponsor), 
these individuals are not afforded the ability to file grievances or labor 
complaints with the labor courts as other workers covered under the 
law could; rather, flexi-permit holders could only file cases against 
employers in civil courts. Additionally, a flexi-permit is not an option 
before a migrant worker arrives in Bahrain—a worker only becomes 
eligible for the program once their visa has expired, their contract has 
ended, or they become irregular—which continued to put workers 
in situations of potential exploitation under a sponsor or employer 
when first arriving in the country. Since 2011, private sector workers 
have had freedom to change jobs without their employer’s consent 
after one year of employment; on average eight to nine percent of 
Bahrain’s migrant worker population change employers each year. 
However, the LMRA still must approve the transfer, and like the 
flexi-permit program, domestic workers do not have the ability to 
change jobs without employer consent—further heightening the 
risk of exploitation to this vulnerable population. The government 
also reported all workers were able to terminate employment at any 
time, with a notice period according to their contract, and leave the 
country permanently without employer consent.
Passport retention was a crime punishable under Article 395 of 
the Bahraini penal code, with a penalty of jail time, a fine, or both. 
However, according to the law, employers were allowed to retain an 
employee’s passport if the employee gave the employer permission 
to do so, enabling the employer to justify the action. Laborers 
continued to be able to file a grievance for passport withholding 
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with the police, the Ministry of Labor and Social Development 
(MOLSD), or the LMRA. When handled by the LMRA, instances of 
passport retention were reportedly screened by trained GPD staff 
for indicators of trafficking. Representatives of labor-source country 
embassies reported that cases handled by the LMRA resulted in 
expedient and fair disposition of cases. A worker could also register 
a complaint to the court directly if the employer refused to return 
the passport; however, in most cases, once the LMRA, MOLSD, or 
police approached the employer, they returned the passport to the 
employee, and the worker chose not to pursue criminal charges 
against their employer. In a purported effort to address the crime, 
the LMRA’s GPD began working more closely with a local NGO to 
learn more about passport retention and address the issue directly 
with employers. During the reporting period, the GPD reported 
improvements in addressing passport retention by employers and 
reported that incidents of employers returning confiscated passports 
to employees increased by 365 percent. The GPD’s strategy included 
an awareness campaign about the issue of passport retention targeted 
at employers and underscored administrative and potential criminal 
repercussions for confiscating a worker’s documents. However, as in 
previous reporting periods, labor authorities or police did not report 
referring any cases of passport retention to the PPO for criminal 
investigation or prosecution. 
The government made efforts to prevent forced labor by increasing 
inspections of recruitment agencies and announcing a plan to 
launch a Wage Protection System (WPS). The LMRA continued 
to oversee the issuing of licenses and regulation of recruitment 
companies through quarterly inspection visits to the offices and other 
measures to ensure the protection of workers’ rights. For example, the 
government continued to require all recruitment agencies to submit 
a security deposit equivalent of 10,000 BD ($26,530) to safeguard 
employees’ rights and required each employer to provide dedicated 
accommodation for recruited workers that met the LMRA’s standards. 
The LMRA’s PID employed 70 inspectors who were responsible for 
enforcement of employment violations, immigration violations, 
and worksite inspections. The LMRA’s PID reported conducting 
2,264 inspections during the reporting year, of which 152 were for 
recruitment agencies. Through these inspections, the government 
permanently shut down six companies and suspended one recruitment 
agency; in 2019, it closed one agency. It also suspended 15 additional 
companies due to noncompliance with LMRA regulations and 
having workers without legal status employed in the establishments. 
As in previous years, the government did not report referring any 
recruitment agency or offices to the PPO for further investigation or 
criminal prosecution. In March 2021, the government announced 
plans to launch a WPS for private sector workers beginning in May 
2021; the system, intended to be rolled out in three phases, is not 
currently obligated for employers of domestic workers, but employers 
of domestic workers had the option to participate in the system. The 
government reported the aim of the system was to ensure regularly 
and timely transfer of worker’s wages directly to their bank account 
and enhance transparency; the system will automatically flag instances 
of non-payment or delayed payment of wages, and an employer’s 
failure to pay monthly salaries on time would result in penalties 
and legal procedures against violators.
The government continued to fund awareness campaigns via text 
messages and social media targeting low-skilled migrant workers 
through the reporting period. It used mobile phones to proactively 
engage with migrant labor populations, sending out nearly one 
million text messages with the trafficking hotline information, labor 
rights facts, and police station locations as well as information to 
migrant workers about the pandemic and associated safety and 
health measures. In addition to traditional messages about the 
dangers and signs of trafficking, the LMRA also deployed extensive 
outreach campaigns to raise awareness for workers regarding the 
amnesty period during the year, guidance on how to obtain and 
renew a flexi-permit, and how to regulate their legal status due to 
pandemic related job loss. During the previous reporting period, the 
LMRA launched a website (endtrafficking.bh) with a wide range of 
information on trafficking and myriad resources readily accessible 
for foreign workers. However, NGOs reported key information on 
the website was only available in English, limiting its application. 
The LMRA continued to provide booklets outlining labor rights 
in 13 languages common among expatriate and migrant worker 
populations and distributed them to such populations upon their 
arrival at the Bahrain International Airport and at the LMRA when 
applying for initial or renewed residency cards. The LMRA’s Expat 
Protection Center’s trafficking hotline collected reports and served 
as a resource to educate workers about their rights and available 
services in Arabic, English, Hindi, Malayalam, Sinhalese, Tagalog, 
Tamil, Telugu, and Urdu 24 hours a day, seven days a week. The 
government advertised the hotline’s number and mandate through 
pamphlets given to each migrant worker upon arrival in Bahrain and 
circulated through the LMRA’s social media platforms and website. 
The government reported receiving a 151 percent increase in the 
number of calls during the reporting period (16,201, an increase 
compared with 6,444 such calls the previous year), most of which 
pertained to the pandemic and associated job losses. Officials initiated 
two trafficking investigations and identified and referred one victim 
through this hotline during the reporting period. The government 
concluded memoranda of understanding with several labor-source 
countries, including Pakistan and India, that focused on oversight of 
recruitment agencies and protection of migrant workers in Bahrain 
and provided technical assistance to other governments in the region 
on trafficking topics such as victim identification, care and assistance, 
migration management and sponsorship reform, and building a 
NRM. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand 
for commercial sex acts. The government provided anti-trafficking 
training for its diplomatic personnel.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
foreign victims in Bahrain. Men and women, primarily from 
India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Philippines, Ethiopia, Nepal, Egypt, 
Jordan, Yemen, Thailand, Syria, and Kenya, among other countries, 
migrate voluntarily to Bahrain to work as semi-skilled or unskilled 
laborers in the construction and service industries. The number of 
migrant workers from African states, such as Senegal, Cameroon, 
Uganda and The Gambia, is increasing. Prior to the pandemic, 
foreigners comprised approximately 80 percent of the total Bahraini 
workforce, the majority being unskilled or semi-skilled construction 
or maintenance workers. Likely due to pandemic-related job loss, the 
economic downturn, and an increased desire for workers to repatriate, 
Bahrain’s migrant workforce decreased in 2020. The government 
reported there were roughly 65,000 domestic workers in Bahrain in 
2020, 85 percent of whom were female, predominantly from Ethiopia, 
India, Philippines, Bangladesh, Kenya, and Indonesia—20 percent 
fewer than the previous reporting period. This category of employee 
includes agricultural workers, home security guards, nannies, drivers, 
and cooks. Men from India and Bangladesh account for the vast 
majority of Bahrain’s male domestic workers. Domestic workers from 
African nations are increasingly at risk of forced labor and arrive in 
Bahrain via direct recruitment from local employers. Some employers 
subject migrant workers to forced labor in Bahrain; indicators 
include passport retention, strict confinement, contract substitution, 
non-payment of wages, debt bondage, threats or intimidation, and 
physical or sexual abuse. NGO and labor-source countries report an 
increase in incidents of unpaid wages and debt bondage, especially 
among construction and unskilled workers. Some migrant workers 
are not given or in possession of their employment contracts and are 
generally unfamiliar with the employment terms contained therein. 
Nationals of countries without diplomatic presence in Bahrain, most 
significantly from African countries, are particularly vulnerable to 
trafficking, as are domestic workers, who are only partially protected 
under Bahraini labor law, and cultural norms and existing legal 
infrastructure avert private home inspection. Government and NGO 
representatives report physical abuse and sexual assault of female 






freedom of movement, withholding of workers’ identity cards 
and passports, and employer coercion constrain employees from 
reporting such instances of exploitation. During the reporting year, 
NGOs report an increase in non-payment of wages and coercion for 
domestic workers who were forced to stay in their employer’s home 
and work after completing their contracts due to pandemic-related 
travel restrictions. Chinese nationals working in Bahrain may have 
been forced to work, including on projects managed by state-owned 
enterprises. Cuban nationals working in Bahrain may have forced 
to work by the Cuban government. 
While the government maintained regulatory authority over 
recruitment agencies, some migrant workers arrive in Bahrain 
independent of regulated agencies. Many laborers are paired with 
employers through intermediaries in Bahrain and unlicensed recruiters 
in their respective countries of origin; back-and-forth movement 
between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain via the King Fahad Causeway 
also contributes to this vulnerability, as Saudi nationals are able to 
sponsor foreign workers in Bahrain. Local press report traffickers 
recruit women to Bahrain via social media platforms or Bahrain-
based acquaintances under false pretenses of high-paying jobs in 
the hospitality and domestic sectors and subsequently force them 
into sex trafficking. Traffickers also convince other women, mostly 
domestic workers already in Bahrain, to abscond from their employers 
with false promises of higher paying jobs; after being recruited, 
traffickers exploit some women in commercial sex through physical 
threats and debt-related coercion. Some NGOs report that due to 
pandemic-related shutdowns of the service industry, workers who 
lost their jobs were consequently forced or exploited in commercial 
sex. Some unscrupulous employers continue to lure migrant workers 
to Bahrain and release them illegally in the labor market under the 
“free visa” scheme—laborers who pay an employer a recurring fee 
to sponsor a work visa while performing work for other employers 
in violation of local labor law—which can render them vulnerable 
to trafficking due to their illegal working status. Although notable 
reforms are underway, Bahrain’s sponsorship-based employment 
system continues to put some workers, particularly domestic workers, 
at risk of trafficking by limiting their ability to change employers or 
leave the country and by giving employers the unilateral power to 
control the status of residency permits.
BANGLADESH: TIER 2 
The Government of Bangladesh does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Bangladesh remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
initiating more prosecutions, particularly of labor traffickers; 
beginning to operate its trafficking tribunals; and collaborating 
with foreign governments on a transnational trafficking case. The 
government also opened an investigation into—and Parliament 
revoked the seat of—a member of Parliament involved in bribing a 
Kuwaiti official to fraudulently send more than 20,000 Bangladeshi 
migrant workers to Kuwait. The government also reported it funded 
95 percent of its national action plan to fight human trafficking. 
However, the government did not meet the minimum standards in 
several key areas. The number of convictions decreased, while law 
enforcement continued to deny credible reports of official complicity 
in trafficking, forced labor and sex trafficking of Rohingya, and child 
sex trafficking, including in licensed brothels, and did not demonstrate 
efforts to identify victims or investigate these persistent reports. While 
international organizations identified signs of trafficking in hundreds 
of migrant workers returning from Vietnam, the government, instead 
of screening them for trafficking indicators, arrested them on vague 
charges, including for damaging the country’s image. The government 
continued to allow recruiting agencies to charge high recruitment fees 
to migrant workers and did not consistently address illegally operating 
recruitment sub-agents, leaving workers vulnerable to traffickers. 
Victim care remained insufficient. Officials did not consistently 
implement victim identification procedures or refer identified victims 
to care, and the government did not have shelters or adequate services 
for adult male victims.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Increase prosecutions and convictions for trafficking offenses, 
particularly of labor traffickers and complicit government officials, 
while respecting due process. • Take steps to eliminate recruitment fees 
charged to workers by licensed labor recruiters and ensure employers 
pay recruitment fees. • Increase investigations and prosecutions of 
credible allegations of trafficking of Rohingya, including cases that 
do not involve movement. • Disseminate and implement standard 
guidelines for provision of adequate victim care referral to protective 
services. • Expand services for trafficking victims, especially adult 
male victims, foreign victims, and victims exploited abroad. • Allow 
NGOs to provide services to trafficking victims in government shelters 
without a court order. • Cease requiring adult trafficking victims to 
obtain a family member’s consent before leaving government shelters. 
• Continue collaboration with the Inter-Sector Coordination Group to 
implement measures protecting Rohingya from traffickers. • Enhance 
training for officials, including law enforcement, labor inspectors, 
immigration officers, and health care providers on identification of 
trafficking cases and victim referrals to services. • Fully implement 
and monitor for compliance the registration requirements for 
recruitment agents and dalals. • Improve quality of pre-departure 
trainings for migrant workers, including sessions on labor rights, labor 
laws, and access to justice and overseas assistance. • Establish clear 
procedures for Rohingya to file complaints in the legal system, and 
train law enforcement and camp management on the procedures. • 
Improve collaboration with NGOs and civil society for more effective 
partnership on anti-trafficking efforts, specifically through allowing 
service providers increased access to assist victims. • Finalize, adopt, 
and implement revisions to the 2015 MOU with India to streamline 
the identification and repatriation of Bangladeshi trafficking victims. 
• Fully implement the 2018-2022 National Plan of Action, including 
dedicating official resources towards enhancing victim care. • Establish 
standard guidelines for investigating transnational trafficking cases. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained overall law enforcement efforts. The 
government prosecuted more traffickers for forced labor, expanded 
cooperation on transnational trafficking crimes, and revoked the 
seat of a member of parliament following his conviction abroad 
for trafficking crimes, but it convicted fewer traffickers and did not 
take adequate steps to address internal sex trafficking or official 
complicity in general, both of which remained pervasive. The 2012 
Prevention and Suppression of Human Trafficking Act (PSHTA) 
criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed 
penalties of five years to life imprisonment and a fine of not less 
than 50,000 Bangladeshi Taka (BDT) ($588). Bonded labor was 
treated as a separate offense with lesser prescribed penalties of five 
to 12 years’ imprisonment and a fine of not less than 50,000 BDT 
($588). These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard 
to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other 
serious crimes, such as kidnapping. The government continued to 
train police officers through an anti-trafficking module at the police 
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academy. The government also continued to train and provide in-kind 
support to international organization and NGO-run trainings for 
judicial, immigration, and border officials. The government did not 
report whether police and other relevant officials received training 
on the 2017 PSHTA implementing rules. 
The government investigated 348 cases under the PSHTA (including 
138 investigations continued from previous years), compared with 
the investigation of 403 cases (including 29 ongoing investigations) 
during the previous reporting period. The government prosecuted 517 
suspects (184 for sex trafficking and 333 for forced labor)—an increase 
from the 312 individuals the government prosecuted the previous 
reporting period, of which 56 were for forced labor. The government 
convicted seven traffickers, including one for sex trafficking, two 
for labor trafficking, and four for undefined trafficking crimes, but 
acquitted 14 defendants. This was a significant decrease from courts 
convicting 25 traffickers the previous reporting year. Due to the 
pandemic, courts were closed from April to July 2020 and in-person 
activities were delayed until August. In addition to delaying trials, 
the pandemic forced postponement of the orientation and training 
for new anti-human trafficking tribunal judges and prosecutors 
who had been appointed in March 2020. The government reported 
more than 4,000 trafficking cases remained pending investigation or 
prosecution as of December 2020. The government acknowledged 
investigations, prosecutions, and convictions for trafficking remained 
inadequate compared to the scale of the problem. 
In previous reporting periods, the majority of cases involved migrant 
smuggling of Rohingya and Bangladeshis without clear indicators of 
crimes of trafficking in persons; the government did not report case 
details of this year’s investigations or prosecutions. Some officials 
did not understand human trafficking and at times conflated it 
with migrant smuggling. Some officials continued to deny the 
existence of internal trafficking, especially child sex trafficking, despite 
observers recording multiple cases of child sex trafficking in licensed 
brothels each month. Police and prosecutors did not collaborate 
during the law enforcement process, which led to delays and the 
formation of weak cases for prosecution. In cross-border cases, 
Bangladeshi officials often did not travel abroad to collect evidence 
and did not have sufficient agreements to receive evidence from 
foreign governments. However, in one notable case, the government 
collaborated with United Arab Emirates (UAE) law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies to investigate organized crime and human 
trafficking following the arrest in Dhaka of a Bangladeshi alleged to 
have led a sex trafficking ring which forced Bangladeshi women into 
commercial sex in Dubai nightclubs. Police also arrested five other 
Bangladeshis in connection to the case. In the previous reporting 
period, the government established seven anti-trafficking tribunals by 
appointing seven judges and special prosecutors exclusively to hear 
human trafficking cases and address the substantial case backlog. Due 
to pandemic-related delays, the tribunals did not begin operating 
until August 2020. Legal experts praised the expediency in which 
one internal case before the Dhaka tribunal was decided. However, 
they cautioned the process for more complicated cases, especially 
those involving transnational elements, would require additional 
time before the tribunals. For cases heard outside of the tribunals, 
observers had previously noted the government generally did not 
dedicate sufficient resources to pre-trial investigations, and cases 
languished due to a lack of evidence or case backlogs. The government 
continued to allow mobile courts, established under the executive 
branch, to adjudicate labor violations, human trafficking cases, and 
migrant smuggling cases, especially in areas without a trafficking 
tribunal. Mobile courts could only prescribe penalties of up to three 
years’ imprisonment—less than the minimum penalty of five years’ 
imprisonment for trafficking offenses under the PSHTA. An NGO 
expressed concern that some village courts, five-person panels of 
local government officials and villagers, adjudicated trafficking cases 
but could only administer financial penalties, and that the courts 
may have subjected victims to intimidation, fraud, and corruption. 
Despite continued reports of traffickers exploiting hundreds of 
Rohingya in forced labor and sex trafficking within Bangladesh, 
most Rohingya-related cases reported by law enforcement involved 
movement via boat—cases that might have amounted to migrant 
smuggling without elements of trafficking. The government did not 
establish clear legal reporting mechanisms within the camps, which 
impeded Rohingyas’ access to justice and increased impunity for 
offenders. Police and international humanitarian actors maintained 
multiple help desks in several refugee camps to provide legal 
assistance to female and child refugee victims of crime, but public 
distrust of police and security services deterred many victims of 
crimes, including trafficking, from approaching law enforcement 
for assistance. In previous reporting periods, the Bangladeshi High 
Court did not accept anti-trafficking cases filed by Rohingya, despite 
the law allowing Rohingya to file such cases in Bangladeshi courts. 
International organizations continued to allege some Bangladeshi 
officials facilitated trafficking of Rohingya, including by accepting 
bribes from traffickers to gain access to camps. 
Official complicity in human trafficking, trafficking-related corruption, 
and impunity for traffickers remained serious concerns, continuing 
to inhibit law enforcement action during the year. The government 
was reluctant to acknowledge or investigate such claims. In registered 
brothels, some police charged bribes to ignore abuse within the 
establishments, to forego checking for the required documentation 
that each individual was older than 18, and to procure fraudulent 
documents for girls as young as 10 years old. Some labor attachés, 
local politicians, judges, and police requested bribes from victims 
and their families to pursue cases. Observers alleged some officials 
from district employment and manpower offices allegedly facilitated 
human trafficking, and some traffickers in rural areas had political 
connections that enabled them to operate with impunity. According 
to NGOs, some local politicians convinced victims to accept payment 
from recruitment sub-agents to not report fraudulent or exploitative 
labor recruitment actions to police. Other observers reported some 
police conducted slow and flawed investigations to allow traffickers 
to evade punishment, including when suspects were fellow officers. 
Because a number of government officials, including parliamentarians, 
maintained close ties to foreign employment agencies, there were 
concerns such officials had conflicts of interest in approving migrant-
friendly practices, such as prosecution of abusive recruitment agencies 
and increasing protections for migrant workers. During the reporting 
period, the Anti-Corruption Commission opened an investigation 
into a Bangladeshi parliamentarian accused of bribing Kuwaiti 
officials to bring more than 20,000 Bangladeshi migrant workers 
into Kuwait on work visas which stipulated a different job, and paid 
the workers significantly lower wages than promised, or none at all. 
Parliament revoked the member’s seat following his conviction and 
imprisonment in Kuwait for bribery. The government initiated an 
investigation into the accused’s wife, also a member of parliament and 
convicted in Kuwait on a related but lesser charge, and other family 
members. Media reported from 2015-2018, Malaysian employment 
agencies and 10 Bangladeshi recruitment agencies bribed officials and 
politicians in both countries to create a monopoly on recruitment 
of Bangladeshi workers. The monopoly increased the recruitment 
fees charged to workers from 37,000 BDT ($435) to more than 
400,000 BDT ($4,710) per person—higher than the government’s 
legal maximum—which increased Bangladeshi migrant workers’ 
vulnerability to debt-based coercion. After two warnings from the 
Dhaka High Court, the government submitted its investigative report 
in November 2019, and for a second year no hearings were held. 
Other than the investigation into the member of parliament, and 
despite ongoing allegations of official complicity, the government 
did not report any other investigations, prosecutions, or convictions 
of government employees complicit in human trafficking offenses. 
PROTECTION
The government increased the number of victims identified but 







Bangladeshi trafficking victims identified overseas. The government 
identified 6,866 potential trafficking victims, a significant increase 
from 585 in the previous reporting period; however, the government 
did not report details of this number or account for the large increase 
and, in the past, had reported many smuggled migrants in the overall 
number. Traffickers exploited the majority of victims identified 
through forced labor. Organizations identified and provided support 
to at least 1,683 trafficking victims, including 339 Rohingya identified 
between December 2019-2020. The Ministry of Home Affairs 
(MHA), the government’s lead agency for combating trafficking, 
had standard operating procedures (SOPs) for proactive trafficking 
victim identification; however, the government did not report how 
widely officials disseminated or used the SOPs. Some police officers 
used a checklist to proactively identify victims when they came into 
contact with individuals in commercial sex establishments; however, 
the government did not formally adopt or disseminate the checklist, 
and its use was inconsistent. The government, in partnership with an 
international organization, developed a rapid victim identification 
mobile application during the reporting period, and the government 
reported initiating a virtual method for trafficking victims to file 
police reports. 
During the reporting period, the government adopted a standard 
policy to refer victims to services, although it retained a court-order 
mechanism to do so, and some officials followed an NGO’s written 
guidelines for referral to and provision of care. Authorities could 
refer trafficking victims to government or NGO shelters; however, 
the government did not provide reimbursement or overall funding 
to the NGOs. The government referred 126 victims to government 
shelters and 167 to NGO-run shelters, an increase from approximately 
74 victims referred in the previous reporting period. While the 
government did not provide trafficking-specific services, police 
operated multiple centers for women and child victims of violence, 
including trafficking, in each of Bangladesh’s eight divisions, offering 
short-term shelter, medical services, and psychological care. In 
response to pandemic-related restrictions, the Ministry of Women and 
Children Affairs created psycho-social support options through cell 
phone and email. With partial funding from a foreign government, 
the Ministry of Social Welfare (MSW) operated some longer-term 
shelters for women and child victims of violence, including trafficking 
victims, which could provide similar care. MSW shelters, however, 
required a court order referral, and victims could not leave without a 
family member’s consent. The government also required NGOs and 
international organizations to obtain a court order to contact victims 
in government shelters to provide additional services. Some victims 
reported abuse within the shelters. Authorities forced some victims 
who could not obtain family consent to remain in the shelters for as 
long as 10 years; some victims referred to these homes as “jails.” The 
government did not report how many trafficking victims its police 
and MSW shelters assisted during the reporting period. Government-
run hospitals also had one-stop centers to assist female victims of 
crime, although it was unclear whether and how officials referred 
women to these centers. The government generally did not view adult 
men as trafficking victims. While some NGO shelters could house 
male victims, the majority of NGO shelters – similar to government 
shelters – could not, although most NGOs could provide non-shelter 
services to adult male victims. 
The government did not allow foreign victims to access government 
services. NGOs could care for foreign trafficking victims. NGOs could 
provide two or three days of temporary care to Rohingya trafficking 
victims in safe homes but then most returned to the refugee camps, 
where they remained vulnerable to re-trafficking. The government’s 
NGO Affairs Bureau at times withheld approval for foreign funding 
to some NGOs working on some human rights or humanitarian 
issues, which may have affected provision of services to vulnerable 
populations, including trafficking victims. The pandemic limited 
resources and strained the ability of NGOs to offer victim services. 
The PSHTA entitled victims to protection during judicial proceedings, 
including police security, and allowed victims to provide testimony via 
video conference. While some victims participated in the investigation 
and prosecution of their traffickers, the government and NGOs 
noted insufficient implementation of the protection provision 
caused the vast majority of trafficking victims not to participate. 
While the 2012 PSHTA mandated creation of a fund to assist victims 
in seeking compensation from their traffickers, the government 
had not yet created the fund. All trafficking victims could file civil 
suits seeking compensation. The government reportedly screened 
for trafficking among individuals before arresting them; however, 
because law enforcement did not uniformly employ SOPs to identify 
trafficking victims among vulnerable populations, including women 
in commercial sex, law enforcement may have penalized sex trafficking 
victims for unlawful acts their traffickers compelled them to commit. 
For example, NGOs in the previous reporting period reported law 
enforcement raided brothels and arrested foreign women working 
in commercial sex for violating their visas without efforts to screen 
for trafficking. NGOs reported some authorities detained and fined 
trafficking victims in transit for failure to carry a passport and may 
have deported some victims without screening for trafficking. The 
government did not provide legal alternatives to removal of foreign 
trafficking victims to countries where they might face hardship or 
retribution.
The government made minimal efforts to assist Bangladeshi sex 
and labor trafficking victims abroad. MHA and the Government of 
India continued to revise but did not finalize SOPs to implement a 
2015 memorandum of understanding (MOU) on trafficking victim 
identification and repatriation. The governments facilitated, and NGOs 
funded, repatriation of trafficking victims from India, but without 
a final, adopted SOP, the lengthy and complex approval system 
resulted in some Bangladeshi victims languishing in Indian shelters 
for up to six years. The Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas 
Employment (MEWOE) maintained 29 labor offices in embassies 
and consulates overseas to provide welfare services to Bangladeshi 
migrant workers. International organizations continued to report 
their labor wings had neither the staffing nor the resources to assist 
the large number of migrant workers, especially at embassies with 
large numbers of Bangladeshi workers in the Gulf. MEWOE operated 
four safe houses abroad for female workers with strong indicators 
of trafficking who fled abusive employers but did not report how 
many individuals the shelters assisted. While the government could 
fund some trafficking victim repatriation, it often took so long that 
victims funded it themselves and incurred additional debt. MEWOE 
operated a desk at the airport providing up to 5,000 BDT ($59) and 
information on available NGO services to returning female migrant 
workers, including trafficking victims.
While MEWOE confirmed approximately 21,230 Bangladeshi workers 
returned from Saudi Arabia during the reporting period, many likely 
domestic workers, the government did not report screening any of 
the returning workers for signs of trafficking. Additionally, at least 
396 Bangladeshi migrant workers from other countries returned 
with substantial indicators of trafficking during the reporting period, 
some of whom the government penalized on ambiguous charges of 
“damaging the image of the nation” without appropriately screening 
for trafficking. In September 2020, the government arrested and 
charged 81 migrant workers recently returned from Vietnam under 
section 54 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which allowed the 
government to detain, without a warrant, individuals suspected 
of committing or intending to commit cognizable offenses. Court 
documents included allegations the migrants damaged the country’s 
image by protesting their payment of recruitment fees for jobs that 
never materialized in front of the Bangladesh embassy in Vietnam. 
While MEWOE closed six recruiting agencies associated with the 
Vietnam case, the government maintained the charges against the 
81 migrant workers. Additionally, 219 Bangladeshi workers who 
had returned from Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain were arrested on 
July 5, 2020 for allegedly committing similar ambiguous offenses 
abroad. NGOs called for the migrant workers’ release and treatment 
as trafficking victims. In November 2020, authorities released the 
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migrant workers on bail. In the previous reporting period, the 
government occasionally required victims of labor exploitation, 
including labor trafficking, to remain at embassies overseas to 
pursue a civil case against their employers; many victims wanted to 
return home and thus could not pursue cases. The government did 
not file any trafficking cases in destination countries but did assist 
with investigations in Libya, Kuwait, and the UAE. Some officials 
blamed victims for their own labor trafficking, claiming workers were 
“unprepared.” The government relied on NGOs to support victims 
upon repatriation. Overseas Bangladeshi workers who secured their 
employment through MEWOE could lodge complaints with MEWOE 
to seek restitution for labor and recruitment violations, including 
allegations of forced labor, through an arbitration process. However, 
trafficking-related corruption impeded the process, which often 
yielded minimal awards. At least one NGO reported the Bureau of 
Manpower and Employment Training (BMET), which facilitated 
the arbitration, prohibited NGO advocates from accompanying 
migrant workers, forcing workers to arbitrate claims alone against 
both powerful recruitment agencies and BMET. MEWOE reported 
it settled 424 complaints against 142 recruitment agents in 2020 
which compelled them to pay 24.04 million BDT ($282,820) total to 
migrant workers, compared with 214 recruitment agents compelled 
to pay 34.4 million BDT ($404,710) in compensation to 352 workers 
in 2019; MEWOE did not report whether any complaints involved 
forced labor. Because the government did not consistently initiate 
criminal investigations into migrant workers exploited abroad, and 
civil remedies remained inadequate, civil society organizations ran 
alternate dispute resolution systems to assist labor trafficking victims 
in obtaining some financial remedies.
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
government continued implementing its 2018-2022 anti-trafficking 
national action plan (NAP). The government harmonized the NAP 
implementation with funded Sustainable Development Goals to cover 
costs associated with 95 percent of the plan. MHA continued to lead 
the inter-ministerial anti-trafficking committee, which met bi-monthly. 
During the reporting year, many MHA officials with responsibilities for 
coordinating anti-trafficking efforts transitioned to new government 
positions, leading to some loss of institutional knowledge and 
momentum in implementing the NAP. The government created 
the National Authority, an institution to serve as a government-
wide supervisory body on combating trafficking, but civil society 
reported the National Authority was neither active, nor funded. The 
government also did not clarify the distinct roles of the National 
Authority versus the inter-ministerial committee. MHA did not make 
its annual reports on human trafficking public, and anti-trafficking 
law enforcement data was published online but did not always 
contain current statistics. 
The 2013 Overseas Employment and Migrants Act (OEMA) 
criminalized fraudulent recruitment and unlawful recruitment 
fees; however, these provisions still permitted the government to 
set legal recruitment fees at rates between 85,000 BDT and 262,000 
BDT ($1,000-$3,080), high enough to render many migrant workers 
indebted and vulnerable to trafficking through debt-based coercion. 
A research organization reported that in 2018, Bangladeshi migrant 
workers traveling to Saudi Arabia on average paid more than 450 
percent of the government’s fixed recruitment price for the total labor 
migration process. According to the research, the government’s fixed 
recruitment fee for Saudi Arabia was equivalent to a Bangladeshi 
worker’s salary for five-and-a-half-months, and workers in reality 
paid fees equivalent to more than two years of salary. The Bangladesh 
Association of International Recruiting Agencies (BAIRA) oversaw 
1,186 licensed labor recruitment agencies. The government’s 
vigilance task force continued operations against corrupt recruitment 
agencies, travel agencies, and dalals—sub-agents who operated 
in rural locations and connected prospective migrant workers to 
licensed employment agencies. MEWOE suspended 32 recruitment 
agencies for operating in violation of the law, including breach of 
employment contracts and recruitment regulations. Following the 
death of 26 Bangladeshi migrants in Libya, the government called for 
an investigation and punishment of perpetrators. The police arrested 
19 people, including two labor recruiters. The government also 
approached INTERPOL for the first time to place six individuals on 
their red notice watchlist, which led to the arrest of two individuals 
at the close of the reporting period. NGOs and academics welcomed 
the quick arrests but questioned the government’s commitment to 
addressing vulnerabilities that led to trafficking in general. Authorities 
referred some of the recruitment agents to mobile courts, which 
convicted and sentenced two individuals to different terms of 
imprisonment and imposed fines of 1.46 million BDT ($17,180) 
for labor trafficking-related offenses under the 2013 OEMA, including 
sending migrant workers abroad unlawfully, charging unlawful 
recruitment fees, and fraudulent recruitment. Mobile courts prescribed 
fines or imprisonment; fines were inadequate penalties to deter the 
crime. In 2018, mobile courts convicted 11 individuals, although it 
was unclear in both years how many cases contained elements of 
trafficking in persons. 
In February 2020, the government granted MEWOE authority to 
register recruiting sub-agents (dalals) and required brokers to register 
sub-agents and representatives. MEWOE did not report how it 
was monitoring existing or new agents for compliance. NGOs 
stated the government needed to do more to bring all recruiting 
companies into compliance with this directive. MEWOE reported it 
was developing a scoring process to rank licensed recruiting agencies. 
BAIRA acknowledged migrant workers frequently paid dalals fees 
in addition to the legal amount BAIRA agents charged before the 
workers began the formal recruitment process. Dalals also directly 
connected workers to overseas jobs by providing fake visas and other 
documentation, and in some cases, incorrect information about the 
migration process and the job in the destination country. Observers 
stated a migrant worker’s financial situation often determined job 
placement, not skills or abilities, and migrant workers frequently 
paid as much as five times the government’s maximum fee level. 
The government maintained a number of bilateral labor agreements, 
in part intended to protect Bangladeshi workers abroad, although 
there was no evidence the government enforced the MOUs. As some 
countries closed their borders due to the pandemic, the government 
expanded labor markets beyond traditional locations and, for the 
first time, signed labor agreements with Uzbekistan and Albania in 
November 2020. Some NGOs expressed concerns with the labor 
conditions in these countries. At the beginning of the pandemic, the 
government took steps to prepare for the anticipated repatriation of 
Bangladeshi workers, including by providing a one-time payment for 
returning migrant workers, and encouraging destination countries to 
protect migrant worker jobs and provide financial support for workers 
who had been laid off. For some Bangladeshis still migrating during 
the pandemic, the government continued to require pre-departure 
training, including safe migration and anti-trafficking components, 
and a 30-day pre-departure training course for female domestic 
workers. The government offered safe migration information through 
numerous district employment and manpower offices and training 
centers. However, it was unclear how many migrants were aware of 
these services and accessed them before traveling abroad. BMET, 
the government agency responsible for preparing and certifying 
outbound Bangladeshi workers, allowed some recruitment agencies 
to prohibit briefings on topics “against recruiting agencies’ interests.” 
Labor inspectors had responsibility for monitoring workplaces 
and reporting allegations of forced and child labor to police for 
criminal investigation. While international organizations estimated 
93 percent of child labor—including forced child labor—took place 
in the informal sector, inspectors were not empowered to monitor 
the informal sector. NGOs estimated child labor increased by 30 
to 40 percent in 2020, due to the pandemic. Staffing and resources 
to inspect for labor violations, including forced and child labor, 
remained severely inadequate, and inspectors regularly conducted 







exploitative conditions. Between July and December 2020, inspectors 
filed 20 cases against employers for the worst forms of child labor; 
they did not report whether they also referred these cases to police 
for criminal investigation. The government continued to conduct 
national awareness campaigns through print media, television, and 
text messages, and through its local counter-trafficking committees, 
at times in partnership with NGOs. The government maintained 
several helplines to report crime; during the reporting period, the 
helplines received 187 reports of trafficking.
The government continued to allow international organizations and 
NGOs to provide some assistance to refugees. In January 2020 the 
government endorsed an international organization’s pilot program 
to introduce the Burmese national curriculum to some Rohingya 
ages 11 to13 years old in refugee camps, allowing them access to 
some schooling. Due to pandemic-related lockdowns, schools 
remained closed during the reporting period and the pilot program 
could not be expanded. However, the government continued to bar 
Rohingya from formal schools and working legally and restricted their 
movement; in addition, it continued to suspend birth registration 
for Rohingya, all of which increased vulnerability to trafficking. The 
government provided anti-trafficking training to its troops prior 
to their deployment as peacekeepers and provided anti-trafficking 
training for its diplomatic personnel. During the previous reporting 
period, the government began criminally investigating one repatriated 
peacekeeper for alleged child sexual exploitation in Haiti in 2017, 
which the UN had substantiated in the previous reporting period; 
the investigation remained ongoing. The government did not make 
efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government 
did not make efforts to reduce the demand for child sex tourism. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Bangladesh, and traffickers exploit victims 
from Bangladesh abroad. Traffickers exploit some Bangladeshi 
men, women, and children who migrate willingly to work in the 
Middle East and Southeast Asia, especially Brunei, Malaysia, and 
the Maldives, in forced labor. Traffickers also exploit Bangladeshis 
in forced labor in South Asia, Southern and Eastern Africa, Europe, 
and the United States. Many Bangladeshis migrate for work each 
year through illegal channels and traffickers target them. Before 
departure, many workers assume debt to pay high recruitment fees, 
imposed legally by recruitment agencies belonging to BAIRA and 
illegally by unlicensed sub-agents; this places workers at risk of debt-
based coercion. Some recruitment agencies, agents, and employers 
also commit recruitment fraud, including contract switching; this 
includes promising women and children jobs and exploiting them 
in sex trafficking upon arrival. In recent years, authorities identified 
more than 100 Bangladeshi male forced labor victims in construction 
in Vanuatu, and officials received thousands of complaints of 
non-payment of wages and contract switching among the 30,000 
Bangladeshi migrant workers in Brunei. More than 69,000 of the 
234,000 Bangladeshi workers in Maldives are undocumented, and 
some report passport retention, underpayment or non-payment of 
wages, and fraudulent recruitment. In Saudi Arabia, traffickers exploit 
through labor trafficking a substantial number of the hundreds of 
thousands of Bangladeshi female domestic workers. Officials report 
that approximately 200 domestic workers return to Bangladesh from 
Saudi Arabia each month with indicators of forced labor. 
Traffickers exploit Bangladeshi women and girls in forced labor and 
sex trafficking abroad, including in India, Pakistan, and Gulf countries. 
Traffickers sold some women who migrated through Bangladeshi 
recruitment agencies to Lebanon or Jordan for domestic work into 
forced labor. Some Chinese traffickers force Bangladeshi women, 
specifically indigenous women from the Chittagong Hill Tracts, into 
sex trafficking and domestic servitude through arranged marriages. 
Some traffickers falsify identity documents to make children appear 
older than age 18 to send them abroad. Since 2016, 473 bodies of 
deceased Bangladeshi domestic workers have been repatriated from 
the Middle East, including 63 between January and September 2020. 
This includes the body of a 13-year-old girl sent to Saudi Arabia 
through a labor recruiter with a falsified passport listing her age 
as 27. During 2020, NGOs reported traffickers used promises of 
employment in “COVID-19 free” locations to attract victims. 
Traffickers continue to exploit adults and children from all regions 
of the country in Bangladesh’s legal brothels, many illegal brothels, 
and private hotels. Traffickers use false promises of work to lure poor 
women and children into sex trafficking and fabricate exorbitant 
debts the women and girls as young as 10 must repay. Child sex 
trafficking remained widespread; experts estimate 20,000 children 
are both growing up in and are exploited in commercial sex in 
Bangladeshi brothels. Several women and girls reported traffickers 
preyed on them and sold them to brothels, after the women fled 
abusive child marriages. Other women reported they had grown 
up in brothels because their mothers were engaged in commercial 
sex, and brothel owners forced them into sex work when they were 
children. In some registered brothels, owners force children to take 
steroids to appear older. In legal brothels, some police charge bribes 
to ignore abuse within the establishment, forego checking for required 
documentation that each individual is older than 18, and to procure 
fraudulent documentation for children as young as 10 years old. 
Some traffickers force sex trafficking victims to become addicted to 
drugs and use addiction to keep them in sex trafficking and forced 
criminality. Sex traffickers exploit street children in exchange for 
food, shelter, protection, and money. NGOs describe increasingly 
widespread job losses, wage cuts, and poverty in rural areas and 
urban slums due to the pandemic, which forces some children into 
begging and commercial sex. 
Traffickers often used debt-based coercion to compel workers into 
labor, exploiting an initial debt assumed by a worker as part of the 
employment terms. Traffickers force adults and children to work 
in the shrimp and fish processing industries, aluminum, tea, and 
garment factories, brick kilns, dry fish production, and shipbreaking. 
Traffickers force children younger than 14 into domestic work, 
including through torture and restricting their movement. In 2018, 
a survey by an international organization found more than 400,000 
children in domestic work in Bangladesh. Bangladeshi children are 
at risk for forced labor in tanneries. Traffickers coerce street children 
into criminality or force them to beg, and begging ringmasters 
sometimes maim children to increase earnings. Traffickers force 
children, especially in border areas, to produce and transport drugs, 
particularly yaba. Traffickers use coercive debts to force Bangladeshi 
families and Indian migrant workers to labor in brick kilns, shrimp 
farming, and on tea estates. NGOs allege some officials allow human 
traffickers to operate at India-Bangladesh border crossings and 
maritime embarkation points. 
Bangladesh hosts more than one million undocumented Rohingya 
in refugee camps and host communities in Cox’s Bazar near the 
Burmese border and other parts of the country, approximately 
700,000 of whom arrived after August 2017. Traffickers exploit 
Rohingya men, women, and children from refugee camps in sex 
and labor trafficking both within Bangladesh and transnationally. 
Traffickers transport Rohingya girls within Bangladesh to Chittagong 
and Dhaka and transnationally to India, Malaysia, and Nepal for 
sex trafficking, sometimes using false promises of jobs or marriage; 
some traffickers “trade” these girls over the internet. As reported in 
previous reporting periods, local criminal networks take Rohingya 
women from refugee camps at night, exploit them in sex trafficking, 
and bring them back to the camps during the day. International 
organizations allege some Bangladeshi officials facilitate trafficking 
of Rohingya, including accepting bribes from traffickers to gain access 
to camps. Rohingya girls and boys are recruited from camps and 
forced to labor as shop hands, fishers, rickshaw pullers, and domestic 
workers. Some Bangladeshi fishers use debt-based coercion to exploit 
Rohingya men if they place their shelter on the fisher’s land. Some 
Rohingya men who fled to Bangladesh from Burma decades ago 
have been trapped in forced labor through debt-based coercion to 
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Bangladeshi fishers for decades. In 2016, some traffickers sold into 
forced labor Rohingya and Bangladeshi migrants, who traveled by boat 
to Southeast Asian and could not pay ransoms. Multiple NGOs and 
humanitarian officials assess Rohingyas’ statelessness and inability 
to receive formal schooling or to work legally has increased their 
vulnerability to traffickers. International organizations allege some 
Bangladeshi officials facilitate trafficking of Rohingya, including by 
accepting bribes from traffickers to gain access to camps. Tourists 
increase demand for child sex tourism, including exploitation of 
Rohingya girls, near Cox’s Bazar. 
BARBADOS: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Barbados does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included investigating two trafficking 
cases, approving and funding a new national action plan, digitizing 
aspects of the criminal case management system, and creating 
mechanisms for victims and witnesses to testify virtually, if needed. 
However, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, even considering 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The government has not 
identified any trafficking victims in the past four reporting periods, has 
not initiated any prosecutions using the 2016 Trafficking in Persons 
Prevention Act (TIPPA) since its enactment, and has never secured 
a trafficking conviction under the TIPPA. The government’s anti-
trafficking law did not provide penalties that were commensurate with 
other serious crimes. Because the government has devoted sufficient 
resources to a written plan that, if implemented, would constitute 
significant efforts to meet the minimum standards, Barbados was 
granted a waiver per the Trafficking Victims Protection Act from an 
otherwise required downgrade to Tier 3. Therefore Barbados remained 
on Tier 2 Watch List for the third consecutive year. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Institutionalize victim identification and referral training for law 
enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges to recognize trafficking 
indicators, improve evidence-gathering, and implement the anti-
trafficking law. • Proactively screen vulnerable groups, including 
children, migrants, and Cuban workers for trafficking indicators and 
identify victims among these populations. • Vigorously investigate, 
prosecute, and convict traffickers with adequate sentences, including 
substantial imprisonment. • Amend the anti-trafficking law to remove 
sentencing provisions that allow fines in lieu of imprisonment for 
sex trafficking offenses. • Implement the anti-trafficking manual and 
improve coordination with NGOs for victim referral. • Systematically 
monitor and assess national anti-trafficking efforts, share data with 
international partners, and ensure that information from the National 
Action Plan study is made public. • Provide trafficking victims, 
including potential victims, with adequate accommodations and 
access to trauma-informed service providers. • Increase awareness 
of human trafficking among the public. • Approve and implement 
the Mandatory Reporting Protocol on Child Abuse. • Amend 
the Recruiting of Workers Act to specify the government agency 
responsible for enforcement functions.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained minimal prosecution efforts. The TIPPA 
criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking. The penalties 
prescribed for adult trafficking were up to 25 years’ imprisonment, 
a fine of up to 1 million Barbados dollars (BDS) ($495,050), or 
both. The penalties prescribed for child trafficking were up to life 
imprisonment, a fine of up to 2 million BDS ($990,100), or both. 
These penalties were sufficiently stringent. However, by allowing for 
a fine in lieu of imprisonment, the prescribed punishment for sex 
trafficking was not commensurate with those for other serious crimes, 
such as rape. The government reported initiating a process with the 
assistance of a foreign government to revise the sentencing guidelines 
for human trafficking and other crimes in order to eliminate fines 
as an alternative to imprisonment; the process remained ongoing 
at the end of the reporting period. 
The government reported two new investigations during the reporting 
period, one for suspected sex trafficking involving four foreign female 
suspects, and another for suspected labor trafficking involving one 
foreign male suspect. This compares to two investigations in 2019 
and 2018, five in 2017, and three in 2016. The government did not 
report initiating prosecutions under the TIPPA during the reporting 
period. The government has not reported initiating a prosecution 
since 2013, and that prosecution remained pending. The government 
has never convicted a trafficker under the 2016 TIPPA, reflecting 
long lags between arrests and prosecutions across the justice system. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government employees complicit in trafficking offenses. 
The Sex Crimes and Trafficking Unit of the Royal Barbados Police 
Force (RBPF) investigated all potential human trafficking cases, 
while the Department of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
(DPP) was responsible for prosecuting human trafficking cases. 
The government reported these entities had island-wide jurisdiction 
and their responsibilities extended beyond human trafficking. There 
were no courts solely dedicated to hearing human trafficking cases; 
any such cases could be heard in one of the five criminal courts. 
Law enforcement contacts reported that serious criminal cases, 
including trafficking cases, required in-person jury trials unless the 
defendant was pleading guilty or in rare instances where the case 
involved no witnesses. These jury trials by law could not take place 
remotely and therefore, no trafficking or other serious criminal 
cases were prosecuted during national lockdowns from March-July 
2020 and January 2021 through the end of the reporting period 
due to the pandemic. The government reported this exacerbated 
an already substantial court backlog. The government reported the 
RBPF, the DPP, and the courts had dedicated budgets, with the Sex 
Crimes and Trafficking Unit funded through the RBPF budget. The 
government reported these entities had adequate financial resources 
during the reporting period. The government reported essential 
services, including the RBPF, worked throughout the pandemic 
but reported authorities had to forego some operational aspects, 
including raids. The government reported difficulties with evidence 
gathering, particularly data collection and analysis, that existed 
prior to the pandemic. The police began to replace paper-based 
records with a fully digitized case management system during the 
reporting period to comprehensively capture crime and violence 
data, including trafficking. The government reported sensitization 
to human trafficking crimes was part of recruitment training for 
police. The government reported that if a sex tourism case were 
associated with human trafficking, the suspect could be tried for 
crimes committed abroad.
PROTECTION
The government maintained minimal efforts to protect victims. 
The government has not identified a victim since 2016, when the 
government identified eight victims. The government reported law 
enforcement screened for trafficking indicators when detaining or 
arresting individuals involved in commercial sex, migrants, or other 
vulnerable groups. The government reported it did not receive any 
victim referrals from NGOs or civil society organizations. Two local 
NGOs reported that in the course of their work supporting victims 







possible trafficking connection when the victim was an undocumented 
foreigner in irregular immigration status. These NGOs reported 
encountering approximately 20-30 potential trafficking victims 
during the reporting period, an increase from previous years, probably 
due to pandemic-driven economic hardship. However, the NGOs 
reported they did not formally document or report their findings 
to authorities, citing fear of retaliation from the traffickers against 
the potential victims. 
During the reporting period, Cuban medical workers provided health 
services in response to the pandemic and Cuban athletic coaches 
worked in the country. The government reported that the Cuban 
medical workers were working under legal contract and were being 
treated in accordance with local labor laws but did not provide a 
copy of the contract. The government did not report any activities 
of the National Committee for Monitoring the Rights of the Child, 
which was responsible for outreach on protections for children, 
including against sex trafficking. 
Both the police and immigration used standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) to interview potential victims. The government reported 
it updated the SOPs during the previous reporting period to take 
into account changing trafficking modes; the government had not 
approved the revised SOPs at the end of the reporting period. A formal 
referral process for government authorities and NGOs existed for 
victim care, as required by law, but the government reported having 
only an informal process by which the Sex Crimes and Trafficking 
Unit would identify a potential victim and then refer them to other 
members of the National Task Force Against Trafficking in Persons 
(Task Force) for service provision. The Sex Crimes and Trafficking 
Unit also could place victims in protective care and refer them to an 
NGO-operated safe house, although it did not do so this reporting 
period. The government designated the Gender Affairs Bureau as 
the government coordinator for local NGO assistance to victims. 
Under the TIPPA, all victims, including those with disabilities, had 
to be provided safe shelter, counseling, health care, and information 
regarding their rights. A foreign victim of trafficking and the victim’s 
accompanying dependent children could receive, for the duration 
of their stay and at the relevant minister’s discretion, support that 
included housing or safe shelter, education and training opportunities, 
psychological counseling, legal assistance, help with obtaining 
documents, living expenses, and medical assistance. Authorities 
could interview victims to ascertain their housing and general health 
care needs. The government had the capacity and financial resources 
to provide all services except housing but did not report doing so 
during the reporting period. There was no specialized shelter for 
trafficking victims. Female trafficking victims and their dependents 
could reside at an NGO-operated women’s domestic shelter; however, 
this shelter did not have the resources for, and previously struggled to 
assist, trafficking victims. The government had a separate agreement 
with an NGO to provide accommodations to male victims. Adult 
victims could leave shelters unchaperoned and could work while 
receiving assistance. The children’s care board could provide care 
for any identified child victims. 
The TIPPA authorized the government to provide safeguards for 
victims’ identities and those of their families, issue work permits, 
and provide transportation and security during legal proceedings. 
Authorities initiated new measures during the reporting period 
to enable trafficking victims and witnesses to provide testimony 
virtually, including from other countries, but did not report using 
these measures during the reporting period. The government could 
accommodate victims who wished to be repatriated in a safe place; 
they could return without unreasonable delay. The government 
maintained an informal policy allowing foreign victims to receive 
temporary legal status as an alternative to their removal to countries 
where they face hardship or retribution by traffickers. The Minister of 
National Security could authorize victims, on a case-by-case basis, to 
remain and work in the country; however, the government did not 
report granting this status during the reporting period as it identified 
no victims. Government policy permitted victims to leave the country 
and return for hearings, but the government did not report any such 
instances during the reporting period. The TIPPA allowed courts to 
order restitution from a trafficker after a conviction; however, no 
victims received restitution during the reporting period. 
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. The Attorney General 
headed the Task Force, which included representatives from the Office 
of the Attorney General, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign 
Trade, the Ministry of Labour and Social Relations, the Ministry 
of People Empowerment and Elder Affairs, the Commissioner of 
Police of the RBPF, the Chief Immigration Officer, the Chief Labour 
Officer, the Chief Welfare Officer, the Bureau of Gender Affairs, and 
a professional women’s association. In March 2021, the Cabinet 
approved an anti-trafficking national action plan developed with 
support from two foreign governments and delayed since 2016. 
The government announced the action plan through a March 2021 
press release and allocated 125,000 BDS ($61,880) to implement the 
plan for two years. As an action item, the plan included conducting 
a study to determine the nature and extent of trafficking in the 
country, which would subsequently guide the government’s efforts 
to combat trafficking. 
The government took significant measures to mitigate the economic 
and social effects of the pandemic, including through economic 
stimulus initiatives and expanded social support programs that 
involved all government ministries and consumed extensive human 
and financial resources, including those used for anti-trafficking 
efforts. Nearly the entire staff of the Attorney General’s Office worked 
on enforcing the government’s pandemic response. The government 
diverted anti-trafficking personnel to support pandemic-response 
efforts. However, the government reported the Task Force continued 
to meet and develop the action plan. The government reported the 
Labor Department conducted its inspection functions in a limited 
manner as a result of pandemic-related movement restrictions. 
The Labor Department regulated recruitment agencies under the 
Recruiting of Workers Act; however, the law did not identify the 
responsible agency for the associated enforcement functions. The 
government reported it was considering reviewing the Act. There 
were no labor recruiters or brokers operating in the country during 
the reporting period. The government reported it maintained two 
liaison offices overseas to recruit nationals for work in other countries, 
and this cooperation helped minimize the exploitation of workers. 
The government promulgated through mass media the Protocol 
to Address Migrant Labor Conditions, which described the legal 
framework governing employers, explained employees’ rights, and 
served to sensitize employers, employees, and the public about 
possible labor violations. There were no reports of forced labor 
during the reporting period. 
The government reported that in August 2020, an officer from the Sex 
Crimes and Trafficking Unit delivered an anti-trafficking awareness 
presentation to the staff of the Ministry of Labor and Social Partnership 
Relations (MLSP), including the Barbados Employment Career and 
Counseling Services. The government reported migrant workers could 
enter and leave the country if they wished as long as they observed 
all health protocols. The government reported it made no changes 
to these workers’ immigration status and made pandemic-related 
benefits available to anyone residing in the country. The government 
did not report whether it had approved the Mandatory Reporting 
Protocol on Child Abuse, which addresses child labor conditions, 
employers’ legal responsibilities, and employee rights. 
The government operated a police hotline number that could receive 
information on potential trafficking crimes; authorities did not report 
receiving any trafficking information from the hotline during the 
reporting period. An NGO operated a human trafficking hotline 
but did not receive any trafficking-related calls during the reporting 
period. The government began efforts to create a platform for a 
virtual library on human trafficking for the use of prosecutors and 
other authorities. The government adopted the National Identity 




noncitizens and should enable the maintenance of an accurate 
database of citizens and residents. The act also required individuals 
to present their national identify card in order to receive certain 
government services. The government reported that in March 2021, 
two representatives from the Task Force briefed the country’s newly 
appointed diplomats, as well as its staff from overseas missions, on 
human trafficking, including domestic servitude. Authorities reported 
that all diplomats received training, including on human trafficking, 
before taking up overseas postings. The government did not make 
efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Barbados. Observers report traffickers exploit 
foreign women in sex trafficking in Barbados. Documented and 
undocumented migrants from Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, and Venezuela 
are at high risk for trafficking, although individuals from Colombia, 
the Dominican Republic, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines are 
increasingly vulnerable. There are anecdotal reports of parents and 
caregivers exploiting children in sex trafficking. A UN expert noted 
in 2017 that Barbados was a transit country for child trafficking at 
that time. Cuban nationals in the country may have been forced 
to work by the Cuban government. Previously, traffickers operated 
as part of an organization; more recently, they appear to operate 
individually. Authorities have noted an increase in use of social 
media as a means of recruiting victims, which may have increased 
further due to the pandemic.
BELARUS: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Belarus does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government made key achievements during the 
reporting period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 
on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Belarus was upgraded to Tier 
2 Watch List. While the government continued the practice of national 
and regional level subbotnik days of service, contrary to previous 
years, observers reported approximately 500,000 fewer Belarusians 
decided to participate in the 2020 national subbotnik, and there 
were no reports of retaliation. Additional achievements included 
amending the national referral mechanism (NRM) to improve 
victim identification and assistance and requiring the recording of 
child victim and witness testimony during pre-trial investigation for 
later use in court to reduce possible re-traumatization. Finally, while 
the government did not report any convictions under its trafficking 
statute, it reported convicting two traffickers under other articles 
and sentencing them to significant prison terms. Despite these 
achievements, the government identified fewer victims and did not 
provide adequate protection services nor funding for NGOs that cared 
for victims. For the fourth consecutive year, the government did not 
report investigating or filing charges related to illegal recruitment 
of migrant workers. 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Vigorously investigate and prosecute cases of forced labor and sex 
trafficking under Articles 181 and 181-1. • Implement a campaign to 
raise awareness about the voluntary nature of subbotniks and increase 
training to government officials at both the national and regional 
level to ensure coercive measures are not used to elicit participation. 
• Increase labor inspections to identify internal forced labor and 
investigate illegal recruitment practices. • Increase resources devoted 
to trafficking victim assistance and protection within Belarus in such 
a manner that improves effectiveness, including for state-owned 
territorial centers for social services and for NGOs. • Continue to 
expand trainings for all relevant officials on the national identification 
and referral mechanism and allocate sufficient resources for its full 
implementation. • Increase funding for services that provide child 
sex trafficking victims with services specialized to their needs and 
continue to refer all identified victims to care facilities. • Continue 
to proactively screen all vulnerable groups, including migrants and 
individuals in commercial sex, for indicators of trafficking. • Amend 
or repeal the penal provisions in sections 193(1), 339, 342, 367, 368 
and 369(2) of the criminal code to clarify that no penalties involving 
compulsory labor may be imposed for the peaceful expression 
of political views and ensure that children are not subjected to 
compulsory labor as punishment. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Article 181 of 
the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and 
prescribed penalties ranging from three to seven years’ imprisonment 
and forfeiture of assets for offenses involving adult victims and 
seven to 15 years’ imprisonment and forfeiture of assets for those 
involving child victims. These penalties were sufficiently stringent 
and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. The government 
reported it continued three trafficking investigations under Article 
181, compared with four investigations in 2019. For the second year 
in a row, authorities did not initiate any investigations under Article 
181-1, which criminalized the use of forced labor, compared with four 
cases in 2018 and one case in 2017. The government also reported 
initiating investigations under a range of trafficking-related articles; 
prosecutors often brought several different criminal charges at once 
against suspected traffickers. In one case, authorities investigated a 
suspect under Article 182 (kidnapping) for abducting a person in 
May 2020 for forced labor in the agricultural sector. The government 
initiated one trafficking prosecution under Article 181, compared with 
four in 2019. The government did not convict any traffickers under 
Article 181 in 2020, compared with its conviction of three traffickers 
in 2019—the government’s first convictions under Article 181 since 
2012. The government reported 101 prosecutions and 30 convictions 
under other articles that contained elements of trafficking, but it 
only provided sufficient details in two cases to determine that they 
included exploitation for the purposes of forced labor or commercial 
sex. In those two cases, a sex trafficker was sentenced to five years’ 
imprisonment and a fine for exploiting Belarusian women in Poland, 
and a child sex trafficker was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment 
and a fine. Observers reported law enforcement efforts were hindered 
during the reporting period because some government agencies 
transitioned employees to remote work, and some officials were 
occasionally forced to isolate due to the pandemic. The government 
did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of 
government employees complicit in trafficking offenses. 
The Main Department for Drug Control and Combating Trafficking in 
Human Beings led law enforcement efforts. The government continued 
to provide trafficking-specific training to law enforcement through 
an international training center in partnership with an international 
organization. As a result of the pandemic, the government canceled 
the majority of trainings, conferences, and forums during the reporting 
period. However, authorities participated in virtual anti-trafficking 
events with other Commonwealth of Independent States members, 
and some officials completed online training offered by a foreign 
government focused on investigating trafficking and related crimes. 
The government also prepared and published a collection of materials 







The government modestly increased protection efforts. The 
government identified 109 confirmed trafficking victims, compared 
with 128 in 2019 and 142 in 2018. The government did not report 
how many potential victims applied for official status; in 2019, 
the government reported 251 potential victims applied for official 
victim status. Of the 109 confirmed victims, 107 were exploited in sex 
trafficking and two were victims of forced labor; 34 were children. 
Traffickers exploited 95 of the confirmed victims in sex trafficking or 
forced labor in Belarus and 14 abroad. NGOs assisted 44 trafficking 
victims in 2020, compared with 129 in 2019; 21 victims were female, 
23 were male, 26 were exploited for forced labor, 11 were exploited in 
sex trafficking, and the remaining seven victims were uncategorized. 
The majority of the victims (22) were exploited in Russia, while 16 
were exploited internally in Belarus. NGOs reported some victims 
were more reluctant to seek assistance and report cases during the 
pandemic because of the lack of COVID-19 preventative measures at 
many government facilities. NGOs reported a variance in the degree 
of cooperation with regional law enforcement. The government 
issued guidelines on victim identification in May 2020 to civil 
aviation organizations. 
In July 2020, the government amended the NRM, simplifying and 
improving the procedure for identifying and providing support to 
victims, including by increasing the amount of time allowed by law 
for the identification process, if needed, from 30 days to up to 90 days, 
during which the government could request additional information 
from other countries to aid in the identification process. An NGO 
reported border officials appropriately used the NRM and did not 
penalize victims for acts traffickers compelled them to commit. 
The government also continued to screen individuals arrested for 
commercial sex for trafficking indicators and exempt those identified 
as trafficking victims from any legal liability. The government reported 
referring 55 victims to NGOs and international organizations for 
reintegration services, compared with 48 in 2019. The government 
reported some victims declined services.
The government’s victim assistance services, while free, continued 
to be underutilized and suffered from burdensome bureaucratic 
requirements, delays in service delivery, and inconsistent quality of 
service, sometimes leading victims to choose to pay for necessary 
services elsewhere or find support through NGOs. The government did 
not have trafficking-specific facilities available to care for victims, but 
local authorities operated 137 “crisis rooms” that offered temporary 
shelter, including beds, meals, and personal hygiene products to 
vulnerable adults, including victims of trafficking, regardless of 
nationality; the government did not report if trafficking victims 
used these facilities in 2020. The government centers included 
accessible services for victims with disabilities and the government 
provided personal protective equipment to these centers to prevent 
COVID-19 infections. However, observers continued to report most 
victims sought assistance at private shelters because the government’s 
centers were poorly equipped and lacked qualified caregivers trained 
in trafficking. Victims’ access to services was not dependent on their 
willingness to participate in the criminal process. NGOs and an 
international organization provided the majority of victim assistance; 
however, the government did not provide direct financial support 
for NGOs. 
The education ministry maintained 135 centers that could provide 
vulnerable children with shelter and basic provisions; children 
between the ages of three and 18 could stay at these centers for a 
maximum of six months, after which they were returned to their 
family, assigned to a foster family, or transferred to an orphanage or 
boarding institution. The government continued to run a program 
of child-friendly rooms for interviews, the provision of assistance, 
and reintegration services at 22 of these centers. Similar to past 
years, no child trafficking victims received services at these facilities; 
the government reported that there were no child victims requiring 
separate accommodation from parents or guardians. An NGO that 
had previously assisted the government in running the child-friendly 
rooms issued a report in January 2020 with recommendations on 
how to improve the use of the rooms and interviewing techniques; 
the recommendations included updating technical equipment and 
drafting legislation to institutionalize and govern the use of the 
rooms. In January 2021, the government amended the criminal code 
to require the recording of testimony of victims and witnesses under 
the age of 14 during pre-trial investigation for later use in court. The 
government provided training to 79 social service center specialists on 
providing assistance to victims of domestic violence and trafficking. 
Victims were entitled to free legal assistance and victims could request 
protection measures to include the non-disclosure of information, 
exemption from attending hearings, delivering testimony remotely, 
and closed court sessions.
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
minister of interior served as the national rapporteur on trafficking 
issues and coordinated implementation of the 2020-2022 State 
Program on Combating Crime and Corruption, which included 
anti-trafficking activities. Interdisciplinary bodies, composed of 
representatives from law enforcement, education, healthcare, labor 
and social welfare sectors, judiciary, media, clergy, and civil society, 
met on an annual basis to discuss implementation of the national 
referral mechanism. Anti-trafficking cooperation at the regional 
level was established through memoranda of cooperation with 
each region; regional interdisciplinary working groups convened 
and included representation from government agencies, NGOs, an 
international organization, media, attorneys, and religious groups 
(as observers). The government implemented a national action plan 
for the protection of children from sexual violence and exploitation. 
The activities in the action plan were also included in the 2020-2022 
Program to Combat Crime and Corruption. In January 2021, the 
government adopted a 2021-2025 national gender equality plan 
that includes measures to combat domestic violence and human 
trafficking.
The government conducted public awareness campaigns through 
television, radio, and print media and provided in-kind assistance 
to NGOs’ campaigns in the form of advertising hotlines, production 
assistance, and placement of awareness-raising materials on state-
owned television, radio, and billboards. The government provided 
in-kind assistance to NGOs; however, NGOs drew on less assistance 
due, at least in part, to pandemic-related restrictions and NGOs’ 
decisions to adapt or limit their activities. In collaboration with an 
international organization, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOI) 
carried out an advertising campaign and launched a website aimed 
at educating the public about sexual violence and exploitation of 
children, including child sex trafficking. During the annual health 
information campaign, the government organized educational 
campaigns to increase awareness about trafficking. MOI continued 
to operate a hotline for safe travel abroad to inform potential labor 
migrants, identify illegal recruitment practices, and route trafficking 
calls to specialized NGOs. For the fourth consecutive year, the 
government did not report investigating or filing charges related to 
illegal recruitment in 2020, compared with 50 companies charged 
in 2016. Labor inspectors conducted 525 inspections in 2019, the 
most recent year for which data was available; efforts remained 
inadequate to enforce and deter violations. The government continued 
to lead and participate in multilateral anti-trafficking activities to 
include coordinating the Group of Friends United against Human 
Trafficking at the UN, which included 23 participating countries. The 
government signed a memorandum of understanding with the United 
Arab Emirates in July 2020 to strengthen cooperation on combating 
trafficking. The government made efforts to reduce the demand for 
commercial sex acts by upholding the prohibition on advertising 
commercial sex and criminalizing the purchase of sex with a child. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
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and foreign victims in Belarus, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Belarus abroad. Data collected by NGOs suggests the majority of 
trafficking victims are men subjected to forced labor, primarily in 
Russia. Belarusian victims are exploited primarily in Belarus and 
Russia, as well as in Poland, Turkey, and other countries in Europe, 
Eurasia, and the Middle East. Some Belarusian women traveling for 
foreign employment in the adult entertainment and hotel industries 
are subjected to sex trafficking. The government has identified 
Belarusian, Moldovan, Russian, Ukrainian, and Vietnamese victims 
exploited in Belarus. The majority of traffickers are Belarusian citizens. 
Due to the pandemic, traffickers increasingly use online methods to 
coerce victims into forced labor and sex trafficking. 
The government continued the practice of subbotniks—voluntary 
service days—which are announced through a government decree, 
holding one national-level and at least one regional-level subbotnik 
during the reporting period. As an alternative form of participation, 
participants can allocate a portion of a single day’s salary toward 
government projects announced by the authorities prior to the 
subbotnik. Historically, individuals have been subjected to government 
reprisals for failure to participate in subbotniks. In the past, observers 
reported authorities threatened individuals who refused to work 
with fines or unpaid premium compensation. However, contrary 
to previous years, approximately 500,000 citizens abstained from 
participating in the national subbotnik in 2020, and observers did not 
report any retaliation for nonparticipation. A media report noted 
workers at a state-run hospital expressed fear of reprisals in the form of 
withholding of wages if they failed to participate. Government decrees 
announcing subbotniks are required to state their voluntary nature. 
The authorities have previously corrected subbotnik announcements 
that fell afoul of the law and rebuked implicated officials. In 2018, 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Belarus reported authorities disguise as strong encouragement, an 
obligation for factory workers, civil servants, and school children to 
participate in harvesting on state-owned farms or in street cleaning. 
However, the UN Special Rapporteur did not report on subbotniks in 
the 2019 or 2020 reports to the Human Rights Council. Historically, 
sources alleged authorities sometimes required university and high 
school students to participate, without compensation, in public works 
projects, but no known cases were identified in the reporting period. 
In 2019, media reported some university students in a rural area in 
the Vitsebsk region claimed they were forced to participate in apple 
picking during the harvest season, but no similar cases were identified 
in the reporting period. In previous years, reports indicated some 
state university students who failed to participate in harvesting risked 
the loss of housing in subsidized dormitories or penalization during 
exams, but no known cases were identified in the reporting period. 
The UN Special Rapporteur noted in 2020 its continued concern 
over the practice of forced labor in places of detention, especially 
with regards to children and youth; the report generally does not 
provide time frames during which specific incidents of concern 
occurred. The ILO Committee of Experts noted its continued concern 
in 2018 that, although there have been no recently reported cases, 
some provisions of the Belarusian criminal code, which included 
forced labor as possible punishment, are worded broadly enough 
to lend themselves to application as a means of punishment for the 
expression of views opposed to the government. There have been no 
known reported cases since the 2018 ILO report or in recent years.
BELGIUM: TIER 1
The Government of Belgium fully meets the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued to 
demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting 
period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its 
anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Belgium remained on Tier 1. These 
efforts included updating the national action plan, centralizing 
funding for shelters to ensure funding remains stable from year to 
year, and cooperating with international law enforcement authorities 
on trafficking cases. Although the government meets the minimum 
standards, authorities prosecuted fewer traffickers, courts suspended 
or partially suspended the majority of convicted traffickers’ sentences, 
and authorities identified fewer victims. Identifying child victims and 
providing appropriate child-specific protection services remained 
persistent weaknesses, and funding for services decreased. The 
government continued to report inconsistent law enforcement data.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Train first responders on the child victim identification and referral 
protocol and ensure it is used effectively in practice. • Secure adequate 
funding for the provision of services for child trafficking victims 
and increase training for front-line personnel on identifying child 
trafficking victims. • Increase resources to assist unaccompanied 
child victims. • Vigorously prosecute and convict traffickers, sentence 
convicted traffickers to significant prison terms, and ensure convicted 
traffickers serve those terms in practice. • Implement trauma-informed 
and victim-centered procedures during trial proceedings to minimize 
the risk of re-traumatization and ensure all victims, not just those 
under threat of physical violence, have access to witness protection 
services. • Ensure victims have access to the full range of services 
regardless of whether they choose to participate in judicial processes. 
• Coordinate and centralize the collection of timely trafficking data 
across the government to effectively analyze efforts. • Increase legal 
representation for victims and ensure victims exploited by means 
other than physical violence have full access to victim compensation. 
• Revise the definition of human trafficking under Belgian law to 
more closely align with the definition in the 2000 UN TIP Protocol.
PROSECUTION
The government demonstrated uneven law enforcement efforts; while 
it continued to investigate cases and convict traffickers in similar 
proportion to the previous year, prosecutions decreased and the 
majority of convicted traffickers received fully or partially suspended 
sentences, which weakened deterrence. Belgium criminalized sex 
and labor trafficking through a 2005 amendment to the 1995 
Act Containing Measures to Repress Trafficking in Persons, which 
prescribed penalties of one to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine 
of €500 to €50,000 ($613 to $61,350) for offenses involving adult 
victims, and 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine of €1,000 to 
€100,000 ($1,230 to $122,700) for those involving a child victim. 
These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other serious 
crimes, such as kidnapping. Belgium’s definition of trafficking in 
persons was broader than the definition in the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. 
Inconsistent with the definition of trafficking under international 
law, the law established the use of force, fraud, or coercion as 
aggravating factors, rather than essential elements of the crime. 
Additionally, Belgian law also allowed the failure of an employer 
to meet the prevailing wage and working conditions to constitute 
“exploitation,” and the government included these cases in its 
prosecution data. GRETA reported this overly broad definition could 
lead to confusion between trafficking and other criminal offenses 
and possible difficulties in mutual legal assistance with foreign 







The government did not report law enforcement data consistently 
from year to year, making it difficult to assess its law enforcement 
efforts. Despite recommendations from GRETA in both its 2013 and 
2017 evaluation reports, the government lacked a coherent system 
to collect law enforcement and victim data for trafficking cases, 
which hindered its ability to track and evaluate law enforcement and 
victim protection efforts. Authorities investigated 372 cases in 2020, 
compared with 374 cases in 2019. The government prosecuted an 
unknown number of defendants in 38 cases in 2020, compared with 
an unknown number of defendants in 73 cases in 2019. Authorities 
reported 113 convictions in 2019, the most recent year for which 
data was available, compared with 127 convictions in 2018. The 
government reported it sentenced 101 convicted traffickers to prison 
terms in 2019 (118 in 2018), 57 of which were suspended or partially 
suspended (53 in 2018). Of the prison sentences issued, including 
those that were suspended or partially suspended, 19 were for less 
than one year, 39 were for one to three years, 36 were for three to five 
years, and seven were for five to 10 years. The failure to sentence the 
majority of traffickers to significant terms of imprisonment weakened 
deterrence, may have undercut broader efforts to hold traffickers 
accountable, and did not adequately address the nature of the crime. 
In March 2021, media reported an Antwerp-based cafe owner was 
convicted for trafficking and operating a brothel and sentenced to 
four years’ imprisonment and a fine; the owner’s son was reportedly 
sentenced to three years’ imprisonment and a fine, two additional 
associates received 30 months’ suspended sentences, one associate 
received a one-year suspended sentence, and one defendant was 
acquitted. The government issued pandemic-related restrictions and 
lockdowns that significantly limited court proceedings from March 
2020 to May 2020 and from October 2020 to December 2020. Law 
enforcement activities were similarly limited by pandemic-related 
restrictions; media reported in October 2020 over 500 police officers 
were in quarantine, and almost 2,000 went into self-isolation between 
early September 2020 and mid-October 2020. 
Each judicial district appointed a magistrate to specialize in trafficking 
and serve as a resource to the district. The government mandated 
trafficking trainings for judicial officials who were on the career track 
to become magistrates and who may eventually become judges. The 
government conducted a virtual training for magistrates in February 
2021 on trafficking indicators and victim referral procedures. In 
2020, the police completed a comprehensive review and revision of 
its training courses on trafficking. Police continued to participate in 
an ongoing labor trafficking investigation with the Government of 
Luxembourg involving five suspects in five companies. In September 
2020, authorities participated in a EUROPOL operation focused 
on trafficking in labor-intensive sectors such as construction, 
logistics, and transport, as well as in nail salons; the operation led 
to the arrest of 193 suspects, the initiation of 606 investigations, 
and the identification of 535 potential victims throughout the 19 
participating countries. Law enforcement also participated in a 
12-country EUROPOL operation in October 2020 that led to 388 
arrests and the identification of 249 potential victims. The government 
did not report how many, if any, arrests, investigations, or potential 
victims identified during these two operations occurred in Belgium 
or involved Belgian nationals. Media reported in October 2020 that 
law enforcement cooperated with French authorities to arrest 13 
suspects and identify 15 child victims as part of an investigation into a 
criminal organization accused of forcing children to beg, among other 
crimes. Law enforcement authorities also participated with French 
authorities in an exchange of best practices on combating forced 
labor. Authorities cooperated with foreign authorities to extradite five 
suspected traffickers to Belgium, one each from Austria, Germany, 
Hungary, Italy, and the United Kingdom (UK). The government 
transferred two convicted traffickers, one to the Netherlands and 
one to the UK. The government did not report any investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government officials complicit in 
trafficking offenses.
PROTECTION
The government demonstrated uneven efforts to protect victims; 
while it maintained services for trafficking victims and provided more 
residence permits for foreign victims, it identified significantly fewer 
victims and decreased funding for services. In 2020, the government 
formally identified and assisted 91 victims (including 49 victims 
of labor exploitation, 35 victims of sexual exploitation, and seven 
victims of other forms of exploitation), compared with 159 victims 
assisted in 2019. The three government-funded shelters received 820 
referrals of victims and potential victims in 2020, compared with 
859 referrals in 2019. The government reported pandemic-related 
restrictions hampered front-line responders’ ability to identify 
victims; labor inspectors were limited in their ability to work because 
of a significant number of COVID-19 infections among inspectors. 
Due to the broad definition of labor exploitation under Belgium’s 
anti-trafficking law, data on the identification of labor trafficking 
victims may have included cases that do not constitute trafficking 
crimes under international law. Law enforcement identified the 
majority of victims, followed by NGOs and social services. There 
were also many cases of victims who self-identified. First responders 
followed a national victim referral protocol to identify victims and 
refer them to care, and the government organized outreach activities 
and awareness-raising campaigns targeting front-line professionals, 
including hospital and social workers. Social security inspectors 
received training on detecting, processing, and providing support 
for trafficking victims. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) reported the 
accurate identification of victims remained a challenge, and experts 
have previously reported particular challenges in identifying child 
victims. Many authorities who did not specialize in trafficking cases 
reportedly could not recognize trafficking indicators and confused 
child trafficking with other crimes, such as smuggling and child abuse. 
Authorities sometimes failed to follow the victim referral protocol 
and did not properly notify child protective services when they 
identified an unaccompanied child victim. The government did not 
report providing training to law enforcement on victim identification. 
The government funded three specialized NGO-run shelters and 
allocated approximately €419,000 ($514,110) for each shelter in 
2020, compared with €427,000 ($523,930) in 2019; the shelters 
also received funding from regional and local governments. The 
government centralized all funding for these shelters in 2020, a change 
that experts believed would make funding more stable year to year. 
NGO-run shelters provided psycho-social, medical, and legal care, 
and were open to all adult victims regardless of gender, immigration 
status, or nationality. The independent Federal Migration Centre 
(Myria), in its capacity as the national rapporteur, provided oversight 
and coordination for the shelters. Authorities placed child trafficking 
victims in government-funded shelters for foreign unaccompanied 
children; children in these centers were assigned a mentor to protect 
their interests. The government did not report on the progress of a 
December 2019 government-approved NGO proposal to open a 
shelter specifically for female child sex trafficking victims. GRETA 
reported the government’s child safety services lacked sufficient 
capacity to accommodate unaccompanied child victims. Shelters 
for unaccompanied children reported many children went missing 
from the shelters each year, some of whom may have been victims 
of trafficking; the agency responsible for these shelters reported 
2,642 children went missing between 2018 and 2020, with 583 
going missing in 2020 alone.
The government conditioned its victim assistance services on three 
criteria: victims had to break off all contact with the trafficker, agree to 
counseling at a specialized shelter, and assist in the prosecution of the 
trafficker. Identified victims were eligible for a 45-day reflection period 
during which they could decide whether to assist law enforcement; 
foreign victims who did not agree to these conditions were repatriated 
to their country of origin. Potential victims had access to social 
services during this reflection period. The government granted 
foreign victims who participated in investigations and prosecutions 
three-month residence and work permits and protective services. 
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If a public prosecutor confirmed the individuals were trafficking 
victims, they could receive a six-month residence and work permit, 
renewable until the end of the criminal case. Victims who were not 
citizens of EU member states could obtain permanent residency only 
upon the successful conviction and sentencing of traffickers; in the 
absence of a conviction, authorities could grant residence permits 
for indefinite lengths of time to non-EU victims if authorities were 
able to bring formal charges against the trafficker. Observers noted 
the conditions the government attached to victim assistance were 
difficult for many victims to meet, especially in the case of child 
victims. Few child victims received residence permits, and GRETA 
expressed concern that residency for non-EU child victims was 
contingent upon cooperation with law enforcement instead of factors 
relating to the best interest of the child. The government issued 174 
residence permits for trafficking victims in 2020, compared with 154 
in 2019, 248 in 2018, and 235 in 2017. 
During criminal proceedings, witness protection laws provided only 
those victims under physical threat of violence or living abroad 
options to testify via video. The law had a specific provision for child 
victims that allowed courts to permit video testimony. Prosecutors 
could seize assets of suspected traffickers during an investigation and 
could request restitution for victims in court through the confiscation 
of these assets; the government did not report if courts granted 
restitution in 2020, nor in 2019. Victims could claim compensation in 
local courts but often had to prove their case involved the intentional 
act of physical violence in order to receive compensation. Victims 
could also seek compensation through the Commission for Financial 
Assistance to Victims of Intentional Acts of Violence; in 2020, the 
commission awarded €12,500 ($15,340) to trafficking victims in 
each of two cases. The high costs of legal representation discouraged 
victim cooperation in criminal and civil proceedings. There were no 
reports the government penalized victims for unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit; however, gaps in identification efforts, 
such as with child victims, made these victims vulnerable to such 
penalization. Additionally, foreign victims were only granted relief 
from deportation or other penalties if they assisted in the prosecution 
of their trafficker. While the Netherlands held the presidency of 
the Benelux Union in 2020, the Belgian government worked with 
it and Luxembourg to improve cooperation on victim protection, 
including by publishing an updated brochure to raise awareness 
amongst the public and potential victims about anti-trafficking laws 
and referral and assistance programs in each of the three countries. 
The government, along with Hungary, also contributed to a Dutch 
project to provide resources for social workers, legal experts, and law 
enforcement authorities, among others, to increase knowledge of 
victim referral and assistance mechanisms, particularly for Hungarian 
victims in Belgium and the Netherlands. 
PREVENTION
The government modestly increased efforts to prevent trafficking. 
The Interdepartmental Coordination Unit coordinated government-
wide anti-trafficking efforts and monitored the implementation of 
the national action plan (NAP); the government updated the 2015-
2019 NAP for action through March 2021, which they finalized 
and released in June 2020. Further updates beyond March 2021 
were pending at the end of the reporting period. The MOJ chaired 
the unit, which included key government ministries and agencies, 
as well as representatives of the three government-funded shelters 
and Myria. Myria served as the secretariat for the unit and as the 
independent national rapporteur, and it produced its own annual 
report on government anti-trafficking efforts. The government held 
several awareness-raising events as part of a UN campaign in July 
2020. The Labor Inspectorate conducted inspections throughout the 
reporting period, but the government did not report the number of 
inspections or if authorities identified any trafficking victims. The 
government maintained an online toolbox to provide information 
for businesses on how to prevent forced labor in their organizations 
and supply chains. The government continued a widely-used 
program that subsidized the wages of maids and domestic workers 
and criminalized exploitative practices such as the confiscation of 
passports and contract switching. The government maintained a 
system to prevent the exploitation of domestic employees of foreign 
diplomats by placing awareness-raising flyers in the consular sections 
of Belgian embassies and consulates abroad. The government did 
not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts or for 
participation in international sex tourism by its citizens, however, the 
law permitted the prosecution of Belgian citizens for participating 
in child sex tourism.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, sex and labor traffickers exploit 
foreign and domestic victims in Belgium. Foreign victims come 
primarily from Asia (including China, India, and Thailand), Eastern 
Europe (especially Albania, Hungary, Romania, and Ukraine), and 
North and Sub-Saharan Africa (primarily Morocco and Nigeria). 
Sex traffickers exploit Belgian women and girls, some of whom are 
recruited by local traffickers. Sex traffickers exploit foreign children, 
including Roma and Nigerian girls; the latter are recruited through 
extensive trafficking networks in Nigeria. Thai criminal organizations 
exploit Thai women for sex in massage establishments that are 
frequently managed by Belgian citizens. Traffickers recruit girls from 
Eastern Europe on social media by posing as potential romantic 
partners. Belgian citizens participate in international child sex tourism. 
Labor traffickers exploit male victims in restaurants, bars, sweatshops, 
horticulture, fruit farms, construction, cleaning businesses, and retail 
shops; they exploit men and women in domestic service, including 
in the diplomatic community. Within the Romani community, 
traffickers exploit Roma children in forced begging and forced 
criminality. Asylum-seekers who have their applications for legal 
status denied and migrants transiting through Belgium to the UK 
are highly vulnerable to trafficking.
BELIZE: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Belize does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts 
to do so.  These efforts included designating judges to preside over 
trafficking trials, providing for shelter for male victims for the first 
time, including anti-trafficking training in police academy training 
for the first time, sentencing a trafficker to a significant sentence, 
and opening an investigation against a police officer accused of 
complicity in a trafficking case.  However, the government did not 
demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared to the previous 
reporting period, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity.  The government initiated 
fewer trafficking investigations, did not convict any traffickers, and 
identified fewer victims of trafficking.  Reports of official complicity 
in trafficking crimes were common.  Because the government has 
devoted sufficient resources to a written plan that, if implemented, 
would constitute significant efforts to meet the minimum standards, 
Belize was granted a waiver per the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act from an otherwise required downgrade to Tier 3.  Therefore 
Belize remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the third consecutive year. 
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prosecuting traffickers, child sex tourists, and officials complicit in 
trafficking crimes and imposing strong prison sentences upon those 
convicted. • Consistently apply formal procedures to identify victims 
of sex and labor trafficking among vulnerable groups, including 
workers from China and Cuban medical personnel, and refer 
identified victims to services. • Strengthen monitoring of alleged 
traffickers out on bail, reduce court delays, and enable victim video 
testimony. • Provide adequate funding, including to NGOs, for 
specialized victim services for all victims, including men and children. 
• Ensure labor and liquor license inspectors comply with their 
obligations to conduct inspections and identify victims. • Increase 
efforts to identify forced labor through recruiter participation in 
the national labor recruiter registry and prevention programs with 
migrant workers. • Continue to ensure victims are not penalized for 
unlawful acts, including immigration violations, traffickers compelled 
them to commit. • Implement the national anti-trafficking plan in 
accordance with its agreed timeline and disburse resources for its 
implementation. • Continue to enforce the prohibition on off-duty 
police officers providing security for bars and restaurants where 
commercial sex acts occur.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained prosecution efforts. The 2013 Trafficking 
in Persons (Prohibition) Act criminalized sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to eight years’ imprisonment 
for offenses involving adult victims, and up to 12 years’ imprisonment 
for offenses involving child victims. These penalties were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
other serious crimes, such as rape. Additionally, the 2013 Commercial 
Sexual Exploitation of Children (Prohibition) (CSEC) Act criminalized 
various offenses relating to the prostitution of anyone younger 
than 18. 
The government opened five new investigations during the reporting 
period. These included one labor trafficking case of a Belizean girl, 
three sex trafficking cases involving the trafficking of Belizean and 
Guatemalan girls, and one case of sex and labor trafficking of a female 
victim. The government additionally reported one investigation of 
a police officer for potential corruption and complicity in hiding 
evidence of trafficking; the government was still considering whether 
to investigate the case under the Trafficking in Persons Act at the end 
of the reporting period. This is compared to 10 new investigations in 
2019 and three in 2018. The government reported continuing nine 
investigations—three from 2019, four from 2018, and two from 
2017. Authorities initiated one new prosecution of one suspect for 
sex and labor trafficking crimes during the reporting period and 
continued prosecution of two cases involving five defendants initiated 
in previous reporting periods; the government did not initiate any 
prosecutions in the previous reporting period. The government did 
not report convicting any traffickers during the reporting period, 
compared to convicting one trafficker for sex and labor trafficking in 
the previous reporting period. During the current reporting period, 
courts sentenced the convicted trafficker to six years’ imprisonment 
for sex trafficking and six years’ imprisonment for labor trafficking. 
The convicted trafficker escaped prison and was believed to have 
fled to Guatemala.
The Police Anti-Trafficking Unit (A-TIP) was the police’s dedicated 
unit of five officers for conducting trafficking investigations and 
operations. The unit coordinated its trafficking investigations with 
officials from the Department of Immigration; the Ministry of 
Human Development, Families, and Indigenous Affairs and its 
associated departments; the Social Security Board; and the Office of 
the Director of Public Prosecutions. The police unit referred cases 
to an office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for prosecution. 
The law required all officials to report suspected trafficking cases to 
the Police A-TIP Unit for investigation. The Police A-TIP Unit had an 
ongoing partnership with an NGO to provide office space, a dedicated 
vehicle, and ongoing technical investigative assistance in trafficking 
cases. The NGO reported the office space provided a secure, private, 
and nonthreatening location for interviewing trafficking victims and 
witnesses, collecting evidence, and planning operations. However, 
law enforcement authorities lacked equipment and personnel to 
conduct large-scale trafficking investigations effectively. In addition, 
the police force was spread across a large geographical area, leaving 
most stations and substations understaffed and unable to pursue 
trafficking investigations adequately. 
The Police A-TIP Unit conducted two raids during the reporting 
period, one organized by the Immigration Department and one by 
the Labor Department. Bars, discos, and clubs were closed through 
most of the reporting period due to the pandemic, resulting in 
authorities receiving fewer reports of suspected sex trafficking from 
NGOs. Civil society organizations also reported some illegal brothels 
reopened in 2021 but moved out of restaurants and bars and into 
private residences, moving sex trafficking further underground and 
making reporting cases more difficult. 
The judiciary designated one Supreme Court Justice out of five and 
Magistrate judges to specialize in trafficking cases; these judicial 
officials, as well as other justices and judges, received anti-trafficking 
training from a foreign NGO. The courts were closed for most of 2020 
for all activity except murder cases and administrative hearings due 
to the pandemic. The pandemic delayed consideration of cases that 
had been docketed for trial and sentencing of convicted traffickers, 
which resulted in one convict absconding before sentencing. Courts 
remained unable to handle trafficking cases effectively and efficiently 
due to the scarcity of human and fiscal resources; the government 
decreased the 2020-2021 judiciary annual budget by 15 percent. 
Limited intelligence gathering and inconsistent application of formal 
victim identification procedures hampered the identification of 
trafficking crimes. Corruption and official complicity in trafficking 
crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement 
action during the year. During the reporting period, civil society 
organizations reported some police officers took bribes to ignore 
incidents of trafficking, to facilitate illegal border crossings, to not 
report suspected victims and perpetrators, to alert establishments 
where trafficking was likely to occur of pending law enforcement 
action, and to stonewall or sabotage investigations of reported cases 
within their jurisdiction. Observers decried the slow official response 
to reports of potential trafficking and complicity. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained efforts to protect victims. Authorities 
identified 20 potential victims in 2020, compared to 24 potential 
victims in 2019 and 17 potential victims in 2018. The victims included 
two men, three women, three boys, and twelve girls. The government 
did not report how many were victims of sex trafficking and how 
many of labor trafficking. The government referred two victims to 
shelters and reported providing other care to all 20, although it did not 
specify which services the victims received. The government reported 
assisting all the foreign victims with repatriation. The government 
reported the Police A-TIP Unit screened prison inmates during the 
reporting period to identify potential trafficking victims who may have 
been mistakenly penalized due to insufficient screening; authorities 
identified one female who was a potential trafficking victim in the 
prison population. In the previous reporting period, authorities 
identified seven potential trafficking victims who were later found 
not to have been victims of trafficking, one of whom chose to remain 
in Belize and received services during the current reporting period. 
The government reported the Police A-TIP Unit conducted screening 
for trafficking indicators and responded to referrals while adhering 
to the guidelines set out by the National Oversight Committee. The 
government incorporated training on screening procedures into the 
police academy syllabus for the first time during the reporting period. 
The government reported Immigration and Labor Department officials 
trained in victim identification and referral also routinely screened for 
human trafficking during each investigation. The government reported 
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that when Immigration Department officials conducted immigration 
enforcement operations, they coordinated with the Police A-TIP 
Unit, which assisted with screening detainees and identifying victims 
of trafficking. The government reported the Department of Social 
Services officers were available to provide victim services if needed. 
The government reported the Police A-TIP Unit had trained female 
officers to conduct screenings for female victims. The government 
reported screening could occur in Spanish or English. The government 
reported the screening process emphasized that trafficked victims 
could not be penalized for unlawful acts they were compelled to 
commit, including immigration violations. However, due to gaps 
in identification procedures, authorities may have punished mis- or 
unidentified victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them 
to commit, and victims’ fear of detention or deportation may have 
contributed to their reluctance to report trafficking to law enforcement 
officers. Civil society reported that the liquor licensing department 
routinely failed to conduct inspections of bars and restaurants 
where commercial sex was known to be offered, largely to avoid 
investigations into possible human trafficking; these allegations 
became less frequent after the closure of bars, clubs, and discos due 
to the pandemic. The Anti-Trafficking in Persons (A-TIP) Council 
and an NGO continued to review and update standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) for victim identification. The government reported 
law enforcement, immigration, and social services officials used the 
SOPs while conducting interviews and screening potential victims 
for trafficking indicators. The government reported that for foreign 
victims, authorities contacted the relevant embassies for potential 
consular services. Victims identified during the screening process could 
also apply for refugee status. The government reported adapting several 
victim protection procedures due to the pandemic, including social 
distancing, quarantining victims, and providing health screenings. 
Observers reported more consistency in victim identification than 
in previous years but stated gaps still existed, such as authorities 
failing to respond to credible reports of potential trafficking victims 
by NGOs, possibly leading to fewer victim identifications and weak 
victim protection. Media reported Chinese workers at a Chinese 
government-funded construction project may have been victims of 
forced labor. The number of Cuban medical professionals in Belize 
grew to 59 in March 2020 due to the pandemic. The government did 
not report screening the Cuban workers for trafficking indicators.
DHS lacked resources to aid victims as required by the law. While 
the law stipulated the government should provide psychosocial 
counseling, housing, food, education, and refugee and worker status 
to victims and potential victims of trafficking, the government had 
a limited ability to consistently support victims during criminal 
proceedings and reintegration. NGOs often provided the necessary 
services and shared their costs with the government. The government 
reported assigning two Spanish-speaking social workers to all 
trafficking cases to ensure victim safety and support, but that they 
were not sufficient for the number of victims. 
The government coordinated and funded shelter, medical, and 
psychological services to adult victims through the Alternative Care 
Unit and to child victims through the Child Protection System and 
foster care. The government lacked sufficient public shelter space for 
all victims and partnered with domestic violence NGOs to provide 
shelter and services to adult female trafficking victims. During the 
reporting period the Ministry of Human Development, Families, and 
Indigenous Affairs made arrangements with an NGO to shelter male 
victims for the first time; the government did not report any male 
victims using the shelter during the reporting period. Government 
and NGO service providers developed victim care plans with victim 
participation with the goal of encouraging independence, and these 
plans allowed adult victims to stay in shelters or safe houses, and 
placed children in the child protection system or in family care and 
independent living upon reaching adulthood. Per the SOPs, DHS 
procured subsidized services for disabled trafficking victims, including 
sign language interpretation; all social workers were trained in basic 
sign language. DHS reported it improved and adjusted programs 
and care provided to trafficking victims based on victim feedback. 
Government social workers monitored foster care placements for 
child victims and developed individual case plans for each child, 
which included a home study to determine if placement was in 
the best interest of the child. Experts expressed concerns about the 
lack of education on trafficking for some foster parents, uneven 
coordination and communication between government agencies 
and foster parents, and limited availability of psychosocial care in 
general, including for trafficking victims. Child victims could access 
the educational system until age 14. 
The government did not allocate a specific amount within the anti-
trafficking budget for victim services; it reported actual spending 
of 35,000 Belizean dollars ($17,500) during the reporting period, 
compared to 109,000 Belizean dollars ($54,500) in 2019, which 
included food, clothing, medical expenses, counseling, stipends, 
and repatriation expenses, among other services. 
The government reported it did not place conditions or time limits on 
the services provided to victims cooperating with law enforcement or 
prosecutors. The government reported victims could stay in separate 
chambers from their accused traffickers during court proceedings. 
The government allowed victims to provide testimony through video 
but lacked the equipment necessary to do so during the reporting 
period. As an interim measure, victims had the option of testifying 
from behind a screen in the court, protecting the victim’s identity. 
The law also allowed for written statements to be provided as 
evidence in cases where repatriated foreign victims did not wish to 
return. The government reported counseling was available during 
testimony. During the reporting period, the government did not 
report any cases of victims assisting with an active prosecution. The 
government reported it encouraged victims to participate but did not 
compel them; court delays and fear of retaliation by traffickers may 
have led foreign national victims to decline or withdraw cooperation 
with law enforcement and return to their home countries. Even those 
who wished to assist in prosecution were sometimes unavailable to 
do so, having chosen repatriation or onward migration in the years 
between. The government reported it provided foreign victims of 
human trafficking with the same victim services as domestic victims. 
Authorities did not deport foreign victims identified in potential 
trafficking cases, and they could grant temporary residency status and 
work permits regardless of victims’ cooperation with investigations 
or prosecutions. A court could order restitution upon a trafficker’s 
conviction but did not do so in 2020.
The police unit acted as the primary provider for counter-trafficking 
training throughout the country, training prison officials, immigration 
officers, customs agents, and any other officials who might encounter 
potential victims. The police unit conducted training sessions year-
round for immigration officers, customs agents, regular police units 
and the police academy, special branch officers, prison guards and 
officials, and truancy officers on screening procedures to identify 
victims and the requirement of all officials to immediately report 
suspected trafficked cases. Authorities reported some of the training 
during the reporting period moved to virtual platforms due to the 
pandemic, and a few trainings were postponed. The government 
funded these trainings, including transportation, facilitators, and 
venues. In April 2020, the National Organization for the Prevention 
of Child Abuse and Neglect, a government entity, funded training 
for 58 teachers and education officials from eight public and private 
shelters on identifying trafficking victims. In May and June 2020, the 
A-TIP Council and an international organization held a workshop 
with 118 tourism sector workers to create awareness of human 
trafficking, victim identification, and referral procedures. In July 
2020, the government provided support for participants in an NGO-
led and foreign government-funded workshop for 170 members 
of the Belize Defense Force, customs officers, police officers, Coast 
Guard officers, teachers, and staff from the Ministry of Human 





Enabling Environment for Victims of Commercial Sexual Exploitation 
of Children and Human Trafficking and Domestic Violence. 
PREVENTION
The government slightly increased its prevention efforts. The 
government enacted and funded a national action plan for 2021-
2023 in March 2021. The government’s main national coordinating 
body for counter-trafficking efforts in addition to the police unit 
was the A-TIP Council. The Council developed and implemented 
an anti-trafficking policy, including identification and screening of 
potential victims, victim services, investigation supervision, and 
public outreach and awareness campaigns. The head of the Ministry 
of Human Development, Families, and Indigenous Peoples’ Affairs 
was the designated chair of the A-TIP Council. The A-TIP Council was 
composed of representatives of the Ministry of Human Development, 
Families, and Indigenous Peoples’ Affairs; the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Foreign Trade, and Immigration; the Office of the Director of 
Public Prosecution; the Belize Police Department; the Department 
of Labor; the Department of Customs; the Health Department; 
the Belize Tourism Board; the National Committee for Families 
and Children; and two NGOs. The A-TIP Council met quarterly 
during the reporting period and three subcommittees (Operations; 
Information, Education, and Communication; and Monitoring and 
Evaluation) met more regularly. The A-TIP Council chair also served 
simultaneously in several other official positions, including Chair of 
the COVID-19 task force, due to personnel and resource limitations. 
The government allocated 200,000 Belizean dollars ($100,000) for 
anti-trafficking activities during the reporting period, the same as for 
the past three years; the government maintained this level of funding 
in the budget for the next reporting period, despite budgeting less 
for other priorities for the upcoming year. 
During the reporting period, the government implemented its national 
action plan, although the pandemic caused some activities to be 
included in the new 2021-2023 national action plan. Specifically, 
pandemic-related travel restrictions and border closures delayed 
implementation of a foreign university project to conduct a baseline 
study of sex trafficking in the country. The A-TIP Council reported 
it analyzed victim profiles, trafficking routes, and trafficker profiles 
to inform workplans and improve anti-trafficking efforts. The A-TIP 
Council systematically documented the government’s efforts on 
human trafficking in the areas of prevention, prosecution, protection, 
and partnerships and maintained an associated database. The quarterly 
A-TIP Council meetings also monitored efforts to evaluate the 
implementation of the national action plan. During the reporting 
period, the government participated in a regional human trafficking 
study led by CARIFORUM, a subgroup of the African, Caribbean, 
and Pacific Group of States. 
The government reported using social media, press releases, media 
appearances, billboards, and signage to raise awareness of trafficking 
for migrants, other vulnerable groups, and the general public. An 
NGO operated the 24/7 “crime stoppers” hotline; it did not report 
receiving any trafficking-related calls and the police reported no 
investigations resulted from the hotline during the reporting period. 
Printed materials for the awareness campaign included the hotline 
number. The police also could be contacted at the 24/7 national 
emergency number. 
The Department of Labor reported strengthening regulations related to 
labor recruitment and the Ministries of Immigration and Agriculture 
led discussions with employers to implement the new regulations. 
The labor code required labor recruiters to register with the national 
labor recruiter registry, but the government reported that none 
did so during the reporting period. The government reported the 
pandemic precluded many outreach efforts to labor recruiters to 
encourage participation in the registry, but authorities and civil 
society partners conducted outreach in English, Spanish, and Kriol 
to migrant workers to advise these workers of their rights. Authorities 
reported that Belize Trade and Investment Development Services, 
a government entity, also offered sessions on labor rights that 
included information on trafficking and conducted quarterly labor 
rights workshops with entrepreneurs and small businesses with the 
Department of Labor. The regulations required foreign workers to 
obtain a work permit from the Employment Permit Committee 
before they engaged in any form of paid work; this body included 
a social service officer responsible for identifying vulnerable groups 
or individuals. The government did not have defined guidelines for 
foreign worker recruitment, but an international organization assisted 
in developing a migrant worker recruitment policy that remained 
under review at the end of the reporting period. A separate draft 
temporary employment policy excluded foreign workers from certain 
job positions that were especially attractive to traffickers, including 
bar and nightclub waitresses, cooks, common laborers, small business 
clerks and managerial staff, waitresses in other establishments, 
supervisors, security guards, domestic workers, caregivers, and 
construction helpers. Authorities also reported undertaking a review 
of immigration regulations, including guidance for issuing of work 
permits for immigrants. Labor inspectors reported a shortage of 
qualified personnel, vehicles, fuel, and operating funds to conduct 
adequate inspections for labor violations. The government reported 
the 23 labor inspectors who had an annual requirement to inspect 
every business, farm, and industry in the country were insufficient 
to perform thorough inspections. 
In December 2020, the A-TIP Council and an international 
organization supported and conducted training for tourism sector 
officials, including 23 tourism police officers and 11 community 
police and other officers. The government did not make efforts to 
reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The law allowed for 
Belizean citizens to be tried for trafficking and child sex tourism 
crimes committed abroad. In March 2020, the government closed 
the international airport, sealed the land and sea borders, and 
denied entry to cruise ships, though the airport reopened in October 
2020. The government reported no cases of child sex tourism inside 
the country or involving Belizeans elsewhere, possibly due to the 
low number of tourists because of the pandemic. The government 
reported sponsoring billboards to combat child sex tourism at the 
international airport and at border crossing points. The government 
did not train diplomats on trafficking during the reporting period. 
The government participated in a multicountry program to identify 
and deny tourist entry to registered sex offenders. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Belize, and traffickers exploit victims from Belize 
abroad. Groups considered most at risk for trafficking in Belize include 
adults, children, LGBTQI+ persons, migrants, and groups that faced 
greater vulnerability due to pandemic-related unemployment. Sex 
traffickers exploit Belizean and foreign adults and girls and LGBTQI+ 
persons, primarily from Central America, in bars, nightclubs, hotels, 
and brothels. Due to the pandemic, sex trafficking during the reporting 
period moved more frequently to more tightly controlled illegal 
brothels rather than bars and clubs. Tourism-related industries lure 
laborers through the offer of legitimate service jobs and exploit them 
in sex trafficking. These illicit operations are typically small in scale 
and unconnected to organized transnational trafficking rings. Family 
members facilitate the sex trafficking of Belizean women and girls, 
including through an arrangement where a wealthy male will offer 
payment or gifts to a family in exchange for sex from a young, usually 
female, family member. Foreign adults and children—particularly 
from Central America, Mexico, and Asia—migrate voluntarily to 
Belize in search of work, and traffickers often exploit victims using 
false promises of relatively high-paying jobs or take advantage of 
migrants’ illegal status and exploit them in forced labor in restaurants, 
shops, domestic work, and agriculture. The law did not provide 
refugees and irregular migrants with work permits, placing them at 
constant threat of deportation that could increase their vulnerability 
to trafficking. Labor trafficking likely decreased in 2020 as a result 
of pandemic-related border closures. Chinese and Indian nationals 
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may be exploited in Belize in domestic service. Chinese workers in 
Belize may have been forced to work in construction by Chinese 
employers. Cuban workers in Belize may have been forced to work by 
the Cuban government. In tourist regions, foreign child sex tourists, 
primarily from the United States, exploit child sex trafficking victims. 
NGOs reported police and immigration officers took bribes in return 
for ignoring trafficking, facilitating illegal entries, failing to report 
suspected victims and perpetrators, and failing to act on reported 
cases under their jurisdiction. 
BENIN: TIER 2
The Government of Benin does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to 
do so. Despite the documented impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 
on the government’s anti-trafficking capacity, the government 
demonstrated overall increasing efforts compared to the previous 
reporting period; therefore Benin remained on Tier 2. These efforts 
included prosecuting more suspected traffickers, identifying more 
potential child trafficking victims, and expanding proactive child 
victim identification and labor inspections at markets. The government 
also increased training for judicial officials and coordinated with the 
Governments of the Republic of the Congo and the United States 
on trafficking investigations. The government’s child protection 
hotline—launched in the prior reporting period—reported more than 
500 actionable tips related to child trafficking or abuse. However, 
the government did not meet the minimum standards in several key 
areas. Authorities investigated fewer trafficking cases, did not report 
clear statistics on convictions, and failed to sanction perpetrators 
with sentences corresponding to the designated penalties under 
the country’s penal code. Additionally, officials reported identifying 
fewer adult victims and did not report initiating law enforcement 
action targeting the trafficking of adults. 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Expand training for law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, and judicial 
staff on the 2018 penal code articles 499-504 to increase their ability 
to investigate, prosecute, and convict perpetrators of sex and labor 
trafficking of adults and children, including fraudulent labor recruiters. 
• Sanction convicted traffickers with sentences in accordance with 
penal code articles 499-504 or the 2006 child trafficking law, while 
respecting due process and the rights of the accused. • Develop and 
disseminate systematic procedures for proactive identification of adult 
victims and their subsequent referral to care. • Collaborate with NGOs 
and international organizations to increase the government’s capacity 
to provide shelter and services to more trafficking victims, including 
adults. • Expand implementation of the 2011 bilateral anti-trafficking 
agreement with the Republic of the Congo as well as the multilateral 
agreement with Burkina Faso and Togo to increase law enforcement 
coordination and investigate, prosecute, and convict perpetrators 
of transnational trafficking cases, while respecting due process. • 
Finalize the multilateral agreement with Togo and Nigeria to increase 
information-sharing and cooperation on transnational investigations. 
• Develop an information management system for the Ministries of 
Justice, Interior, Labor, and other relevant government agencies—in 
coordination with international organizations—to improve access 
and utilization of law enforcement and judicial statistics. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained its overall law enforcement efforts, 
although judges continued to sentence traffickers to penalties less 
stringent than designated by Benin’s penal code. Existing laws 
criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking. Articles 499-504 of 
the Penal Code criminalized all forms of labor trafficking and some 
forms of sex trafficking and prescribed penalties of 10 to 20 years 
imprisonment; these penalties were sufficiently stringent, and with 
respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with other grave crimes, such 
as rape. The 2006 Act Relating to the Transportation of Minors and 
the Suppression of Child Trafficking (Act 2006-04) criminalized all 
forms of child sex trafficking as well as labor trafficking and prescribed 
penalties of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment. These penalties were 
sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate 
with those for other serious crimes, such as rape. 
The government shared preliminary statistics indicating officials 
investigated at least 49 cases of sex and labor trafficking of children 
in 2020, compared with 117 cases involving 117 suspects in 2019. 
Authorities reported prosecuting 72 cases under child trafficking 
and illegal transport of minors laws and 323 other cases that may 
have contained exploitative aspects under related statutes (240 
cases of abduction of minors and 83 cases of illegal confinement 
of minors) during the reporting period. In 2019, officials reported 
prosecuting 42 cases of child trafficking and one case of adult 
trafficking. The government reported authorities referred 86 suspected 
child traffickers to the Court of Cotonou under a variety of laws 
during the reporting period, although officials did not disclose the 
outcomes of the cases. In 2019, judicial officials reported convicting 
140 traffickers under a variety of laws. Courts reportedly sentenced 
the majority of the traffickers to prison terms substantially shorter 
than the 10-20 years’ imprisonment required by Benin’s Penal Code 
for trafficking; some judicial officials asserted that more stringent 
prison terms may exacerbate the vulnerability of some child victims 
when the perpetrators are relatives. The majority of arrests occurred 
along Benin’s southern corridor in the cities of Abomey-Calavi, Port 
Novo, and Cotonou. The government did not report initiating law 
enforcement action targeting the trafficking of adults. 
The Ministry of Justice noted the lack of an effective data collection 
system resulted in the need for officials to contact individual courts to 
obtain case details. Apart from the Central Office for the Protection of 
Minors, Families, and the Prevention of Human Trafficking (French 
acronym OCPM), many police stations lacked the computers and 
reliable electricity necessary to maintain electronic databases on 
human trafficking; judicial personnel and most courts continue to 
record cases on paper, creating challenges in compiling and sharing 
law enforcement statistics. 
Authorities did not take action against informal employment agents 
who facilitated trafficking, and some illicit recruiters continued to lure 
Beninese victims abroad with fraudulent employment promises during 
the reporting period. The government did not report prosecuting 
or convicting government officials complicit in human trafficking 
offenses, although some civil servants may have exploited children 
through the traditional practice of vidomegon. Additionally, there were 
specific allegations of customs official facilitated human trafficking 
during the reporting period; according to observers, the official 
continued in their role and the government’s investigation was 
ongoing at the end of the reporting period. 
In 2020, the Ministry of Justice trained 75 magistrates on human rights 
and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime, including the UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol (Palermo 
Protocol). Additionally, the government partnered with international 
organizations to train an unknown number of judges, prosecutors, 
social workers, and police on standard operating procedures for 
adjudicating human trafficking cases as well as how to provide trauma-
informed care to victims. During the previous reporting period, the 





on combatting human trafficking 70 police officers, prosecutors, 
and juvenile court judges in key trafficking cities of Parakou, Dassa, 
and Bohicon.
During the reporting period, Beninese honorary consuls in Brazzaville 
and Pointe Noire in the Republic of the Congo assisted with a 
trafficking investigation into a cross-border case of domestic servitude 
in Brazzaville involving eight Beninese children. The Congolese 
judiciary convicted four of the traffickers during the reporting period 
and sentenced them to 10 years imprisonment each. Additionally, 
the Ministry of Interior provided documentation integral to a 
trafficking investigation involving Beninese children in the United 
States, resulting in the indictment of three suspects in August. The 
government did not finalize its trilateral cooperation agreement 
with Togo and Nigeria to increase law enforcement coordination on 
transnational trafficking cases during the reporting period. 
PROTECTION
The government increased overall efforts to identify and protect 
child trafficking victims, although its efforts to identify adult victims 
remained inadequate. In 2020, OCPM officials reported identifying 
and providing services to 363 potential victims, compared with 
identifying 309 potential victims in 2019. OCPM officers continued 
to patrol borders, bus stations, and large markets to proactively 
detect child trafficking victims, identifying and referring an unknown 
number of potential victims to temporary shelter and services in 2020, 
compared with identifying and referring 1,387 potential victims to 
care in 2019. The government reported NGOs identified 539 child 
trafficking victims (271 girls and 268 boys) and 63 adult victims 
(59 women and four men) and referred them to government social 
services in 2020; officials did not disclose similar statistics in 2019. 
The Ministry of Labor and Civil Service General Directorate of 
Labor reported conducting 2,070 inspections in 2020 at the primary 
markets in Dantokpa (Cotonou), Ouando (Porto-Novo), and Arzeke 
(Parakou), as well as in workshops, bars, restaurants, and other areas 
with high risks of child exploitation. An international organization 
reported the government identified 2,643 at-risk children through 
these inspections, and the Ministry of Labor stated it identified 
1,273 violations related to child labor during the reporting period. 
In 2019, authorities conducted 746 inspections and identified 
approximately 1,040 vulnerable children. Without providing statistics, 
the government reported law enforcement officers identified victims 
of sexual exploitation among commercial sex workers through 
undercover operations during the reporting period. The Ministry of 
Health’s standard operating procedures for providing health services 
to individuals in commercial sex included a presumption that any 
minor involved in commercial sex was a sex trafficking victim. The 
government has not developed a corresponding directive or procedure 
for the identification of adult trafficking victims. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Microfinance, OCPM, Ministry 
of Justice, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and various international 
donors and NGOs coordinated during the reporting period to 
identify, assist, repatriate, and reintegrate child trafficking victims. 
The process involved OCPM taking initial custody of victims in 
Benin and providing them temporary shelter in its Cotonou facility 
with a capacity of 160 (80 boys and 80 girls). Following an OCPM 
interview and assessment, officials referred victims to a network of 
NGO shelters. OCPM officers then referred cases to court when there 
was sufficient evidence following investigations. Ministry of Social 
Affairs and Microfinance representatives coordinated with NGOs 
and civil society to reunite children with their families. Observers 
described the government’s referral process as adequate; however, 
they noted limited shelter capacity hindered the country’s service 
provision and access to justice for some victims. The OCPM shelter 
offered child victims legal, medical, and psychological assistance and 
served as a transit facility for potential child trafficking victims while 
officials worked to place the children in long-term NGO shelters. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Microfinance’s network of Social 
Promotion Centers (Centres de Promotion Sociale) continued to 
provide basic services for adult and child trafficking victims in all of 
Benin's 77 communes, with additional Social Promotion Centers in 
more populated communes such as Parakou, Cotonou, and Porto 
Novo. Each commune had a service center staffed with a local 
representative and a social protection committee that could refer 
child trafficking victims to NGO housing or foster families with the 
approval of a juvenile court judge. 
The Ministry of Social Affairs and Microfinance continued to assist 
foreign trafficking victims, predominantly children, before repatriating 
them to their home countries. The government repatriated 155 
children (63 girls and 92 boys from Nigeria and the Republic of the 
Congo, as well as other countries) and two adult victims (women) 
of trafficking in 2020, compared with 50 victims in 2019. Separately, 
the Beninese honorary consuls in Brazzaville and Pointe Noire in the 
Republic of the Congo facilitated the repatriation of eight Beninese 
child victims of domestic servitude from Brazzaville.
An official reported the government increased OCPM funding for 
the third consecutive year despite the country’s resource constraints. 
Beninese law did not provide legal alternatives to the removal of 
trafficking victims to countries in which victims would face retribution 
or hardship, although cases involving foreign child trafficking victims 
were considered for immigration relief on an ad hoc basis. While 
there were no reports the government penalized victims for crimes 
their traffickers compelled them to commit, some adult victims may 
have remained unidentified in the law enforcement system due to 
authorities’ limited awareness of adult trafficking.
PREVENTION
The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking in persons and 
periodically convened its inter-ministerial committee (IMC) during 
the reporting period. The IMC—chaired by the Chief of Staff of the 
Minister of Planning and Development—was composed of directors 
of offices from across the government as well as partners from key 
NGOs and international organizations. The government reported 
it continued to implement the country’s 2020-2024 anti-trafficking 
national action plan, although it did not fund the plan fully due to 
broad resource constraints exacerbated by the pandemic.
To reduce the demand for commercial sex, the Republican Police, in 
conjunction with the General Directorate of Labor, held awareness 
sessions on the risks of the practice with owners of bars, hotels, and 
restaurants in 2020 in the communes of Malanville, Parakou, Bohicon, 
and Cotonou. In January 2021, the police’s vice squad disseminated 
letters to landowners with suspected brothels on their property, 
notifying them that operating brothels is illegal and emphasizing 
that child sex trafficking is a criminal offense under Benin’s laws. 
The Ministry of Labor did not conduct inspections in some sectors 
known to employ forced child labor, such as quarries and agriculture.
The government continued its Administrative Census for the 
Identification of the Population during the reporting period, resulting 
in officials retroactively registering the births of more than one million 
children since 2019 in a country with a population of approximately 
12.3 million. In 2020, the government registered 1,679 births via SMS 
through an initiative developed in partnership with an international 
organization in 2018. A lack of identity documentation contributed 
to increased vulnerability to trafficking in Benin. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs used a code of conduct for diplomats that prohibited 
Beninese nationals deployed abroad from engaging in or facilitating 
trafficking in persons; however, it did not report providing training 
on the subject to officials. 
The OCPM maintained its database—“Enfants du Benin”—to organize 
information related to child trafficking cases. In 2020, the National 
Institute of Statistics and Economic Analysis and the Ministry of 
Justice compiled incomplete nationwide prosecution statistics. The 
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Family and Child Monitoring Office at the Ministry of Social Affairs 
and Microfinance also maintained a database on child trafficking 
statistics – Child Pro. 
In coordination with an international organization, the Ministry of 
Social Affairs launched a child protection hotline in March 2020, 
which received 546 actionable tips regarding child abuse—including 
exploitation—as of March 2021. The government ensured the hotline 
remained operational 24 hours a day throughout the reporting period 
despite the pandemic and staffed it with French and local language 
speakers. The hotline is available domestically and internationally. 
The government did not provide anti-trafficking training to its troops 
prior to their deployment as peacekeepers.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Benin, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Benin abroad. Trafficking in the country is predominantly internal 
and involves Beninese children from low-income families exploited 
in forced labor or sex trafficking. Vulnerable populations most at 
risk of trafficking frequently lack formal education or basic identity 
documents, including birth certificates and national identification; 
officials reported parent illiteracy and single-parent households also 
increase children’s risk of exploitation. Some community members 
and relatives use the promise of education or employment to recruit 
Beninese children from northern rural areas to the more urban 
southern corridor and exploit them in forced labor in domestic 
servitude, markets, farming, as “apprentices” engaged in various 
trades, and in handicraft manufacturing. Beninese traffickers include 
farmers, traders, artisans, small factory owners, and civil servants; 
some belong to criminal networks and others may have been former 
trafficking victims. 
Authorities stated COVID-19-related border closures as well as 
cancelled flights likely decreased cross-border exploitation but may 
have complicated victim repatriation efforts. Poverty resulting from 
the pandemic’s economic impacts and school closures to prevent 
the disease’s spread increased the population’s risk of exploitation, 
according to officials. Further, experts state migrant workers are 
especially vulnerable to COVID-19-related shocks due to their 
propensity for employment in markets, restaurants, hotels, retail, 
wholesale trade, tourism, and transportation sectors, which are 
industries disproportionately impacted by the pandemic.
The government reported traffickers exploit children living in the 
lakeside areas of Benin—including the commune of So Ava in 
southeast Benin—into debt bondage. Criminal elements operate 
in urban areas under the guise of informal employment agents and 
recruit children for domestic work in private residences, where house 
managers and families exploit them in domestic servitude. Some 
parents follow a traditional practice known as vidomegon, which 
involves sending children to wealthier families for educational or 
vocational opportunities; some of these more affluent families then 
subject the children to forced labor in various sectors, including in 
domestic service and open-air markets. The government reported 
criminals exploit girls in sex trafficking in Cotonou and Malanville. 
Officials reported traffickers exploit boys, girls, and women from 
Djougou and Bassila in the northwest of the country; Parakou in 
the northeast; Zakpota, Djida, and Agbaizoun in the central region; 
in the Adja region and in Lobogo in the southwest; and Pobe and 
Sakete in the southeast; traffickers exploit these groups in labor and 
sex trafficking.
Cross-border criminal groups subject Beninese children to domestic 
servitude and other forms of forced labor in Nigeria, Gabon, the 
Republic of the Congo, and other West and Central African countries. 
Benin has been the largest source country for trafficking victims in the 
Republic of the Congo, with the department of Oueme in southeast 
Benin historically an area traffickers used to recruit child victims. 
Child, early, and forced marriage remains a nationwide problem, with 
some families forcing girls into marriages as a result of generational 
poverty; husbands and their families may then subject these girls to 
sexual slavery or domestic servitude.
Reports indicate criminal groups fraudulently recruit young Beninese 
women for domestic work in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, 
and Algeria and subsequently exploit them in forced labor or sex 
trafficking; however, travel restrictions related to the pandemic 
likely decreased this phenomenon during the reporting period. 
Traffickers and their accomplices continue to send child victims to 
their destinations alone and then meet the victims upon arrival, 
increasing the challenges for law enforcement to investigate these 
crimes. International organizations report some adult labor migrants 
use airports primarily in Togo—but also in neighboring countries 
Burkina Faso and Nigeria—to circumvent anti-trafficking screening 
procedures put in place by the government at Cotonou’s international 
airport, increasing the migrants’ vulnerability to human trafficking. 
Experts highlighted the commune of Djougou in northwestern Benin 
as an area of origin for women whom traffickers subject to forced 
labor and potentially sexual exploitation in Persian Gulf countries, 
Lebanon, and the Maghreb.
BHUTAN: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Royal Government of Bhutan does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included amending Section 154 of 
the penal code to further align the definition of trafficking with the 
definition under international law, finalizing a national prevention 
strategy (NPS) on trafficking, expanding funding to NGOs for shelter 
services, and funding the repatriation and support services for 160 
Bhutanese women who were victims of trafficking in the Gulf. In 
addition, the government continued to work with an international 
organization on anti-trafficking trainings and public awareness events. 
However, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, even considering 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity. 
Bhutan’s trafficking laws do not criminalize all forms of child sex 
trafficking. Officials did not initiate any new trafficking cases, convict 
any traffickers, or identify any new trafficking victims during the 
reporting period. Therefore Bhutan remained on Tier 2 Watch List 
for the second consecutive year. 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Amend anti-trafficking laws to ensure that a demonstration of 
force, fraud, or coercion is not required to constitute a child sex 
trafficking offense, consistent with international law. • Vigorously 
investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers with significant terms of 
imprisonment. • Increase proactive trafficking victim identification, 
including by training officials on, and implementing, existing standard 
operating procedures (SOPs). • Draft and finalize a national action 
plan to combat trafficking. Disseminate information and train officials 
on the amended Penal Code Section 154 and the implementation of 
anti-trafficking laws. • Train and instruct labor inspectors to screen 
cases of labor violations for indicators of forced labor, including 
nonpayment of wages, and refer to police for criminal investigation. 
• Finalize and implement guidelines to oversee drayangs, including 





all recruitment fees charged to workers by recruitment agents, and 
investigate claims of nonpayment of wages, contract switching, 
and illegal fees charged by agents. • Increase awareness of human 
trafficking, including forced labor of Bhutanese students abroad. • 
Accede to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol.
PROSECUTION
The government increased anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. 
The law criminalized all forms of labor trafficking and some forms 
of sex trafficking. During the reporting period, the government 
amended Section 154 of the penal code, which criminalized 
“trafficking in persons,” to further align the definition of trafficking 
with the definition under international law. Specifically, the amended 
legislation defined trafficking as incorporating any form of exploitation 
and removed a previous provision that required prosecutors to prove 
that trafficking was conducted for an “illegal purpose.” Under the 
current provision, all forms of adult sex trafficking, adult labor 
trafficking, and child labor trafficking are criminalized. However, the 
law defined trafficking to require a demonstration of force, fraud, 
or coercion, which is inconsistent with international law for child 
sex trafficking, thereby failing to criminalize all forms of child sex 
trafficking. Similarly, Section 224 of The Child Care and Protection 
Act (CCPA) criminalized child trafficking but, inconsistent with 
international law, also required a demonstration of force, fraud, or 
coercion to constitute a child sex trafficking offense and therefore did 
not criminalize all forms of child sex trafficking. Section 379 of the 
penal code defined “trafficking a person for prostitution” as selling, 
buying, or transporting a person into or outside of Bhutan for the 
purposes of prostitution. Section 154 of the Penal Code prescribed 
punishment ranging from three to five years’ imprisonment; Section 
379 from five years’ to life imprisonment; and Section 224 of the 
CCPA from five to nine years. These punishments were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as abduction. 
The government did not initiate any new investigations but did 
reinvestigate one case and made new arrests in existing cases during 
the reporting period, compared with two investigations in the previous 
reporting period. In 2020, the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) 
prosecuted three suspects for labor trafficking of three Bhutanese 
women in a case stemming from 2018 and continued two previous 
prosecution cases, compared with three prosecutions the previous 
year. Authorities arrested 12 individuals in ongoing forced labor cases 
during the reporting period, including nine in relation to a 2019 case 
in which 160 Bhutanese women were exploited for domestic service 
in Iraq, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Investigation 
of the employment agencies involved in the case remained ongoing. 
Three additional individuals were charged in a 2018 case of three 
Bhutanese women rescued in India who were en route to Iraq, 
where investigators believed they would be forced into domestic 
service. In 2019, Bhutanese law enforcement arrested two suspects 
in this case. A Bhutanese request for the extradition from India of 
a third alleged Bhutanese trafficker was unsuccessful. In 2020, the 
government reinvestigated the case, which led to the arrests. At the 
end of the reporting period, the trial remained ongoing. An ongoing 
OAG appeal of the dismissal of trafficking charges in a 2018 case, in 
which a suspect was charged with child trafficking for forced domestic 
labor of an 8-year-old girl, sought to reimpose trafficking charges 
on the defendant. Despite indicators of trafficking, including severe 
physical abuse that required hospitalization and amputations, in 2018 
the court dropped the trafficking charges, convicted the employer 
for illegal transportation of a child, and penalized her with a 9,900 
Bhutanese ngultrum (Nu) ($136) fine and 180,000 Nu ($2,470) in 
victim compensation. The OAG appeal was ongoing at the end of 
the reporting period. The government did not convict any traffickers 
during the reporting period.
In mid-2018, several hundred Bhutanese participants in a government-
approved work-study program in Japan reported indicators of forced 
labor. The government dismissed the allegations for nearly one year, 
but after a lawyer representing a group of students filed a criminal 
complaint against the recruitment agency, the government investigated 
the case. The lawyer alleged forgery, deceptive practices, harassment, 
abandonment of a person in danger, and human trafficking. The OAG 
reportedly could not bring trafficking charges due to lack of evidence 
of human trafficking as defined by Bhutanese law but charged the 
agency with 2,887 counts of forgery and 730 counts of larceny by 
deception. The government also charged the Director-General of 
the Ministry of Labor and Human Resources with four criminal 
offenses, including illegal issuance of a certificate of registration to 
an employment agency without required documentation. For the 
second year, the prosecution of both cases was ongoing at the close 
of the reporting period.
Some officials continued to lack an understanding of human 
trafficking, especially internal and transnational forced labor, although 
recent high-profile cases have helped increased awareness. Limited 
police resources often hindered thorough investigations, and a lack of 
training for law enforcement on victim-centered questioning impeded 
formation of strong cases. In some cases, persistent individual officers 
accounted for successful anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. In 
partnership with an international organization, the Department of Law 
and Order (DLO) continued to support anti-trafficking trainings for 
law enforcement and prosecutors. The lack of diplomatic relationships 
or mutual law enforcement agreements with destination countries 
hindered Royal Bhutan Police (RBP) efforts to investigate some 
potential trafficking cases. 
PROTECTION
The government demonstrated mixed protection efforts; the 
government did not identify any victims during the reporting period 
but did expand funding to NGOs for shelter services and repatriated 
and provided short-term services to 160 women identified by an 
international organization as victims of domestic servitude in Iraq, 
Oman, and the UAE in the previous reporting period. The government 
did not identify any trafficking victims during the reporting period. 
During the previous reporting period, the government—with help 
from an international organization—identified 160 women as 
victims of domestic servitude in Iraq, Oman, and the UAE. The 
government had SOPs on trafficking victim identification and referral. 
In partnership with an international organization, the government 
conducted five trainings for officials on the SOPs, including three 
that were conducted online due to pandemic-related restrictions. 
The government also finalized a training manual on trafficking for 
the judiciary and held a two-day training for judges in March 2021. 
RBP maintained Women and Child Protection Units at three police 
stations, which consisted of a female police officer assigned to crimes 
against women and children. Ten women and child desks at other 
police stations had a police officer assigned to these crimes. RBP 
reportedly screened for trafficking, including at worksites, businesses, 
and border areas, but did not identify any trafficking victims. Due to 
the pandemic, the entertainment sector, including drayangs (karaoke 
bars), were closed during the reporting period. 
When it identified trafficking victims, RBP and other agencies could 
refer them to the National Commission for Women and Children 
(NCWC) or an NGO for care. NCWC and NGOs could refer female 
and child victims to two NGO-run facilities that provided counseling, 
medical services, and long-term shelter to women and child victims 
of crime. The government funded a full-time nurse, security guards, 
and some operating costs. No shelter could accommodate male 
trafficking victims. During the reporting period, one child trafficking 
victim identified in 2018 remained at a shelter. Starting at the end 
of the previous reporting period and continuing throughout the 
current reporting period, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs assisted an 
international organization and coordinated with the Iraqi government 
in screening the 160 Bhutanese women identified in domestic 
servitude in Iraq, Oman, and UAE for trafficking indicators in the 
previous reporting period. The government funded the repatriation of 
all the women, including in some cases paying fees to break contracts 
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in Iraq. During the required 21-day pandemic quarantine period 
upon return to Bhutan, the government provided the women with 
medical care, counseling, assistance in reuniting with their families, 
and temporary financial support. NCWC developed a reintegration 
program for each of the women and continued to provide support 
once they returned home. This included providing livelihood skills 
training for 63 of the women. Shelter services in Thimphu were 
provided to 21 women.
There were no shelters for crime victims outside of the capital area. In 
2020, the government expanded funding to include a second shelter in 
the capital and allocated an additional 100,000 Nu ($1,370) to NGOs 
providing shelter services. One shelter had case management officers 
in five districts and the other had the ability to assign counselors to 
visit crime victims outside the capital on an ad hoc basis. Ministries 
did not have dedicated budgets to support trafficking victims, which 
created gaps in services in some reported cases. NCWC maintained 
a budget to assist women in difficult circumstances, which was 
available to support female and child trafficking victims. NCWC 
could also provide case management assistance and legal aid. The 
pandemic-related government lockdown and movement restrictions 
hampered NCWC and NGO efforts to provide some services. NCWC 
and NGOs provided counseling and psychological support services 
virtually as well as in-person services.
During the previous reporting period, some Bhutanese students 
who went to Japan through a placement program contracted serious 
illnesses due to the squalid living conditions, resulting in several 
deaths. At the close of the reporting period, the Bhutanese government 
had repatriated most of the participants. The government did not 
report on the status of any students remaining in Japan or on 
assistance to these potential victims but maintained its intent to 
repatriate any additional participants wishing to return to Bhutan. The 
immigration department mandated that authorities report suspected 
foreign trafficking victims identified within Bhutan to NCWC before 
initiating deportation for immigration violations. Bhutanese law 
did not provide legal alternatives to removal of trafficking victims 
to countries in which victims would face retribution or hardship. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent human trafficking. 
DLO led the government’s anti-trafficking task force, composed of 
government and civil society; however, during the reporting period, 
task force meetings were suspended due to a need to shift focus and 
resources to the COVID-19 mitigation task force. In partnership 
with an international organization, DLO finalized its national 
prevention strategy (NPS) in collaboration with civil society and 
other relevant stakeholders; at the close of the reporting period, 
it was awaiting full government endorsement. The NPS was based 
on an assessment conducted in the previous reporting period with 
the assistance of an international organization and a parliamentary 
study on national trafficking trends and will serve as the foundation 
of the future national action plan. During the reporting period, the 
government delayed meetings to begin drafting the national action 
plan because of the pandemic. Insufficient application of SOPs, and 
a lack of a dedicated anti-trafficking budget continued to hamper 
DLO’s implementation of its anti-trafficking mandate. In partnership 
with an international organization, DLO continued to support public 
awareness events on human trafficking for groups including students, 
airport officials, local government officials, and the general public. 
All entertainment venues, including drayangs, were closed in March 
2020 due to the pandemic and had not reopened at the end of the 
reporting period. In the past, the government and media reported 
cases of children working in drayangs, a violation of the minimum age 
requirement of 18. The Ministry of Economic Affairs continued for a 
second year to work on new guidelines to review and oversee drayangs, 
including mandating investigations into potentially exploitative 
working conditions. The Ministry of Labor and Human Resources 
(MOLHR) registered foreign migrant workers in Bhutan, monitored 
working conditions, and produced and disseminated pamphlets 
advising workers of their rights. The Department of Labor (DOL), 
within MOLHR, had a total of 35 labor inspectors, but inspectors 
lacked adequate anti-trafficking training. The July 2018-June 2019 
DOL annual report documented 147 complaints of nonpayment of 
wages, compared to 211 in the previous reporting period; the 2019-
2020 report had yet to be published by the end of the reporting 
period. As in the previous reporting period, the government did 
not report the disposition of these complaints, including whether it 
levied civil or criminal penalties. DOL generally mediated claims of 
nonpayment of wages, and it did not report violators to police for 
criminal investigation of potential forced labor offenses or penalize 
employers if they paid the outstanding wages. MOLHR did not have 
the ability to inspect private homes for labor violations and relied 
on the RBP to report or potential victims to self-identify.
Government regulations on overseas employment allowed most agents 
to charge Bhutanese migrant workers a recruitment fee of one month’s 
salary along with a limited number of recruitment expenses, except 
for costs associated with a visa or work permit. Recruitment fees are 
not charged to Bhutanese workers who travel overseas through direct 
placement programs or by Bhutanese companies who bring foreign 
workers to Bhutan. Foreign workers are required to pay fees for a work 
permit and medical check-up, which amounts to about 20 percent of 
one month’s wages. MOLHR requires all Bhutanese traveling overseas 
for employment to participate in a predeparture orientation on human 
trafficking and the risks of overseas employment. Individual police 
officers continued to educate migrant workers about trafficking when 
they applied for the mandatory police clearance. MOLHR continued 
to monitor recruitment agencies that assisted Bhutanese citizens older 
than age 21 seeking work overseas. During the reporting period, it 
continued to monitor five licensed agencies and one agency it had 
suspended in the previous reporting period. During the previous 
reporting period, the government suspended registration of all new 
labor recruitment agencies and agents; the government did not 
report if it had reinstated new registrations. MOLHR posted online 
announcements to warn potential migrant workers of false advertising 
and to encourage applicants to verify overseas job advertisements 
with the ministry. The government did not make efforts to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex acts. The government did not provide 
anti-trafficking training for its diplomatic personnel. Bhutan is not 
a party to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
victims in Bhutan, Bhutanese abroad, and foreigners in Bhutan. 
Unregistered and unscrupulous foreign employment recruitment 
agencies and sub-agents increasingly operate through social media. 
Some traffickers posing as recruiters offer ostensibly well-paying 
jobs overseas but exploit Bhutanese in forced labor. Some agencies 
have subjected Bhutanese students in work-study programs in Japan 
and Malaysia with indicators of forced labor, including fraudulent 
contracts, nonpayment of wages, and passport retention. Bhutanese 
citizens continued to work in the hospitality, retail, and service sectors 
in the Gulf, including in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and UAE, and in 
India, Thailand, and the United Kingdom through global training 
and placement academies. Some participants reported indicators of 
trafficking, including illegal recruitment fees and wage deductions, 
restricted movement, passport retention, and nonpayment of wages. 
Media outlets reported traffickers have exploited Bhutanese women in 
sex trafficking in India. In recent years, traffickers sent approximately 
160 Bhutanese women to Iraq for forced labor in domestic work. 
Traffickers have exploited Bhutanese women and girls in sex and 
labor trafficking, including in forced domestic labor and caregiving, 
through debt bondage and threats of physical abuse. Bhutanese 
women and girls who work as entertainers in drayangs are vulnerable 
to labor and sex traffickers. Drayang workers often come from rural 
areas and sign contracts they later cannot access that can give more 





female drayang entertainers reportedly work in commercial sex 
after the drayangs close, some of which traffickers might facilitate. 
Relatives transport rural Bhutanese to urban areas for employment 
in domestic work, which at times may involve forced labor. Media 
outlets have reported instances of child labor within Bhutan’s 
restaurant and automobile workshop industries, some of which 
had indicators of forced labor. Prior to the pandemic, the expanding 
construction sector increased the demand for low-skilled foreign 
labor. Male Indian migrant workers—including in the construction 
and hydropower sectors—often receive advances before beginning 
work in Bhutan. Some workers subsequently report unauthorized 
deductions and nonpayment of wages. Traffickers have exploited 
Indian child domestic workers in Bhutan. Media outlets and NGOs 
report an increase in commercial sex by Bhutanese and Indian 
women in the Bhutanese-Indian border’s growing hospitality and 
entertainment districts—including hotels, massage parlors, and 
nightclubs—some of which might be forced. Bhutan’s small stateless 
persons population’s lack of access to documentation necessary to 
attend school rendered stateless children vulnerable to traffickers. 
BOLIVIA: TIER 2
The Government of Bolivia does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Bolivia remained on Tier 2. These efforts included sentencing 
two complicit officials to seven years’ imprisonment for their active 
role in a trafficking case initiated in 2016, prosecuting more traffickers, 
establishing specialized prosecutor offices in all nine departments, and 
working with international and civil society organizations to conduct 
anti-trafficking prevention campaigns. However, the government 
did not meet minimum standards in several key areas. Authorities 
reported a decrease in the number of investigations, convictions, and 
victims identified; it did not report the number of victims referred 
to services. In addition, the Ministry of Labor (MOL) reduced the 
number of labor inspectors and did not conduct any investigations 
into cases of forced labor. 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, including perpetrators 
of labor trafficking. • Identify victims of trafficking, including victims 
of forced labor and criminality, and refer them to services. • Fund 
and collaborate with civil society organizations to provide specialized 
services for trafficking victims and increase the availability of services 
nationwide. • Expand training of officials on the use of established 
protocols for the proactive identification of trafficking victims among 
vulnerable populations and for the referral of victims to care services. 
• Finalize, approve, and fund the 2021-2025 National Action Plan. 
• Increase the number of specialized labor inspectors and train all 
labor inspectors on victim identification and criminal referral of 
forced labor cases. • Develop and implement a centralized data 
collection system on trafficking to reconcile duplicative data stored 
across different systems. • Screen displaced Venezuelan migrants for 
trafficking indicators, including individuals in commercial sex and 
those working in high-risk sectors. • Amend the anti-trafficking law to 
ensure that a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion is not required 
to constitute a child sex trafficking offense. • Direct Ministry of Health 
staff to screen vulnerable populations for trafficking indicators when 
conducting medical screenings. • Provide interpreters to assist law 
enforcement officials investigating child sex tourism cases in popular 
tourist locations. • Increase the time law enforcement officials serve in 
anti-trafficking units to preserve institutional knowledge. • Expedite 
the issuance of humanitarian visas for victims of trafficking. • Increase 
awareness of “Triple Seal” certification among businesses to reduce the 
demand for forced labor. • Train officials on the difference between 
human smuggling and human trafficking. • Apply the anti-trafficking 
law apolitically and non-discriminatorily. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Law 263 of 
2012—the Comprehensive Law against Trafficking and Smuggling 
of Persons—criminalized labor trafficking and some forms of sex 
trafficking through amendments to Bolivia’s Criminal Code and 
prescribed penalties of 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment for adult 
trafficking and 15 to 20 years’ imprisonment for child trafficking. 
These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with penalties for other serious crimes, 
such as rape. Inconsistent with the definition of trafficking under 
international law, the definition of trafficking under Article 281-bis 
required a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute 
a child sex trafficking offense and therefore did not criminalize all 
forms of child sex trafficking. Article 281-bis defined trafficking broadly 
to include illegal adoption without the purpose of exploitation, the 
sale of organs, and unlawful biomedical research. Article 321 of the 
Criminal Code criminalized pimping using force, fraud, or coercion 
and was used to prosecute sex trafficking crimes. The law prescribed 
penalties of 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving adults, 
12 to 18 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving children ages 14 to 
18, and 15 to 20 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving children 
under 14, which were sufficiently stringent and commensurate with 
penalties prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. Article 321 
did not require a showing of force, fraud, or coercion for victims 
under 14 years of age but did require a demonstration of such means 
for offenses involving children ages 14 to 17. Additionally, Article 
322 criminalized the purchase of sex with a minor and prescribed 
penalties of eight to 12 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving 
victims 14 to 17 years of age. Penalties increased by one-third for 
offenses involving children younger than 14. While the Criminal 
Code included separate criminal offenses for trafficking in persons 
and migrant smuggling, one government agency was responsible 
for both crimes, and that agency often conflated the two crimes in 
its collection of data and response to perpetrators and potential 
victims of trafficking.
In November 2020, a new administration took office, and massive 
turnover across government institutions led to gaps of information and 
efforts, including human trafficking. Government authorities reported 
new detailed information on law enforcement efforts not provided in 
previous years, making it difficult to draw an adequate comparison 
to the last reporting period. Data available was likely duplicative or 
contradictory, as no single agency was responsible for maintaining 
comprehensive protection or law enforcement data. Pandemic-related 
mitigating measures slowed trafficking investigations due to several 
week court closures and the reassignment of some law enforcement 
personnel to non-trafficking activities. The national police investigated 
39 new cases of trafficking (14 for sex trafficking and 25 for forced 
labor), and department authorities arrested 48 suspects for trafficking 
and trafficking related crimes (28 in La Paz and 20 in Santa Cruz). 
The Public Ministry (MP) referred 83 potential cases of trafficking 
(33 for sex trafficking and 50 for forced labor) to the Ministry of 
Justice and reported 32 prosecutions (14 for sex trafficking, 17 for 
labor trafficking, and four for other forms of servitude), compared 
with 55 cases prosecuted in 2018, the last year data was available. 
Authorities indicated there were 115 traffickers imprisoned in 2020 




final sentence. In addition, authorities reported to an international 
organization it convicted 11 traffickers (compared with five in 2019 
and two in 2018), but authorities did not provide information on 
sentences prescribed to traffickers in 2020. Observers continued to 
note the vast majority of arrested suspects, including traffickers, served 
time in pre-trial detention without ever receiving a final sentence and 
often avoided justice by paying bribes to corrupt officials to avoid 
prosecution. General backlogs in the judiciary, insufficient resources 
and personnel, and inadequate training of law enforcement officials 
impeded law enforcement efforts. Officials reported that by the end 
of 2020, the courts had received 600 cases of trafficking and rejected 
524 of the cases received. Misunderstanding of human trafficking by 
judicial authorities likely led to the premature dismissal of cases. In 
September 2020, the attorney general announced the establishment 
of department-level specialized prosecutor offices focused on human 
trafficking and human smuggling cases. The new offices provided 
training and specialized courses for public prosecutors and civil 
servants engaged in the fight against trafficking. In coordination with 
an international organization, authorities trained 48 new specialized 
prosecutors on trafficking crimes. 
Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained 
significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action during the 
year. The government did not report investigating, prosecuting, or 
convicting any new cases of official complicity. In August 2020, 
the interim government opened an investigation of the former 
president for trafficking crimes; however, the allegations may not 
be considered trafficking according to international law. Authorities 
abused law enforcement resources to prosecute individuals for 
politically motivated trafficking charges, bringing into question the 
veracity of the anti-trafficking data reported by the government. In 
2020, courts sentenced two low-ranking police officers to seven years’ 
imprisonment for their active role in a 2016 case of sex trafficking 
involving several women and girls at two nightclubs in La Paz. 
In coordination with an international organization, the government 
led a series of virtual training sessions for more than 290 department 
and national level officials on prosecution of traffickers, including 
specialized investigative techniques, awareness of emerging trends 
in online trafficking crimes, and victim identification; the training 
sessions also included prevention efforts and protection of victims. 
In coordination with civil society, authorities also trained 83 police 
investigators and officials from the human trafficking division of each 
department on victim-centered investigations, victim identification, 
intervention skills, and recruitment tactics used by traffickers. The La 
Paz police department’s anti-trafficking unit maintained 18 police 
investigators, and other departments’ anti-trafficking units had three 
to five investigators. Police officials rotated into new positions every 
three months to one year, resulting in a cyclical loss of institutional 
knowledge and impeding specialization in investigation of trafficking 
crimes. Civil society organizations indicated government authorities 
coordinated with the governments of Paraguay and Peru on cases 
involving victims from those countries identified in Bolivia. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained protection efforts. In 2020, law 
enforcement officials reported identifying 300 victims (292 Bolivians, 
four Haitians, one Colombian, one Chinese, and one Venezuelan), 
compared with 422 victims identified in 2019. Authorities had a 
victim identification handbook for law enforcement and a victim 
identification referral mechanism. However, according to officials, 
pandemic-related restrictions severely impacted their ability to 
identify victims proactively. The government’s overlapping legal 
framework and understanding of human trafficking and related 
crimes limited victim identification efforts. Authorities confused 
human trafficking with other crimes, such as child pornography, 
general labor exploitation, sexual abuse, and migrant smuggling, 
hindering their ability to identify trafficking victims. Authorities 
from the Ministry of Health did not receive training on victim 
identification and did not screen for trafficking indicators despite 
periodically administering medical tests to individuals in commercial 
sex, a population vulnerable to sex trafficking. 
The government did not report how many victims it referred to services 
during the reporting period. There were six multi-use shelters for 
victims of domestic violence and other crimes that could accept child 
and female trafficking victims, each reportedly underfunded. Law 
enforcement officials were often unable to secure safe accommodation 
for trafficking victims, particularly in departments without multi-use 
facilities. The government relied on private organizations, faith-based 
groups, foreign donors, and NGOs to fund and provide victim 
services; in some cases, police officers gave victims money for hotel 
rooms for the night in the hope victims could seek greater support 
from local government authorities or get back in touch with family 
members. The government did not provide any specialized services 
to adult male victims but could provide basic assistance at migrant 
shelters. Authorities could refer underage male trafficking victims to 
NGOs, private shelters, and religious organizations for assistance. 
Foreign victims who assisted in the case against their traffickers 
could receive a humanitarian visa, but the process often took years, 
and victims could not work during that time. While authorities did 
not report how many victims of trafficking received humanitarian 
visas, NGOs reported authorities treated foreign victims of trafficking 
fairly, following legal standards, and government officials worked 
with their foreign counterparts to facilitate repatriation in a timely 
fashion when victims sought that remedy. The government had 
a protocol for the repatriation of victims identified abroad, and 
in 2020, authorities reported repatriating and providing consular 
assistance to two victims, compared with 22 victims in 2019 and 
20 in 2018. The government allowed the use of Gesell chambers in 
every department, and in lieu of testifying in person, victims could 
provide recorded testimony or submit a written statement to the 
court. The government did not report using these provisions to 
encourage victims to cooperate in the case against their traffickers. 
Under Bolivian law, victims and their prosecutors could request 
restitution for damages from the sentencing judge. When victims 
did not participate in the case against their traffickers, they or their 
prosecutors could still file restitution claims within three months 
of sentencing. The government did not report whether any victim 
or prosecutor sought restitution in trafficking cases. Authorities did 
not report penalizing victims for crimes their traffickers compelled 
to commit. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. The Plurinational 
Council against Human Trafficking and Smuggling, chaired by the 
MOJ, was responsible for coordinating antitrafficking efforts at 
the national level. Two sub-ministerial units were responsible for 
coordinating anti-trafficking efforts at the technical level. Observers 
noted a lack of interagency coordination, in part due to overlapping 
mandates. Authorities used the 2016-2020 national action plan (NAP) 
and—with the support of an international organization—began 
developing the 2021-2025 NAP; the new NAP was incomplete at the 
end of the reporting period. Authorities did not report making any 
progress in 2020 on the development of a consolidated database 
of trafficking cases that began in 2018 with the support of an 
international organization. 
The government had a federal registry requiring all employment 
agencies to register and provide the MOL with all recruitment and job 
placement records. Authorities did not report how many applications 
the MOL reviewed or flagged for trafficking concerns, compared with 
42 applications reviewed in 2019, when authorities granted five 
permits and denied 37 requests. While authorities did not deny all 
applications due to trafficking concerns, they reported one of the 
main considerations when making a final decision for approval was 
limiting employment opportunities that increased vulnerability to 
trafficking. MOL officials reported pandemic mitigation measures 






October 2020, labor inspectors reported an average of 20 general 
inspections per week. Budget cuts also reduced the number of 
inspectors to 71, compared with 102 inspectors in 2019. Officials 
indicated all 71 inspectors were trained to identify cases of forced 
labor but did not report identifying victims during the reporting 
period. The government did not report providing additional training 
on forced labor during the reporting period. Authorities did not report 
conducting any inspections into forced labor, compared with 145 
inspections in areas with a high prevalence of trafficking conducted 
in 2019. Authorities in the La Paz metropolitan area launched a new 
hotline for citizens and victims to report trafficking crimes. However, 
authorities did not report identifying any victims or starting any 
investigations as a result of calls to the hotline. 
According to government officials and international organizations, 
the pandemic, political instability surrounding the general election, 
and a government transition decreased the frequency of government-
funded awareness and education campaigns. Authorities reportedly 
adapted ongoing prevention campaigns to online platforms and 
partnered with international organizations to expand the reach of 
these campaigns. In 2020, authorities joined the Blue Heart campaign 
and launched an effort to raise public awareness of trafficking crimes 
using digital platforms and social network accounts of government 
institutions, civil society, and telecommunication, radio, and television 
companies. As part of this campaign, authorities placed awareness 
banners in transit terminals and offered training to adolescents 
and school aged children on ways to recognize recruitment tactics 
used by traffickers in online platforms. The government conducted 
a trafficking awareness orientation campaign that reached 7,300 
students in 11 schools in Santa Cruz, and—with the support of an 
international organization—department anti-trafficking offices offered 
a public forum on awareness reaching approximately 300 people. 
Government officials worked with an NGO to distribute short videos 
targeting young audiences focused on preventing recruitment into 
trafficking, receiving 10,000 views. The government did not make 
efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The Institute for 
Normalization of Quality, a semi-autonomous government agency, 
operated a “triple seal” certification program for sugar producers 
whose final products were certified to be free of child and forced 
labor, which could reduce the demand for forced labor. Officials 
did not report how many new companies obtained the seal in 2020. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
domestic and foreign victims in Bolivia, and traffickers exploit 
victims from Bolivia abroad. Traffickers exploit Bolivian adults and 
children in sex trafficking and forced labor within the country and 
abroad. To a more limited extent, traffickers exploited women from 
neighboring countries, including Brazil, Colombia, and Paraguay, 
in sex trafficking in Bolivia. Traffickers exploit an increasing number 
of Venezuelan victims in sex trafficking and forced labor within the 
country. Traffickers subject some migrants from Africa, Chile, and 
the Caribbean traveling to or through Bolivia to sex trafficking and 
forced labor. Traffickers exploited children in sex tourism in rural 
indigenous communities in the north of the La Paz department, 
in and around the city of Rurrenabaque, and in tourist areas in 
the departments of La Paz and Beni, openly advertising to tourists 
speaking Hebrew and Arabic. Rural and poor Bolivians, most of 
whom are indigenous, and LGBTQI+ youth are particularly at risk 
for sex and labor trafficking. Bolivian women and girls are exploited 
in sex trafficking within Bolivia and neighboring countries such as 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Panama, and Peru. Within the country, 
traffickers exploit Bolivian adults and children in forced labor in 
domestic work, mining, ranching, and agriculture. Forced criminality 
continues to be a problem; media outlets reported cases of children 
forced to commit crimes, such as robbery and drug production, 
and others exploited in forced begging. In 2019, traffickers forced a 
Bolivian victim into criminality by compelling her to smuggle drugs 
into Malaysia. Traffickers exploit many Bolivians in forced labor in 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in sweatshops, agriculture, brick making, 
domestic work, textile factories, and the informal sector.  Traffickers 
continued to use social media as the primary recruitment tool, luring 
vulnerable individuals with fraudulent employment opportunities 
and then exploiting them in forced labor or sex trafficking.  Civil 
society organizations noted a pattern of exploitation in which older 
trafficking victims became recruiters of younger victims.
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA: 
TIER 2
The Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina does not fully meet 
the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is 
making significant efforts to do so. The government demonstrated 
overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, 
considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its 
anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Bosnia and Herzegovina was 
upgraded to Tier 2. These efforts included strengthening the anti-
trafficking strike force by allocating resources for honoraria and 
operational costs, expanding membership of the strike force, and 
creating a network of prosecutors and investigators to facilitate 
coordination. The Republika Srpska (RS) amended their law to 
increase the minimum sentence of child trafficking from five to 20 
years and expanded the definition of trafficking. A judge from Tuzla 
Canton issued the highest sentence to date for forced child begging, 
and the State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) established 
an operational team across four regional offices. The government 
increased overall victim protection efforts by identifying more victims, 
combining the domestic and foreign victim funds and disbursing 
funds to anti-trafficking NGOs, and drafting guidelines to standardize 
victim assistance, particularly for children. The government created 
a new database to standardize data collection on trafficking victims, 
established 18 regional monitoring teams (RMT) to coordinate anti-
trafficking efforts, and helped recruit and train 25 Romani activists 
to join RMTs. However, the government did not meet the minimum 
standards in several key areas. The state, RS, and Brcko District (BD) 
did not convict any traffickers, while the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (Federation) convicted fewer traffickers than the year 
before. Law enforcement continued to regularly investigate trafficking 
under lesser offenses, while Federation judges continued to issue 
sentences below minimum penalties. Law enforcement lacked 
capacity, resources, and technical knowledge, which hindered their 
ability to conduct effective and victim-centered investigations and 
prosecutions. Authorities justified cases of potential forced child 
begging and forced labor involving Roma as traditional cultural 
practices and customs and sometimes returned children to their 
families even when parents were involved in their exploitation. 
Additionally, the government lacked proactive identification efforts 
and, as a result, often penalized victims for unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit, particularly with misdemeanor charges 
for petty crimes.






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers and impose 
adequate penalties, which should involve significant prison terms. • 
Implement the law that exempts victims from penalties for unlawful 
acts their traffickers compel them to commit, particularly victims 
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of sex trafficking, forced begging, and forced criminality. • Train 
first responders on victim identification and referral and increase 
proactive identification efforts, particularly for migrants, refugees, 
asylum seekers, and Roma. • Institutionalize and implement screening 
procedures for migrant flows. • Establish and implement policies 
to formally disconnect identification procedures and official victim 
status from cooperation on investigations and prosecutions. • Increase 
resources, personnel, and training for law enforcement to investigate 
complex trafficking cases. • Train judges to understand the severity of 
trafficking when issuing sentences and sensitize prosecutors and judges 
to the issues of secondary trauma and victim-centered approaches. 
• Establish procedures to ensure trafficking cases are handled by 
trained prosecutors. • Improve cooperation and coordination among 
state and sub-state actors, including allocating adequate resources 
and enhancing participation in the anti-trafficking strike force. • 
Standardize victim assistance throughout the country, including 
the ability to access assistance and support outside of shelters and 
specialized assistance for male victims. • Integrate Romani advocates 
into decision-making processes regarding victim protection. • Train 
judges on restitution in criminal cases, establish procedures to seize 
assets from traffickers, and create effective methods to allocate 
restitution to ensure victims receive restitution in a timely manner. 
PROSECUTION
The government increased law enforcement efforts. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) consisted of two entities within the state – the 
Federation and RS. Each entity has political, legislative, and judicial 
authority. BD was a self-governing area under the jurisdiction of the 
state. Entity-level authorities addressed domestic trafficking offenses 
internal to their territories and state-level authorities addressed cases 
with international aspects. Article 186 of the state-level criminal 
code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking only in cases 
where the victim was exploited in a country in which he or she did 
not reside or have citizenship; it prescribed penalties of one to 10 
years’ imprisonment. Articles 210a and 210b of the Federation’s 
criminal code criminalized sex and labor trafficking and prescribed 
a minimum penalty of five years’ imprisonment. Article 145 of RS’s 
criminal code criminalized sex and labor trafficking and prescribed 
a minimum penalty of three years’ imprisonment. RS amended 
Article 146 to increase the minimum sentence of child trafficking 
from five to 20 years. Article 207a of BD criminal code criminalized 
sex and labor trafficking and prescribed a minimum penalty of five 
years’ imprisonment. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, 
with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with those for serious 
crimes, such as rape.
State Prosecutor’s Office (SPO) initiated two investigations on two 
suspects (one investigation on one suspect in 2019) and indicted 
one defendant (none in 2019). State courts did not convict any 
traffickers in 2019 and 2020. Federation authorities investigated 
three suspects (16 in 2019). Federation prosecutors indicted three 
defendants (none in 2019) and courts convicted 10 traffickers (12 
in 2019). Federation judges issued sentences ranging from one year 
and 10 months’ imprisonment to 10 years’ imprisonment for six 
traffickers, which included a judge from Tuzla Canton issuing 10 years’ 
imprisonment, the highest sentence to date for forced child begging. 
Federation courts did not provide sentencing information for the 
other four traffickers (five traffickers with no sentencing information 
in 2019). RS authorities investigated four suspects (seven in 2019) 
and indicted three defendants (two in 2019). RS lower courts did 
not convict any traffickers (one in 2019) but the RS Supreme Court 
upheld a conviction and sentenced the child trafficker to five years’ 
imprisonment. BD authorities initiated three investigations on three 
suspects (none in 2019) and prosecutors indicted two defendants 
(none in 2019). BD courts did not convict any traffickers in 2019 or 
2020. The government reported law enforcement personnel suffered 
from COVID-19 infections, lockdown measures halted operations 
from March to May 2020, and many courts suspended hearings with 
three or more defendants due to the pandemic. Court proceedings 
lasted many years and judges continued to issue sentences below 
minimum penalties, while often citing unreasonable “mitigating 
circumstances” to decrease further the sentences. Additionally, the 
government reported traffickers avoided imprisonment by utilizing 
a law that allowed convicted perpetrators to buy their way out of up 
to one year of imprisonment for 100 convertible marks a day ($63). 
SIPA established an operational team with 20 officers across four 
regional offices and Tuzla Canton in the Federation maintained 
a specialized trafficking unit in addition to trafficking liaison 
officers in all police units within the canton. RS, BD, and other 
Federation cantons did not have specialized officers, although 
organized crime and corruption units were designated to investigate 
trafficking. Law enforcement continued to report that the lack 
of capacity, resources, and technical knowledge hindered their 
ability to conduct effective investigations. Authorities continued to 
regularly investigate and prosecute sex trafficking, forced begging, and 
trafficking cases involving family members under lesser crimes, such 
as “enticement to prostitution,” “child negligence,” and “enticement 
to child prostitution.” Prosecutors reported they were evaluated on 
monthly quotas, which incentivized pursuing trafficking offenses as 
lesser offenses that are easier and faster to prosecute, while police 
experienced obstacles in investigating trafficking crimes involving 
multiple cantons or entities, due to a lack of communication 
and coordination with cantonal prosecutors. The standing anti-
trafficking strike force remained the only mechanism to coordinate 
law enforcement efforts across entities on trafficking cases. In 
previous years, the strike force was largely ineffective due to a lack 
of participation and the state failing to disburse operational funds, 
which the government worked to address in 2020. The government 
approved and allocated 80,000 convertible marks ($50,190) for 
honoraria and operational expenses in December 2020. Additionally, 
the government assigned another prosecutor from SPO, a second 
Federation prosecutor, a Federation Ministry of Interior (MOI) 
investigator, and two border police representatives to the strike 
force. The strike force, in cooperation with a foreign government 
during the reporting period, established a network of prosecutors 
and investigators to facilitate coordination across BiH; as a result, 
most prosecutors’ offices, except in RS, appointed a point of contact 
for trafficking cases to participate in the network. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, 
or convictions of government employees complicit in trafficking. 
SPO established a joint investigative team with Swedish authorities 
to investigate a forced labor case and cooperated with Austrian 
authorities on a forced criminality case. The government continued 
its joint investigation with French authorities initiated in 2015 of 
a Bosnian and Croatian married couple alleged to have forced 
six Romani children to pickpocket in France; SPO indicted eight 
defendants in May 2018 but the court did not order authorities to 
place defendants in custody during court proceedings, and officials 
reported one defendant was in Turkey likely involved in another forced 
begging case. In June 2014, SPO issued the biggest indictment for 
trafficking in BiH's history against 13 Bosnian nationals accused of 
exploiting 672 individuals in the construction industry in Azerbaijan 
in 2009; judges acquitted all defendants involved in the case in 
December 2019, but SPO prosecutors appealed the decision and 
presented arguments in January 2021. The government did not 
enter any new bilateral agreements; the lack of bilateral agreements 
regarding witness protection created obstacles for witnesses and 
victims to participate effectively in international investigations. Police 
academies maintained basic and advanced courses on trafficking, 
and the government, with financial and technical assistance from an 
international organization, trained police, border police, prosecutors, 
and judges on various trafficking issues. 
PROTECTION
The government increased victim protection efforts. The government 
identified 80 potential trafficking victims during the reporting period, 
an increase compared with 61 in 2019. Of these, 17 were victims 













exploitation; 55 were female and 25 were male; 45 were children; 
and seven were foreign victims. The government implemented a 
new database to standardize data collection and expand access to 
information on identified trafficking victims. Two bylaws provided 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) for identifying and referring 
victims to services, including a list of general indicators, but observers 
continued to report that first responders did not know or consistently 
use the guidelines and lacked the knowledge to accurately identify 
trafficking victims. The government operated seven drop-in centers 
for children and a mobile team for street children in Sarajevo 
that conducted outreach work. The mobile team identified 165 
(160 street children in 2019) and drop-in centers provided 373 
children with academic tutoring, hot meals, and laundry services 
(163 in 2019). Drop-in centers lacked resources, capacity, and staff 
and could only provide basic food, workshops, and short-term 
accommodation for a small number of children. Observers reported 
mobile team members were attacked, threatened, and intimidated 
by traffickers and perpetrators during their outreach efforts but law 
enforcement did not investigate these allegations. Law enforcement 
and social workers at centers for social welfare (CSW) justified 
cases of potential forced child begging and forced labor involving 
Roma as traditional cultural practices and customs and sometimes 
returned children to their families even when parents were involved 
in their exploitation. In addition, a report from an international 
organization indicated first responders, including border police, 
local police, and Service for Foreigners’ Affairs, lacked standard 
guidelines and trafficking indicators for migration flows, interview 
questions and interpreters, as well as general capacity to screen 
the large influx of migrants and refugees. First responders referred 
potential trafficking victims to law enforcement, which conducted an 
interview and had authority to officially recognize victims. However, 
international organizations reported the interview and identification 
procedures lacked transparency and authorities often required 
victims to cooperate with investigations and prosecutions to receive 
assistance and support. 
The government partly funded five NGO-run shelters and authorities 
referred 51 victims to them in 2020. The Ministry of Human Rights 
and Refugees allocated 60,000 convertible marks ($37,640) to four 
NGOs assisting domestic trafficking victims in 2020 and the Ministry 
of Security allocated 70,000 convertible marks ($43,910) to two NGOs 
assisting foreign victims in 2020. In 2019, the government did not 
disburse funds to NGOs due to the absence of a state government 
and budget. The government merged the internal and foreign victim 
funds into one victim protection fund with 130,000 convertible marks 
($81,560) administered by the State Coordinator. This provided a 
more effective use of victim assistance funds than in previous years 
when the government returned unused funds allocated to assist 
foreign victims to the state budget instead of reallocating those funds 
for internal victim assistance. The government, in cooperation with 
NGOs, provided accommodation, psycho-social support, medical 
assistance, legal assistance, and guardianship for child victims. While 
access to care was not standardized and was based on bylaws that 
were not legally binding, the government, in cooperation with an 
NGO, drafted guidelines and standards on providing assistance to 
victims, particularly children. NGO-run shelters allowed victims 
to leave voluntarily after informing the staff, but no mechanisms 
were in place to assist victims outside of shelters, including at CSW. 
One NGO-run shelter accommodated male trafficking victims but 
did not offer specialized services. Authorities reported developing a 
reintegration plan for each victim, including vocational training, but 
the government did not provide funding for reintegration programs, 
and observers reported victims spent, at times, multiple years at 
shelters due to slow court proceedings and a lack of reintegration 
opportunities. The law provided repatriation assistance to Bosnian 
citizens identified abroad and foreigners identified in Bosnia; no 
victims required repatriation assistance in 2019 and one victim 
required assistance in 2020. Foreign victims were eligible for a 
humanitarian visa allowing them to temporarily live and work in BiH, 
and victims were permitted a 30-day reflection period to determine 
whether they wanted to request a visa; one foreign victim received 
a humanitarian visa, compared with three in 2019. 
The government penalized victims for unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit due to inadequate identification efforts; 
authorities penalized victims of sex trafficking, forced begging, and 
forced criminality with misdemeanor charges for petty crimes with 
some victims owing 10,000 to 15,000 convertible marks ($6,270 
to $9,410) after receiving multiple fines. The government reported 
SOPs incorporated non-penalization standards but acknowledged 
authorities still penalized victims due to a lack of knowledge of the 
SOPs exacerbated by frequent rotations and turnover. Sub-state laws 
against “enticement to prostitution” permitted law enforcement to 
treat children 14 years and older as juveniles willingly engaged in 
commercial sex instead of victims of rape or sex trafficking; there 
were six prosecutions of enticement to prostitution in 2020. The law 
provided witness protection and free legal aid; the government did 
not report the number of victims in witness protection and relied 
mainly on NGOs to provide free legal aid. The government did not 
consistently conduct victim-centered investigations and prosecutions. 
For example, prosecutors did not need certification to work with 
children and often interrogated child victims without a psychologist 
or social worker present. Police did not consistently notify victims’ 
lawyers when conducting interviews, and some courts required victims 
to testify with no prior notification or preparation. Victims could 
obtain restitution through criminal proceedings or compensation 
through civil suits; in 2019, a district court awarded a victim 7,500 
convertible marks ($4,710) but the victim has not received the 
restitution because seized properties and assets of the traffickers 
went toward the state budget rather than restitution. Judges generally 
rejected restitution in criminal proceedings and encouraged victims 
to seek compensation by filing civil suits, according to observers, 
who noted civil suits required victims to submit new testimonies 
and medical examinations, causing re-traumatization, despite the 
government convicting their trafficker in criminal proceedings. 
PREVENTION
The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
government continued to implement the 2020-2023 national strategy 
and the state coordinator continued to produce annual reports and 
organized four virtual coordination meetings. The national strategy 
required the state, Federation, RS, BD, and cantonal governments 
to adopt their own action plans; the state, RS, Sarajevo, Tuzla, and 
Herzegovina-Neretva cantons adopted their action plans during the 
reporting period. In 2019, the state coordinator organized meetings 
to solicit feedback on RMTs and accordingly changed the structure 
from four to 18 RMTs: 10 in the Federation; six in the RS; one in BD; 
and one overarching team at the state level. The government formed 
all of the 18 RMTs during the reporting period. RMTs consisted of 
government and NGO representatives and an MOI official as the 
coordinator. The government, with financial and technical assistance 
from NGOs, trained RMT members, organized discussions with the 
Romani community on trafficking, and recruited and trained 25 
Romani activists to join RMTs. The government, in partnership with 
civil society, conducted an awareness campaign targeting children 
and students. State-level institutions regulated recruitment agencies 
and required agencies to obtain a license and register, but labor 
inspectors lacked resources to adequately inspect recruitment agencies. 
The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for 
commercial sex acts. The government did not provide anti-trafficking 
training for its diplomatic personnel.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in BiH, and traffickers exploit victims from BiH 
abroad. In 2020, traffickers exploited foreign victims from Afghanistan 
(1), Iran (2), Serbia (2), and Syria (2). In previous years, victims 
from Afghanistan, Cuba, The Gambia, Libya, and Serbia, Sri Lanka, 
and neighboring Balkan countries were exploited in BiH. Traffickers 
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exploit BiH women and girls in sex trafficking within the country in 
private residences and motels. Romani children are exploited in forced 
begging, sex trafficking, and domestic servitude in forced marriages. 
Foreign women and girls from European countries are vulnerable 
to sex trafficking within the country. Traffickers exploit BiH victims 
in sex trafficking and forced labor in construction and other sectors 
in neighboring Balkan countries and other countries across Europe. 
Thousands of migrants and refugees from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Iraq, Morocco, Pakistan, Syria, and neighboring countries traveling 
through, stranded in, or being smuggled through BiH are vulnerable 
to trafficking, particularly women and unaccompanied minors. 
BOTSWANA: TIER 2
The Government of Botswana does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Botswana remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
referring all identified victims to NGOs for care and providing some 
funding to the NGOs, funding and implementing the anti-trafficking 
national action plan, and providing additional services to victims 
who participated in trials against their traffickers. However, the 
government did not meet the minimum standards in several key 
areas. The government did not convict any traffickers and identified 
significantly fewer victims than the previous reporting period. Despite 
officials’ acknowledgement of forced and child labor among the 
San community on cattle farms, neither law enforcement nor labor 
inspectors made concerted efforts to investigate or address the issue. 
The government continued to lack formal procedures to identify 
and refer victims to care and devoted substantially less funding for 
victim care than in the previous reporting period. 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Significantly increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict 
traffickers. • Amend the anti-trafficking law to remove sentencing 
provisions that allow fines in lieu of imprisonment. • Conduct 
comprehensive trainings for prosecutors and judges on Botswana’s 
2014 anti-trafficking law so they can more effectively try and adjudicate 
cases. • Create procedures to identify trafficking victims and train 
stakeholders on them, including front-line law enforcement and 
immigration officials. • Routinely inspect cattle farms, including in 
Ghanzi, to ensure children are not engaged in forced labor. • Provide 
funding to the NGOs to which the government refers trafficking 
victims for shelter and services. • Formalize and implement procedures 
to refer trafficking victims to care. • Disallow suspended sentences 
for convicted traffickers. • Fund and implement the anti-trafficking 
national action plan. • Work with NGOs to increase freedom of 
movement and work opportunities for trafficking victims residing 
in shelters. • Screen for indicators of trafficking among vulnerable 
populations, including cattle farm workers, refugees, and Cuban 
medical workers. • Develop formal care procedures that incentivize 
victims to participate in trials against their traffickers. • Continue 
to conduct public awareness campaigns, particularly in rural areas.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained modest anti-trafficking law enforcement 
efforts. The 2014 Anti-Human Trafficking Act criminalized sex 
trafficking and labor trafficking and defined trafficking broadly to 
include all child labor. The law prescribed penalties of up to 25 years’ 
imprisonment, a fine of 500,000 pula ($46,300), or both, which 
were sufficiently stringent; however, by allowing for a fine in lieu of 
imprisonment, with regard to sex trafficking, these penalties were 
not commensurate with those for other serious crimes, such as rape. 
Section 57 of the 2009 Children’s Act criminalized inducing, coercing, 
or encouraging a child to engage in prostitution, and prescribed 
penalties of two to five years’ imprisonment or a fine of 50,000 pula 
($4,630), or both, penalties which were significantly lower than those 
prescribed under the 2014 anti-trafficking act. During the reporting 
period, the government and an international organization finalized 
drafting implementing regulations for the 2014 act to make it easier 
for judges and prosecutors to use and submitted them to the Anti-
Human Trafficking Committee (AHTC) for approval. 
The government initiated three trafficking investigations and 
continued 10 investigations initiated in prior years, compared to 
initiating one potential labor trafficking investigation in the previous 
reporting period. All three cases involved Zimbabwean traffickers 
who allegedly exploited Zimbabweans in labor and sex trafficking 
within Botswana. Officials prosecuted all three individuals for forced 
labor and continued prosecutions against 11 alleged traffickers 
from previous reporting periods, and all prosecutions remained 
ongoing at the close of the reporting period. This was compared 
to no new prosecutions but continuing the same 11 prosecutions 
in the previous reporting period. The government did not convict 
any traffickers. This was a decrease from convicting five traffickers 
in two cases in the previous reporting period. Due to the pandemic, 
courts did not operate for a significant part of the reporting period. 
Experts noted the slow pace of Botswana’s judicial system and the 
lack of qualified interpreters hindered authorities’ ability to prosecute 
trafficking crimes.
Law enforcement did not investigate reports of government officials 
allegedly complicit in human trafficking offenses. Neither labor 
inspectors nor law enforcement investigated the private farms in 
Ghanzi that officials acknowledged held San individuals in conditions 
indicative of forced labor. In addition, some local governments 
and labor inspectors provided advance notice to the farm owners 
before inspection. Botswana’s laws were broad enough to allow for 
conviction of political prisoners, and the laws granted authorities 
the discretion to subject this population to unlawful prison labor, 
including to private contractors outside of prisons, with indicators of 
forced labor for private gain. Authorities acknowledged corruption 
as a general impediment to law enforcement efforts. 
The Directorate of Public Prosecution (DPP) continued to support 
specialized anti-trafficking units and monitored the investigation and 
prosecution of trafficking cases. The Ministry of Defence, Justice, and 
Security (MDJS) funded and conducted a trafficking and smuggling 
training for 30 security and intelligence officers. Due to the restrictions 
on large gatherings during the pandemic, the government could 
not carry out any additional planned training for DPP and other 
officials. The police academy continued to include a human trafficking 
module in its curriculum to educate recruits and in its in-service 
training for officers on the anti-trafficking law, victim identification, 
and investigation of human trafficking cases. The government did 
not report cooperating with any foreign governments, compared to 
collaboration on multiple cases in the previous reporting period. 
PROTECTION
The government decreased efforts to identify and protect trafficking 
victims. The government identified three foreign child victims of sex 
and labor trafficking. This was a substantial decrease from identifying 
24 foreign trafficking victims within Botswana in the previous 







but did not report the type of exploitation. The government did not 
have formal procedures to proactively identify trafficking victims and 
did not fully operationalize the 2014 law’s victim referral measures. 
Nevertheless, officials coordinated with NGOs to refer all identified 
victims to NGO-run facilities providing shelter, medical care, and 
other services. The government and NGOs also continued to care for 
32 trafficking victims identified in previous reporting periods. The 
government did not operate any victim shelters. It generally referred 
female trafficking victims to government-supported NGO shelters 
for victims of crime or funded housing in hotels. NGO shelters did 
not permit adult trafficking victims to work or to leave without a 
chaperone. The government provided 650,000 pula ($60,190) to 
NGOs that cared for trafficking victims. This was a significant decrease 
from spending 4.69 million pula ($434,300) for victim care in 
the previous reporting period, but in line with overall decreases in 
government funding due to the pandemic. The government allocated 
COVID-19 tests to identified trafficking victims so they could be 
expeditiously transferred to shelters and receive services. 
Six trafficking victims sought voluntary repatriation, but the 
government could not accommodate the requests due to border 
closures and travel restrictions stemming from the pandemic. Instead, 
the government referred the victims to NGO shelters and services. 
While the government did not have a formal policy of providing 
longer-term shelter or residency to foreign trafficking victims, it stayed 
deportation for three Zimbabwean victims as the cases against their 
traffickers continued. The government collaborated with INTERPOL 
and the Government of South Africa to identify and repatriate 
two Batswana sex trafficking victims in South Africa. To encourage 
victims to participate in trials against their traffickers, the government 
provided at least one victim witness with transportation to court 
and conducted all victim testimony in closed courtrooms. Botswana 
law provides for restitution for trafficking victims after conviction of 
their trafficker, but the government did not convict any traffickers. 
There were no reports officials penalized victims for unlawful acts 
their traffickers compelled them to commit; however, some victims 
may have remained unidentified and subsequently penalized due to 
the government’s failure to employ systematic measures to identify 
trafficking victims among vulnerable populations.
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. The AHTC, established 
under the MDJS, met twice, similar to prior reporting periods. The 
committee led implementation of the 2018-2022 anti-trafficking 
national action plan, and the government devoted the equivalent of 
approximately $92,000 towards implementation, which was similar 
to the funding allocated in prior years. The government increased 
efforts to self-assess its trafficking problem and response. MDJS created 
and distributed a survey to ministries to assess the effectiveness of 
the government anti-trafficking efforts, and it produced the first of 
an expected bi-annual public report on trafficking in persons. As 
in previous years, MDJS held a public awareness-raising event on 
trafficking on World Day Against Trafficking in Persons in July 2020. 
With support from an international organization, the government 
contributed information to a centralized anti-trafficking database 
that collected national data on criminal cases and victims identified 
and shared it with countries in the region. 
Labor inspectors did not adequately monitor for forced labor. 
Inspectors lacked funding and covered large swaths of territory that 
made routine inspections impossible. Labor inspectors reportedly 
did not visit Ghanzi province, where officials acknowledged private 
cattle farmers exploited San individuals in conditions indicative of 
forced labor since 2014. The government largely permitted child 
labor in agriculture, in some cases forced, to continue without 
oversight because of its cultural nature; the government did not 
identify any child labor victims in 2020. Enrollment in school 
required an identity document, usually a birth certificate or other 
national card known as an omang. Many San families did not have 
either document, which rendered their children unable to enroll in 
school and more likely to work on farms, at times in exploitative 
conditions. The government did not have procedures to screen for 
trafficking in the labor recruitment process; it relied on recruitment 
agencies to proactively do so and self-report. Moreover, Botswana law 
did not prohibit labor recruitment practices that traffickers commonly 
exploit, including the charging of recruitment fees, confiscation of 
workers’ passports, unilateral contract switching, and withholding 
of wages. The government began collaboration with an international 
organization to identify foreign recruitment agencies operating 
within the country. The government did not make efforts to reduce 
the demand for commercial sex acts or forced labor.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Botswana, and traffickers exploit victims 
from Botswana abroad. Many trafficking victims in Botswana are 
Central African economic migrants intercepted by traffickers while 
transiting Botswana to South Africa. Traffickers transport some child 
sex trafficking victims through Botswana en route to exploitation in 
South Africa. Within Botswana, traffickers target unemployed women, 
the rural poor, agricultural workers, and children. Some relatives 
force their family members into domestic work, cattle herding, and 
commercial sex. Some parents in poor rural communities send their 
children to work for wealthier families as domestic servants in cities 
or in agriculture and cattle farming in remote areas, increasing their 
vulnerability to forced labor. Extended family members may subject 
their young Batswana domestic workers to conditions indicative of 
forced labor, including denial of education and basic necessities; 
confinement; and verbal, physical, or sexual abuse. Criminals exploit 
some Batswana girls and women in commercial sex within the country, 
including in bars and along major highways. Officials acknowledged 
the forced labor of adults and children of the San ethnic minority 
group in private cattle farms in Botswana’s rural west, particularly 
in Ghanzi district. Most cattle farm owners are white emigres from 
South Africa, whose relationships with local government officials 
allow them to avoid inspection. Restrictions on freedom of movement 
and systemic delays in obtaining refugee status and permission to 
work render the approximately 800 refugees, most located in Dukwi 
refugee camp, vulnerable to traffickers. There are reports child refugees 
from the camp are exploited in sex trafficking, including by South 
African truck drivers transiting Botswana. Botswana’s laws allow 
for conviction of political prisoners, and the government may have 
subjected such prisoners to unlawful forced labor for private gain, 
including to private contractors outside of prisons.
Traffickers transport Batswana individuals to Zimbabwe for forced 
labor. Organized trafficking rings subject some Batswana women to 
trafficking internally or transport women from neighboring areas, 
including South Africa, Zimbabwe, and East Africa, and subject 
them to sex trafficking in Botswana. Some traffickers entrap victims 
through social media, including through advertisements for fake 
employment opportunities. Traffickers exploit Zimbabwean and 
Namibian individuals in forced labor in agriculture in Botswana. 
Traffickers likely exploit some undocumented Zimbabwean children 
in commercial sex and forced labor in Botswana. Cuban medical 
personnel working in Botswana may have been forced to work by the 
Cuban government. Bangladeshi traffickers have brought Bangladeshi 
women to Botswana for sex trafficking.
BRAZIL: TIER 2
The Government of Brazil does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts 
to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts 
compared to the previous reporting period, considering the impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Brazil remained on Tier 2. These efforts included obtaining final 
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convictions for three sex traffickers and initial convictions for six labor 
traffickers, as well as developing comprehensive new guidance for 
identifying and providing assistance to slave labor victims, including 
labor trafficking victims. However, the government did not meet the 
minimum standards in several key areas. It did not report initiating 
new prosecutions for forced labor, and officials continued to punish 
most labor traffickers with administrative penalties instead of prison, 
which neither served as an effective deterrent nor provided justice for 
victims. Victim identification and protection mechanisms, including 
shelter services, remained inadequate and varied substantially by 
state. The government investigated and prosecuted fewer traffickers 
and did not offer sufficient training for law enforcement, prosecutors, 
and judges to increase their capacity to respond to trafficking. The 
government penalized victims of trafficking for crimes committed 
as a result of their trafficking situation, and authorities in populous 
states did not proactively identify victims of sex trafficking, including 
among highly vulnerable populations, such as children and LGBTQI+ 
persons. 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Provide shelter and specialized assistance to victims of sex trafficking 
and forced labor. • Proactively identify and vigorously investigate 
cases of sex trafficking, including child sex tourism. • Prosecute and 
convict labor traffickers in criminal courts and punish traffickers 
with significant prison terms. • Train law enforcement officials 
on victim identification to prevent the penalization of victims for 
unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit. • Increase the 
number of specialized anti-trafficking offices, especially in Mato 
Grosso do Sul, Piaui, Rondônia, Roraima, and Santa Catarina. • 
Prosecute and convict officials complicit in trafficking. • Improve 
interagency, federal, and state coordination efforts to combat 
trafficking, including among law enforcement. • Develop a victim 
identification protocol for law enforcement officials on trafficking 
indicators and proactive identification of victims and train them 
on its use. • Amend the 2016 anti-trafficking law to criminalize 
child sex trafficking without elements of force, fraud, or coercion in 
accordance with the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. • Allocate resources to 
local guardianship councils to increase specialized services for child 
trafficking victims, including case management assistance. • Increase 
and fund efforts to raise awareness of trafficking, including child sex 
tourism, on television, social media, and in print form, especially in 
communities along highways where human trafficking is prevalent. 
• Compile comprehensive data on victim identification; victim 
assistance; and investigations, prosecutions, and convictions at the 
federal and state level, disaggregated between sex and labor trafficking 
cases. • Implement the third national action plan. • Strengthen the 
mandate of the National Committee to Combat Human Trafficking 
(CONATRAP) to assist in the development of anti-trafficking offices 
in every state. • Update the referral mechanism guidance to reflect 
the provisions of the 2016 trafficking law. 
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. Article 149a of 
the penal code criminalized some forms of sex trafficking and all 
forms of labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of four to eight 
years’ imprisonment and a fine, which were sufficiently stringent and, 
with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent with international 
law, Article 149a required force, fraud, or coercion for child sex 
trafficking cases and therefore did not criminalize all forms of child 
sex trafficking. However, Article 244a of the child and adolescent 
statute criminalized inducing a child to engage in sexual exploitation 
without the need to prove the use of force, fraud, or coercion and 
prescribed penalties of four to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine, 
which were sufficiently stringent and commensurate with those 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Additionally, Article 
149 of the penal code prescribed penalties of two to eight years’ 
imprisonment and a fine. It prohibited “slave labor,” or reducing 
a person to a condition analogous to slavery, defining forced labor 
to include degrading work conditions and exhausting work hours, 
going beyond situations in which people are held in service through 
force, fraud, or coercion. 
Law enforcement data provided by the government reflected efforts 
made under federal jurisdiction. Authorities reported initiating 206 
new slave labor investigations but did not report the number of 
new sex trafficking investigations in 2020, compared with 296 new 
investigations in 2019 (40 for sex trafficking and 256 for slave labor). 
There were 237 ongoing slave labor investigations initiated in previous 
years, some dating to 2003. The government prosecuted 14 new cases 
of suspected sex trafficking in lower courts in 2020, compared with 
56 new prosecutions in 2019 (four for sex trafficking and 52 for slave 
labor). Authorities did not report any new criminal prosecutions for 
slave labor in 2020. The government reported 512 ongoing trafficking 
prosecutions (six for sex trafficking and 506 for slave labor) in courts 
of first and second instance. In 2020, the government reported three 
final trafficking convictions under a related statute criminalizing 
the facilitation of human trafficking; it did not confirm whether 
these were sex or labor trafficking convictions or provide details on 
the length of sentences the traffickers received. Courts convicted at 
least six labor traffickers in other cases in 2020, but these traffickers 
could appeal their verdicts and therefore the convictions were not 
final. In one case where convictions were subject to appeal, courts 
convicted three labor traffickers for exploiting a Venezuelan woman 
in forced labor. Brazil allowed successive appeals in criminal cases, 
including trafficking, before courts could issue a final conviction and 
sentence. Many convicted sex and labor traffickers appealed their 
convictions several times, in both lower and appeals courts. Media 
reports showed that adjudication of cases could take anywhere from 
four to 10 years. Traffickers sometimes served their sentence under 
house arrest or in prison work release programs, leaving to work 
during the day and returning to prison overnight, punishments that 
were not commensurate with the seriousness of the crime and did 
not effectively deter human trafficking. The government reported 
pandemic-related delays in the judicial system slowed the processing 
of prosecutions and appeals, including human trafficking and slave 
labor prosecutions.
In one notable case, officials arrested a suspected trafficker accused 
of falsely purporting to be a talent scout for professional soccer 
teams to exploit young athletes. The suspect allegedly recruited 
boys from Mato Grosso to travel to Paraná to play soccer, where he 
restricted their movement and forced them to pay a monthly fee, 
purportedly to maintain their recruitment eligibility. In another 
high-profile case, law enforcement officials arrested an executive in 
the beauty industry on slave labor charges after a hotline tip revealed 
she had exploited her 61-year-old domestic employee for 23 years, 
offering meager pay, regularly withholding wages and food, and 
providing inadequate housing. In a third case, officials arrested a 
Venezuelan couple on charges of human trafficking and extortion; 
the suspected traffickers made false job offers to Venezuelans with 
hearing impairments, offering to pay their travel expenses to Brazil 
to establish a debt. Once arrived, the couple confiscated the victims’ 
passports and forced them to beg on the street to repay the debt. In 
2020, law enforcement officials reported pandemic-related decreases 
in their interactions with the public, including potential trafficking 
victims, reduced staffing, and inadequate training on performing 
routine duties under such conditions; these factors may have limited 
the efficacy of law enforcement efforts to investigate trafficking crimes 





The government treated forced labor as a distinct crime from human 
trafficking. Labor inspectors and labor prosecutors had primary 
authority over cases of slave labor and could apply civil penalties. 
The federal police and public ministry handled the investigation 
and prosecution of severe slave labor cases and had the authority 
to pursue criminal charges against labor traffickers. Authorities in 
populous states, such as Rio de Janeiro, had a limited understanding 
of sex trafficking, and mostly focused on cases of transnational sex 
trafficking. Law enforcement officials in the state of Rio de Janeiro 
did not have a protocol to help them identify victims and did not 
receive any training on proactive identification. Many of this state’s 
government authorities had difficulty conceptualizing individuals in 
commercial sex as potential trafficking victims, which inhibited law 
enforcement action against traffickers and likely led to authorities 
overlooking potential victims. When authorities identified exploitation 
of individuals in commercial sex, including potential victims of sex 
trafficking, they sometimes considered them victims of slave labor 
and referred them to the Public Labor Ministry (MPT) or the Special 
Secretariat for Social Security and Labor. 
Interagency coordination and data collection efforts were inadequate. 
Data remained spread across multiple databases at the federal and 
state level, making it difficult to obtain and analyze comprehensive 
data. The Brazilian Federal Police (PF) had a unit in every state and 
was involved in the investigation of most trafficking crimes; however, 
in some states, such as Rio de Janeiro, the PF and state and municipal 
entities generally did not cooperate or communicate. Observers 
reported police occasionally misclassified trafficking cases, suggesting 
such cases were under-reported. Law enforcement units at all levels 
had insufficient funding, expertise, and staff to investigate trafficking. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking 
offenses; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking 
crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement 
action during the year. Cases of official complicity from previous 
years remained open, including the October 2016 investigation of 
an elected official who was arrested and removed from his position 
in Paraná state after allegations of his involvement in a child sex 
trafficking ring. Similarly, there were no updates on the prosecution’s 
appeal of an inadequate sentence given to a civil police investigator in 
2016 for his involvement in a sex trafficking ring involving children. 
During the reporting period, the government offered limited training 
opportunities; it did not report anti-trafficking training targeting 
prosecutors, judges, or law enforcement officials. Civil society 
observers reported law enforcement and judicial sector officials 
demonstrated a limited understanding of trafficking crimes; these 
observers also reported state and municipal officials were significantly 
less proficient than their federal counterparts. The government 
required new labor judges to receive training on slave labor and 
human trafficking, but it did not recruit new judges during the 
reporting period due to the pandemic; by contrast, 76 new judges 
completed the training in 2019. Authorities continued to coordinate 
with United States officials to prevent suspected child sex tourists from 
entering the country. The government hosted the headquarters for a 
large-scale, multicountry investigation into human trafficking and 
human smuggling, coordinated by an international law enforcement 
agency; through the investigation, PF forces contributed to the arrest 
of approximately 30 suspected traffickers and the identification of 
nearly 100 potential trafficking victims across 32 countries. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained protection efforts. In 2020, the 
government reported identifying and providing protection services 
to 494 potential trafficking victims. The government provided 
partial victim identification data from a subset of federal agency 
records; in past years, the government also reported partial victim 
identification statistics but collected this data from a subset of 
state-level protection agencies. Several government agencies at 
various levels collected data on victim identification and assistance; 
for example, in 2020, the Ministry of Health reported its officials 
identified 61 adult and 36 child trafficking victims, more than half 
of whom were Afro-Brazilian or mixed race. However, the lack of a 
centralized database and inconsistent reporting made year-to-year 
comparisons difficult. Identification efforts varied greatly from state to 
state; select rural states, such as the state of Paraná, identified a large 
number of the reported victims, while more populous states, such 
as Rio de Janeiro, identified relatively few. In 2020, labor inspection 
authorities conducted inspections at 266 companies and identified 
942 victims of labor exploitation; however, the government did 
not specify how many of these victims experienced forced or slave 
labor, as opposed to other forms of exploitation. The government 
did not report the total number of cases of forced labor as defined 
under international law. In comparison, authorities inspected 280 
companies and identified 1,130 victims of labor exploitation in 
2019. Labor inspectors at the federal level reportedly shared with 
victims of slave labor information on basic resources available to 
them. The government did not report how many slave labor victims 
received such information in 2020. However, all 942 identified 
victims had access to three months of unemployment insurance, 
compared with the 713 possible victims that received unemployment 
insurance in 2019. The government did not report what other 
services slave labor victims received. According to the Ministry of 
Justice and Public Security (MOJPS), authorities from all federal, 
state, and local governments continued to use victim identification 
guidance from 2013, which predated the 2016 anti-trafficking law, 
to aid victim identification and assistance. However, government 
officials did not receive training on the use of such guidance, and 
there was no indication that authorities in most states proactively or 
consistently identified victims of sex trafficking, child sex tourism, or 
forced labor, especially forced criminality. Officials from the labor 
inspector’s office identified victims of slave labor while conducting 
impromptu inspections into businesses or employers suspected of 
using slave labor. According to some government officials, judges 
did not consistently identify individuals as trafficking victims who 
had initially consented to perform a certain job or service in which 
they were later coerced or forced to provide labor or services against 
their will. In 2020, the government produced new standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) for identifying and providing assistance to victims 
of slave labor; the new guidance did not include additional funding 
for victim assistance and the government did not report trainings 
related to the new SOPs. The MOJPS maintained eight “advanced 
posts” at locations, such as airports and bus stations, where authorities 
could screen for trafficking indicators, a decrease from nine advanced 
posts in 2020 and 12 in 2019. 
Law 13.344 mandated the government provide victims with temporary 
shelter; legal, social, and health assistance; and protection against re-
victimization; however, implementation of the law was inconsistent 
across states. Authorities continued to operate 16 state-level and one 
municipal-level anti-trafficking offices (NETPs). NETPs operated 
interagency networks that could serve as the first point of contact 
for victims who had been identified by any means, including NGOs; 
however, most NETPs did not provide services to victims directly 
and were only open during the day. Most agencies with equities 
participated in the network, and NETPs could refer victims of adult 
sex trafficking to Specialized Social Service Centers (CREAS) serving 
vulnerable populations, victims of forced labor to the Secretariat 
of Labor Inspections (SIT), and child victims of trafficking to 
guardianship councils. In 2020, an unknown number of NETPs 
assisted 156 potential victims, compared with 10 NETPS assisting 129 
possible victims in 2019. Adult victims referred to CREAS could receive 
assistance from non-specialized psychologists and social workers; the 
government reported all 494 potential trafficking victims received 
services from CREAS but did not disclose the forms of assistance 
provided. A government official indicated that the NETPs were not 
distributed in a balanced way across the country. In wealthier states, 
such as Sao Paulo, the NETP had effective assistance and coordination 
teams comprised of police officers, prosecutors, labor inspectors, 
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labor prosecutors, and mental health professionals. In contrast, 
the government did not adequately fund or equip other NETPs to 
refer and assist victims. Many states did not have NETPs, including 
border states where trafficking was prevalent. Throughout 2020, the 
government maintained a partnership with a Brazilian LGBTQI+ 
organization to increase the protection of transgender trafficking 
victims, but it did not report any active projects involving the group. 
Some NETPs and CREAS could provide limited short-term shelter; 
the federal government did not fund specialized or long-term shelters 
for trafficking victims. Some states placed victims in shelters for 
migrants, the homeless, or victims of domestic violence. The state 
of Sao Paulo had two main shelters where trafficking victims could 
receive assistance—one was a state government-funded shelter where 
female victims and their children could receive health benefits, 
education, food, and housing for three to six months; the other 
was an NGO-operated shelter that provided temporary assistance 
for refugees and trafficking victims. When space in these shelters 
was unavailable, Sao Paulo officials housed trafficking victims in 
other non-specialized shelters and, occasionally, hotels. States did 
not have specialized shelters for child sex trafficking victims, and 
guardianship councils often lacked the expertise and resources to 
adequately identify, refer, and support child victims. There were no 
specialized shelters for male victims of trafficking. The government 
had a network of non-specialized government and civil society shelters 
serving vulnerable populations, such as individuals experiencing 
homelessness, victims of domestic violence, and the elderly. Of 
these shelters, the government reported more than 3,700 could 
receive trafficking victims, although far fewer served trafficking 
victims in practice. In 2019, the most recent year for which data 
was available, 32 of these shelters reported providing services to at 
least one trafficking victims. The government did not report how 
many trafficking victims these shelters assisted during the reporting 
period. Despite being the second most populous city in the country, 
Rio de Janeiro did not have any specialized shelters for victims of 
sex trafficking. Officials from the MPT used assets forfeited from 
traffickers to provide care to victims of slave labor. To increase and 
expedite access to care for forced labor victims, state governments 
could participate in the Integrated Action Program through MPT, 
which coordinated vocational training, sought restitution from 
traffickers, and arranged job placements. Authorities did not report 
providing training to any guardianship council social workers on the 
worst forms of child labor, including trafficking, in 2020, compared 
with training 242 social workers in 2019. 
Authorities penalized victims for unlawful acts traffickers forced them 
to commit. Due to inadequate application of formal identification 
and screening procedures, officials sometimes arrested foreign 
women for drug trafficking crimes committed under coercion and as 
a result of their trafficking situation. The government had measures 
to encourage victims to testify in the case against their traffickers, 
including allowing remote live video testimony. However, authorities 
have never reported using these measures for trafficking cases. 
Observers continued to express concern about the under-reporting of 
trafficking crimes, attributing it in part to victims’ lack of awareness 
of protection services and fear that filing complaints would lead to 
further exploitation, deportation, or other harm. The law entitled 
foreign trafficking victims to a residence permit; the government 
updated the permit application process to clarify required steps in 
March 2020. The government reported issuing 12 such residence 
permits in 2020 but did not report how many of these permits it 
issued to trafficking victims. The government could assist victims 
of trafficking with repatriation, but authorities have not reported 
assisting any victims since 2017.
PREVENTION
The government decreased efforts to prevent trafficking. The MOJPS 
continued to oversee the inter-ministerial group responsible for 
the implementation of the 2016-2022 Third National Action 
Plan, and worked with an operational budget of 443,840 reais 
($85,450), a decrease from 639,250 reais ($123,070) in 2019. 
The MOJPS also funded the CONATRAP advisory committee, 
which included representatives from federal government agencies 
and NGOs. CONATRAP operated with a reduced membership of 
seven representatives, the result of a 2019 executive order; in 2020, 
CONATRAP met virtually to elect new civil society participants. 
Coordination between agencies at the national and state levels 
remained uneven and varied in efficacy. At the state government level, 
officials from different agencies in 16 states continued to convene 
and address trafficking independently from the federal government 
and in a decentralized manner through the state NETPs. The MPT 
continued its three-year technical cooperation agreement with the PF, 
initiated in 2019, focused on increasing information sharing on cases 
of child labor and slave labor, but it did not report specific activities 
related to the agreement in 2020. MPT established a working group 
to develop SOPs for government officials working with child victims 
of sexual exploitation, including sex trafficking.
Most awareness raising efforts focused on addressing child or slave 
labor more broadly; few campaigns attempted to raise awareness 
of sex trafficking and child sex tourism. Throughout the year and 
to commemorate World Day against Trafficking, municipal and 
state governments hosted workshops, training, art installations, 
performances, and roundtable discussions; however, many municipal 
entities canceled celebrations of the World Day against Trafficking 
due to pandemic-related complications or restrictions. The Federal 
Highway Police (PRF) distributed flyers in a January 2020 event to 
educate recipients on human trafficking and how to make a report 
via the hotline. A state-level anti-trafficking commission launched 
an awareness campaign featuring ads on 30 buses in the city of 
Florianopolis, where forced labor was common in the garment 
sector. The government reported partnering with NGOs to produce 
online seminars and a range of awareness materials, including a 
series of comic strip-style social media posts. There were overall fewer 
awareness-raising events and campaigns in 2020 than in 2019; the 
government attributed this decrease, at least in part, to pandemic-
related restrictions. The government coordinated with a civil society 
organization to offer trafficking awareness training to approximately 
100 state government officials in Para and Sao Paulo. PRF officials 
continued to operate a database to identify critical locations along 
highways where the commercial sexual exploitation of children 
was prevalent. In 2020, PRF partnered with MPT and the Brazilian 
Association for the Defense of Women, Children and Youth to 
include human trafficking in its mapping efforts. In the first half 
of 2020, government-operated human rights hotlines received 194 
calls for human trafficking, 382 calls for slave labor of adults, and 
1,915 calls for child labor, a significant increase from the first half of 
2019, when hotlines reported 46 calls for human trafficking, 61 for 
slave labor of adults, 1,971 for child labor, and seven calls reporting 
child sex tourism. Hotline operators could refer victims to local 
resources including police, state prosecutor’s offices, social workers, 
guardianship councils, CRAS, CREAS, and the labor inspectorate. 
Some states, such as Sao Paulo, operated their own human rights 
hotlines. The government did not indicate whether it initiated any 
investigations from calls to the hotlines, but media reporting suggested 
at least one investigation, involving a 61-year-old domestic worker 
exploited in slave labor, stemmed from a hotline call.
Authorities did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial 
sex acts. However, authorities made efforts to reduce the demand for 
forced labor. The SIT published a “dirty list,” or lista suja, which made 
public the names of individuals and businesses found guilty of using 
slave labor, twice annually. In its most recent iteration, released in 
October 2020, the list included 113 total employers, compared with 
190 in October 2019. The SIT added 44 new employers to the list in 
2020, compared with 69 new employers in 2019. The government 
attributed the decrease in new additions in the list’s October edition 
to pandemic-related restrictions; officials stopped processing new 
names for inclusion for several months during the reporting period 





adjudication process by the end of the reporting period but continued 
to operate at reduced capacity. Individuals and companies on the list 
were prohibited from accessing credit by public or private financial 
institutions; the government reported its civil lawsuits against seven 
banks that continued extending credit to businesses included on 
the dirty list, initiated in 2019, remained ongoing in 2020. While 
the dirty list remains one of Brazil’s most effective tools to reduce 
the demand for slave labor, the inadequate criminalization of these 
crimes hindered efforts to combat labor trafficking. Officials issued 
administrative penalties to 266 employers guilty of slave labor in 
2020, compared with 106 employers in 2019. From April 2020 until 
June 2020, labor inspectors ceased performing routine inspections 
due to pandemic-related lockdowns; mobile inspection teams 
continued to operate during this time. The government published 
guidance on conducting labor inspections during the pandemic 
and provided COVID-19 testing and personal protective equipment 
to labor inspectors. Observers indicated the government’s staff of 
labor inspectors shrunk for at least the fourth consecutive year. The 
government did make available to labor inspectors an online course 
on slave labor and human trafficking for labor inspectors, but it did 
not report how many inspectors participated in this programming. In 
2019, the MPT committed to creating a new public list of employers 
convicted of slave labor; however, the government had not released 
the list by the end of the reporting period. Authorities did not report 
any new investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of child sex 
tourists in 2020.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Brazil, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Brazil abroad. Traffickers exploit women and children from Brazil 
and from other South American countries, especially Paraguay, in 
sex trafficking in Brazil. Gangs and organized criminal groups have 
subjected women and girls to sex trafficking in the states of Rio 
Grande do Sul and Santa Catarina. Traffickers also exploit Brazilian 
women in sex trafficking abroad, especially in Western Europe and 
China. Traffickers lure Brazilian women abroad with false promises 
to exploit them in sex trafficking; traffickers have feigned offers of 
successful music careers to entice Brazilian women to travel to South 
Korea, where they are forced into commercial sex. Traffickers have 
exploited Brazilian men and transgender Brazilians in sex trafficking 
in Spain and Italy. Transgender women are one of the most vulnerable 
populations in Brazil. According to a study conducted in 2019, 90 
percent of transgender women in Brazil are in commercial sex, and of 
those in Rio de Janeiro, more than half are in a situation at high risk 
for human trafficking. Traffickers often require transgender victims 
to pay them for protection and daily housing fees. When they are 
unable to pay, traffickers beat them, starve them, and force them into 
commercial sex. Traffickers deceive transgender Brazilian women with 
offers of gender reassignment surgery, planning to exploit them in sex 
trafficking when they are unable to repay the cost of the procedure. 
Traffickers exploit children in sex trafficking along Brazil’s highways, 
including BR-386, BR-116, and BR-285. Child sex tourism remains 
a problem, particularly in resort and coastal areas; many child sex 
tourists are from Europe and the United States. 
Migrants and people living near any of Brazil’s border areas are 
vulnerable to trafficking. Traffickers have exploited Chinese women 
in sex trafficking in Rio de Janeiro. Venezuelan migrants within 
Brazil were highly vulnerable to sex trafficking and forced labor. 
Traffickers recruit Venezuelans—those living in Brazil and those still 
in Venezuela—via online advertisements and social media platforms 
offering fraudulent job opportunities, later exploiting them in sex 
trafficking in major cities like Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. 
Many identified trafficking victims are Afro-Brazilian or of African 
descent. Traffickers exploit Brazilian men—notably Afro-Brazilian 
men—and, to a lesser extent, women and children, in situations that 
could amount to labor trafficking in both rural areas (including in 
ranching, agriculture, charcoal production, salt industries, logging, 
and mining) and cities (construction, factories, restaurants, and 
hospitality). Traffickers exploit adults and children from other 
countries—including Bolivia, Paraguay, Haiti, and China—in forced 
labor and debt-based coercion in many sectors, including construction, 
the textile industry (particularly in Sao Paulo), and small businesses. 
Traffickers exploit Brazilians in forced labor for some producers of 
sugar, coffee, and carnauba wax. Traffickers exploit Brazilian women 
and children, as well as girls from other countries in the region, in 
forced labor for domestic servitude. Traffickers exploit Brazilians 
in forced labor in other countries, including in Europe. Traffickers 
force Brazilian and foreign victims, especially from Bolivia, South 
Africa, and Venezuela, to engage in criminal activity, including drug 
trafficking, in Brazil and neighboring countries. In 2018, the Cuban 
government ended its medical missions to Brazil after Brazilian 
authorities raised significant concerns of exploitation and forced labor 
associated with these missions. Cuban medical professionals who 
participated in medical missions in Brazil may have been exploited 
and forced to work by the Cuban government. NGOs and officials 
report some police officers ignore the exploitation of children in 
sex trafficking, patronize brothels, and rob and assault women in 
prostitution, impeding identification of sex trafficking victims.
BRUNEI: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Brunei does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included standing up an interagency 
team to investigate all potential trafficking cases, devoting funding 
towards dedicated male and female trafficking shelters, establishing 
an interagency public relations task force to raise awareness of 
trafficking and labor rights, and working with an NGO to produce 
sample translated employment contracts in the workers’ primary 
languages. The government created, finalized, and disseminated 
victim identification and protection standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) to all government anti-trafficking stakeholders. However, the 
government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared 
to the previous reporting period, even considering the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity. For the 
third consecutive year, the government did not formally identify 
any cases of trafficking, despite the significant number of migrant 
workers in Brunei who exhibit multiple trafficking indicators. For 
the fourth consecutive year, the government did not prosecute or 
convict any traffickers under its trafficking statute. The government 
continued to detain, deport, and charge potential victims for crimes 
without employing a victim-centered approach to discern if traffickers 
compelled the victims to engage in the unlawful acts. Because the 
government has devoted sufficient resources to a written plan that, 
if implemented, would constitute significant efforts to meet the 
minimum standards, Brunei was granted a waiver per the Trafficking 
Victims Protection Act form an otherwise required downgrade to 
Tier 3. Therefore Brunei remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the third 
consecutive year. 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, convict, and punish both sex 
and labor traffickers, including complicit government officials, with 
strong penalties. • Widely disseminate SOPs for victim identification, 
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and train all relevant officials on the procedures, emphasizing a 
focus on vulnerable populations such as individuals in commercial 
sex, domestic workers, and migrant workers, including Chinese 
nationals working on Chinese projects, some of which are managed 
by state owned enterprises. • Cease the arrest, deportation, and 
punishment of trafficking victims for unlawful acts their trafficker 
compelled them to commit. • Train judges on accurate and effective 
implementation of trafficking laws, including through understanding 
the many ways coercion can be applied. • Increase protective services 
to provide incentives for victims to participate in investigations and 
prosecutions, including by allowing at-will communication with 
people outside shelter facilities and issuing work permits to all victims. 
• Ensure migrant worker contracts and information on their rights 
and obligations under Brunei law are available in migrant workers’ 
primary language and that workers can retain a copy. • Issue guidelines 
on the prohibition of recruitment agencies charging or receiving 
worker-funded fees and enforce the prohibition. • Implement the 
victims’ fund to allow those funds to be paid directly to victims 
as compensation. • Strengthen efforts to enforce laws prohibiting 
acts that facilitate trafficking, such as retention or confiscation of 
migrant workers’ identity documents and partial or full withholding 
of wages. • Offer foreign victims long-term alternatives to removal 
from the country. • Expand comprehensive and visible anti-trafficking 
awareness campaigns directed at employers of foreign workers and 
buyers of commercial sex. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained inadequate law enforcement efforts. The 
2019 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Order criminalized sex trafficking 
and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of four to 30 years’ 
imprisonment and fines of between 10,000 and 1 million Brunei 
dollars (BND) ($7,560 and $756,430), which were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
penalties prescribed for other serious offenses, such as rape. While the 
passage of the 2019 law did not substantively change the trafficking 
in persons criminal provisions under the pre-existing 2004 law, it 
successfully separated trafficking crimes from migrant smuggling 
crimes, which are now addressed under a separate law and had 
been frequently conflated. The penal code also criminalized travel 
outside the country for commercial sex with children, prescribing 
a punishment of up to 10 years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both. The 
government may have also utilized Chapter 120 Section 5 of the 
Women and Girls Prosecution Act, which addresses “living on or 
trading in prostitution,” to prosecute potential sex trafficking crimes. 
The act prescribed penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment and 
a fine of up to $20,000, which were significantly lower than those 
available under the trafficking law. 
Royal Brunei Police Force (RBPF), labor, and immigration officers 
referred cases of suspected trafficking to the human trafficking unit 
(HTU) for further investigation. The HTU also reviewed case reports 
from other RBPF units to look for trafficking indicators, particularly 
in cases involving commercial sex, unpaid wages, workers fleeing 
their place of employment, or physical abuse of workers. The HTU 
reported it screened 147 such cases in 2020 for trafficking indicators, 
an increase compared with 90 cases in 2019. However, of these, the 
government investigated only three as potential trafficking cases, two 
of which resulted in non-trafficking charges, and the third, involving 
Department of Labor (DOL) officials, was ongoing at the end of the 
reporting period. Authorities did not refer any cases to the attorney 
general’s chambers (AGC) for prosecution; the most recent cases 
that authorities identified and referred to the AGC were two cases 
in 2017. For the fourth consecutive year, the AGC did not initiate 
any new trafficking prosecutions, and the courts did not convict 
any traffickers under its trafficking statute. The government’s most 
recent trafficking convictions were of three traffickers in 2016. The 
government reported high evidentiary standards precluded authorities 
from prosecuting cases under the anti-trafficking legislation. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking 
offenses but did investigate and prosecute officials for crimes that 
increased migrant workers’ vulnerability to trafficking. The government 
continued to prosecute a Department of Immigration officer and 
two Bruneian labor recruiters under the Prevention of Corruption 
Act involved in a case stemming from the previous reporting period. 
The government charged the individuals with committing visa 
application fraud in an illegal operation to bring Bangladeshi workers 
to Brunei on false visa applications without existing jobs. In addition, 
authorities reported four government officials, including a senior 
DOL official, were under investigation for corruption related to visa 
fraud for migrant workers at the end of the reporting period. Law 
enforcement officials cooperated with a foreign government on an 
ongoing international trafficking case. The HTU continued to train 
RBPF, immigration, labor, and anti-vice officers on trafficking and 
victim identification. In March 2021, 29 law enforcement, labor, 
and immigration officials participated in a trafficking identification 
and investigation techniques training course facilitated by the prime 
minister’s office.
PROTECTION
The government maintained efforts to protect victims; while the 
government created and funded protection mechanisms, it did not 
report identifying any trafficking victims during the reporting period, 
compared with seven potential victims identified in 2019. In January 
2021, the government finalized and disseminated national SOPs for 
trafficking victim identification, referral, and protection to all front-
line agencies involved in anti-trafficking efforts; implementation 
was ongoing at the end of the reporting period. In some cases, 
authorities employed identification measures only after detaining 
victims following law enforcement operations, such as past reports of 
raids in which police arrested foreign women for prostitution crimes. 
Officials may have also detained and deported unidentified trafficking 
victims for labor or immigration violations. Foreign government 
officials continued to report Bruneian authorities deported several 
of their citizens after their Bruneian employers withheld wages or 
medical care and then reported to immigration officials that the 
migrant workers had run away. According to observers, the practice of 
detention and deportation perpetuated victims’ fear of communicating 
with law enforcement officers, exacerbating significant identification 
and service provision gaps. 
In its national action plan (NAP), the government allocated 331,000 
BND ($250,380) for trafficking victim protective services; 100,000 
BND ($75,640) to a trafficking victim assistance fund; and 231,000 
BND ($174,740) to two trafficking victim shelters to separately 
accommodate female and male victims, each housing up to 20 victims. 
The government had not previously reported allocating a budget to 
trafficking-specific expenses. The government reported construction 
of the shelters was ongoing at the end of the reporting period. In the 
interim, the government maintained a secure, general-purpose shelter 
and provided medical care, counseling, psychological assessment, 
clothing, meals, and access to vocational training programs and 
recreational activities to all female trafficking victims and male 
trafficking victims under the age of 18. The government indicated 
it would house adult male victims, if identified, in local hotels until 
the completion of the trafficking shelter. Shelter officials permitted 
victims to make calls home in the presence of an official from their 
embassy who could interpret the conversation for authorities. Unlike 
the previous reporting period, the government allowed victims to 
freely leave the shelter without a chaperone and stated it would assist 
victims to find alternative employment. The departments of labor 
and immigration could grant victims temporary work passes on an 
ad hoc basis; the government did not report granting any victims 
work passes during the reporting period. The government did not 
have legal alternatives to removal for victims who may face hardship 






The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
government’s interagency anti-trafficking committee met regularly to 
review government efforts during the reporting period. In November 
2020, the committee finalized the NAP; the plan prioritized protecting 
victims, raising awareness, and strengthening interagency cooperation 
and investigation and prosecution efforts. The committee established 
a sub-committee, which included a dedicated public prosecutor, 
focused on identifying and investigating trafficking cases and a public 
relations task force to oversee awareness activities. 
Brunei’s 2004 Employment Agencies Order (EAO) mandated licensing 
and regulation of recruitment agents. The EAO prohibited agencies 
from charging or receiving any form of fees, remuneration, profit, 
or compensation; however, the labor department continued to not 
issue guidelines on this prohibition and authorities therefore had 
not implemented oversight of this provision. DOL required foreign 
workers to sign their contracts in the presence of a labor officer to 
prevent forgery, ensure compliance with the law, and enable the 
labor official to provide information to the worker on their rights 
and obligations. The public relations task force partnered with an 
NGO to produce translations of sample migrant worker contracts and 
employment rights pamphlets in the primary language of regional 
labor-source countries. Brunei did not have a minimum wage; salary 
payments were negotiated in individual contracts. Without legal 
guidance, labor officials could not determine the fairness of the 
contracts. The 2009 Employment Order did not require employers 
to provide a written record of terms to employees not covered under 
the order, namely domestic workers and fishing crews. DOL hosted 
a series of labor rights workshops to train and raise awareness of the 
2009 Employment Order among employment agencies. 
Although Bruneian law prohibited employers from withholding 
wages more than seven days or retaining employees’ passports, 
foreign embassies continued to report their citizens commonly 
experienced both practices. The government continued its public 
awareness campaign with printed materials in English and Malay. A 
government-owned media outlet published five articles on trafficking 
and labor rights to spread awareness and educate the public on the 
rights of foreign workers. DOL provided workers with business cards 
containing the department’s hotline for reporting labor violations 
and continued its awareness roadshow to educate the public on 
labor laws, including on passport retention. However, when labor 
officials inspected worksites, they only required migrant workers to 
show a copy of their passport and visa; officials fined 462 employers 
for not renewing expired workers’ passports held by the employer 
but did not report taking administrative or legal action against 
employers for passport retention during the reporting period. Law 
enforcement officials conducted an inspection of a refinery worksite 
dormitory and found workers living in unsafe accommodations and 
without proper employment documents. Authorities issued a stop-
work order to the employer and opened an investigation into the 
undocumented foreign workers; the investigation remained open 
at the end of the reporting period, allowing the workers to stay in 
the country with an agreement to conduct monthly check-ins with 
immigration authorities until all employment documentation was 
resolved. After two weeks, the refinery resumed operations, after it 
closed the unsafe living facility and met with the government to 
review workplace safety and foreign worker regulations. Authorities 
also reported fining five employers for labor rights violations as a 
result from worksite inspections. The government did not make 
efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit foreign 
victims in Brunei. There are approximately 140,000 foreign workers in 
Brunei, mainly from Indonesia, Philippines, Bangladesh, and China. 
Men and women migrate to Brunei primarily for domestic service, 
retail, and construction work. Chinese nationals working in Brunei 
may have been forced to work by Chinese companies, including 
state-owned enterprises. Upon arrival, traffickers exploit some migrant 
workers through involuntary servitude, debt-based coercion, contract 
switching, non-payment of wages, passport confiscation, physical 
abuse, or confinement. Although it is illegal for employers to withhold 
the wages from their employees for more than seven days, some 
employers withhold wages to recoup labor broker or recruitment 
fees or to compel the continued service of workers. Retention of 
migrant workers’ travel documents by employers or agencies remains 
a widespread practice, although the law prohibits it. Traffickers may 
force some female migrants who arrive in Brunei on tourist visas into 
sex trafficking. Some traffickers who exploit migrants in Malaysia or 
Indonesia for sex or labor trafficking use Brunei to transit victims.
BULGARIA: TIER 2
The Government of Bulgaria does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Bulgaria remained on Tier 2. These efforts included allocating 
more funding per child accommodated in a crisis center, increasing 
funding for the national anti-trafficking strategy and annual national 
program, and cooperating with foreign governments on several 
outreach programs to stem labor trafficking, including developing a 
brochure informing Bulgarian workers abroad of their labor rights. 
However, the government did not meet the minimum standards in 
several key areas. Authorities investigated, prosecuted, and convicted 
fewer traffickers. Courts continued to issue suspended sentences 
for most convicted traffickers – only 29 percent received significant 
sentences – which weakened deterrence and may have undercut 
broader efforts to fight trafficking. Victim identification and assistance 
data remained unreliable, and uncoordinated child protection 
services persisted. The lack of resources, legal authority to pursue 
labor trafficking cases, and sufficient training impeded labor officials’ 
ability to enforce laws effectively. Corruption in law enforcement and 
the judiciary continued to hinder progress, and alleged complicity 
in trafficking crimes persisted with impunity.






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, including 
complicit government officials. • Sentence convicted traffickers to 
significant prison terms and ensure they serve those sentences in 
practice. • Establish and implement a comprehensive data system 
for collecting and collating victim identification and assistance 
data and provide comparable annual data that does not include 
duplications from previous years. • Ensure all child victims receive 
assistance by significantly increasing cooperation among the various 
authorities engaged in child protection and the referral of child 
victims. • Expand labor inspectors’ legal authority to identify and 
pursue labor trafficking cases and provide training for inspectors on 
recognizing trafficking indicators. • Proactively identify and refer to 
assistance potential trafficking victims, especially among vulnerable 
populations, such as asylum-seekers, individuals in commercial sex, 
and children in residential care, and provide training for officials on 
victim identification. • Issue prosecutorial guidelines redirecting more 
trafficking cases to the National Investigative Service (NIS) to help 
institute specialization at the pre-trial level. • Introduce a sustainable 
financial mechanism for victim services and allocate adequate 
funding for the victim protection program. • Increase the number of 
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police officers and labor inspectors investigating trafficking crimes. • 
Establish a centralized database with disaggregated information on 
investigations, prosecutions, convictions, and sentencing. • Enhance 
efforts to train law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges 
to understand the severity of sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
crimes and their impact on victims. • Provide additional dedicated 
shelters for trafficking victims. • Provide qualified legal counsel and 
courtroom protections for victims assisting prosecutions. • Reform 
the victim compensation process to make it accessible to trafficking 
victims and increase the number of victims receiving compensation.
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. Articles 159a-159d 
of the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed penalties of two to eight years’ imprisonment and a 
fine of 3,000 to 12,000 lev ($1,880 to $7,530) for offenses involving 
adult victims, and three to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 
10,000 to 20,000 lev ($6,270 to $12,550) for those involving child 
victims. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect 
to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other 
serious crimes, such as rape. As a result of the pandemic, courts neither 
reviewed criminal cases, including trafficking cases, nor heard victim 
testimony from March to May 2020 and operated with limited capacity 
in November and December 2020. Authorities investigated 74 cases 
(58 sex trafficking, 16 labor trafficking), compared with 84 in 2019 
and 59 cases in 2018. Authorities prosecuted 45 defendants (42 sex 
trafficking, three labor trafficking), a decrease compared with 73 in 
2019 and 68 in 2018. Courts convicted 42 traffickers (41 sex trafficking, 
one labor trafficking), a decline from 61 in 2019 and 59 in 2018. Only 
12 of 42 convicted traffickers (29 percent) received imprisonment; 
most convicted traffickers received suspended sentences, which did 
not serve to deter the crime or adequately reflect the nature of the 
offense. As in previous years, the government did not report the 
range of prison sentences imposed on convicted traffickers. In 2020, 
authorities investigated one case involving those allegedly knowingly 
patronizing or soliciting a trafficking victim for commercial sex acts 
and, in a separate case, prosecuted two traffickers. Both traffickers 
agreed to plea bargains and received suspended sentences. In order 
to clear case backlogs, prosecutors often agreed to plea bargains with 
traffickers, and courts approved ensuing settlements as a cost-effective 
alternative to a full trial. Guilty pleas reduced traffickers’ sentences 
by one-third and led to a majority of lenient or suspended sentences. 
Cases that did not involve organized crime were handled by regional 
police, prosecutors, and courts. The Specialized Criminal Court for 
organized crime and corruption and its prosecutors’ office presided 
over and prosecuted trafficking cases involving organized crime. The 
General Directorate for Combating Organized Crime (GDBOP) 
maintained a specialized police unit for investigating trafficking cases 
involving organized crime, primarily international cases. In 2020, 
GDBOP participated in one new joint investigation team (one in 
2019) with the assistance of Europol and Eurojust as well as other 
international cases. In one case, Bulgarian and French authorities 
cooperated on an investigation that led to the French prosecution 
of 18 Bulgarians for exploiting handicapped individuals in forced 
begging. Separately, Bulgarian and French authorities cooperated 
on a sex trafficking investigation that resulted in 15 convictions of 
Bulgarian traffickers by French courts. In 2020, authorities extradited 
eight suspected traffickers, compared with 18 in 2019 and 13 in 2018.
Corruption in law enforcement and the judiciary, lack of meaningful 
sentences or impunity for complicit officials, and selective prosecution 
impeded effective progress. NGOs reported alleged complicity in 
smaller towns by law enforcement officials who were reluctant to 
investigate trafficking cases because they either knew the traffickers or 
feared retaliation. Additionally, media outlets reported some police 
officers took payments to turn a blind eye toward women exploited 
in commercial sex. Nonetheless, the government did not report any 
investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees 
complicit in trafficking crimes. At the end of the reporting period, a 
second and final appeal remained ongoing for a suspended sentence 
issued to a police officer whom authorities charged for obstructing 
a 2016 trafficking investigation. Problems persisted within the 
judicial system, such as a bureaucratic judicial process that resulted 
in lengthy trials and the absence of specialized trafficking prosecutors. 
The random assignment of cases in prosecutors’ offices inhibited 
specialization. The NIS, which employed trained and experienced 
lawyers, retained the resources for specialization, but had limited 
jurisdiction over trafficking cases. Practitioners reported guidelines 
from the Prosecutor General could redirect more trafficking cases to 
the NIS and help institute specialization. NGOs also reported overall 
prosecutors continued to lack knowledge in handling trafficking 
cases and sensitivity toward trafficking victims.
In 2020, the government conducted multiple trainings on trafficking 
to address knowledge gaps. The National Institute of Justice trained 
five judges, 11 prosecutors, five investigators, and eight clerks 
on different aspects of international legal assistance in criminal 
cases, including trafficking, and offered a module on trafficking 
investigations to 49 newly appointed judges and prosecutors. The 
National Commission for Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings, 
the agency that coordinated the government’s anti-trafficking efforts, 
local anti-trafficking commissions, and other organizations conducted 
a total of 21 trainings for more than 590 practitioners, including eight 
specialized trainings for 220 investigators, prosecutors, and judges 
on investigating trafficking cases, confiscating trafficking proceeds, 
psychological aspects of victim interviews, and victim protection. 
Additional trainings focused on victim identification and referral for 
more than 370 social workers, teachers, and NGO experts.
PROTECTION
The government maintained overall insufficient protection efforts. 
The prosecution service reported formally identifying 413 potential 
trafficking victims (336 sex trafficking, 77 labor trafficking), a 
significant increase from 340 in 2019 and 376 in 2018. Of the 413 
identified victims, 30 were child victims (24 sex trafficking, six labor 
trafficking), compared with 33 in 2019 and 53 in 2018. Authorities 
identified three foreign victims—one Ukrainian sex trafficking victim 
and two Kyrgyz labor trafficking victims—compared with one in 2019 
and none in 2018. Statistics included victims from investigations and 
prosecutions initiated in previous years, raising concerns that the 
data reported did not provide an accurate picture of the trafficking 
situation. The Commission maintained separate statistics on the 
number of victims identified and, in 2020, identified 60 potential 
victims, a striking difference compared with the prosecution service’s 
statistic of 413. Furthermore, the Commission’s statistic (60) reflected 
a multi-year decline from 94 in 2019 and 130 in 2018 and contradicted 
the multi-year increase indicated by the prosecution service’s statistics. 
While stakeholders held discussions on establishing a single and 
unified register of victim statistics and as part of a regional project, 
an international organization developed an electronic register, the 
government made no progress on implementing a system. As a result, 
the number of reported victims identified remained unreliable. 
Moreover, the number of victims assisted remained unclear. In 2020, 
the Commission reported accommodating 26 adult and child victims, 
compared with 30 in 2019. The State Agency for Child Protection 
(SACP), which coordinated different protection measures than the 
Commission, reported assisting 31 children but did not differentiate 
how many were victims of sex and labor trafficking or abandoned 
by their parents, compared with 17 child trafficking victims in 2019.
According to the Commission, authorities did not identify as many 
victims because of pandemic-related movement restrictions as well as 
possible reluctance of victims to report exploitation if they anticipated 
doing so would result in no prospect of income. NGOs alleged some 
authorities could not effectively identify victims, especially among 
vulnerable groups such as asylum-seekers, migrants, individuals 
exploited in commercial sex, and members of the Roma community. 
NGOs and international organizations reported cultural issues created 
extreme difficulties for all practitioners in identifying trafficking 






viewed Roma as people who chose a lifestyle that included sexual 
exploitation and either did not need support or could not be identified 
as trafficking victims.
Authorities, NGOs, and the Commission referred victims to services. 
The government provided counseling, shelter, and reintegration 
assistance to domestic and foreign victims. In 2020, the government 
paid 117,560 lev ($73,750) to NGO service providers for victim health 
care and psychological and social assistance, compared with 117,400 
lev ($73,650) in 2019 and 234,000 lev ($146,800) in 2018. Experts 
noted the victim protection program was chronically underfunded 
and hampered implementation of a fully-fledged victim-centered 
approach. The government continued contracting NGOs to operate 
crisis centers and shelters. The government provided 25 crisis centers 
for victims of violence and trafficking, but observers noted limited 
dedicated shelters for trafficking victims remained problematic 
with only three throughout the country (two in Burgas and one in 
Varna). In 2020, the Commission received an EU grant for 450,000 
lev ($282,310), 25 percent of which the government co-funded, to 
reopen an adult shelter that closed in 2019 due to lack of funding. 
However, concerns remained about the sustainability of the shelter 
beyond the duration of the EU-funded project. Observers noted an 
increased challenge finding accommodation for victims in Sofia that 
the pandemic exacerbated.
During the reporting period, the government temporarily closed 
the crisis center for child trafficking victims in Sofia after several 
incidents at the center, including attempted arson by a victim 
compelled by their trafficker. Child victims could stay in centers 
for up to six months at which point SACP could place them with 
relatives, a foster family, or another residential care institution. An 
underdeveloped foster care system often resulted in SACP placing 
children in shelters for victims of trafficking or domestic violence. 
SACP assisted child victims for 12 months with the option to extend. 
A 2020 UN Special Rapporteur report found child sex exploitation 
prevalent among children in residential care, particularly children 
from marginalized communities. The report acknowledged there was 
a lack of systematic and reliable data on the scope of the problem 
citing evidence from child protection stakeholders. The report also 
identified insufficient cooperation among the various authorities 
engaged in child protection inhibited provision of assistance to 
child victims. NGOs also reported challenges in the coordination 
and referral of child victims due to an overly bureaucratic approach 
of child protection officials who sometimes prioritized paperwork 
over children’s needs. The government allocated 11,570 lev ($7,260) 
annually per child accommodated in a crisis center and increased 
funding to 12,730 lev ($7,980) during the middle of the reporting 
period, compared with 9,870 lev ($6,190) in 2019. The increase in 
funding was due to new legislation on social services updating the 
minimum wage in the country; the law also allowed municipalities 
to co-fund services and seek co-funding from private entities. SACP 
operated the 24-hour hotline for children and, in 2020, added 
more operators and online services. The National Council on Child 
Protection maintained referral services and accommodation for 
unaccompanied children.
During the reporting period, a 2020 amendment to the law reduced 
the length of stay in registration centers for asylum-seekers from six 
months to two weeks. NGOs noted the new law decreased asylum-
seekers’ prospects for successful integration and increased their 
risk of exploitation. Bulgarian law allowed foreign victims who 
cooperated with law enforcement to stay and work in Bulgaria for 
the duration of criminal proceedings before deportation, although 
no foreign victims had applied for this status. For foreign victims 
who chose not to assist in investigations, the government provided 
a 40-day recovery period (70 days for foreign child victims) before 
repatriation. Observers noted many victims did not cooperate with law 
enforcement because they did not believe the judicial system would 
protect them, effectively administer justice, or convict perpetrators 
with meaningful sentences. The law exempted trafficking victims 
from punishment for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them 
to commit; however, practitioners noted this law did not provide 
full exemption as force was not always applied. Some experts said 
police generally did not understand that people in commercial sex 
were vulnerable to trafficking or that the non-punishment provision 
for crime victims could apply to them. The government provided 
repatriation assistance to Bulgarian citizens but had no designated 
funds, relying on an international organization or institutions in 
the destination countries to cover costs. While the law provided 
free legal assistance to victims, qualified legal aid was difficult to 
access, especially when victims were outside of the jurisdiction of 
the court reviewing the case. The process for seeking reparation 
from the government's victim fund remained overly bureaucratic 
and discouraged victims from making claims; as a result, no victims 
received restitution or compensation in 2020.
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. The government 
continued to implement the 2017-2021 national anti-trafficking 
strategy and adopted the annual national program for combating 
trafficking and victim protection for implementing strategy activities 
with a budget of 440,400 lev ($276,290), an increase from 401,000 
lev ($251,570) in 2019. The Commission published an annual report 
of the government’s anti-trafficking efforts, monitored the activities 
of the 10 local anti-trafficking commissions, and assessed the quality 
of services provided at the specialized government-run shelters and 
crisis centers. NGOs expressed concerns about the lack of high-
level government support and public commitment to combating 
trafficking and the future of the Commission. The Commission 
struggled with limited financial and human resources and uneven 
levels of cooperation from leadership. Nevertheless, in 2020, the 
Commission conducted multiple national awareness campaigns, 
including campaigns on labor trafficking involving information 
sessions and workshops with vulnerable groups and on sex trafficking 
targeting students and children. Local anti-trafficking commissions 
executed more than 50 prevention projects (70 in 2019), reaching 
more than 30,000 people, including vulnerable groups such as 
members of the Roma community. Additionally, GDBOP officers 
held trafficking awareness discussions with 80 school students in 
Sofia. The government continued to support an NGO-run hotline 
for victims of violence, including trafficking, allocating 65,000 
lev ($40,780), the same amount as in 2019 and 2018. Separately, 
the government supported a dedicated NGO-run hotline through 
burden sharing, such as transportation costs, and consultative 
services, including advise on assistance and identification. The 
hotline received 43 trafficking-related calls and referred 19 cases to 
police. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand 
for commercial sex acts.
Experts noted systemic issues, such as the lack of resources, limited 
legal authority to identify and pursue labor trafficking cases, and 
insufficient training impeded labor officials’ ability to enforce laws 
effectively. Bulgarian labor laws prohibited employers and labor agents 
from charging recruitment fees, withholding identity documents, 
unilaterality changing employment contracts, and delaying payment 
of workers’ wages. NGOs criticized the government for failing to 
identify and prosecute cases of severe labor exploitation, alleging 
the government focused instead on labor law violations that carried 
administrative sanctions. In 2020, the General Labor Inspectorate 
(GLI) conducted 742 inspections of labor recruitment firms, 
temporary employment agencies, overseas companies, employers 
sending “posted workers” to EU countries, and cases involving foreign 
workers in Bulgaria; it identified 1,080 violations and imposed 371 
fines. Additionally, the GLI investigated a potential labor trafficking 
case involving 80 Bulgarian seasonal workers hired to pick fruit in 
France and found numerous violations by the Bulgarian recruitment 
agency that recruited the workers. The GLI initiated a process to 
revoke the agency’s license.
During the reporting period, the government continued outreach 
work on labor trafficking, including partnering with an NGO to 
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conduct an online discussion on ways to combat trafficking in supply 
chains. The GLI published information for seasonal workers on labor 
trafficking risks with a special focus on pandemic-related challenges. 
The Ministry of Labor and Social Policy maintained labor offices 
in EU countries with large Bulgarian communities and considered 
high-risk trafficking destinations; the offices provided information 
and advice to job seekers on trafficking and reported cases to the 
Commission for repatriation. The Bulgarian labor attaché located 
at the Bulgarian embassy in Austria reported a labor trafficking 
case involving two child victims and subsequently facilitated their 
repatriation. In 2020, media outlets reported a potential labor 
trafficking case involving Bulgarian workers in a meat processing plant 
in Germany, which led to the Bulgarian and German governments 
developing a program to increase cooperation on potential labor 
trafficking cases and provide workers with information about labor 
exploitation. Consequently, GLI and the Berlin Center for Migration 
and Decent Labor developed a brochure informing Bulgarian workers 
of their labor rights in Germany. In another international program, 
the government examined labor trafficking cases, particularly cases 
combining economic crime and illicit financial flows, and developed 
guidelines for authorities to use in identifying cases. Furthermore, 
Bulgaria and Moldova established a bilateral work agreement allowing 
Moldovan workers to be recruited under a government-sponsored 
framework to perform migrant labor.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Bulgaria, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Bulgaria abroad. Bulgaria remains one of the primary source countries 
of human trafficking in the EU. Traffickers exploit Bulgarian women 
and children in sex trafficking throughout Western Europe and in 
Bulgaria, particularly in the capital, resort areas, and border towns. 
Bulgarians of Turkish ethnicity and Romani women and girls account 
for most of the sex trafficking victims identified in Bulgaria. Authorities 
report an uptick in internal sex trafficking, which they attribute 
to international travel restrictions resulting from the pandemic. 
Also due to the pandemic, traffickers increasingly use the internet 
and social media to recruit victims. Traffickers typically recruit 
and exploit women and girls from poorer regions of the country. 
Family- or clan-based organizations and independent traffickers are 
overwhelmingly of Roma ethnicity and usually know the victims, 
who are also Roma. According to authorities, sex trafficking rings 
typically consist of Bulgarian traffickers who cooperate with foreign 
nationals in destination countries but have no direct ties to foreign 
organized crime groups. Reports indicate a rise in the number of cases 
of women and girls from marginalized communities forced to marry 
third-country nationals. Reports also indicate a growing number of 
international labor trafficking cases. Traffickers exploit Bulgarian men 
and boys in forced labor across Europe, predominantly in agriculture, 
construction, and the service sector. Traffickers exploit Romani 
children in forced labor, particularly begging and pickpocketing in 
Austria, France, and Sweden. The majority of labor trafficking victims 
are of Roma origin or come from poor regions of the country with 
high levels of unemployment. Traffickers force Bulgarian men with 
disabilities into street begging abroad. Reports indicate an increase 
in child trafficking cases. NGOs report the exploitation of children 
in small family-owned shops, textile production, restaurants, and 
construction businesses. A UN special rapporteur report found child 
sex exploitation prevalent among children living in government-run 
institutions, particularly children from marginalized communities. 
Asylum-seekers and migrants from Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq, 
some of whom may be or may become trafficking victims, transit 
Bulgaria en route to Western Europe. Government corruption in law 
enforcement and the judiciary continues to enable some trafficking 
crimes, and officials have been investigated for suspected involvement 
in trafficking.
BURKINA FASO: TIER 2  
WATCH LIST
The Government of Burkina Faso does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included the Ministry of Women 
coordinating the third phase of its program to remove vulnerable 
children from the streets, including forced begging victims. The 
government repatriated domestic and foreign victims with the 
assistance of NGOs and international organizations and implemented 
a humanitarian response plan to assist vulnerable people in conflict-
affected areas, including potential trafficking victims. However, the 
government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared 
to the previous reporting period, even considering the impact of 
the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity. 
The government did not prosecute or convict any traffickers for the 
second consecutive year, identified fewer trafficking victims, and 
did not effectively screen vulnerable populations for trafficking 
indicators. Shelter and services, especially for adult victims, remained 
insufficient. The anti-trafficking committee did not meet or conduct 
any activities for the second consecutive year. Therefore Burkina Faso 
was downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List. 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase efforts to vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict 
traffickers, including those who exploit children in forced begging, 
and complicit officials, while respecting due process, and sentence 
convicted traffickers to significant prison terms, as prescribed in 
the 2008 anti-trafficking law. • Collaborate with international 
organizations and foreign donors to adopt and implement a handover 
protocol for children associated with non-state armed groups and 
establish a reintegration program for those children. • Increase the 
availability of shelter and services for all victims, including adults. • 
Train law enforcement and military officials on the standard operating 
procedures to identify victims among vulnerable populations, 
including women in commercial sex, children associated with non-
state armed groups, and Cuban medical professionals, and refer 
them to protective services. • Train law enforcement, prosecutors, 
and judicial officials on investigating and prosecuting trafficking 
cases, including cases that do not involve movement. • Increase 
nationwide trafficking data collection on law enforcement and victim 
identification efforts. • Investigate and prosecute recruitment agencies 
suspected of fraudulently recruiting women for exploitation abroad. 
• Increase funding and resources for police and security force units 
charged with investigating trafficking crimes. • Increase funding and 
in-kind support, as feasible, for victim services, including long-term 
services and social reintegration. • Work with NGOs to raise awareness 
of trafficking, especially forced begging in Quranic schools and 
trafficking that does not involve movement. • Improve coordination 
among the anti-trafficking and child protection committees by 
providing funding or in-kind resources, convening regularly, and 
sharing data. • Draft, approve, and implement a national action 
plan to combat trafficking.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained insufficient law enforcement efforts. 








and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of five to 10 years’ 
imprisonment and fines of 1 million to 5 million West African CFA 
francs (FCFA) ($1,890-$9,450) for offenses involving a victim over the 
age of 15, and 11 to 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 2 million 
to 10 million FCFA ($3,780-$18,900) for those involving a victim 
15 years old or younger. These penalties were sufficiently stringent 
and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. 
Insecurity across the country hindered the government’s collection 
of law enforcement statistics. The government reported initiating 
one investigation in which police dismantled a child sex trafficking 
network during the reporting period; police arrested 15 alleged 
traffickers, including six Senegalese citizens. This compared to 
reporting zero investigations during the previous reporting period. 
For the second consecutive year, the government did not report 
any prosecutions or convictions of traffickers. However, media 
reported the government continued prosecution of one alleged 
foreign child sex tourist during the reporting period who had been 
detained since October 2019. The government did not report any 
investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government officials 
complicit in human trafficking offenses; however, corruption and 
official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, 
inhibiting law enforcement action during the year. In the past, 
authorities alleged some officials exerted pressure over police and 
the judiciary to drop labor trafficking cases, especially in the mining 
sector. In July 2018, a federal court in New York entered a default 
judgment against a former Burkina Faso diplomat who had been 
assigned to Burkina Faso’s Mission to the UN. In October 2019, the 
court awarded the plaintiff approximately $784,000. The plaintiff 
(the diplomat’s former domestic worker) had alleged, among other 
things, violations of the TVPA and federal and state labor laws 
after his employer allegedly forced him to work long hours under 
intolerable conditions. The judgment appears to remain unpaid 
and the government did not to report taking any actions to hold the 
diplomat accountable for the second consecutive year. 
The government did not provide specialized anti-trafficking training 
to law enforcement officials, in part due to the pandemic, compared 
to its training of 250 police officers and gendarmes in the previous 
reporting period. The government continued to implement the 2019 
law enforcement cooperation agreement with Cote d’Ivoire and the 
2019 tripartite agreement on transnational child trafficking with 
Togo and Benin. The government cooperated with the governments 
of Cote d’Ivoire and Togo to identify and repatriate victims to their 
countries of origin.
PROTECTION
The government decreased efforts to identify and protect victims. 
During the reporting period, the government did not report identifying 
any trafficking victims, but did report identifying 380 potential 
trafficking victims. This compared to identifying 114 child forced 
labor victims and 1,628 potential victims during the previous 
reporting period. According to media and government reports, 
police in Central Burkina Faso identified 70 children ages 11 to 16 
years old en route to potential exploitation in mining sites in Mali, 
Equatorial Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, and Senegal. In August 2020, the 
Ministry of Women launched its third campaign to remove vulnerable 
children from the street, including talibés (Quranic students) exploited 
in forced begging. As a result of the campaign, the government 
identified and provided care to 275 vulnerable children and 35 
women, including potential trafficking victims, compared to 1,578 
vulnerable children identified and provided care as part of this 
campaign in the previous reporting period. As previously reported, 
the Ministry of Women did not involve law enforcement in the 
campaign, limiting subsequent investigations and prosecutions of 
traffickers. The government provided shelter and services including 
family reintegration, counseling, education, and medical services 
as needed to children identified during the campaign. Authorities 
and front-line responders effectively implemented standard victim 
identification and referral procedures in the regions where training 
had occurred. In addition, the government had a case management 
guide for law enforcement and social services personnel to facilitate 
the uniform referral of child victims of crime, including trafficking, to 
care. The government continued to coordinate with an international 
organization to screen for trafficking indicators among refugees 
and IDPs.
The government operated and staffed two shelters in Ouagadougou 
for victims of crime, including trafficking victims; the shelters were 
open 24 hours per day, provided food and medical assistance, and 
could accommodate long-term stays for both adults and children. 
The government did not report the number of trafficking victims, if 
any, it referred to the shelters during the reporting period. Outside 
of the capital, the Ministry of Women operated 34 regional centers 
for victims of crime that provided psycho-social, and food assistance. 
These centers provided short-term services, but usually not shelter, 
to an unknown number of Burkinabe and foreign child trafficking 
victims; the centers operated during weekly business hours and when 
they had sufficient funding, although the centers could provide 
short-term shelter to some adults and children when necessary. The 
short-term centers relied heavily on local NGOs and international 
organizations for the majority of support. When trafficking victims 
outside of Ouagadougou required shelter, authorities nearly 
always placed victims with host families or an NGO. Outside of 
Ouagadougou, there were no shelters or services specifically for 
adults. Long-term care for all victims remained inadequate. The 
government acknowledged victim services were insufficient, and 
service providers lacked the funding and resources to support victim 
protection, rehabilitation, and reintegration; the lack of victim 
support subsequently resulted in traffickers being able to exploit 
many victims again. The government did not report allocating 
funding for victim services for the second year in a row. However, 
the government allocated 233 billion FCFA ($440.5 million) to 
its humanitarian response plan intended to provide shelter, food, 
essential household items, and sanitary supplies to 2.9 million 
vulnerable people, including potential trafficking victims, in conflict-
affected areas. The 2015 law on the prevention and repression of 
violence against women and girls mandated measures for victim 
support, including the establishment of free emergency integrated 
support centers to offer comprehensive services for women and girl 
victims of violence, including sex trafficking, and the creation of a 
government support fund for victims. The government had one such 
center in operation during the reporting period. The government did 
not report how many victims it referred to this center or provided 
support from the fund during the reporting period. 
The government encouraged victims to participate in trials against 
their traffickers by providing protection through the Ministry of 
Women and a regional human rights office. The 2008 anti-trafficking 
law and 2018 penal code revisions contained provisions to protect 
victims’ identities and encourage their participation in prosecutions 
by allowing for closed sessions to hear victim testimony, excusing 
victims from appearing at hearings, and for social workers to 
accompany child victims. The government did not report if it utilized 
these provisions during the reporting period. Victims could file 
civil suits against their traffickers; however, victims were often not 
aware of this provision and it was not utilized during the reporting 
period. Foreign victims who faced hardship or retribution in their 
country of origin could apply for asylum, but there were no reports 
trafficking victims applied for asylum during the reporting period. The 
government facilitated repatriation of 42 Burkinabe trafficking victims 
identified in Cote d’Ivoire by providing financial assistance, travel 
documents, and reintegration support. The government coordinated 
with the Nigerian and Nigerien embassies in Ouagadougou and 
provided travel documentation to repatriate trafficking victims 
to Nigeria and more than 100 vulnerable people to Niger; the 
government provided shelter services and financial assistance to 
repatriate five child trafficking victims identified in 2019 to Togo. 
There were no reports the government penalized victims for crimes 
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their traffickers compelled them to commit; however, without 
uniform implementation of victim identification measures, including 
among vulnerable populations, authorities may have detained some 
unidentified victims. The government detained 10 children ages 12 
to 14 years old for alleged association with violent extremist groups, 
some of whom may have been trafficking victims. Authorities held all 
10 children in a high security prison separately from adult detainees 
and allowed international organizations and NGOs access to provide 
specialized care, including legal services. In many cases, authorities 
held detainees, including children allegedly associated with violent 
extremist groups, without charge or trial for longer periods than the 
maximum sentence for the alleged offense; this included terrorism 
cases. Detainees, including children allegedly associated with violent 
extremist groups, faced harsh conditions, including inadequate food 
and water, and poor sanitation, heating, ventilation, lighting, and 
medical care. Since 2019, security forces and prison authorities have 
transferred 14 boys detained for alleged association with armed 
groups ages 10 to 16 years old to the Ministry of Women for care; 
the government did not report how many boys it transferred to the 
ministry during the reporting period. The government, with the 
support of an international organization, drafted a handover protocol 
on children associated with non-state armed groups; however, the 
government did not finalize the protocol by the end of the reporting 
period. During the reporting period, the government released six 
children formerly associated with armed groups to an international 
organization; the organization provided family tracing, reunification, 
and family reintegration support. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained insufficient efforts to prevent trafficking. 
The Ministry of Women, also responsible for the government’s 
response to the humanitarian crisis, nominally led the national 
anti-trafficking coordination committee established to coordinate 
government anti-trafficking efforts. However, the committee did not 
meet or conduct capacity building activities during the reporting 
period and continued to lack the resources to plan future initiatives or 
take proactive measures to combat trafficking. Due to the pandemic, 
the hybrid government-NGO working group for child protection, 
which the government previously used to coordinate and share 
information on child protection and child trafficking issues, did 
not operate during the reporting period. Sub-committees of the 
national anti-trafficking committee at the regional, provincial, 
and departmental levels coordinated local efforts and helped raise 
awareness of child protection issues, including trafficking; police, social 
workers, transit companies, NGOs, and other regional stakeholders 
participated in the sub-committees. However, the committees lacked 
resources for day-to-day operations and also did not meet during 
the reporting period. The government did not report allocating any 
funding to these sub-committees in the reporting period. Prior to 
its third annual operation to remove vulnerable children from the 
street in Bobo-Dioulasso in August 2020, the government increased 
engagement with stakeholders, including religious and traditional 
leaders and mayors, on the dangers of child forced begging. The 
Ministry of Women signed an agreement with 119 Quranic teachers 
to stop the practice of child forced begging; in exchange for the loss 
of income from street begging, the government donated 70 tons 
of food and supplies, valued at 20 million FCFA ($37,810). The 
government sensitized 5,395 people on children’s rights during this 
operation. The government also consulted 400 Quranic teachers 
in Dori, Bobo-Dioulasso, and Ouagadougou in January 2021 on 
combating child forced begging.
The government continued to implement its 2019-2023 national 
strategy to end the worst forms of child labor, which included 
child trafficking, along with the 2020-2021 operational action plans 
and 2020-2024 national strategy for child protection. During the 
reporting period, the government established a national committee 
responsible for coordinating the government’s efforts to combat 
the worst forms of child labor, including potential cases of child 
trafficking; the committee met twice during the reporting period. The 
government conducted labor inspections but could not access all 
regions of the country due to insecurity; the government did not report 
identifying any potential trafficking victims during the inspections. 
The government issued approximately two million identity cards in 
2020 to local populations, including rural communities and IDPs. 
The Ministry of Women continued to operate a hotline to report 
cases of violence against children, including trafficking. The hotline 
operated every day from 7:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. in French and five 
other languages. The government reported identifying 78 vulnerable 
children, including potential trafficking victims, as a result of calls to 
the hotline. The government did not report any policies to prevent 
the fraudulent recruitment or exploitation of Burkinabes abroad. 
The government did not report any efforts to reduce the demand 
for commercial sex acts. The government did not report providing 
anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
domestic and foreign victims in Burkina Faso, and traffickers exploit 
victims from Burkina Faso abroad. Traffickers fraudulently recruit 
Burkinabe children under the pretext of educational opportunities 
and instead force them to labor as farm hands, gold panners and 
washers in artisanal mines, street vendors, and domestic servants. 
In some cases, parents know their children will be exploited in 
domestic servitude but allow the exploitation to supplement the 
family income. An international organization estimates between 
200,000-300,000 children work in artisanal mining sites, some of 
whom may be trafficking victims. Unscrupulous Quranic teachers 
force or coerce children to beg in Quranic schools, sometimes with 
parents’ knowledge. According to a 2016 survey, 9,313 children are 
living in the streets of Ouagadougou, of which 46 percent are talibés 
vulnerable to forced or coerced begging. Traffickers exploit girls in 
sex trafficking in Ouagadougou and in mining towns. Traffickers 
transport Burkinabe children—including orphan street children—to 
Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Senegal, and Niger for forced labor—including 
in artisanal mining, forced begging, and cocoa production—or 
sex trafficking. Traffickers recruit women for ostensibly legitimate 
employment in Lebanon, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and—to a lesser 
extent—Europe, and subsequently force them into commercial sex. 
Traffickers also exploit Burkinabe women in domestic servitude in 
the Middle East. In 2018, an international organization repatriated 
approximately 588 Burkinabe adults from Libya, some of whom 
traffickers exploited in forced labor in construction and agriculture 
and sex trafficking in Libya, compared to 845 in 2017. 
Between September 2019 and December 2020, the number of IDPs 
in Burkina Faso grew from nearly 300,000 people to more than 
one million people, an increase of more than 200 percent. Violent 
extremist groups continue to exploit women and children, including 
IDPs, in forced labor and sex trafficking. In addition, violent extremist 
groups allegedly coerced individuals to carry out attacks and otherwise 
act as accomplices. The government reported violent extremist groups 
recruited and used child soldiers during the reporting period. School 
closures, regional instability, and economic vulnerability increase 
children’s susceptibility to trafficking and recruitment by armed 
groups. Burkina Faso is a transit country for traffickers transporting 
children from Mali to Cote d’Ivoire and women and girls from Cote 
d’Ivoire to Saudi Arabia, and it is a transit country for Ghanaian 
migrants traveling to Libya and Italy, some of whom are trafficking 
victims. Traffickers exploit children from neighboring countries, 
including Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria, in 
forced labor and sex trafficking. Traffickers fraudulently recruit women 
from other West African countries for employment in Burkina Faso 
and subsequently exploit them in sex trafficking and forced labor in 
restaurants or domestic service. Sex traffickers exploit Nigerian girls 
in Burkina Faso. Cuban medical professionals working in Burkina 
Faso may have been forced to work by the Cuban government. In 
past years, authorities have identified Sri Lankan citizens transiting 









The Government of Burma does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making 
significant efforts to do so, even considering the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Burma remained on Tier 3. During the reporting period, there was 
a government policy or pattern of use of children for forced labor by 
the military. The international monitor-verified use of children in labor 
and support roles by certain military battalions increased in conflict 
zones, predominantly in Rakhine and Kachin States. Additionally, 
the military continued to rely on local communities to source labor 
and supplies, thereby perpetuating conditions enabling the forced 
labor of adults and children. Enduring military conflict with ethnic 
armed organizations (EAOs) in several areas in the country and the 
February 1, 2021, military coup that deposed the democratically 
elected government continued to dislocate hundreds of thousands 
of people, most of them from ethnic minority communities, and 
political dissidents, many of whom were at risk of human trafficking 
in Burma and elsewhere in the region as a result of their displacement. 
Despite the lack of significant efforts, the government took some 
steps to address trafficking. It continued to investigate, prosecute, 
and convict traffickers, including complicit officials, and achieved 
a significant number of convictions; formally adopted national 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the return, reintegration, 
and rehabilitation of trafficking victims; and continued to identify 
and improve some protection services to trafficking victims. The 
government also issued military directives against the recruitment and 
use of children for combat and non-combat roles, and it continued 
to grant formal permission to the UN to enter into child soldier 
demobilization agreements with EAOs. The government also created 
policies and practices to increase and streamline the demobilization 
of child soldiers from the military, but some soldiers were reportedly 
discharged without following agreed upon procedures with the UN. 
However, investigations and prosecutions of traffickers decreased 
substantially during the reporting period due to pandemic-related 
limitations and in the wake of the military initiated coup, leading 
police to identify fewer trafficking victims. 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Cease official involvement in compelling civilians to perform any 
type of forced labor for the military by fully implementing associated 
military command orders against all forms of forced labor, and by 
prosecuting, convicting, and imprisoning any officials involved in the 
practice. • Cease all unlawful recruitment and use of children by armed 
forces, including in non-combatant roles, and continue cooperation 
with the UN to facilitate ending recruitment and use of children by 
the military and EAOs. • Initiate the issuance of high-security identity 
documents, with a nationwide priority of issuance to children, to 
prevent the use of counterfeit documents by children attempting to 
enlist in the military at the behest of their families or civilian brokers. 
• Strengthen efforts to identify, prosecute, and convict civilian brokers 
and military and other officials complicit in the unlawful recruitment 
and use of child soldiers, and impose significant prison terms. • 
Finalize implementing regulations for the Child Rights Law, and in 
particular those related to accountability for crimes involving the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers. • Expand formal procedures to 
proactively identify and protect victims among vulnerable populations, 
including communities displaced by conflict and internal migrants 
working in the fishing and agricultural sectors, using the new national 
referral mechanism. • Widely distribute to relevant authorities at the 
national and local levels SOPs on victim return, reintegration, and 
rehabilitation, and adequately train field officers, local administrators, 
and service providers on their implementation. • Grant UN agencies and 
humanitarian organizations immediate, safe, and unhindered access, 
including humanitarian access across the country, especially to Rakhine, 
Chin, Kachin, and Shan States as well as throughout southeast Burma. 
• Provide legal status to stateless persons and facilitate high security 
official identity documents to stateless persons and other vulnerable 
populations in Burma to decrease their vulnerability to trafficking. • 
Eliminate restrictions on freedom of movement for all populations 
in Burma, including internally displaced members of ethnic minority 
groups. • Amend the anti-trafficking law to explicitly state that a 
demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion is not required to constitute 
a child sex trafficking crime. • In partnership with civil society, increase 
the capacity of relevant ministries to enforce labor laws, raise public 
awareness on deceptive recruitment and safe job placement channels, 
and proactively prevent and detect forced labor in the agricultural, 
extractive, domestic work, and fishing sectors. • Increase training of 
police and border, judicial, social service personnel on anti-trafficking 
laws and victim identification, referral, and assistance best practices. • 
Continue work toward establishing a comprehensive criminal justice 
record-keeping system to track data on anti-trafficking investigations, 
prosecutions, convictions, and sentencing. • Strengthen efforts to 
prioritize and increase resources available for victim protection, 
including victim shelters, provision of services for male victims, and 
reintegration support for former child soldiers.
PROSECUTION
The government largely maintained law enforcement efforts. The 
2005 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law criminalized all forms of 
labor trafficking and some forms of sex trafficking and prescribed 
penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine for trafficking 
offenses involving male victims, and penalties of 10 years’ to life 
imprisonment for trafficking offenses involving female or child 
victims. These punishments were sufficiently stringent and, with 
regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for 
other serious crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent with international law, 
the 2005 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law required a demonstration 
of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex trafficking crime 
and therefore did not criminalize all forms of child sex trafficking. 
However, in July 2019, parliament enacted the Child Rights Law, which 
criminalized all forms of child sex trafficking, thereby addressing this 
gap. The law prescribed penalties of one to 10 years’ imprisonment 
and a fine of 1 million to 2 million kyat ($754-$1,510), which were 
also sufficiently stringent and commensurate with those prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as rape. Forced labor, including the 
recruitment and use of children in military non-combatant roles is a 
criminal offense under the 2005 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law, the 
2012 Wards and Village Tracts Administration Act, Section 374 of the 
Penal Code, and the Child Rights Law. The military continued to cite 
provisions in military law to punish individuals who used or recruited 
children for forced labor in non-combat roles; punishments included 
demotions, pension reductions, and geographic reassignments, which 
were disproportionately low compared to the seriousness of the crime. 
Authorities drafted legislation in late 2019 to replace the 2005 anti-
trafficking law in an effort to criminalize all forms of trafficking in 
accordance with international standards and expand law enforcement 
mandates for certain interagency stakeholders; the draft remained 
pending at the end of the reporting period. 
To curb the spread of the pandemic, the Supreme Court of the Union 
suspended all civil and criminal cases, including trafficking cases, for 
several months during the reporting period, which led to delayed trials 
for all cases, including human trafficking cases. Some law enforcement 
actions—including investigations—criminal justice procedures, and 
trials were also delayed or hindered as police, prosecutors, and court 




temporarily closed; some witnesses were unable to appear in court 
due to pandemic-related restrictions and lockdowns. Nevertheless, 
the government continued to use a database maintained by the Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Division (ATIDP) to track trafficking cases, but 
the database was not comprehensive and did not include trafficking 
cases recorded by all justice sector actors. In 2020, the government 
reported it initiated investigations into 93 trafficking cases, a substantial 
decrease from 207 trafficking cases it investigated in 2019. According 
to ATIPD, these investigations included 68 cases of forced marriage 
with indicators of labor or sex trafficking, four of forced labor, seven 
of “forced prostitution,” and one of “forced surrogacy” involving 
indicators of sexual exploitation. From January to December 2020, 
the government also reported initiating prosecutions of 96 cases under 
the anti-trafficking law, 82 of which were pending trial as of the end 
of December 2020. There were 297 suspects associated to these cases 
and this compared with 624 suspects prosecuted in 2019. For the 
second consecutive year, the government provided comprehensive 
conviction and sentencing data. During the reporting period, the 
government convicted 201 traffickers, who received sentences ranging 
from one year and eight months to 20 years in prison. Additionally, 
the government acquitted 22 perpetrators, discharged 11, and found 
130 guilty in absentia. The number of traffickers convicted in 2020 
increased from the 163 total convicted traffickers in 2019. Like in 
previous years, the government reported it continued to prosecute 
brokers for crimes involving illegal recruitment practices under the 
Overseas Employment Act, but it did not report specific statistics on 
convictions of brokers under this law. 
The Union Attorney General’s Office (UAGO) continued to maintain 
anti-trafficking coordinators in 70 prosecutorial districts to collect and 
report data and provide advice to colleagues prosecuting trafficking cases 
in their districts. The ATIPD maintained 60 dedicated anti-trafficking 
task force (ATTF) police units throughout the country in 2020; there 
were 69 squads formed under the regional ATTF units, which included 
dedicated child-protection units and squads. Burma’s Central Body 
for the Suppression of Trafficking in Persons (CBTIP) coordinated the 
government’s anti-trafficking efforts, including training for government 
personnel. However, the government canceled nearly all in-person 
training programs during the reporting period due to the pandemic; 
the government lacked sufficient infrastructure, especially at the state 
and local levels, to conduct adequate virtual trainings for officials. 
Despite these challenges, ATIPD – with support from an international 
organization and an NGO – delivered five capacity building programs 
focused on victim support to 174 participants from the government 
and civil society organizations. The government also partnered with a 
foreign government to provide training to 43 prosecutors on techniques 
for interviewing victims and witnesses, including trafficking victims. 
The Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief, and Resettlement (MSWRR) 
held a video conference on human trafficking issues for 14 senior 
security officials in December 2020. Despite these trainings, interagency 
coordination remained a challenge. Limited training and capacity for 
non-specialized Myanmar Police Force (MPF) officers, coupled with 
regular law enforcement turnover and limited resources, continued 
to hamper the success of some investigations and prosecutions. Some 
civil society organizations observed in prior years that non-specialized 
police officers were sometimes unaware of how to pursue human 
trafficking investigations without consulting ATTF; it is therefore 
possible that authorities turned away some victims of human trafficking 
when attempting to report their cases. Law enforcement and justice 
sector officials had limited or no ability to exercise their investigative 
mandates in geographic areas not controlled by the government. The 
government continued to cooperate with law enforcement agencies in 
China, Thailand, and Vietnam during the reporting period. 
Some government and law enforcement officers reportedly participated 
in, facilitated, or profited from human trafficking, and the law 
enforcement response to official complicity was mixed. Corruption 
and impunity reportedly continued to hinder law enforcement in 
general; this included police officers and other public officials accepting 
bribes, as well as individuals claiming to have ties to high-level officials 
purportedly pressuring victims not to seek legal redress against their 
traffickers in some cases. There were credible allegations during the 
reporting period that police and other officials received kickbacks for 
allowing brothels and other locations that facilitated commercial sex, 
including potential sex trafficking, to operate. The government reported 
two criminal case investigations initiated during the reporting period 
in which government officials were allegedly complicit in trafficking 
crimes. In mid-2020, the government initiated the investigation and 
prosecution of a commissioned military officer – and his spouse – for 
facilitating the marriage of a Burmese girl to a Chinese man, which 
involved indicators of sex and labor trafficking; the government court-
martialed the officer and charged him under the 2005 Anti-Trafficking 
in Persons law in civilian court. The prosecution was ongoing at the 
end of the reporting period. In September 2020, the ATIPD investigated 
a government official in Mandalay region for involvement in the 
trafficking and forced marriage of a 14-year-old girl to a Chinese 
national residing in Burma; the investigation was ongoing at the end 
of the reporting period. In December 2020, the government convicted 
a military officer and two co-conspirators for facilitating the forced 
marriage of and subjecting a girl in China to trafficking – a case that 
was initiated in 2019; the government sentenced the officer to 10 
years in prison. In a separate case first initiated in June 2019, the 
government continued to pursue a case of a military captain and five 
other perpetrators for their alleged role in facilitating the forced labor 
of a Burmese woman in China; at the end of the reporting period, the 
military officer was pending trial in a civilian court for charges under 
the 2005 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Law. 
Although the 2019 Child Rights Law strengthened penalties for any 
individual who, knowingly or through “failure to inspect,” engaged in 
child soldier recruitment or use, authorities did not report implementing 
the law during the reporting period. In the previous reporting period, 
some international observers expressed concern that Burma’s array 
of relevant laws were insufficient to adequately deter commission of 
child soldier-related crimes. The constitutionally guaranteed power 
of the military continued to limit the ability of the government to 
address cases of adult forced labor and child soldier recruitment and 
use by the armed forces. Burmese law provided for separate judicial 
procedures for military personnel accused of criminal misconduct. 
During the reporting period, international observers reported that the 
military continued to forcibly use children in non-combat, support 
roles, such as camp maintenance, construction work, paddy harvest, 
and as guides, predominantly in one township in Rakhine state, as 
well as in—in limited reported instances—hostilities. The government 
reported only punishing one military warrant officer for committing 
these criminal acts in 2020, though no information on the punishment 
was made available. In 2019, the Ministry of Defense (MOD) reported 
taking disciplinary action against 18 military personnel for child 
soldier recruitment, penalties that included reprimands impacting 
promotion, service recognition, and pensions. As in the previous 
reporting period, the MOD did not report punitive measures for military 
personnel guilty of subjecting adults to forced labor within Burma. In 
past years, most of these cases reportedly culminated in reprimands, 
fines, or pension reduction – penalties significantly less than those 
prescribed by criminal law. As in the previous reporting period, the 
government did not report if it prosecuted civilians involved in the 
recruitment of child soldiers.
PROTECTION
The government demonstrated uneven victim protection efforts. 
During the reporting period, the CBTIP formally adopted national 
SOPs for the return, reintegration, and rehabilitation of trafficking 
victims and circulated them to all relevant ministries. CBTIP offered 
six virtual trainings on the SOPs for 183 government officials, along 
with the participation of anti-trafficking civil society organizations. 
During 2020, the police identified 118 trafficking victims, compared 
with 335 victims identified during the previous reporting period. 
The government’s national forced labor complaints mechanism, 
which went into effect in February 2020, received 58 complaints of 





if any of these complaints resulted in the identification of victims or 
criminal investigations. After the coup, there was a notable decline in 
the population reporting potential trafficking cases to ATIPD, which 
likely reflected growing distrust between the public and Burmese 
law enforcement that were involved in violent crackdowns against 
pro-democracy demonstrators. Authorities at times penalized some 
victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit—in 
part—due to a lack of awareness or implementation of victim screening 
procedures among some police and judicial officials. There was at least 
one reported instance in which the government penalized a victim 
during the reporting period; ATIPD reported that local police charged a 
trafficking victim with theft, but the state-level CBTIP chair ultimately 
suspended the criminal case once authorities officially identified the 
victim. In April 2020, the government released all Rohingya from 
detention centers who had previously been charged with immigration 
violations for traveling without proper identification. The government 
policy not to charge Rohingya with immigration violations continued 
through the end of January 2021, to the benefit of more than 200 
Rohingya—a population highly vulnerable to trafficking—who were 
returned to their places of origin in December 2020 and January 2021 
without facing charges. This policy changed after the military coup, 
as the military regime issued a directive for authorities to resume 
detention and legal actions against the Rohingya, including the threat 
of imprisonment on immigration-related charges.
The government continued to operate various services for trafficking 
victims through the CBTIP Central Fund for Trafficking Victim Support 
during the reporting period. Services in government facilities remained 
rudimentary, but authorities continued to allocate funding for trafficking 
victim protection services, psycho-social support, travel allowances, 
support for obtaining official documents, and assistance in returning to 
home communities. NGOs and foreign donors funded and facilitated 
delivery of most services available to trafficking victims. The government 
also maintained labor attachés in Malaysia, South Korea, Thailand, 
and elsewhere whose responsibilities included assisting trafficking 
victims abroad. The government continued to operate five “temporary 
shelters” for women and children who were victims of violent crime; 
all five could shelter trafficking victims, and one was dedicated to 
female trafficking victims. An additional new temporary shelter for 
trafficking victims remained under construction at the end of the 
reporting period; the government also began preliminary coordination 
during the reporting period with the Kachin State Government to 
obtain land for a new temporary shelter in Bamaw Township. The 
Department of Rehabilitation (DOR) under MSWRR continued to 
operate four transit centers for repatriated trafficking victims called 
“women’s vocational training centers.” Longer-term support was 
limited to vocational training for women and some former child 
soldiers in major city centers and border areas; the lack of adequate 
protective measures for victims, particularly males, increased their risk 
of re-trafficking. During the reporting period, the MSWRR provided 
direct rehabilitation assistance, including vocational training, to 331 
trafficking victims, which included 136 men and 195 women. However, 
civil society organizations reported that the small number of MSWRR 
case workers and overall low capacity limited MSWRR officials from 
following up with victims after providing them with vocational training 
and financial assistance. From April to December 2020, the DOR—in 
partnership with international, local, and civil society organizations 
and with some funding from foreign governments—also provided 
assistance to 313 trafficking victims, most of whom were repatriated 
from abroad. These victims included 195 female victims of sex or labor 
trafficking through forced marriages in China; five women exploited 
in Thailand; 106 male economic migrants exploited in Thailand; three 
women exploited in Mongolia; and four women exploited in Burma. 
The government also coordinated with authorities in Wa State, a non-
government-controlled area, to assist eight Vietnamese sex trafficking 
victims in border towns along the Burma-China border during the 
reporting period.
Trafficking victims frequently declined to cooperate with authorities 
due to the lack of adequate victim protection or compensation 
programs, language barriers, a lengthy and opaque trial process, fear 
of repercussions from their traffickers, and general mistrust of the legal 
system. A cumbersome investigative process sometimes required victims 
to give statements multiple times to different officials, increasing the 
likelihood of re-traumatization; however, the authorities’ increased 
use of police-prosecutor guidelines on trafficking case cooperation 
reportedly generated some improvement to this trend. Nevertheless, 
victims were not required to cooperate with law enforcement authorities 
in order to receive protection services. The government continued 
to implement a court program—initiated in 2019—allowing video 
testimony for victims, but only two courts utilized video interviews 
during the reporting period. Civil society organizations reported that 
courts lacked clear SOPs and alternative victim testimony options, 
which resulted in judicial officials requiring some underage victims to 
provide testimony in open court. The government did not provide legal 
alternatives to the removal of foreign victims to countries where they 
may face hardship or retribution, nor did it provide temporary legal 
status to any foreign victims, although foreign victims were entitled 
to temporary shelter while awaiting repatriation. 
The government did not adequately institute measures to protect 
children and adults from being recruited and used for forced labor by 
military and civilian brokers and recruiters. Prior to the military coup, 
credible reports of the military’s forcible recruitment and use of children 
increased, primarily in non-combat support roles, predominantly by 
one battalion in one township of Rakhine state. After the coup, credible 
allegations of military use of adults and children for forced labor 
surfaced in the media and on social media. International monitors 
confirmed more than 300 cases of child recruitment or use by the 
military, with nearly all of them attributed to two large-scale incidents 
of use of children in Rakhine State. Recruitment methods included 
deception, force, and coercion by both informal civilian and military 
brokers, as well as intake of minors joining at the behest of their 
families. In July 2020, the military released from its ranks 26 soldiers 
who were previously recruited as children and provided rehabilitation 
and reintegration services and 500,000 kyat ($377) to each former 
soldier. The military also agreed to release an additional 22 soldiers 
who were previously recruited as children in November 2020, including 
three who were released under the military “benefit of the doubt” 
policy since their age could not be verified. This is compared with the 
military removing from its ranks at least 22 children and young men 
suspected of being recruited as minors during the previous reporting 
period (75 in 2018; 49 in 2017; and 112 in 2016). However, overall 
government support to demobilized child soldiers remained limited 
in absolute value, with most services provided by civil society partners. 
The government continued to implement the “benefit of the doubt” 
policy, under which the military agreed to immediately demobilize 
any individuals serving without proof of age upon suspicion of minor 
status, rather than waiting on age verification. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. In January 2021, CBTIP 
finalized and dedicated resources to an anti-trafficking 2021 annual 
work plan that outlined preventative efforts, which accompanied the 
government’s 2017-2021 national plan of action to combat human 
trafficking. During the reporting period, CBTIP and ATIPD organized 
417 awareness raising campaigns—many with the support of local 
and international organizations—through print media, television, 
billboards, distribution of pamphlets and educational materials, 
and in-person events for more than 36,000 people. The Ministry of 
Transportation and Telecommunications supported efforts by mobile 
telephone operators to send anti-trafficking awareness messages to 
subscribers in certain areas of the country. Authorities collaborated 
with an international organization to raise awareness on safe migration 
to decrease vulnerability to trafficking abroad. During the reporting 
period, the government participated in regional anti-trafficking forums, 
including the virtual Coordinate Mekong Ministerial Initiative against 
Trafficking (COMMIT) Regional Task Force and the 14th Senior Official 
Meetings (SOM14) hosted by the Government of Vietnam, as well as 
the Bali Process. The ATIPD maintained four anti-trafficking hotlines, 




with information on trafficking during the reporting period; it reported 
that from April to December 2020, ATIPD received 1,326 calls through 
its hotlines, which led to one trafficking investigation. 
A 2014 directive prohibiting the use of children by the military remained 
in place. In July 2020, the military ordered all regional commands to 
comply with this directive, prohibiting the recruitment of any child 
under the age of 18 or use of children for labor in military-owned 
shops, factories, or military facilities, as well as the use of schools and 
religious facilities as temporary military quarters. The military also 
issued a directive in August 2020 to meet Burma’s obligations under 
the UN joint action plan on the recruitment and use of children. 
The military reported that it trained 177 military personnel on these 
directives. The MOD reported in February 2021 that the military took 
action against one warrant officer who violated the military directives, 
but it did not report if the officer was punished for this violation. In 
August 2020, the government approved a National Action Plan for 
2020-2021 on the prevention of death, injury, and sexual harassment of 
children in armed conflict. In November 2020, the government formed 
the National Committee on Implementation of the Optional Protocol 
to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement 
of Children in Armed Conflict. The government continued to grant 
formal permission to the UN to enter into child soldier demobilization 
agreements with EAOs, which it did for the first time in the previous 
reporting period, addressing a longstanding recommendation from 
the international community; in November 2020, the UN virtually 
signed a joint action plan on grave violations against children with 
the EAO, Democratic Karen Benevolent Army. 
In previous years, Burmese fishermen had no formal channels through 
which to seek employment in the Thai fishing industry, and instead 
relied exclusively on unregulated brokerage networks that exacerbated 
their indebtedness and vulnerability to coercion at sea. To address this 
issue, Burma maintained a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
with Thailand to facilitate labor recruitment into the Thai fishing sector 
through a formalized, government-to-government hiring process. 
However, the MOU did not standardize or clarify the two countries’ 
disparate laws and policies on eligible recruitment fees and minimum 
wages, constraining meaningful implementation. Furthermore, most 
vessel owners were unaware of the new hiring system and continued to 
staff their crew through unregulated Thai and Burmese intermediaries 
charging high recruitment fees that continued to place Burmese 
fishermen at risk of debt-based coercion into forced labor. Some 
Burmese recruitment agencies avoided the hiring system altogether 
due to distrust of labor conditions in the Thai fishing sector and 
doubts concerning the capacity of the Thai authorities to enforce the 
MOU. The government also maintained an MOU with India, which 
was signed in February 2020, on anti-trafficking prevention initiatives 
and victim assistance, repatriation, and reintegration.
According to the 2014 census, approximately one quarter of Burma’s 
residents lacked access to citizenship or identity documents, significantly 
increasing their vulnerability to traffickers in Burma and in other 
countries. Authorities continued to offer a citizenship verification 
process pursuant to a 1982 law, but participation was low among 
Rohingya in Rakhine State amid concerns that the authorities 
might require these individuals to inaccurately list themselves as 
“Bengali,” a term that could potentially further limit their access 
to certain rights. Since late 2019 and during this reporting period, 
the government provided documents, including birth certificates, 
to some undocumented Rohingya, and it began accelerating certain 
citizenship verification processes. Immigration authorities continued 
to operate a mobile service center to issue these documents to residents 
of internally displaced persons (IDP) camps in Shan, Kachin, and 
Rakhine States. However, most Rohingya who received citizenship 
were naturalized—a distinction that afforded them fewer rights than 
full citizens. International observers were concerned provisions of 
the Child Rights Law would further codify statelessness for some 
groups. Government policies limiting freedom of movement in some 
jurisdictions continued to hinder access to employment and education 
for some communities, especially in IDP camps housing Rohingya 
and other ethnic minority groups, further aggravating economic 
conditions that may have contributed to individuals pursuing irregular 
migration and employment channels known to engender forced labor 
and sex trafficking.
The government reported opening investigations into 56 cases involving 
brokers or labor recruiters suspected of illegal recruitment practices 
under the Overseas Employment Act, prosecuting and convicting 
at least one case. Some civil society contacts characterized Burma 
labor inspection practices as untimely, unresponsive to complaints, 
and devoid of enforcement. Government officials noted a lack of 
adequate human resources, increasingly sophisticated document forgery 
techniques, conflict, and geographic remoteness constrained sufficient 
oversight into several sectors known or reported to be vulnerable 
to traffickers, including fishing, garment manufacturing and illegal 
logging. The government did not take steps to reduce the demand for 
commercial sex acts or child sex tourism. However, ATIPD continued to 
coordinate with the Ministry of Hotels and Tourism to raise awareness 
about child sex abuse in the tourism sector. The government postponed 
its regular anti-trafficking training to its diplomats and labor attaches 
during the reporting period because of the pandemic. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers subject men, 
women, and children to forced labor, and women and children to sex 
trafficking, both in Burma and abroad. There have also been limited 
reports of traffickers transporting foreign victims through Burma en 
route to other countries in Asia. Traffickers subject some Burmese men, 
women, and children who migrate for work abroad—particularly to 
Thailand and China, as well as other countries in Asia, the Middle 
East, and the United States—to forced labor or sex trafficking. The 
pandemic, however, caused thousands of economic migrants to return 
to Burma from abroad in 2020; traditional cross-border migration to 
Thailand and China decreased because of travel restrictions and border 
closures, which limited instances of irregular migration. Additionally, 
the economic devastation caused by the February 2021 coup created 
new patterns of economic migration in the country and increased 
financial hardship for a wide swatch of the country; economic distress 
combined with sharply deteriorating political stability also create the 
conditions for trafficking and exploitation. Traffickers force men to 
work domestically and abroad in fishing, manufacturing, forestry, 
agriculture, and construction, and they subject women and girls 
primarily to sex trafficking or forced labor in garment manufacturing 
and domestic service. NGOs continue to report instances of Burmese 
males transiting Thailand en route to Indonesia and Malaysia where 
traffickers subject them to forced labor, primarily in fishing and other 
labor-intensive industries. Recruitment agencies in Burma and other 
Southeast Asian countries lure fishermen with promises of high wages, 
charge fees and curtailment deposits to assign them fake identity and 
labor permit documents, and then send them to fish long hours in 
remote waters on vessels operating under complex multinational 
flagging and ownership arrangements. Senior crew aboard vessels 
in the Thai and Taiwanese fishing fleets subject some Burmese men 
to forced labor through debt-based coercion, passport confiscation, 
contract switching, wage garnishing and withholding, threats of 
physical or financial harm, or fraudulent recruitment; they also subject 
some to physical abuse and force them to remain aboard vessels in 
international waters for years at a time without coming ashore. Informal 
brokers also lure Burmese men onto offshore fishing and shrimping 
rafts in Burmese waters, where traffickers confine and physically 
abuse them to retain their labor for months at a time. There are some 
reports of boys subjected to forced labor in Burma’s fishing industry 
as well. Traffickers are increasingly transporting Burmese women 
to China and subjecting them to sex trafficking and forced labor in 
domestic service under the false pretense of marriage to Chinese men; 
Burmese government officials are occasionally complicit in this form 
of trafficking. Some traffickers abduct Rohingya women and children 
in transit while fleeing violence—and reportedly from refugee camps 
in Bangladesh—and sell them into sex trafficking and forced marriage 





indicative of forced labor. Companies operating under the auspices 
of the Japanese government’s “Technical Intern Training Program” 
have exploited Burmese nationals in forced labor in food processing, 
manufacturing, construction, and fishing. 
Within Burma, men, women, and children from predominantly ethnic 
minority areas – including an estimated 104,000 persons displaced by 
conflict in Kachin and northern Shan States, 16,000 persons displaced 
in southeast Burma, and at least 25,000 persons displaced in Rakhine 
and Chin States – are at increased risk of trafficking as of December 
31, 2020. Since the February 1, 2021 coup, due to continued fighting 
in ethnic areas, an additional 42,000 people have been displaced 
internally in southeast Burma and 7,000 people have fled across 
the border to seek refuge in Thailand, most of whom were returned 
to Burma. In Kachin and northern Shan States 14,000 people have 
been displaced by fighting. An unverified number of thousands have 
been displaced due to fighting in Chin State, and between 4,000-
6,000 refugees and asylum seekers have crossed to border to seek 
refuge in India’s Mizoram and Manipur States. Years of violence and 
ethnic conflict in Rakhine State continues to result in the migration 
of Rohingya, where many of them are at high risk of sex and labor 
trafficking—especially via transport to other countries for the purpose 
of economic migration. Children in Kachin and northern Shan States 
are particularly vulnerable to sex traffickers operating near the Chinese 
border. Human smuggling and trafficking networks reportedly prey 
on girls living in Rakhine IDP camps and subject them to forced labor 
and sex trafficking in Malaysia. Restrictions on IDP camp residents’ 
freedom of movement and employment, particularly among Rohingya 
communities, drive internal migration through irregular, unsafe 
channels known for trafficking vulnerabilities. Criminals in EAO-
controlled areas reportedly force children, especially boys, to serve as 
drug mules in Shan, Kachin, and Karen States. Absent oversight and 
enforcement measures in non-government controlled areas, often in 
border zones, women and girls from these border regions and elsewhere 
in Southeast Asia may be vulnerable to sex trafficking in casinos and 
Special Economic Zones owned or operated by EAOs and Chinese 
and Thai companies. Farming communities displaced following land 
confiscation by the military and private commercial entities are also 
at higher risk of exploitation due to ensuing economic hardships.
Approximately one quarter of the population in Burma does not have 
access to citizenship or identification documents, generating human 
trafficking risks that disproportionately affect ethnic minority groups – 
particularly in Kachin, Shan, and Rakhine States. In Kachin, displaced 
women and girls are also vulnerable to sex and labor trafficking, 
including forced concubinism leading to forced childbearing, via 
forced or fraudulent marriages to Chinese men arranged by deceptive or 
coercive brokers who use fraudulent offers of employment or promises 
of a better life; traffickers recruit victims through in-person connections, 
digital platforms, and—increasingly due to the pandemic—social 
media. One academic study found that 2,800 out of 5,000 Kachin and 
Shan women returning to Burma after experiencing forced marriage 
in China had also been subjected to forced childbearing. Rohingya 
individuals are at particularly high risk of labor trafficking in Rakhine 
state, including forced labor perpetrated by the military. Many women 
and girls among the estimated 740,000 Rohingya who fled from 
conflict in Rakhine State to neighboring Bangladesh since August 
2017 have been subjected to sex trafficking in Bangladesh and India. 
Ethnic Rakhine are reported to be victims of forced labor on the 
margins of conflict between the military and EAOs in Rakhine State. 
Traffickers subject members of Burma’s vulnerable populations to 
sex trafficking and forced labor in seasonal strawberry and longan 
harvesting, year-round orange farming, manufacturing in registered and 
unregistered factories, and construction of roads and city government 
facilities across the border in northwestern Thailand. Traffickers use 
deceptive recruitment tactics and immigration status-based coercion to 
subject migrant workers from Shan State to forced labor on sugarcane 
plantations in China’s Yunnan Province. Illegal logging operations near 
the Chinese border may subject local communities to forced labor.
Local traffickers use deceptive tactics to recruit men and boys into forced 
labor on oil palm, banana, and rubber plantations; in jade and precious 
stone mines; in bamboo, teak, rice, and sugarcane harvesting; and in 
riparian fishing. IDPs from the Sagaing, Bago, Irrawaddy, Mandalay, and 
Tanintharyi regions, as well as from Shan and Rakhine States, experience 
contract discrepancies, wage garnishing and withholding, forced and 
arbitrary cost-sharing of pesticides, penalty fees, coerced overtime, 
identity document retention, and restricted freedom of movement 
in banana plantations in Kachin State. Communities displaced by 
environmental degradation resulting from the establishment and 
operation of these plantations, which are often Chinese owned, are 
also vulnerable to trafficking, including on lands they previously 
occupied and through internal economic migration to other parts of 
the country. In Kachin State, men, women, and children are also at 
risk of forced labor in jade prospecting throughout refuse areas created 
by larger mining operations, as well as in road and dam construction. 
A majority of these prospectors are reportedly addicted to opiates or 
methamphetamines, which some traffickers—including members of 
EAOs and government-supported militias—may intentionally facilitate 
and exploit to retain their labor. Crime syndicates subject women and 
girls to sex trafficking in massage parlors located in close proximity to 
these refuse mining areas, often in partnership with local government 
and law enforcement officials. Many people displaced by violence in 
Rakhine State, including ethnic Rakhine, travel to Kachin State for this 
work. Forced eviction from new mining sites and resulting economic 
hardships make some communities in Kachin, Shan, and Kayin States 
more vulnerable to trafficking. Traffickers subject children to sex 
trafficking or to forced labor, at times through debt-based coercion, in 
teashops, small businesses, the agricultural and construction sectors, 
in domestic work, and in begging. Traffickers subject children and 
adults to forced domestic service. A small number of foreign child 
sex tourists exploit Burmese children.
Some military personnel, civilian brokers, informal civilian 
intermediaries, border guard officials, and EAOs continue to recruit 
or use child soldiers, particularly in conflict-affected ethnic areas. Ethnic 
minority groups in Burma—particularly internally displaced Rohingya, 
Rakhine, Shan, and Kachin communities—continued to be at elevated 
risk of forced labor as a result of longstanding armed conflict between 
the military and EAOs. EAOs continued their recruitment and use of 
child soldiers during the reporting period amid ongoing violence in 
several areas of the country. Civilian recruiters in some cases coerce 
or offer incentives to children or their families through false promises 
about working conditions, salary, and promotion opportunities. EAOs 
force men and boys to serve through intimidation, coercion, threats, 
arbitrary taxation, and violence. The military has employed the same 
tactics in the past, although most children identified in military 
service initially enter under the auspices of civilian brokers or enlist 
at the behest of their own families. The military may still deploy 
some child soldiers to the front-line as combatants. Military-backed 
militias are also involved in the recruitment and use of children in 
conflict settings. Some EAOs abduct or recruit children, including 
from IDP camps, to fight against the military. The military, informal 
civilian brokers, and some EAOs also use deception and various 
forms of coercion, including threats of financial and physical harm, to 
compel adult victims into short-term forced labor. Under the auspices 
of the legacy counter-insurgency strategy of “self-reliance,” some 
military authorities in areas with active conflict subject members of 
local populations—mostly men, but also women and children—to 
forced labor in portering, construction, cleaning, cooking, and public 
infrastructure projects. Reports of military-controlled forced labor and 
other abuses are highest among ethnic minority communities in the 
conflict zones within Shan, Rakhine, and Kachin States. Since the 
military coup in February 2021, similar tactics have been used across 
the country, including in majority Bamar regions.
The government operates as many as 47 prisons and 48 labor camps 
called “agriculture and livestock breeding career training centers” 
and “manufacturing centers,” respectively. The labor camps house 




prisoners. Eighteen of these camps feature government-managed 
mining operations. According to previous limited reporting, authorities 
at times may subject these incarcerated populations to unlawful 
prison labor or conditions with indicators of forced labor for private 
gain. Anti-LGBTQI+ laws place some LGBTQI+ individuals at higher 
risk of extortion and psychological coercion by law enforcement. 
Discriminatory hiring practices complicate access to formal sector 
employment for LGBTQI+ individuals and persons diagnosed with 
HIV/AIDS, forcing some to seek opportunities in unregulated sectors 
known for trafficking vulnerabilities – particularly among transgender 
persons in commercial sex.
BURUNDI: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Burundi does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. Considering the documented impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on the government’s anti-trafficking capacity, 
the government made key achievements during the reporting 
period; therefore Burundi was upgraded to Tier 2 Watch List. These 
achievements included the government significantly increasing 
investigations and prosecutions of suspected trafficking offenses, 
convicting traffickers for the first time in six years, and referring 
victims to assistance for the first time in six years. The government 
institutionalized anti-trafficking training for law enforcement, 
prosecutors, and judicial officials. The government developed and 
implemented the country’s first-ever national data collection system 
on law enforcement’s efforts to combat human trafficking and 
trained prosecutors, judicial officials, and law enforcement on its use. 
Despite these achievements, the government decreased the number 
of victims identified. The government continued to lack standard 
operating procedures to identify and refer victims to services and 
did not have adequate protection services available for victims. The 
government failed to allocate resources to complete implementation 
of the 2019-2020 National Action Plan (NAP) through the anti-
trafficking inter-ministerial committee. 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Implement the anti-trafficking law and significantly increase efforts 
to more effectively investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers. • 
Develop national-level data collection on law enforcement and victim 
identification efforts. • Investigate all credible accusations of official 
complicity and hold complicit officials criminally accountable. • 
Institutionalize anti-trafficking training—including training on case 
investigation and victim identification—for all law enforcement and 
on implementation of the anti-trafficking law for all prosecutors and 
judges. • Develop and provide training on national standardized 
procedures to allow for the systematic identification and referral 
of trafficking victims to appropriate care. • Expand protective 
services for victims through partnerships with NGOs, including by 
allocating resources and providing separate shelter for children and 
adults. • Devote sufficient resources to implement the 2019-2020 
national action plan. • Implement and consistently enforce strong 
regulations and oversight of labor recruitment companies, including 
by eliminating recruitment fees charged to migrant workers and 
holding fraudulent labor recruiters criminally accountable. • Finalize 
and implement bilateral labor negotiations with destination country 
governments on migrant worker rights. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained inadequate law enforcement efforts. 
Burundi’s 2014 anti-trafficking law criminalized sex trafficking and 
labor trafficking. The law prescribed penalties of five to 10 years’ 
imprisonment and a fine of 100,000 to 500,000 Burundian francs 
($54 to $270), and in cases involving children, the law prescribed 
penalties of 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 to 
two million Burundian francs ($270 to $1,080). These penalties were 
sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate 
with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. 
The government continued to lack a centralized data collection 
mechanism and did not systematically report law enforcement 
actions, making comprehensive statistics difficult to obtain. The 
government investigated eight cases and indicted 11 suspects in 2019, 
compared with 10 investigations and no indictments in 2018. The 
government did not convict any traffickers for the fifth consecutive 
year. All investigations in 2019 related to transnational trafficking. 
During the reporting period, the government released seven suspected 
traffickers in Cankuzo province that an NGO reported the government 
had arrested in 2018. The government did not report any updates on 
a case from 2018 in which airport immigration officials reportedly 
arrested a suspected trafficker for fraudulent recruitment in Qatar. 
Law enforcement reported collaborating with foreign police on 
trafficking-related cases; however, they did not report the details of 
such cases. Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes 
remained significant concerns, potentially inhibiting law enforcement 
action during the year; however, the government did not report any 
investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees 
complicit in human trafficking offenses. In 2018, the government 
reportedly arrested and initiated an investigation into a police officer 
for allegedly providing support to traffickers; the government did 
not report updates to this case during the reporting period. Security 
remained a concern for civil society organizations and individuals 
reporting allegations of complicity; anti-trafficking activists reported 
receiving threats, leading some to flee the country. In 2019, the 
Government of France convicted a former Burundian government 
minister and his spouse on forced labor charges for exploiting a 
domestic worker in their home in France. 
The government’s ad hoc inter-ministerial anti-trafficking committee 
collaborated with an international organization to provide anti-
trafficking training, including on the definition of trafficking, the 
anti-trafficking legal framework, identification of potential victims, 
and victim referral procedures to 50 immigration officials from 
Bujumbura and other provinces. However, the government reported 
a lack of capacity to provide adequate training for law enforcement 
agencies responsible for investigating trafficking crimes. Due to a 
lack of training on victim identification and referral procedures, 
observers continued to report that local police mischaracterized 
and arrested potential victims. Local police often did not refer the 
cases to the Burundian National Police’s Unit for the Protection of 
Minors and Morals, the lead investigative body for trafficking cases, 
which led to poor case investigations and limited prosecutions; 
officials’ lack of investigative skills and insufficient understanding 
of trafficking crimes continued to impede overall law enforcement 
efforts. The government also reported inadequate efforts to address 
internal trafficking, misunderstandings of the anti-trafficking law by 
judicial officials, and a lack of resources, which inhibited successful 
law enforcement efforts and judicial proceedings during the reporting 
period. 
PROTECTION
The government minimally increased protection efforts. The 
government did not maintain a centralized system to share victim 
identification and referral information between government 






comprehensive victim identification statistics. The government 
identified 372 victims; of these, 314 were identified abroad—including 
in Kenya, Saudi Arabia, Tanzania, and Uganda—compared to no 
identified victims in 2018. Of these cases, authorities reported 
identifying 58 victims en route to the Middle East but did not 
report information on what indicators of trafficking the victims 
experienced. The government has yet to report identifying a foreign 
national victim of trafficking domestically. The government did not 
report if it provided any identified victims with care or assistance. 
The government did not have SOPs for authorities to identify 
and refer trafficking victims to protection services, and many law 
enforcement officials lacked adequate training to identify potential 
victims. Stakeholders did not coordinate with each other and often 
conflated human trafficking with migrant smuggling and gender-
based violence (GBV), causing confusion and impeding coordination 
efforts. Civil society reported the referral process remained ad hoc, and 
they could not verify if victims were referred for services. However, 
civil society noted improved communication with government 
counterparts and an increase in proactive referrals of victims compared 
to previous reporting periods. Civil society continued to provide 
the vast majority of assistance to trafficking victims. In 2019, an 
international organization and its partners reported identifying 143 
child victims—20 girls and 123 boys. The international organization 
noted a likely underreporting of cases involving female victims. 
Separately, another international organization reported identifying 
113 victims, five of whom had been referred by the government 
to the organization. Of the other 108 identified victims, 16 were 
children (eight boys and eight girls) and 92 were adults (13 men 
and 79 women). Notably, 96 percent of the cases were identified 
as forced labor, including in agriculture, hospitality, construction, 
domestic work and childcare, begging, and peddling; only four percent 
of the identified cases involved sex trafficking. Both international 
organizations reported all identified victims were Burundian citizens. 
The government reported providing some assistance to Burundian 
victims abroad, including providing food and lodging for victims 
awaiting repatriation and updated travel documents. 
An overall lack of dedicated funding for victim protection measures 
continued to restrict the government’s ability to assist victims. The 
government continued to operate Humura Center in Gitega, which 
offered protection services to foreign and domestic victims of sexual 
abuse, GBV, and trafficking. The Humura Center continued to provide 
temporary shelter, medical care, and guidance on engaging with law 
enforcement and the judicial system and was accessible to victims 
with disabilities; however, the government reported that the center has 
never provided services to any victims of trafficking. Without financial 
support from the government, the Seruka Center continued as an 
NGO-run center in Bujumbura and provided medical and psycho-
social assistance, as well as legal assistance, to victims of various abuses, 
including human trafficking. The NGO reported victims returned to 
their families after a short stay at the shelter. In addition to the Seruka 
Center, there were four NGO-run shelters that trafficking victims could 
utilize. Adults and children, men and women, and foreign victims 
all had access to the same care. Some international organizations 
provided tailored services for female victims of abuse and trafficking, 
such as collaborating with temporary emergency care for first aid 
and temporary housing, providing family tracing and reunification, 
vocational training, solidarity groups, and school reintegration. 
The 2016 law for the protection of witnesses, victims, and the 
vulnerable required a centralized unit in the Ministry of Justice be 
created to coordinate witness protection for victims; however, the 
government did not report using these provisions for trafficking 
cases during the reporting period. Labor laws continued to lack 
sufficient protection for domestic workers or employees in the 
informal economy, leaving the population vulnerable to trafficking. 
Burundian law did not allow prosecutors to request restitution in 
trafficking cases. The law provided foreign trafficking victims with 
legal alternatives to their removal to countries where they may face 
hardship or retribution, subject to judicial decision, and allowed 
the government to grant temporary residency; the government did 
not report identifying any foreign victims who could benefit from 
this protection during the reporting period. Observers continued to 
report the government arrested victims for unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit and detaining them in jail for vagrancy, 
commercial sex, or other charges. 
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. The anti-trafficking 
committee led the government’s policy coordination and 
communication with civil society, but its ability to drive national 
anti-trafficking efforts continued to be limited by resource constraints. 
The government has yet to establish the Commission for Consultation 
and Monitoring on the Prevention and Suppression of Trafficking in 
Persons, mandated by the 2014 anti-trafficking act, which would take 
leadership over government efforts on prosecution, prevention, and 
protection. The government continued implementing the 2019-2020 
national action plan (NAP) despite limited funding. The government 
partnered with an international organization that funded and 
began a three-year national anti-trafficking program. In addition, in 
partnership with the international organization, the anti-trafficking 
committee delivered various awareness raising activities in February 
2020 that reached more than 2,000 people, including potential victims 
and first responders. The government’s anti-trafficking committee also 
requested and received training from an international organization on 
best practices for anti-trafficking coordination efforts, the identification 
and referral of victims to assistance, and prosecution procedures of 
trafficking cases. In December 2019, the anti-trafficking committee 
exchanged information with counterparts from the Government of 
Tunisia on promising practices to combat trafficking. The government 
did not have a national anti-trafficking hotline, but international 
organizations funded a national human rights hotline with operators 
trained to identify trafficking victims. NGOs also funded a hotline 
specifically for reporting human trafficking or child labor; details 
regarding the number of trafficking-related calls were unavailable. 
The government issued a decree waiving late birth registration fees 
and implemented a birth registration campaign, with support from 
an international organization; more than one million children were 
registered and received birth certificates. 
The government did not have effective policies or laws regulating 
labor recruiters. The national action plan included the proposed 
creation of a labor market regulation agency, but the government did 
not report its creation during the reporting period. The government 
reported contacting the Government of Saudi Arabia in an effort to 
increase the rights of Burundian migrant workers. The government 
reported initiating several bilateral labor agreements with destination 
countries; however, no formal agreements were finalized during the 
reporting period. Although the president and senior officials spoke 
out against commercial sex, the government made limited efforts to 
reduce the demand for commercial sex and did not make any efforts 
to reduce the demand for child sex tourism. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Burundi, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Burundi abroad. As the result of a complex political, economic, 
and security crisis that began in 2015, by February 2020, more than 
336,650 Burundians remained in neighboring countries as refugees, 
including, but not limited to, Tanzania, Rwanda, Uganda, and 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In 2019, the Government 
of Tanzania told refugees within its borders, a majority Burundian-
born, to return home and commenced an operation with the goal 
of repatriating some 200,000 Burundian refugees despite concerns 
that they faced a lack of protection and security. Many refugees, in 
fear of illegal arrests, deportation, and murder, departed Tanzania 
without formal assistance or adequate identity documentation. 
Returned refugees frequently lacked access to basic services and 




Burundi’s challenging security environment, endemic poverty, and 
low education levels create an opportunity for criminals, including 
traffickers, to take advantage of Burundians in precarious or desperate 
situations. Due to regional instability, observers sporadically report 
recruitment of children as young as 15 years old by armed groups who 
force them to participate in anti-government activities. In July 2015, 
traffickers recruited approximately 58 children, some younger than 15 
years old, and forced them to participate in an anti-government armed 
invasion in Kayanza Province, which was ultimately put down by the 
government; it was unclear if these children were armed. Between 
May and December 2015, an international organization reported 
allegations that Burundian refugees residing in Mahama refugee camp 
in Rwanda were recruited into non-state armed groups, allegedly by 
Rwandan security forces, to support the Burundian opposition; many 
refugees alleged recruiters had threatened, intimidated, harassed, 
and physically assaulted those who refused recruitment—a form 
of human trafficking. Most of these recruits were adult males, but 
six Burundian refugee children between the ages of 15 and 17 were 
also identified as recruits from Mahama refugee camp. The same 
international organization reported that hundreds of Burundian 
adult and child recruits, including girls, were allegedly trained in 
weaponry at a training camp in southwestern Rwanda—some may 
have been trafficking victims. In 2016, the Government of the DRC 
apprehended 16 Burundian children transiting through the east 
allegedly after recruitment from refugee camps in Rwanda or the 
DRC to participate in armed conflict in Burundi with an unknown 
entity. In 2018, an international organization reported separating 
four Burundian children from armed groups in the DRC. 
Both economic necessity and coercion push children and young adults 
into labor, including domestic service, forced labor on plantations or 
small farms throughout Burundi, in gold mines in several provinces 
around the country, in informal commerce in the streets of larger cities, 
in charcoal production, and in the fishing industry. Traffickers include 
victims’ relatives, neighbors, and friends, who recruit them under false 
pretenses to exploit them in forced labor and sex trafficking. Some 
families are complicit in the exploitation of children and adults with 
disabilities, accepting payment from traffickers who run forced street 
begging operations. Traffickers fraudulently recruit children from 
rural areas for forced labor for domestic service and sex trafficking 
in private homes, guesthouses, and entertainment establishments; 
the children frequently experience non-payment of wages and verbal 
and physical abuse. NGOs report that fishermen exploit some boys 
in the Lake Tanganyika fisheries in forced labor and some girls and 
young women in domestic servitude and sex trafficking in restaurants 
and bars around the lake. Traffickers exploit Burundian adults and 
children in forced labor in agricultural work, particularly in Tanzania. 
Women and girls traveling to the Middle East, and often through 
Tanzania, for domestic service report abusive labor conditions as 
well as physical and sexual abuse. Young women take vulnerable 
girls into their homes, eventually pushing some into commercial sex 
to pay for living expenses. Traffickers exploit orphaned girls, often 
using underage males as facilitators. There were unsubstantiated 
allegations that male tourists from East Africa and the Middle East, 
as well as Burundian government employees, including teachers, 
police officers, military, and prison officials, are complicit in child 
sex trafficking by procuring underage Burundian girls. 
International organizations continue to report that young Muslim 
women from Burundi are particularly vulnerable to forced labor 
and sex trafficking in Gulf countries. Traffickers fraudulently recruit 
some young adult Burundian women for jobs, but instead subject 
them to forced labor and sex trafficking in various Gulf countries, 
such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Qatar. NGOs estimate that 
between 500 and 3,000 young women became trafficking victims in 
these countries between 2015 and 2016, and one NGO reported over 
800 young women remain in these countries. In 2017, Burundian 
and Kenyan recruitment agencies fraudulently recruited several 
adult Burundian women, who were identified in Kuwait, for work as 
domestic workers and receptionists; however, upon arrival, traffickers 
subjected them to forced labor and confiscated their passports, the 
victims were paid less than what was agreed, had restricted movement, 
and were forced to work excessive hours without breaks.
CABO VERDE: TIER 2
The Government of Cabo Verde does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Cabo Verde remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
drafting standard operating procedures for victim identification 
and referral to services. The government identified and referred 
to care potential child trafficking victims and continued ongoing 
prosecutions of alleged traffickers. However, the government did 
not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. Data sharing 
and coordination among government agencies remained weak. The 
Observatory for Monitoring and Rapid Identification of Situations 
of Trafficking in Persons (the Observatory), while intended to 
lead national efforts, in practice did not coordinate anti-trafficking 
activities adequately. Government agencies charged with combating 
trafficking continued to lack resources and training.






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking offenses and hold 
convicted traffickers, sex traffickers, and sex tourists accountable in 
accordance with the law. • Ensure all trafficking cases are prosecuted 
through the judicial system without political interference rather 
than resolved through non-judicial means. • Adopt, implement, 
and train law enforcement, labor inspectors, and other officials 
on the draft standardized procedures to proactively identify 
trafficking victims—including among vulnerable populations such 
as West African migrants, Chinese workers, and Cuban medical 
professionals—and refer them to care. • Train law enforcement 
and judicial officials on the anti-trafficking provision of the penal 
code, Article 271-A. • Empower the Observatory to better coordinate 
the government’s anti-trafficking response and increase relevant 
stakeholders’ participation in Observatory activities. • Develop and 
train officials on a system to compile and share comprehensive anti-
trafficking law enforcement and victim identification data among 
agencies. • Strengthen international law enforcement cooperation to 
prevent and investigate cases of child sex tourism. • Increase efforts 
to raise public awareness of human trafficking, including child sex 
trafficking and domestic servitude. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. 
Article 271-A of the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking and prescribed penalties of four to 10 years’ imprisonment; 
these penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other serious 
crimes, such as rape. During the reporting period, the government 
initiated one investigation into an alleged trafficking case involving 
a foreign domestic worker, continued investigations of 12 cases, 
initiated prosecution of one defendant, and continued prosecutions 







investigation, continuing 11 investigations, and prosecuting at least 
three defendants during the previous reporting period. For the second 
consecutive year, courts did not convict any traffickers. Authorities 
concluded one investigation initiated during the previous reporting 
period into an alleged trafficker who sexually exploited her 14-year-
old daughter; authorities charged the alleged trafficker with pimping 
and referred the case for prosecution. Three defendants charged 
with trafficking in persons and employment of undocumented 
foreign workers on the island of Sal were awaiting trial at the end 
of the reporting period. The government did not initiate any child 
sex tourism investigations during the reporting period, likely due 
to decreased opportunities for tourism, and by extension, child sex 
tourism, as a result of the pandemic. During a previous reporting 
period, the government initiated an investigation of one National 
Police (PN) officer as part of a broader forced labor investigation; 
the government reported investigators found insufficient evidence 
to bring charges against the officer, and the case was closed. The 
government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking 
offenses during the reporting period. According to isolated reports 
during previous reporting periods, political intervention in ongoing 
investigations and prosecutions impeded some law enforcement 
and judicial efforts.
Law enforcement and justice system officials sometimes lacked 
adequate understanding of trafficking crimes and anti-trafficking laws, 
and the judicial system as a whole was overburdened, resulting in 
weak and inconsistent efforts to identify, investigate, and prosecute 
trafficking cases. The pandemic reduced court operations from 
March to June 2020 and exacerbated existing judicial backlogs, 
including for trafficking cases. Furthermore, a cyber-attack rendered 
the government’s computer network largely inoperable for two 
months during the reporting period. The government did not provide 
specialized training on identifying, investigating, and prosecuting 
trafficking cases to law enforcement or judicial officials during the 
reporting period, in part due to pandemic gathering restrictions. 
This was a decrease compared with training 75 magistrates and 
child protection actors on child exploitation, including trafficking, 
during the previous reporting period. The government trained an 
unknown number of new police officers using a training module 
on trafficking victim identification previously developed by an 
international organization. Judicial Police (PJ) presence was limited 
to the four islands with international airports and the most significant 
tourism activity, affecting the government’s ability to identify victims, 
investigate crimes, and collect comprehensive data on other islands; 
information sharing between agencies remained poor. Government 
social service providers often resolved intra-familial abuse cases, 
which could include child sex trafficking, through non-judicial means. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained efforts to identify and protect trafficking 
victims. Case management and the ability to track victim-related 
statistics were relatively weak in Cabo Verde, and as in previous 
years, the government did not provide comprehensive statistics 
on the number of trafficking victims identified and referred to 
care. The government identified at least one forced labor victim 
during the reporting period, compared with identifying at least one 
child sex trafficking victim during the previous reporting period. 
Authorities identified one foreign woman exploited in domestic 
servitude and referred her to an international organization for 
care. The international organization repatriated the victim with the 
government’s assistance. In addition, the government’s Institute for 
Children and Adolescents (ICCA) identified and provided assistance 
to at least 196 vulnerable children, including potential trafficking 
victims, in 2020, compared with identifying 215 vulnerable children 
in the previous reporting period. The government did not have a 
formal mechanism to identify trafficking victims and refer them 
to care. Border police had written victim identification procedures 
but did not consistently receive training on the procedures. During 
the reporting period, the government drafted standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) for victim identification and referral to services in 
partnership with an international organization and foreign donor; the 
SOPs were pending final approval at the end of the reporting period. 
The government and an international organization held webinars 
with over 20 government agencies and civil society organizations 
on the draft procedures. 
There were no shelters or services specifically for trafficking victims, 
but government-funded agencies provided emergency services, 
shelter, and psycho-social care to at-risk populations and female 
and child victims of crime, including trafficking victims. ICCA 
operated a national network to assist child victims of sexual abuse, 
including referral to care and legal support. Law enforcement and 
first responders generally referred child victims to ICCA, victims 
requiring long-term care to the Public Ministry, women to the Cabo 
Verdean Institute for Gender Equality (ICIEG) or NGOs, and foreign 
victims to an international organization. Officials acknowledged 
the ad hoc, informal referral system was insufficient. ICCA did not 
report screening victims referred to its shelters for trafficking. ICCA 
operated three shelters on three of Cabo Verde’s nine inhabited islands 
that provided temporary accommodation and care for child victims 
of sexual abuse, violence, and abandonment and maintained five 
protection and social reintegration centers, which provided services 
for children who experienced prolonged trauma, including trafficking. 
Two of the centers, located on the islands of Santiago and Sao Vicente, 
provided 24-hour emergency care, including to child victims from 
other islands. ICCA had staff on all nine islands. The government 
funded and provided police security to ICCA and ICIEG shelters.
Law enforcement maintained policies to interview sex trafficking 
victims in collaboration with psychologists and, in cases of child 
victims, the victims’ parents, as appropriate, to provide a comfortable 
and safe environment; but, the government did not report providing 
these benefits to any victims during the reporting period. Authorities 
noted it was difficult to provide meaningful protection to victim-
witnesses due to the small population and close-knit community. 
The government provided in-kind support to an NGO project aiming 
to enhance the justice system’s capacity to support child victims 
of sexual abuse, including trafficking, and train judicial and child 
protection actors on victim-centered care. Cabo Verdean law provided 
legal alternatives to the removal of foreign victims to countries 
where they may face hardship or retribution; authorities did not 
report providing these benefits to any victims during the reporting 
period. The law provided for restitution, but the government did 
not report pursuing restitution in any cases during the reporting 
period. In addition, victims could file civil suits against traffickers, 
but no victims reportedly pursued civil suits during the reporting 
period, in part due to lack of awareness of the option. There were 
no reports officials penalized trafficking victims for unlawful acts 
traffickers compelled them to commit; however, due to the lack of 
formal victim identification procedures, some victims may have 
remained unidentified in the law enforcement system.
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. The Observatory 
coordinated the government’s efforts to combat trafficking in persons. 
The Observatory consisted of officials from the Ministry of Justice 
and Labor (MJT), PN, PJ, ICCA, ICIEG, Ministry of Education, Family, 
and Social Inclusion (MEFIS), other government institutions, NGOs, 
and civil society organizations. The Observatory met once during the 
reporting period due to pandemic gathering restrictions, compared 
with five times in the previous reporting period. The government 
continued implementing the 2018-2021 anti-trafficking national 
action plan. The MJT led the government’s anti-trafficking efforts; the 
government allocated 7 million escudos ($77,920) for anti-trafficking 
activities including the national action plan’s implementation in 
2020, the same amount provided in the previous year. Observers 
reported the Observatory lacked authority and struggled to ensure 
all members fully participated in Observatory meetings and met 




restrictions, the government did not conduct public awareness events 
or trainings; however, ICCA conducted child protection campaigns 
using radio ads, television, posters, community engagement, and 
distributable materials. ICCA continued to support 20 municipal 
Committees for the Defense of Children’s and Adolescents’ Rights 
to prevent child abuse, including child trafficking. ICCA and the PN 
worked with maritime transportation services to prevent children 
from traveling alone to neighboring islands where they would be 
vulnerable to exploitation, including trafficking. 
ICCA continued to operate three centers for street children through 
its Nos Kaza project and six day centers, all of which aimed to reduce 
the vulnerability of street children to forced labor and sexual abuse, 
including sex trafficking. MJT collaborated with an international 
organization to develop a child protection case management system 
for ICCA and MEFIS to identify and track child victims of exploitation, 
including child trafficking, but the system was not yet operational by 
the end of the reporting period. ICCA operated a hotline linked to 
the PN hotline to report cases of violence against children, including 
trafficking; although the hotline was always operational, ICCA did 
not report the number of calls it received in 2020. It was unclear if 
ICCA trained hotline workers to differentiate trafficking from similar 
crimes, such as child labor or sexual abuse. The government made 
efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex that equated to 
child sex trafficking, but it did not make efforts to reduce demand 
for other forms of commercial sex. The Children and Adolescent 
Committee to Prevent and Combat Sexual Abuse and Exploitation 
coordinated the government’s efforts combating child sexual abuse, 
including child sex tourism. The government continued enforcing 
the Ethics Code of Conduct for Tourism, which included provisions 
countering child sex tourism. The government did not provide anti-
trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Cabo Verde, and, to a lesser extent, traffickers 
exploit victims from Cabo Verde abroad. Traffickers exploit boys and 
girls, some of whom may be foreign nationals, in sex trafficking on 
Brava, Santiago, Fogo, Sal, Sao Vicente, and Boa Vista, sometimes 
through child sex tourism. In the past, observers reported tourists 
perpetrated child sexual abuse on the islands of Sal, Boa Vista, Sao 
Vicente, Fogo, and Maio. In some cases, parents have encouraged their 
daughters to be exploited in commercial sex by tourists, especially 
Cabo-Verdean Americans, as potential marriage could result in 
immigrant visas to the United States or remittances to support the 
family. Authorities identify West African women victims, including 
Nigerians and Senegalese, of sex trafficking, including on Boa Vista and 
Sal Islands, and sometimes of sex tourism; in one instance, authorities 
identified a West African woman exploited in domestic servitude. On 
Sao Vicente, traffickers have coerced girls as young as 12 years old 
in sexual exploitation in exchange for drugs. Cabo Verdean children 
engaged in begging, domestic work, street vending, car washing, 
and agriculture are vulnerable to trafficking; children used in illicit 
activities, including drug trafficking, are also vulnerable to trafficking. 
Children living in impoverished neighborhoods with little state 
presence are also at risk of trafficking, especially sex trafficking. West 
African migrants may transit the archipelago en route to exploitive 
situations in Europe. Cuban medical professionals working in Cabo 
Verde may have been forced to work by the Cuban government, and 
Chinese nationals may have been forced to work, including by PRC 
state-owned enterprises. Some adult migrants from ECOWAS countries 
may receive low wages and work without contracts, rendering them 
vulnerable to forced labor and sex trafficking. In 2018, alleged labor 
traffickers exploited four Chinese nationals, two girls and two men, in 
the retail sector; observers suspect there may be organized syndicates 
engaging in similar forced labor exploitation in the country. NGOs 
reported Nigerian criminal syndicates exploited Cabo Verdean 
women in sex trafficking in Brazil in 2018. In a previous reporting 
period, labor traffickers exploited a Cabo Verdean man in Europe.
CAMBODIA: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Cambodia does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included improving data collection and 
monitoring of prosecutions and convictions of traffickers, as well as 
victim identification data, throughout the entire country; continuing 
to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers; and continuing to 
implement a national action plan to combat trafficking. However, the 
government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared 
to the previous reporting period, even considering the impact of 
the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity. Endemic 
corruption and lack of political will continued to severely limit 
progress in holding traffickers accountable; corruption continued 
to impede law enforcement operations, criminal proceedings, and 
victim service provision. Amid insufficient government oversight 
and accountability measures, authorities did not investigate the 
large majority of credible reports of official complicity, in particular 
with unscrupulous business owners who subjected thousands of 
men, women, and children throughout the country to human 
trafficking in entertainment establishments and brick kilns. The 
government’s failure to establish and implement adequate judicial 
monitoring systems continued to enable suspected traffickers to 
abscond prior to their trials, culminating in some convictions in 
absentia. The government did not provide adequate protection services 
for victims domestically or overseas and relied heavily on foreign 
donors and NGOs to provide much-needed care. Authorities did not 
issue formal guidance allowing the use of undercover investigative 
techniques in anti-trafficking operations—a factor that continued 
to impede officials’ ability to hold sex traffickers fully accountable. 
Because the government has devoted sufficient resources to a written 
plan that, if implemented, would constitute significant efforts to 
meet the minimum standards, Cambodia was granted a waiver per 
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act from an otherwise required 
downgrade to Tier 3. Therefore Cambodia remained on Tier 2 Watch 
List for the third consecutive year.






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Respect due process, vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking 
offenses, and convict and adequately penalize sex and labor traffickers, 
including complicit officials, with significant prison sentences. • 
Increase funding to anti-trafficking law enforcement units and disburse 
it in advance of investigations, rather than by reimbursement. • 
Strengthen efforts to fully implement the nationwide protocol for 
proactive victim identification among vulnerable groups and train 
officials in all areas of the country on its provisions. • Allocate 
increased resources to anti-human trafficking police to better facilitate 
the monitoring of defendants released under judicial supervision 
pending trial. • Increase or start unannounced labor inspections in 
high-vulnerability professions, especially at brick kilns entertainment 
venues, construction sites, and plantations, with a focus on identifying 
debt bondage and holding business owners accountable to the law. 
• Increase the availability of services for male victims, especially 
men and boys exploited in commercial fishing abroad. • Increase 
efforts to incentivize domestic and foreign victims’ participation in 
criminal and civil proceedings, including by establishing a victim’s 
fund and granting permission to work, temporary residency, or other 
relevant immigration status to foreign victims wishing to remain in 







collecting, and reporting data on anti-trafficking prosecution and 
victim protection efforts, and disseminate data among the relevant 
government agencies in a manner that protects victims’ identities 
and privacy. • Take steps to eliminate recruitment or placement fees 
charged to workers by Cambodian labor recruiters and ensure they 
are instead paid by employers. • Increase inspection and oversight of 
lending institutions, including private micro-finance organizations, 
to reduce vulnerability to debt-based coercion among economically 
disadvantaged communities. • Modify the law to allow restitution 
upon conviction of the trafficker and establish and train the relevant 
officials on standard operating procedures for calculating and granting 
restitution. • Establish and allocate resources to implement systematic 
procedures at diplomatic missions to assist Cambodian victims 
abroad, including in countries without Cambodian diplomatic 
representation. • Amend regulations on labor recruitment licensure 
and contract requirements to include strengthened language on 
worker protections and labor rights. • Strengthen efforts to inspect 
private labor recruitment agencies and their sub-licensed brokers for 
fraudulent recruitment and other trafficking indicators. • Increase 
public awareness on proper travel document application procedures 
to facilitate safe, legal migration. • Strengthen efforts to incorporate 
NGO input into the policy for formally transferring custody of 
child victims. 
PROSECUTION
The government modestly increased law enforcement efforts. The 
2008 Law on the Suppression of Human Trafficking and Commercial 
Sexual Exploitation criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed penalties of seven to 15 years’ imprisonment for 
offenses involving an adult victim and 15 to 20 years’ imprisonment 
for those involving a child victim; these penalties were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. NGOs reported that, 
in practice, the government did not issue criminal penalties under the 
anti-trafficking law for labor trafficking offenders; instead, it utilized 
the labor law to issue fines and/or short jail sentences of six days to 
one month, which did not represent sufficient punishment to deter 
future crimes or provide justice for the victims. 
The pandemic hindered government efforts to prosecute perpetrators 
and heighten awareness of trafficking among officials and vulnerable 
populations. Cambodian courts shut down for several months 
beginning in March 2020, temporarily halting all judicial activity 
including anti-trafficking investigations. Despite this challenge, for the 
first time since 2017, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) reported data on 
trafficking prosecutions and convictions in all provinces throughout 
the country, although it did not provide comprehensive details on 
such cases. Judicial authorities may have included cases of rape and 
other crimes outside the standard definition of trafficking in their 
reported data; therefore the true number of trafficking investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions was likely lower than reported. According 
to the Anti-Human Trafficking Juvenile Police (AHTJP), during the 
reporting period, authorities arrested 48 suspects in connection 
with 37 cases of “non-sexual human trafficking” (26 suspects in 
connection with 21 cases in 2019) and 46 suspects in connection with 
21 cases of sex trafficking (27 suspects in connection with 14 cases 
in 2019); of these arrests, 14 were labor brokers. According to the 
MOJ, from January to December 2020, the government prosecuted 
a total of 348 cases of trafficking in all provinces in the country, of 
which they referred 233 for formal investigation; 190 cases remained 
active as of February 2021. Some of these cases, however, occurred 
outside of the reporting period and may have involved crimes 
other than trafficking. During the previous reporting period, the 
government reported incomplete data only from certain parts of the 
country, in which it prosecuted 199 cases and referred 134 for formal 
investigation. During the reporting period, the government convicted 
and sentenced 440 individuals in all provinces in the country, 234 
of whom remained in detention, but the MOJ did not report the 
details of these cases and some may not have met the definition of 
human trafficking under international law. In previous years, courts 
reportedly convicted suspects on lesser charges and concluded sex 
trafficking cases with monetary settlements in lieu of prison sentences. 
As also reported in previous years, victims whose families received 
out-of-court settlements from traffickers often withdrew from trials 
or changed their testimonies, further complicating prosecutions. 
During the previous reporting period, the government reported 
conviction data only from the Phnom Penh Municipal Court, 
which convicted 140 individuals. The government maintained 
memoranda of understanding (MOUs) outlining cross-border anti-
trafficking investigation with Thailand and Vietnam, as well as an 
extradition treaty with the former, but did not report investigating 
or extraditing any suspected traffickers under their auspices during 
the reporting period. During the reporting period, the government 
also entered into an agreement with Thailand to establish standard 
operating procedures on bilateral anti-trafficking law enforcement 
cooperation. The government continued to cooperate with the United 
States through a law enforcement task force dedicated to combating 
online child sexual exploitation and other child sex crimes, but it 
did not report if it conducted investigations on such cases during 
the reporting period. 
Nationwide, law enforcement authorities often did not take 
appropriate action against suspected or convicted traffickers. Judicial 
police lacked the resources to monitor defendants released on 
“judicial supervision” pending trial, allowing some to flee prior to 
their trial dates, which left courts the only option to convict offenders 
in absentia. Authorities rarely issued arrest warrants for absconded 
defendants unless NGOs were available to assist in tracking and 
apprehending them. Further compounding this challenge, Cambodian 
criminal procedural code featured no guidelines, monitoring 
provisions, or language outlining specific law enforcement duties with 
regard to judicial supervision. Citing resource constraints, prosecutors 
and investigating judges did not advance all of the trafficking cases 
for which police had supplied evidence. Local experts continued to 
report that cases involving foreign suspects were more likely to result 
in trafficking convictions than cases involving Cambodian suspects, 
for whom charges were often reduced to less serious offenses. 
Authorities continued to deliver donor-designed and -funded training 
to police, prosecutors, judges, and other government officials, 
including 192 training sessions on anti-trafficking laws, investigative 
techniques, and evidence collection for 7,491 law enforcement and 
judicial officers; it did not report how many provincial officials 
participated in these sessions. Despite these trainings, many police—
particularly in rural areas—remained unaware of how to conduct 
anti-trafficking work, as most did not receive training on basic law 
enforcement techniques. Moreover, law enforcement and judicial 
officials lacked the necessary equipment to handle trafficking cases 
appropriately, including vehicles, computer and communications 
equipment, and forensic tools. Additionally, the government required 
the funding of all anti-trafficking investigative work to be conducted 
through reimbursement, forcing individual police units to personally 
cover relevant expenses. NGO contacts reported some officers waited 
months for this reimbursement, which was sometimes not repaid in 
full, and that the ensuing financial hardships made some police units 
more susceptible to corruption. Local organizations and some officials 
continued to stress an urgent need for more sophisticated evidence 
collection techniques, including more undercover investigations, to 
decrease reliance on witness testimony and improve efforts to detect 
and combat sex trafficking. MOJ officials reported their concern that 
revising the law or issuing new regulations to specifically authorize 
undercover investigation authority in trafficking cases could lead to 
abuse of power by the police. 
Endemic corruption at many levels of government continued to 
severely limit the ability of individual officials to make progress 
in holding traffickers accountable. The Supreme Council of the 
Magistracy, which had the power to remove judges and prosecutors 
for corruption, did not do so during the reporting period; it also 
lacked the investigative resources to respond to such allegations. 





of the reports of government officials’ complicity in trafficking 
crimes, nor did it prosecute and convict any government employees 
complicit in trafficking during the reporting period. The national 
police maintained a mechanism for NGO workers to report incidents 
of corruption among anti-trafficking police, but it did not report 
if it received or responded to any complaints during the reporting 
period. Law enforcement raids on sex trafficking establishments were 
sometimes unsuccessful due to advance warning from working-level 
police. However, some provincial police chiefs continued to minimize 
these leaks by turning over cases to the AHTJP, which conducted 
independent raids without notifying the local authorities until 
moments before they began. Some police reportedly protected sex 
trafficking establishments in exchange for monthly payments from the 
business owners or sexual favors from the victims. In February 2021, 
authorities arrested an anti-trafficking police officer for physically 
assaulting a girl in a karaoke bar after she refused to have sex with 
him and for threatening to close the bar down; the case was under 
investigation at the end of the reporting period. Authorities often 
overlooked, denied, or downplayed labor abuses—including forced 
child labor—in factories and at brick kilns, and colluded with brick 
manufacturers to arrest, jail, and return indentured laborers who 
had attempted to escape. Contacts alleged prosecutors and judges 
accepted bribes in return for dismissal of charges, acquittals, and 
reduced sentencing. Corrupt officials often thwarted progress in cases 
where the perpetrators were believed to have political, criminal, or 
economic ties to government officials. During the reporting period, 
Cambodian labor inspectors made no progress accessing construction 
sites to inspect potential forced labor abuses because—as some NGOs 
reported—construction company owners with political connections 
refused labor inspectors entry to construction sites. Throughout 
the reporting period, AHTJP police leadership publicly warned 
entertainment business owners who had military connections that 
they would shut down their businesses for any violation of anti-
trafficking laws; the government did not report, however, if it shut 
down or investigated any of these businesses for trafficking crimes. 
In February 2021, the government investigated and arrested a district 
police chief for allegedly releasing 14 labor brokers days after they 
were arrested for facilitating the illegal movement and alleged labor 
trafficking of migrant workers from Cambodia to Thailand. Despite 
consistent credible allegations of complicity, the government did 
not report prosecuting or convicting any government employees 
complicit in human trafficking crimes.
PROTECTION
The government maintained insufficient protection efforts. Despite 
retaining victim identification guidelines developed by the Ministry 
of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation (MOSAVY) in 
2017, victim identification, referral, and repatriation efforts remained 
disparate and underdeveloped across law enforcement agencies. Due 
to improved data collection measures, the government reported 
victim identification data from all provinces in the country. While 
conducting arrests during the reporting period, police identified 
322 potential victims of “non-sexual trafficking” (66 in 2019) 
and 95 potential victims of sex trafficking, including 26 children 
(76 victims in 2019). As with all law enforcement statistics, these 
figures likely included victims of crimes that did not meet standard 
definitions of sex trafficking or forced labor. MOSAVY continued to 
operate a migrant transit center in the border city of Poipet, where 
transit center officials reportedly continued to screen for and identify 
trafficking victims among adult and child migrants at the center. The 
government, however, did not report how many trafficking victims 
officials identified in the transit center during the reporting period. 
During the previous reporting period, the National Committee for 
Counter Trafficking (NCCT) launched an application-based victim 
identification manual and screening tool for use at the transit center 
to improve victim identification procedures; however, it did not 
report if transit center officials used this screening tool during the 
reporting period. Given the high vulnerability to trafficking among 
migrant populations and the lack of universal implementation of 
victim identification standards, many victims likely transited this 
facility unidentified. The government continued implementing a 
regulation barring NGOs from representing individuals seeking formal 
recognition as trafficking victims. Under this arrangement—which 
NGOs claimed severely intimidated victims and their families—
victims were required to approach the Ministry of Interior (MOI) 
for the formal identification needed to access protection services. 
Some anti-trafficking NGOs further reported a lack of cooperation 
with the authorities, which hindered the operations of key anti-
trafficking NGOs.
The government did not have the capacity or resources available to 
provide adequate protection services, including shelter, to trafficking 
victims; it therefore continued to rely heavily on donor countries, 
international organizations, and NGOs to provide or support 
provision of such services to trafficking victims. The government did 
not have enough shelter capacity throughout the country dedicated 
to providing immediate or long-term assistance to trafficking victims, 
including Cambodian victims who were repatriated, or those 
vulnerable to trafficking. MOSAVY maintained guidelines outlining 
minimum standards for residential care of trafficking victims and 
continued to disseminate them among NGO shelters during the 
reporting period. The government, however, did not facilitate formal 
transfer of the custody of child trafficking victims to NGOs, leaving 
NGOs that accepted child victims into their care vulnerable to court 
action. Ongoing custody issues reportedly dissuaded some NGO 
shelters from protecting residents’ freedom of movement, contrary 
to best practices. Provisions allowing for financial settlements in 
lieu of harsher sentencing further discouraged some families from 
consenting to temporary guardianship at shelters; absent family 
consent, government officials, at times, returned children to high-risk 
environments, leaving them vulnerable to re-victimization. During 
the reporting period, the government established a national policy 
on migrants’ health, which gave public health facilities the authority 
to provide free medical services to all migrant workers in Cambodia, 
including foreign trafficking victims; this policy relieved NGOs of 
the financial burden of providing medical care to this vulnerable 
population. 
Despite the prominence of male labor trafficking victims, government 
assistance for this population remained limited. During the 
reporting period, the government acknowledged this population 
was underserved and requested help from NGOs to provide services 
to male victims. The government reportedly provided vocational 
training and other programs to identify job opportunities for male 
trafficking victims from the commercial fishing industry, but it did not 
report how many victims benefited from these programs. However, 
service provider NGOs noted that an acute lack of reintegration 
services and cultural stigma surrounding the experience of forced 
labor at sea catalyzed re-trafficking among fishermen returning home 
after escaping their abuses. Unlike in the previous reporting period 
when authorities did not provide complete statistics on the number 
of victims they assisted or referred, during this reporting period local 
police referred 371 international and domestic victims of trafficking 
and those vulnerable to trafficking to provincial social affairs offices. 
These offices generally referred victims to short- and long-term NGO 
shelters for care; NGOs reported that in most cases, the victim referral 
process was quick. Additionally, in 2020 MOSAVY referred to NGO 
services 220 Cambodian trafficking victims and “other vulnerable 
migrants” who were repatriated from foreign countries, including 
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
Of the 220 returnees, 113 were victims of forced marriage, 54 of 
forced labor, and three of sex trafficking. MOSAVY reintegrated 104 
Cambodian trafficking victims and persons vulnerable to trafficking 
to their home villages. In comparison in 2019, MOSAVY assisted in 
the repatriation of 290 Cambodian victims of trafficking and other 
vulnerable migrants and referred them to NGOs for care. 
The government continued to rely on donor organizations to finance 
the repatriation of Cambodian victims who were exploited abroad. 
Cambodian diplomatic missions overseas continued to lack adequate 







despite government action in prior years to train diplomats on 
migrant worker protections. According to an NGO, some victims 
were reportedly unable to secure assistance from Cambodian consular 
services overseas due to unattended hotlines and unresponsive 
staff. The government also maintained labor attachés at embassies 
in Malaysia, South Korea, and Thailand—the countries with the 
highest number of Cambodian migrant workers—but did not 
provide data on their involvement in identifying or assisting labor 
trafficking victims. Victims identified in countries without Cambodian 
diplomatic representation had access to even less support. During the 
reporting period, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation (MFAIC) facilitated the return of 10,574 Cambodian 
migrant workers from China, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, and Vietnam, a large increase over the prior year due the 
pandemic. After MOSAVY conducted preliminary interviews of these 
returnees, it referred all of them to local NGOs for interviews to 
determine appropriate services: care, rehabilitation, or immediate 
return to their home villages. However, as in the previous reporting 
period, authorities did not specify if they implemented appropriate 
victim identification measures to screen for trafficking among the 
returnees or what portion of these returnees were trafficking victims. 
The number of Cambodian returnees who experienced forced labor 
and sex trafficking abroad was likely much higher than reported due 
to an increasing tendency among these groups to return via informal 
migration channels, and due to insufficient victim identification 
procedures. 
There were no legal provisions to offer work permits, temporary 
residency, or other immigration status to foreign victims wishing to 
remain in Cambodia to participate in civil or criminal proceedings. 
The government required the repatriation of foreign victims, except 
in rare cases, and did not provide legal alternatives to their removal 
regardless of whether they would face hardship or retribution upon 
return to their countries of origin. While awaiting repatriation, the 
government generally allowed foreign victims temporary residence 
at NGO shelters. In 2020, MOSAVY repatriated two Vietnamese 
trafficking victims to Vietnam (nine in 2019). Insufficient victim 
identification efforts left many potential foreign victims at risk of 
deportation or charged with immigration violations. However, an 
NGO reported that during the reporting period, anti-trafficking police 
and prosecutors willingly worked with social workers and employed 
child-friendly practices when encountering trafficking victims. Law 
enforcement often did not keep victims and perpetrators separated 
during interviews. During the reporting period, MOJ instructed 
provincial courts to implement a child-friendly judicial program, 
initiated in 2016, allowing for video-conferencing technology as 
an alternative to direct cross-examination of victims in front of 
the accused; despite the instruction from MOJ, it did not report if 
courts universally implemented this program. During the reporting 
period, the government—in cooperation with an NGO—launched a 
pilot program in three provinces that trained social workers to offer 
psychological support to victims involved in court cases. Nevertheless, 
Cambodia’s weak and corrupt legal system and the lack of adequate 
victim and witness protection, exacerbated by a lengthy trial process 
and fear of retaliation by traffickers, hindered victims’ willingness 
to cooperate in many cases. NGOs reported victims preferred out-
of-court settlements over court proceedings as the fastest way to 
obtain monetary compensation. Cambodian law outlined channels 
for victim restitution. However, restitution was extremely difficult to 
obtain due to a legal requirement delaying payment until after the 
completion of the trafficker’s jail term; convicted traffickers’ frequent 
abscondment further complicated this arrangement. Observers noted 
Cambodia lacked a standard operating procedure for determining 
how to calculate restitution or compensation. Victims rarely received 
the amount promised, and many victims’ families settled out of 
court with traffickers or accepted bribes to drop the relevant charges.
PREVENTION
The government maintained some prevention efforts. The NCCT and 
its secretariat coordinated anti-trafficking activities and continued 
to implement a 2019-2023 national anti-trafficking action plan, 
which was developed in collaboration with civil society and 
international donors. The government’s anti-trafficking budget to 
fund the interagency committee was approximately 2.2 billion riels 
($543,080), compared with approximately 5.4 billion riels ($1.33 
million) during the previous reporting period; austerity measures due 
to the pandemic's economic impact caused the sharp reduction. Most 
ministries also maintained separate line items in their budgets for 
anti-trafficking activities. The secretariat of the NCCT maintained six 
working groups to monitor the efforts of the interagency committee, 
as well as those of its provincial subcommittees. Subsidiary provincial 
anti-trafficking committees, four of which continued to receive modest 
central government funds, coordinated efforts at the local level to 
mirror the activities of the national action plan. A Monitoring Working 
Group strengthened the work of the NCCT at the provincial level by 
meeting with provincial officials and assessing areas of improvement. 
NGOs noted the provincial committees’ ad hoc reliance on insufficient 
surplus funds from General Social Services—rather than on their 
own annual budgets—undermined the scope and sustainability 
of their work. The NCCT continued to produce an annual report 
documenting the government’s holistic anti-trafficking efforts, 
including comprehensive data on prosecutions and convictions. 
The Minister of Women’s Affairs and the NCCT Vice Chair co-
hosted two bilateral meetings on human trafficking with a foreign 
government in September 2020 and January 2021, which were 
attended by senior Cambodian government officials. NGOs and 
international organizations reported the NCCT was increasingly 
effective at coordinating with civil society in some anti-trafficking 
efforts during the reporting period. 
The Ministry of Labor and Vocational Training (MOLVT) maintained a 
separate action plan aimed at reducing child labor and debt bondage 
in the service, agricultural, mining, and energy sectors by 2025 through 
awareness raising, legal action, and collaboration with civil society 
funded in part through the national budget. There was no ban on the 
imposition of worker-paid recruitment or placement fees. Observers 
noted that the high costs, complex administrative requirements, and 
restrictive provisions inherent to the formal migration process drove a 
majority of Cambodian labor migrants to pursue informal pathways 
to working abroad. The government reported investigating labor 
recruiters for illegal practices that may have contributed to or involved 
trafficking. In February 2021, authorities arrested 14 labor brokers for 
assisting Cambodian workers to illegally cross the Cambodian-Thai 
border; the government did not report if it investigated the brokers 
for potential trafficking crimes. Officials and NGO observers noted 
that labor officials’ insufficient inspections of private recruitment 
agencies, and the ability of these agencies to sub-license their names 
to independent brokers continued to perpetuate widespread labor 
exploitation. Some of these agencies were reportedly directly involved 
in deceptive recruitment practices leading to trafficking. Adding to 
the vulnerability of popular migration channels, sub-decrees and 
regulations governing private recruitment agency licensure and 
contracting procedures did not include sufficient language outlining 
migrant worker protections or labor rights. The MOLVT established 
offices at the provincial level to monitor recruitment agencies and 
address complaints from workers, including potential incidents of 
trafficking; however, it did not report how many complaints these 
offices received during the reporting period. The government did not 
address recruitment firms that were allegedly involved in trafficking 
crimes. For example, in August 2020, the Ministry of Labor permitted 
six recruitment agencies previously suspected of involvement in 
trafficking to send Cambodian domestic workers abroad. 
The government—in collaboration with various donors and NGOs—
disseminated information about trafficking laws, safe migration, child 
labor, and strategies to combat trafficking to law enforcement and 
other government personnel and the general population. During the 
reporting period, the Ministry of Education, Youth, and Sports—in 
cooperation with NGOs—designed and approved a school curriculum 
to educate students about human trafficking. Despite these efforts, 





the pandemic as of the end of the reporting period. The AHTJP 
and MOI operated a hotline for victims and witnesses to report 
human trafficking crimes; the government publicized the hotline on 
government websites and social media sites, required guesthouses 
and hotels in all 25 provinces to publicize the hotline, and it worked 
with an NGO focused on child sex trafficking to place placards of the 
hotline number in taxis and tuk-tuks throughout the country. The 
government reported the hotline received 21 calls related to trafficking, 
rape, and domestic violence, but it did not report if it referred any 
potential trafficking cases to police for further investigation. The 
AHTJP’s social media site, however, received information on a 
potential trafficking case in 2020, which led to the arrest of two 
suspects. MOLVT also reported providing pre-departure orientation 
to 20,360 Cambodians migrating abroad for work (48,000 in 2019). 
However, many Cambodians were reportedly unaware of how to apply 
for travel documentation or how much it should cost—leaving them 
at higher risk of travel through informal, more vulnerable means—
and the government did not take sufficient steps to publicize that 
information. The government maintained two labor recruitment 
agreements with Saudi Arabia, a domestic worker recruitment 
agreement with Hong Kong, and a bilateral cooperative agreement 
with India. The MFAIC continued to implement consular screening 
measures to reduce the sex and labor trafficking of Cambodian 
women via forced and fraudulent marriages, including by assessing 
applicants against trafficking victim profiles jointly developed with 
China in 2016. However, the MFAIC did not report referring these 
potential victims to law enforcement or protective services. The 
government also continued implementing a regulation passed in 
2018 requiring foreign men to pay a fee if intending to return to their 
home countries with a Cambodian spouse; because this regulation 
only applied to air travel, contacts reported an increase in the number 
of Cambodian women traveling through unsafe overland channels 
for marriage migration to China. 
Labor ministry officials continued to deny the existence of child 
labor—including forced child labor—and debt-based coercion within 
the brick industry. The Ministry of Labor visited 62 out of 486 brick 
kilns in 2020, but the purpose of these visits was to raise awareness 
about child and forced child labor; none of the visits resulted in 
issuance of penalties or other such punishments for violations of labor 
or anti-trafficking laws. NGOs claimed police were often unaware 
that detection of crimes at brick kilns fell under their investigative 
purview; the AHTJP confirmed that they viewed brick kiln inspections 
as under the MOLVT’s purview and would only investigate kilns if 
the MOLVT referred a case to them. The AHTJP could not report any 
such referrals in 2020. Authorities often conducted inspections with 
advance notification to the kiln owners, potentially enabling them 
to conceal abuses. The government’s inter-ministerial task force—
established in the previous reporting period—to investigate alleged 
Chinese involvement in money laundering and human trafficking in 
Preah Sihanouk province did not report issuing its findings during 
the reporting period.
The Ministry of Tourism, in collaboration with the NCCT, made efforts 
to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts through workshops for 
staff in the tourism sector and government officials on child sexual 
exploitation in the tourism industry; it also continued to produce 
billboards, signs, posters, pamphlets, and other materials targeting 
potential consumers of commercial sex with children. However, as 
in prior years, the government generally focused on deterring foreign 
involvement in child sex tourism, rather than targeting campaigns to 
the local population that constituted the main source of demand for 
commercial sex with children in Cambodia. Local experts continued 
to report concerns over the government’s ongoing failure to impose 
appropriate punishments on foreign nationals who purchased 
commercial sex acts with children.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
Cambodian men, women, and children in forced labor and sex 
trafficking in Cambodia and abroad. Traffickers also subject victims 
from other countries to trafficking in Cambodia, and they use 
Cambodia as a transit point to exploit victims from other countries 
to trafficking elsewhere in Asia. NGOs and labor unions reported in 
2020 that foreign labor brokers are fraudulently recruiting foreign 
migrants, including from Bangladesh, China, and Nepal, to work 
in Chinese-run and other construction sites in Cambodia where 
some are indebted to recruitment firms and experience passport 
confiscation. Cambodian adults and children migrate to other 
countries within the region and increasingly to the Middle East for 
work; traffickers force many to work on fishing vessels, in agriculture, 
in construction, in factories, and in domestic service – often through 
debt-based coercion – or exploit them in sex trafficking. Migrants 
using irregular migration channels, predominantly with the assistance 
of unlicensed brokers, are at an increased risk of trafficking, although 
those using licensed recruiting agents also become victims of forced 
labor or sex trafficking. Companies operating under the auspices of 
the Japanese government’s “Technical Intern Training Program” have 
exploited Cambodian nationals in forced labor in food processing, 
manufacturing, construction, and fishing. Children from impoverished 
families are vulnerable to forced labor, often with the complicity of 
their families, including in domestic service and forced begging or 
street vending in Thailand and Vietnam. Undocumented Cambodian 
labor migrants working in Thailand—who constituted an estimated 
30-40 percent of the 1.5 to two million Cambodians there before the 
pandemic—are at high risk of trafficking due to their immigration 
status, as are undocumented Cambodians working in Vietnam. One 
study conducted by an international organization in 2017 found 
that nearly three quarters of all Cambodians traveling to Thailand 
for work do so through irregular channels known for trafficking 
vulnerabilities; additionally, only 14 percent of Cambodians 
emigrating to Thailand through regulated channels participated 
in pre-departure orientation outlining their rights and protections. 
The pandemic affected established migration patterns and certain 
sectors in 2020, such as construction, which placed some vulnerable 
groups at greater risk of trafficking than in previous years. Between 
February 2020 to February 2021, more than 150,000 Cambodian 
labor migrants returned to Cambodia from other countries, primarily 
Thailand, due to industry closures caused by the pandemic. 
Traffickers continue to recruit significant numbers of Cambodian men 
and boys in Thailand to work on fishing boats and exploit them in 
forced labor on Thai-owned and -operated vessels in international 
waters. Cambodian victims escaping from their traffickers have been 
identified in Fiji, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Papua New Guinea, 
Senegal, and South Africa. Cambodian men working on Thai-owned 
and -operated fishing vessels report deceptive recruitment tactics, 
severe physical abuse, underpayment or nonpayment of wages, 
restricted access to medical care, and confinement at sea for years at a 
time without permission to come ashore. Traffickers recruit women, 
and some girls, from rural areas under false pretenses to travel to 
China to enter into marriages with Chinese men. These women incur 
thousands of dollars in debt to brokers facilitating the transaction; 
the men force some of these women to work in factories or exploit 
them in sex trafficking to repay this debt. Some parents reportedly 
receive between $1,500 to $3,000 from marriage brokers to send 
their daughters to China for marriage. Cambodian women serving 
willingly as illegal surrogates for Chinese families are vulnerable 
to confinement and domestic servitude. Stateless persons, namely 
in ethnic Vietnamese communities, are at higher risk of trafficking 
due to lack of identity documentation necessary for access to formal 
employment, education, marriage registration, the court system, or 
the right to own land.
The proprietors of brick kilns subject many of the more than 10,000 
Cambodians living at such kilns, including nearly 4,000 children, 
to multigenerational debt-based coercion, either by buying off their 
preexisting loans, or by requiring them to take out new loans as a 
condition of employment or to cover medical expenses resulting 







in 2017 found nearly all of brick kilns surveyed throughout the 
country featured indicators of forced labor via debt-based coercion. 
An extensive, largely unregulated network of predatory micro-finance 
organizations and private creditors contributes to this arrangement by 
proactively advertising loans to families in vulnerable communities 
and connecting them with the kilns. Rural farming families are at 
higher risk of this form of forced labor due to economic hardships 
ensuing from climate change; unseasonal rain patterns and subsequent 
loss of crops push many farmers to take out large loans for new 
irrigation or pesticide systems, and brick kiln owners often purchase 
these loans as a means of securing and retaining their labor. Extended 
rainy seasons also delay the brick-drying process, reducing these 
bonded kiln workers’ pay and forcing many to become further 
indebted to the kiln owners. To dissuade workers from fleeing abusive 
conditions, some kiln owners reportedly allow only select members 
of family units to be absent for public holidays or to seek medical 
care at any given time. Some workers report continued confinement 
and forced labor in the kilns long after they have repaid their debts. 
Cambodian families may also experience conditions indicative of 
forced labor in the clay extraction process required for brick making. 
Traffickers exploit children as young as 13 in domestic servitude 
and in brothels to pay off family debts accrued through this system. 
Communities displaced by illegal logging operations supplying the 
brick kilns with timber for fuel may be at elevated risk of trafficking, 
including in logging itself and elsewhere as a result of ensuing 
economic hardships. In previous years, North Koreans working 
in Cambodia may have been forced to work by the North Korean 
government. Pursuant to a 2017 UN Security Council resolution 
requiring the repatriation of all North Korean nationals earning 
income overseas by the end of 2019, subject to limited exceptions, the 
government reportedly repatriated all North Korean labor migrants 
covered under the relevant provision.
All of Cambodia’s 25 provinces are sources for human trafficking. 
Sex trafficking is largely clandestine; Cambodian and ethnic 
Vietnamese women and girls move from rural areas to cities and 
tourist destinations, where criminals exploit them in sex trafficking 
in brothels and, more frequently, clandestine sex establishments at 
beer gardens, massage parlors, salons, karaoke bars, retail spaces, 
and non-commercial sites. In recent years, the rapidly growing and 
largely unregulated presence of Chinese casinos, entertainment 
establishments, and other commercial enterprises in Preah Sihanouk 
province led to an increase of local sex trafficking and forced labor 
among Cambodian women and girls, although Cambodia’s 2020 
ban on online gambling and the subsequent shuttering of many 
Chinese-owned casinos and other entertainment establishments has 
reduced such trafficking. Cambodian men form the largest source of 
demand for children exploited in sex trafficking; however, men from 
elsewhere in Asia, Australia, Europe, South Africa, and the United 
States travel to Cambodia to engage in child sex tourism, increasingly 
facilitated through social media contact. Thousands of urban children 
left behind by families migrating abroad for work are particularly 
vulnerable to sex trafficking and forced labor. The prevalence of 
child sex trafficking and child sex tourism reportedly declined in 
2020 due to reduced international travel and pandemic-related 
quarantine requirements. However, NGOs and law enforcement 
officials reported the pandemic increased incidents of online child 
sexual exploitation in 2020. Vietnamese women and children, many 
of whom are victims of debt-based coercion, travel to Cambodia 
and are exploited in sex trafficking. NGOs report that criminal gangs 
transport some Vietnamese victims through Cambodia before they 
are exploited in Thailand and Malaysia. Traffickers in Cambodia are 
most commonly family or community members or small networks of 
independent brokers. Some Cambodian orphanages purchase local 
children from economically disadvantaged families and subject them 
to malnutrition and unclean living conditions in their facilities for 
the purpose of attracting and profiting from charitable donations; 
some of these children are at further risk of sex trafficking and 
domestic servitude, as a result of poor government oversight of 
adoption processes. Endemic corruption aids and abets trafficking 
crimes. Some police reportedly solicit commercial sex with children. 
Corrupt officials facilitate cross-border trafficking, thwart progress on 
investigations and prosecutions, and, in some cases, profit directly 
from establishments suspected of trafficking.
CAMEROON: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Cameroon does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included investigating more trafficking 
cases as well as identifying significantly more potential victims 
than the previous reporting period. Cameroon’s anti-trafficking 
inter-ministerial committee (IMC) met more frequently, and the 
government continued its awareness-raising activities. Further, 
the government developed and partially implemented a one-year 
national action plan to enhance the country’s anti-trafficking efforts. 
However, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, even considering 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking 
capacity. Authorities did not report investigating allegations of security 
forces recruiting and using child soldiers in 2019, or during the 
reporting period, or allegations military officials sexually exploited 
women. Additionally, the government has not taken any action in 
response to multiple reports of diplomats exploiting individuals in 
forced labor. Officials did not widely disseminate standard operating 
procedures on victim identification and referral to law enforcement 
or first responders and did not pass draft anti-trafficking legislation 
from 2012 that conforms to international law. Therefore Cameroon 
remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the second consecutive year.






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Investigate allegations of trafficking against complicit officials—
including security forces and diplomats—and prosecute cases 
transparently while respecting due process. • Disseminate and 
train law enforcement and civil society on the National Referral 
System and Standard Operating Procedures (NRS/SOP) on victim 
identification and referral to increase first responders’ ability to 
identify internal trafficking cases proactively, as well as cross-border 
trafficking as distinct from smuggling. • Amend the anti-trafficking 
law to remove the requirement of force, fraud, or coercion for child 
sex trafficking offenses and to make a clear distinction between 
trafficking and smuggling. • Expand training for law enforcement, 
judicial officials, and social workers on the anti-trafficking section 
of the penal code to increase the effectiveness of investigations and 
prosecutions while respecting the rule of law and human rights; 
and administer sufficiently stringent sentences to those convicted. • 
Increase formal collaboration with NGOs on proactively identifying 
and protecting victims. • Provide counseling, legal support, protection 
against intimidation, and other necessary assistance to victims to 
encourage and support their cooperation with law enforcement. • 
Provide financial and human resources to the IMC, and regularly 
convene the committee in coordination with NGOs and international 
organizations. • Publicize information to citizens on their rights as 
foreign workers and sources of assistance while abroad. • Investigate 
labor recruiters and agencies suspected of fraudulent recruitment—
including unlicensed recruiters and intermediaries—and prosecute 







The government maintained its overall anti-trafficking law 
enforcement efforts. The 2011 anti-trafficking law criminalized 
some forms of sex trafficking and all forms of labor trafficking. 
Inconsistent with international law, Cameroon’s legal framework 
required a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute 
a child sex trafficking offense, and therefore did not criminalize all 
forms of child sex trafficking. The law prescribed penalties of 10 to 
20 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 50,000 to 1 million Central 
African francs (CFA) ($94-$1,890), which were sufficiently stringent 
and, with respect to some forms of sex trafficking, commensurate 
with penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. If 
the trafficking offense involved a victim who was 15 years old or 
younger, the penalties increased to 15 to 20 years’ imprisonment 
and a fine of 100,000 to 10 million CFA ($189 to $18,890). The law 
prescribed separate penalties for debt bondage, which ranged from 
five to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 10,000 to 500,000 CFA 
($19-$945) and were also sufficiently stringent. The law was published 
in French and English, the two official languages of the government. 
The English version conflated trafficking in persons and migrant 
smuggling offenses by referring to trafficking in persons offenses, 
as defined under international law, as “slavery in persons,” while 
referring to smuggling-related offenses as “trafficking in persons.” 
Increasing the potential for conflating smuggling and trafficking in 
persons, Article 342 of Cameroon’s 2016 Penal Code prohibited 
both “trafficking in persons” and “slavery in persons.” Legislation 
drafted in 2012 to address victim and witness protection and correct 
inconsistencies with international law remained pending for the 
ninth consecutive year. 
The government did not provide comprehensive law enforcement 
statistics, but officials reported investigating 205 potential human 
trafficking cases between January and August 2020; referring 62 
cases (30 forced labor and 32 sexual exploitation) to courts for 
prosecution; and prosecuting four suspects potentially for forced 
labor. In the entirety of 2019, the government reported investigating 
nine potential trafficking cases and prosecuting seven suspected 
traffickers. Officials reported convicting at least two traffickers between 
April and August 2020 and sentencing them to life and 15 years’ 
imprisonment, compared with convicting five traffickers in 2019. 
According to observers, courts likely prosecuted and convicted 
additional traffickers during the reporting period, despite the lack 
of government reporting. 
Separate from the aforementioned potential cases, in February 2021, 
gendarmerie in the Southwest city of Limbe arrested seven suspects 
accused of exploiting 29 children between the ages of seven and 14 
in domestic servitude after promising their parents to provide the 
children an education. Media reported the suspects were preparing 
to transfer the children to Nigeria before law enforcement officers 
intervened. Judicial officials charged all seven of the accused under 
the country’s 2005 child trafficking law related to the fight against 
child trafficking and slavery, and the five suspected accomplices under 
penal code article 292 in addition to the child trafficking law. As of 
March 2021, the prosecution was ongoing. 
Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained 
significant concerns. Officials did not report the outcome of an 
investigation into a complicit official that was opened in 2018. 
Authorities did not report investigating two allegations of child 
soldier recruitment and use from 2019 and 2020. Additionally, 
the government did not disclose efforts to investigate allegations 
of government security forces sexually exploiting women in the 
Southwest Region or soldiers from the 42nd Motorized Infantry 
Battalion who NGOs reported forcibly recruited community members 
in the Far North Region to stand watch against Boko Haram incursions 
during the rating period. 
Ongoing insecurity in the Far North Region as well as armed conflict 
in the Northwest and Southwest regions between the government and 
Anglophone separatists hindered the government’s law enforcement 
efforts due to the closure of courts and lack of official access in some 
areas. Some regional courts and NGOs encouraged victims to settle 
trafficking cases outside of court in part because of insufficient 
cooperation between the government and NGOs and weak judicial 
administration. 
The government did not disclose implementing or widely 
disseminating its standard operating procedures on victim 
identification and referral to law enforcement or first responders. 
Over the course of the reporting period, the General Delegation 
for National Security reported conducting anti-trafficking training 
for an unknown number of police, compared with the government 
holding six seminars and sending two officers abroad for training in 
2019. Additionally, officials coordinated with NGOs and a partner 
government to conduct a training on identifying and assisting 
trafficking victims in January 2021. Because many law enforcement 
and judicial officials lacked knowledge of the crime, they may have 
tried some trafficking crimes as child abuse or kidnapping, which 
carried lesser penalties.
PROTECTION
The government increased efforts to identify victims and protect 
them. Although the government did not maintain comprehensive 
statistics, officials reported identifying at least 752 potential victims 
from January to August 2020, compared with identifying 77 potential 
victims over the course of the entire previous calendar year. Observers 
noted the increase in potential victims identified may be attributed 
to increased sensitization efforts by the government and NGOs 
but may include some cases of migrant smuggling. The Ministry of 
Social Affairs (MINAS) stated its officials provided basic assistance, 
psychological support, health care, as well reintegration services for all 
752 potential victims at five MINAS-run social centers in Yaoundé and 
Douala, with MINAS providing some individuals livelihoods training 
at the Betamba Childhood Institute in the country’s Center region. 
Additionally, between April and June 2020, MINAS reported 
identifying 162 homeless children vulnerable to trafficking 
and providing them shelter, food, and psychological support in 
government-supported social centers in Yaoundé. MINAS reported 
identifying 1,147 vulnerable homeless children throughout Cameroon 
in 2019; the pandemic’s effects on government revenue and operations 
negatively impacted many anti-trafficking efforts related to protection. 
Of the 162 children, officials reunited 78 with their families, referred 
40 to an education center to help them develop vocational skills to 
limit their future vulnerability, and continued to provide services 
to 27 as of June 2020. In February 2021, gendarmerie identified 29 
child victims of forced labor (separate from the 752 potential victims 
previously referenced) in collaboration with civil society; the court 
directed authorities to return the children to their parents following 
a hearing in March.
NGOs reported thousands of Cameroonian workers remained in 
Middle Eastern countries, many of whom were at risk of exploitation 
in domestic servitude or sex trafficking. For the second consecutive 
year, officials did not share the number of trafficking victims 
Cameroon repatriated from the Maghreb and Middle East. 
MINAS partnered with an international organization in July to 
update and disseminate the NRS/SOP to guide officials in proactive 
identification and referral of trafficking victims, initially developed 
in 2013. The National Gendarmerie reported it developed a strategy 
to detect trafficking victims and smuggled migrants proactively as 
a prerequisite to begin an investigation; however, observers stated 
authorities did not disseminate the NRS/SOPs widely during the 
reporting period. 
MINAS had the authority to admit children subjected to abuse—
including trafficking victims—to government institutions for 








psychological care, education, vocational training, and family tracing. 
Private centers funded by NGOs and regulated by MINAS provided 
care for an unknown number of child victims. 
The government did not have a formal policy to encourage victims 
to participate in investigations or prosecutions of their traffickers 
and did not report providing counseling, legal support, or any 
other assistance to victims who testified during court proceedings. 
The government did not report providing protection for victims 
cooperating with trafficking investigations despite experts claiming 
trafficking networks threatened victims during their trials. While 
there were no reports the government penalized trafficking victims 
for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit, authorities 
may have detained or deported some unidentified victims due to the 
limited use of the NRS/SOP and understanding of the crime among 
officials. The government could grant temporary residency status to 
foreign victims who, if deported, may face hardship or retribution; 
however, it did not report providing this accommodation during 
the reporting period.
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. Officials finalized a 
one-year national action plan in October focusing on six principles: 
prevention through awareness raising and capacity building; socio-
economic reintegration of victims; punishment for traffickers; 
development of statistical capacity; inter-ministerial and multi-
sectoral cooperation; and coordination of anti-trafficking efforts. 
The government implemented some aspects of the plan. The IMC 
convened at least four times in 2020 compared to twice in 2019 and 
underwent two leadership transitions during the reporting period. 
Cameroon dedicated human resources to joining the Alliance 8.7 
initiative as a Pathfinder country, a global partnership aimed at 
ending human trafficking through multi-stakeholder collaboration. 
During the reporting period, MINAS continued its public awareness 
campaign directed towards the general public and vulnerable children 
to inform Cameroonians on trafficking indicators. Officials did 
not report the number of individuals reached, compared with 
approximately 397,000 Cameroonians in 2019. The government 
partnered with an international organization in 2020 to implement 
awareness raising activities in four cities focused on informing 
vulnerable families on the risks of child exploitation; however, 
pandemic restrictions on in-person gatherings hindered many planned 
sensitization efforts. Authorities reported a hotline developed in 2020 
and implemented under the NRS/SOP received approximately 10-15 
trafficking-related calls every four months; however, officials did not 
disclose whether these calls led to investigations or victims identified. 
NGOs stated police and immigration officials’ screening efforts at 
Douala’s international airport prevented some potential victims 
from traveling to the Middle East as a result of human trafficking 
schemes; however, the government’s enforcement efforts diverted 
some vulnerable job seekers to Lagos, Nigeria where screening 
procedures were less stringent. The Ministry of Employment and 
Vocational Training (MINEFOP), in conjunction with the Ministry 
of Labor and Social Security, monitored formal labor recruiters 
but did not report the number of illicit labor recruitment offices 
it determined to be engaged in fraudulent recruitment and closed. 
During the previous year, officials denied the accreditation of 10 labor 
recruitment firms for violations potentially related to trafficking, issued 
warnings to 16 temporary employment placement firms suspected 
of human trafficking, and suspended nine firms for trafficking-
related concerns. MINEFOP officials reported publishing a list 
of licensed recruitment agencies annually, although the scope of 
dissemination was limited. MINEFOP reported it does not have a 
system to prevent traffickers from exploiting workers once agencies 
placed them in overseas employment. Increasing their vulnerability 
to trafficking, Cameroonians frequently used unauthorized recruiters 
to seek employment abroad. Observers noted there was anecdotal 
evidence border officials began requiring parental authorization 
for unaccompanied children in 2020; however, the government 
did not report whether it identified any children through these 
screening efforts.
The lack of birth certificates remained a factor increasing the 
vulnerability of individuals to exploitation, with only 40 percent 
of children registered in Cameroon. In November, National 
Assembly members and ministers convened to develop mitigating 
strategies to increase key communities’ access to birth certificates. 
Officials highlighted the need for civil registrars to visit health 
facilities to register births proactively, as well as the need to increase 
computerization of birth records. At the end of the reporting period, 
the government did not report implementing these recommendations. 
Ministry of External Relations officials stated they delivered training 
and sensitization programming to diplomats but did not report how 
many officials they reached. Between 2015 and 2017, a Cameroonian 
diplomat posted in the United States allegedly engaged in visa fraud 
related to a child female domestic worker. Because of diplomatic 
immunity, the United States could not commence prosecution, nor 
did the government report taking any action during the reporting 
period to hold the diplomat accountable. The diplomat left the United 
States in 2018. Additionally, between 2017 and 2019, a different 
Cameroonian diplomat posted in the United States engaged in alleged 
violations of the TVPA, as well as federal and state labor laws. Because 
of diplomatic immunity, the United States could not commence 
prosecution, nor did the government report taking any action during 
the reporting period to hold the diplomat accountable. The official left 
the United States in 2021. In November, the government coordinated 
with an international organization to obtain human rights training 
for 14 Rapid Intervention Battalion officers that included sessions 
on victim protection and sexual violence. The government did not 
report providing anti-trafficking training to its troops prior to their 
deployment as peacekeepers. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Cameroon, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Cameroon abroad. Pandemic-related border closures likely reduced the 
scale of transnational exploitation, according to experts. However, the 
economic impacts of the pandemic combined with ongoing violence 
in the Northwest and Southwest regions contributed to a sharp 
increase in the number of victims exploited domestically. Government 
officials, NGO representatives, and media outlets stated the conflict 
increased the risk of human trafficking during the reporting period 
due to the more than one million displaced individuals, diminished 
police and judicial presence, as well as deteriorated economic and 
educational conditions. The four years of school closures stemming 
from the conflict have resulted in some parents sending their children 
to stay with intermediaries who, instead of providing education and 
safety, exploit the children in domestic servitude. 
Child traffickers often use the promise of education or a better life 
in urban areas to convince rural parents to entrust their children to 
intermediaries, who then exploit the children in sex trafficking or 
forced labor; parents may play an active role early in the process 
due to their desire to remove their children from areas impacted 
by conflict. Criminals coerce women, IDPs, homeless children, 
and orphans into sex trafficking and forced labor throughout the 
country. Some labor recruiters lure children and adolescents from 
economically disadvantaged families to cities with the prospect of 
employment and then subject victims to labor or sex trafficking. 
Traffickers exploit Cameroonian children in domestic service and 
restaurants, as well as begging or vending on streets and highways. 
Additionally, criminal elements force Cameroonian children to work 
in artisanal gold mining, gravel quarries, fishing, animal breeding, 
and agriculture (on onion, cotton, tea, and cocoa plantations), as well 
as in urban transportation assisting bus drivers and in construction 
to run errands, work, or provide security. Media reporting indicates 






Observers note pandemic travel restrictions likely decreased child sex 
tourism in 2020; past reports highlighted Kribi and Douala as two 
centers of the crime, primarily perpetrated by nationals of Belgium, 
Chad, France, Germany, Nigeria, Switzerland, and Uganda. Criminals 
exploited Cameroonians in forced labor and sex trafficking in the 
Bonaberi neighborhood in Douala – which hosts hundreds of IDPs, 
according to NGOs. In December 2020, observers alleged 30 cases 
of debt bondage in the Ndop subdivision of the Northwest Region. 
Foreign business owners and herders force children from neighboring 
countries including Benin, Central African Republic, Chad, Equatorial 
Guinea, and Nigeria to labor in spare parts shops or cattle grazing in 
northern Cameroon; many traffickers share the nationality of their 
victims. The number of children traffickers exploit as they transit the 
country en route to Gabon and Equatorial Guinea decreased due to 
border closures related to the pandemic. Experts reported Turkish 
and Chinese officials in Cameroon may facilitate transnational 
human trafficking by granting visas to Africans with little oversight. 
Cameroonian banks may have assisted criminal networks involved 
in fraudulent recruitment by validating income and employment 
oversight requirements, as well as opening “ghost” bank accounts 
for victims to demonstrate false income levels. 
Observers reported there were more than one million IDPs in 
Cameroon at the end of 2020, an increase from 977,000 in 2019. 
In addition to IDPs, there were approximately 435,000 refugees in 
the country as of November 30, 2020. Traffickers may prey on both 
IDPs and refugees due to their economic instability and sometimes-
limited access to formal justice. Boko Haram’s activities on the border 
with Nigeria continued to displace many of these refugees. There 
continued to be reports of hereditary slavery in northern chiefdoms. 
An NGO reported a 17-year-old boy claimed soldiers from the 42nd 
Motorized Infantry Battalion attempted to coerce him into guard duty 
in the Far North Region, and soldiers from the same unit forcibly 
recruited other community members in the city of Mozogo to stand 
watch against Boko Haram incursions. Additionally, observers 
reported government security forces engaged in commercial sex with 
women in the Southwest Region divisions of Ndian, Buea, Ekona, 
and Muyuka, using food insecurity and their authority as leverage. 
Some community neighborhood watch groups, known as vigilance 
committees, may also use and recruit children in operations against 
Boko Haram and separatists, although there is no evidence of the 
government providing material support to these specific groups. 
Boko Haram is a consistent terrorist threat, and continues to forcibly 
recruit Cameroonian children as porters, cooks, and scouts. The 
terrorist organization also uses women and girls as forced suicide 
bombers as well as sex slaves, and boys and girls as child soldiers. An 
international organization reported non-state armed groups abducted 
26 children and forced seven to commit suicide bombings in July 
2020. Anglophone separatists recruited and used child soldiers in 
the Southwest and Northwest Regions, both for fighting government 
forces and for gathering intelligence, according to observers.
Traffickers exploit Cameroonians from disadvantaged social strata, 
in particular from rural areas, in forced labor and sex trafficking in 
the Middle East (especially Kuwait and Lebanon), Thailand, as well 
as in Europe (including Switzerland and Cyprus), the United States, 
and multiple African countries (including Benin and Nigeria). Most 
Cameroonians exploited abroad are between the ages of 20 and 38, 
and come from the Northwest, Southwest, Littoral, Center, South, and 
West Regions. Fraudulent labor brokers recruit some Cameroonian 
women for domestic work in the Middle East, where traffickers 
exploit them in sex trafficking or domestic servitude. Pandemic border 
closures reduced but did not eliminate the risk that criminals exploit 
some economic migrants in search of opportunity in Libya, or while 
in transit through Niger. NGOs reported Nigerians in the eastern 
states of that country exploited Cameroonian refugees displaced by 
the Anglophone conflict in forced labor and sex trafficking. 
Trafficking networks generally consist of local community members, 
including religious leaders and trafficking victims who have become 
perpetrators. These networks advertise jobs through the internet, 
as well as other media, and recruit and sell other Cameroonians 
directly to families in need of domestic workers. Advocates working 
on trafficking issues report the government’s awareness-raising 
activities targeting fraudulent recruitment have raised awareness 
among vulnerable populations, but have caused intermediaries to 
operate with greater discretion, often directing victims to travel to 
the Middle East through neighboring countries, including Nigeria. 
International organizations, NGOs, and migrants report Cameroonian 
trafficking networks in Morocco coerce women into sex trafficking.
CANADA: TIER 1
The Government of Canada fully meets the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued to 
demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting period, 
considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-
trafficking capacity; therefore Canada remained on Tier 1. These efforts 
included increasing funding for victim services; amending the Customs 
Tariff to prohibit the importation of goods produced by forced labor; 
and launching a five-year public awareness campaign informed by 
research on public awareness and attitudes on trafficking. Although 
the government meets the minimum standards, it did not provide 
comprehensive data on investigations, prosecutions, and convictions 
during the reporting period or on victims provided with services 
nationwide. The government’s efforts to identify victims, provide 
protections to all victims—particularly forced labor victims—and 
investigate and prosecute forced labor crimes, remained inadequate. 
The range, quality, and timely delivery of trafficking-specific services 
varied nationwide, and service providers reported a shortage of victim 
services, including emergency shelters and longer-term housing. 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes, including 
forced labor and child sex tourism, and impose adequately strong 
sentences on convicted traffickers. • Increase proactive identification 
of victims, particularly male victims and forced labor victims, through 
screening among vulnerable populations and proactive outreach 
and assistance to migrant workers. • Significantly increase trauma-
informed specialized services and shelter available to all victims, 
including male victims and foreign national victims, in partnership 
with civil society and through ongoing dedicated funding from 
federal and provincial governments. • Increase nationwide trafficking 
data collection, including timely consolidation of investigations, 
prosecutions, and convictions and numbers of victims identified and 
assistance provided. • Increase coordination and communication 
among federal, provincial, and territorial actors and strengthen 
provincial interagency efforts. • Establish a survivor-led advocacy 
council to assist in policy development, and ensure members are 
duly compensated for their work. • Amend the criminal code and 
Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to include definitions of 
trafficking that are consistent with international law. • Increase 
training for government officials, particularly for prosecutors and 
judges, including on seeking and ordering restitution upon trafficking 





financial institutions, to prevent trafficking. • Implement laws and 
policies to address trafficking in the federal supply chain.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Criminal code 
sections 279.01 and 279.011 criminalized sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking, prescribing penalties of four to 14 years’ imprisonment 
for trafficking adults and five to 14 years’ imprisonment for trafficking 
children; these penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect 
to sex trafficking, commensurate with those for serious crimes, 
such as rape. Inconsistent with the definition of trafficking under 
international law, the law did not establish the use of force, fraud, 
or coercion as an essential element of the crime. Section 279.02 
also criminalized receiving financial or any other material benefit 
from trafficking and prescribed a maximum penalty of 10 years’ 
imprisonment for offenses involving adult victims and a mandatory 
minimum of two years’ to a maximum of 14 years’ imprisonment 
for offenses involving child victims. Section 279.03 criminalized 
withholding or destroying documents to facilitate trafficking and 
prescribed a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment in cases 
involving adult victims and a mandatory minimum of one year to a 
maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment in cases involving child victims. 
Section 286.1 criminalized purchasing commercial sex acts from an 
individual under 18 years of age and prescribed a minimum penalty 
of six months and a maximum penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment. 
The Immigration and Refugee Protection Act established a separate 
crime of “human smuggling and trafficking” to mean “no person 
shall knowingly organize the coming into Canada of one or more 
persons by means of abduction, fraud, deception or use or threat 
of force or coercion.” Inconsistent with the definition of trafficking 
under international law, this provision did not include exploitation 
as an essential element of the crime. 
Government officials at the federal, provincial, and municipal levels 
investigated and prosecuted trafficking crimes, but the government 
did not report comprehensive law enforcement data at each of 
these levels. The federal government did not maintain a national 
database. It provided data from Canada’s Uniform Crime Reporting 
(UCR) system, which included provincial and municipal data but 
did not disaggregate between sex and labor trafficking. The UCR 
data is available each July for the previous calendar year, and in 
2019, the government reported a total of 511 trafficking incidents 
investigated leading to 270 individuals charged with trafficking 
crimes; this compared with a total of 340 trafficking incidents 
investigated and 236 individuals charged in 2018. Employment 
and Social Development Canada (ESDC) reported identifying 
and referring to law enforcement 45 suspected forced labor cases 
within the temporary foreign worker program between April 2020 
and December 2020, compared with 32 forced labor investigations 
between April 2019 and October 2019. The government reported 
law enforcement officials investigated 573 trafficking cases in 2020. 
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, which conducted 
administrative investigations of potential human trafficking cases 
among immigration and refugee cases, initiated 37 new large-scale 
investigations involving allegations of human trafficking in 2020, 
compared with 20 in 2019. Unlike previous years, the government 
did not report the number of suspected traffickers that authorities 
prosecuted in the most recent calendar year. Federal, provincial, and 
municipal authorities prosecuted and concluded cases against 185 
suspected traffickers in 2019, compared with 197 suspects in 2018, 
and convicted 50 traffickers, compared with 51 traffickers convicted 
in 2018. Though the government did not report the number of 
individuals prosecuted or convicted in 2020, it reported that courts 
imposed sentences between seven years’ and eight years six months’ 
imprisonment for convicted traffickers in 2020. The government 
reported some traffickers may have been convicted under other 
sections of the criminal code. The government reported the majority 
of trafficking cases were prosecuted at the provincial level, though 
it did not provide complete data on provincial-level prosecutions 
and convictions. Some provinces and municipalities maintained 
specialized anti-trafficking law enforcement units. In July 2020, 
the Government of Nova Scotia announced the appointment of 
its first Crown attorney dedicated to prosecuting trafficking cases 
in the province. Most provincial courts suspended trials for several 
months following the onset of the pandemic in March 2020, and 
some closed for a second time beginning in November 2020. Many 
courts continued to operate at a decreased capacity and struggled 
to manage the backlog of cases. 
Several government agencies continued collaboration with financial 
institutions, technology companies, and NGOs to monitor financial 
transactions for indicators of possible money laundering linked 
to human trafficking; through this collaboration, the Financial 
Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) 
received thousands of suspicious transaction reports and provided 232 
disclosures of actionable financial intelligence to police in support of 
investigations. NGOs noted a continued imbalance in the government’s 
anti-trafficking efforts, with limited attention to and understanding 
of forced labor. Coordination challenges among federal, provincial, 
territorial, and municipal authorities limited the effectiveness of anti-
trafficking law enforcement efforts, particularly on cases that spanned 
multiple jurisdictions. The government’s lack of a coordinated data 
collection system made it difficult for authorities to collect reliable, 
timely, and consolidated data to assess efforts and respond to trends. 
The Canadian Police College provided a human trafficking 
investigators course that trained 17 police—a limited number due 
to pandemic-related restrictions—on understanding the scope of 
trafficking crimes, fostering trust between law enforcement and victims, 
and overcoming challenges in investigating and prosecuting trafficking 
cases. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) provided an 
online introduction to human trafficking course completed by 638 
law enforcement officials. The government’s training academy for 
new police recruits included trafficking awareness in its training 
curriculum. FINTRAC regularly presented during the human trafficking 
investigator courses at the provincial and federal levels to educate law 
enforcement officials on financial intelligence in human trafficking 
investigations. The RCMP updated its guidelines and procedures 
for investigating human trafficking cases in its operational manual. 
New border officials received training in human trafficking through 
their agency’s People at Risk course; in 2020, 124 officials completed 
this course, while 201 additional agency employees completed 
an online training on trafficking. The Department of National 
Defense and Canadian Armed Forces continued providing online 
trafficking awareness training for all new Canadian Defense Attaché 
personnel. The government reported police cooperated with foreign 
law enforcement officials on several open investigations during the 
reporting period. The government did not report any investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in 
trafficking offenses.
PROTECTION
The government increased protection efforts. The government did 
not report complete data on the number of victims identified. RCMP 
officers identified 80 sex trafficking victims in 2020, compared with 
119 victims in 2019, and 89 victims in 2018. Of these, 78 were 
female, two were male, 63 were adults, 13 were children, and four 
were unspecified. In addition, ESDC identified 45 suspected forced 
labor victims among temporary foreign workers. The government 
provided several handbooks, guidelines, and other resources for 
front-line officials—including police, justice practitioners, and 
border officials—to enable them to proactively identify indicators 
of trafficking among the populations they served. 
Provinces and territories were primarily responsible for the delivery 
of victim services. The government did not report complete data on 
victims receiving government-funded services. The federal government 
allocated 930,200 Canadian dollars ($729,570) to Justice Canada’s 
Victims Fund to support trafficking victims and groups at high 
risk of exploitation, compared with 1 million Canadian dollars 
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($784,310) in 2019. Through this fund, the government provided 
funding to organizations implementing 11 projects to improve 
services for trafficking victims and develop and deliver training 
for law enforcement officers and service providers in the provinces 
and territories. One project ended during the reporting period, 
and 10 remained ongoing at the close of the reporting period. The 
government did not collect standardized data from these projects, 
but implementing organizations estimated providing services to 
approximately 220 victims and vulnerable individuals between April 
2020 and December 2020 through government-funded projects. In 
December 2020, the government awarded an additional approximately 
19 million Canadian dollars ($14.9 million) over four years to 63 
organizations working to identify and protect trafficking victims—
including through housing assistance, mental health services, and 
employment and livelihood development and support—and prevent 
victimization among vulnerable groups. 
Each province or territory provided some services for victims, often 
in collaboration with NGOs, though the government did not collect 
comprehensive data on the amount of funding or number of victims 
served at the provincial and territorial level. Services varied widely 
across the country—with some based in the criminal justice process 
and some providing more comprehensive individual support—
though victims could typically access emergency shelter, food, 
medical services, psychological services, safety planning, and legal 
services. Assistance was available for both Canadian and foreign 
victims, as well as male and female victims, but service providers 
reported they primarily served Canadian female victims. Several 
provincial governments funded or implemented trafficking-specific 
programming. The Government of Alberta continued funding a 
coalition, which included survivors, to provide services to victims 
and coordinate a regional response to trafficking; the Government 
of British Columbia maintained an office to develop and coordinate 
the region’s anti-trafficking strategy; and the Government of Quebec 
continued implementation of a strategy to prevent and combat 
sexual violence, including providing support for trafficking victims. 
In Manitoba, police and NGOs continued to assist victims through a 
collaborative response team. The Government of Ontario continued 
implementation of a five-year strategy to combat trafficking announced 
in March 2020, including 307 million Canadian dollars ($240.78 
million) in new funding. In February 2020, the Government of 
Nova Scotia launched a provincial approach to combat trafficking 
and sexual exploitation, including new funding of 1.4 million 
Canadian dollars ($1.1 million) annually for five years; these funds 
were allocated to programs that included strengthening support for 
black and indigenous victims and re-opening a resource center for 
indigenous women who were vulnerable to exploitation. In July 
2020, Nova Scotia opened a youth safe house with the capacity to 
provide specialized trafficking victim services and 24-hour support 
to two residents at a time for up to three months, as well as follow-
up services after victims leave the shelter. 
NGOs operated shelters for victims of violence nationwide, mostly 
women and their accompanying children; some shelters were 
government-funded, but only a few provided beds specifically for 
trafficking victims. Service providers reported there was an insufficient 
supply of emergency shelters, medium- to long-term housing, and 
specialized medical and psychological services to meet the needs of 
trafficking victims and that some available shelter options were not 
adequate for victims to receive appropriate, trauma-informed care. 
Through the Victims Fund, the government continued to provide an 
annual allocation of more than 3.3 million Canadian dollars ($2.59 
million) to support multidisciplinary, child-friendly advocacy centers 
to enhance trauma-informed assistance to child victims of abuse, 
including human trafficking, during the criminal justice process. In 
addition, the government provided supplemental funding to assist 
child advocacy centers to adapt their services and meet increased 
demand during the pandemic. 
The onset of the pandemic hurt the availability of services for victims. 
An NGO that maintained a national directory of trafficking victim 
service providers reported that in April and May 2020, 22 percent 
of non-governmental programs and services were suspended or 
not accepting new referrals and 71 percent operated in a modified 
capacity. The Government of Ontario implemented measures to 
facilitate sustained support for victims during the pandemic; it 
provided eligibility to trafficking victim service providers to receive 
emergency childcare, implemented a temporary pay increase for 
staff assisting trafficking victims in residential settings, provided 
personal protective equipment to anti-trafficking organizations, and 
increased funding to assist organizations in adapting operations and 
services during the pandemic. The federal government provided 100 
million Canadian dollars ($78.43 million) in emergency funding 
for organizations providing shelter and other services to victims 
of gender-based violence—including 20 million Canadian dollars 
($15.69 million) allocated to organizations assisting indigenous 
women and children—which likely benefited some trafficking victims. 
Canadians who were victims of trafficking crimes that occurred 
outside Canada could be eligible to receive financial assistance for 
travel, psychological services, and other expenses through the Victims 
Fund, but the government did not report providing this assistance to 
any victims during the reporting period. The government provided 
alternatives to removal for foreign trafficking victims who faced 
danger or hardship in their home countries. Foreign trafficking 
victims could apply for a temporary resident permit (TRP) to remain 
in Canada under regularized immigration status, to receive access 
to healthcare, including psychological services, and to apply for a 
work permit. Officials issued short-term TRPs for up to 180 days or 
long-term TRPs for three years. Authorities did not require victims 
to participate in an investigation or prosecution to be eligible for 
a TRP, and victims could apply directly without a referral from law 
enforcement or service providers. The government reported authorities 
prioritized trafficking-related TRP applications, including throughout 
the pandemic. Between January 2020 and November 2020, the 
government issued 110 TRPs to foreign trafficking victims and their 
dependents; this compared with 228 TRPs issued to trafficking 
victims in 2019 and 40 issued in 2018. TRP holders could apply 
for fee-exempt work permits; the government reported providing 
permits to approximately 40 trafficking victims and their dependents 
between January 2020 and November 2020. 
Canadian law provided various protections to victims and other 
witnesses participating in trials, many of which were mandatory 
for children and available to adults at a judge’s discretion. These 
protections included video testimony, the presence of a support 
person during testimony, a ban on publishing names of or releasing 
identifying information about witnesses, and closing courtrooms to 
the public. Authorities did not report how frequently courts afforded 
these protections to trafficking victims during trials. NGOs reported 
some victims were re-traumatized during court proceedings due to 
the lack of victim-centered methods. Traffickers could be ordered to 
pay restitution to victims under Canadian law, and the provinces of 
Alberta, Manitoba, and Ontario had laws allowing trafficking victims 
to seek civil redress. Some provinces had compensation or financial 
benefits programs for crime victims. The government did not report 
whether any victims received restitution, sought civil redress, or 
were awarded compensation through provincial programs in 2020. 
There were no reports authorities penalized victims for unlawful acts 
traffickers compelled them to commit, although the government did 
not have a formal law or policy prohibiting this practice. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. Public Safety Canada 
(PSC) continued to lead the government’s federal interagency task 
force to combat trafficking, and it strengthened the task force’s 
governance structure by establishing an annual Assistant Deputy 
Ministers meeting, a Directors-General Steering Committee, and 
five working groups on key topics. Federal agencies continued 
coordination to implement the government’s National Strategy 





million Canadian dollars ($44.88 million) in funding over five 
years and 10.28 million Canadian dollars ($8.06 million) annually 
after 2024. PSC was expected to publish an annual progress report 
on Canada’s achievements under the National Strategy but did not 
publish the first annual report during the reporting period. The 
National Strategy called for the establishment of a survivor-led 
advisory committee, though this was not established during the year. 
The Government of Ontario continued to convene a roundtable to 
facilitate input from trafficking survivors to inform its approach. To 
facilitate coordination and collaboration among federal, provincial, 
and territorial governments, PSC chaired meetings of the Federal, 
Provincial, and Territorial (FPT) Trafficking in Persons Working 
Group and Justice Canada led the FPT Coordinating Committee of 
Senior Officials Working Group on Human Trafficking. 
The government continued funding the Migrant Worker Support 
Center in British Columbia, a pilot program to strengthen protections 
for migrant workers through providing funding to NGOs and 
facilitating quarterly multi-stakeholder meetings to address worker 
protection issues. In April 2020, network-supported projects were 
refocused to respond to migrant workers’ immediate needs during the 
pandemic, and in July 2020, the government announced an additional 
6 million Canadian dollars ($4.71 million) in emergency funding 
to support migrant workers during the pandemic. The government 
implemented an initiative allowing migrant workers in an abusive 
employment situation to apply for an open work permit, which would 
allow them to change employers without losing their status to work 
in Canada; however, the government did not provide statistics on the 
number of trafficking victims or vulnerable migrants that applied 
for or received open work permits. The government temporarily 
extended the program to agricultural workers from Trinidad and 
Tobago who were stranded in Canada during the pandemic. The 
government implemented a policy during the pandemic to allow 
additional time for foreign nationals to renew their temporary 
immigration status and to permit some work permit applicants to 
work legally while their applications were pending; these measures 
may have mitigated trafficking risks among some foreign nationals 
who would have lost their immigration status during the pandemic. 
In March 2020, the Canadian parliament passed implementing 
legislation for a trade agreement that requires the parties to prohibit 
the importation of goods produced by forced labor; the agreement 
entered into force in July 2020, and in the same month, Canada 
amended its Customs Tariff to include the forced labor prohibition. 
Trade analysts reported the implementation of these measures was 
slow as the government coordinated internally. Public Services and 
Procurement Canada maintained a team focused on ethical sourcing 
in federal procurement supply chains. Officials implemented an 
apparel sector initiative requiring suppliers to certify their products 
were free from forced labor, and the government added an ethical 
employment clause that included a forced labor prohibition to 
its contracts for personal protective equipment beginning in July 
2020. Officials drafted revisions to Canada’s Code of Conduct for 
Procurement to include labor and human rights standards, including 
a prohibition on forced labor for all suppliers and launched a 
consultative process with suppliers, NGOs, and experts to validate 
and finalize these changes. 
In February 2021, the government launched the first phase of a 
five-year national awareness campaign with digital advertising 
aiming to raise awareness of human trafficking, address common 
misperceptions of the crime, educate the public on warning signs, and 
provide information for reporting suspected cases; the government 
designed the campaign using results from a survey measuring public 
attitudes and awareness of trafficking. The government provided an 
NGO 25,000 Canadian dollars ($19,610) to implement an ongoing 
campaign raising awareness and providing support to potential 
victims of trafficking and sexual exploitation in the context of the 
Formula 1 Grand Prix in Quebec, although the Grand Prix was not 
held in 2020 due to the pandemic.
The government allocated foreign assistance funds to anti-trafficking 
programming in other countries in the Americas and around the world; 
these projects included combatting trafficking within indigenous 
communities in Mexico, developing a permanent specialized training 
program for anti-trafficking officials in Honduras, and strengthening 
the capacity of criminal justice officials to prosecute cross-border 
trafficking crimes in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The 
government also funded programming to improve trafficking victim 
protection in Ukraine, to provide alternatives to irregular migration for 
youth in Central America, and to investigate violations of international 
law—including trafficking and enslavement—in Iraq and Syria. The 
government funded small-scale anti-trafficking projects tailored to 
local needs in Belarus, Bolivia, Iraq, Lebanon, Micronesia, Senegal, 
and Tajikistan. 
The government made efforts to reduce the demand for participation 
in international sex tourism by its citizens, including by distributing 
publications warning Canadians traveling abroad about penalties 
under Canadian law and directing personnel in its overseas diplomatic 
missions to report suspected cases to local law enforcement and 
INTERPOL. The government, however, did not collect data on 
child sex tourism investigations, prosecutions, or convictions. The 
government made efforts to reduce the demand for commercial 
sex acts through public messaging and awareness-raising activities. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
domestic and foreign victims in Canada, and traffickers exploit 
victims from Canada abroad. Women and children from indigenous 
communities, migrants, new immigrants, LGBTQI+ persons, persons 
with disabilities, at-risk youth, runaway youth, and youth in the child 
welfare system are at high risk for trafficking. Traffickers lure girls and 
young women, including some who are not socially or economically 
disadvantaged, into deceptive romantic relationships and exploit 
them in sex trafficking. Traffickers exploit Canadian victims within 
and across the country, and sometimes abroad, mainly in the United 
States. Traffickers exploit foreign women, primarily from Asia and 
Eastern Europe, in sex trafficking in Canada. Traffickers exploit 
legal foreign workers from Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America, 
the Caribbean, and Africa in forced labor in a variety of sectors, 
including agriculture, construction, food processing, restaurants, 
and hospitality, or as domestic workers, including isolated reports 
of incidents in diplomatic households. Migrant workers in the 
caregiving and agricultural sectors were at the highest risk of forced 
labor due to language barriers, isolated worksites, and limited access 
to protections. Media reports indicated some employers confined 
migrant workers to employer premises during the pandemic, including 
through the use of armed guards to restrict workers from departing 
farm grounds, and some imposed wage deductions to obtain food 
and supplies on workers’ behalf at high rates. Some foreign nationals 
are exploited by traffickers with ties to organized crime networks in 
victims’ home countries. Canadians travel abroad to purchase sex acts 
from child victims in other countries, and foreign nationals purchase 
sex acts from child victims in Canada. Traffickers in Canada operate 
individually and via family-based connections; some are affiliated 
with street gangs and transnational organized crime.
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC: 
TIER 2
The Government of the Central African Republic (CAR) does not fully 
meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but 
is making significant efforts to do so. The government demonstrated 
overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, 
considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its 
anti-trafficking capacity; therefore CAR remained on Tier 2. Officials 
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
168
investigated more trafficking cases and identified more victims. 
Additionally, the government coordinated with partners to demobilize 
855 children associated with non-state armed groups and to provide 
reintegration services for 963 children recruited by armed groups; 
launched a public awareness campaign to increase the population’s 
ability to identify trafficking cases; provided training for more officials; 
and enacted the country’s Child Protection Code (CPC). However, the 
government did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. 
Victim services remained inadequate, and the government detained 
some child soldiers in contravention of the CPC. The government 
has not convicted a trafficker under the country’s trafficking penal 
code articles since 2017, and official complicity remained a concern, 
including allegations government security forces may have used 
children in support roles at checkpoints during the reporting period. 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Finalize and disseminate victim identification and referral procedures 
in coordination with international organizations and NGOs to guide 
front-line officials’ protection activities and increase efforts to identify 
trafficking victims within Bangui, including in the informal sector. • 
Proactively investigate and prosecute individuals sexually exploiting 
children and adults in maisons de joie (“houses of joy”) within Bangui 
under Penal Code Article 151. • Provide anti-trafficking training for 
police and gendarmerie so they can effectively investigate trafficking 
cases, identify victims, and refer them to care. • Allocate financial and 
human resources to support the Mixed Unit for Rapid Intervention 
and Repression of Sexual Violence to Women and Children’s 
(UMIRR) operations. • Increase the number of court hearings—
separate from informal mediation—for suspected trafficking cases 
– including for armed groups that recruit and use child soldiers, 
and expand efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers 
through independent and fair trials. • Coordinate with international 
organizations to demobilize and provide reintegration services to 
child soldiers and increase efforts to minimize their re-recruitment 
by armed groups. • Develop and formally adopt a national action 
plan building on the 2020-2021 plan. • Increase referrals of victims to 
services in partnership with NGOs and international organizations, 
and ensure trafficking victims are not punished for unlawful acts 
traffickers compel them to commit. • Expand radio programming 
in French and Sangho to raise awareness of the crime in Bangui in 
partnership with civil society, traditional and religious leaders, as 
well as international organizations to enhance the public’s ability 
to identify and refer trafficking crimes to law enforcement officers. 
• Take concrete actions to begin implementing the CPC, beginning 
with the protection of child soldiers. • Provide additional staff and 
resources—in coordination with international organizations—to 
support the government’s anti-trafficking focal point within the 
Presidency as well as the Anti-Trafficking Coordination Bureau.
PROSECUTION
The government demonstrated mixed anti-trafficking law enforcement 
efforts during the reporting period. Article 151 of the penal code 
criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed 
penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment, which were sufficiently 
stringent and with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
penalties prescribed for other serious offenses, such as kidnapping. 
If the offense involved a child victim of sex trafficking or forced 
labor similar to slavery, the prescribed penalties increased to five to 
10 years’ imprisonment with hard labor. 
The pandemic’s impacts on government operations and insecurity 
across the majority of the country’s territory hindered officials’ ability 
to conduct law enforcement activities outside of the capital and 
collect statistics. Authorities reported opening 33 investigations into 
suspected trafficking cases (sex trafficking and forced labor of adults, 
as well as children exploited in mines) during the reporting period, 
compared with three in the previous reporting period. The government 
did not report initiating any prosecutions, although an NGO reported 
courts initiated one prosecution for a suspected trafficking case 
during the reporting period; officials have not convicted a trafficker 
under Penal Code Article 151 since 2017. In the previous reporting 
period, the country’s criminal court partnered with an international 
organization to prosecute and convict 33 militants and armed group 
leaders for crimes including child soldier recruitment and use. 
NGOs reported law enforcement officers may have deprioritized 
investigating owners of brothels known as “houses of joy”—despite 
their engaging in child sex trafficking—to focus limited resources 
on addressing the pandemic. 
In partnership with a donor-funded international organization, 
the government facilitated the training of all 24 UMIRR officers 
during the reporting period in victim identification best practices, 
exploitation risks to ethnic minorities, sex trafficking indicators, and 
the importance of working collaboratively with labor inspectors. 
Additionally, authorities partnered with international organizations 
to provide training to an unknown number of gendarmerie, police, 
and army officials on recognizing trafficking victims; given its severe 
resource limitations, the government contributed facilities and other 
in-kind donations to support these capacity-building initiatives. 
Years of destabilizing conflict exacerbated by worsening violence 
during the reporting period severely limited formal judicial capacity 
outside the capital, leading to the frequent use of customary dispute 
resolution methods through which traditional chiefs or community 
leaders administered punishment for criminal acts. The government 
did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting government 
officials complicit in human trafficking offenses; however, allegations 
of corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes by judges 
remained concerns and may have inhibited law enforcement action 
during the year. 
PROTECTION
The government demonstrated mixed results on protection; it 
increased efforts to identify victims, although the dearth of services 
remained a glaring shortcoming in the government’s response to 
trafficking. The country’s anti-trafficking committee reported UMIRR 
officials identified 34 victims (25 adult women, one adult male, and 
eight girls) of sex trafficking, forced labor of adults, and forced labor 
of children at mining sites, compared with identifying two child 
victims in the previous reporting period; as previously unreported, 
the government had identified a total of 23 victims from 2018 
to 2020. UMIRR coordinated with a donor-funded international 
organization to begin developing victim identification and referral 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) and trained officials on the 
procedures; the government did not finalize the SOPs by the close 
of the reporting period. 
Authorities did not report referring victims—separate from child 
soldiers—to services during the reporting period. To address its 
deficiency in care, UMIRR contributed funds to open a shelter in 
March 2021 that would provide psycho-social care for victims; the 
shelter did not open by the end of the reporting period. International 
organizations and NGOs continued to provide the majority of 
care for victims of abuse, including human trafficking. In June, 
the government enacted the CPC, which strengthened protections 
for child soldiers, mandated the creation of state institutions to 














children accused of crimes, and defined child trafficking according 
to international standards; however, the government did not report 
fully applying the law to potential violations during the reporting 
period. In March, the government’s anti-trafficking committee 
partnered with an international organization to train social workers 
on victim identification and data collection methods. 
Over the course of the reporting period, authorities reportedly 
dispersed individuals engaged in commercial sex—some of whom 
may have been sex trafficking victims—without verifying their ages 
or attempting to identify indicators of trafficking; law enforcement 
officers allegedly arrested individuals in commercial sex in prior 
years. During the reporting period, the government partnered with an 
international organization to demobilize 855 children used by armed 
groups and—in coordination with the international organization—
provided 963 (some of whom were identified in previous reporting 
periods) shelter, psycho-social services, and reintegration assistance, 
compared with demobilizing 1,150 child soldiers in 2019. In early 
2020, the pandemic disrupted the demobilization process, which 
restarted in September. Observers reported there was not a specific 
protocol in CAR for child soldier disarmament, demobilization, 
and reintegration (DDR), resulting in children navigating the DDR 
process with adults. During the reporting period, the government 
launched a coordination committee and developed a national 
action plan to address child soldier recruitment and use, although 
post-election violence throughout the country at the end of 2020 
hindered authorities’ progress on this issue.
In December, the government released four children authorities 
detained for potential use by armed groups as child soldiers; a 
judge ordered them into a shelter and required weekly check-ins 
with authorities, but an NGO reported the order was not properly 
implemented. Observers noted 25 children as young as 14 and 
including some now in adulthood remained in government detention 
at the close of the reporting period for crimes related to serving in 
armed groups, as well as rape. Authorities did not report providing 
legal alternatives to the removal of foreign victims to countries where 
they may face hardship or retribution and issued a deportation 
order for one potential victim during the reporting period. The law 
allowed victims to file civil suits against the government or their 
alleged traffickers for restitution; however, there was no information 
this occurred during the reporting period. 
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. The government 
partially funded and implemented its 2020-2021 national action 
plan, although worsening conflict throughout the country, severe 
budgetary constraints, and pandemic-related restrictions on in-
person coordination hindered its ability to execute the plan fully. 
The country’s inter-ministerial committee—established in September 
2019 and led by a presidentially-appointed advisor—convened at 
least four times during the reporting period, compared with five 
during the previous reporting period. The government continued 
to dedicate financial and in-kind resources to implement aspects of 
the plan during the reporting period. 
Per the country’s 2020-2021 national action plan, the committee 
developed and launched an awareness raising campaign in February 
2021—funded by the government—using daily radio programs 
in French and in the local language Sango; these sensitization 
campaigns helped to address a pronounced lack of understanding 
of the crime among many Central Africans. In March 2021, officials 
held a workshop in the capital for community members to educate 
them on how to report trafficking crimes to UMIRR. Additionally, the 
government organized a conference in July around the World Day 
Against Trafficking in Persons, leveraging national media coverage 
to increase awareness of the phenomenon. 
In March 2021, the anti-trafficking committee trained approximately 
30 deputies from the National Assembly on human trafficking 
principles and the need for strengthened legal frameworks to address 
the crime. Also in March, officials from the committee partnered 
with an international organization to train 30 journalists on best 
practices for reporting on the crime, trafficking indicators, child 
soldier recruitment and use, international law, regional issues, and 
the country’s national action plan. 
UMIRR continued to operate its hotline dedicated to gender-based 
violence staffed by French and local language speakers; during the 
reporting period, the government initiated a process to expand the 
hotline’s usage to include reporting of human trafficking cases, 
but it was unclear whether officials had implemented the hotline’s 
expansion. Officials did not report taking any measures to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex acts, nor providing anti-trafficking training 
for its diplomatic personnel. Ministry of Labor officials conducted 
inspections in Bangui during the reporting period; however, instability 
and armed conflict throughout the country limited the government’s 
ability to observe areas outside the capital, and inspectors did not 
monitor the informal sector where experts reported child trafficking 
and hazardous work conditions commonly occurred. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in CAR, and traffickers exploit victims from 
CAR abroad. Most government officials, as well as civil society, lack 
an understanding of human trafficking, hindering the country’s 
ability to identify victims and address the crime. Observers report 
traffickers primarily exploit CAR nationals within the country and 
in smaller numbers in Cameroon, Chad, Nigeria, Republic of the 
Congo, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and South Sudan. 
Perpetrators—including transient merchants, herders, and non-state 
armed groups—exploit children in domestic servitude, sex trafficking, 
as well as in forced labor in agriculture, artisanal gold and diamond 
mines, shops, drinking establishments, and street vending within 
CAR. Also within the country, some relatives exploit children in 
domestic servitude, and community members exploit Aka (pygmy) 
minorities in domestic servitude, especially in the southwest of the 
country. Authorities’ prejudice against individuals in commercial 
sex—despite its prevalence—hinders victims’ access to justice and 
assistance. Some government workers reportedly coerced women 
into sex in exchange for government employment or documents and 
services to which they were entitled. Observers note non-state armed 
groups’ December 2020 to February 2021 closure of the main supply 
route from Cameroon resulted in rising prices, and a corresponding 
increase in exploitation of many Central Africans. Fraudulent labor 
recruiters attract foreigners from nearby countries such as Chad and 
Libya to enter the country illegally to work in CAR’s mining sector; 
armed groups capture and exploit some of these irregular migrants 
in forced labor. 
Some relatives or community members coerce girls into forced 
marriages and subsequently exploit the girls in domestic servitude 
or sex trafficking. Stemming from severe poverty throughout the 
country, a government official stated many husbands physically 
coerce their wives to engage in commercial sex to cover household 
expenses, with little recourse from authorities. Officials note family 
members also exploit children in forced labor and sex trafficking to 
supplement family income.
Observers reported Central African criminal elements engage in the 
sex trafficking of girls as young as 13 in maisons de joie (houses of 
joy) throughout Bangui. Maisons de joie are private residences with 
little official oversight where CAR nationals serve alcohol and food 
to middle and upper class customers as a cover to exploit girls and 
women in commercial sex. Criminals reportedly take advantage of 
abject poverty across the country to recruit women and girls with 
the promise of money for their children or families. 
Violent conflict since 2012 has resulted in chronic instability and the 
displacement of 1.3 million people, increasing the vulnerability of 
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adults and children to forced labor and sex trafficking. As of February 
2021, more than 741,000 IDPs and 647,000 Central Africans sought 
refuge in neighboring countries. This represents a significant increase 
from September 2019, in which there were approximately 600,000 
IDPs and 592,000 Central African refugees in neighboring countries.
Escalating pre- and post-election violence resulted in armed groups 
recruiting and using more child soldiers, with nearly 3,000 recruited 
into combat since the country’s December 2020 elections. The 
new coalition of six armed groups (Mouvement Patriotique pour la 
Centrafrique (MPC), Return, Reclamation, and Rehabilitation (3R), 
Union pour la Paix en Centrafrique (UPC), Front Populaire pour la 
Renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC), Anti-Balaka Mokom, and 
Anti-Balaka Ndomate) intent on overthrowing the democratically 
elected government—the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC)—
led a child soldier recruitment campaign near the town of Bambari 
for children between the ages of 12 and 17 through February 2021. 
Additionally, individual militias associated with Anti-Balaka; Ex-
Seleka; FPRC; Lords Resistance Army; 3R; UPC; and other armed 
groups continued to forcibly recruit and use child soldiers in CAR 
before and after the creation of the CPC. Multiple sources alleged 
armed groups in southeastern CAR—areas outside of governmental 
control—kidnapped children and coerced them into serving as 
child soldiers, in addition to forcing community members into 
forced labor as porters, cooks, and other support roles, or in illegal 
mining operations. Additionally, observers reported government 
security forces may have used children at checkpoints during the 
reporting period. International organizations reported armed groups 
recruited children to serve as combatants, servants, child brides, 
and sex slaves in 2020; armed groups also subjected children to 
forced labor in the mining sector. Since the conflict began in 2012, 
armed groups have recruited more than 17,000 children; during 
the reporting period, militias primarily recruited and used child 
soldiers from the prefectures of Vakaga, Haute-Kotto, Haut-Mbomou, 
Nana-Grebizi, Nana-Mambere, and Basse-Kotto; these areas were 
outside of government control during the reporting period. Although 
some children initially join locally organized community defense 
groups to protect their families from opposifng militias, many 
commanders maintain influence over these children even after they 
are demobilized, increasing their risk of re-recruitment. Inadequately 
funded reintegration programming, continuing instability, and a lack 
of economic opportunity throughout the country exacerbate the risks 
of re-recruitment among former child soldiers. Some demobilized 
child soldiers face violent—and at times deadly—reprisals from their 
communities following reintegration. 
The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission 
in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) has 14,921 civilian and 
military staff in CAR—as of January 2021—to protect civilians, 
provide security, support humanitarian operations, and promote and 
protect human rights, among other objectives. Although not explicitly 
reported as human trafficking, an international organization reported 
there were 21 allegations of sexual exploitation by UN peacekeepers 
with trafficking indicators in the 2020 reporting period, compared 
with 30 allegations in the 2019 reporting period, of which four cases 
were unsubstantiated.
CHAD: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Chad does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts 
to do so. Officials identified more potential victims and increased 
efforts to raise public awareness of the crime among the population, 
addressing a key deficiency in the country’s anti-trafficking efforts. 
The Ministry of Justice legally established its national anti-trafficking 
committee and designated a focal point to lead the country’s human 
trafficking efforts. However, the government did not demonstrate 
overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, 
even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its 
anti-trafficking capacity. Authorities did not report investigating, 
prosecuting, or convicting any confirmed trafficking cases, and the 
government did not report designating members of or inaugurating 
its national anti-trafficking committee as required by the country’s 
2018 law. Therefore Chad remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the 
second consecutive year.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
While respecting due process, vigorously investigate and prosecute 
suspected traffickers according to Chad’s anti-trafficking Law 006/
PR/18. • Sanction convicted traffickers with sentences in accordance 
with Law 006/PR/18. • Develop formal standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) for the identification and referral of trafficking victims to 
medical care; train security services, law enforcement, and civil society 
to implement the SOPs. • Formally inaugurate and staff the National 
Committee to Combat Trafficking in Persons (NCCTIP) and include 
civil society, NGOs, and international organizations in its activities. 
• Draft, finalize, and provide sufficient resources to implement a 
national action plan to combat trafficking that includes steps to 
increase the government’s ability to prosecute traffickers, identify 
victims, and prevent the crime through sensitization. • Distinguish 
between human trafficking and migrant smuggling to reinforce 
public and government efforts to counter trafficking in persons. • 
Incorporate human trafficking awareness into basic training for law 
enforcement and judicial officials, in coordination with international 
organizations and donors. • Establish a specialized anti-trafficking 
unit in the Judicial Police to ensure officers effectively investigate 
suspected trafficking crimes under the country’s 2018 trafficking 
law. • Include trafficking components for all new magistrates and 
prosecutors attending the Ministry of Justice’s training college in 
N’Djamena. • Increase the provision of shelter and protective services 
to all trafficking victims, in coordination with NGOs and international 
organizations. • Beginning in N’Djamena, use local community 
radio stations to raise public awareness of human trafficking, and 
incorporate the High Islamic Council, tribal leaders, and other 
members of the traditional justice system into sensitization campaigns. 
• Given concerns that Cuba forces its citizens to work abroad in 
medical missions, screen Cuban medical workers for trafficking 
indicators and refer them to appropriate services, if exploitative 
conditions are determined to exist.
PROSECUTION
The government slightly increased overall law enforcement efforts. 
Law 006/PR/2018 on Combatting Trafficking in Persons criminalized 
sex trafficking and labor trafficking. Article seven of Law 006/PR/2018 
prescribed penalties of four to 30 years’ imprisonment and a fine 
of 250,000 to 5 million Central African CFA francs (CFA) ($470 to 
$9,450); these penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard 
to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other 
serious crimes, such as rape. 
The Ministry of Justice reported investigating, prosecuting, and 
convicting three potential traffickers, although officials did not share 
sufficient information to clarify whether these were cases of forced 
labor, sexual exploitation, or human smuggling. Observers noted 
magistrates often do not have access to the internet, electricity, or 
telephones, making it difficult to compile and report law enforcement 
data. Courts sanctioned the perpetrators with the following sentences: 
five years’ imprisonment and a fine of $1,000; five years’ imprisonment 




Experts stated the penalties more closely aligned with the criminal 
code rather than the 2018 anti-trafficking law. Separate from the three 
cases shared by the Ministry of Justice, media reported three potential 
cases, although it was unclear if these were human trafficking or 
smuggling. During the previous year, the government did not report 
investigating or prosecuting any trafficking cases; courts reported 
convicting one trafficker for forcing multiple victims to work in 
Chad’s northern gold mines and sentenced the perpetrator to three 
years’ imprisonment and a 200,000 CFA ($380) fine. During the 
reporting period, the pandemic resulted in the Ministry of Justice 
shuttering courts from March to June and again in January 2021. 
Observers noted some communities resolved issues—including 
criminal offenses—through customary, traditional, or Islamic courts 
as opposed to the codified judicial system. 
In February 2021, the Ministry of Justice published a directive to all 
prosecutors, appeals court presidents, and grand tribunal presidents 
urging judicial officials to prioritize trafficking cases and to transmit all 
cases before and after adjudication to the Judicial Affairs Department 
of the Ministry of Justice. Additionally, officials shared the note with 
the public via social media. 
Authorities did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting 
government workers complicit in human trafficking offenses, despite 
experts alleging officials were complicit in trafficking crimes. Reports 
of complicity included government-affiliated security forces profiting 
from illicit activity such as forced labor in cattle herding throughout 
the country’s rural areas and along its borders, as well as officials 
forcing prisoners to work on private enterprises separate from their 
legal sentences. In 2020, the government did not report providing 
trafficking-specific training for officials; however, the pandemic 
impeded the government’s ability to undertake training initiatives 
by limiting in-person meetings. The government provided in-kind 
support for a donor-funded training for 68 law enforcement and 
judicial officials on the 2018 trafficking law during the previous 
reporting period. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained efforts to protect victims. It identified 
more potential victims, but other protection efforts remained minimal; 
officials did not report identifying victims during the previous 
reporting period. Authorities did not screen proactively for trafficking 
indicators. Officers from Chad’s G-5 Sahel Joint Force battalion—
stationed in Tibesti Province in the country’s north—identified 19 
potential child victims during a February 2021 operation, although 
these children may have been associated with smuggling clients. 
The Ministry of Women, Family, and National Solidarity provided 
shelter and basic care to the 19 children. Additionally, the National 
Committee of Human Rights investigated allegations of human 
trafficking in Bitkine province and reported returning four potential 
victims to their families in January 2021. 
The government remained without comprehensive written victim 
identification and referral procedures to guide front line officials. 
NCCTIP policy directed officials to refer suspected child trafficking 
cases to Child Protection Brigade officers—who investigate and 
report cases to the Ministry of Justice—and refer cases involving 
adult victims to police; the government did not report referring any 
cases during the reporting period. 
Law enforcement coordinated with the country’s leading anti-
trafficking NGO, although the government did not provide material 
support to the NGO during the year. The Ministry of Women, 
Family, and National Solidarity, in partnership with an international 
organization and local NGOs continued to operate transit centers 
that served as temporary shelters throughout the country. The shelters 
provided temporary housing, food, and education to victims of 
gender-based violence and other crimes, including potential victims 
of trafficking. Officials did not report providing services to trafficking 
victims in these shelters during the reporting period. Privately 
run orphanages may have provided assistance to child victims of 
trafficking, although these organizations did not provide statistics. 
Services continued to be limited to urban areas and were largely 
inaccessible to much of Chad’s rural population. 
The government did not have a formal policy to offer temporary or 
permanent residency for foreign victims of trafficking and did not 
report identifying any foreign victims. While there were no reports 
the government penalized any trafficking victims for unlawful acts 
traffickers compelled them to commit, authorities may have arrested 
some victims due to the lack of formal victim identification and 
referral procedures, as well as officials’ limited understanding of the 
crime. While the pandemic did not significantly alter the minimal 
availability of services offered to victims, its adverse economic impacts 
affected the government’s budgets and corresponding ability to refer 
personnel for the country’s social services. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking, and high-
level support for anti-trafficking efforts improved slightly. Law 06/
PR/2018 designated the NCCTIP as the lead entity on addressing 
trafficking. In February 2021, the Minister of Justice signed decree 
151/MJCDH/2021 legally establishing the NCCTIP with 25 members 
representing 21 different entities, including three positions designated 
for civil society representatives. Also in February, the Ministry of 
Justice designated a single focal point on TIP matters. However, the 
government did not officially inaugurate or staff the NCCTIP before 
the end of the reporting period. The government did not develop a 
national action plan in 2020, which hindered coordination efforts 
during the reporting period. The pandemic’s deleterious impact on 
government budgets and government operations – coupled with 
falling oil prices – impeded authorities’ implementation of trafficking 
initiatives. The government did not independently research trafficking 
in Chad, exacerbating a general lack of understanding of the issue 
in the country. 
During the reporting period, officials promoted sensitization 
campaigns leveraging radio and social media, and they highlighted 
arrests of suspected traffickers to the press, NGOs, and the diplomatic 
community. The government collaborated with the radio show 
Know Your Rights (Connaitre Vos Droits) in an October broadcast, 
featuring the Minister of Justice and the director of the National 
Commission on Human Rights, to encourage public dialogue around 
human trafficking. Authorities did not disclose implementing any 
awareness-raising activities during the previous reporting period. 
The government continued to make no discernible efforts to reduce 
the demand for commercial sex during the reporting period. A lack 
of identity documentation remained a risk factor for trafficking in 
Chad, and the government did not share whether it continued to 
implement the 2013 birth registration policy requiring universal 
issuances of uniform birth certificates. The government did not provide 
anti-trafficking training to its troops prior to their deployment as 
peacekeepers. Authorities did not provide anti-trafficking training 
or guidance for its diplomatic personnel. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Chad, and traffickers exploit Chadian victims 
abroad. Human trafficking remains a primarily internal phenomenon. 
Families frequently entrust their children to relatives or intermediaries 
to receive education, apprenticeship, goods, or money; some of those 
relatives or intermediaries subsequently force or coerce the children 
to work in domestic service or cattle herding. Individuals associated 
with small- and medium-scale enterprises force children to beg in 
urban areas and exploit them as agricultural laborers on farms, in 
northern gold mines and charcoal production, and as domestic 
workers across the country. In the Lake Chad region, community 
members exploit some children in catching, smoking, and selling 
fish. Elders of some traditional Quranic schools known as mouhadjirin 
coerce children from small rural villages into begging, street vending, 
or other forced labor throughout the country. 
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Cattle herders force some children to work along traditional routes 
for grazing cattle and, at times, cross ill-defined international borders 
into Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Sudan, and Nigeria. 
Traffickers in rural areas sell children in markets for use in cattle or 
camel herding. In some cases, military or local government officials 
exploit with impunity child herders in forced labor. Additionally, 
experts allege officials force prisoners to work on private enterprises 
separate from their legal sentences. Criminal elements exploit some 
rural Chadian girls who travel to larger towns in search of work in 
child sex trafficking or domestic servitude. According to observers, 
Chadian mercenaries recruited to Libya to take up arms in the conflict 
facilitated human trafficking. 
Chad hosts approximately 930,000 refugees, internally displaced 
persons, returnees, and asylum seekers as of February 2021; these 
populations may be vulnerable to trafficking—including adult and 
child sexual exploitation—based on their economic instability and 
lack of access to support systems. While many individuals crossing 
clandestinely into Libya for economic reasons initially used the 
services of smugglers, traffickers exploit some of these irregular 
migrants in commercial sex or forced labor. The Nigerian terrorist 
group Boko Haram and the terrorist organization ISIS-West Africa 
forcibly abducted children to serve as child soldiers, suicide bombers, 
child brides, and forced laborers. Community-based armed groups 
tasked with defending people and property in rural areas likely 
recruit and use children in armed conflict. Cuban nationals working 
in Chad on medical missions may have been forced to work by the 
Cuban government.
CHILE: TIER 1
The Government of Chile fully meets the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued to 
demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting 
period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its 
anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Chile remained on Tier 1. These 
efforts included establishing its third specialized anti-trafficking unit, 
expanding staffing of another specialized unit, and identifying more 
trafficking victims. Although the government meets the minimum 
standards, it investigated and prosecuted fewer traffickers. Further, 
Chilean courts issued lenient sentences to convicted traffickers, 
resulting in a pattern of suspended sentences that could undercut 
nationwide efforts to fight trafficking. Victim services provision 
remained uneven, with limited access to care for male victims and 
victims outside the capital. Allegations against a shelter director 
indicated children living in National Service for Minors (SENAME) 
facilities were at risk of abuse, including sex trafficking. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict all forms of human 
trafficking, including domestic child sex trafficking, under Article 
411 of the penal code. • Sentence traffickers to adequate penalties, 
which should include significant imprisonment, as required by 
Articles 367 and 411. • Provide suitable, safe shelter for child and 
adolescent trafficking victims as required by law, including through 
implementation of plans to restructure or replace the SENAME child 
protection system. • Increase training on application of Article 411 
for judges and prosecutors. • Actively screen for trafficking victims 
among vulnerable migrant groups. • Continue efforts to disrupt 
systematic child abuse, including trafficking, in care facilities used by 
trafficking victims and hold violators accountable. • Expand access 
to specialized shelters for trafficking victims, including male victims, 
child victims, and victims outside the capital. • Provide victims 
access to a full range of services, including long-term rehabilitation. • 
Develop guidelines for officials to screen for trafficking indicators for 
children involved in illicit activities to ensure no trafficking victims 
are penalized for unlawful acts their traffickers compelled them to 
commit. • Consistently support victim efforts to seek restitution.
PROSECUTION
The government decreased prosecution efforts. Article 411-quater 
of the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking, 
prescribing penalties ranging from five years and one day to 15 years’ 
imprisonment and a fine for offenses involving an adult victim and 
10 years and one day to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine for those 
involving a child. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, 
with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as rape. Chilean officials continued to 
investigate and prosecute many internal child sex trafficking cases 
under Article 367 of the penal code, which penalized “promoting 
or facilitating the prostitution of minors.” Although Article 367 
prescribed penalties ranging from three years and one day to 20 
years’ imprisonment, many child sex trafficking crimes were subject to 
penalties of only three years and one day to five years’ imprisonment 
under this provision, significantly lower than the penalties available 
under Article 411-quater. Under mandatory sentencing laws, judges 
frequently suspended or commuted sentences of less than five years’ 
imprisonment, even when adjudicating cases of human trafficking 
and other serious crimes.
Anti-trafficking police units opened 30 new investigations in 2020 (21 
for sex trafficking and nine for labor trafficking), compared with 92 
new investigations in 2019, 39 in 2018, and 21 in 2017. Authorities 
prosecuted seven individuals in 2020 (two for sex trafficking under 
Article 367 and five for labor trafficking under Article 411), compared 
with 22 individuals in 2019 (4 under Article 367 and 18 under Article 
411), and 19 individuals in 2018 (13 under Article 367 and six under 
Article 411). There were 14 ongoing prosecutions initiated in previous 
reporting periods. The government convicted six traffickers in 2020 
(one sex trafficker under Article 367 and two labor traffickers and 
three sex traffickers under Article 411), compared with six convictions 
in 2019 (two under Article 367 and four under Article 411), nine 
in 2018 (four under Article 367 and five under Article 411), and 29 
convictions in 2017 (26 under Article 367 and three under Article 411). 
Judges issued sentences ranging from three to eight years’ 
imprisonment for the five traffickers convicted under Article 411 and 
approximately 18 months’ imprisonment for the trafficker convicted 
under Article 367. Some of these sentences undercut the mandatory 
minimum penalties prescribed for each article in the penal code; 
consequently, four traffickers (three convicted under Article 411 and 
the one convicted under Article 367) received suspended sentences. 
The government deported another trafficker, convicted under Article 
411, upon conviction, and prohibited re-entry into Chile for 10 
years. Only one of the six convicted traffickers, a woman convicted 
of exploiting two Bolivian girls in sex trafficking and sentenced to 
eight years’ imprisonment, was expected to serve time in prison 
post-trial, which limited the deterrent effect of convictions against 
traffickers. In the past five years, just seven of 58 convicted traffickers 
have been sentenced to penalties above the mandatory minimum. 
Judges have suspended the sentences of more than 60 percent of 
traffickers convicted since 2016, which weakened deterrence. The 
majority of traffickers ultimately served parole or probation without 
post-trial imprisonment. The government continued to investigate and 
prosecute individuals that engaged in commercial sex with children, 
resulting in two convictions in 2020, compared with eight convictions 
in 2019 and four in 2018. Judges convicted and sentenced these two 





However, the courts suspended these sentences, allowing them to 
be served on probation in lieu of imprisonment.
The national investigations police (PDI) had two specialized anti-
trafficking units operating in Iquique and Santiago throughout 2020. 
During the reporting period, PDI established a third specialized unit in 
Arica and expanded the staffing of the Santiago unit. The government 
established special procedures to allow prosecutors to work remotely 
and courts to hold most hearings via videoconference; as a result, 
criminal trials proceeded throughout the pandemic with only modest 
delays. The government exchanged eight cooperation requests with 
Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, Switzerland, and 
Uruguay. Authorities’ use of electronic transmission of cooperation 
requests facilitated the continuation of these exchanges during the 
pandemic. The national prosecutor’s office (MP) and PDI provided 
specialized training to investigators, attorneys, advisors, and staff 
on a range of trafficking issues, utilizing online delivery during 
the pandemic. Law enforcement could use a software system to 
search for evidence of official complicity in trafficking cases. The 
government investigated one law enforcement official accused of 
obstruction of justice associated with a sex trafficking case; the 
investigation was ongoing at the end of the reporting period. In 
April 2020, media reported the children’s rights defender registered 
a complaint against a SENAME care facility director for facilitating 
the sexual abuse of two children under her supervision in exchange 
for financial compensation – allegations which, if proven, would 
amount to sex trafficking under international law. In March 2021, 
officials reportedly charged the director with commercial sexual 
exploitation; the government confirmed the reports of two child sex 
trafficking victims exploited while under SENAME’s care but insisted 
there was no tie to SENAME or its employees. The government later 
closed this SENAME facility.
PROTECTION
The government maintained victim protection efforts. The 
government's interagency task force on trafficking (MITP) coordinated 
the government’s anti-trafficking efforts. The government identified 
47 adult victims of trafficking (21 men and 26 women), compared 
with 37 victims in 2019, 41 in 2018, and 21 victims in 2017. Of the 
47 victims identified, 42 were exploited in labor trafficking and 5 
were exploited in sex trafficking. The government reported identifying 
two child trafficking victims during the reporting period, compared 
with two in 2019 and two in 2018. The National Service of Women 
and Gender Equality (SERNAMEG) provided shelter and legal 
service to 16 female victims among the 47 victims of trafficking. 
The MP provided housing to most victims, while the SERNAMEG-
funded shelter could directly assist female victims identified in 
2020 and other victims identified in previous reporting periods. 
The MITP’s protocol on victim assistance entitled victims to safe 
housing, health services, psychological services, legal assistance, 
education, employment assistance, and regularization of migratory 
status. However, provision of victim services remained uneven 
across the country, and NGOs reported funding was inadequate to 
provide necessary services, especially adequate shelter for children 
and male victims. The government did not fund most NGOs that 
provided victim assistance; most agencies did not have specific line 
items in their budgets for victim assistance. Reintegration services, 
such as education and job placement assistance, were insufficient, 
and officials reported access to adequate mental health services was 
expensive and limited. 
The national prosecutor’s office’s Regional Victims and Witness 
Assistance Unit (URAVIT) budgeted approximately 84 million 
Chilean pesos ($118,350) to provide housing and other basic needs 
for trafficking victims and potential victims in 2020, up from 17.2 
million pesos ($24,230) in 2019. SERNAMEG allocated 136 million 
pesos ($191,600) to fund the NGO-operated shelter for women 
victims of trafficking, smuggled women, and their children, compared 
with 127 million pesos ($179,000) in 2019 and 140 million pesos 
($197,200) allocated in 2018. The government also housed trafficking 
victims in domestic violence shelters, although these facilities did 
not necessarily provide specialized services for trafficking victims. 
URAVIT could arrange housing for male victims on a case-by-case 
basis; however, there were no shelters for male victims. NGOs 
administered shelter services for most victims outside the capital 
region. The Ministry of Interior maintained official agreements on 
legal representation and civil restitution for victims with the Ministry 
of Justice. SENAME provided basic services to child sex trafficking 
victims through 18 NGO-operated programs specialized for child 
victims of commercial sexual exploitation and its national network 
of residential centers. SENAME allocated 3.26 billion pesos ($4.59 
million) to these programs for child and adolescent victim services 
in 2020, compared with 3.37 billion pesos ($4.75 million) in 2019 
and three billion pesos ($4.23 million) in 2018. SENAME assisted 
1,371 children in 2020, compared with 1,477 children in 2019, 
1,459 children in 2018 and 1,350 children in 2017; SENAME did not 
track how many of the children it assisted were trafficking victims. 
SENAME noted the worst forms of child labor registry identified 80 
children or adolescents as victims of commercial sexual exploitation, 
eight of whom were sex trafficking victims. In response to ongoing 
concerns over the safety of children in certain SENAME-affiliated 
residential centers, the government continued efforts to replace the 
agency’s Specialized Redress Centers under Direct Administration 
(CREADs), the category of care facility most often serving child 
trafficking victims, with smaller “family-style residences.” According 
to government reports, children in CREADs were at severe risk of 
rights violations and sexual abuse. The government closed two 
CREADs in 2020, leaving four of the original 11 facilities operational. 
Legislation to restructure SENAME passed in 2020 and was pending 
implementation at the conclusion of the reporting period. 
SENAME trained 74 members of its shelters staff on identifying child 
and adolescent trafficking victims. The government provided training 
on detecting and addressing various crimes, including trafficking, 
in a clinical setting to an unspecified number of public health 
officials. The government issued 11 no-fee visas for foreign trafficking 
victims, compared to 13 in 2019 and 17 in 2018; two additional 
requests were pending. Such a visa was valid for up to one year and 
renewable for up to two additional years if the victim reported the 
trafficking crime to the prosecutor’s office. Foreign victims received 
the same victim services and courtroom accommodations – such as 
teleconference, witness protection, and video testimony – as Chilean 
victims. Officials recognized growing migrant populations, especially 
irregular Venezuelan migrants, as increasingly at risk of trafficking. 
Due to the pandemic, the government largely closed national borders 
to non-resident foreign nationals from March to December 2020; 
over the same period, a record number of irregular migrants entered 
Chile, primarily Venezuelans via northern land borders. Under 
a new immigration framework established in a December 2020 
immigration reform law but retroactive to the March 2020 border 
closure, the government did not permit irregular migrants or those 
entering the country on a tourist visa to alter their residency status 
in-country. Civil society actors expressed concern the confluence of 
increased irregular arrivals and the new regulations would increase 
migrants’ vulnerability to trafficking. The same immigration reform 
law included a provision to expressly prohibit the deportation of 
identified trafficking victims. Officials expected to implement the 
new framework in early 2021. 
In response to the pandemic, URAVIT implemented a video 
interpretation service to facilitate safe exchanges between law 
enforcement and victims of all crimes, including trafficking 
victims, providing access to interpretation in sign language, regional 
indigenous languages, Haitian Creole, and Chinese. Officials extended 
until 2022 the deadline for gradual implementation of a 2019 law 
to reduce re-traumatization of child and adolescent victims through 
required video testimony facilitated by an expert intermediary. 
Judges often held accused traffickers in pretrial detention. Despite 
these efforts, the government reported challenges in encouraging 
victims to participate in a full trial. Victims could receive restitution 
or compensation through civil or criminal cases, respectively; in 
CHILE
174
2020, the courts awarded one victim 7 million pesos ($9,860) in 
restitution during the criminal prosecution of her two traffickers. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained modest prevention efforts. The Ministry 
of Interior continued to lead the MITP, which included government 
agencies, international organizations, and local NGOs. The task force 
met once during the reporting period. The MITP promoted informal 
implementation of a draft 2019-2022 national action plan, which 
had not been approved at the ministerial level and was not public. 
There was no federal allocation to fund the implementation of the 
draft plan; instead, each agency contributed to implementation 
from its own budget. Personnel and budget constraints affected 
several agencies with victim protection and trafficking prevention 
responsibilities. Observers noted a need for more robust coordination 
and data-sharing among government agencies. 
The government held awareness-raising events throughout the 
year, primarily for officials who might encounter trafficking victims 
and for the general public; the majority of these events took place 
online. Several agencies operated hotlines that could take calls 
on trafficking victims. There were at least 15 trafficking-related 
investigations initiated from hotline calls. Labor inspectors conducted 
more than 65,000 worksite inspections, during which they identified 
66 child labor violations, some of which may have constituted 
trafficking offenses; in response, the labor inspectorate imposed 
sanctions and levied fines against offenders. The national tourism 
service, in collaboration with SENAME, continued its certification 
of tourism organizations and establishments that adhere to best 
practices for the prevention of child sex trafficking; businesses had 
to participate in an anti-trafficking training during the certification 
process. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand 
for commercial sex acts during the reporting period. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) routinely offered consular trainings covering 
trafficking in persons for diplomats; in 2020, the MFA reported 
diplomats also had access to a virtual anti-trafficking training through 
an international organization.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Chile, and, to a lesser extent, traffickers exploit 
Chilean victims abroad. Chilean women and children are exploited 
in sex trafficking within the country, as are women and girls from 
Asia and other Latin American countries, particularly Colombia. 
Migrants’ vulnerability to trafficking increased during the COVID-19 
pandemic, with more than 30 percent experiencing job loss with 
limited alternatives amid regional movement restrictions. Stricter 
immigration laws also contributed to heightened vulnerability in 
migrant populations, especially Venezuelans. Children staying in 
child protection centers are at risk of potential abuse, including 
trafficking. At least one child staying in a child protection center 
died as a result of abusive conditions. Some traffickers may recruit 
children staying in child protection centers. Traffickers exploit adults 
and children – primarily from other Latin American countries, as well 
as Asia – in forced labor in Chile in mining; agriculture; construction; 
street vending; the hospitality, restaurant, and garment sectors; and 
domestic service. Traffickers subject Chinese and Haitian immigrants 
to sex trafficking and forced labor and Colombian women to sex 
trafficking. Chilean authorities identified a significant number of 
children involved in illicit activities, including drug trafficking and 
theft; some of these children may have been trafficking victims. 
Traffickers subject Chilean men to labor trafficking in Peru and 
Chilean women to sex trafficking in Argentina, as well as other 
countries. An international organization expressed concern striking 
workers in certain industries could be imprisoned and forced to work. 
Police often frequented brothels in small towns and labor inspectors in 
rural areas maintained relationships with local businesses, dissuading 
potential trafficking victims from reporting exploitation and fueling 
perceptions of complicity.
CHINA: TIER 3
The Government of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) does not 
fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking 
and is not making significant efforts to do so, even considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore the PRC remained on Tier 3. Despite the lack of significant 
efforts, the government took some steps to address trafficking, 
including by continuing to prosecute and convict some traffickers 
and by maintaining consultative mechanisms with law enforcement 
counterparts in other countries. However, during the reporting period 
there was a government policy or pattern of widespread forced labor, 
including through the continued mass arbitrary detention of more 
than one million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, ethnic Kyrgyz, and other 
Muslims in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang). 
Authorities continued to implement these policies in other provinces, 
targeted other religious minorities under their auspices, and sought 
the coerced repatriation and internment of religious and ethnic 
minorities living abroad through the use of surveillance, harassment 
and threats against them and their family members, and extradition 
requests. The government also reportedly placed ethnic Tibetans in 
vocational training and manufacturing jobs as part of an ostensible 
“poverty alleviation” and “labor transfer program” that featured overt 
coercive elements. Chinese nationals reportedly suffered forced labor 
in several countries in Asia, Africa, and Europe hosting Belt and Road 
Initiative (BRI) projects, within which PRC authorities exercised 
insufficient oversight of relevant recruitment channels, contracts, 
and labor conditions, and PRC diplomatic services routinely failed 
to identify or assist those exploited. For the fourth consecutive year, 
the government did not report identifying any trafficking victims or 
referring them to protective services. 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
 Abolish the arbitrary detention and forced labor of persons in 
internment camps and affiliated manufacturing sites in Xinjiang 
and other provinces and immediately release and pay restitution to 
the individuals detained therein. • End forced labor in government 
facilities, in nongovernmental facilities converted to government 
detention centers, and by government officials outside of the penal 
process. • Cease all coercive labor transfer and vocational training 
programs targeting Tibetans and other ethnic minority groups. • Cease 
the use of harassment, threats, and illegal discriminatory immigration 
policies as measures to coerce the return to Xinjiang and subsequent 
forced labor of Chinese national ethnic and religious minorities living 
abroad. • Cease discriminatory hiring and targeted displacement 
policies that place Muslim and other minority communities at risk 
of trafficking. • Cease all forced urban resettlement and displacement 
programs, particularly those targeting Uyghurs, Tibetans, and members 
of other ethnic and religious minority groups. • Respecting due 
process, vigorously investigate, prosecute, and impose prison sentences 
on perpetrators of forced labor and sex trafficking, including complicit 
government officials. • Criminalize all forms of sex trafficking and 
labor trafficking as defined under international law. • Institute and 
systematize proactive, formal procedures to identify trafficking victims 
throughout the country—including male victims, labor trafficking 
victims, Chinese national victims returning from abroad, and victims 
among vulnerable groups, such as migrant workers, Chinese national 





Chinese national women and children arrested on “prostitution” 
charges—and train front-line officers on their implementation. 
• In conjunction with receiving countries, increase oversight of 
recruitment, contracts, and working conditions associated with BRI 
project worksites; enforce bans on the imposition of worker-paid 
recruitment fees and security deposits; and train PRC consular services 
to identify and assist victims forced labor abroad, including in BRI 
projects. • Increase oversight of seafarer labor conditions in the 
PRC fishing industry, including by banning illegal and unregistered 
recruitment agencies; mandating international vessel registration; 
collecting and publishing information on vessel licensure, registered 
operating areas, and crew manifests; conducting random onboard 
inspections; and working with port country authorities to investigate 
and criminally prosecute distant water fleet (DWF) forced labor 
crimes. • Cease penalization of victims for unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit and ensure authorities do not subject 
trafficking victims to extended detention, punishment, or deportation. 
• Immediately screen individuals suspected of prostitution offenses 
for sex trafficking indicators and refer identified victims to protection 
services. • Expand victim protection services, including comprehensive 
counseling and medical, reintegration, and other rehabilitative 
assistance for male and female victims of sex and labor trafficking. 
• Provide legal alternatives to foreign victims’ removal to countries 
where they would face hardship or retribution, particularly North 
Korea. • Increase the transparency of government efforts to combat 
trafficking and provide disaggregated data on investigations and 
prosecutions, victim identification, and service provision, including 
by continuing to share relevant data with international partners. • 
Apply the 2000 UN TIP Protocol to Hong Kong.
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts, including by 
continuing to apply extensive law enforcement and paramilitary 
resources toward the mass detention and forced labor of members 
of Muslim and other ethnic and religious minority groups. The 
criminal code criminalized some forms of sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking. Various provisions of the criminal code could be used 
to prosecute sex trafficking offenses. Article 240 criminalized “the 
abduction and sale of women or children,” which included abduction 
by deceit, kidnapping, purchasing, selling, sending, receiving, and 
transferring for the purpose of sale; however, unlike the definition 
of trafficking in persons under international law, Article 240 did 
not explicitly link these acts to a purpose of exploitation. Article 
240 prescribed penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment and fines 
for the abduction and sale of women and children. If an abducted 
woman was then forced into prostitution, the penalties increased to 
10 years’ to life imprisonment, fines, and confiscation of property. 
These penalties were sufficiently stringent and commensurate with 
the penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Article 
241 criminalized the purchase of abducted women or children 
and prescribed a maximum penalty of three years’ imprisonment, 
short-term detention, or controlled release; like Article 240, it did 
not require that the purchase be for the purpose of exploitation. 
Penalties under this provision were not alone sufficiently stringent; 
however, Article 241 stipulated that if an individual purchased an 
abducted woman or child and then subjected them to “forcible sexual 
relations,” they would face additional penalties under the criminal 
code’s rape provisions. Article 358 criminalized forced prostitution 
and prescribed penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment; if the 
offense involved a child under the age of 14, the penalties increased 
to 10 years’ to life in addition to fines or confiscation of property. 
These penalties were sufficiently stringent and commensurate with 
the penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Article 
359 criminalized harboring prostitution or luring or introducing 
others into prostitution, and it prescribed a maximum of five years’ 
imprisonment and a fine; if the offense involved a girl under the age 
of 14, it prescribed a minimum of five years’ imprisonment and a 
fine. These penalties were sufficiently stringent; however, the penalties 
prescribed for offenses involving girls 14 to 17 years of age were 
not commensurate with the penalties prescribed for other serious 
crimes, such as rape. Labor trafficking offenses could be prosecuted 
under Article 244, which criminalized forcing a person “to work by 
violence, threat, or restriction of personal freedom” and recruiting, 
transporting, or otherwise assisting in forcing others to labor, and 
prescribed three to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine. These penalties 
were sufficiently stringent. 
Although the central government continued to prosecute and convict 
Chinese nationals for trafficking crimes, authorities did not collect or 
report comprehensive law enforcement data. Partial public records 
of anti-trafficking enforcement continued to feature crimes outside 
the definition of trafficking according to international law (including 
migrant smuggling, child abduction, forced marriage, and fraudulent 
adoption), making it difficult to assess progress. The government 
continued to handle most cases with indicators of forced labor as 
administrative issues through the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) and 
seldom initiated prosecutions of such cases under anti-trafficking 
statutes. Some courts likely continued to prosecute trafficking crimes 
under laws pertaining to domestic violence, labor contract violations, 
and child abuse, all of which prescribed lesser penalties. For the 
fourth consecutive year, the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) did not 
report the number of investigations initiated into possible trafficking 
cases (1,004 in 2016). Authorities concluded 546 cases of “women 
trafficking and child abduction,” 475 cases of “forced prostitution,” 
and 38 cases of forced labor, each under unknown legal statutes 
and involving an unknown number of total defendants (compared 
with 638 prosecutions of “women trafficking and child abduction,” 
538 cases of “forced prostitution,” and 38 cases of forced labor, 
each involving an unknown number of total defendants, in 2019). 
The government did not provide data on convictions (compared 
with 2,355 convictions, in 2019). In prior years, authorities did 
not disaggregate conviction data by the relevant criminal code 
statutes, and courts reportedly prosecuted the vast majority of these 
cases under Article 358—especially for those involving commercial 
sexual exploitation—rather than under Article 240. The government 
again did not provide sentencing data, but media reports indicated 
penalties imposed in at least one case ranged from five to three 
years’ imprisonment (compared with five months’ to ten years’ 
imprisonment and fines of 74,000 renminbi ($11,310) to the death 
sentence in prior years). 
Authorities engaged in law enforcement cooperation with foreign 
governments to investigate cases of Chinese citizens subjected 
to trafficking abroad, although the government did not provide 
illustrative examples; in prior years, law enforcement bodies 
cooperated with counterpart authorities in South and Southeast Asia. 
The government maintained agreements with the five Lower Mekong 
countries to jointly address trafficking via the forced and fraudulent 
marriage of their citizens to PRC-based individuals. Authorities also 
reported maintaining coordinated anti-trafficking mechanisms with 
law enforcement and interior ministry counterparts in 27 countries. 
Some law enforcement personnel in neighboring countries continued 
to report their PRC counterparts were unresponsive to requests for 
bilateral cooperation on cross-border trafficking cases, while others 
reported the PRC’s cumbersome law enforcement bureaucracy 
hindered joint operations.
For the third consecutive year, the government did not provide data 
on specific law enforcement trainings. In previous reporting periods, 
the government allocated funding to co-host capacity-building 
training for law enforcement and judicial officials on investigating 
and prosecuting trafficking cases; the government did not report if 
this work continued. Chinese media outlets occasionally published 
accounts of corrupt officials arrested for allegedly shielding or 
profiting from criminal organizations engaged in commercial sex 
rings known to perpetrate sex trafficking. In previous years, officials 
found guilty through this process reportedly faced expulsion from 
the Chinese Communist Party, termination of their official positions, 
fines, and referral to the judicial system. However, authorities did not 
provide statistics on the number of investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions resulting from these efforts. Despite continued reports 
CHINA
176
of law enforcement officials benefiting from, permitting, or directly 
facilitating sex trafficking and forced labor, the government did 
not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of law 
enforcement officials allegedly involved in the crime. Officials at 
multiple levels were also complicit in state-sponsored forced labor 
as part of the PRC’s mass detention, political indoctrination, and 
labor transfer campaign against members of Muslim minority 
groups, and some officials reportedly profited directly from this 
system; authorities reportedly subjected Tibetans and members of 
other ethno-religious groups to similar abuses. 
PROTECTION
The government decreased efforts to protect victims. For the fourth 
consecutive year, the government did not report how many victims 
it identified, although media reports indicated authorities continued 
to remove some victims from their exploitative situations. The 
government delayed or altogether ceased the identification and 
repatriation of foreign trafficking victims while diverting law 
enforcement resources to pandemic mitigation measures during 
the reporting period. Based on media and NGO reports, authorities 
continued to prioritize the identification of women and girls in sex 
trafficking to the near total exclusion of efforts to identify forced 
labor victims. The overly narrow definitions inherent to China’s 
anti-trafficking statutes significantly limited the scope of victim 
identification among key demographics; in practice, authorities did 
not screen men or boys over the age of 14 for any signs of exploitation 
in sex trafficking or forced labor. NGOs reported identifying and 
repatriating 312 Burmese national women subjected to forced or 
fraudulent marriages to local men; it was unclear how many of 
these cases featured corollary trafficking indicators, or whether 
the government assisted in their protection. Authorities claimed 
to have used an app-based system to track and remove more than 
4,600 missing children from exploitation, some of whom were 
likely victims of trafficking; however, unlike the previous year, 
authorities did not provide relevant statistics or information on 
identification or referral measures (compared with 120 victims 
identified among more than 4,000 children in 2019). The PRC lacked 
a standardized national referral mechanism, but MPS maintained 
written instructions promulgated in 2016 for law enforcement 
officers throughout the country aiming to clarify procedures for 
identifying trafficking victims among individuals in commercial 
sex and forced or fraudulent marriage. MPS officials reportedly 
maintained a procedure to screen for trafficking indicators among 
individuals arrested for alleged prostitution. Authorities reportedly 
worked with an international organization to begin formulating 
new victim identification guidelines; these remained in process at 
the end of the reporting period. A 2016 policy limiting the detention 
of individuals arrested for alleged criminal sex to 72 hours remained 
in place. Despite the existence of these procedures, and contrary to 
the aforementioned policy, law enforcement officials continued to 
arrest and detain foreign women on suspicion of prostitution crimes 
without screening them for indicators of sex trafficking—sometimes 
for as long as eight months—before deporting them for immigration 
violations. In previous years, rural border officials received reports 
involving the sex trafficking and forced labor of some foreign women 
and girls via forced and fraudulent marriage to Chinese national 
men, and officials provided them with temporary shelter and helped 
to fund and escort their repatriation. However, observers noted 
this assistance was ad hoc, often heavily bureaucratic, and less 
prevalent among front-line officers working farther inland, where 
some foreign victims escaped, reported these abusive circumstances 
to the authorities, and were summarily arrested and forcibly returned 
to their PRC “husbands”—sometimes in exchange for bribes from the 
men’s families. Because authorities did not universally implement 
identification or referral procedures across law enforcement efforts, it 
was likely police arrested and detained unidentified PRC trafficking 
victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit. 
Authorities may have detained some victims of sex trafficking—
alongside individuals with drug addictions and men arrested for 
commissioning sex acts—in government “rehabilitation camps” 
known to feature forced labor conditions. 
In prior years, the government reported maintaining at least 10 
shelters specifically dedicated to care for PRC trafficking victims, as 
well as eight shelters for foreign trafficking victims and more than 
2,300 multi-purpose shelters nationwide that could accommodate 
trafficking victims; it did not provide any information on these 
shelters for the second consecutive year. The Ministry of Civil Affairs, 
a nationwide women’s organization, and community-based NGOs 
could provide victims with shelter, medical care, counseling, legal 
aid, and social services, as well as rehabilitation services in some 
cases. Access to specialized care depended heavily on victims’ 
location and gender; experts noted ad hoc referral procedures and 
an acute lack of protection services in the south, and male victims 
were far less likely to receive care nationwide. The government did 
not report how many victims benefited from these services, and 
widespread stigma against victims of sex trafficking likely continued 
to discourage many from accessing protection services. The Ministry 
of Human Resources and Social Services (MOHRSS) was reportedly 
able to provide compensation and some protection services to labor 
trafficking victims, but authorities did not report information on the 
number of victims MPS referred for these services. Implementation 
of a law placing foreign NGOs in the PRC under MPS supervision 
continued to impose burdensome requirements and restrictions on 
the activities of civil society organizations, including those able to 
provide services for trafficking victims and communities vulnerable 
to the crime. Foreign embassies in the PRC could provide shelter 
or other protective services to victims, but the extent to which this 
continued during pandemic mitigation measures was unclear. 
Authorities did not condition access to victim care on cooperation 
with law enforcement, but they did require victims to provide 
information to police. The law entitled victims to request criminal 
prosecution and claim compensation through civil lawsuits against 
their traffickers; the government did not report whether any victims 
benefited from this provision during the reporting period. Some 
forced marriage cases, many of which continued to demonstrate 
corollary indicators of sex trafficking and forced labor, were mediated 
at the village collective-level; these proceedings rarely culminated 
in a guilty verdict through which to grant restitution to the victims. 
MOJ officials reportedly provided some pro bono legal assistance to an 
unspecified number of trafficking victims, but government-affiliated 
NGO observers noted some victims faced difficulties accessing these 
services or paying for their own representation. The judicial system 
did not require victims to testify against their traffickers in court and 
allowed prosecutors to submit previously recorded statements as 
evidence; however, authorities required some foreign victims to stay 
in the PRC to assist in police investigations until their conclusion.
The efficacy of the government’s previously reported victim assistance 
abroad—including its eight border liaison offices with Burma, Laos, 
and Vietnam, along with victim funds, hotlines, and government-
to-government agreements to assist victims—remained unclear. 
The government did not report data on victim repatriation in 
2020, but civil society groups confirmed authorities assisted in the 
repatriation of some Southeast Asian victims to their countries of 
origin. PRC officials operating in other countries may have facilitated 
the sex trafficking of Chinese nationals abroad through lax visa and 
immigration procedures. Authorities reportedly harassed, threatened, 
and attempted to discredit Uyghur and ethnic Kazakh forced labor 
survivors seeking asylum in retaliation for their contact with foreign 
media outlets. 
The government did not report any measures to screen for or identify 
forced labor indicators among the thousands of vulnerable migrant 
seafarers employed on Chinese DWF vessels, nor within its extensive 
coastal offshore fishing fleet. PRC consular officials did not take 
steps to proactively identify, respond to, or assist Chinese nationals 
subjected to forced labor under the auspices of BRI projects overseas, 
including when victims reported abuses to local PRC diplomatic 





were generally unable to report abuses to local authorities or access 
protection services when returning to China. The government did 
not undertake efforts to identify trafficking victims within its highly 
vulnerable North Korean migrant population, nor did it provide 
suspected North Korean trafficking victims with legal alternatives to 
repatriation. Although significantly fewer North Korean nationals 
transited China while seeking asylum in third countries due to 
pandemic-related border closures, authorities continued to detain 
North Korean asylum-seekers and forcibly return some to North 
Korea, where they faced severe punishment or death, including in 
forced labor camps; the government did not report screening these 
individuals for indicators of trafficking. The government continued 
to restrict access of UN agencies attempting to monitor and assist 
refugees near China’s border with North Korea.
PREVENTION
The government decreased efforts to prevent trafficking, including by 
perpetrating genocide and continuing to use emerging technologies 
to carry out discriminatory surveillance and ethno-racial profiling 
measures designed to subjugate and exploit minority populations 
in forced labor in internment camps under the pretext of combating 
violent extremism and other social ills. The PRC continued its policies 
of mass detention and political indoctrination against more than one 
million Uyghurs, ethnic Kazakhs, ethnic Kyrgyz, and members of other 
Muslim minority groups in Xinjiang, and it continued to expand these 
policies through the transfer of at least 80,000 detainees into forced 
labor into dozens of other provinces, according to NGO estimates 
and media reports. Local governments and businesses received tax 
breaks and financial subsidies for establishing new manufacturing 
sites and accepting or transferring detainees for these purposes, and 
officials reportedly received promotions and other benefits for their 
role in the process. According to official PRC government documents, 
local governments at times arrested Muslims arbitrarily or based on 
spurious criminal charges and administrative violations, including 
violation of birth restrictions, in order to meet detention quotas 
established specifically for this internment system. Reports indicate 
authorities partially staffed internment camp facilities using forced 
labor, including among Mandarin language instructors. Many detained 
individuals approved to “graduate” from these facilities were sent 
to external manufacturing sites in close proximity to the camps or 
in other provinces and subjected to forced labor, while others were 
transferred and likely subjected to forced labor within a separate—and 
growing—formal prison system. In 2020, the government issued false 
reports that it released thousands of previously detained Uyghurs and 
other Muslims and closed the camps in which they had been confined. 
However, satellite imagery indicated many of the camps remained in 
operation or were expanded during the year; consistent with reports 
that the government had begun convicting and transferring thousands 
of interned Muslims on spurious terrorism charges, geospatial analysis 
pointed to a sharp increase in the construction of large, higher-security 
prison facilities elsewhere in the region. The government continued 
to transfer some members of non-interned minority communities 
designated arbitrarily as “rural surplus labor” to other areas within 
Xinjiang as part of a “poverty alleviation” program and exploit them 
in forced labor. Authorities also used the threat of internment to 
coerce members of some Muslim communities directly into forced 
labor in manufacturing. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued 
to confiscate, cancel, or refuse to renew the Chinese passports of 
Uyghurs and other Muslims living abroad, including those with 
legal permanent resident status or citizenship in other countries, as 
a coercive measure to lure them back to Xinjiang and likely detain 
them within the camps. There were also reports that authorities 
threatened, detained, and forcibly hospitalized these individuals’ 
family members in Xinjiang in an attempt to silence them and/or 
coerce their return. The PRC continued to seek the extradition of 
Muslim individuals who fled Xinjiang human rights abuses, including 
forced labor, and sought asylum abroad. Several ethnic Kazakhs who 
spoke to journalists after fleeing Xinjiang and seeking protections 
in neighboring Kazakhstan experienced violent physical attacks that 
may have been coordinated by PRC security services. Nationwide, 
some school districts reportedly compelled ethnic Han students to 
participate in internship programs featuring forced labor indicators. 
According to NGO observers, during the reporting period authorities 
placed more than 500,000 rural Tibetans in “military-style” vocational 
training and manufacturing jobs around the country under the 
auspices of a quota-based “surplus labor” transfer program ostensibly 
intended as a “poverty alleviation” measure. Although the program 
did not feature overt arrests or enforced disappearances, observers 
noted the system was likely highly coercive, given individuals’ relative 
inability to refuse participation amid the central government’s 
pervasive system of social control in Tibetan areas. Some of these 
Tibetans were subsequently subjected to forced labor in manufacturing. 
PRC-owned companies continued to employ Chinese nationals at 
BRI project worksites in foreign countries; the government did not 
exercise adequate oversight into recruitment procedures, which 
often featured worker-paid fees driving indebtedness to unregistered 
brokers, nor did it take steps to ensure worker contracts were free of 
abusive provisions. In recognition of this insufficiency, authorities 
maintained policies and regulatory standards issued in 2017 barring 
the collection of recruitment fees or security deposits, banning the 
use of tourist visas for travel to work in BRI destination countries, and 
instructing companies on safeguarding labor rights; however, these 
were largely nonbinding, and the government did not report efforts 
to enforce them. In recent years, NGOs in countries receiving Chinese 
national migrant workers through other bilateral agreements reported 
the PRC government ignored abusive and potentially illegal contract 
stipulations, including fees and provisions requiring immediate 
repatriation for pregnancies or illnesses, which placed some Chinese 
national workers at higher risk of debt or punitive deportation as 
coercive measures to retain their labor; the government did not take 
steps to address these vulnerabilities during the reporting period. 
The PRC government’s exertion of political pressure and operating 
restrictions on NGOs in Hong Kong had a negative impact on anti-
trafficking coordination with the local authorities there. 
Unlike in previous years, the PRC government did not report holding 
an annual inter-ministerial meeting to coordinate anti-trafficking 
efforts during the reporting period. MPS continued to coordinate 
the anti-trafficking interagency process and led interagency efforts 
to implement the 2013-2020 National Action Plan on Combating 
Human Trafficking, including research into the efficacy of national 
efforts to combat the crime; the government did not provide updates 
on its next iteration, the draft of which was in process at the end 
of the previous reporting period. For the fourth consecutive year, 
the government did not report the extent to which it funded anti-
trafficking activities in furtherance of the action plan (more than 55 
million renminbi, or $8.41 million, in 2016). It conducted media 
outreach campaigns on some forms of trafficking, although the 
content thereof generally focused on child abduction. MOHRSS 
operated and publicized three 24-hour hotlines that could benefit 
potential trafficking victims—one for labor issues, one for child 
protection, and one for gender-based violence—but authorities did 
not provide statistics on their use. Academics and experts noted the 
gender imbalance created by the previous One-Child Policy likely 
continued to contribute to trafficking crimes in the PRC. According 
to international media outlets and human rights groups, in 2020, 
the government intentionally underreported—or altogether excluded 
from statistical research—data on population demographics within 
Xinjiang, likely in an attempt to obfuscate evidence of the ongoing 
genocide and crimes against humanity perpetrated there. 
The government hukou (household registration) system continued to 
contribute to the vulnerability of internal migrants by reducing access 
to social services, particularly for Chinese national victims returning 
from exploitation abroad; however, the government relaxed some 
internal migration restrictions dictated by the hukou system during 
the reporting period. The government continued to address some 
of these vulnerabilities by requiring local governments to provide a 
mechanism for migrant workers to obtain residency permits. However, 
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these residency permits were disproportionately unavailable to 
rural ethnic Han migrants and members of ethnic minority groups, 
exacerbating their constrained access to employment and social 
services. The government made no efforts to reduce the demand for 
commercial sex acts. The government did not report investigating 
or prosecuting any Chinese citizens for child sex tourism, despite 
widespread reports of the crime. While the PRC government included 
Macau in its succession to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol in 2010, it stated 
the protocol “shall not apply” to Hong Kong. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in China, and traffickers exploit Chinese victims 
abroad. Traffickers also use China as a transit point to subject 
foreign individuals to trafficking in other countries throughout Asia 
and in international maritime industries. Well-organized criminal 
syndicates and local gangs subject Chinese women and girls to sex 
trafficking within China. Traffickers typically recruit them from 
rural areas and take them to urban centers, using a combination 
of fraudulent job offers and coercion by imposing large travel fees, 
confiscating passports, confining victims, or physically and financially 
threatening victims to compel their engagement in commercial sex. 
China’s national household registry system (hukou) continues to 
restrict rural inhabitants’ freedom to legally change their residence, 
placing China’s internal migrant population—estimated to exceed 
169 million men, women, and children—at high risk of forced labor 
in brick kilns, coal mines, and factories. Some of these businesses 
operate illegally and take advantage of lax government enforcement. 
Chinese nationals are subjected to conditions indicative of forced 
labor in BRI projects in several countries. African and Asian men 
reportedly experience conditions indicative of forced labor aboard 
Chinese-flagged and Chinese-owned, foreign-flagged fishing vessels 
operating worldwide in China’s DWF; men from other regions may 
be in forced labor aboard these vessels as well. Women and girls 
from South Asia, Southeast Asia, and several countries in Africa 
experience forced labor in domestic service, forced concubinism 
leading to forced childbearing, and sex trafficking via forced and 
fraudulent marriage to Chinese men. Traffickers target adults and 
children with developmental disabilities and children whose parents 
have left them with relatives to migrate to the cities—estimated at 6.4 
million—and subject them to forced labor and forced begging. State 
bodies reportedly subject members of Muslim minority groups and 
Tibetans to forced labor as part of arbitrary mass detention, political 
indoctrination, and labor transfer schemes.
State-sponsored forced labor is increasingly prevalent in China. In 
2013, the National People’s Congress ratified a decision to abolish 
“Re-education through labor” (RTL), a punitive system that subjected 
individuals to extra-judicial detention involving forced labor, from 
which the government reportedly profited. The government closed 
most RTL facilities by October 2015; however, the government 
reportedly converted some RTL facilities into state-sponsored drug 
rehabilitation facilities or administrative detention centers where, 
according to civil society and media reports, forced labor continues. 
State-sponsored forced labor is intensifying under the government’s 
mass detention and political indoctrination campaign against Muslim 
minorities in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (Xinjiang). 
Authorities have utilized discriminatory surveillance technologies 
and arbitrary administrative and criminal provisions to detain more 
than one million ethnic Muslims, including Uyghurs, ethnic Hui, 
ethnic Kazakhs, ethnic Kyrgyz, ethnic Tajiks, and ethnic Uzbeks in 
as many as 1,200 “vocational training centers”—internment camps 
designed to erase ethnic and religious identities. Camp authorities 
reportedly force some individuals to work in staff positions within the 
camps, including in Mandarin language instruction. During detention 
within—and following “graduation” from—these facilities, many of 
these individuals are subjected to forced labor in adjacent or off-site 
factories producing garments, footwear, carpets, yarn, food products, 
holiday decorations, building materials, solar power equipment 
polysilicon and other renewable energy components, consumer 
electronics, bedding, hair products, cleaning supplies, personal 
protective equipment face masks, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and 
other goods for domestic and international distribution. Coercive 
conditions reportedly include threats of physical violence, forcible 
drug intake, physical and sexual abuse, and torture. Local governments 
have reportedly used the threat of internment to coerce some members 
of these communities directly into forced labor. A small number of 
ethnic Han individuals and members of other religious minority 
groups, including Jehovah’s Witnesses, are also reportedly in detention 
within this system. Authorities offer subsidies incentivizing Chinese 
companies to open factories in close proximity to the internment 
camps and to receive transferred detainees at satellite manufacturing 
sites in other provinces, and local governments receive additional 
funds for each inmate forced to work in these sites at a fraction of 
minimum wage or without any compensation. The government has 
transported at least 80,000 of these individuals to other provinces 
for forced labor under the guise of poverty alleviation and industrial 
aid programs; authorities have formally convicted many more, 
perhaps hundreds of thousands, under spurious criminal charges 
and transferred them to more than 100 urban prisons throughout 
the country, where they suffer additional forced labor conditions. 
Authorities in some localities also subject the families of men 
arbitrarily detained in Xinjiang to forced labor in their absence. 
Contacts report families separated by this system are more likely 
to fall below the poverty line and are therefore at higher risk of sex 
trafficking and forced labor. Authorities place the young children 
of interned Muslims in Xinjiang in state-run boarding schools, 
orphanages, and “child welfare guidance centers,” and force them 
to participate in political indoctrination activities and report on 
their families’ religious activities. Authorities reportedly place older 
children among these groups in vocational schools, where some 
may be victims of forced labor. Some Kazakhstani and Kyrgyzstani 
citizens are arbitrarily detained while visiting family in Xinjiang; their 
children, now unaccompanied abroad, are also at elevated risk of 
trafficking. NGOs report ethnic Han men may be increasingly able 
to force Uyghur and other Muslim women into marriages under the 
government’s discriminatory ethnic assimilation policies, placing 
them at higher risk of forced labor in domestic service and other 
forms of exploitation. Members of these Muslim minority groups 
attempting to seek asylum abroad are vulnerable to immigration-
related administrative and criminal charges in destination countries, 
as well as to PRC extradition and refoulement. 
Xinjiang authorities issued a notice in 2017 abolishing rural obligatory 
labor under the hashar system, in which thousands of Uyghur adults 
and children were reportedly subjected to forced labor in government 
infrastructure projects and agriculture each year. Despite this policy 
change, similar forms of state-sponsored forced labor continue in 
Xinjiang, including under the auspices of the Xinjiang Production 
and Construction Corps (Bingtuan)—an economic and paramilitary 
organization with administrative control over several areas in the 
region comprising approximately 2.8 million personnel. According 
to NGO reports, Bingtuan regiments manage at least 36 agricultural 
prison farms throughout Xinjiang; unlike the aforementioned mass 
detention campaign, this system primarily subjects ethnic Han 
inmates—many of whom may be victims of arbitrary detention—to 
forced labor. Bingtuan authorities also force inmates to build new 
prison facilities in several areas of the province and may subject 
inmates to forced labor in coal, uranium, and asbestos mining, as 
well as in lead and zinc smelting and fertilizer production. Some 
Xinjiang residents are also subjected to forced labor in polysilicon 
mining and processing. The Bingtuan reportedly forces half a million 
Uyghur adults and children to pick and process cotton, tomatoes, 
sugar beets, and possibly apples and peanuts. The impact of formal 
discriminatory employment policies barring Uyghurs from jobs in 
many sectors—including in the annual cotton harvest—reportedly 
drives thousands of Uyghur farmers out of their communities in 
search of alternative work, placing them at higher risk of forced labor. 
The same is true of the government’s targeted forced-displacement 





designated for ethnic Han internal migrants, which reportedly 
disperses Uyghur communities and disrupts their livelihoods. 
The government subjects some Tibetans to arbitrary detention 
featuring similar political indoctrination and forced prison labor 
practices in the Tibet Autonomous Region and in neighboring 
provinces. Authorities have placed more than 500,000 rural Tibetans 
in “military-style” vocational training and manufacturing jobs 
around the country under the auspices of a quota-based “surplus 
labor” transfer program ostensibly intended as a poverty alleviation 
measure. Although the program does not feature arrests or enforced 
disappearances, observers note the system is likely highly coercive, 
given individuals’ relative inability to refuse participation amid the 
central government’s pervasive system of social control in Tibetan 
areas. Reports indicate some of these Tibetans are subjected to forced 
labor in factories. Authorities also reportedly subject some Buddhist 
clerics to political indoctrination activities and forced labor in 
monasteries repurposed as factories. The government’s forced urban 
resettlement programs require Tibetans to bear a large portion of 
resettlement costs, placing many of them in debt and consequently at 
higher risk of forced labor. Elsewhere, religious and political activists 
held in legal education facilities continue to report forced labor 
occurring in pretrial detention and outside of penal sentences. The 
government subjects Christians and members of other religious groups 
to forced labor as part of detention for the purpose of ideological 
indoctrination; survivors report having been forced to work in brick 
kilns, food processing centers, and factories manufacturing clothing 
and housewares. Law enforcement officials detain some Chinese 
national and foreign women on prostitution charges without due 
process in “custody and education” centers, where they are subjected 
to forced labor. International media report local authorities force 
children in some government-supported work-study programs to 
work in factories. Some school districts compel students into forced 
labor in manufacturing under the guise of mandatory internships. 
Although information is limited, Chinese nationals may experience 
conditions indicative of forced labor at large-scale rare earth mining 
operations within China, and rural communities displaced by these 
activities and by concomitant environmental contamination may 
themselves be vulnerable to sex and labor trafficking. 
Some Chinese nationals employed in large-scale BRI construction 
projects, mining operations, and factories in African, European, 
Asian and Pacific, and Latin American and Caribbean countries 
experience conditions indicative of forced labor. These include 
deceptive recruitment into debt bondage; arbitrary wage garnishing 
or withholding; contract irregularities; confiscation of travel and 
identity documentation; forced overtime; resignation penalties; 
intimidation and threats; physical violence; denial of access to 
urgent medical care; poor working and living conditions; restricted 
freedom of movement and external communication; and retaliation 
for reported abuses, among others. Pandemic-related travel restrictions 
in many of these countries and reentry restrictions imposed by the 
PRC government compounded these vulnerabilities. Some Chinese 
nationals reportedly recruit local children from the communities in 
which some BRI projects are underway and subject them to forced 
labor in hazardous work.
Traffickers subject Chinese national men, women, and children to 
forced labor and sex trafficking in at least 80 other countries. They 
force Chinese national men, women, and girls to work in restaurants, 
shops, agricultural operations, and factories in overseas Chinese 
communities. Some are promised jobs abroad and confined to private 
homes upon arrival overseas, held in conditions indicative of forced 
labor, and compelled to conduct telephone scams. Traffickers also 
reportedly subject some Chinese nationals to forced criminality in 
the cultivation, processing, and distribution of recreational drugs. 
Chinese national men in Africa, Europe, and South America experience 
abuse in factories, at construction sites, in coal and copper mines, and 
in other extractive industries, where they face conditions indicative 
of forced labor, such as non-payment of wages, restrictions on 
movement, withholding of passports, and physical abuse. Chinese-
owned manufacturing facilities in South Africa have reportedly 
subjected Chinese nationals to forced labor in the manufacturing 
of pandemic-related medical protective garments. Traffickers subject 
Chinese national women and girls to sex trafficking throughout the 
world, including in major cities, construction sites, remote mining 
and logging camps, and areas with high concentrations of Chinese 
national migrant workers. Companies operating under the auspices 
of the Japanese government’s “Technical Intern Training Program” 
have exploited Chinese nationals in forced labor in food processing, 
manufacturing, construction, and fishing. Traffickers also subject 
undocumented Chinese national seafarers to forced labor on board 
fishing vessels in Taiwan’s highly vulnerable Distant Water Fleet. 
Chinese national traffickers operating abroad also subject local 
populations to sex trafficking in several countries in Africa, the 
Mediterranean region, and South America. Chinese national 
traffickers also subject women and girls in other Asian countries to 
sex trafficking and forced labor in sham businesses and entertainment 
establishments, including Chinese national-owned casinos, 
constructed in close proximity to large-scale PRC infrastructure and 
investment projects—at times under the auspices of the BRI—and 
in special economic zones with limited local government oversight. 
Chinese national-owned factories and agricultural plantations in 
Burma reportedly subject local and internal migrant populations 
to forced labor; the same may also be true for PRC-owned logging 
operations there. Chinese crime syndicates reportedly assist traffickers 
in Southeast Asian countries in the production of counterfeit travel 
documents to facilitate trans-border trafficking. Congolese men and 
boys experience conditions indicative of forced labor in Chinese 
national-owned mining operations in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. 
Many men from countries in Africa, Asia—especially Indonesia 
and the Philippines—and other regions employed on many of the 
2,900 Chinese-flagged DWF fishing vessels operating worldwide 
experience contract discrepancies, excessive working hours, degrading 
living conditions, severe verbal and physical abuse, denial of access 
to health care, restricted communication, document retention, 
arbitrary garnishing or nonpayment of wages, and other forced labor 
indicators, often while being forced to remain at sea for months or 
years at a time. This statistic does not include Chinese-owned DWF 
vessels that are flagged or registered through front companies in other 
countries; the true number of DWF vessels with Chinese beneficial 
ownership may therefore be much higher than reported. Many DWF 
crewmembers are recruited through unlicensed or poorly regulated 
informal brokerage networks within China and abroad, exacerbating 
their risk of indebtedness through the imposition of unregulated 
hiring fees, commissions, and expenses accrued while being forced to 
reside in dormitories in the months leading up to their deployment. 
Chinese fishing operators in turn require DWF crewmembers to pay 
“guarantee money” that places them at further risk of debt-based 
coercion. Some DWF senior vessel crew also force these fishermen 
to engage in illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing 
and smuggling—including in areas under the jurisdiction of other 
coastal states—making many victims vulnerable to unjust civil and 
criminal liabilities in port countries. Some Chinese-owned fishing 
vessels reportedly operate in violation of UN sanctions off the coast 
of North Korea while evading detection by maritime authorities; 
the crew aboard these ships are also vulnerable to forced labor in 
IUU fishing. 
Chinese national traffickers subject women and children from 
neighboring Asian countries, Africa, and the Americas to forced labor 
and sex trafficking within the PRC. Traffickers promise African and 
South American women legitimate jobs in the PRC and force them 
into commercial sex upon arrival. The PRC government’s birth-
limitation policy and a cultural preference for sons created a skewed 
sex ratio of 110 boys to 100 girls in the PRC, which observers assert 
continues to drive the demand for commercial sex and for foreign 
women as brides for Chinese national men—both of which may be 
procured by force or coercion. Traffickers kidnap or recruit women 
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and girls through marriage brokers and transport them to the PRC, 
where some are subjected to sex trafficking or forced labor. Illicit 
brokers increasingly facilitate the forced and fraudulent marriage of 
South Asian, Southeast Asian, Northeast Asian, and African women 
and girls to Chinese national men for fees of up $30,000. The men—
sometimes in partnership with their parents—often incur large debts 
to cover these fees, which they attempt to recover by subjecting the 
“brides” to forced labor or sex trafficking. Some Chinese national 
men reportedly circumvent this brokerage system by traveling to 
Southeast Asian capitals and entering into legal marriages with 
local women and girls, then return to the PRC and compel them 
into commercial sex. There are also reports of Chinese national 
men and their parents deceiving Southeast Asian women and girls 
into fraudulent marriages in China, then confining them in forced 
concubinism involving rape leading to forced pregnancy. In cases 
where this forced pregnancy leads to childbirth, the men and their 
parents sometimes use the child as collateral to retain the women’s 
forced labor or sexual slavery or use the women’s immigration 
status as coercion to dissuade them from reporting their abuses to 
the authorities. Traffickers also reportedly lure women from Burma, 
Vietnam, and Cambodia to China under similar false pretenses and 
subject them to forcible artificial insemination in unregulated hospital 
facilities; they confine groups of these women in private residences 
until they give birth and then drive them across international borders 
to their home countries with impunity. A small number of Chinese 
national women are reportedly subjected to sex trafficking and 
forced labor via forced or fraudulent marriages to Taiwanese men. 
Mongolian boys are at high risk of forced labor and sex trafficking 
under visa regimes that enable them to work indefinitely as herders, 
horse jockeys and circus performers across the PRC border, provided 
they return with a chaperone once a month. African residents of 
the PRC displaced through discriminatory eviction policies related 
to the pandemic may be at higher risk of sex trafficking and forced 
labor due to ensuing homelessness and other economic hardships. 
Many North Korean refugees and asylum-seekers living irregularly 
in the PRC are particularly vulnerable to trafficking. Traffickers lure, 
drug, detain, or kidnap some North Korean women upon their arrival 
in the PRC and compel them into commercial sex in brothels and 
bars, through internet sex sites, or in relation to forced marriage. 
Traffickers also subject these women to forced labor in agriculture, 
as hostesses in nightclubs and karaoke bars, in domestic service, and 
at factories. According to media and NGO reports, the North Korean 
government subjects North Korean citizens to forced labor in China 
as part of its proliferation finance system, likely with the knowledge 
of PRC officials; this includes forced labor in hotels, restaurants, 
and in remote cyber operations. Chinese manufacturing facilities 
reportedly also subject North Korean workers to forced labor in the 
production of protective medical garments for international export.
COLOMBIA: TIER 1
The Government of Colombia fully meets the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued to 
demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting 
period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its 
anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Colombia remained on Tier 1. 
These efforts included convicting traffickers for the forced recruitment 
of children—including a member of the National Liberation Army 
(ELN), adopting the 2020-2024 anti-trafficking national strategy, 
proposing a reorganization of the Commission for the Prevention 
of Recruitment, Use, and Sexual Violence against Children and 
Adolescents (CIPRUNNA) to better address forced child recruitment 
by illegal armed groups, and adopting new territorial plans for the 
fight against trafficking in 21 departments. Although the government 
meets the minimum standards, the government decreased the number 
of investigations, prosecutions, and convictions for trafficking crimes. 
For the fourth year in a row, authorities did not provide information 
on sentences given to traffickers, casting doubt that prescribed 
punishments were severe enough to deter the crime. Authorities 
continued to identify victims but did not provide adequate services 
for them and did not have shelter available for adults—who made up 
the majority of the victims identified—or victims of labor trafficking. 
The Ministry of Interior (MOI) did not provide financial support 
for victim protection to departments and territories, and authorities 
did not fund civil society organizations that could amplify access to 
services and provide adequate assistance to all victims. In addition, 
the government did not effectively address forced labor through law 
enforcement or victim protection, resulting in impunity for labor 
traffickers and leaving unidentified victims without protection in 
critical sectors. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict cases of human 
trafficking. • Make efforts to combat forced labor by enhancing 
proactive identification of victims and increasing investigations, 
criminal prosecutions, and convictions of labor traffickers. • Take 
steps toward amending policies to fund civil society actors directly 
to provide shelter care for adult victims of trafficking and victims of 
forced labor. • Increase efforts to combat child sex trafficking in the 
tourism sector, especially in coastal cities. • Develop a record-keeping 
system to track data on anti-trafficking investigations, prosecutions, 
convictions, and sentencing. • Train prosecutors on the elements of 
human trafficking and promote the use of Law 985 regarding the 
criminalization of trafficking crimes, such as child sex tourism, forced 
criminality, and forced child recruitment under trafficking provisions. 
• Draft standard operating procedures for victim identification for 
border officials. • Train border officials on victim identification to 
prevent the inappropriate deportation and incarceration of victims. • 
Revise the definition of human trafficking under Colombian Law to 
more closely align with the definition in the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained mixed prosecution efforts and did not 
proactively investigate, prosecute, or convict cases of forced labor. 
Article 188A of the penal code criminalized sex and labor trafficking 
and prescribed punishments of 13 to 23 years’ imprisonment plus 
fines between 800 and 1,500 times the monthly minimum salary. 
Penalties under Article 188A were sufficiently stringent and, with 
respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for 
other serious crimes, such as rape. Article 188A of the penal code is 
inconsistent with the definition of trafficking under international law, 
as the law did not include force, fraud, or coercion as an essential 
element of a trafficking crime. The law criminalized forced child 
recruitment and forced criminal activity by illegal armed groups 
under separate statutes, and authorities did not view these crimes as 
human trafficking. Child sex trafficking and child sex tourism crimes 
were most often criminalized under the induction into prostitution 
law, which prescribed penalties that were not commensurate with 
those of other serious crimes.
Pandemic related lockdowns impacted judicial processes and affected 
the government’s ability to operate, including a six-month national 
lockdown and a two-month closure of the courts. Information about 
sentences prescribed for trafficking crimes was unavailable, and 
arrests, investigations, prosecutions, and convictions decreased. In 
2020, the government updated law enforcement data it reported in 







cases investigated, prosecuted, or convicted and because Colombia’s 
law was broad, it was unclear if the cases reported constituted 
trafficking as defined in international law. In addition, authorities 
did not confirm if cases were prosecuted or convicted using Article 
188A of the penal code. The attorney general’s office (AGO) received 
185 possible cases of trafficking for investigation in 2020, compared 
to 203 in 2019 and 180 in 2018. Immigration officials opened three 
new cases for transnational sex trafficking involving 16 suspects and 
one case of forced labor involving one suspect. The government did 
not report whether these cases were referred to the national police for 
investigation or to the AGO for criminal prosecution. Additionally, 
police arrested 38 suspects for trafficking crimes (eight for crimes 
committed in 2020 and 29 for crimes committed in 2019 or prior), 
compared with 40 in 2019, 85 in 2018, 30 in 2017, and 29 in 2016. 
The AGO reported prosecuting 65 defendants, compared with 75 
in 2019, 88 in 2018, 31 in 2017, and 59 in 2016. The government 
convicted 22 traffickers, compared with 36 in 2019, 34 in 2018, 21 
in 2017, and 25 in 2016. 
In 2020, authorities convicted 10 traffickers for forced recruitment, 
including a member of the National Liberation Army (ELN), bringing 
the total number of those ever convicted for forced recruitment in 
Colombia to 19. More than half of all people ever convicted for 
forced recruitment in Colombia were convicted in 2020. Officials did 
not indicate which law was used for the prosecution or conviction 
of trafficking crimes committed by illegal armed groups. The 
AGO reported it did not keep a record of sentences prescribed for 
trafficking crimes. The government did not report information on 
sentences issued for trafficking crimes for the fourth year in a row. 
A congressional hearing highlighted that since 2010, there have 
been 1,817 cases of child sex trafficking, but only 54 convictions, 
illustrating that authorities have brought roughly only three percent 
of cases of child sex trafficking to justice. Elected officials indicated 
that convicted traffickers rarely receive sentences as prescribed in the 
anti-trafficking law and noted only one of 43 traffickers convicted 
between 2013 and 2018 received a sentence as prescribed in the anti-
trafficking law. The large number of laws criminalizing trafficking 
crimes likely created confusion among those charged with the 
prosecution and conviction of traffickers and led to a disjointed and 
ineffective response. The Ministry of Labor (MOL) did not investigate 
cases or increase inspections of forced labor, and authorities did 
not have a protocol to connect labor inspectors with police or 
provide guidance on trafficking indicators for front-line personnel. 
Prosecutors’ inability to increase convictions for trafficking crimes may 
be related to an absence of adequate protection mechanisms, which 
can affect victims’ willingness to cooperate with law enforcement 
in cases against their traffickers. The national police reported some 
difficulty deploying teams to municipalities to investigate alleged 
trafficking incidents due to safety measures implemented in light 
of the pandemic. Immigration officials noted the closure of official 
border crossings due to the pandemic limited law enforcement’s 
ability to investigate potential cases and screen some potential 
victims for trafficking indicators. International borders were closed 
from March to September and the border with Venezuela remained 
closed at the end of the year. 
Illegal armed groups and criminal organizations continued to forcibly 
recruit children for armed conflict. These groups exploited child 
soldiers in forced labor and sex trafficking, forcing them to work 
at checkpoints and prohibit strangers from entering illegal armed 
group strongholds. Forced recruitment of children by illegal armed 
groups and criminal organizations remained a significant concern. 
In 2020, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) made progress in 
“macro case” 007 concerning the recruitment of child soldiers. Fifteen 
former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) commanders 
testified at the transitional justice court regarding their role in the 
forced recruitment of children. Former child soldiers participated 
in accordance with the court’s victim-centered approach. An NGO 
reported impunity in cases of forced child recruitment remained a 
problem, with the ongoing concern that Colombian illegal armed 
groups continue to strengthen their operations using children in 
Colombia and nearby Venezuela. At the end of 2020, the AGO had 
2,249 active cases for the forced recruitment of children into armed 
conflict and 2,263 cases for the use of children in forced criminality 
or other illicit activities by illegal armed groups. 
Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained 
concerns. Officials from the inspector general’s office noted judicial 
leniency toward public officials involved in trafficking crimes. While 
the government investigated and, in some cases, arrested complicit 
officials, authorities often opted for disciplinary measures in lieu 
of prison time, a response that was not commensurate with the 
severity of the crime and hindered efforts to combat trafficking. In 
2020, the AGO opened investigations into public officials, including 
one into local government offices in the Engativa neighborhood 
of Bogota for complicity in a transnational sex trafficking case; 
another into officers from the national police who were allegedly 
notifying traffickers of upcoming raids; and a third into public servants 
who knowingly falsified documentation for underage victims who 
were later exploited in Mexico and Spain. In addition, authorities 
indicted one officer from the Colombian Family Welfare Institute 
(ICBF) for human trafficking. All cases, including the indictment, 
remained open at the end of the reporting period. Authorities did 
not provide information on the sentence prescribed for the public 
official convicted in 2019 for the sex trafficking of a 14-year-old girl in 
2014. Sources reported there was complicity in the police department 
and the attorney general’s office in the city of Cartagena, in which 
child sex trafficking and child sex tourism were prevalent. Authorities 
penalized potential victims for crimes their traffickers compelled them 
to commit. In 2020, an investigative press report alleged immigration 
officials near the Colombia-Venezuela border subjected Venezuelan 
women working in commercial sex—many of whom may have been 
victims of trafficking—to degrading treatment and deportation 
using dangerous illegal border crossings without screening them for 
trafficking indicators. Authorities provided training—in some cases 
with the support of international organizations—to immigration 
officials, police, and members of the AGO on the law, understanding 
trafficker recruitment tactics, and the investigation and prosecution 
of trafficking crimes. In 2019, authorities appropriated a total of 
2.1 billion Colombian pesos ($616,370) for the implementation 
of anti-trafficking efforts, including 855.68 million Colombian 
pesos ($250,600) including technical assistance and anti-trafficking 
training. Authorities collaborated with Ecuador, Spain, the United 
States, and international organizations on trafficking-related law 
enforcement operations. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained protection efforts; however, services 
available were cursory and efforts to protect most victims were 
inadequate. In 2020, the government continued to identify a greater 
number of adult victims but did not provide them or victims of forced 
labor with shelter. The MOI identified 100 victims of trafficking, of 
whom 71 were exploited in sex trafficking, four in forced labor, nine 
in forced begging, two in indentured servitude, and 14 unknown. In 
addition, the government reported identifying four individuals in 
servile marriage, but it was unclear if these individuals were forced 
or coerced to marry for the purposes of exploitation. This compared 
with 124 potential victims identified in 2019, including 12 in servile 
marriage; 114 in 2018, including nine in servile marriage; and 96 in 
2017, including two in servile marriage. Of the total number of victims, 
nine were men, and seven identified as LGBTQI+. Authorities reported 
that 32 of the 71 victims of sex trafficking were adults, 19 children. 
The ICBF reportedly assisted 144 victims of forced recruitment in 
2020, compared with 180 in 2019 and 196 in 2018. The AGO reported 
identifying 124 potential victims, 72 Colombians, one Peruvian, one 
Venezuelan, and 50 without record of nationality. Some data was 
duplicative or contradictory, as no single agency was responsible for 
maintaining comprehensive protection or law enforcement data, and 
because Colombia’s law was broad, it was unclear if the cases reported 






The government reported that law enforcement officials used a victim 
identification protocol developed by an international organization; 
however, many law enforcement officials working on trafficking cases 
were not aware of protocol to identify victims. The municipality of 
Cali had a victim identification protocol that was developed with the 
support of an international organization; however, it was unclear if 
officials used it or if anyone received training on its use during the 
reporting period. The government offered some training on victim 
identification as part of its prevention campaigns. Nonetheless, 
experts indicated in some cases, law enforcement officials retrieved 
data from victims’ phones for evidentiary purposes and released 
the victims without referring them to adequate services. Despite 
the government’s concern with forced labor in sectors such as legal 
and illegal mining, emerald extraction, coal, domestic service, 
agriculture near the coffee belt, cattle herding, and crop harvesting, 
the MOL did not train inspectors to identify the crime, and a victim 
identification protocol for labor inspectors – in development since 
2016 with the support of an international organization – remained 
unfinished. Government authorities and NGOs reported that some 
officials working with victims of the armed conflict did not have 
enough training on victim identification; therefore, some victims 
may have been unidentified and vulnerable to trafficking and new 
patterns of recruitment. 
Of the 100 victims identified, authorities provided emergency 
assistance to 71 victims; of these 57 received temporary shelter, 
compared with 79 victims who received temporary shelter in 2019. 
Forty-four victims received medium-term assistance, compared 
with 66 in 2019. The government did not provide shelter to forced 
labor victims or adult trafficking victims. The ICBF did not provide 
details of the assistance provided to victims of child sex trafficking 
or forced child labor. Authorities identified 495 child victims of 
forced recruitment by illegal armed groups in 2020, of whom 63 
reported being recruited during the reporting period. The ICBF 
reportedly provided support services to every underage victim of 
forced recruitment. To an international organization, ICBF officials 
reported assisting 144 victims of forced recruitment in 2020, compared 
with 180 in 2019 and 196 in 2018. 
The MOI and the ICBF were responsible for victim protection; the 
former was responsible for the protection of adult victims and 
the latter responsible for the protection of child and adolescent 
victims of trafficking. According to ICBF officials, the process of 
rights restoration included an evaluation of each case and the 
provision of mental and physical health services depending on 
each victim’s needs. In 2020, authorities reported adopting victim 
referral protocols in 13 departments, but did not indicate how 
many officials were trained or how many victims were referred to 
services using these protocols. The government reported following a 
national trafficking victim assistance plan to refer victims to services, 
which by decree could include emergency assistance, including 
medical and psychological examination, clothing, hygiene kits, 
issuance of travel and identity documents, and shelter for five 
days with a maximum extension of five additional days. In fewer 
cases, and after administrative approval, authorities could provide 
medium-term assistance including educational services, job skills 
training, assistance with job placement, economic support, and 
legal assistance, including witness protection. Authorities reported 
allocating 470.93 million Colombian pesos ($137,920) for victim 
protection and assistance, including 123.9 million Colombian pesos 
($36,290) for victim transportation services. According to the MOI, 
most of the funding was used for technical assistance for regional 
and municipal trafficking in persons committees; however, the 
national government relied solely on individual departments and 
municipalities for the provision of services. According to experts, 
some victims who did not self-identify were not legally considered 
victims and did not receive care. 
Government officials and NGOs asserted government-funded victim 
assistance was cursory and insufficient. In 2020, authorities noted 
the pandemic reduced availability of in-person services, limiting 
emergency assistance, and NGOs, especially those providing shelter, 
reported an increase in operating costs associated with victim testing 
and required personal protective equipment. In addition, quarantine 
measures and social distancing requirements complicated efforts 
to find housing for trafficking victims, as there were fewer spots 
available. While assistance for underage victims was limited, and 
in some places non-existent, some department ICBF authorities 
assisted victims and provided outpatient case management services 
to aid in their recovery. In most parts of the country, department 
ICBF authorities did not fund physical spaces where child victims 
could go, and as a result, coordination for services was left to the 
last minute, making it unreliable and difficult to obtain. The ICBF 
partially funded two shelters for child and adolescent victims, at least 
one of which had a multi-disciplinary team trained to work with 
victims of sexual abuse, including sex trafficking; however, funding 
was insufficient to provide the comprehensive assistance victims 
needed. Local ICBF officials in Bogota operated a shelter for underage 
victims of commercial sexual exploitation that could provide care for 
trafficking victims but did not report how many victims received care 
in 2020. Authorities sometimes placed victims in hotels on a case-
by-case basis. In contrast, adult victims did not receive specialized 
shelter assistance or any assistance beyond emergency care despite 
making up the majority of the victims identified. Authorities did not 
report if any of the 32 adult victims identified received care in any 
non-specialized shelter. In 2020, some department anti-trafficking 
committees, including in Bogota and Caldas department, signed 
initial agreements with an NGO to provide shelters for trafficking 
victims, but authorities did not indicate if they referred any victims to 
these shelters for care. Lack of funding for civil society organizations 
fighting to combat trafficking hindered the government’s ability to 
mitigate the crime; victims who did not receive adequate care were 
less able and willing to assist authorities in the case against their 
traffickers and less likely to provide input for the improvement of 
the overall response. 
Government officials did not report deporting trafficking victims; 
however, media reports indicated that border authorities continued 
deporting alleged trafficking victims for prostitution-related crimes 
without proper screening for trafficking indicators. Forty-three 
Colombian trafficking victims were identified in foreign countries; 17 
were repatriated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) compared 
with 33 in 2019 and seven in 2018. MFA officials did not keep 
record of funding provided for the repatriation of victims during 
the reporting period. According to officials, many victims returned 
in pandemic repatriation flights and such expenses were included 
as general expenses paid for by the government.
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. The Interagency 
Committee for the Fight Against Trafficking in Persons (ICFTP), 
chaired by the MOI and comprising 16 government entities, conducted 
19 virtual technical advisory meetings (compared with 20 meetings 
in 2019 and 44 in 2018). The ICFTP sought to improve coordination 
between it and its regional committees and make recommendations 
for the preparation of territorial action plans. The MOI reported that 
21 territories adopted anti-trafficking plans and by the end of 2020, 
all 32 departments had adopted territorial plans to combat trafficking. 
In addition, authorities approved the 2020-2024 national action 
plan and appropriated some funding for its implementation from 
the general fund to combat trafficking in persons. The government 
allocated 606.41 million Colombian pesos ($177,600) for awareness 
campaigns, including a television and social media campaign with 
the support of national celebrities to promote trafficking awareness 
and advertise the anti-trafficking hotline. Immigration officials held 
events to educate migrant children on trafficking crimes, and the MOL, 
with the support of an international organization, held an event to 
educate communities on ways to identify fraudulent employment 
opportunities. Authorities reported reaching 22,328 people through 
virtual events as part of a long-standing awareness campaign; however, 







mostly dormant during the year, despite the critical need to promote 
awareness during the COVID-19 pandemic. Due to growing concerns 
of gender-based violence, including trafficking, during mandatory 
isolation and quarantines, the health ministry introduced a new 
hotline to report these crimes. 
Colombia continued to operate a 24-hour anti-trafficking hotline, 
which in 2020 received 1,625 calls and five led to investigations, but 
authorities did not report how many victims were identified or if any 
led to prosecutions. The AGO monitored a general hotline for citizens 
to report crimes (Line-122), and in 2020, authorities indicated 14 
calls were for trafficking crimes. During the reporting period, with the 
support of a foreign government and an international organization, 
authorities launched a cellphone app to report trafficking cases; 
however, reporting via the app was not anonymous and could hinder 
reporting of crimes due to fear of reprisal. 
In response to the influx of more than 1.7 million Venezuelans 
arriving in the country since 2016, the government provided temporary 
residence permits, health care, education for school-aged children, 
and social services, likely reducing their vulnerability to trafficking. 
In 2020, the MOI developed a regional plan to mitigate child sex 
tourism in coordination with six Caribbean region anti-trafficking 
committees. An international organization reported that 49 children 
were victims of forced recruitment by illegal armed groups, compared 
to 99 in 2019 and 292 in 2018. An NGO noted there was a nine 
percent increase in encounters that involved child soldiers in the 
first half of 2020, with 40 separate events involving 190 children. 
Authorities announced the reorganization of CIPRUNNA to create a 
more decentralized structure and enlist support from municipalities, 
strengthen coordination between government institutions, increase 
the number of government agencies under CIPRUNNA from nine 
to 22, and to seek international cooperation in combating child 
soldiering. Authorities allocated approximately 1.5 billion Colombian 
pesos ($439,300) for the reorganization of CIPRUNNA. While the 
government did not sign any new international agreements in 2020, 
authorities participated in virtual exchanges with Ecuador and Peru 
to promote transnational cooperation. The government did not 
make any efforts to reduce the demand of commercial sex during 
the reporting period. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Colombia, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Colombia abroad. Traffickers exploit Colombian adults and children 
in sex trafficking and forced labor in Colombia and Latin America, 
Asia, and Europe. Traffickers exploit Colombians in Israel and the 
United Arab Emirates, mainly in Dubai. According to a Colombian 
government agency, in 2019, nearly 55 percent of transnational 
trafficking cases with a Colombia nexus involved Colombian victims 
exploited in trafficking in Turkey. Traffickers lured victims with 
fraudulent employment opportunities later to exploit them in sex 
trafficking and forced labor. In 2019, 38 percent of victims in domestic 
trafficking cases were from Bogota and Antioquia Department, and 
44 percent of domestic cases were identified in Bogota. Government 
reports released in 2019 indicate that since 2013 roughly 90 percent 
of victims identified in Colombia were adults. Groups at high 
risk for trafficking include displaced Venezuelans, LGBTQI+, Afro-
Colombians, members of indigenous communities, individuals 
with disabilities, internally displaced persons, and those living in 
areas where illegal armed groups and criminal organizations are 
active. Sex trafficking of Colombian women and children occurs 
within the country and around the world. Colombian women and 
children are victims of sex trafficking within Colombia in areas with 
tourism and large extractive industries. Transgender Colombians and 
Colombian men in commercial sex are vulnerable to sex trafficking 
within Colombia and in Europe. Traffickers exploit Colombian 
nationals in forced labor, mainly in mining for the extraction of 
coal, alluvial gold, and emeralds; agriculture in coffee harvesting 
and palm production; begging in urban areas; and domestic service. 
Traffickers exploit Colombian children working in the informal 
sector and street vending in forced labor. Illegal armed groups, 
particularly in the departments of Choco, Norte de Santander, 
Cordoba, Narino, and Cauca, forcibly recruit children, including 
Venezuelan, indigenous, and Afro-Colombian youth, to serve as 
combatants and informants and harvest illicit crops, and to exploit 
them in sex trafficking. Between 2017 and 2019, early alert systems 
identified 182 municipalities where children were vulnerable to 
forced recruitment by illegal armed groups. Women, children, and 
adolescents who separate from the ranks of illegal armed groups 
are vulnerable to trafficking. Traffickers recruit vulnerable women 
and girls in dire economic circumstances, mostly Colombians and 
displaced Venezuelans, into “webcam modeling.” In some cases, 
traffickers drugged women and girls using fear and coercion through 
debt and extortion to force victims to perform live streaming sex 
acts. Government officials and civil society organizations have 
expressed concern about the burgeoning webcam industry and its 
ties to sex trafficking. Displaced Venezuelans, including women, 
children, transgender individuals, and those in irregular migration 
status, were the most vulnerable to sex trafficking and forced labor. 
Traffickers target impoverished women and girls to exploit them in 
sex trafficking; this vulnerable population represented 80 percent of 
sex trafficking cases. Youth living under poor social and economic 
conditions are at a high risk of human trafficking. The pandemic 
led an economic contraction of 6.8 percent, creating hardships 
and likely increased the vulnerability to trafficking of LGBTQI+ 
individuals, irregular migrants, and indigenous communities that 
relied on the informal sector. 
COMOROS: TIER 3
The Government of Comoros does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making 
significant efforts to do so, even considering the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Comoros remained on Tier 3. Despite the lack of significant efforts, the 
government took some steps to address trafficking, including passing 
penal code amendments that criminalize all forms of trafficking; 
acceding to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol; developing a 2020 national 
action plan to combat trafficking; and partnering with an international 
organization to train law enforcement officials on trafficking crimes. 
However, the government continued to lack formal procedures to 
identify trafficking victims or refer them to care and has not identified 
or referred any trafficking victims to protective services since 2013. 
The scale of trafficking crimes in Comoros was unknown, in part due 
to the lack of identification procedures, and the government did not 
investigate, prosecute, or obtain convictions for any sex trafficking 
or forced labor crimes. Reports continued that informal mediation 
and financial settlements, in lieu of investigation and prosecution of 
crimes, may have resulted in the return of children to their alleged 
exploiters. The government did not conduct anti-trafficking public 
awareness campaigns.






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Develop standard operating procedures to identify trafficking 
victims—especially among vulnerable groups, including children 






Investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes, and sentence convicted 
traffickers, including complicit officials, to penalties as prescribed in 
the penal code. • Amend trafficking provisions in the penal code to 
prescribe penalties for adult sex trafficking that are commensurate 
with Vpenalties prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. • 
Develop, adopt, and implement a multi-year national action plan 
to combat trafficking. • Improve coordination among the Anti-
Trafficking Task Force by providing funding or in-kind resources, 
convening it regularly, and sharing data on trafficking crimes. • 
In coordination with NGOs and international partners, provide 
comprehensive protective services to trafficking victims. • Increase 
anti-trafficking training to all front-line officials, including law 
enforcement, social workers, health service providers, prosecutors, 
judges, and civil society. • Cease returning trafficking victims to their 
exploiters. • Engage French officials to prevent the trafficking of 
unaccompanied Comorian youth in Mayotte. • Expand anti-trafficking 
public awareness campaigns to all three islands. • Develop national-
level data collection on trafficking crimes, including anti-trafficking 
law enforcement efforts and trafficking victims identified.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained inadequate anti-trafficking law 
enforcement efforts. In February 2021, the government enacted 
amendments to the criminal code that criminalized sex trafficking and 
labor trafficking. Article 266-11 of the new criminal code prescribed 
penalties of seven to 10 years' imprisonment and a fine of 30 million 
Comorian francs ($74,880) for offenses involving an adult victim, 
and 10 to 20 years' imprisonment and a fine of 30 million Comorian 
francs ($74,880) for those involving a child victim. These penalties 
were sufficiently stringent. However, the penalties prescribed for 
adult sex trafficking were not commensurate with those prescribed 
for other grave crimes, such as rape. 
The government did not systematically collect data on law enforcement 
efforts, including human trafficking. The government did not report 
investigating, prosecuting, or convicting any traffickers, despite 
previous reports listening centers recorded many cases that may 
have been trafficking. The government has not reported investigating 
a trafficking case since 2014 and has never reported convicting a 
trafficker. The government also did not report any investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government employees allegedly 
complicit in human trafficking offenses; however, corruption and 
official complicity in trafficking crimes at all levels of government 
remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action 
during the year. The police lacked basic resources, including vehicles, 
fuel, and equipment, which limited their ability to investigate 
trafficking cases. The judicial system in Comoros remained weak; 
observers continued to report criminals were frequently convicted and 
sentenced, but then released without explanation, creating a culture 
of impunity among criminals, including potential traffickers. While 
discouraged by the government, families or village elders continued 
to settle many allegations of sexual violence, possibly including 
sex trafficking and child domestic servitude, informally through 
traditional means without recourse to the formal court system. 
Many rural families still preferred informal arrangements with host 
families; children in these arrangements were particularly vulnerable 
to trafficking. In previous years, judges were known to negotiate 
agreements between a child’s parents and his or her trafficker, often 
returning the child to trafficking situations. Some police reportedly 
returned sexually abused children to their exploiters, sometimes due 
to a lack of shelters or an alternative form of care.
The government, in partnership with an international organization, 
provided training for 30 law enforcement officials on trafficking 
crimes, compared with no trafficking-related trainings in previous 
years. The government, in partnership with an international 
organization, organized training sessions for the Anti-Trafficking 
Task Force focused on the UN TIP Protocol and identifying cases of 
exploitation, including trafficking. The government, in partnership 
with the same international organization, also trained the task force 
and a group of religious judges on combating human trafficking in 
accordance with the principles of Islamic law. In partnership with an 
international donor, the government provided training to 20 police 
officers on Anjouan on children’s rights, which may have included 
information related to child trafficking. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained inadequate victim protection efforts. 
The government did not identify any trafficking victims during the 
reporting period and has not identified a victim since 2013. The 
government did not develop or employ systematic procedures to 
identify trafficking victims or refer them to the limited care available. 
The government continued to provide financial support, including 
salaries for employees and office space, to listening centers (Service 
d’ecoute); however, the government did not provide anti-trafficking 
training to staff. The listening centers, with assistance from an NGO, 
offered medical care, psycho-social counseling, and legal assistance 
mostly to women and children who were victims of abuse and 
violence, including potential trafficking victims. The government 
continued operating listening centers in four locations—two on 
Grande Comore, one on Anjouan, and one on Moheli. In 2020, the 
listening centers reported providing assistance to at least 189 women 
and children, compared with at least 144 in 2019. The listening 
centers recorded these persons as victims of abuse; however, because 
of inadequate training on trafficking victim identification, some of 
these victims may have been trafficking victims. On all three islands, 
the listening centers reportedly coordinated with the Morals and 
Minors Police Brigade on cases.
The government did not report assisting in the repatriation of any 
victims during the reporting period. The government also did not 
report making additional efforts to investigate, identify, or assist the 
3,000 to 4,000 unaccompanied Comorian children on the island 
of Mayotte, a French department, after France denied the National 
Human Rights Commission in Comoros visas in 2018. There were no 
shelters available, for short- or long-term use, for adult or child victims. 
In 2018, the government identified a possible site for a temporary 
shelter, but the government did not report making any progress in 
establishing a shelter for the second consecutive year. Similar to last 
year, the Morals and Minors Police Brigade did not report whether any 
children were assisted or whether the government provided financial 
or in-kind assistance to 10 foster homes that reportedly existed on 
Grande Comore. In the absence of adequate funding and shelter, 
listening center staff and police sometimes provided temporary 
shelter in their private homes; however, government officials often 
returned children to their parents or guardians where they might 
have originally faced abuse or were vulnerable to trafficking. There 
were no reports the government inappropriately penalized victims 
for crimes traffickers compelled them to commit; however, because 
there were no standard victim identification procedures, victims may 
have remained unidentified in the law enforcement system. Despite 
requirements of the 2015 child labor law, the government did not 
establish a support fund for children vulnerable to trafficking.
PREVENTION
The government demonstrated mixed efforts to prevent trafficking. 
In June 2020, Comoros acceded to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. The 
interagency Anti-Trafficking Task Force, composed of representatives of 
relevant government agencies, the listening centers, and international 
organizations, continued to lead the government’s anti-trafficking 
efforts and met nine times in 2020, compared with one meeting in 
2019. For the first time since 2015, the task force adopted an anti-
trafficking national action plan, which delegated specific, short-term 
actions to relevant government agencies for implementation in 
2020. The government implemented some of these actions, such 
as training law enforcement officials; however, most activities were 
not completed during the reporting period. The government did not 
report conducting any national public awareness campaigns during 







to do so. The government continued to fund two toll-free emergency 
lines for all three islands, which were used to report crimes to the 
listening centers. During the reporting period, the listening centers 
received 9,072 calls reporting abuse and exploitation, a significant 
increase compared with 1,139 calls the previous year; however, the 
government did not track call data related to potential victims of 
human trafficking. 
The Ministry of Labor employed four labor inspectors who were 
responsible for implementing the 2015 child labor law prohibiting 
child trafficking; they did not receive training on the relevant trafficking 
laws and did not receive operational resources to conduct labor 
inspections of informal work sites, where children were especially 
vulnerable to forced labor. Inspectors did not remove or assist any 
children as a result of labor inspections during the reporting period. 
The absence of a clear understanding of trafficking may have resulted 
in the misclassification of cases as other crimes, such as child labor, 
abuse, and rape. The government did not have effective policies or 
laws to govern labor recruiters and did not report holding anyone 
civilly or criminally liable for fraudulent recruitment during the 
reporting period. In 2016, the labor ministry signed an agreement 
with several labor recruitment agencies to facilitate review of the 
transnational recruitment processes and to monitor job advertisements 
in an effort to identify recruitment activities that might endanger 
Comorians seeking overseas employment; however, the government 
has made no efforts to regulate labor recruitment agencies since 
then. The government did not provide anti-trafficking training to 
its diplomatic personnel. The government did not make efforts to 
reduce demand for commercial sex acts. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers may exploit 
domestic and foreign victims in Comoros, and traffickers may exploit 
victims from Comoros abroad. Traffickers may exploit Comorian 
women and Malagasy women who transit Comoros in forced labor 
in the Middle East. Traffickers may exploit Comorian adults and 
children in forced labor in agriculture, construction, and domestic 
work in Mayotte, a French department. Traffickers and employers on 
Anjouan may subject children, some of whom were abandoned by 
parents who left to seek economic opportunities in other countries, 
to forced labor, mostly in domestic service, roadside and market 
vending, baking, fishing, and agriculture. Poor rural families, often 
on Anjouan and Moheli, frequently send their children to live with 
wealthier relatives or acquaintances in urban areas or on Grande 
Comore for access to schooling and other socio-economic benefits; 
these children are vulnerable to physical and sexual abuse and forced 
labor in domestic servitude. Most Comorian children aged 3 to 7 
(and some as old as age 14) study at informal neighborhood Quranic 
schools headed by private instructors, where they may be vulnerable 
to exploitation through coercion and forced labor as field hands 
or domestic servants as payment for instruction and subjected to 
physical and sexual abuse. The estimated 3,000-4,000 unaccompanied 
Comorian children on Mayotte, a French department, are especially 
vulnerable to domestic servitude and sex trafficking. Comorians may 
be particularly vulnerable to transnational trafficking due to a lack 
of adequate border controls, corruption of government officials, 
and the existence of international criminal networks involved in 
migrant smuggling.
CONGO, DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF THE: TIER 2  
WATCH LIST
The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of 
trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. These efforts 
included convicting an armed group leader for crimes including 
child soldier recruitment as well as sexual slavery and sentencing 
him to life imprisonment. Authorities also took actions to investigate 
and prosecute complicit officials. The government developed and 
disseminated materials to support improved victim identification 
efforts by law enforcement, as well as care providers, and partnered 
with NGOs to identify substantially more victims than in the 
previous reporting period. Further, the government’s Agency for the 
Prevention and the Fight Against Trafficking in Persons (APLTP)-led 
inter-ministerial committee met 50 times and held five technical 
working group meetings during the reporting period, facilitating the 
partial implementation of the country’s first national action plan as 
well as an awareness campaign. However, the government did not 
demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared to the previous 
reporting period, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on its antitrafficking capacity. Congolese National Army 
(FARDC) officers unlawfully used three children and continued 
coordinating with an armed group that recruited and used children 
during the reporting period. Additionally, authorities reported 
investigating fewer cases. Therefore DRC remained on Tier 2 Watch 
List for the second consecutive year.






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Expand efforts to enforce the law and to sensitize all FARDC officers 
on the need to cease the unlawful use of children; hold officials who 
recruit or use children accountable. • Allocate sufficient financial 
and human resources for the APLTP to execute its mandate fully, 
including to expand the provision of services to victims in partnership 
with NGOs. • Increase efforts to investigate and prosecute suspected 
traffickers—and if convicted in a transparent trial—adequately 
sentence traffickers in accordance with the law, including complicit 
officials. • Improve measures to identify trafficking victims proactively 
in coordination with civil society and international organizations, 
including providing training for front-line officials to identify victims 
in the commercial sex industry, street begging, and artisanal mining, 
and to refer victims to appropriate care in coordination with NGOs 
as well as international organizations. • Finalize pending legislation 
that criminalizes all forms of trafficking and prescribes penalties 
that are sufficiently stringent, and with respect to sex trafficking, 
commensurate with penalties prescribed for other serious crimes. • 
In partnership with international experts, develop and implement 
national standard operating procedures for the identification and 
referral of victims. • Finalize and disseminate procedures for collecting 
and reporting data on cases of sex trafficking—as distinct from other 
sexual violence crimes—and forced labor. • Use radio in French 
and local languages as well as engagement with civil society to raise 
public awareness about human trafficking and enhance the public’s 
ability to identify and report trafficking crimes.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained overall law enforcement efforts. 
Congolese law criminalized all forms of sex trafficking and some 
forms of labor trafficking. However, the lack of a comprehensive anti-
trafficking legal framework continued to exacerbate officials’ limited 
understanding of trafficking and their conflation of the offense with 
other crimes, such as illegal international adoption. Article 174(j) 
of the 2006 Sexual Violence Law criminalized child sex trafficking 
and prescribed penalties of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment. Section 
174(e) criminalized sexual slavery and prescribed penalties ranging 







Congolese francs ($102). These penalties were sufficiently stringent 
and commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes. 
Article 174(c), which criminalized the “forced prostitution” of adults, 
prescribed penalties of three months to five years’ imprisonment; 
these penalties were sufficiently stringent but not commensurate with 
those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Articles 182 
and 183 of the 2009 Child Protection Law 09/001 also criminalized 
the “procurement” of children and child sexual slavery and prescribed 
penalties of five to 20 years’ and 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment 
with a fine between 8,000 and 1 million Congolese francs ($4 to 
$509), respectively; these penalties were sufficiently stringent and 
commensurate, with respect to sex trafficking, with other serious 
crimes, such as rape. Article 187 criminalized child labor, including 
forced child labor, and prescribed penalties of one to three years’ 
imprisonment and fine between 100,000 and 200,000 Congolese 
francs ($51 to $102); these penalties were not sufficiently stringent 
with respect to forced child labor. Article 326 of the 2002 Labor 
Code criminalized adult forced labor and prescribed penalties of up 
to six months’ imprisonment or a fine of 30,000 Congolese francs 
($15); this penalty was not sufficiently stringent. Congolese law 
also criminalized the enlistment of persons younger than 18 years 
old into the armed forces and the police which carried penalties 
of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment. The comprehensive trafficking 
law—drafted by the APLTP and the Ministry of Human Rights in 
partnership with an international organization—remained pending 
for the second consecutive year.
Despite the closure of courts for five months of the reporting period 
due to pandemic restrictions, civilian and military courts reported 
investigating six cases involving more than 100 victims whom multiple 
traffickers subjected to forced labor, sex trafficking, and domestic 
servitude; initiating 13 prosecutions that remained ongoing at the end 
of the reporting period (three cases of child soldier recruitment and 
use military courts were in the process of adjudicating, three cases of 
forced labor involving two adults and one child, and seven cases of 
sexual slavery); and convicting four traffickers for crimes involving 
forced labor, sex trafficking, as well as child soldier recruitment and 
use. Sentences included a fine of 1 million Congolese Francs ($509) 
only; five years’ imprisonment in juvenile detention for a 17-year-old 
perpetrator; and five years’ imprisonment for sexually trafficking a 
child. In November, a military court sanctioned an Nduma Defense 
of Congo (NDC) militia commander to life imprisonment for crimes 
including child soldier recruitment and use. Authorities reported 
investigating 32 cases, prosecuting six suspects, and convicting four 
traffickers in the previous reporting period. 
Limited information management capabilities, poor understanding 
of the crime by many law enforcement and judicial officials, weak 
judicial systems, and broad government corruption hindered law 
enforcement efforts in 2020. The government suspended court 
hearings from March to August 2020 to decrease the spread of 
COVID-19, reducing the number of all criminal cases heard during 
the reporting period. Officials did not report whether the government 
investigated 142 cases involving sexual slavery NGOs shared with 
provincial courts in Ituri province in 2019. During the reporting 
period, APLTP developed a judicial training program in coordination 
with an international organization. In February 2021, the APLTP 
launched the first session and provided training for 60 magistrates, 
including 15 from Kinshasa, five from the public prosecutors’ office, 
five from the Tribunal de Grande Instance, and five from the children’s 
courts. Additionally, in December 2020, officials from the police, 
immigration, APLTP, presidency, and public prosecutors, took part in 
a training focused on developing a data collection system conducted 
by an international organization. This effort contributed to the 
government’s implementation of the data collection system, and the 
Ministry of Interior producing an annual report on the country’s anti-
trafficking efforts. In February and March 2021, the APLTP organized 
two trainings for judges, prosecutors, police, juvenile justice advocates, 
border control officials, and other first responders on basic human 
trafficking principles as well as existing legal frameworks. 
Corruption and complicity by the government’s armed forces in 
trafficking crimes remained a significant concern, although an August 
2020 decree by the Minister of Defense reiterating the zerotolerance 
policy for FARDC support for armed groups that unlawfully recruit 
children had an impact and led to the demobilization of some 
child soldiers. There were two reported instances of members of 
the FARDC unlawfully using children in support roles and one 
incident where a child was engaging in espionage for the FARDC. In 
all instances, however, the FARDC commanding officers voluntarily 
released children to appropriate authorities and took corrective 
action consistent with the national action plan against the use of 
child soldiers. Some members of the FARDC continued to coordinate 
with a non-governmental armed group that recruited and used child 
soldiers. The military initiated prosecutions for two FARDC soldiers 
accused of kidnapping children for the purpose of sexual enslavement 
and arrested an officer for his alleged role in a child trafficking ring; 
both cases remained pending at the end of the reporting period. 
In April 2020, Ministry of Interior officials trained 15 Kinshasa police 
officers on the risks associated with mandatory quarantines, including 
human trafficking, as part of a program to mitigate adverse effects 
related to the pandemic. The officers applied the training during 
patrols of the areas between Kinshasa and Kongo Central, Kwilu 
province, as well at the Baramoto port, which serves as a screening 
area for boats travelling from Equateur and Kasai provinces. During 
the previous reporting period, the government coordinated with an 
international donor to train 25 mine inspectors and controllers in 
North and South Kivu on inspections, child labor, and sex trafficking. 
The APLTP reported DRC and Republic of the Congo authorities 
collaborated to disrupt a transnational child trafficking ring, identify 
two children forced to beg, and arrest the suspects. In December 
2020, officials used a bi-lateral agreement with the Republic of the 
Congo—finalized in March 2020—to investigate a child trafficking 
network and repatriated two child victims and a suspected trafficker to 
the DRC. In addition to the alleged Republic of the Congo perpetrator, 
authorities arrested two suspects, and they remained in pre-trial 
detention at the end of the rating period. The government referred 
the children to a shelter in Kinshasa following their repatriation. 
Additionally, APLTP coordinated with INTERPOL and a civil society 
group to investigate a sex trafficking ring in North Kivu province; 
officials did not provide an update on the investigation at the close 
of the reporting period.
PROTECTION
The government increased efforts to identify victims, although 
government-provided victim services remained insufficient. 
Nonetheless, FARDC officers used one child to perform espionage 
and two others in support roles during the reporting period. Following 
the identification of the children by an international organization, 
the military removed the children from service and referred them 
to care. The Ministry of Defense—in close coordination with an 
international organization—continued to engage directly with 
armed group commanders, resulting in seven new armed groups 
committing to end and prevent the recruitment and use of child 
soldiers. Stemming from these agreements, armed groups voluntarily 
released 838 children to an international organization in 2020. 
The APLTP reported government officials identified 207 victims (140 
sex trafficking, 50 children in forced labor, 13 adults in forced labor, 
and four unknown) during the reporting period and referred them 
to care in coordination with NGOs. During the previous reporting 
period, the government stated it identified six victims. The 157 victims 
the government referred to NGOs received the following care: 120 
received health care, psychosocial support, legal counselling, and 
livelihoods training; 20 received health care and legal counseling; 
14 victims received psychosocial care; two received medical and 
psychosocial, as well as vocational training; and one was referred to a 
foster family. Officials noted the government provided basic medical 




















via the Ministry of Social Affairs’ provincial departments during the 
reporting period; officials did not report providing similar services 
to victims in previous years. During the previous reporting period, 
the government collaborated with international organizations and 
NGOs to provide protective services to approximately 400 victims 
of child soldering. 
The government did not have standard operating procedures to 
systematically identify and refer trafficking victims to appropriate 
care; however, the APLTP developed reference cards during the 
reporting period for law enforcement and civil society organizations to 
enhance the ability of first responders to identify cases of exploitation 
and manage case data more effectively. Pandemic restrictions on 
in-person gatherings hindered the government’s planned training 
on the reference cards. The APLTP disseminated standard victim 
identification forms to care providers in at least six provinces to 
increase first responders’ ability to report trafficking cases; healthcare 
providers and civil society actors from five provinces used the forms to 
report an unknown number of potential victims to the government. 
Additionally, the Congolese National Police (PNC) Child Protection 
and Sexual Violence Directorate used a formal mechanism in 
collaboration with an NGO to screen for potential victims within 
vulnerable populations; the NGO reported identifying 18 children 
and referred them to services. 
As part of its national disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration 
plan, the government continued to partner with an international 
organization and NGOs to identify and remove child soldiers from 
armed groups operating in eastern DRC. In partnership with the UN 
Peacekeeping and Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), 
the Ministry of Defense identified 2,101 former child soldiers and 
referred all victims to care in coordination with the ministries of 
health, education, and social affairs, compared with 3,107 during the 
previous reporting period; access challenges due to increasing violence 
in eastern DRC hindered screening and subsequently demobilization 
efforts. Procedures were in place for referring child soldiers to an 
international organization for specialized care, and FARDC officers 
followed these procedures in the three identified cases of recruitment 
and use. The government did not report identifying victims among 
vulnerable groups, such as in street begging and commercial sex, 
despite the significant scale of these problems; however, government 
officials screened gold mining sites for children, but did not report 
identifying any child trafficking victims. 
The government did not provide specialized services and care to 
trafficking victims as distinct from other vulnerable groups. The 
government could provide victims housing for up to three months, 
family reunification for children separated from armed groups, and 
support for socioeconomic integration of sexual violence victims; the 
government did not report the total number of children it provided 
these services. 
Trafficking victims could file cases against their traffickers in civil 
courts, although few victims pursued this avenue, and compensation 
for victims was rarely, if ever, paid. In November 2020, a military 
court ordered the leader of an armed group to pay restitution between 
$4,000 and $12,000 to 11 victims of sexual enslavement and other 
crimes. Observers did not report whether the perpetrator disbursed 
the funds. 
In December, officials used a bilateral agreement with the Republic 
of the Congo—finalized in March 2020—to investigate a child 
trafficking network and repatriated two child victims to the DRC. The 
government referred the children to a shelter in Kinshasa following 
their repatriation. The government did not report additional 
repatriations, compared with at least 18 children during the previous 
reporting period. Pandemic border closures beginning in March 2020 
hindered many forms of transnational cooperation. 
Due to a lack of training on victim identification, the absence of 
widespread screening for indicators of trafficking among vulnerable 
populations, and the frequency of arbitrary arrest in the country, 
authorities detained unidentified victims. In 2020, international 
organizations identified 85 children in detention following their 
separation from armed groups, compared with 111 during the previous 
year. The government held seven of these children in detention for 
periods ranging from two to nine months, and two 17-year-olds for 
periods of two and three years. 
Although officials generally afforded protections for victims testifying 
in legal proceedings on an ad hoc basis, the Ministry of Defense 
coordinated with international organizations and NGOs to support 
the more than 300 victims who participated in the November 2020 
trial of an armed group leader. In addition to providing physical 
security, the government offered temporary resettlement assistance 
for the 300 witnesses. If a victim’s lawyer requested it, courts were 
authorized to provide additional measures to conceal the witness’ 
identity such as using physical screens, testifying in adjacent rooms, 
or submitting written testimony in lieu of appearing in person. 
Infrastructure challenges and severe resource constraints throughout 
the country limited the availability of these anonymizing measures. 
Despite these witness protection interventions, NGOs reported 
defendants’ family members frequently intimidated witnesses and 
victims. 
PREVENTION
The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking. The APLTP 
is the inter-ministerial body that leads the government’s efforts. 
The agency is part of the presidency, and convenes an inter-agency 
committee which includes representatives from the presidency; the 
prime minister’s office; the ministries of defense, foreign affairs, gender 
and family, human rights, interior, labor, social affairs, and social 
security; as well as representatives from the National Intelligence 
Agency, PNC, Migration Authority, UN organizations, and local civil 
society groups. The APLTP-led inter-agency committee—established 
in April 2019—met 50 times and held five technical working group 
meetings during the reporting period; the government did not disclose 
how many times the APLTP convened over the course of the previous 
reporting period. Unlike the previous year, the APLTP had a budget 
sufficient to hold regular technical committee meetings and cover 
its operating expenses. 
The government took some steps to implement its 2020-2024 national 
anti-trafficking action plan, although it did not allocate sufficient 
resources to implement all actions of the plan. The plan focused 
on awareness raising and stakeholder training, two issues that have 
historically hindered the country’s efficacy in mitigating this issue. 
The APLTP designed and launched a national awareness-raising 
campaign consisting of three tracks focused on educating the general 
population about the dangers of human trafficking, establishing a 
national hotline, training government authorities on identification 
and referral procedures, as well as identifying strategies for prosecuting 
trafficking cases under existing legal frameworks. In March 2021, 
APLTP coordinated with an international organization and donor 
to conduct trainings for journalists to increase their knowledge of 
human trafficking and enhance their ability to use a newly developed 
journalists’ manual. The APLTP provided direct input into the manual 
that explains different types of trafficking, international and national 
laws, how to identify victims, and how to effectively report crimes 
without violating victims’ rights. 
Officials reported investigating multiple Indian and Pakistani labor 
recruiters in 2020, compared with investigating and temporarily 
closing 116 agencies in 2019. To prevent predatory recruitment 
practices, the government continued to uphold standards for labor 
recruitment and placement agencies, including having a National 
Business Identification Certificate, a business license, a tax ID number, 
and to be officially recognized by the Ministry of Labor. However, 
Congolese law does not criminalize fraudulent labor recruitment, 
thereby limiting the government’s ability to penalize agencies for 







The government continued efforts to prevent the recruitment and use 
of children into the FARDC. MONUSCO confirmed there were 788 
children recruited by armed groups in 2020, an increase from 601 in 
2019; observers reported this increase was due to worsening violence 
in the country’s east, as well as the government’s direct engagement 
with armed groups and the effectiveness of sensitization campaigns. 
In collaboration with an international organization, the government’s 
Joint Technical Working Group (JTWG) for implementing the UN 
National Action Plan to end child recruitment – composed of 
government ministries, NGOs, and international organizations – 
continued to implement a national action plan to end the recruitment 
and use of child soldiers and remove them from armed groups. 
In partnership with an international organization, the FARDC screened 
2,489 new recruits to verify their ages; through the screening process, 
the government prevented 53 children from joining the FARDC in 
2020, compared with identifying 141 the previous year. In 2020, the 
FARDC formally ceased collaborating with NDC-Renova’s (NDC-R) 
Guidon faction—a group that recruits and uses child soldiers—and 
continued its efforts to arrest Guidon under the government’s 2019 
arrest warrant; however, the military continued to collaborate and 
provide material support to the NDC-R’s Bwira faction. Over the 
course of 2020, the government collaborated with an international 
organization to hold 14 trainings on age verification procedures, 
reaching 1,543 FARDC and law enforcement officers.
Following the president’s July 2020 public directive to launch a plan 
to eliminate the worst forms of child labor, the Minister of Human 
Rights issued a decree in August 2020 that included a roadmap for 
increasing oversight of mining communities and stipulated a zero-
tolerance policy for forced child labor in the mining sector. During the 
reporting period, the government continued its efforts, in cooperation 
with an international organization, to certify artisanal mining sites in 
eastern DRC as conflict-free and child labor-free. Ministry of Mines 
officials visited 125 mine sites and verified none of the 3,479 miners 
screened were exploited in forced labor. The national police, with 
support of international donors, formalized the role of mining police 
in the prevention, detection, protection, and prosecution of child 
labor, and trained 250 new mining police. The government did not 
provide anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel, although 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported diplomats were required to 
follow the government’s code of conduct for civil servants, which 
prohibit trafficking. The government did not provide anti-trafficking 
training for FARDC troops prior to their deployment abroad as part 
of international peacekeeping missions. The government did not 
make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in DRC, and traffickers exploit victims from DRC 
abroad. Some traffickers were individuals or family members who 
promised victims or victims’ families educational or employment 
opportunities but instead exploited victims by forcing them to work 
as domestic workers, street vendors, and gang members, or to engage 
in commercial sex. Most trafficking is internal and involves forced 
labor in artisanal mining sites, agriculture, domestic servitude, or 
armed groups recruiting children in combat and support roles, as 
well as sex trafficking. The capital region served as a source for sex 
trafficking victims, with criminal networks and community members 
facilitating the movement of women and girls. As in years past, 
traffickers took advantage of families eager to lessen economic costs 
and seek opportunities for their children. In urban centers such as 
Kinshasa, Lubumbashi, and Goma, some foreign workers in the beauty 
industry reported employers failed to honor contracts, controlled 
their passports, and forced workers to pay exorbitant fines to leave 
the country before their contracts expired. 
Decades-long instability in eastern DRC—notably North Kivu, Ituri, 
South Kivu, and Tanganyika provinces—continued, resulting in armed 
groups and criminal networks engaging in unlawful child soldier 
recruitment and use, forced labor in artisanal mining, as well as in 
sex trafficking and slavery-like practices. Children in the Kasai region 
were vulnerable to forced begging schemes facilitated by criminals in 
Kasai and Kinshasa. The APLTP and NGOs reported years of cyclical 
displacement stemming from escalating insecurity in Ituri Province 
(bordering South Sudan and Uganda) has increased the vulnerability 
of thousands of homeless children without support networks who 
criminal elements—including armed groups and community 
members—coerce into commercial sex or forced labor. During the 
reporting period, individuals associated with a construction company 
in Kinshasa may have exploited Indian and Pakistani workers in 
forced labor; authorities reported the suspects confiscated the workers’ 
passports, controlled their movements, and withheld their salaries. 
In 2020, experts reported there were more than 500,000 refugees 
and five million internally displaced people (IDPs)—the largest IDP 
population in Africa; these individuals are vulnerable to trafficking 
due to their lack of economic stability and access to justice. 
In 2020, armed groups (most egregiously Mai Mai Mazembe, 
Mai Mai Nyatura, and Mai Mai Apa na Pale, NDC-Renova (NDC-R), 
Alliance des Forces de Resistance Congolaise (AFRC), Kamuina 
Nsapa, Raia Mutomboki, Democratic Forces for the Liberation of 
Rwanda (FDLR), Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and Cooperative 
for Development of the Congo (CODECO)) continued to abduct 
and forcibly recruit Congolese adults and children as combatants as 
well as human shields. Additionally, armed groups forcibly recruited 
adults and children to serve in support roles such as guards, porters, 
cleaners, cooks, messengers, spies, and tax collectors at mining sites; 
some armed groups also forced women and girls to marry or serve 
as sex slaves for their members. 
Community and family members, as well as loosely organized illicit 
networks, force children across the border into the Republic of the 
Congo where criminal actors coerce the children to commit theft. 
Child soldiers separated from armed groups and reintegrated into 
society remain vulnerable to re-recruitment, as adequate rehabilitation 
services did not exist for children suffering severe psychological trauma, 
and stigmatization may interfere with community reintegration. 
FARDC officers used one child to perform espionage, and two others 
in support roles during the reporting period; in coordination with 
an international organization, the officers released all three children 
by October 2020 and referred them to care. In July 2020—following 
years of operational coordination and materiel support—the FARDC 
ceased collaborating with the Guidon faction of the NDC-R, a group 
that recruits and uses child soldiers. However, observers reported the 
military continued to coordinate with the NDC-R’s Bwira faction, 
a group that had no documented cases of child soldier recruitment 
and use during the reporting period.
Traffickers—including mining bosses, other miners, family members, 
government officials, and armed groups—force or coerce some adults 
and children to work in artisanal mines in eastern DRC, including 
through debt-based coercion. Individuals associated with the extractive 
sector abuse some children in forced labor in the illegal mining of 
diamonds, copper, gold, cobalt, tungsten ore, tantalum ore, and tin, 
as well as the smuggling of minerals to Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Tanzania. Children are also vulnerable to 
forced labor in small-scale agriculture, domestic work, street begging, 
vending, and portering. Children from the Republic of the Congo 
may transit through the DRC en route to Angola or South Africa, 
where traffickers may exploit them in domestic servitude. Some 
criminal elements coerce Congolese women and girls into forced 
marriages where they are highly vulnerable to domestic servitude 
or sex trafficking. Congolese women and children migrate to other 
countries in Africa, the Middle East, and Europe, where traffickers 
exploit them in commercial sex or forced labor in agriculture, diamond 
mines, or domestic service. Illicit labor recruiters may fraudulently 
recruit women and force or coerce them into domestic work abroad 




















CONGO, REPUBLIC OF THE:  
TIER 2
The Government of the Republic of the Congo does not fully meet the 
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making 
significant efforts to do so. Despite the documented impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on the government’s anti-trafficking capacity, 
the government demonstrated overall increasing efforts compared to 
the previous reporting period; therefore the Republic of the Congo 
remained on Tier 2. These efforts included convicting traffickers for the 
first time since 2017 and providing shelter for eight victims, as well as 
assisting in their repatriation. The federal inter-ministerial committee 
increased the frequency of its meetings compared with the previous 
reporting period and the government conducted awareness-raising 
activities. However, the government did not meet the minimum 
standards in several key areas. The government did not screen 
proactively for trafficking among vulnerable populations and failed 
to report identifying any victims during the reporting period. The 
lack of a clear understanding of anti-trafficking laws among officials 
continued to hinder countrywide efforts.






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, 
and impose adequate penalties; fully investigate, and as required, 
prosecute, allegations of officials complicit in trafficking. • Train 
officials, NGOs, and civil society on the implementing regulations 
to identify victims proactively, including by screening for trafficking 
indicators, especially among vulnerable populations, including 
child laborers, women and girls exploited in commercial sex, 
unaccompanied minors, indigenous persons, and undocumented 
migrants. • Improve the provision of protective services to trafficking 
victims to provide appropriate care to victims nationwide. • While 
respecting due process, expedite hearings and consider prosecuting 
trafficking cases in the low court while maintaining stringent 
sentencing according to the country’s anti-trafficking law. • Increase 
anti-trafficking training for all law enforcement, prosecutors, and 
judges. • Increase law enforcement and first responders’ capacity to 
collect data on trafficking crimes. • Allocate a budget with adequate 
funding to the federal-level Inter-Ministerial Committee and the 
Pointe-Noire-based Anti-Trafficking Coordinating Committee. • 
Expand anti-trafficking efforts to identify victims and prosecute 
traffickers beyond Pointe-Noire and Brazzaville. • Update, finalize, 
approve, and resource the national action plan to combat trafficking 
in persons. • Designate one official or office to lead the anti-trafficking 
inter-ministerial committee and empower that entity to lead the 
government’s anti-trafficking efforts. • Further bolster anti-trafficking 
law enforcement cooperation with other governments in the region, 
especially Benin and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 
• Establish an anti-trafficking law enforcement unit. • Conduct an 
awareness campaign for law enforcement, judicial, and civil society 
organizations on the 2019 anti-trafficking law. • Given concerns 
that North Korea forces its citizens to work abroad, screen North 
Korean workers for trafficking indicators and refer trafficking victims 
to appropriate services. • Accede to the UN Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime and the 2000 UN TIP Protocol.
PROSECUTION
The government increased overall anti-trafficking law enforcement 
efforts. The 2019 Combatting Trafficking in Persons Law criminalized 
sex trafficking and labor trafficking. The related provisions in 
Congolese criminal law prescribed penalties of five to 10 years’ 
imprisonment, which are sufficiently stringent and, with respect to 
sex trafficking, commensurate with the penalties prescribed for other 
grave crimes, such as kidnapping. 
For the first time since 2017, the government convicted traffickers 
for exploiting victims in forced labor. Officials prosecuted six 
traffickers and courts sentenced four of those individuals to 10 years 
imprisonment under Article 2 of the 2019 trafficking law. While the 
government did not report investigating any new cases, observers 
noted anecdotal evidence that authorities opened new trafficking 
cases during the reporting period. The government investigated and 
prosecuted six traffickers in 2019. An NGO reported conducting 
investigations, in coordination with local law enforcement officers, 
into 24 additional trafficking cases during the reporting year; this is 
compared to 15 in 2019. Illicit recruiters frequently operated from 
other West African countries, and Congolese officials did not report 
taking significant actions to hold domestic criminals accountable for 
exploiting victims within the country. Authorities reported opening an 
investigation into an allegation of judicial corruption in a trafficking 
case; the case remained open at the end of the reporting period. 
Low-level corruption and limited intragovernmental coordination 
constrained officials’ ability to investigate, prosecute, and convict 
suspected traffickers, inhibiting law enforcement action during the 
year. The court system remained dysfunctional and many criminal 
cases continued to languish due to significant backlogs in the high 
court as a result of irregular court sessions, lack of centralized record 
keeping, limited legal statistics, and in 2020, court closures related 
to COVID-19 restrictions on in-person meetings. 
The government continued to include anti-trafficking training in the 
standard academy training for new police and immigration officers. 
In December, the Ministry of Social Affairs provided training on the 
country’s anti-trafficking framework for an unknown number of 
officials in six districts. The government regularly coordinated with 
source countries including Benin, DRC, Gabon, and Cameroon to 
share law enforcement information. The government did not report 
extraditing any suspects during the reporting period, compared with 
one during the previous reporting period.
PROTECTION
The government decreased efforts to identify victims, although it 
increased the number of victims it provided care. Officials did not 
report identifying any victims during the reporting period, compared 
with approximately nine in the previous reporting period. Experts 
reported NGOs identified 12 potential victims in 2020. Although 
the government did not report identifying any victims in 2020, 
it continued providing shelter and psychosocial services to eight 
victims identified in previous reporting periods. A government-run 
center in the Moungali neighborhood of Brazzaville hosted the eight 
trafficking victims. The shelter provided the victims water, food, 
clothes, education, security, and psycho-social counseling. 
The government’s implementing regulations for the anti-trafficking law 
provided formal written procedures for proactive victim identification, 
although officials did not report using these procedures to identify 
any victims. In Pointe-Noire, the government continued to focus 
the majority of its efforts on West African children in forced labor, 
including those in domestic service. In November, the government 
facilitated the repatriation of eight victims it identified in 2019 to 
Benin, compared with supporting one repatriation during the previous 
reporting period. In December, Congolese authorities coordinated 
with the DRC government to repatriate two minors to Kinshasa. In 
past reporting periods, law enforcement generally assisted in removing 





provide funding for transportation. Police did not report screening 
for indicators of sex trafficking. Instead, the government traditionally 
relied on NGOs and international organizations to assist with the 
identification, referral, assistance, investigation, and negotiation of 
compensation for the majority of victims.
The Trafficking in Persons Coordinating Committee in Pointe-Noire, 
which was responsible for assigning identified West African child 
trafficking victims to foster homes and conducting family tracing, 
did not report the number of trafficking victims referred to the five 
available foster families or funding the foster homes during the 
reporting period. A local NGO also funded and referred child victims 
to foster families if repatriation, family integration, or local reinsertion 
options were unavailable. The government funded three public 
shelters that at-risk victims, including child trafficking victims, could 
access. The government provided the same availability of care to both 
national and foreign victims and provided temporary residency status 
to foreign trafficking victims during judicial proceedings. Authorities 
provided foreign adult victims a choice between repatriation to 
their country of origin or reintegration into the local community. 
Congolese law did not provide legal alternatives to the removal of 
victims to countries where they would face retribution or hardship.
PREVENTION
The government marginally increased efforts to prevent trafficking. 
Despite COVID-19 restrictions on in-person meetings, the 
government’s federal inter-ministerial committee convened four 
times during the reporting period, compared with approximately 
twice during the previous reporting period. The government 
remained without a current national action plan or entity to lead 
the government’s efforts, which hindered the effectiveness of the 
country’s anti-trafficking response. Officials reported continuing public 
awareness programming leveraging television, radio, and newspapers, 
as well as direct outreach to indigenous populations at risk of 
exploitation and to relevant officials; however, COVID-19 restrictions 
on in-person gathering limited some sensitization activities. 
The government operated an emergency assistance line for victims of 
crime; however, officials did not report whether it received any calls 
related to human trafficking during the year. The government did not 
have effective laws or policies regulating labor recruiters. Congolese 
authorities worked with officials from the DRC government to address 
cross-border trafficking by preventing unaccompanied minors from 
entering the country. Additionally, officials coordinated with the 
Government of Benin to implement the countries’ 2011 bilateral 
anti-trafficking agreement, resulting in the repatriation of eight 
Beninese victims during the reporting period. The government has 
signed but has not acceded to the Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime and the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in the Republic of the Congo, and traffickers 
exploit victims from the Republic of the Congo abroad. Forced 
labor involving adults and children continues to be the primary 
type of trafficking within Congo. Most trafficking victims in Congo 
originate from Benin and DRC, and to a lesser extent from Gabon 
as well as other neighboring countries. Beninese networks with 
representatives in the Congo target destitute families in their country 
of origin, promising parents they will provide children an education 
in the Congo before exploiting them in domestic servitude or sex 
trafficking. Congolese authorities and civil society representatives 
report fraudulent employment agents located in Benin, DRC, and 
Gabon recruit victims into exploitative conditions in the Congo. 
Foreign business owners and Congolese exploit most foreign victims 
in forced labor in domestic service and market vending. Some hotel 
owners and other criminal actors exploit adults and children in 
commercial sex in the Congo, with the most common victims being 
Congolese from DRC. Parents in foreign countries, mostly West 
African, sometimes send their children to Congo with the expectation 
that the child will send remittances or receive an education, but 
instead criminals exploit the children in sex trafficking or forced labor. 
Experts report COVID-19-related economic hardships during the 
reporting period increased the vulnerability of individuals working 
in the informal sector, although border closures beginning in March 
2020 may have decreased cross-border trafficking in persons.
Internal trafficking primarily involves recruitment from remote rural 
areas for exploitation in cities. Individuals in the fishing industry and 
market shop owners were the primary exploiters of victims within 
the country. Traffickers—including members of the majority Bantu 
community—exploit some members of the indigenous populations 
for forced labor in the agricultural sector; reports suggest that some 
servitude involving Congolese might be hereditary. North Korean 
nationals working in the Republic of the Congo may have been 
forced to work by the North Korean government.
COSTA RICA: TIER 2
The Government of Costa Rica does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Costa Rica remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
employing new investigative techniques in trafficking cases, identifying 
more victims, and converting planned trainings and interagency 
coordination to virtual delivery amid the pandemic. However, the 
government did not meet the minimum standards in several key 
areas. The government decreased funding for anti-trafficking efforts 
and closed a trafficking-specific emergency shelter.






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Reduce bureaucratic obstacles to the disbursement of funds allocated 
to anti-trafficking efforts. • Increase funding for victim services and 
provide specialized shelter and services for trafficking victims in 
partnership with civil society organizations. • Fund and implement 
the judicial action plan to improve the investigation and prosecution 
of trafficking cases. • Intensify efforts to investigate and prosecute 
trafficking offenses and convict and punish traffickers, including child 
sex tourists. • Increase victim identification and referral, particularly 
in coordination and collaboration with civil society. • Further 
reduce the backlog of trafficking cases in the judicial system. • 
Conduct thorough and transparent criminal investigations of alleged 
government complicity in trafficking offenses and prosecute, convict, 
and punish complicit officials. • Provide increased anti-trafficking 
training for police, prosecutors, judges, and municipal officials. • 
Improve data collection on law enforcement and victim protection 
efforts. • Monitor and report the number of trafficking-related calls 
to existing hotlines.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Article 172 of 
the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and 
prescribed penalties of six to 10 years’ imprisonment for offenses 
involving an adult victim, and eight to 16 years’ imprisonment for 







stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
those for other serious crimes, such as rape. The law defined 
trafficking broadly to include illegal adoption without the purpose 
of exploitation, inconsistent with the definition of trafficking 
under international law. In addition to Article 172, officials used 
trafficking-related offenses to prosecute trafficking cases, including 
aggravated pimping (Article 170) and coerced pimping (Article 171), 
both of which prescribed penalties ranging from two to 10 years’ 
imprisonment. Article 189 criminalized forced labor or services and 
prescribed penalties of six to 10 years’ imprisonment. 
Costa Rica had two police forces involved in trafficking investigations—
the Judicial Investigation Police (OIJ) and the Migration Authority’s 
(DGME’s) Professional Migration Police. The Attorney General’s Office 
supervised both investigative units. The Attorney General’s Office 
reported investigating 103 cases total—68 trafficking cases (Article 
172), 28 cases of child sex trafficking (Article 170), and seven cases 
of forced labor or services (Article 189) – compared with 69 cases 
in 2019 (43 cases under Article 172, six under Article 170, and 11 
under Article 189) and 74 cases in 2018. The government initiated 
prosecutions against four accused sex traffickers under Articles 172 
and 170, compared with prosecuting seven accused traffickers in 
2019 and 12 in 2018. Courts convicted five sex traffickers in 2020, 
all under Article 172, compared with convicting 15 traffickers in 
2019 and 10 in 2018. Judges sentenced one convicted trafficker to 
four years’ imprisonment; the other four traffickers each received 
sentences of 36 years’ imprisonment. In one case, courts convicted 
a sex trafficker for forcing a 13-year-old girl to engage in commercial 
sex acts with foreign clients. The trafficker also forced the victim to 
consume drugs to establish greater control over her; the government 
provided detoxification treatment to the victim to address drug 
dependence. In 2020, the government did not prosecute or convict 
any labor traffickers; in 2019, the government prosecuted just one 
labor trafficker, under Article 189. 
Officials reported pandemic-related mitigation measures strained 
law enforcement capacity and limited the resources available for 
anti-trafficking efforts. The government charged law enforcement 
officials, including trafficking investigators, with enforcing the closure 
of Costa Rica’s land borders; these reassignments, in combination 
with funding shortages, restricted law enforcement officials’ 
ability to conduct regular monitoring and anti-trafficking patrols. 
However, the government employed new investigative techniques 
during the reporting period, in part to mitigate the limitations on 
law enforcement activity during the pandemic; in its first use of 
wiretapping in a trafficking investigation, the government acquired 
key evidence to support a series of raids, where authorities arrested 
12 suspected traffickers and identified 40 trafficking victims. 
The government did not report any new investigations, prosecutions, 
or convictions of government employees complicit in human 
trafficking offenses; however, at least two previously reported cases 
involving complicit officials remained ongoing during the reporting 
period. In one such case, prosecutors appealed a 2019 ruling in 
which courts acquitted a public official of trafficking and convicted 
the official of a lesser charge. In another, authorities continued 
to investigate 12 public officials accused in 2018 of facilitating 
trafficking victims’ entry into Costa Rica. The government did not 
provide updates on a third ongoing case, first investigated in 2011, 
involving a local mayor indicted for establishing a trafficking ring. 
The government continued to investigate and prosecute individuals 
who paid child trafficking victims for commercial sex, resulting in 
one conviction in 2020, compared with four convictions in 2019 
and 22 in 2018.
From March until October 2020, courts only adjudicated “emergency” 
or “urgent” cases under pandemic restrictions. Due to these limitations 
and the judicial sector’s chronic backlog of cases, the government 
reported delays in processing all cases, including trafficking cases. The 
Supreme Court had a judicial branch action plan with a dedicated 
budget, developed in 2018 to build capacity and raise public 
awareness on how to identify trafficking, but the government did not 
implement the plan in 2020 due to a technicality that blocked access 
to funding. The government provided five trainings on investigating 
and prosecuting human trafficking cases to 108 law enforcement 
officials, prosecutors, immigration officials, and labor officials; officials 
conducted all but one training virtually. An unknown number of 
public officials attended virtual trainings offered by international 
and civil society organizations. Government officials reported the 
pandemic and related restrictions impeded planned trainings for 
2020. Because law enforcement officials supported anti-trafficking 
efforts on short rotations, limited training during the pandemic may 
have reduced new officials’ familiarity with trafficking indicators and 
other critical information. Institutional capacity to combat human 
trafficking varied across the country, with national-level officials 
demonstrating greater familiarity with trafficking than municipal 
counterparts. The Attorney General’s Office reported collaborating 
with Mexican officials on three cases involving human trafficking.
PROTECTION
The government maintained victim protection efforts. The government 
identified 50 trafficking victims (20 women, 24 girls, six boys), 
compared with 35 in 2019 and 20 in 2018. The government reported 
identifying one transgender victim; it did not report identifying any 
adult male victims. Traffickers exploited 23 of these victims in sex 
trafficking and 13 in labor trafficking, including forced begging; the 
government did not identify the form of trafficking experienced for 
14 victims. Of the 50 newly identified victims, at least 32 were Costa 
Rican nationals, 17 were Nicaraguan, and one was Panamanian. 
Thirty victims were children; of this group, 14 were children exploited 
alongside a parent or guardian. 
Through the Immediate Response Team (ERI), a specialized inter-
institutional body within the National Coalition against Illicit 
Smuggling and Trafficking of Migrants (CONATT), the government 
provided initial services to all 50 reported victims. The Office of 
Attention and Protection of Crime Victims, which served victims 
of all crimes, reported providing services to 75 trafficking victims, 
including several victims identified in previous years, compared 
with serving 48 victims in 2019. The National Women’s Institute 
(INAMU) provided services to 47 female victims of trafficking in 2020, 
compared with providing care to 31 female victims of trafficking in 
2019. Some victims may have received services from more than one 
provider. Specialized law enforcement units and national immigration 
authorities used written procedures for identifying victims among 
vulnerable groups, such as migrants and individuals in commercial 
sex, and referred identified victims to CONATT to coordinate service 
provision. Public officials used the “Institutional Protocol for the 
Care of Minors and Survivors of Trafficking in Persons” and the 
“Interagency Manual of Attention of Minors in Sexual Trafficking, 
Child Labor, and Dangerous Work” which established the steps 
officials must take when identifying a possible case of trafficking. 
The government could provide victims with access to health care 
providers, psychological services, legal counsel, financial aid, law 
enforcement liaison, and other services, including detoxification 
treatment, for up to three years. CONATT coordinated emergency, 
short-term, and long-term assistance for victims. ERI arranged short-
term services for newly identified victims, including shelter, food, 
and medical care. CONATT favored housing victims in a network 
of government safe houses but also placed victims in a safe house 
operated by civil society, or a longer-term shelter for women and 
children. Authorities infrequently referred victims to NGO facilities. 
Until December 2020, CONATT managed an emergency shelter 
dedicated to trafficking victims within its headquarters in San Jose; 
however, the agency relocated within the city due to budget constraints 
and did not have a shelter at its new site. As a result, there were no 
trafficking-specific shelter facilities in the country. The government 
did not have shelters for male victims, although the safe house 
network could accommodate male trafficking victims on a case-
by-case basis. The government assisted child victims through the 
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national child welfare institution (PANI), which had a network of 
shelters for children and could place girl victims with an NGO facility 
that could provide long-term shelter. CONATT designated one of its 
constituent agencies to oversee services provision on a rotating basis. 
The designated agency had the discretion to refer victims to services 
based on individual needs; not all victims received the same level 
of protection. Civil society organizations reported authorities did 
not always implement referral mechanisms in an effective or timely 
manner and recommended the government provide transportation 
for victims to institutions providing assistance. The National Anti-
Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants Fund (FONATT) 
disbursed 7.41 million colones ($12,170) to provide services for 
identified victims, a significant decrease from the 172 million colones 
($282,380) reported in 2019 and 429.6 million colones ($705,300) 
in 2018. The government attributed the decrease to sharp budget 
limitations during the pandemic and government-wide financial 
austerity measures. The government allocated 7.42 million colones 
($12,180) in additional funding to cover expenses stemming from 
emergency service provision and initial contact and care for potential 
victims. PANI continued to provide direct funding and a per-victim 
subsidy for identified victims to an NGO-run shelter for child victims. 
The government did not report the total funding it allocated in 
2020 to NGOs providing services to trafficking victims; in 2019, this 
funding amounted to 171.5 million colones ($281,560). Observers 
reported failure to disburse all of the allocated resources hindered 
the country’s ability to address its trafficking problem, despite 
dedicated government resources to anti-trafficking efforts, including 
victim services. 
Costa Rican law allowed victims to obtain temporary residency 
status and work permits, leave the country, file civil suits against their 
traffickers, and provide testimony outside of court proceedings. The 
government issued 11 new temporary residence or work permits to 
trafficking victims in 2020 and continued annual renewals of existing 
permits issued in previous years. Victims could testify outside of 
court proceedings; in 2020, two human trafficking victims utilized 
this provision. The government did not facilitate the repatriation 
of any foreign victims exploited in Costa Rica, compared with two 
victims in 2019 and two in 2018. It did, however, receive three Costa 
Rican trafficking victims repatriated after facing exploitation abroad. 
CONATT offered trafficking awareness and victim identification 
trainings, primarily virtually, for officials in a range of agencies, 
including DGME, the social security administration, and the Ministry 
of Justice and Peace; international organizations provided educational 
materials or otherwise supported some of these trainings.
PREVENTION
The government significantly decreased prevention efforts, primarily 
due to funding limitations. CONATT, chaired by DGME, integrated 
and coordinated anti-trafficking efforts among 22 public institutions, 
key NGOs, and international organizations, and maintained sub-
commissions focused on attention to victims, prevention, justice, 
investigation and analysis, and project management. CONATT met 
periodically to review progress in the areas of research, protection, 
prevention, and prosecution; during the pandemic, it maintained 
interagency coordination via virtual meetings and telework. CONATT 
presented a quarterly public report on its accomplishments. The 
Government Council reviewed the draft 2020-2030 national action 
plan but did not approve it by the end of the reporting period. 
Through the FONATT, the government reported 620.45 million 
colones ($1.02 million) of anti-trafficking expenditures in 2020, 
compared with 1.4 billion colones ($2.3 million) in 2019. The 
government primarily financed its anti-trafficking activities through 
the FONATT, but bureaucratic hurdles continued to stymie execution 
of these funds; in 2020, the government disbursed just 13 percent 
of FONATT funds, down from 77 percent in 2019. In August 2020, a 
government decree enacted emergency austerity measures, cutting the 
FONATT budget by approximately 60 percent; these measures did not 
specifically target anti-trafficking funding, but impacted other entities 
working to combat trafficking, including DGME and CONATT. The 
government funded the FONATT primarily through a national exit 
tax; consequently, funding for anti-trafficking efforts fluctuated with 
travel to and from Costa Rica, which sharply decreased due to the 
pandemic. The government did not report any funding allocated to 
prevention programming in 2020, compared to 171.5 million colones 
($281,560) for prevention programming and 1.37 billion colones 
($2.25 million) for other anti-trafficking events and projects in 2019. 
Funding shortages also prevented the government from making 
its usual trafficking-specific allocations to DGME, the Ministry of 
Public Education, and other agencies. The government engaged in 
limited awareness-raising activities during the reporting period; the 
government attributed reduced programming to pandemic-related 
restrictions on in-person gatherings. Officials worked to expand social 
media usage and offer virtual events, such as a live broadcast that 
reached 9,700 people. OIJ operated two hotlines to receive confidential 
criminal complaints but did not report the number of calls related 
to potential trafficking cases in 2020; there were approximately 100 
calls in 2018. The Judiciary Police also operated the 9-1-1 hotline 
available for general crime reporting but did not specifically report 
receiving trafficking calls through that mechanism. 
In past years, the government educated labor recruiters for 
international and domestic businesses about the consequences of 
violating the anti-trafficking regulations but did not report doing 
so, or investigating or penalizing any labor recruiters for illegal 
practices that contribute to trafficking in 2020. The government 
promoted an international code of conduct related to commercial 
sexual exploitation in the travel and tourism industry; it collaborated 
with civil society to offer two in-person trainings for tourism sector 
staff on identifying and referring trafficking victims. The government 
did not report efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts 
in 2020. In addition to prosecuting and convicting individuals that 
paid child trafficking victims for commercial sex, the government 
made efforts to reduce the demand for participation in international 
sex tourism by working with international partners to deny entry to 
24 foreign-registered sex offenders who attempted to travel to Costa 
Rica as tourists in 2020. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
 As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Costa Rica, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Costa Rica abroad. Traffickers subject Costa Rican women and children 
to sex trafficking within the country, with those living in the Pacific 
coastal zones and near the northern and southern borders being 
particularly vulnerable. Authorities suspect that adults use children 
to transport or sell drugs; some of these children may be trafficking 
victims. Traffickers exploit LGBTQI+ persons, including transgender 
persons, in sex trafficking. Women and girls from Nicaragua, the 
Dominican Republic, and other Latin American countries have been 
identified in Costa Rica as victims of sex trafficking and domestic 
servitude. Traffickers subject migrant adults and children, primarily 
from Nicaragua, to forced labor in agriculture and domestic service or 
to sex trafficking. Criminal organizations recruit and coerce homeless 
individuals to smuggle contraband into prisons for the purpose of 
further criminal activity. Traffickers prey on migrants, some en route 
to the Unites States, from other Central American countries; the 
Caribbean; China; and South America. Indigenous Panamanians are 
vulnerable to forced labor in Costa Rica’s agricultural sector. Child 
sex tourism is a serious problem, with child sex tourists arriving 
mostly from the United States and Europe.
COTE D’IVOIRE: TIER 2
The Government of Cote d’Ivoire does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 









impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Cote d’Ivoire remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
establishing new specialized police units to investigate child labor and 
child trafficking across the country, training more law enforcement 
and judicial officials on the anti-trafficking law, referring identified 
victims to care, and increasing financial and in-kind support to NGOs 
providing services to trafficking victims. However, the government 
did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. The 
government continued to use pimping and illegal mining statutes 
to prosecute trafficking cases, which carried lesser penalties than 
the anti-trafficking law. The government identified fewer trafficking 
victims, and shelter services for adult victims remained inadequate. 
The government did not allocate dedicated resources to the anti-
trafficking committee.






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Using the 2016 anti-trafficking law, increase efforts to investigate, 
prosecute, and convict traffickers, following due process, including 
complicit officials, and apply significant prison terms as prescribed 
by law to those convicted. • Train law enforcement and judicial 
officials on how to identify, investigate, and prosecute trafficking 
cases under the 2016 anti-trafficking law, including the difference 
between pimping and sex trafficking. • Increase funding and in-
kind resources, as feasible, for the police anti-trafficking units to 
investigate trafficking cases nationwide and delineate responsibilities 
between the units. • Standardize existing procedures used to identify 
potential trafficking victims to include adults and victims among 
vulnerable populations, and train law enforcement, labor inspectors, 
and other officials on the revised procedures. • Establish and train 
officials on a standardized victim referral mechanism for use across 
ministries to ensure all trafficking victims receive services. • Adopt 
and implement a new anti-trafficking national action plan; clearly 
delineate responsibilities for activities under the plan and fund its 
implementation. • Increase funding to expand shelter and services 
for trafficking victims, including adults. • Direct labor inspectors 
to increase inspections in the informal sector to help detect forced 
labor conditions. • Actively monitor agencies and intermediaries 
that recruit Ivoirians for work abroad and investigate allegations of 
fraudulent recruitment. • Improve nationwide data collection on 
anti-trafficking law enforcement and victim identification efforts.
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. Law No. 2016-
111 on the Fight Against Trafficking in Persons criminalized sex 
trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of five to 
10 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 5 million to 10 million West 
African CFA francs (FCFA) ($9,450-$18,900) for adult trafficking, and 
20 to 30 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 10 million to 50 million 
FCFA ($18,900-$94,520) for child trafficking. These penalties were 
sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate 
with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. The 
2010 Child Trafficking and Child Labor Law remained the primary 
law used to prosecute child trafficking, and it criminalized child sex 
trafficking and labor trafficking with 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment 
and a fine of 5 million to 20 million FCFA ($9,450-$37,810). The 
government used penal code provisions on illegal mining and pimping 
to prosecute trafficking cases during the reporting period. The penal 
code prescribed penalties of one to five years’ imprisonment and a 
fine of 1 million to 10 million FCFA ($1,890-$18,900) for pimping 
and penalties of two to five years’ imprisonment and a fine of 50 
million to 100 million FCFA ($94,520-$189,040) for illegal mining. 
These penalties were significantly lower than those prescribed under 
the trafficking law.
The government diverted law enforcement from anti-trafficking 
activities to enforce pandemic mitigation measures and travel 
restrictions, and courts operated at a reduced capacity. Despite 
the pandemic’s impact, the government investigated at least 18 
cases, prosecuted 25 alleged traffickers, and convicted 12 traffickers 
under trafficking laws and penal code provisions on illegal mining 
and pimping during the reporting period. This compared to 191 
investigations, prosecution of 35 alleged traffickers, and conviction 
of 12 traffickers in the previous reporting period. Judges sentenced 10 
defendants to prison sentences ranging from six months to 10 years 
with fines ranging from 100,000 FCFA ($189) to 10 million FCFA 
($18,900). Two convicted traffickers received no prison sentence or 
a fully suspended sentence. Some judges and prosecutors remained 
unaware of the 2016 law and continued to use the 2010 law and illegal 
mining and pimping statutes to prosecute trafficking cases, which 
carried lesser penalties. The court convicted six out of 12 traffickers 
using pimping statutes during the reporting period. The 2016 anti-
trafficking law and related penal code provisions also criminalized 
the knowing solicitation and patronization of a sex trafficking victim; 
the government reported three prosecutions and three convictions of 
such cases during the reporting period, compared to prosecuting 15 
such cases and obtaining convictions in 11 cases during the previous 
reporting period. The government did not report continuing any 
prosecutions from the previous reporting period. The government 
did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions 
of government officials complicit in human trafficking offenses; 
however, official corruption and complicity in trafficking crimes 
remained concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action during the 
year. Observers alleged police on the borders with Mali and Burkina 
Faso facilitated child trafficking during the reporting period, taking 
bribes at checkpoints along bus routes from non-Ivoirian passengers, 
including potential child forced labor victims en route to exploitation 
on cocoa plantations. As detailed in a previous reporting period, 
five gendarmes and two military firefighters allegedly abducted a 
trafficking victim from an NGO shelter in 2018; a military tribunal 
sentenced four of the gendarmes and military firefighters to 50 
days in military jail in August 2019 as an administrative sanction 
for unbecoming conduct. A subsequent prosecutions of four of the 
gendarmes and one of the military firefighters for kidnapping of a 
minor, forced confinement, and attempted rape was pending before 
a military judge at the end of the reporting period. 
Limited funding and resources for law enforcement created serious 
gaps in the government’s ability to address human trafficking. The 
Sub-Directorate in the Fight against Trafficking and Child Labor 
(SDLTEDJ, the Sub-Directorate, or anti-trafficking unit) bore primary 
responsibility for enforcing anti-trafficking laws and investigating 
cases throughout the country, although it only had staff in Abidjan. 
In June 2020, the government established six special police units 
under the Sub-Directorate across the country to investigate child 
labor and child trafficking cases; each unit had 10-20 officers with 
two motorcycles, a four-wheel drive vehicle, computers, and office 
materials. The units received specialized training in Abidjan before 
deploying to six locations where child trafficking and child labor were 
prevalent. The new units successfully conducted several anti-trafficking 
operations, including one in February 2021 that identified 19 potential 
child trafficking victims. The gendarmes under the Ministry of 
Defense were responsible for investigations in rural areas where the 
Sub-Directorate was not present. Funding levels for law enforcement 
activities remained severely inadequate. Resource limitations also 
constrained the Brigade Mondaine—the unit responsible for 
investigating prostitution and sex trafficking—to Abidjan and a 
few regional precincts. The Transnational Organized Crime Unit 
(UCT) had national jurisdiction over transnational organized crime, 
including a specialized human trafficking department. The Sub-




trafficking, and Brigade Mondaine for sex trafficking; however, the 
units lacked coordination, and no unit had a clear responsibility for 
internal adult labor trafficking. Authorities outside Abidjan lacked 
training to identify and investigate trafficking. 
The government conducted trainings for 176 law enforcement and 
judicial officials, an increase from 129 officials trained during the 
previous reporting period. In coordination with a foreign donor and 
international organization, the government organized three training 
sessions for 108 judges, magistrates, prosecutors, police, and ministry 
officials on the 2016 anti-trafficking law, victim identification and 
protection, investigative techniques, and cross-agency collaboration. 
The government organized an additional three trainings for 68 officials 
from the UCT, Sub-Directorate, Brigade Mondaine, and Airport Anti-
Trafficking Cell (CAAT) in coordination with a foreign donor; topics 
included national and international anti-trafficking legal frameworks, 
distinctions between human trafficking and migrant smuggling, and 
investigative and prosecutorial procedures. The government continued 
to meet virtually with Tunisian authorities to exchange information 
on victim support and law enforcement networks. 
PROTECTION
The government decreased efforts to identify victims but maintained 
protection efforts. During the reporting period, the government 
identified 302 trafficking victims, compared with at least 738 
trafficking victims identified among 1,157 potential victims during 
the previous reporting period. Of these, the government identified 19 
children and 283 adults; this included 27 Ivoirian and 275 foreign 
trafficking victims from Burkina Faso, Gabon, Mali, Morocco, Nigeria, 
and Togo. Media reported police identified 19 Burkinabe children en 
route to potential exploitation on cocoa plantations or in artisanal 
mines and three Burkinabe child forced labor victims. 
The government began developing a national referral mechanism with 
the assistance of an international organization and foreign donor, 
which remained pending at the end of the reporting period. While the 
government did not have formal mechanisms to proactively identify 
trafficking victims and refer them to care, the UCT, Brigade Mondaine, 
and Sub-Directorate had operational procedures to refer victims to 
care. Government ministries lacked coordination, which in some cases 
hindered the provision of services. During the reporting period, the 
government referred adult victims to NGO-operated shelters and child 
victims to government and NGO-operated shelters. The government 
provided food, medical care, psycho-social support, and transportation 
to some victims, including 138 children exploited in forced labor 
and 15 adults exploited in sex trafficking identified in February 2020. 
Despite the lack of a formal referral mechanism, in practice, officials 
referred trafficking victims to one of 90 government-run social centers 
for victims of abuse to receive psychological care and then to NGOs 
for shelter and further services. The government also placed children 
with foster families and used orphanages or its 36 special education 
centers to temporarily shelter women and child trafficking victims 
when necessary. Due to the pandemic, the government-run shelter 
for child victims of exploitation in Soubre operated at reduced 
capacity and the government referred all child trafficking victims 
identified during the reporting period to NGOs for long-term care. 
There was no government-run shelter that could accommodate adult 
victims. The Ministry of Family Women and Children reported it 
allocated 100 million FCFA ($189,040) in financial assistance and 
50 million FCFA ($94,520) in in-kind support, including clothing, 
food, and hygiene kits, to NGOs serving child trafficking victims 
during the reporting period. Despite this, NGOs reported government 
support for victim protection and services remained inadequate, 
and in many cases, NGOs funded and provided the majority of 
victim care. NGOs also reported the government closed food and 
medical assistance centers for portions of the reporting period due 
to the pandemic. The lack of services, especially for adults, and lack 
of reintegration assistance rendered many victims vulnerable to 
re-victimization. Foreign victims reportedly had the same access to 
care as domestic victims. However, the government did not report 
providing temporary or permanent residency to foreign victims who 
faced hardship or retribution in their countries of origin. In some 
cases, the government depended on foreign victims’ home embassies 
to provide shelter and care prior to repatriation; the Nigerian and 
Moroccan embassies assisted their citizens identified as trafficking 
victims during the reporting period. The government collaborated 
with international organizations to facilitate the repatriation of 13 
Ivoirian child trafficking victims from Ghana and 17 victims from 
other countries not specified by the government. The government 
also assisted in repatriating 16 Nigerian women and two Togolese 
women during the reporting period. 
Ivoirian law required the government to provide protection and 
assistance to victims who participated in investigations or trials 
against their traffickers; the government did not report whether 
any victims received this assistance during the reporting period. In 
December 2018, the government approved a law protecting victim 
and witness testimony by establishing a bureau to coordinate victim-
witness protection issues and develop a case management system for 
individuals; the government approved the implementing decree to 
establish the bureau in December 2020. Trafficking victims could file 
civil suits against their traffickers, but many victims were not aware 
of this option. A sex trafficking victim reportedly filed a civil suit 
against her trafficker and a court awarded her 300,000 FCFA ($567) 
in damages. There were no reports the government detained, fined, or 
jailed victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit; 
however, due to the lack of formal identification procedures for adult 
trafficking victims and victims among vulnerable populations, some 
victims may have remained unidentified within the law enforcement 
system. International organizations reported border agents sometimes 
denied entry to foreign nationals, including potential victims, without 
screening for human trafficking. Law enforcement officials reportedly 
only screened individuals in commercial sex for trafficking when 
detaining or arresting them. The government did not partner with 
NGOs to screen for victims.
PREVENTION
The government modestly increased efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
interagency Anti-Trafficking Committee (CNLTP) led anti-trafficking 
prevention efforts, including implementation of the 2016-2020 anti-
trafficking national action plan, with the assistance of foreign donors. 
The government did not allocate a budget to implement the national 
action plan for the second consecutive year. The government had a 
2019-2021 action plan to combat child labor and trafficking with 
a three-year budget of over 76 billion FCFA ($143.7 million). The 
Oversight Committee to Combat Child Trafficking and the Worst 
Forms of Child Labor (CNS) and the Inter-Ministerial Committee 
in the Fight Against Child Trafficking, Child Exploitation, and Child 
Labor (CIM) continued to coordinate efforts to combat child labor 
and child trafficking. CNS oversaw CIM and conducted monitoring 
and evaluation activities. Observers reported coordination between 
the three bodies improved during the reporting period, although 
increased collaboration and dedicated resources were still needed 
for the CNLTP to be fully effective. Despite postponing several 
trainings and events due to the pandemic, the government funded 
and carried out five anti-trafficking awareness events in collaboration 
with international organizations, an increase compared to two events 
during the previous reporting period. This included an event in July 
2020 with 250 participants from youth and women’s associations, 
religious leaders, and traditional leaders on human trafficking 
indicators and vulnerability of economic migrants. The labor code 
regulated labor recruitment and labor migration in the formal sector 
but did not extend to the informal sector, including domestic work, 
which increased some migrant workers’ vulnerability to trafficking. 
In 2020, labor inspectors conducted limited inspections of the 
informal sector—where most children worked—but did not identify 
child forced labor cases through these inspections. The government 
continued to operate a hotline for child protection and human 
rights, which received 43,456 calls in 2020. The Sub-Directorate is 









minors; the government did not report identifying any child trafficking 
victims or initiating trafficking investigations from the hotline. 
In September 2020, the government established two inter-ministerial 
commissions to adjudicate claims for statelessness, intending to 
process status for approximately 16,000 people living in the country 
without identity documents and therefore vulnerable to trafficking. 
However, the commissions had not begun adjudicating claims by the 
end of the reporting period. The government did not demonstrate 
efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government 
did not provide anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Cote d’Ivoire, and traffickers exploit victims 
from Cote d’Ivoire abroad. The majority of victims identified are 
children; due to a stronger emphasis on combating internal child 
trafficking, the prevalence of adult trafficking may be underreported. 
Traffickers exploit Ivoirian women and girls in forced labor in 
domestic service and restaurants and in sex trafficking. Traffickers also 
exploit Ivoirian boys in forced labor in the agricultural and service 
industries, especially cocoa production. West African boys, especially 
Burkinabe, may be forced into labor in agriculture (on cocoa, coffee, 
pineapple, cashew, and rubber plantations, and in animal herding) 
and in mining, carpentry, construction, and begging in Cote d’Ivoire. 
Traffickers often operate in well-established networks consisting of 
both Ivoirians and foreigners and, in cases of transnational trafficking, 
use social media, making networks difficult for law enforcement to 
detect. In 2018, authorities estimated there were more than 2,000 
Ivoirian, Burkinabe, Malian, Nigerien, and Senegalese talibés (students 
in Quranic schools) in northern and central Cote d’Ivoire and that 
corrupt teachers force many of them to beg; authorities have not 
provided an updated statistic since 2018. NGOs and officials report 
drug traffickers use children—some of whom may be forced—to 
sell and traffic drugs in restaurants and nightclubs. Some Beninese 
and Togolese workers migrate to Cote d’Ivoire for construction and 
carpentry work and bring children, whom they exploit in domestic 
servitude. Traffickers—commonly distant relatives—bring girls from 
rural Cote d’Ivoire and other West African countries to Abidjan 
ostensibly to go to school or receive professional training but subject 
them to domestic servitude. Ghanaian, Moroccan, and Nigerian 
traffickers recruit women and girls from Ghana, Morocco, and Nigeria 
for waitressing jobs but subject them to sex trafficking in restaurants 
or massage parlors; some victims believe they are transiting Cote 
d’Ivoire en route to Europe. Nigerian traffickers increasingly exploit 
Nigerian women and girls in sex trafficking in Cote d’Ivoire’s northern 
and western mining regions, including near gold mines in Tengrela. 
Nigerian traffickers bring Nigerian children to northern Cote d’Ivoire 
for domestic servitude. Nigerian victims transit Cote d’Ivoire en route 
to exploitation in sex trafficking in Asia, the United Arab Emirates, 
and North Africa. Chinese traffickers have in the past forced Chinese 
women into commercial sex in Cote d’Ivoire.
Some Ivoirian community and religious leaders, possibly working in 
concert with others abroad, reportedly recruit Ivoirian women and 
girls for work in the Middle East and Europe. While much of this is 
for legitimate employment, some women and girls are subjected to 
forced labor in Europe, North Africa, and Gulf countries, primarily 
Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia. Traffickers exploit 
men and boys in forced labor on farms in Tunisia, often promising 
the men well-paying jobs and the boys the opportunity to play 
soccer. Officials identified an uptick in Ivoirian migrants in Libya 
and Tunisia who were vulnerable to trafficking. An international 
organization reported an increase in Ivorian migrant women and 
unaccompanied children arriving in Italy; an NGO reported traffickers 
sexually exploited many of the women in Libya prior to their arrival 
in Italy. Authorities have also noted an increase in male trafficking 
victims among migrants to Europe. Migrants commonly depart 
from Daloa and proceed via airplane to Tunisia, or overland via 
Mali and Algeria to Libya, or, to a lesser extent, via Niger to Libya. 
In Tunisia—specifically Sfax and Grand Tunis—intermediaries 
confiscate migrants’ identity documents until they can pay for the 
next leg of their journey, creating vulnerabilities to trafficking. During 
the previous reporting period, the Tunisian government, NGOs, and 
international organizations identified an estimated 1,470 Ivoirian 
potential trafficking victims in Tunisia, approximately 80 percent 
of the total trafficking victims identified in Tunisia. International 
organizations and Ivoirian law enforcement agencies reported Ivoirian 
migrant smuggling networks based in Tunisia increasingly became 
involved in trafficking as European governments blocked migration 
inflows and that these networks also coerced Ivoirians to engage in 
criminal acts, including drug smuggling. Ivoirian irregular migrants 
in Algeria are vulnerable to trafficking due to their irregular status. In 
2018, French authorities disbanded an Ivoirian trafficking network 
linked to Daloa that provided Ivoirian children with fake documents 
and facilitated their travel to France through Libya and Italy. Kuwaiti 
employers increasingly recruit domestic workers from Cote d’Ivoire 
who may be vulnerable to domestic servitude in Kuwait. Authorities 
previously identified Ivoirian trafficking victims in Cyprus, France, 
Iraq, Israel, Italy, Morocco, and the United Kingdom. 
CROATIA: TIER 2
The Government of Croatia does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Croatia remained on Tier 2. These efforts included adopting 
a protocol on data exchange and continuing to provide robust 
training for police. A municipal civil court issued a trafficking victim 
compensation for the first time, and the government extended 
temporary residence permits due to the pandemic. Civil society 
reported helpful cooperation with the Ministry of Interior (MOI), 
and the government included representatives from the judiciary in 
the national committee. However, the government did not meet the 
minimum standards in several key areas. The government investigated 
and prosecuted fewer suspects and did not convict any new traffickers 
under the trafficking article. The government identified fewer victims, 
and some judges continued to require victims to provide multiple 
statements or testimonies causing re-traumatization, while prosecutors 
often charged traffickers with lesser offenses. The MOI investigated 
the continued allegations of pushbacks and excessive use of force 
on the border and charged two police officers in June 2020, but 
according to some observers, the government continued to lack 
adequate screening efforts for irregular migrants and asylum seekers, 
which discouraged victims from cooperating and self-identifying. 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, and sentence 
convicted traffickers to significant prison terms. • Enhance screening 
procedures for irregular migration flows, including asylum seekers and 
unaccompanied children. • Further increase capacity and training to 
accurately screen for victims and continue to consistently implement 
screening procedures for vulnerable populations, particularly irregular 
migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, and seasonal workers. • Train 
CROATIA
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judges at all levels of the judiciary to take the severity of trafficking 
into account when issuing sentences and sensitize judges on victim-
centered approaches. • Continue to allocate and disburse sufficient 
resources to NGO-run shelters and NGOs participating in the mobile 
identification teams. • Train prosecutors on trafficking, victims’ 
rights, and victim-centered approaches. • Continue to encourage 
victim participation in investigations and prosecutions by providing 
alternative methods to testify, including remote testimony or funding 
for travel and other expenses for victims to attend court hearings. • 
Further reduce the judiciary’s backlog of cases, including trafficking 
cases. 
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. Article 106 of 
the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed penalties of one to 15 years’ imprisonment, which 
were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, 
commensurate with those for serious crimes, such as rape. Law 
enforcement investigated 15 cases with 29 suspects (19 cases with 31 
suspects in 2019). Prosecutors indicted eight defendants in five cases 
(26 defendants in 13 cases in 2019) and continued to prosecute 32 
defendants in 16 ongoing cases (27 defendants in ongoing cases in 
2019). Courts did not convict any new traffickers, but a higher court 
confirmed one forced labor conviction from 2019 (four traffickers 
convicted in 2019; one for sex trafficking, one for labor trafficking, 
and two for forced criminality). The higher court issued the trafficker 
a non-appealable sentence of two years’ imprisonment, compared 
with courts issuing two traffickers an appealable sentence of two years’ 
imprisonment and two traffickers an appealable, partially-suspended 
sentence of two years and eight months’ in 2019. The government 
used child pandering (Article 162 of the criminal code) to convict 
some suspected traffickers; courts convicted two perpetrators for child 
pandering in 2020. Some court proceedings lasted years. contributing 
to a substantial backlog of criminal cases, including trafficking cases 
dating as far back as 2013. The government effectively closed most 
courts from March 2020 to June 2020 due to pandemic lockdown 
measures. As such, judges reported an increased influx of new cases 
to the existing backlog and delayed court proceedings as witnesses, 
defendants, or attorneys tested positive for COVID-19. Additionally, 
two earthquakes in 2020 destroyed or damaged multiple courts, 
including Zagreb County Court and several courts located in Sisak-
Moslavina county, further delaying court proceedings. Croatian 
law did not permit virtual trials for first instance courts and only 
permitted virtual trials in limited circumstances for appellate courts.
Law enforcement personnel under the MOI conducted proactive 
investigations of commercial sex establishments and cooperated with 
the State Labor Inspectorate to jointly inspect 144 employers in the 
agriculture, construction, hospitality, and service industries (116 in 
2019); most inspections resulted in administrative labor violations 
involving contracts, permits, and salaries rather than labor trafficking 
prosecutions. Civil society representatives and government officials 
reported the MOI accurately and consistently identified victims and 
noted good cooperation. GRETA and other sources reported some 
judges and prosecutors lacked an understanding of trafficking and 
often prosecuted traffickers using offenses with lesser sentences, such 
as prostitution, assault, sexual abuse, and pandering. Similarly, some 
prosecutors charged individuals suspected of trafficking with other 
or lesser offenses that were easier to prove to decrease their large 
caseloads. Prosecutors heavily relied on victim testimony and did 
not often use special investigative measures to corroborate evidence; 
while some judges in past years issued lenient sentences by liberally 
applying mitigating circumstances, the absence of convictions 
during the reporting period made it difficult to assess whether the 
practice persisted. The government maintained institutionalized 
training programs on various trafficking issues at the Police Academy, 
Police College, Judicial Academy, and Border Police Directorate. The 
government provided virtual and in-person trainings for at least 
1,372 police officers, but all four trainings for judges and prosecutors 
were temporarily canceled or postponed due to the pandemic. The 
government did not share information on international investigations 
due to confidentiality protections. The government did not report any 
investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government officials 
complicit in trafficking offenses.
PROTECTION
The government maintained victim protection efforts. The government 
identified 17 victims in 2020 (25 victims in 2019). Of these, three 
were victims of sex trafficking, five of forced labor, one of both sex 
trafficking and forced labor, seven of forced criminality, and one 
of “imposing slavery” (in 2019, 13 were victims of sex trafficking, 
three of forced labor, seven of forced criminality, one of both forced 
labor and forced criminality, and one of “imposing slavery”); seven 
were children (16 children in 2019); seven females and 10 males 
(17 females and eight males in 2019); and one foreign victim (three 
foreign victims in 2019). The government maintained standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) for screening and identifying victims 
and published a protocol on identification, assistance, and protection 
of victims. Civil society, media, and GRETA continued to report a lack 
of government efforts to adequately screen irregular migrants and 
asylum seekers, including unaccompanied children. International 
organizations criticized the government for violent pushbacks of 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers into Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and Serbia, while civil society and media alleged border police abused 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers, including one allegation of 
sexual abuse. International and civil society organizations claimed 
these practices strongly discouraged victims from self-identifying or 
cooperating with authorities. However, the MOI reported conducting 
internal investigations for all claims of abuse and UNHCR reported 
accusations were hard to verify as migrants wanted to move quickly 
through Croatia and were inaccessible for follow-up investigations. 
The MOI investigated 60 cases of alleged pushbacks and excessive use 
of force in 2019 and 2020 and fired and charged two Karlovac-based 
police officers in June 2020 over the assault of an Afghan asylum seeker. 
A multidisciplinary national referral mechanism (NRM) provided 
SOPs for identifying and referring victims to services. According to 
the NRM, first responders carried out the preliminary identification 
of potential victims and contacted one of four regional mobile teams 
consisting of social workers from a Center for Social Work and NGO 
representatives, who traveled to assess potential adult victims in person 
and coordinated victim care and placement. For child victims, first 
responders contacted the Ministry of Labor, Pension System, Family 
and Social Policy (MLPSFSP), who dispatched a mobile team of 
specialized social workers. The MOI cooperated with mobile teams 
to officially identify victims and included specialized police officers 
for potential child victims. Officials reported the mobile team for 
child victims functioned well, but NGOs participating in the mobile 
team for adults had not been reimbursed for expenses related to 
the use of their private vehicles for official travel. Sources reported 
difficulties in recruiting new NGO members into the mobile team 
due to the financial burden and that the one-day training for new 
team members was inadequate to learn the complex process of 
identifying victims. The government approved and allocated 170,000 
Croatian kunas ($28,570) to reimburse travel costs for mobile teams 
but, according to participating NGOs, Office for Human Rights and 
Rights of National Minorities (OHRRNM) did not reimburse invoices 
in a timely manner. 
The government and NGOs provided victims protection and 
assistance, including shelter, medical assistance, legal assistance, 
psycho-social support, rehabilitation, reintegration services, and, 
during the pandemic, personal protective equipment and COVID-19 
tests; three adults and five children received assistance in 2020 (two 
adults and 16 children in 2019). The government funded two NGO-
run shelters, one for adults and one providing specialized support for 
children, and the Center for Missing and Exploited Children provided 
a range of educational and psychosocial services for unaccompanied 
and exploited children, including child trafficking victims; these 






adults and three children in 2019). The government-funded, NGO-
run shelter for adults allowed freedom of movement and provided 
separate accommodation for men and women, where they could 
stay for up to one year with the possibility of an extension. The 
government-funded, NGO-run shelter for children had the capacity 
to accommodate five child victims and could enroll children into 
school, including distance learning. The government continued its 
efforts to implement foster care for the custody of children instead 
of using state childcare institutions. MLPSFSP did not organize 
any foster families for child victims in 2020 (three child victims 
in 2019) and appointed special caregivers for three children (five 
children in 2019). MDFYSP organized trainings for foster families 
and special caregivers and required them to maintain a license, but 
officials reported a shortage in the number of foster families and 
special caregivers to fully support the increasing number of child 
victims. The Croatian Employment Bureau (HZZ) maintained special 
coordinators in regional and branch offices, who assisted victims 
in finding employment and worked with businesses to employ 
victims; HZZ did not assist any victims in 2020. MLPSFSP allocated 
funding for NGO-run shelters based on the number of assisted 
victims. It allocated 216,590 kunas ($36,400) to support the NGO-
run shelter for adults, compared with 457,000 kunas ($76,800) in 
2019. Additionally, MLPSFSP allocated 441,690 kunas ($74,230) for 
the NGO-run shelter for children, compared with 527,000 kunas 
($88,570) in 2019.
There were no reports the government penalized victims for crimes 
their traffickers compelled them to commit; however, due to a lack 
of consistent screening efforts for trafficking indicators in irregular 
migration flows reported by some observers, authorities may have 
detained and deported some unidentified victims among irregular 
migrants and asylum seekers. Foreign victims had access to the same 
services as domestic victims, but foreign victims without work permits 
at the time of their exploitation could not receive compensation for 
lost wages. Foreign victims could receive a temporary residence permit 
after a 60-day reflection period for adults and 90 days for children; 
the government reported one victim received a temporary residence 
permit (one in 2019). In response to the pandemic, the government 
amended the Law on Foreigners to extend temporary residence permits 
up to 30 days from the end of the pandemic. Seven out of the 15 
county courts had Victim and Witness Support Offices (VWSO) that 
provided assistance during criminal proceedings, including requests 
to testify via video link, referrals to specialized institutions, legal 
and logistical assistance, and measures to prevent re-traumatization. 
The government also funded a civil society network to provide legal 
and psychological assistance and logistical support in county courts 
without VWSOs. Observers reported courts with VWSOs offered 
assistance consistently, and while the eight courts without a VWSO 
did not have the capacity or resources to provide victim-centered 
approaches, government-funded civil society organizations provided 
assistance in those areas. Civil society reported the judiciary was not 
always familiar with legal protections available for trafficking victims, 
and some judges lacked sensitivity and an understanding of the impact 
of psychological trauma and required victims to provide statements 
or testimonies multiple times, causing re-traumatization. Children 
could provide testimonies to specialized professionals in child 
interview rooms, but observers reported, in 2019, a judge required 
a child to testify in court for seven hours. The law provided witness 
protection, and the government reported no victims required witness 
protection in 2020. Authorities reported difficulties in encouraging 
victims to cooperate with investigations, particularly sex trafficking 
cases or cases involving potential foreign victims. The law entitled 
victims to restitution in criminal cases and compensation in civil 
suits, but experts reported judges rejected claims for restitution in 
criminal cases and recommended victims to file a civil suit. Judges 
in civil courts were sometimes better positioned to assess emotional 
pain, but civil suits were expensive, lengthy, and required victims 
to re-testify about their exploitation, causing re-traumatization. A 
municipal civil court issued a trafficking victim compensation for 
the first time and awarded 143,650 kunas ($24,140). 
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. OHRRNM served as 
the secretariat for the senior-level national coordinating committee; 
the national committee met once (once in 2019). The government 
adopted a decision to include representatives from the judiciary in the 
national committee, appointed two judges from the Supreme Court, 
and appointed the Deputy Prime Minister to chair the committee. The 
committee’s working-level operational team held monthly meetings 
and monitored the implementation of the 2018-2021 national action 
plan. The government exchanged and shared information with civil 
society, adopted a protocol on data exchange, and posted information 
on ministries’ websites. The government held virtual awareness 
campaigns targeting students and teachers, distributed informative 
materials, and organized virtual and in-person awareness-raising 
events for NGOs, government officials, and the general public. 
OHRRNM reported spending 37,851 kunas ($6,360) on services 
for trafficking victims, including funding for the NGO-run hotline, 
compared with 93,304 kunas ($15,680) in 2019. Observers reported 
the NGO-run hotline operated only from 10:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. 
due to inadequate financial support; in 2020, the hotline received 
296 calls, leading to three investigations (474 calls leading to four 
investigations in 2019). The government maintained a legal framework 
for regulating and licensing private sector employers, including 
foreign employment agencies. The law prohibited worker recruitment 
fees with fines ranging from 4,000 to 100,000 kunas ($670 to 
$16,800). Labor inspectors could issue administrative fines and/or 
file criminal charges against employers for nonpayment of salaries. 
Labor inspectors conducted 8,101 inspections in a variety of sectors, 
such as agriculture, construction, elderly care, forestry, and service; 
most infractions involved improper labor contracts, work permits, 
and salary issues. The government made efforts to reduce the demand 
for commercial sex acts. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Croatia, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Croatia abroad. Women and girls from the Balkans and Central 
Europe are exploited in sex trafficking in Croatia. Traffickers exploit 
Croatian women and girls in sex trafficking within the country and 
elsewhere in Europe. Traffickers exploit Croatian, Bosnian, and 
Romanian women and some Afghan, Filipino, Pakistani, Taiwan, 
and Thai men in forced labor in the Croatian agricultural sector. Men 
also are exploited in forced begging and forced criminality, including 
theft and fraud. Traffickers increasingly use the internet, in particular 
social media platforms, to recruit children for sex trafficking. Irregular 
migrants and refugees from Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and neighboring 
countries traveling or being smuggled through Croatia are vulnerable 
to trafficking, particularly women and unaccompanied children. In 
2018, Taiwanese women and men were exploited in forced labor 
and forced criminality in an illegal call center.
CUBA: TIER 3
The Government of Cuba does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts 
to do so, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Cuba remained 
on Tier 3. During the reporting period, there was a government 
policy or government pattern to profit from labor export programs 
with strong indications of forced labor, particularly its foreign 
medical missions program. Despite the lack of significant efforts, 
the government took some steps to address trafficking. Some reports 
indicated the government continued training law enforcement officers, 
prosecutors, and judges on trafficking crimes. However, in 2020, the 
government capitalized on the pandemic by increasing the number 
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and size of medical missions and refused to improve the program’s 
transparency or address labor violations and trafficking crimes 
despite persistent allegations from observers, former participants, 
and foreign governments of Cuban officials’ involvement in abuses. 
The government failed to inform participants of the terms of their 
contracts, which varied from country to country, confiscated their 
documents and salaries, and threatened medical professionals and 
their family members if participants left the program. Within Cuba, 
the government did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting 
trafficking crimes. Authorities did not report identifying victims and 
lacked a comprehensive package of housing and other services for 
victims and did not protect potential trafficking victims from being 
detained or charged for unlawful acts their traffickers coerced them 
to commit. The government did not criminalize all forms of forced 
labor or sex trafficking. 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Ensure state-run labor export programs, such as foreign medical 
missions, comply with international labor standards or end them—
specifically ensure participants receive fair wages, fully paid into 
bank accounts the workers can personally control; retain control 
of their passports, contracts, and academic credentials; ensure a 
work environment safe from violence, harassment, and intrusive 
surveillance; and have freedom of movement to include leaving the 
program or refusing an assignment without penalties such as being 
threatened, imprisoned, harmed, or banned from returning to Cuba. 
• Vigorously investigate and prosecute sex trafficking and forced 
labor crimes and convict offenders. • Implement formal policies 
and procedures to proactively identify trafficking victims, including 
among vulnerable populations, and refer them to appropriate services, 
and train officials, including first responders, in their use. • Draft 
and enact a comprehensive anti-trafficking law that criminalizes 
all forms of trafficking, including the explicit prohibition of labor 
trafficking, and ensures that the use of force, fraud, or coercion is 
considered an essential element of adult trafficking. • Adopt policies 
and programs that provide trafficking-specific, specialized assistance 
for male, female, and LGBTQI+ trafficking victims. • Screen individuals 
charged or detained for commercial sex-related crimes for trafficking 
indicators and refer identified victims to care. • Train those responsible 
for enforcing the labor code to screen for trafficking indicators and 
educate all Cuban workers about trafficking indicators and how to 
report trafficking-related violations. • Establish a permanent inter-
ministerial anti-trafficking committee. • Create a new national anti-
trafficking action plan in partnership with international organizations. 
• Provide specialized training on trafficking indicators for hotline 
staff and interpretation for non-Spanish speakers. 
PROSECUTION
The government did not report making law enforcement efforts to 
combat trafficking in persons. Government officials in the Ministry 
of Justice continued to be complicit in state labor export schemes by 
prosecuting people who abandoned Cuba’s international missions due 
to abuses within the programs. The Cuban penal code criminalized 
some forms of sex trafficking and labor trafficking. Article 302 
(“procuring and trafficking in persons”) criminalized inducing 
another person to engage in prostitution, or cooperating, promoting, 
or benefiting from such an act, and prescribed penalties of four to 
10 years’ imprisonment. These penalties were sufficiently stringent 
and commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, 
such as rape. Inconsistent with the definition of trafficking under 
international law, the law established the use of force, fraud, or 
coercion as aggravating factors, rather than essential elements of 
the crime. Article 310 (“corruption of minors”) criminalized the use 
of a person under the age of 16 for sexual purposes and prescribed 
penalties of seven to 15 years’ imprisonment, which were sufficiently 
stringent and commensurate with those prescribed for other serious 
crimes, such as rape. Article 312 (“corruption of minors”) criminalized 
the use of a person under the age of 16 for begging and prescribed 
penalties of two to five years’ imprisonment or a fine; these penalties 
were sufficiently stringent. Article 316 (“sale and trafficking of 
minors”) criminalized the sale or illegal adoption of a person under 
the age of 16 for “international trafficking relating to corrupting or 
pornographic conduct, the practice of prostitution, trade in organs, 
forced labor, or activities linked to narcotics trafficking or illicit drug 
use,” and prescribed penalties of seven to 15 years’ imprisonment. 
These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with other grave crimes such as rape. 
Inconsistent with international law, these provisions defined a minor 
as under the age of 16 instead of 18. Provisions relating to adult and 
child trafficking did not explicitly criminalize the acts of recruitment, 
transport, and receipt of persons for these purposes. Cuban law did 
not explicitly prohibit labor trafficking as defined in international 
law. The government did not make efforts to amend the criminal 
code to address trafficking in line with international law. 
The government did not publish official data on anti-trafficking 
efforts for 2020, making it difficult to assess progress compared 
to the previous reporting period. The government’s annual report 
was the primary source of information on its efforts; however, the 
annual report’s last publication was in January 2020 and covered 
efforts made in 2019. While the government controls all sanctioned 
media outlets, some independent sources provided information on 
trafficking and efforts to combat it. The government did not report 
investigating cases of trafficking in 2020, compared with 15 potential 
cases of trafficking investigated in 2019. Authorities did not report 
prosecuting or convicting any traffickers during the reporting period, 
compared with 15 prosecutions in 2019, 20 in 2017, 21 in 2016, and 
10 in 2015; and 24 convictions in 2019, 20 in 2017, 39 in 2016, and 
17 in 2015. In addition, authorities did not report any information 
on sentences given to traffickers, compared with reports indicating 
that the average sentence was 7.1 years of imprisonment in 2019, 9.2 
years in 2017, 10.5 years in 2016, and 12 years in 2015. Authorities 
did not report any new investigations, prosecutions, or convictions 
of foreign nationals for purchasing sex from child sex trafficking 
victims, compared with five foreign nationals imprisoned in 2019 
from Italy, Serbia, India, France, and the Netherlands. According to 
sources, the Cuban government organized and sponsored training 
for law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges, but there 
was no information on the content of the training or details on the 
number of officials who participated. The government did not report 
cooperating with foreign governments on trafficking cases during the 
reporting period. Authorities had more than 20 bilateral cooperation 
agreements or memoranda of understanding with 15 countries that 
included trafficking; the government did not provide information 
on trafficking-related protections or the results of these agreements. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government officials complicit in trafficking, despite 
persistent allegations that officials threatened and coerced some 
participants in the foreign medical missions to remain in the program. 
PROTECTION
The government did not make efforts to identify or protect trafficking 
victims. Rather reports continued that government officials forced 
or coerced individuals to participate and remain in the Cuban 
government’s labor export programs, particularly the foreign medical 
missions program. Authorities did not report identifying any victims 
in 2020, compared with 25 in 2018, 24 in 2017, 27 in 2016, and 
11 in 2015. While authorities reported having some procedures to 
screen travelers abroad, they did not report screening individuals for 




to proactively identify and refer sex trafficking victims to care; 
however, the government lacked formal procedures to identify 
victims in police raids and relied on victims to self-report in previous 
years. The government did not report having procedures to identify 
victims of forced labor and no information was available about the 
number of labor inspectors. NGOs organized by the government 
or Communist Party of Cuba, such as the Federation of Cuban 
Women (FMC), the Prevention and Social Assistance Commission, 
and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDRs), 
could identify and refer trafficking victims to state authorities and 
provide some victim services, including psychological treatment, 
health care, skills training, and assistance in finding employment; 
however these services were politicized and unavailable to people 
the government and/or Communist Party deemed subversive. The 
FMC continued to receive funding from international organizations 
and operated centers for women and families nationwide to assist 
individuals harmed by violence, including victims of sex trafficking. 
Observers, however, noted that these organizations did not have 
the capacity to help trafficking victims, and the government did not 
offer comprehensive or specialized services for victims. Neither the 
government nor the government-organized NGOs operated shelters 
or provided services specifically for adult male or LGBTQI+ victims.
As of early 2020, the government funded child protection and 
guidance centers for women and families, which served all crime 
victims, including some trafficking victims, but authorities did not 
provide an update on funding provided for these centers or how the 
pandemic affected their operations. These centers reportedly had 
the ability to screen cases, make referrals to law enforcement, assist 
with arranging cooperation with law enforcement in preparation for 
prosecution, and provide victim services. Authorities did not report if 
guidance centers screened for trafficking indicators, referred cases to 
law enforcement, arranged for victims to cooperate with prosecutors, 
or provide services. The Family Protection and Jurisdictional Issues 
Directorate was charged with providing specialized attention to child 
victims of crime and violence, including trafficking, but authorities 
did not report if it assisted any trafficking victims during the reporting 
period. The government shut down the courts for an extensive period 
of time to mitigate the spread of the virus; actions that likely impacted 
measures police took to encourage child sex trafficking victims younger 
than the age of 16 to assist in the prosecution of their traffickers. 
Prior to the pandemic, authorities could gather testimony through 
psychologist-led videotaped interviewing, usually avoiding the need 
for children to appear in court. Observers reported law enforcement 
did not proactively screen for indicators of trafficking as police may 
have detained individuals in commercial sex or charged them with 
crimes such as “social dangerousness,” thereby potentially penalizing 
some victims for unlawful acts their traffickers coerced them to 
commit. Cuban law permitted courts to order restitution be paid 
to victims, but the government has not reported any such orders 
since 2018. The government did not identify any foreign trafficking 
victims in Cuba in 2020.
PREVENTION 
The government did not make efforts to prevent sex trafficking or 
forced labor. The 2017-2020 anti-trafficking national action plan 
expired at the end of the reporting period, and the government did 
not provide information on the development of a new national 
action plan. The government reportedly held training sessions for 
government employees, teachers, school administrators, tourist 
industry employees, and parents on prevention and detection of 
trafficking. The government and the FMC continued to operate a 
24-hour telephone line for individuals needing legal assistance, 
including sex trafficking victims; authorities did not report if any of 
the calls made to this hotline in 2020 were in reference to trafficking 
in persons. 
State media continued to produce newspaper articles and television 
and radio programs, including a new public service announcement, 
to raise public awareness about sex trafficking. The FMC raised 
public awareness through workshops and training with government 
officials, social workers, educators, and students, and the distribution 
of materials explaining trafficking and risks associated with it; 
however, there were not publicly available materials that showed the 
effectiveness or impact of these programs. Authorities maintained 
an office within the Ministry of Tourism charged with monitoring 
Cuba’s image as a tourism destination, combating sex tourism, 
and addressing the demand for commercial sex acts. The ministry 
reportedly monitored foreign tour companies and travel agencies, 
whose employees could be held accountable for marketing the 
country as a sex tourism destination or for trafficking crimes. The 
government did not report efforts to reduce its nationals’ participation 
in child sex tourism. The Ministry of Labor and Social Security did 
not report training inspectors or identifying cases of forced labor. 
In the past, authorities reported taking steps to identify and prevent 
young people who might be vulnerable to traffickers from traveling 
abroad; however, the government did not report how many victims 
had been identified. Observers noted that the government failed 
to monitor and combat forced labor in its own supply chains. The 
government did not implement policies to prohibit force, fraud, or 
coercion by foreign labor recruiters and state-owned or controlled 
enterprises in recruiting and retaining employees, despite persistent 
allegations Cuban officials threatened and coerced some participants 
to remain in the foreign medical mission program. The government 
did not explain international labor standards to members of its labor 
export schemes working in conditions that might be considered 
trafficking. The Cuban government did not maintain labor attachés 
abroad, nor did it coordinate with other governments to ensure safe 
and responsible recruitment of Cuban laborers. Observers noted 
that the government prohibited freedom of movement of its citizens 
internally or abroad, rendering them without a way to migrate legally, 
making them more vulnerable to trafficking. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Cuba, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Cuba abroad. Human trafficking concerns in Cuba fall under two 
broad categories: sex trafficking and forced labor, and government-
sponsored labor export programs. Sex trafficking and sex tourism, 
including of child victims, occur within Cuba. Traffickers exploit 
Cuban citizens in sex trafficking and forced labor in Africa, Asia, 
the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, Latin America, and the United 
States. Traffickers exploit foreign nationals from Africa and Asia 
in sex trafficking and forced labor in Cuba to pay off travel debts. 
The government identified children, young women, elderly, and 
disabled persons as the most vulnerable to trafficking. Experts raised 
concerns about Cuba’s LGBTQI+ population and its vulnerability to 
sex trafficking and the increasing vulnerability of Cuban economic 
migrants, including cases of professional baseball players, to labor 
and sex trafficking. The government uses some high school students 
in rural areas to harvest crops and does not pay them for their work 
but claims this work is voluntary. 
International observers and former participants reported government 
officials force or coerce individuals to participate and remain in the 
Cuban government’s labor export programs, particularly the foreign 
medical missions program, managed by the Unidad Central de 
Cooperacion Medica (UCCM), the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry 
of Foreign Trade and Investment. The government has not addressed 
its exploitative and coercive policies in these missions, which are 
clear indicators of human trafficking. According to statements from 
government officials, the government employed between 34,000-
50,000 health care professionals in more than 60 countries in Africa, 
the Americas, Asia, Europe, and the Middle East in foreign medical 
missions through contracts with foreign governments and, in some 
countries, with international organizations serving as intermediaries 
or providing funds for their work. According to the government, 
75 percent of its exported workforce are medical professionals. 
Experts estimated the Cuban government collected $6 billion to 
$8 billion annually from its export of services, namely the foreign 
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medical missions program. The government has stated the postings 
are voluntary, and some participants also have stated the postings 
are voluntary and better paid compared to low paying jobs within 
Cuba, where basic wages for a doctor are $55 a month. However, 
observers report the government does not inform participants of 
the terms of their contracts or allow them to retain a copy of their 
contracts, heightening their risk of forced labor. Workers receive 
only a portion of their salary ranging from five to 25 percent, and 
these funds are retained in Cuban bank accounts – often in Cuban 
pesos rather than the hard currency the government is paid for their 
services, which are relinquished if the participant leaves the program. 
The Cuban government acknowledges that it withholds passports of 
overseas medical personnel in Venezuela; the government provided 
identification cards to such personnel. Many Cuban medical personnel 
claim they work long hours without rest and face substandard and 
dangerous working and living conditions in some countries, including 
a lack of hygienic conditions and privacy, and are forced to falsify 
medical records. In 2020, at least four Cuban medical professionals 
died after contracting COVID-19, three in Venezuela and one in 
Angola. Observers noted that failure to obtain adequate personal 
protective equipment (PPE) for medical workers in Venezuela could 
have contributed to the death of at least one worker. In 2019, at least 
six professionals died, two were kidnapped, and others were sexually 
assaulted. Many medical professionals reported being sexually 
abused by their supervisors. Observers reported Cuban authorities 
coerced some participants to remain in the program, including by 
withholding their passports and medical credentials; restricting their 
movement; using “minders” to conduct surveillance of participants 
outside of work; threatening to revoke their licenses to practice 
medicine in Cuba; retaliating against their family members in Cuba 
if participants leave the program; or imposing criminal penalties, 
exile, and family separation if participants do not return to Cuba 
as directed by government supervisors. Sources indicate that from 
March to mid-June 2020, the government used the pandemic as an 
opportunity to expand the reach of its exploitative export medical 
services, sending more than 2,770 workers to 26 countries to provide 
medical care. By September 2020, official government media reported 
medical missions in 39 countries (22 in the Americas), in addition 
to the 28,000 health workers already in 58 countries. All agreements 
were made under unclear financial arrangements. In addition to the 
medical missions, the government profited from other similarly 
coercive labor export programs, including dance teachers and sports 
coaches in Venezuela, engineers in South Africa, forestry technicians 
in Angola, and merchant mariners across the world.
CURAÇAO: TIER 2 WATCH LIST†
The Government of Curaçao does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included drafting new guidelines for 
victim identification and referral and providing services to a victim and 
the victim’s spouse. However, the government did not demonstrate 
overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, 
even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-
trafficking capacity. Authorities prosecuted fewer traffickers, did not 
report identifying any victims, and continued to condition foreign 
victims’ access to services, including residency, on cooperation with 
law enforcement in cases against their traffickers. Lack of funding 
remained a primary obstacle to robust anti-trafficking efforts. Officials 
conflated human trafficking with migrant smuggling, hindering 
the effectiveness of prosecution, prevention, and protection efforts. 
Because the government has devoted sufficient resources to a written 
plan that, if implemented, would constitute significant efforts to 
meet the minimum standards, Curaçao was granted a waiver per 
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act from an otherwise required 
downgrade to Tier 3. Therefore Curaçao remained on Tier 2 Watch 
List for the third consecutive year.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Provide potential victims, including those who choose not to 
cooperate with law enforcement in cases against their traffickers, 
with services and legal alternatives to deportation, especially where 
victims face harm or abuse in their home country. • Provide foreign 
victims access to health insurance, which victims must have to apply 
for temporary residency, and medical services. • Train detention 
center staff on victim identification procedures and routinely screen 
detained migrants for trafficking indicators. • Enforce the 30-day 
reflection period and refer victims to protection services without 
requiring them first to commit to assist a criminal investigation. • 
Improve coordination and information-sharing with anti-trafficking 
counterparts across the Kingdom of the Netherlands. • Vigorously 
prosecute and convict traffickers, including complicit officials, 
sentencing them to significant prison terms. • Increase proactive 
victim identification among vulnerable populations, such as migrants 
and individuals in commercial sex. • Disseminate standard operating 
procedures for victim identification and referral to law enforcement 
and detention facility staff and train officials on their use. • Provide 
specialized care and assistance for trafficking victims, including male 
victims. • Allocate sufficient resources for anti-trafficking efforts, 
including protection services and funding for full implementation of 
the national anti-trafficking action plan. • Provide targeted resources 
and training for local officials to conduct outreach to vulnerable 
communities through awareness campaigns on workers’ rights, 
trafficking indicators, and available resources.
PROSECUTION
The government slightly decreased prosecution efforts. Article 2:239 
of the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed penalties of up to nine years’ imprisonment or a 
fifth category fine of up to $56,000 for offenses involving a victim 
16 years of age or older, and up to 12 years’ imprisonment or a fine 
for those involving a victim younger than 16. These penalties were 
sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate 
with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as kidnapping. 
The organized crime unit (DGC) within the Curaçao Police Force was 
the lead agency for law enforcement efforts to combat trafficking. 
Authorities initiated one investigation in 2020, compared with 
one in 2019 and four in 2018. Officials did not report any ongoing 
investigations from previous years, although they stipulated there 
was investigative activity related to ongoing prosecutions. The 
government did not initiate prosecution of any alleged traffickers in 
2020, compared with prosecuting four alleged traffickers in one case 
in 2019 and none in 2018. Authorities also reported four ongoing 
prosecutions related to one labor trafficking case initiated in 2017; 
officials expected the case to return to trial in 2021. There was one 
new arrest associated with the ongoing case; authorities detained one 
suspect in the Netherlands and transported him to Curaçao to face 





† Curaçao is a semi-autonomous entity within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. For the purpose of this report, Curaçao is not a “country” to which the minimum standards for 
the elimination of trafficking in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act apply. This narrative reflects how Curaçao would be assessed if it were a separate, independent country. 
However, the Kingdom is an important contributor to the Government of Curaçao’s anti-trafficking efforts. 
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two for sex and labor trafficking) in two cases in 2020, compared with 
eight traffickers in 2019 and zero in 2018. The government reported 
it secured two of these convictions on appeal. The courts prescribed 
sentences ranging from 12 months’ to three years’ imprisonment, 
with conditions. The courts reexamined on appeal the cases of 10 
accused traffickers; although officials cautioned further appeals could 
affect the courts’ findings, judges reaffirmed the convictions of two 
traffickers, newly convicted two more, and postponed the review 
of six convictions until 2021. Law enforcement officials reported 
decreased case volume for all crimes due to reduced investigative 
activity during lockdowns to mitigate the impacts of the pandemic; 
during these spans, law enforcement helped to enforce movement 
restrictions. The government did not report any new investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit 
in human trafficking offenses; however, authorities reported two 
active cases—one ongoing prosecution and one appeal of a 2019 
conviction—involved complicit officials, both policemen. In the first 
case, authorities released the complicit official from pretrial detention 
upon payment of a $3,500 fine to the victim; criminal proceedings 
against the officer were set to resume in May 2020 but were delayed 
due to lockdowns. Courts expected to hear appeals in 2021 in the 
second case involving a complicit official, a police officer convicted 
in 2019 and initially sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment for 
sex trafficking. 
Law enforcement suffered from generalized budget and personnel 
shortages and did not have a dedicated anti-trafficking budget; instead, 
officials requested funding from the central Ministry of Justice budget 
on a case-by-case basis. Some officials reported the lack of funding 
and lengthy request process disincentivized investigation of trafficking 
crimes. The pandemic caused discontinuation of anti-trafficking 
training for law enforcement between March 2020 and September 
2020; the government did not report funding law enforcement training 
during the reporting period. However, an unspecified number of law 
enforcement officials attended four trainings funded by international 
organizations and foreign governments. The government reported 
it lacked the resources to provide virtual training opportunities 
during the pandemic. The government continued to address human 
trafficking and migrant smuggling with the same resources and 
procedures, frequently prosecuting traffickers for smuggling crimes; 
officials often conflated the two crimes. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained inadequate protection efforts. Authorities 
did not report identifying any victims in 2020, compared with three 
sex trafficking victims in 2019 and 44 victims in 2018. Officials did 
not regularly perform proactive screenings among vulnerable groups, 
such as individuals in commercial sex, construction, supermarkets, 
and catering, despite a Kingdom-wide requirement to do so. Similarly, 
the government did not report screening vulnerable migrant groups. 
In practice, assistance for victims was contingent upon cooperation 
with law enforcement efforts to prosecute traffickers. The government’s 
procedures outlined standard services for victims of trafficking, 
including shelter, meals, medical attention, and psychological 
services, and assigned an agency to provide each service. However, 
the agencies responsible lacked dedicated funds to furnish these 
services; consequently, service provision was inconsistent, and the 
costs often fell to the DGC or international organizations. In 2020, 
the government provided shelter and healthcare services to one victim 
identified in a previous reporting period and the victim’s spouse, 
compared with providing such services to 12 victims in the previous 
reporting period; the victim continued to cooperate in the trial against 
his trafficker. Trafficking victims willing to participate in the trial 
against their traffickers could apply for a temporary residence permit 
valid for six months. Officials could renew the permit if the criminal 
investigation or prosecution of the trafficker continued; however, 
residence permits valid beyond the conclusion or dismissal of these 
criminal proceedings would be canceled. In practice, funding shortfalls 
delayed processing of permit applications, creating uncertainty for 
foreign trafficking victims otherwise vulnerable to deportation. 
Foreign victims who did not participate in investigations against 
their traffickers were not eligible for temporary residence permits 
and could not legally remain in Curaçao; the government sometimes 
deported victims and potential victims present in the country illegally, 
including Venezuelan nationals. Observers reported the pandemic 
likely contributed to fewer deportations during the reporting period. 
Through a separate administrative process, victims were eligible to 
apply for temporary work permits; however, many victims could not 
afford the costs related to the application. 
In 2020, the government worked with an international organization 
to develop a comprehensive handbook for victim identification and 
referral procedures; although the government approved the new 
procedures, it had not yet implemented or trained relevant officials 
on them. Under the new system, officials would refer all potential 
trafficking victims to the victim support bureau (SSHC) and the 
DGC. The government did not operate any specialized shelters for 
trafficking victims. The government could place a limited number of 
trafficking victims—adult women and their children up to 12 years 
of age—in an NGO shelter for victims of domestic violence that 
could accommodate up to eight individuals; in 2020, an increase 
in domestic violence cases meant the shelter had reduced capacity 
to accommodate trafficking victims. The government could refer 
child trafficking victims to guardianship councils for placement in 
boarding school or foster care; the government did not assist any 
child trafficking victims in 2020. Authorities reported difficulty 
arranging housing for male victims due to budget constraints; the 
government did not report any shelters for male victims. Authorities 
required victims to check in with shelter staff when leaving the 
facility. When existing shelter facilities reached maximum capacity, 
the government placed victims in short-term government-funded 
accommodations. Under the 2017-2021 national action plan (NAP), 
victims could reflect for 30 days before deciding to participate in 
the trial against their trafficker; however, the government did not 
report implementing the reflection period in 2019 or 2020. The 
government reported approximately 8,000 Dutch guilder ($4,490) 
in trafficking victim assistance expenditures in 2020. The SSHC, 
which supported victims of all crimes, operated with a budget of 
307,000 guilder ($172,470). Foreign victims were entitled to similar 
care as domestic victims but did not have access to publicly funded 
medical insurance; adequate medical insurance was a requirement 
to apply for the temporary residence permit. Kingdom evaluators 
determined officials inconsistently informed victims of their rights 
as trafficking victims, especially foreign victims, and lacked written 
resources enumerating these rights in common languages.
PREVENTION
The government maintained insufficient prevention efforts. The 
national coordinator nominally led the interagency anti-trafficking 
task force and oversaw the government’s efforts to combat trafficking; 
however, the coordinator had no dedicated budget in this capacity 
and had other full-time duties. The government continued to use 
the 2017-2021 NAP. In 2020, the government did not report any 
new or ongoing awareness activities; it attributed the absence of 
programming to the pandemic and general funding limitations. 
However, the national coordinator continued to participate in radio 
and television programming. The SSHC operated a victim assistance 
hotline but did not report receiving any trafficking tips during the 
reporting period; calls to the hotline were not toll-free. Due to 
health concerns during the pandemic, the government closed the 
open-air brothel Campo Alegre in March 2020. The government 
made efforts to reduce demand for commercial sex acts through 
its public awareness campaign informing the public that women, 
especially foreign women, employed in Curaçaoan bars could be 
sex trafficking victims. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs continued 
to coordinate with airport administration to monitor ticketing and 
passenger logs for patterns indicative of human trafficking; when 
observed, the government could institute additional checkpoints, 




As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
domestic and foreign victims in Curaçao. Undocumented migrants 
in Curaçao, especially the substantial population of Venezuelan 
nationals, are vulnerable to both sex and labor trafficking. In 2020, 
movement restrictions prevented migrants from departing Curaçao, 
creating new trafficking risks for migrants who lost work during 
the economic downturn associated with the pandemic; traffickers 
may have exploited some of these individuals, taking advantage 
of their vulnerable position. Officials reported traffickers’ activity 
increased during the pandemic, especially individual traffickers acting 
independently. Traffickers exploit women and girls from Curaçao, 
Dominican Republic, and Venezuela, among other countries, in sex 
trafficking. Bar owners recruit women and girls to work as waitresses 
or ‘trago girls’, and subsequently force them into commercial sex. 
Traffickers exploit migrant workers from other Caribbean countries, 
South America, China, and India in domestic servitude, as well as 
forced labor in construction, landscaping, minimarkets, retail, and 
restaurants. Venezuelan migrants are vulnerable to exploitation by 
Spanish-speakers purporting to offer employment assistance in 
Curaçao. Recent research suggests traffickers in Curaçao may exploit 
more domestic and more male victims than previously understood. 
CYPRUS: TIER 2
The Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not fully meet the 
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making 
significant efforts to do so. These efforts included prosecuting more 
traffickers and significantly increasing resources to the Social Welfare 
Services-run (SWS) anti-trafficking shelter and resources for rent 
allowances and financial assistance for victims. SWS deployed 42 
officers to assist asylum seekers, including screening for trafficking 
indicators, and the police anti-trafficking unit (ATU) adopted a new 
victim identification form. An international organization reported 
“a high standard of accommodation” at the SWS-run shelter, while 
civil society reported the implementation of the national referral 
mechanism (NRM) improved during the reporting period. However, 
these efforts were not serious and sustained compared to the efforts 
during the previous reporting period, even considering the impact of 
the COVID-19 pandemic on the government’s anti-trafficking capacity. 
Although the government identified roughly the same number of 
victims, authorities investigated fewer suspects, and, for the third 
consecutive year, courts did not convict any perpetrators under the 
trafficking law. Court proceedings for most crimes lasted years, and 
foreign victims and witnesses often returned to their countries of origin 
without an adequate means to ensure the continued inclusion of their 
testimony, resulting in trafficking cases convicted under lesser charges. 
ATU continued to lack sufficient resources to thoroughly investigate 
all referrals of potential trafficking victims. SWS did not respond in a 
timely manner to referrals of potential victims and failed to refer all 
potential victims to ATU for official identification procedures. As a 
result, potential victims lacked adequate accommodation, healthcare, 
and financial support for months. The Multidisciplinary Coordinating 
Group (MCG) met less frequently than in 2019 due to the pandemic, 
and the government did not organize any awareness campaigns. 
Therefore Cyprus was downgraded to Tier 2. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers under Law 
60(I) and sentence convicted traffickers to significant prison terms. 
• Allocate sufficient resources to enable ATU to effectively investigate 
all offenses and SWS to refer all potential victims in a timely manner. 
• Reduce delays in providing victim assistance, including access 
to health care, rental disbursements, and financial assistance. • 
Train government personnel, particularly SWS officials, on victim 
identification, assistance, and referral. • Proactively identify victims 
among vulnerable populations, including migrants, asylum seekers, 
and agricultural workers. • Reduce delays in court proceedings. • 
Strengthen the capacity of the Labor Inspectorate to identify and 
refer victims of forced labor. • Improve victim-centered investigations 
and prosecutions and implement witness protection measures when 
necessary. • Implement recommendations made by the Ombudsman 
and other entities that monitor and evaluate anti-trafficking policies 
and efforts. 
PROSECUTION
Law enforcement efforts continued to decrease, particularly the 
ability of the government to successfully convict a trafficker for 
three consecutive years. The government adopted Law 117(I)/2019 
in July 2019, which amended Law 60(I)/2014 that criminalized sex 
trafficking and labor trafficking. Law 117(I)/2019 increased prescribed 
penalties from up to 10 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving 
an adult victim to 25 years’ imprisonment. Additionally, the law 
increased prescribed penalties for offenses involving a child victim 
from up to 20 years’ imprisonment to up to life imprisonment. 
These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with those for serious crimes, such as 
rape. The police investigated 18 suspects (24 in 2019); six suspects 
for sex trafficking, 11 suspects for forced labor, and one for both 
sex trafficking and forced labor. The police also investigated two 
forced marriage cases, which authorities considered to be trafficking 
under their law. The government prosecuted 23 defendants (16 in 
2019); five defendants for sex trafficking, 15 for forced labor and 
three defendants for forced begging. The government continued to 
prosecute 86 defendants (86 in 2019); 53 for sex trafficking and 33 
for forced labor. The government also continued to prosecute 24 
defendants for forced marriage and three defendants for “soliciting 
or patronizing a sex trafficking victim.” For the third consecutive year, 
courts failed to convict any traffickers under their trafficking law. 
Courts convicted two perpetrators prosecuted under the trafficking 
law with lesser offenses (four in 2019), including drug trafficking 
offenses, forgery, circulating false documents, obtaining a residency 
permit under false pretenses, and assisting an undocumented foreign 
national. The judge sentenced one perpetrator to nine months’ 
imprisonment and three years’ probation and the other to two 
years’ imprisonment. The government suspended most court cases 
from March to April 2020 due to pandemic mitigation efforts except 
cases with suspects in custody and cases deemed as urgent by a 
judge. GRETA and OSCE reported cases relied heavily on victim and 
witness testimonies, and the government often did not provide or 
seek corroborating evidence. Additionally, court proceedings lasted 
up to three years, and the government did not ensure the continued 
inclusion of victim testimony after foreign victims and witnesses often 
returned to their countries of origin, resulting in lenient sentences, 
downgraded cases, and acquittals of suspects on trafficking charges 
due to a lack of other evidence. 
The Ministry of Justice and Public Order maintained the ATU, which 
conducted proactive investigations and used special investigative 
techniques, including surveillance, undercover operations and 
informants, and wire-tapping. However, observers reported inadequate 
staffing and growing responsibilities outside of ATU’s mandate limited 
the number of proactive investigations. For example, ATU spent much 
of its time helping victims with issues under the mandate of SWS, 
including assisting victims with administrative forms, applying for 
jobs on their behalf, and supporting victims with drug rehabilitation. 





as labor disputes and, in 2020, observers reported local police, 
particularly in rural areas, tolerated practices that were indicators of 
forced labor, including withholding salaries and confiscating travel 
documents. The government did not report any new investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit 
in human trafficking offenses. In September 2018, the ATU and 
the Internal Affairs Unit arrested and prosecuted four immigration 
police officers on suspicion of aiding a criminal network involved 
in trafficking; the government scheduled a hearing for June 2021. 
ATU and the Police Academy continued to train police officers on 
trafficking issues, including new recruits and immigration officers. 
The government also trained judges and asylum service officers 
on various anti-trafficking issues. The government executed one 
European investigative order, issued one European investigative order, 
and continued a joint investigation with Poland and the United 
Kingdom. The government participated in a EUROPOL operation 
and shared information with Germany, Portugal, Romania, Spain, 
and the United Kingdom.
PROTECTION
The government maintained victim protection efforts. The government 
identified 25 victims (24 in 2019); nine were sex trafficking victims, 
13 were forced labor victims, including one victim of forced begging, 
and three were victims of both sex trafficking and forced labor; eight 
were female and 13 were male; three were children; and all adults 
were foreign victims. The three child victims, two males and one 
female, were Cypriot nationals. A multi-disciplinary NRM provided 
standard operating procedures for identifying and referring victims 
to services, including an operational manual, written guidance for 
first responders, and guidelines specifically for children. The police 
conducted proactive identification efforts, including in apartments, 
pubs, and agricultural establishments, but GRETA and other observers 
reported the ATU lacked sufficient resources to effectively investigate 
all referrals of potential victims, particularly among the increasing 
number of asylum seekers. The NRM required first responders to 
conduct preliminary identification of potential victims and refer 
potential victims to SWS. SWS officers provided potential victims 
with information and notified the ATU, who officially identified 
victims. Civil society reported the implementation of the NRM 
improved during the reporting period; however, SWS continued to 
respond slowly to referrals of potential victims and failed to refer all 
potential victims to ATU for official identification procedures. For 
example, trafficking victims exploited prior to arriving in Cyprus and 
applying for asylum at immigration offices and detention centers 
may not be identified, according to GRETA, that documented NGOs 
referring potential victims among asylum seekers to SWS who were 
not referred to ATU. Additionally, SWS continued to lack the capacity 
to maintain contact with potential victims, and some potential 
victims did not have access to adequate accommodations and 
financial assistance. SWS reduced staff due to pandemic mitigation 
efforts, and a sharp increase in asylum applications exacerbated 
delays, resulting in potential victims among asylum seekers lacking 
adequate accommodation, health care, and financial support for 
months while waiting for SWS services. In 2019, the government 
established a permanent screening system for newly arrived asylum 
seekers and, in 2020, SWS deployed 42 officers dedicated to assisting 
asylum seekers, including screening for indicators of trafficking. 
SWS assigned an on-call officer outside of working hours and on 
weekends to provide emergency accommodation and financial 
support to potential victims, but observers noted that at times the 
NRM was not fully functional on weekends and, in previous years, 
the on-call SWS officer did not deem potential trafficking cases an 
emergency. The ATU interviewed 196 potential victims referred by 
SWS (246 potential victims, including 172 asylum seekers in 2019). 
In previous years, observers reported the ATU identification process 
lacked transparency and some interviews were not victim-centered, 
but ATU adopted a new victim identification form for potential 
victims aligned with internal identification manuals and based on 
international standards and guidelines. The government trained SWS 
officers, asylum officers, and mental health services staff on victim 
identification and assistance.
The law entitled officially identified victims to psycho-social services, 
health care, translation and interpretation services, education, 
vocational training, and financial assistance. Once ATU officially 
identified a victim, SWS evaluated the needs of victims and referred 
them to the appropriate government agencies and NGOs for assistance. 
SWS operated a specialized shelter for female sex trafficking victims 
with the capacity to accommodate 15 victims; the SWS-run shelter 
accommodated 50 official and potential victims (53 in 2019). Victims 
may stay for one month or longer, as appropriate, in the shelter for a 
reflection period. The SWS-run shelter allowed adult victims to leave 
the shelter voluntarily after an assessment conducted by the ATU. 
The government allocated €494,010 ($606,140) to operate the SWS-
run shelter, a significant increase compared to €337,970 ($414,680) 
in 2019. GRETA reported “a high standard of accommodation” in 
the SWS-run shelter, including living conditions, protections, and 
reintegration programs. Similarly, NGOs reported good service quality 
at the SWS-run shelter, health care services, and labor office but, as in 
previous years, observers reported victims continued to rely heavily 
on NGOs to help navigate cumbersome SWS procedures to access 
support services. The government maintained a memorandum of 
cooperation with an NGO to manage transitional housing for female 
sex trafficking victims, which accommodated sex trafficking victims 
searching for permanent residence after leaving the state-run shelter, 
and to provide longer-term accommodation for female victims in 
apartments. The government allocated €164,990 ($202,440146,700) 
to the NGO, compared with €147,000 ($180,370) in 2019. The 
government also provided a rent subsidy and a monthly allowance 
for all victims and partnered with NGOs to provide apartments for 
male victims; however, victims faced obstacles to secure adequate 
accommodations due to increasing housing costs and greater demand 
for low-cost housing. The government allocated €213,620 ($262,110) 
for rent allowances and financial assistance to trafficking victims 
through a public benefit scheme known as Guaranteed Minimum 
Income, an increase compared with €168,980 ($207,340) in 2019. The 
government prioritized public benefit applications from trafficking 
victims over all other beneficiaries, but observers continued to report 
long delays, which were prolonged from reduced staff due to pandemic 
mitigation efforts, and victims waited several months to receive 
benefits with no retroactive payments. Victims received emergency 
financial assistance in cases of delayed distribution of monthly 
allowances, but the amount was insufficient to cover basic necessities. 
The government allocated €36,400 ($44,670) for emergency rent and 
assistance to cover urgent needs, compared with €30,000 ($36,810) 
in 2019. The government maintained a children’s house to provide 
education, placement into foster homes, and specialized medical and 
psycho-social care for child victims of sexual abuse and exploitation, 
including trafficking. Victims could access free health care at public 
hospitals but did not have access to the General Healthcare System, 
established in 2019, which allowed free access to participating private 
sector healthcare providers. Employment counselors trained to 
handle sensitive cases sought suitable employment for each victim 
and benefits to victims did not discontinue until a SWS officer and 
an employment counselor examined each case. 
There were no reports the government penalized victims for crimes 
their traffickers compelled them to commit; however, due to delays 
in formal identification procedures, some asylum seekers may have 
been detained in reception centers while waiting for their interviews. 
The government repatriated or granted residence permits and work 
authorization to foreign victims, including those who decided 
after their reflection period not to cooperate with the police. The 
government granted eight requests for residence and work permits 
(10 in 2019) and granted refugee or international protection status to 
three victims of trafficking. However, in November 2020, the Ministry 
of Interior (MOI) informed a labor trafficking victim from India—
identified in 2015—that his residence and work permits would not 
be renewed and that he would be processed for repatriation due to 
the absence of a criminal court case against his traffickers. Prosecutors 
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reportedly declined to prosecute his case due to a lack of corroborating 
evidence, and police arrested and detained the trafficking victim on 
March 14, 2021. After the international community inquired about 
the case, authorities released the victim on March 31, but his residency 
and work permits were still pending. Specialized personnel in the 
ATU, including a forensic psychologist, conducted interviews with 
potential and identified victims before taking an official statement. 
Overall, 21 victims assisted law enforcement investigations. Police 
permitted victims to leave Cyprus and return for trial after assessing 
the potential risks. No victims left Cyprus and returned to testify in 
trial (one in 2019). However, victims and witnesses often left the 
country and did not return before trial due to long delays, hindering 
prosecution efforts. The law entitled victims to witness protection 
through a request made by the police to the Attorney General; 
no requests were made in 2019 or 2020. Police officers escorted 
victims to court proceedings, and the law allowed courts closed-door 
trials, a partition to separate victims from their traffickers, remote 
testimony, and the use of video-recorded testimonies for child victims; 
courts used none of these methods in 2019. Authorities provided 
victims’ family members living abroad protection measures from 
intimidation and retaliation by arranging travel to Cyprus through 
diplomatic channels. Law allowed restitution through criminal cases 
and compensation through civil suits, but judges have never issued 
restitution, and authorities only approved two applications to date 
from victims for legal aid to pursue compensation. 
PREVENTION
The government decreased prevention efforts, partly due to 
pandemic-related restrictions. The MCG to combat trafficking, 
comprising relevant government agencies and NGOs, monitored the 
implementation of the 2019-2021 national action plan; the MCG met 
in-person on July 16, 2020 and virtually on December 16, 2020 (met 
three times in 2019). The government did not conduct any awareness 
campaigns. During the previous reporting period, the Ombudsman 
produced two public reports on the government’s anti-trafficking 
policies in response to civil society concerns. One report concluded 
government services did not fully implement provisions of the victim 
protection law because authorities did not renew the residence 
permits of victims exploited abroad; civil society filed a complaint 
stating authorities had not fully implemented the Ombudsman’s 
recommendations. Law required employment agencies to acquire a 
permit and prohibited withholding payment, confiscating passports, 
and charging workers for job searches, placement, and maintenance 
of employment. In 2020, the Ministry of Labor (MOL) inspected 123 
employment agencies, revoked the licenses of 14 agencies, and fined 
14 agencies for failing to maintain required records. MOI maintained 
a contract for employment of domestic workers and defined the 
process by which the employee or the employer could terminate 
the contract. In addition, the contract set a €309 ($380) minimum 
monthly salary for domestic workers and required employers to be 
responsible for accommodation, medical insurance, meals, visa fees, 
travel expenses, and repatriation ticket. The government contributed 
€25,000 ($30,670) to co-fund an OSCE project to combat trafficking 
in the Mediterranean. The government made efforts to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex acts, including by strengthening the 
criminalization of the demand and purchase of commercial sex 
from a trafficking victim. The government did not operate a hotline. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Cyprus. Foreign victims identified in Cyprus in 
2020 were from Bulgaria, Cameroon, Egypt, India, Nepal, Philippines, 
Nigeria, and Romania. In previous years, victims were also from 
Cameroon, China, Czechia, Ethiopia, Greece, India, Moldova, 
Nepal, Nigeria, Romania, Russia, Sri Lanka, Ukraine, Uzbekistan and 
Vietnam. Traffickers subject women, primarily from Eastern Europe, 
South and Southeast Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa, to sex trafficking. 
Sex trafficking occurs in private apartments and hotels, on the street, 
and in bars, pubs, coffee shops, massage parlors, and cabarets known 
for the availability of commercial sex. Traffickers exploit short-term 
tourist visas available to Ukrainian and Russian nationals to recruit 
young women for sex trafficking in bars and private establishments 
and recruit some female sex trafficking victims with false promises 
of marriage or work as barmaids or hostesses. Traffickers subject 
foreign migrant workers—primarily from South and Southeast 
Asia—to forced labor in agriculture. Employment agencies recruit and 
exploit migrant workers who enter the country on short-term work 
permits in labor trafficking; after the permits expire, traffickers use 
debt-based coercion, threats, and withholding of pay and documents. 
Domestic workers from India, Nepal, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka 
are vulnerable to forced labor. Traffickers subject asylum seekers 
from Southeast Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe to forced labor in 
agriculture and domestic work. Unaccompanied children, children 
of migrants, Roma, and asylum seekers are especially vulnerable to 
sex trafficking and forced labor. Romani children are vulnerable to 
forced begging. Traffickers exploit Cypriots addicted to drugs and 
young women with disabilities to commit criminal offenses such as 
distributing illegal substances and committing welfare benefits fraud.
AREA ADMINISTERED BY TURKISH CYPRIOTS
The northern area of Cyprus is administered by Turkish Cypriots. 
In 1983, the Turkish Cypriots proclaimed the area the independent 
“Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (“TRNC”). The United 
States does not recognize the “TRNC,” nor does any other country 
except Turkey. If the “TRNC” were to be assigned a formal ranking 
in this report, it would be Tier 3. “TRNC” does not fully meet the 
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not 
making significant efforts to do so, even considering the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity. Despite the lack 
of significant efforts, “TRNC” took some steps to address trafficking. 
In March 2020, “Parliament” amended the “TRNC criminal code” 
to include trafficking for the first time and “Parliament” also passed 
the 2000 UN TIP Protocol in April 2018. However, Turkish Cypriot 
authorities did not investigate, prosecute, or convict any traffickers. 
Turkish Cypriot authorities did not identify any trafficking victims 
and provided no victim protection, including shelter and social, 
economic, and psychological services. Turkish Cypriot authorities 
did not allocate funding to anti-trafficking efforts or provide training 
on anti-trafficking issues. 
The “Nightclubs and Similar Places of Entertainment Law of 2000” 
stipulated nightclubs may only provide entertainment such as dance 
performances, but Turkish Cypriot authorities rarely enforced this 
“law” and observers continued to report the 27 nightclubs in “TRNC” 
acted as brothels where sex trafficking commonly occurred. Police 
confiscated passports of foreign women working in nightclubs and 
issued them identity cards, reportedly to protect them from abuse 
by nightclub owners. Observers reported women preferred to keep 
their passports, but police convinced them to render passports to 
avoid deportation. “TRNC” authorities did not permit women to 
change location once under contract with a nightclub and routinely 
deported foreign victims who voiced discontent about their treatment; 
Turkish Cypriot authorities deported 255 women who curtailed 
their contracts without screening for indicators of trafficking (581 in 
2019). The “law” prohibited living off the earnings of prostitution or 
encouraging prostitution, but nightclub bodyguards accompanied 
female nightclub employees to their weekly health checks for sexually 
transmitted infections, ensuring the women did not share details about 
potential exploitation in commercial sex with police or doctors in 
order to facilitate continued illegal activity. The “law” that governed 
nightclubs prohibited foreign women from living at their place of 
employment; however, most women lived in dormitories adjacent to 
the nightclubs or in other accommodations arranged by the owner, 
a common indicator of trafficking. 
The “Nightclub Commission,” composed of police and “government 
officials” who regulate nightclubs, met monthly and made 
recommendations to the “Ministry of Interior” regarding operating 
licenses, changes to employee quotas, and the need for intervention at 





inspected approximately five nightclubs every two weeks and followed 
up on complaints; however, in practice, inspections focused on 
the sanitation of kitchens and interviews with women working in 
nightclubs always took place in front of nightclub bodyguards or 
staff, preventing women from speaking freely. Nightclubs provided 
a source of tax revenue for the Turkish Cypriot administration with 
media reports in 2015 estimating nightclub owners paid between 
20 million and 30 million Turkish lira ($2.69 million and $4 
million) in taxes annually, presenting a conflict of interest and a 
deterrent to increased political will to combat trafficking. Additionally, 
observers alleged complicit “government officials” were involved in 
organized criminal groups associated with nightclubs and that some 
“parliament” members were among the nightclubs’ clientele. Despite 
business closures due to pandemic mitigation measures, night club 
owners continued to force victims into sex trafficking. NGOs reported 
an increase in calls to an NGO-run hotline from trafficking victims 
and a 400 percent increase in requests for psychological assistance 
and 300 percent increase in legal assistance from victims in 2020.
“TRNC” authorities did not report the number of six-month hostess 
and barmaid “work permits” for individuals working in nightclubs 
and pubs, compared with 942 six-month “work permits” between 
April 2019 and January 2020. During the reporting period, there 
were 255 women working under such “permits” (310 during the 
previous reporting period). Nightclub owners hired female college 
students to bypass the cap on the number of employees legally 
permitted in each club and to avoid taxes and monitoring. Most 
permit holders came from Belarus, Moldova, Morocco, Russia, and 
Ukraine, while others came from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, 
Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Paraguay, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan. “TRNC” did not provide the number of “work 
permits” issued to domestic workers in 2019 or 2020 (3,143 in 2018). 
Turkish Cypriot authorities did not encourage potential victims 
to assist in prosecutions against their traffickers and deported all 
potential victims. “TRNC” authorities did not enforce labor “laws” 
and observers reported Turkish Cypriot authorities made little efforts 
to investigate employers and recruitment agencies charging high 
recruitment fees, confiscating passports, and withholding salaries that 
were common practices. Turkish Cypriots made no efforts to reduce 
demand for commercial sex acts. The “Social Services Department” 
in the “Ministry of Labor” continued to run a hotline for trafficking 
victims; however, it was inadequately staffed, not always operational 
and experts reported trafficking victims were afraid to call the hotline 
because they believed it was linked to authorities. 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in the “TRNC.” Traffickers exploit women from 
Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa in sex trafficking in nightclubs 
licensed and regulated by Turkish Cypriot authorities. Men and 
women are exploited in forced labor in the industrial, construction, 
agriculture, domestic work, restaurant, and retail sectors. Traffickers 
control victims of forced labor through debt-based coercion, threats 
of deportation, restriction of movement, and inhumane living and 
working conditions. Labor trafficking victims originate from Eastern 
Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, Central Asia, and South and Southeast 
Asia. Migrants, especially those who cross into the area administered 
by Turkish Cypriots after their work permits in the Republic of Cyprus 
have expired, are vulnerable to labor trafficking. Romani children 
and Turkish seasonal workers and their families are also vulnerable 
to labor exploitation and trafficking. Foreign university students, 
many of whom were recruited with false promises of scholarships, 
free housing, and employment, are vulnerable to both sex and labor 
trafficking. Traffickers force female students into sex trafficking in 
apartments and male students into forced labor or coerce students 
to commit crimes such as transporting or selling drugs. Students 
who drop out of school or engage in irregular work, many from 
sub-Saharan African countries, were particularly vulnerable. As in 
previous years, observers report that a number of women, some of 
whom are trafficking victims, entered the “TRNC” on three-month 
tourist or student visas and engaged in commercial sex in apartments 
in north Nicosia, Kyrenia, and Famagusta. Migrants, asylum seekers, 
LGBTIQ+ persons, refugees, and their children are also at risk for 
sexual exploitation. Observers report traffickers shifted tactics during 
the pandemic, forcing female sex trafficking victims to visit clients’ 
homes due to the drop in demand at nightclubs and often marketed 
home visits to potential clients under the guise of massage services. 
Civil society report traffickers allegedly facing financial hardship 
due to the pandemic act with increased aggression towards victims.
CZECH REPUBLIC: TIER 1
The Government of the Czech Republic fully meets the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued 
to demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting 
period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its 
anti-trafficking capacity; therefore the Czech Republic remained on 
Tier 1. These efforts included approving a new national strategy to 
guide the government’s anti-trafficking efforts and increasing efforts 
to prevent labor trafficking, including through temporarily waiving a 
2019 requirement that foreign workers remain with their employer 
for at least six months. In response to the pandemic, the government 
created hotlines to provide information on labor issues and provided 
bonuses to social workers to encourage their continued engagement 
during the pandemic. Although the government meets the minimum 
standards, it did not effectively screen vulnerable populations for 
trafficking, and officials expressed concern regarding the difficulty 
in prosecuting and convicting trafficking cases where coercion was 
the means of exploitation. Observers had previously noted concern 
that not all relevant officials seemed to understand the elements of 
the crime, which may have continued to result in trafficking crimes 
being prosecuted under the pimping statute with a lack of significant 
prison sentences for convicted offenders. The government had an 
official program to provide services to victims but did not maintain 
comprehensive victim identification and assistance statistics. 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate and prosecute suspected offenders of both sex 
and labor trafficking using the anti-trafficking statute, and sentence 
convicted traffickers to significant prison terms. • Increase efforts 
to effectively screen vulnerable populations, including asylum-
seekers and children in institutional care. • Improve and reform law 
enforcement data collection efforts, including by disaggregating sex 
and labor trafficking case data, and comprehensively report victim 
data, particularly on those who do not participate in the Ministry 
of Interior (MOI) program. • Streamline identification procedures 
and specialized crisis and long-term case management, including 
for children. • Increase training for prosecutors and judges on the 
severity of the crime and on applying the anti-trafficking statute to 
protect victims and ensure convictions result in significant sentences. 
• Train a wider range of prosecutors and judges on recognizing subtle 
forms of coercion, on the irrelevance of a victim’s initial consent 
when proving a trafficking crime, and on how to utilize victim 
protection programs for trafficking victims. • Continue training first 
responders, including labor inspectors, police, and state contracting 
officers, on sex and labor trafficking victim identification criteria 
and on evolving trends in labor trafficking. • Enhance collaboration 
between the labor inspectorate and police in order to effectively 
identify potential labor trafficking cases. • Improve victims’ ability to 
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access court-ordered restitution in criminal cases and compensation 
through civil proceedings.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Section 168 of 
the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed punishments of two to 10 years’ imprisonment. These 
penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, 
commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such 
as rape. The government may have prosecuted some sex trafficking 
offenses as pimping crimes under Section 189 of the criminal code 
and prescribed penalties ranging from imprisonment of six months to 
four years, a ban on business activities, or a sentence of forfeiture of 
property. These penalties were significantly lower than the penalties 
prescribed under Section 168.
In 2020, police initiated 18 trafficking investigations involving 20 
suspects (20 investigations involving 24 suspects in 2019). Authorities 
prosecuted nine defendants under Section 168 (21 in 2019 and 18 in 
2018), eight for sex trafficking and one for labor trafficking. Courts 
convicted eight traffickers – seven for sex trafficking and one for 
labor trafficking (nine convictions, all for either sex trafficking or for 
both sex and labor trafficking, in 2019 and 16 convictions, all for sex 
trafficking, in 2018). Two of the convicted traffickers were children 
from institutional care convicted for sex trafficking another child. 
Courts sentenced three traffickers to up to five years’ imprisonment 
and two traffickers to prison terms ranging from five to 15 years. 
Judges suspended the prison sentence of three convicted traffickers. 
Government officials attributed two of the three suspended sentences 
to the Act on Juvenile Judiciary, which allows for lower penalties 
for juvenile perpetrators. The conviction of multiple perpetrators 
from a November 2019 case into a Czech trafficking operation in 
the United Kingdom (UK) involving both sex and labor trafficking 
was under appeal at the end of the reporting period. The court had 
sentenced one trafficker to 18 years’ imprisonment, the highest 
trafficking sentence ever issued, and the court awarded victims 5 
million koruna ($240,920) in restitution, the highest amount ever 
granted in a trafficking case. Police investigated 19 cases (37 in 2019) 
of pimping; although the government did not provide details so it was 
unknown whether any involved sex trafficking. The government did 
not report any seized assets from suspected traffickers but reported 
temporarily seized properties in the amount of 62 million koruna 
($2.99 million). Authorities collaborated with foreign governments 
on four transnational investigations (one new and three ongoing). 
In one ongoing case, UK authorities arrested nine suspects in 2019 
for exploiting Czech victims in the food service industry; the trial 
was still ongoing in the UK at the end of the reporting period. In 
another case in which traffickers exploited multiple victims from 
the Czech Republic in the UK from 2009-2017, Czech prosecutors 
brought additional charges in May 2020, including trafficking for 
the purposes of slavery, and in December 2020 charged three new 
suspects. This was the first time prosecutors charged a suspect with 
trafficking for the purposes of slavery. A liaison police officer assigned 
to the Czech Embassy in London collaborated closely with host 
government officials on several trafficking cases involving Czech 
citizens and often trained and assisted consular officers in screening 
for trafficking indicators among Czech citizen services applicants. 
The Trafficking in Human Beings Division continued to be the 
lead investigative agency for trafficking within the national police 
and oversaw trafficking cases involving organized crime; regional 
police were responsible for smaller-scale cases. The Supreme Public 
Prosecutor’s Office’s specialized prosecutor for trafficking and domestic 
violence oversaw specialized trafficking prosecutors in the regional 
prosecutorial offices. Regional police directorates sometimes chose 
to devote their limited resources to fighting other types of crime, 
especially crimes deemed easier to solve and achieve a conviction, 
as well as crimes related to the pandemic or the enforcement of state 
of emergency rules. Law enforcement officials said they more easily 
identified sex trafficking cases than labor trafficking cases. Judges and 
prosecutors continued to note it was difficult to prove some instances 
of labor trafficking were more than cases of simple fraud, as traffickers 
often used subtle coercive practices. Observers reported prosecutors 
and judges pursued trafficking cases unevenly, at least in part due 
to lack of familiarity with the elements of the crime; GRETA noted 
Article 168 did not explicitly state the irrelevance of the victim’s initial 
consent to the subsequent exploitation, which may lead to uneven 
implementation of the law. The government provided training for law 
enforcement officials, labor inspectors, consular officers, prosecutors, 
and others in investigating and prosecuting trafficking cases and 
identifying victims. As a result of the pandemic, the Judicial Academy 
offered an online course for prosecutors and judges. The State Labor 
Inspection Office held a virtual workshop in September 2020 for 
labor inspectors from each region; in addition to training labor 
inspectors, the workshop facilitated cooperation between police and 
labor inspectors. Experts reported inconsistent collaboration between 
regional police and labor inspectors, as well as a need for enhanced 
training for inspectors on labor trafficking indicators. Inspectors 
conducted 5,557 inspections in 2020 (compared to 8,532 in 2019) 
and identified 3,110 illegally employed persons, but the government 
did not report identifying any trafficking victims. The national labor 
inspectorate did not perform routine workplace inspections due to 
the pandemic but did respond to reports of suspected violations. 
In September 2020, the national labor inspectorate conducted an 
“extraordinary” inspection aimed at detecting illegal employment. 
During the month, authorities carried out 321 inspections targeting 
1,418 persons. Law enforcement used information collected to conduct 
further preliminary investigations but did not identify any victims 
of trafficking. The government did not report any investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit 
in trafficking offenses.
PROTECTION
The government maintained victim protection efforts. The MOI’s 
Program of Support and Protection of Victims of Trafficking in 
Human Beings (the Program) remained the only official source of 
data on victim identification and protection, although the 2020-
2023 national strategy included data collection reform as a key 
objective. The government did not officially recognize victims who 
did not participate in the Program, although it provided support to 
NGOs who identified and helped potential or unidentified victims. 
Police data collection focused on perpetrators rather than victims; an 
overly broad definition of a victim according to police regulations 
further hindered data accuracy. In 2020, 13 new victims (six men 
and seven women) entered the Program, a decrease from 15 in 2019 
and 17 in 2018. Police referred three victims to the Program and 
NGOs referred eight, while two victims were reported jointly. In 
2020, government-funded NGOs provided services or other support 
to 317 victims or potential victims, a significant increase from 
259 in 2019 and 180 in 2018. The MOI distributed an electronic 
manual that described trafficking indicators among vulnerable 
populations to assist government officials in identifying victims and 
began work with representatives from socially excluded localities 
on a new, more inclusive list of trafficking indicators. However, 
observers noted the manual lacked a clear systematic procedure 
for identifying victims or referring them to the correct services. The 
agency also continued distributing a card-sized version and a manual 
outlining best practices in handling child trafficking cases to regional 
police. While the government made some effort to identify foreign 
victims of labor trafficking among the increasing number of illegally 
employed foreigners from non-EU countries, observers noted there 
were persistent weaknesses.
The Program provided medical care, psychological and crisis 
counseling, housing, legal representation, vocational training, 
and other specialized services to officially recognized foreign and 
Czech adult victims of sex and labor trafficking regardless of their 
immigration status. The MOI provided funding and administrative 
oversight and selected one NGO to be the primary implementing 









specialized services. Victims with children were generally placed in 
an NGO-run shelter, or into other MOI-funded housing. Participants 
in the Program were granted a 60-day reflection period, after which 
they were required to assist law enforcement if they wanted to stay in 
the Program, unless subject to a serious health issue. As assisting in 
the criminal case was a prerequisite for participation in the Program 
after the 60 days, only victims whose traffickers faced criminal charges 
were therefore eligible for these MOI-funded services. The MOI drafted 
procedures that would allow victims to remain in the Program even 
after termination of the criminal process against the trafficker, thus 
granting victims easier access to free legal representation in civil 
compensation proceedings. Victims could voluntarily withdraw 
from the Program at any time and would remain eligible for services 
under the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MLSA); all victims in 
the Program during 2020 chose to cooperate with law enforcement. 
Victims who chose to cooperate with law enforcement were eligible 
for a free legal advocate and, in some cases, the option to choose the 
gender of the judge or to testify via videoconference. Foreign victims 
accepted into the Program could receive temporary residence and 
work visas for the duration of relevant legal proceedings. Victims 
could receive assistance to return to their country of origin at any 
time or, upon completion of the Program, could apply for permanent 
residency; the government granted permanent residency to two victims 
in 2020 (eight in 2019 and two in 2018), extended immigration 
relief to one victim, and granted one long-term residence permit to 
a victim due to pandemic-related travel restrictions. 
Victims unwilling to assist law enforcement through the Program 
were eligible to access MLSA-funded welfare benefits, including 
housing, in-person and telephone crisis help, counseling and social 
rehabilitation, drop-in centers for children, and social services for 
families with children. Although the government did not provide 
specialized centers specifically for child trafficking victims, there was 
a unique national referral mechanism for child victims and social 
workers developed individualized support plans for potential child 
trafficking victims, who received welfare benefits, such as shelter, 
food, clothing, and medical and psychological counseling. An NGO 
noted the government increased the number of mental health service 
providers for child victims during the reporting period. Nevertheless, 
observers reported identification procedures, crisis support, and long-
term services for child trafficking victims remained insufficient. The 
2020-2023 national strategy included a plan to study child trafficking 
in the Czech Republic and to create educational materials for first 
responders on the identification of and assistance to child victims. 
The MOI allocated approximately 1.6 million koruna ($77,090) 
for the victim assistance program and voluntary returns, the same 
amount as in 2019 and 2018; the Program did not spend the full 
allotment. An international organization used some of this funding 
to repatriate one victim (three in 2019) and an NGO worked with the 
government to repatriate one potential victim. The MLSA increased its 
funding to NGOs to provide social services, including to trafficking 
victims not in the MOI program. MLSA funding for NGOs increased 
during the reporting period. NGOs reported sufficient funding for 
short- and long-term activities and believed the ability to use MLSA 
funds for purposes other than the standard social services they 
already provided, such as public transportation tickets, telephone, 
medical checks, and psychological therapy, allowed them to offer 
more holistic services, which were limited in previous years due to 
regulations on use of these funds. Nevertheless, NGOs reported the 
MLSA’s funding structure inhibited long-term planning, as funds 
were only allocated one year at a time and did not arrive until after 
the beginning of the fiscal year. To guarantee victims’ access to social 
services during the pandemic, the government increased funding 
to provide monthly bonuses for social workers to encourage their 
continued engagement.
While there were no reports of victims penalized for unlawful acts 
traffickers compelled them to commit, border police and asylum 
and migration officials occasionally failed to recognize trafficking 
indicators among asylum-seekers and did not always proactively screen 
migrants, including those in detention, for indicators of trafficking. 
Additionally, the government did not report case details of the two 
children in a government institution convicted for sex trafficking 
another child. According to an NGO report, Czech police operating 
in North Macedonia participated in violent pushbacks of migrants 
into Greece, which discouraged victims from cooperating and self-
identifying. Experts noted some courts declined to recognize victims 
in migration detention facilities as such if they did not self-identify 
as victims in their initial asylum claims. Some experts criticized the 
Refugee Facility Administration (RFA) for charging a daily fee to 
some migrants for stays in transit zones; such fees could increase the 
vulnerability of potential victims to debt-based coercion. The RFA 
maintained a system where potential victims and other members 
of at-risk groups that were identified in an entrance interview for 
asylum-seekers would be voluntarily housed in a guarded facility or, 
if in immediate danger, referred to NGOs for services; the RFA did 
not identify any victims in the transit zones in 2018, 2019, or 2020.
Victims had the legal option of seeking court-ordered compensation 
from their traffickers through civil suits; however, compensation was 
rare, as victims could not afford attorney fees for a civil suit. To seek 
civil damages, the law required a finding of criminal misconduct 
against the defendant. The law also allowed victims to obtain 
restitution in criminal proceedings, although courts rarely issued 
restitution to victims in criminal cases. An NGO reported one victim 
received 300,000 koruna ($14,460) as restitution for a forced labor 
case in 2020. During the reporting period, the November 2019 
court judgment awarding a record 5 million koruna ($240,920) to 
the victims in a case involving a transnational trafficking operation 
went under appeal. 
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. The MOI chaired the 
Inter-Ministerial Coordination Group (IMCG), which included 
representatives from various government ministries and agencies, as 
well as three NGOs and an international organization. Due to the 
pandemic, the IMCG met only once (twice in 2019) to coordinate 
national efforts, but successfully approved the 2020-2023 national 
strategy. A unit in the MOI served as the national rapporteur and 
prepared a comprehensive annual report on trafficking patterns and 
programs. The government funded several NGO-run hotlines to 
identify and assist both potential and officially recognized victims; 
NGOs reported a significant increase in calls in 2020 due to the 
pandemic. Hotlines operated on weekdays, and the government 
provided training to operators on how to advise victims. One NGO 
reported receiving 1,700 calls and chats on its hotline in 2020 and 
subsequently identified seven victims. MOI funds from the victim 
assistance program were available for prevention campaigns and 
fieldwork; the government funded an NGO to conduct an online 
public awareness campaign highlighting real cases of trafficking that 
occurred in the country or that affected Czech citizens. Another NGO 
received funding to conduct 43 monitoring and awareness trips to 
areas with a high potential for labor trafficking and exploitation, while 
a third NGO received funds to conduct an awareness-raising lecture 
as well as outreach to women in commercial sex. The government 
and the EU provided funding for an NGO to conduct a research 
project exploring ways to more effectively assist victims. 
The MLSA and labor inspection office websites published information 
in multiple languages about foreign workers’ rights, laws governing the 
employment of foreigners, and information on the Czech labor system 
and requirements for work permits. During the pandemic, the national 
labor inspectorate set up free information lines for the provision of 
counseling on labor issues at each regional inspectorate. Likewise, 
the MOI and MFA regularly updated websites with information 
regarding the waiver of immigration enforcement for foreigners 
during the pandemic-related state of emergency. The law did not 
specifically criminalize confiscation of workers’ passports. The labor 
code prohibited charging workers recruitment fees. Section 342 of 
the criminal code criminalized the illicit employment of foreign 
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workers under especially exploitative conditions. Labor inspectors had 
dedicated staff to focus on illegal employment and verify requirements 
for conditions of work. They conducted inspections of employment 
agencies and identified 98 illegal “pseudo-agencies” in 2020; most 
suspected cases of labor trafficking were arranged via these types of 
agencies. MLSA proposed several measures to increase oversight and 
potential sanctioning of these agencies, which were in various stages 
of implementation during the reporting year. In November 2020, the 
government waived for the duration of the second pandemic-related 
state of emergency the 2019 requirement that employer-sponsored 
foreign workers must remain with the same employer for a minimum 
of six months. The government also passed legislation in August 
2020 to allow holders of employment permits that expired between 
March and November 2020 due to the pandemic, to remain in the 
country if they secured new employment or extended in a previous 
position. The government reported these measures reduced the 
number of foreign workers in potentially vulnerable situations. In 
May 2020, the government fully resumed issuing authorizations for 
domestic employees of accredited diplomatic personnel in the Czech 
Republic, subject to new rules and requirements to safeguard against 
the exploitation of domestic workers by foreign diplomats. The 
government issued one new authorization in 2020. The government 
did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in the Czech Republic, and traffickers exploit 
Czech victims abroad. Traffickers exploit women, girls, and boys from 
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Nigeria, 
the Philippines, and Vietnam in sex trafficking in the Czech Republic 
and also transport victims through the Czech Republic to other 
European countries for sex trafficking. The UK has been a significant 
destination in recent years for Czech female and male victims of 
trafficking. Men and women from the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Ukraine, Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Nigeria, 
Philippines, Russia, and Vietnam are exploited in forced labor in the 
Czech Republic, typically through debt-based coercion or exploitation 
of other vulnerabilities, in the construction, agricultural, forestry, 
manufacturing, food processing, and service sectors, including in 
domestic work. Most identified victims in the country are Czech. Law 
enforcement reported an increase in non-EU victims. NGOs report 
labor trafficking is more prevalent than sex trafficking. Traffickers 
exploit Romani men from the Czech Republic in forced labor and 
Romani women from the Czech Republic in sex trafficking and 
forced labor internally and in destination countries, including the 
UK; many such traffickers operate as family groups. Most traffickers 
are Czech citizens; foreign traffickers often recruit victims from 
their home countries and work in cooperation with local Czech 
citizens. Law enforcement continue to report an increase in cases 
of “marriages of convenience” where Czech women are recruited 
through sham marriages with non-EU men, often of South Asian 
descent, and then exploited in sex trafficking and/or forced labor. 
The commercial sex industry increasingly operates out of private 
residences, complicating efforts to identify sex trafficking victims. 
Private, unregistered labor agencies often use deceptive practices to 
recruit workers from abroad as well as from inside the country. Some 
agencies sell their registration to unqualified recruiters.
DENMARK: TIER 2
The Government of Denmark does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Denmark remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
financially supporting counseling centers and health clinics for 
potential trafficking victims, including mobile health units focused 
on sex trafficking outreach, and issuing new guidelines related to 
victim support during a pandemic and victim identification in 
asylum centers. However, the government did not meet the minimum 
standards in several key areas. Courts did not convict any traffickers 
for the second consecutive year, and authorities prosecuted fewer 
suspected traffickers. The government continued to focus on the 
undocumented status of some foreign victims rather than screening 
for trafficking indicators. The government did not provide significant 
incentives for victims to cooperate in investigations, such as long-term 
residence permits, and the government’s practice to move toward 
repatriating victims inhibited successful prosecutions and left victims 
vulnerable to re-trafficking and reluctant to come forward and work 
with police. Additionally, the government held the passports of foreign 
victims who cooperated with authorities, without their consent, 
leaving them at risk of re-traumatization. Finally, the criminal code 
lacked a non-punishment provision, resulting in some authorities 
prosecuting victims, including children, for crimes their traffickers 
compelled them to commit.






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Significantly increase efforts to prosecute and convict suspected 
traffickers. • Proactively screen all vulnerable individuals, such as 
migrant workers, asylum-seekers, and unaccompanied children, for 
trafficking indicators and stay deportation of potential victims prior 
to identification and care. • Grant and renew residence permits to 
asylum-seekers. • Vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking 
cases under the trafficking statute. • Increase incentives for all victims 
to cooperate in the prosecution of traffickers, including by granting 
longer-term residency, work permits, and reparation. • Amend the law 
to include a non-punishment provision ensuring trafficking victims, 
including children, are not inappropriately incarcerated, fined, or 
otherwise penalized solely for unlawful acts their traffickers compelled 
them to commit. • Increase efforts to identify labor trafficking victims 
and prosecute and convict labor traffickers. • Develop clear procedures 
for identifying child trafficking victims and train relevant workers 
to recognize indicators. • Increase the number of law enforcement 
officials, prosecutors, and judges who specialize in trafficking cases. • 
Train staff at asylum centers to recognize trafficking indicators among 
potential victims and report those victims for assistance. • Expand 
efforts to streamline victim identification procedures, including by 
expeditiously transferring potential trafficking victims from police 
or immigration custody to crisis centers or care providers. • Establish 
an anti-trafficking unit within the Copenhagen Police.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Section 262(a) 
of the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed punishments of up to 10 years’ imprisonment; these 
penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, 
commensurate with penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, 
such as rape. During the reporting period, authorities investigated six 
trafficking cases (five sex trafficking, one labor trafficking), the same 
number as in 2019 (one in 2018, four in 2017). Officials prosecuted 
two suspects (both labor trafficking), compared with four in 2019, 
three in 2018, and two in 2017. Courts did not convict any traffickers 
for the second consecutive year (one in 2018, nine in 2017). There 
was one trafficking-related prosecution that resulted in a conviction 






Ghanaian sailors in forced labor for three years; courts acquitted the 
man of those charges and instead convicted him of usury, issuing 
a sentence of one year and six months’ probation, 250 hours of 
community service, and a 3 million kroner ($494,640) fine. Experts 
continued to express concern with the low number of convictions, 
particularly for labor trafficking, over the past several years. The 
government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government officials complicit in trafficking offenses.
Local police in collaboration with regional departments investigated 
trafficking cases. However, overextended police officers managed 
multiple responsibilities, including counterterrorism, redirecting a 
significant amount of their attention and time from trafficking and 
limiting the number of officers available to conduct investigations. 
Furthermore, the Copenhagen Police’s homicide division maintained 
responsibility for anti-trafficking investigations as one of its many 
responsibilities, despite Copenhagen being the most populous city 
in the country and a primary location for trafficking crimes. An 
investigation unit within the National Police worked on trafficking 
investigations among other crimes, such as human smuggling. The 
Danish Tax Agency (DTA) assessed the risk of trafficking in tax-related 
criminal cases, and in cases involving trafficking, DTA participated 
in police inspections and provided police and prosecutors with 
information on citizens’ and companies’ tax and value added tax 
payments. The National Police continued to allocate approximately 
18 million kroner ($2.97 million) through 26 full-time staff to 
combat and investigate trafficking cases. The government maintained 
trafficking coordinators in each of the country’s 12 districts. According 
to regional experts, however, the level of expertise varied by district, 
and there were no specialized police investigators outside of the 
National Centre of Investigation, which had no jurisdiction but 
assisted local and regional police in trafficking investigations. 
Additionally, there were no specialized prosecutors or judges in the 
country. Reports indicated limited resources and an overreliance on 
victim testimony led to cases being investigated and prosecuted under 
non-trafficking statutes, such as pimping. The government’s Center 
against Human Trafficking (CMM) and National Police provided 
police with instructions on trafficking at the police academy and 
additional training for police who became investigators. CMM also 
provided guidelines to defense lawyers representing trafficking victims.
PROTECTION
The government decreased efforts to protect trafficking victims. 
Authorities identified 64 trafficking victims (36 sex trafficking, seven 
labor trafficking, 10 forced criminality, 11 uncategorized), the same 
number as in 2019 (97 in 2018, 98 in 2017). Of these victims, 43 
were female, 20 were male, and one identified as transgender. Eleven 
of the identified victims were children (six in 2019, 10 in 2018, 
three in 2017). There were five Danish victims identified (none in 
2019 or 2018, one in 2017). Experts noted the trend toward online 
advertisement of commercial sex made identifying sex trafficking 
victims more difficult. NGOs reported the government’s perspective 
that trafficking was a sex-based phenomenon with primarily female 
victims led to the underreporting and inadequate identification of 
adult and child male victims in forced labor. Furthermore, while 
local organizations, including local unions and churches, played 
a central role in identifying large-scale labor cases in recent years, 
the pandemic-related lockdown hindered organizations’ ability to 
identify victims through their communities. In 2020, the government 
developed procedures for staff at asylum centers to identify trafficking 
indicators among potential victims, but observers noted staff did not 
receive training. The government provided a list of indicators and 
procedures to authorities for proactive victim identification. The 
procedures involved multiple government and law enforcement 
agencies, requiring several interviews of victims, who at times 
remained in detention before referral to NGOs, and required police to 
call CMM if a suspected victim was in custody. CMM was responsible 
for formal identification of victims of Danish or EU origin or who 
were documented migrants, and the Danish Immigration Service 
(DIS) was responsible for formal identification of undocumented 
immigrants and asylum-seekers. DIS screened potential victims 
during the asylum interview; however, according to NGOs, the DIS 
interview was often too brief to make an accurate identification. Due 
to the pandemic, CMM and DIS were unable to conduct interviews 
in prison facilities; as a result, the police agreed to conduct detailed 
interviews with trafficking-specific questions. Officials had the 
authority to detain potential victims for 72 hours and could extend 
this period when they needed more time to determine victim status 
or immigration status, or to identify traffickers. NGOs contended 
authorities primarily treated victims as undocumented immigrants 
subject to deportation, especially if victims were previously detained 
by law enforcement. Furthermore, while the government provided 
guidelines on not imposing penalties upon trafficking victims, Danish 
law lacked a non-punishment provision ensuring victims were not 
inappropriately incarcerated, fined, or otherwise penalized solely for 
unlawful acts their traffickers compelled them to commit. Observers 
noted incidents in which authorities prosecuted victims, including 
children, for crimes their traffickers compelled them to commit.
In 2020, all 64 identified victims received some form of government 
assistance (63 in 2019, 89 in 2018, 88 in 2017); 41 victims entered 
care facilities. As a standard practice, CMM assigned a contact person 
to identified victims to assist them with support. Government-funded, 
NGO-operated facilities provided trafficking victims medical and 
psychological care, shelter, and financial, legal, and reintegration 
assistance. Although these facilities were trafficking-specific, authorities 
sometimes housed victims with asylum-seekers. Three shelters for 
female victims accommodated up to nine adults and received 7.8 
million kroner ($1.29 million) from the government. During the 
reporting period, CMM established counseling centers and health 
clinics for foreign women in commercial sex in Copenhagen and 
Aarhus. There was no specialized shelter for male victims, but 
accommodation was available if necessary. Municipal child protection 
authorities assisted child victims and placed them in municipal 
accommodation or in residential care institutions. The Danish 
Red Cross assisted unaccompanied children in facilities partially 
funded by the government and screened all unaccompanied children 
in asylum centers for trafficking indicators. Observers continued 
to express concern over the disappearance of unaccompanied 
children from asylum centers and reports of unaccompanied 
children, particularly Moroccan boys living in asylum centers, 
being forced into sex trafficking, forced labor, and petty criminality. 
Regional experts reported shortcomings, such as a lack of clear 
procedures, in the identification of child victims, especially among 
unaccompanied children. Of the 11 child victims identified, eight 
received accommodations – four in asylum centers and four under 
the auspices of relevant municipalities.
Stricter immigration policies and guidelines, including an assessment 
deeming parts of Syria safe, increased vulnerability among asylum-
seekers and refugees, particularly those the government returned 
to their country of origin who could face retribution or hardship. 
The Aliens Act allowed the government to grant residence permits 
to refugees and family members, including trafficking victims, for 
temporary stay only, and to revoke residence permits if the need 
for protection no longer existed, unless contrary to Denmark’s 
international obligations. Consequently, Syrian refugees—the highest 
percentage of asylum-seekers in Denmark—who received residence 
permits linked to their approved asylum claims had their cases 
reopened and reviewed, affecting approximately 1,250 Syrians. 
Officials and media outlets reported, by the end of 2020, 170 Syrian 
refugees from Damascus and Rif Damascus had their residence permits 
revoked or denied for renewal and more than 1,000 remained under 
review, exposing them to long stays in asylum centers and increased 
risk to trafficking.
In 2020, the government did not report granting residence permits 
to victims, the same as in 2019 and 2018 (one in 2017). Regional 
experts underscored it was “nearly impossible” for victims to receive a 
residence permit in Denmark, noting since 2015 the government had 




difficulty for victims to receive work permits. As part of procedure, 
the government granted identified, undocumented trafficking victims 
a 30-day reflection period to stay in Denmark and receive support 
and assistance with the potential to extend another 90 days. The 
government required victims who accepted the subsequent 90 days 
extended departure deadline to leave voluntarily within 120 days. 
Regional anti-trafficking experts, including the Council of Europe, 
emphasized this period did not refer to a period of reflection and 
recovery necessary to determine whether victims would cooperate 
in the investigation of their cases; rather it was a period of time the 
victims had to cooperate in their repatriation. Until March 2020, 
an international organization served as the contracted partner for 
voluntary returns. Since then, the government moved the mandate to 
the Ministry of Immigration and Integration’s Return Agency, which 
oversaw the return of foreigners, who received rejected residency 
requests, including trafficking victims, to their country of origin. 
While the move centralized victim support in the Return Agency, 
NGOs expressed concern the new agency lacked experience and 
capacity. Furthermore, one NGO reported the Return Agency held 
the passports of four trafficking victims without their consent – a 
practice that could potentially re-traumatize victims. During the 
reporting period, the ministry responded to a parliamentary inquiry 
about this practice, stating the Return Agency had victims who opted 
into the voluntary return program “deposit” their passports with the 
government to “ensure the alien’s presence, while the cooperation with 
the alien on an individual action plan leading up to the repatriation 
takes place.” Predictably, some victims chose not to participate in 
a voluntary return because they viewed it as merely preparation for 
deportation. Additionally, traffickers’ use of debt-based coercion and 
victims’ lack of protection in their home countries served as significant 
deterrents from accepting the return. The government allowed victims 
who assisted in the prosecution of a trafficker to remain in Denmark 
for the duration of the investigation or court proceedings. However, 
NGOs reported the threat of deportation prevented victims from 
coming forward and led some identified victims to leave shelters 
before the conclusion of police investigations or court proceedings in 
order to evade deportation. Additionally, observers noted that many 
victims saw no benefit to being identified and that there was little 
to no incentive for victims to serve as witnesses since there were no 
long-term residency options, the compensation process remained 
complex, and above all else, the government prioritized returning 
victims to their countries of origin.
PREVENTION
The government moderately increased prevention efforts. Officials 
implemented the 2019-2021 national action plan and budgeted 
63 million kroner ($10.39 million) for the duration of the plan. 
In addition, a 2016 omnibus social spending resolution passed 
by Parliament allocated 9.4 million kroner ($1.55 million) 
through 2020 for anti-trafficking efforts, such as outreach, victim 
identification, and shelter. CMM received 14.8 million kroner 
($2.44 million) annually as well as an additional 1.7 million 
kroner ($280,300) allocated for reintegration. During the reporting 
period, CMM conducted awareness campaigns addressing forced 
labor, including outreach to businesses with at-risk employees, 
such as massage parlors. Additionally, CMM released guidelines on 
providing support to potential victims during a pandemic. Since 
many potential victims did not speak Danish and struggled to 
access and understand information on assistance, CMM released 
translated health guidelines and mobile health units focused 
primarily on outreach to individuals in commercial sex. CMM 
operated a hotline for reporting trafficking cases in Danish and 
English; in 2020, the hotline received 204 calls (316 in 2019, 277 
in 2018) and identified 19 victims. Although CMM coordinated the 
government’s anti-trafficking efforts, multiple government agencies 
maintained equities and responsibilities in anti-trafficking efforts. 
NGOs reported challenges in coordination and referred to the issue 
as “politically homeless,” falling between many priority areas, such 
as immigration or gang violence. CMM distributed guidelines on 
preventing forced labor in businesses and supply chains. CMM also 
supported a working group focused on combating forced labor and 
exchanging information on new trends among relevant authorities. 
Denmark participated in a regional project to support stakeholders 
in combating and disrupting labor trafficking by analyzing and 
consolidating information, improving assistance to victims, and 
increasing prosecution of traffickers. Authorities from Denmark, 
Finland, Norway, and Sweden facilitated international policing 
efforts and information-sharing, including on trafficking-related 
issues, through Nordic liaison officers stationed at 20 Nordic 
embassies and consulates around the world. The government did 
not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
 As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
domestic and foreign victims in Denmark and, to a lesser extent, 
traffickers exploit victims from Denmark abroad. Vulnerable groups 
include migrant and asylum-seeking women, young men, and 
children, and members of the LGBTQI+ community, particularly 
those with non-traditional gender identities. Reports indicate a 
drop in the number of asylum-seekers in 2020—approximately 
1,547, the lowest number since Denmark began tracking in 
1998—as a result of stricter policies prioritizing repatriation over 
integration. NGOs express concern the new immigration policies 
exacerbate the risk to trafficking among asylum-seekers. Reports also 
indicate victims without EU citizenship or residency experienced 
increased vulnerability throughout the pandemic due to domestic 
lockdowns and international border closures. Traffickers exploit 
migrants, typically men who come to Denmark in large groups 
from Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia, in labor trafficking, 
specifically trucking, construction, agriculture, domestic service, 
restaurants, hotels, and factories, through debt-based coercion, 
withheld wages, abuse, and threats of deportation. According to 
NGOs, traffickers exploit unaccompanied children, particularly 
Moroccan boys, in sex trafficking and forced labor, including drug 
trafficking, theft, and other forms of forced criminality. Traffickers 
exploit men, women, and children from Eastern Europe, Africa, 
and Southeast Asia in forced labor and sex trafficking in Denmark. 
The majority of women exploited in commercial sex originate 
from the Philippines, Romania, Thailand, and Nigeria. Reports 
indicate an increasing number of sex trafficking victims coming 
from Poland, African countries including Ghana and Uganda, 
and South American countries including Brazil. NGOs report an 
increasing trend toward online advertised commercial sex rather 
than in established locations.
DJIBOUTI: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Djibouti does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included funding civil society 
organizations to provide services to potential trafficking victims; 
assisting vulnerable populations or referring them to civil society 
protective services; and, for the first time, training the incoming class 
of magistrates on trafficking crimes. However, the government did 
not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared to the previous 
reporting period, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity. The government decreased 
the number of investigations and prosecutions related to trafficking 
crimes and has not convicted a trafficker since 2017. Limited 
understanding of trafficking indicators among front-line officials 
continued to inhibit law enforcement and victim identification and 
screening efforts; the government did not identify any trafficking 
victims during the reporting period and remained without specialized 
protection services for victims, if identified. Officials also continued 
to conflate human trafficking and migrant smuggling, hindering the 







year, the government did not fully operationalize its national action 
plan to combat trafficking. Therefore Djibouti was downgraded to 
Tier 2 Watch List.






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict 
suspected traffickers, including allegedly complicit officials, under 
the 2016 anti-trafficking law. • Widely disseminate and implement 
the standardized procedures for government personnel to proactively 
identify potential trafficking victims, using the established national 
referral mechanism. • Systematically and proactively identify 
trafficking victims by screening vulnerable populations for trafficking 
indicators, including refugees, asylum-seekers, and foreign nationals, 
such as Ethiopian and Somali economic migrants and Cuban medical 
professionals, and refer all identified victims to appropriate care. • 
Institute and partner with international experts to provide regular 
training for judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement officials on 
the distinctions between human trafficking and migrant smuggling 
and on compiling and interpreting evidence of trafficking crimes 
using a victim-centered approach. • Establish a training program for 
the Coast Guard to improve identification of potential trafficking 
victims among migrants transiting by sea. • Revise, finalize, resource, 
and implement the extended national action plan. • Strengthen 
protective services for victims through partnerships with NGOs or 
international organizations and provide support to civil society 
organizations providing protection services. • Increase awareness of 
trafficking among the public, especially transiting migrants, through 
government-run campaigns or financial and in-kind support for 
NGO-run campaigns.
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts to combat 
trafficking. The 2016 Law No.133, On the Fight Against Trafficking 
in Persons and Illicit Smuggling of Migrants, criminalized sex 
trafficking and labor trafficking; it prescribed penalties of five to 
10 years’ imprisonment, which were sufficiently stringent and, 
with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those for other 
serious crimes, such as rape. The law considered the involvement 
of a minor or forcing a victim into prostitution as aggravating 
circumstances for which the penalties increased to 10 to 20 years’ 
imprisonment. Law No.111, Regarding the Fight Against Terrorism 
and Other Serious Crimes of 2011, also prohibited sex trafficking 
and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of 10 to 15 years’ 
imprisonment, which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to 
sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other serious 
crimes, such as rape. Definitions and penalties in these two laws 
diverged, but the extent to which this hampered law enforcement, 
prosecutorial, and judicial officials’ ability to prosecute suspected 
traffickers effectively was indeterminable.
The government investigated 13 potential trafficking crimes, 
compared with 33 investigations during the prior reporting period. 
The government reported prosecuting 21 suspected traffickers in 
13 cases under the 2016 anti-trafficking law, a significant decrease 
compared with 80 suspected traffickers in 33 cases in the prior year; 
however, it was unclear if prosecutors filed human trafficking or 
migrant smuggling charges in either year. For the fourth consecutive 
year, officials did not achieve any trafficking convictions; analogous to 
previous years, most prosecutions resulted in smuggling convictions. 
In response to the pandemic, the government closed the country’s 
only court from March to August 2020. Severe resource and capacity 
limitations impeded officials’ ability to develop comprehensive 
investigations of trafficking indicators and crimes. During the 
reporting period, finite human resources and limited awareness 
by law enforcement of how to identify trafficking victims reduced 
its ability to gather and collect evidence in all potential trafficking 
crimes. Additionally, officials’ propensity to conflate trafficking 
and smuggling made it likely that some reported cases involved 
individuals seeking to illegally cross international borders via 
irregular migration (migrant smuggling) and other crimes not 
involving exploitation through forced labor or sex trafficking. 
Officials also shared that the requirement for law enforcement to 
present an investigative report and evidence to the court within 
three days of a suspect’s arrest (two days for crimes committed in 
Djibouti City) inhibited law enforcement’s ability to fully investigate 
all crimes, including trafficking, and judges often dismissed cases 
on procedural grounds. Observers reported that families or village 
elders often settled allegations of forced labor informally through 
traditional arrangements between religious and community leaders, 
without recourse to the formal court system. The government 
did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of 
government employees complicit in human trafficking offenses; 
however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes 
remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action 
during the year. Observers reported that security forces, especially 
at lower levels, were susceptible to bribes and may have ignored 
trafficking crimes. 
The National Police maintained a unit focused on vulnerable 
minors that had a mandate to investigate and arrest traffickers. The 
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) had an unspecified number of dedicated 
prosecutors for cases involving trafficking or vulnerable children. 
During the reporting period, the government, in partnership with 
an international organization, continued to participate in a monthly 
mixed-migration task force for coordination on migration, smuggling, 
and human trafficking. In partnership with the French government, 
gendarmerie and coast guard officials developed a standard operating 
procedure (SOP) to collaborate with international investigators on 
trafficking cases. The MOJ worked with an international organization 
to provide training seminars on trafficking to an unspecified 
number of judges, prosecutors, and advisors to training seminars 
on trafficking; this included, for the first time, training the incoming 
class of magistrates on trafficking crimes. The National Police and 
Gendarmerie continued to work with an international organization 
to implement training on detection and identification of trafficking 
crimes in all police academies in Djibouti City and in the rural 
areas of the country.
PROTECTION
The government decreased efforts to identify trafficking victims, while 
maintaining protection services that could benefit potential victims. 
For the second consecutive reporting period, the government did not 
report identifying any trafficking victims and quickly repatriated all 
potential victims—most of whom were Ethiopian—to their home 
countries without screening for trafficking indicators. As no victims 
were formally identified, the government did not report referring 
any trafficking victims to services; however, the government, in 
partnership with international organizations and NGOs, continued 
to provide services to thousands of individuals in vulnerable 
populations, which may have included trafficking victims. Although 
it had formal SOPs to guide officials in the proactive identification 
of victims and their subsequent referral to care, relevant officials did 
not consistently use these procedures, and few officials were trained 
do so; in practice, officials routinely called upon prominent points of 
contact for assistance in determining care options for victims rather 
than consulting the written procedures. The government continued to 
grant authority to an international organization to conduct trafficking 
screenings of all transiting migrants—including an unknown number 
of potential trafficking victims—and partnered with this entity to 




period. During the reporting year, relevant government entities, in 
close cooperation with an international organization, facilitated 
the repatriation of 537 migrants to their respective countries of 
origin, the large majority of whom were Ethiopian, compared with 
4,220 repatriations in 2019. Some of these individuals reportedly 
encountered violence, coercion, or exploitation during their travels 
across multiple transit countries. The government and international 
organization involved with repatriations attributed the significant 
decrease to border closures and travel and movement restrictions 
in response to the pandemic. 
The government continued to depend on ad hoc mechanisms to 
refer victims to care and continued to assist potential trafficking 
victims through programming targeting refugees or migrants more 
broadly, rather than providing specialized services. The government 
and international organizations reported that the provision of 
services to vulnerable populations—including potential victims—
during the pandemic was difficult, especially in crowded migrant 
response centers (MRCs) and refugee camps, some of which regularly 
accommodated double the intended capacity during the year. With 
governmental authorization, a locally-operated NGO continued to 
host unaccompanied migrant and highly vulnerable street children 
in Djibouti’s first secure, 24-hour dormitory that could appropriately 
house trafficking victims; the police unit that focused on vulnerable 
children had a mandate to refer children to the shelter, but the 
government did not report referring any potential victims to the 
shelter during the reporting period. In prior years, the Ministry 
of Women and Family Affairs provided social workers to offer 
psychosocial support at the shelter; however, in light of pandemic 
restrictions, the government did not provide this service during the 
reporting period. Separately, the Coast Guard provided clothing and 
food to vulnerable migrants stranded at sea and transported them 
to care provided by an international organization, typically in Khôr 
'Angar or Obock. The government continued its administration and 
funding of two MRCs, in Obock and Aour Aoussa, which included 
office and short-term living quarters staffed and were operated 
by an international organization, and other transit or processing 
centers along routes heavily traversed by migrants. An international 
organization closed two MRCs in Loyada and Khôr 'Angar, which 
the government previously supported, during the reporting period 
due lack of funding from pandemic-related budget allocations. Since 
2017, the Ministry of Health has provided one full-time doctor trained 
to identify trafficking indicators to the National Union for Djiboutian 
Women counseling center, a facility that deals with trafficking cases 
among other crimes; the MOJ provided a prosecutor liaison to the 
same center to provide legal assistance to victims. Health officials, 
in partnership with an international organization, continued to 
operate five mobile clinics along dangerous migration routes that 
could provide vulnerable migrants with medical assistance. 
Key ministries that supported groups vulnerable to trafficking 
continued to provide resources to support various protection services 
for potential victims. The government allocated more than 109 
million Djiboutian francs ($615,820) in 2020, compared with 
more than 110 million Djiboutian francs ($621,470) in 2019 and 
140 million Djiboutian francs ($790,960) in 2018, to relevant 
ministries, MRCs, transit centers, and local NGOs, which operated 
counseling centers and other programs—including a hotline—that 
assisted potential trafficking victims. The 2016 anti-trafficking law 
included provisions allowing trafficking victims temporary residency 
during judicial proceedings and permanent residency, as necessary, 
as a legal alternative to removal to countries where victims might 
face hardship or retribution. Additionally, the 2016 law directed the 
government to provide victims legal assistance and an interpreter, 
in addition to psychological, medical, and social assistance; the 
government did not report whether it applied these provisions during 
the reporting year. There were no reports the government penalized 
victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit; 
however, due to irregular implementation of formal identification 
procedures, trafficking victims, particularly vulnerable migrants 
and individuals involved in commercial sex, may have remained 
unidentified within the law enforcement system.
PREVENTION
The government decreased efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
Ministry of Interior (MOI) maintained responsibility to coordinate 
government efforts to monitor mixed migration and combat human 
trafficking; however, the government did not report convening a 
coordinating body to implement anti-trafficking efforts during the 
reporting period. In 2020, the government created a specialized 
office within the National Directorate of the Police, which sits within 
the MOI, to coordinate migration issues, including those involving 
human trafficking; during the reporting period the office focused on 
patrolling areas known for commercial sex transactions, but did not 
report identifying any victims or reporting potential trafficking cases 
to law enforcement. For the sixth consecutive year, the government 
did not operationalize its 2015-2022 national action plan, hindering 
targeted anti-trafficking efforts. The MOJ’s website featured the 
government’s trafficking-related efforts throughout the year and 
publicized articles on human trafficking in addition to Djibouti’s anti-
trafficking law. The government did not report conducting targeted 
awareness campaigns to combat trafficking during the reporting 
period. The Ministry of Women and Family Affairs operated two 
24-hour hotlines to report cases of gender-based violence and refer 
victims to services, which could be utilized by trafficking victims; 
the government continued to publicize hotline information on its 
website and local radio and television stations. While the hotline 
reported it received five to 10 calls per day, the government did not 
report call data related human trafficking. Labor recruitment and 
placement companies were subject to random inspections by the 
inspector general; however, the government did not report how 
many inspections of these companies it conducted during the 
reporting period. The government conducted 30 labor inspections 
to enforce laws against forced labor during the reporting period, 
a decrease from 103 inspections in 2019; due to pandemic-related 
travel restrictions, officials conducted inspections in Djibouti City 
but not in the regions of Ali Sabieh, Dikhil, Tadjourah, and Obock 
as in previous years. The government did not report identifying 
any trafficking victims during these inspections or investigating 
any potential violations. The government did not make efforts to 
reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Djibouti. Adults and children, primarily 
economic and often undocumented migrants from Ethiopia and 
Somalia, transit Djibouti voluntarily en route to Yemen and other 
locations in the Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia. Traffickers, 
often outside of Djibouti, exploit an unknown number of these 
migrants in forced labor and sex trafficking in their intended 
destinations, and these irregular migrants are also at increased risk 
of trafficking in various transit points, particularly Yemen. Economic 
migrants who also pass through Djibouti to return to their respective 
countries of origin are vulnerable to trafficking. An international 
organization observed an increase in returning migrants during the 
reporting period due to travel restrictions or economic impacts of the 
pandemic in the Middle East. According to government estimates and 
an international organization, approximately 120,000 migrants—
predominantly Ethiopian—transited Djibouti (population of less 
than one million) in 2020, including both land and sea crossings, 
putting a significant strain on the government’s already limited 
resources. Due to the closure of Ethiopian borders in response 
to the pandemic, the number of entries from Djibouti's western 
borders significantly decreased from January to June 2020; however, 
the number of entries from Ethiopia sharply increased when land 
services resumed in July 2020. The civil war in Yemen continued 
to generate a reverse flow of persons from Yemen to Djibouti; 
migrants voluntarily fled or were illegally, forcibly deported from 







have been trafficking victims. As in previous years, the government 
allowed roughly 32,000 people of diverse nationalities to enter 
freely and take refuge, a practice dating to the start of the Yemeni 
war in 2015; some individuals in this population may have endured 
exploitation before their arrival in Djibouti and remained vulnerable 
to trafficking. Given the protracted political instability in Ethiopia’s 
Oromia region, many Ethiopian nationals, including unaccompanied 
children, continued to journey on foot from Ethiopia to Djibouti 
either to claim asylum with their families or to continue onward 
to destination countries in Gulf states. In response to increasing 
conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, Ethiopians of Tigrayan ethnicity 
in Djibouti were unable or unwilling to return to Ethiopia during 
the reporting period; many of these migrants reported abuses and 
may have been trafficking victims at various points on their journey, 
particularly in Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
Migrant and local children in Djibouti City, particularly along the 
Siesta Beach road, remain vulnerable to sex trafficking. Traffickers 
exploit Djiboutian and migrant women and street children in 
sex trafficking in Djibouti City, the Ethiopia-Djibouti trucking 
corridor, and Obock, the main departure and arrival point for Yemen. 
Increasingly, traffickers exploit migrant women in sex trafficking 
at truck stops and in restaurants and guest houses in Balbala, one 
of Djibouti’s poorest neighborhoods. Traffickers, including family 
members, exploit local and migrant children in forced begging 
and peddling. Traffickers may exploit foreign workers—including 
Ethiopians, Yemenis, Indians, Pakistanis, and Filipinos—in labor 
trafficking in the construction and food service sectors, and Cuban 
medical professionals working in Djibouti may have been forced 
to work by the Cuban government.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: TIER 2
The Government of the Dominican Republic does not fully meet 
the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is 
making significant efforts to do so. The government demonstrated 
overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting 
period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its 
anti-trafficking capacity; therefore the Dominican Republic was 
upgraded to Tier 2. These efforts included increasing efforts to 
investigate official complicity in trafficking crimes, paying restitution 
to a trafficking victim, prohibiting child marriage to reduce girls’ 
vulnerability to trafficking, and offering shelter and immigration 
relief for vulnerable Venezuelans. However, the government did not 
meet the minimum standards in several key areas. The government 
did not always apply minimum sentences as required by law; did 
not pass a revised trafficking law to remove the requirement to 
prove force, fraud, or coercion of sex trafficking victims younger 
than 18 years of age; did not effectively screen all vulnerable 
individuals for trafficking indicators or refer them to services; and 
did not report how many, if any, identified victims received care. 
Government services available for victims, including shelters, 
remained inadequate. 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase criminal investigations and prosecutions of government 
officials allegedly complicit in trafficking and impose stronger 
sentences. • Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers 
involved in forced labor and sex trafficking and apply appropriate 
sentences as ordered by law. • Proactively screen for trafficking 
indicators among Venezuelans, Haitians, other undocumented or 
stateless persons at risk of deportation, and Cuban medical and 
sports professionals to identify victims, refer them to care, and 
prevent re-trafficking. • Amend the 2003 anti-trafficking law to 
remove the requirement to prove force, fraud, and coercion of sex 
trafficking victims younger than 18 years of age to be consistent with 
international law. • Adopt and fund a new national action plan. • 
Fully implement protocols to identify adult and child trafficking 
victims and refer them to protective services. • Provide a dedicated 
budget for trafficking victim assistance services and provide dedicated 
shelters for adult and child victims of trafficking. • Provide adequate 
human and financial resources and training to law enforcement, 
prosecutors, and judges to combat trafficking, particularly in areas 
outside of Santo Domingo. • Involve survivors when developing 
and implementing anti-trafficking laws, regulations, and policies.
PROSECUTION
The government increased prosecution efforts. Dominican law 
criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking. The 2003 Law 
on Human Smuggling and Trafficking (Law 137-03) criminalized 
all forms of labor trafficking and some forms of sex trafficking and 
prescribed penalties of 15 to 20 years’ imprisonment and fines. 
Inconsistent with international law, the law required a demonstration 
of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex trafficking offense 
and therefore did not criminalize all forms of child sex trafficking. 
Article 25 of the Child Protection Code of 2003 criminalized the 
offering, delivering, or accepting, without regard to means used, 
anyone younger than 18 years of age for the purpose of sexual 
exploitation, forced labor, or any other purpose that demeaned 
the individual, for remuneration or any other consideration, and 
prescribed a penalty of 20 to 30 years’ imprisonment and a fine. 
All these penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect 
to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other 
serious crimes, such as rape. During the current reporting period, 
the foreign ministry led a consultation process with government 
agencies, NGOs, international organizations, and foreign donors 
for the modification of the law to remove the provision requiring a 
demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex 
trafficking crime; while the government completed an initial draft 
of the amendment, it remained pending completion and passage 
in the National Congress. 
The Attorney General’s Office (AGO) reported initiating 63 
investigations (59 for sex trafficking, four for labor trafficking) 
in 2020, compared with 26 investigations in 2019, 11 in 2018, 17 
in 2017, and 25 in 2016. The police anti-trafficking unit (ATU) 
reported initiating 44 investigations in 2020, compared with 
35 investigations in 2019, 45 investigations in 2018, and 83 in 
2017. Of the 44 investigations reported by the police, 36 were co-
initiated by the Special Prosecutor against Trafficking of Persons 
and Smuggling of Migrants’ office (PETT). An NGO reported 
assisting the government in the investigation of one of the cases 
that involved child victims. The government reported one ongoing 
labor trafficking investigation from a previous reporting period. The 
government reported initiating prosecutions of 42 defendants in 
2020 (36 for sex trafficking and six for labor trafficking), compared 
with prosecuting 47 defendants in 2019, 14 defendants in 2018, 
20 defendants in 2017, and 40 defendants in 2016. The AGO 
secured convictions of four traffickers, compared with five in 
2019, 22 in 2018, 16 in 2017, and 13 in 2016. Courts in Santo 
Domingo convicted two individuals in February 2020 for trafficking 
in persons for the purpose of sexual exploitation, psychological 
abuse, and sexual assault of children; they received 25 and 20 years’ 
imprisonment, respectively, were fined 175 times the minimum 
salary (1.75 million Dominican pesos or $30,100), and forfeited 
property to the government. The Court of Appeals upheld a 2019 
guilty verdict with a 25-year sentence in one trafficking case. In 





a trial court’s sentence in a previous reporting period of six years’ 
imprisonment for a sex trafficking conviction as inconsistent with 
Dominican law. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the NGO 
and increased the sentence to 15 years’ imprisonment, in accord 
with the Dominican trafficking law. In cooperation with a foreign 
government, the ATU made three arrests as part of a joint operation 
in September 2020, resulting in the identification of three female 
sex trafficking victims. The government reported it prosecuted 
four cases of sex trafficking initiated in prior reporting periods as 
procuring or pandering cases because it determined the individuals 
involved in commercial sex were not trafficking victims. 
Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained 
significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action during the 
year; the government increased efforts to investigate allegations of 
official complicity, although it did not initiate any prosecutions in 
these cases. The government reported opening one investigation into 
official complicity involving a regional employee of the AGO over 
allegations of leaks to suspects in a case involving sexual exploitation 
of children. The government reported it opened an investigation 
in November 2020 into two Dominican diplomats posted in 
Argentina accused of child sex trafficking of Dominican children 
in Argentina. The government reassigned the diplomats but did 
not report initiating prosecution in this case because no complaint 
was filed. The National Police opened a trafficking investigation 
into a member of the armed forces accused of accepting bribes at 
the border. The government completed two investigations initiated 
in the previous reporting period of three government employees 
assigned to the PETT. One prosecutor allegedly sexually abused 
an identified trafficking victim, while two police investigators 
allegedly provided confidential information to nightclub owners 
before planned raids to help them evade capture; the government 
suspended all three from their positions. The government did not 
prosecute the police officers due to lack of evidence; the government 
had not initiated prosecution of the public prosecutor by the end 
of the reporting period. The government did not report the status 
of a 2017 sex trafficking case involving police officers and members 
of the military. 
The PETT and the ATU were the principal law enforcement bodies 
pursuing trafficking cases, with police units in Santo Domingo, 
Punta Cana, San Cristóbal, Puerto Plata, and Boca Chica. The 
PETT had established liaisons in each of the 35 district attorney’s 
offices nationwide. However, the government concentrated 
its anti-trafficking resources in Santo Domingo, resulting in a 
lack of institutional capacity—including resources, training, 
and experience—to properly investigate and prosecute human 
trafficking cases in areas of the country outside of the Santo 
Domingo metropolitan area. NGOs reported Dominican authorities 
often lacked the training and technology for the identification, 
investigation, prosecution, and sentencing of both traditional 
and online trafficking crimes, sometimes favoring the rights of the 
defendant over those of the victim. NGOs suggested evidence of 
corruption and misuse of victim assistance funds, as well as the 
departure of specialized personnel from the PETT in recent years, 
including the current reporting period, significantly lowered public 
confidence in the government’s ability to investigate and prosecute 
trafficking cases or protect victims effectively. NGOs stated the PETT 
remained the weakest link in the government’s anti-trafficking 
response. The government also reported a lack of understanding of 
the nature of human trafficking among the Dominican population 
hindered effective identification and investigation of the crime. 
The government did not have courts specifically for trafficking 
cases, nor was there a separate judicial budget for trafficking. In 
response to the pandemic, courts closed in March 2020 and began 
to gradually re-open beginning in July 2020. Both the government 
and NGOs reported the courts created protocols for virtual and 
in-person hearings, but the number of cases processed by law 
enforcement both at the investigative level and in the courts fell. 
The government and local NGOs reported the pandemic may 
have pushed traffickers online into chat rooms and social media, 
which made the crime more difficult to identify. The pandemic 
also hindered investigators’ ability to collect evidence, and NGOs 
reported police attention shifted to enforcing nightly curfews and 
other public health-related measures. The government reported a 
lack of adequate personnel and equipment for the anti-trafficking 
police for the entire reporting period affected operations. Despite 
this, NGOs reported the ATU remained proactive and effective in 
investigating suspected trafficking cases. 
 The government reported training 153 defense, tourism, police, 
and immigration officials and civil society representatives on the 
detection of the crime of human trafficking and on fraudulent 
methods traffickers employ in cooperation with an international 
organization. The government also reported training 50 judges, 
prosecutors, and public defenders from the Supreme Court, AGO, 
and National Office of Public Defense on the Legal Protection Course 
on the rights of the child, including trafficking and child sexual 
exploitation, in coordination with an international organization 
and a foreign donor, and 80 Supreme Court and AGO judges and 
prosecutors on human trafficking and the sexual exploitation of 
children and adolescents in coordination with an international 
organization, an NGO, and a foreign donor. An NGO reported 
police cadets received training on human trafficking and sexual 
exploitation but that the training was insufficiently detailed and 
inaccessible to patrol officers. Authorities began a joint project 
with an NGO to improve the police cadet training curriculum. 
The government reported assisting three foreign governments with 
trafficking investigations, of which one resulted in a conviction for 
sexual exploitation of a child. An international organization reported 
the government participated in an INTERPOL law enforcement 
operation, along with 32 countries across four continents. Police 
authorities signed an agreement with the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police to expand cooperation against the sale of children, child 
prostitution and pornography, child trafficking, and other forms 
of child sexual abuse. The government continued cooperation with 
two foreign countries and an international organization on a 2019 
prosecutor anti-trafficking training project.
PROTECTION 
The government maintained victim protection efforts. Authorities 
reported identifying 95 victims (82 for sex trafficking and 13 for 
labor trafficking), compared with 195 victims in 2019, 96 in 2018, 
102 in 2017, and 157 in 2016. Of the 95 victims identified, 56 were 
Dominican and 39 foreigners; 54 were adults and 41 children. Of 
the victims of sex trafficking, 24 were girls, four were boys, and 54 
were adult females. Of the labor trafficking victims, six were girls 
and seven were boys. However, experts questioned the number of 
reported sex trafficking victims identified in 2020 and 2019, since 
it may have included individuals in commercial sex present during 
raids of nightclubs that did not identify as victims, and it may not 
have included potential Haitian victims not screened or referred 
before deportation, despite the known prevalence of trafficking 
among Haitian migrants. 
The government provided entrance and referred to care 12 adult 
female Venezuelan trafficking victims during the reporting period 
who were identified in a neighboring country. Upon arrival, the 
government, working with an international organization, provided 
shelter and 24-hour security for the victims. One victim remained 
in the country at the end of the reporting period and was working 
with an NGO to normalize her immigration status; the government 
collaborated with an NGO to return another victim to Venezuela 
at the victim’s request. 
The government did not report how many of the 83 additional 
identified victims received services and reported a lack of resources 
to provide assistance for victims, including shelters. The government 
reported housing trafficking victims in Ministry of Women domestic 












Counsel for Children and Adolescents (CONANI) temporary 
homes until they were reunited with their families, whereupon 
the government did not offer the victims additional services. The 
government centers did not offer specialized, expert care, and the 
government reported it did not have a dedicated budget for victim 
services or a full-time government shelter for adult trafficking victims; 
temporary shelter and food were provided to victims from PETT’s 
budget only after raids. Observers noted the AGO had not accounted 
for utilization of victim assistance donations conveyed as cash 
transfers from international donor organizations. The government 
largely relied on NGOs and religious-based organizations to provide 
accommodations for foreign and domestic trafficking victims in 
addition to psychological, reintegration, repatriation, and medical 
assistance and medical services. These organizations were inadequate 
in terms of staff skills and resources, and they lacked capacity to 
provide for the large number of victims in country. The government 
reported it started discussions with local NGOs about the need for 
dedicated shelters for trafficking victims. The government reported 
implementing health protocols for victim services in response to 
the pandemic. NGOs reported the pandemic did not affect the 
already low quality of the government’s victim referral efforts 
although due to restrictions few, if any, victims were identified 
from March to May 2020. 
Government officials reported having two protocols to identify and 
assist adult and child trafficking victims; the Ministry of Women 
was revising these with international technical assistance and 
funding. Observers noted authorities did not effectively implement 
the protocols, particularly with regard to detained migrants. The 
government worked with NGOs to screen for potential victims; 
although the government reported it had a process for referring 
victims to care with local NGOs, experts reported that it was not 
formal. The government had protocols to screen for trafficking 
victims when detaining or arresting individuals in vulnerable 
groups, but authorities acknowledged they had not yet applied them 
effectively. The government reported law enforcement conducted 
interviews to identify trafficking victims after raids of commercial 
sex establishments, but civil society representatives reported the 
government did not effectively implement its screening procedures. 
An international organization reported a joint project with the 
judiciary to develop an interview protocol for child victims and 
witnesses of crimes of sexual violence that established guidelines for 
abiding by applicable human rights concerns and intended to avoid 
re-traumatizing the victims and witnesses. The trafficking law did 
not provide immigration protections for trafficking victims whether 
or not they assisted with court cases. However, the government 
reported it did not detain or deport trafficking victims and if victims 
wished to return to their country of origin, the government would 
forgive the overstay fee they may have incurred. Local NGOs stated 
that although the government did not deport foreign trafficking 
victims, it also did not offer temporary residence or work permits 
or take constructive steps to regularize a victim’s immigration 
status after a short period of time. As a result, foreign victims may 
have found themselves without legal status, which increased their 
vulnerability to trafficking. The pandemic slowed the government’s 
efforts to repatriate foreign victims. 
The government permitted victims to work and offered legal 
assistance, although there was no report of the government providing 
such assistance to victims. This included legal assistance for victims 
who wished to file civil suits for restitution against their traffickers; 
NGOs reported prosecutors did not always pursue restitution for 
victims. The government, working with NGOs, offered protection 
to trafficking victims during the legal process, including videotaped 
testimony. Witnesses could provide testimony despite limitations 
imposed as a result of the pandemic, although the government 
reported this was more challenging when victims opted to leave 
NGO shelters. The government reported 12 victims gave testimony by 
video or written statements during the reporting period, compared 
with approximately 20 in 2019. However, the court system lacked 
a sufficient number of specialized cameras to allow victims to be 
interviewed in a safe environment to avoid re-traumatization. In 
February 2020, a court ordered two defendants to pay a child victim 
500,000 Dominican pesos ($8,600) in restitution. 
The government offered diploma certificate courses to 153 National 
Institute of Migration (INM) employees and 45 other government 
employees on Trafficking in Women, Children, and Adolescents: 
Strategies for Protection and Assistance to Survivors, in cooperation 
with an international organization. The government reported 
pandemic response measures reduced the number of training 
opportunities for victim identification procedures, but these trainings 
resumed as the country relaxed certain restrictions and adapted the 
courses for virtual delivery. The government reported no Dominican 
victims of human trafficking were identified abroad.
PREVENTION
The government slightly increased prevention efforts. The Inter-
institutional Commission against Trafficking in Persons and 
Smuggling of Migrants (CITIM) continued to function normally 
during the reporting period after moving its meetings online 
in response to the pandemic. The pandemic caused across-the-
board cuts in the government’s budget, and the government did 
not allocate specific funds for implementation of its national 
anti-trafficking plan beyond the standard operating budgets for 
CITIM institutions. The plan assigned goals, responsibilities, and 
deadlines to each of the 14 government agencies comprising the 
CITIM, and it was overseen by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). 
The MFA published on its website an annual evaluation of anti-
trafficking efforts of each CITIM member institution. Authorities 
reported undertaking an assessment of the current plan and began 
development of the subsequent plan, which was ongoing at the end 
of the reporting period. Draft anti-trafficking legislation included a 
proposal to earmark a portion of the existing tourism tax to fund 
anti-trafficking efforts, and it also included a new visa category 
for certain human trafficking victims. In addition, a new law 
prohibiting child marriage took effect in January 2021; the law 
aimed to prevent girls from becoming trafficking victims. Local 
NGOs reported traffickers used child marriage to mask child sex and 
labor trafficking. The government also announced it would begin 
to implement a program to normalize the immigration status of 
the estimated 115,000 Venezuelan migrants in the country, another 
group highly vulnerable to human trafficking. The program would 
initially provide a 60-day extension of stay to qualified Venezuelan 
migrants, who would then have the opportunity to apply for one-
year, renewable, non-resident work or study visas. 
The government reported it continued to disseminate material on 
billboards and to the local press and radio through the “Ojo Pelao” 
(“Eyes Peeled”) awareness and prevention campaign for potential 
victims, focusing particularly on commercial sex. The government 
instituted a state of emergency in March 2020, which reduced transit 
into and out of the country. However, the government reported it 
relaunched the national “No Hay Excusas” (“No Excuses”) campaign 
against child sexual exploitation, created community groups in 
tourist areas to raise awareness of trafficking, and worked with 
Haitian counterparts to address unaccompanied children crossing 
the border. The government reported it canceled trainings for 
the Specialized Tourist Security Corps between May to July 2020 
and face-to-face trainings on passport security measures between 
March and September 2020 due to the pandemic. The government 
reported that in response to the pandemic, INM expanded its course 
offerings in 2020 and modified the courses for distance learning. 
The government reported training 23 senior military officers on 
migration and human rights; 153 government officials and civil 
society representatives on awareness raising in the areas of migrant 
smuggling and human trafficking; 153 INM employees on basic 
trafficking concepts, the country’s trafficking profile, and victim 
assistance, in cooperation with an international organization; and 
330 air traffic, MFA, migration, and passport inspectors, servers, and 





security measures and mechanical reading. The government also 
reported the MFA implemented virtual training for 170 diplomatic 
and consular personnel on human trafficking and human smuggling, 
and it offered virtual talks on human trafficking for designated 
Foreign Service personnel. 
The national action plan delegated responsibility to conduct research 
on human trafficking to the INM. In 2019, with the financial support 
of an international organization, INM commissioned four research 
projects, two of which it completed and presented to a variety of 
stakeholders the same year and informed recommendations to the 
government on trafficking. Authorities were finalizing the third study 
addressing foreign children at risk of trafficking in the country at 
the end of the reporting period. The government also reported it 
was working with a local university to produce a study analyzing 
trafficking patterns of Dominican women in Spain, Switzerland, 
and Costa Rica. 
PETT operated a dedicated 24/7 national trafficking hotline and 
reported it received 37 calls during the reporting period. Four other 
general hotlines could also receive human trafficking calls in Spanish, 
English, French, and Creole. In addition, CONANI established a 
hotline during the reporting period for referral of children without 
appropriate care during the pandemic. The government reported 
the PETT hotline referred one case to the special tourist police, 
who investigated in collaboration with the National Directorate 
of Children, Adolescents and Family. Authorities identified and 
removed three victims, two girls and one boy. 
The labor code prohibited the charging of fees for the recruitment 
of workers; the recruitment of workers through fraudulent offers 
of employment; misrepresentation of wages, working conditions, 
location or nature of work; and the confiscation or denial of 
workers’ access to identity documents. The government worked 
with an international organization and a foreign donor to improve 
operations and capacity at the Ministry of Labor (MOL) to investigate 
potential labor violations. The government reported 41,953 labor 
inspection visits in 2020, a 45 percent decrease from 2019, due 
to the pandemic. Complaints about child labor could be made 
electronically, by telephone, or in person at any of the 40 offices of 
the MOL, and the government reported it had a system of referring 
children found during labor inspections to appropriate social 
services. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand 
for commercial sex acts. The government continued to participate 
in a multi-country operation to identify and investigate individuals 
traveling overseas who had been convicted of sexual crimes against 
children and may engage in sex tourism. The government denied 
entry to such persons at the second highest rate in the program. 
In 2020, the government reported two open investigations for the 
sale of tourist packages to individuals in the United States, Canada, 
and Europe, with the apparent inclusion of sexual contact with 
individuals identified as children. Authorities reported increasing 
personnel assigned to the protection and rescue program for 
children and adolescents run by the specialized tourist police, who 
also received additional equipment and opened a new facility in 
a popular tourist location for this program. Laws did not provide 
for the prosecution of Dominican citizens who engage in child 
sex tourism abroad.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
domestic and foreign victims in the Dominican Republic, and 
traffickers exploit victims from the Dominican Republic abroad. 
Dominican women and children were sex trafficking victims 
throughout the Dominican Republic, the Caribbean, South and 
Central America, Europe, the Middle East, and the United States. 
Foreign victims from Haiti and other parts of the Caribbean, Asia, 
and Latin America were trafficking victims in the Dominican 
Republic. Experts noted an increase in the number of Venezuelan 
trafficking victims in the Dominican Republic since the onset of 
Venezuela’s economic and political crisis. Cuban nationals working 
as doctors and baseball players may have been forced to work by 
the Cuban government. The Dominican Republic is a destination 
for sex tourists primarily from North America and Europe for child 
sex trafficking. Sex trafficking of 15- to 17-year-old girls occurs in 
streets, in parks, and on beaches. Traffickers operating in networks 
continue to employ methods to mask their activities, including 
the use of catalogs to sell victims to potential clients, using private 
homes, rented private apartments, or extended stay hotels to house 
victims. In cases of sexual exploitation of children, WhatsApp 
chats and social media are used to attract children and exploit 
them. NGOs report police complicity in areas known for child sex 
trafficking. Government officials and NGOs report an increase in 
traffickers recruiting Colombian and Venezuelan women to dance 
in strip clubs and later coerce them into sex trafficking. Traffickers 
lure Dominican women to work in nightclubs in the Middle East, 
Africa, the Caribbean, and Latin America and subject them to sex 
trafficking. The pandemic forced many companies to idle workers at 
partial salaries or lay them off entirely, increasing their vulnerability 
to trafficking. The government offered unemployment benefits, but 
many households sought informal labor opportunities; this, along 
with the fact that schools were closed entirely between April and 
November 2020 and did not offer an extended school day, likely 
increased the incidence of child labor. Dominican officials and NGOs 
documented cases of children forced into domestic service, street 
vending, begging, agricultural work, construction, and moving illicit 
narcotics. During the reporting period, the government described 
an increase in Dominican trafficking victims, specifically children 
brought from the interior of the country to coastal tourist areas. There 
are reports of forced labor of adults in construction, agricultural, 
and service sectors. Haitian women report smugglers often become 
traffickers for the purpose of sexual exploitation along the border, 
and observers note traffickers operate along the border with impunity 
and sometimes with the assistance of corrupt government officials 
who accept bribes to allow undocumented crossings. Unofficial 
border crossings remain unmonitored and porous, leaving migrants, 
including children, vulnerable to trafficking.
ECUADOR: TIER 2
The Government of Ecuador does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking 
capacity; therefore Ecuador remained on Tier 2. These efforts 
included increasing funding for victim protection and assistance; 
developing assistance protocols outlining minimum standards 
of care for trafficking victims in specialized and non-specialized 
shelters; amending the trafficking provision in the penal code to 
better align with the definition of trafficking under international 
law; adapting the interagency protocol to include COVID-19 testing 
and medical care for victims; establishing three provincial anti-
trafficking committees; and cooperating with foreign governments 
to bring traffickers to justice. However, the government did not 
meet the minimum standards in several key areas. The Ministry 
of Labor (MOL) did not make sufficient efforts to address forced 
labor; authorities did not investigate, prosecute, or convict cases of 
labor trafficking; and specialized services for all victims remained 
unavailable in most of the country, including for adults who made 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, including 
public officials complicit in trafficking. • Increase training for labor 
inspectors on indicators of forced labor, expand the MOL’s mandate 
to include inspections of the informal sector, and conduct proactive 
and unannounced labor inspections in formal sectors vulnerable to 
exploitation, such as banana plantations, floriculture, and mining. 
• Provide specialized services for victims of forced labor and sex 
trafficking, including adults, boys, and girls younger than the age 
of 12. • Amend legal provisions to explicitly prohibit employers 
from withholding passports, or travel documents from workers. • 
Appoint a specialized prosecutor to focus solely on trafficking crimes. 
• Create an anti-trafficking committee sub-working group focusing 
on prosecution. • Adopt comprehensive stand-alone anti-trafficking 
legislation that criminalizes all forms of trafficking in line with 
international definitions and stipulates protection measures and 
preventive techniques to combat trafficking. • Increase proactive 
identification and services for trafficking victims among vulnerable 
populations, such as irregular migrants, indigenous communities, 
LGBTQI+ individuals, some foreign workers, and individuals in 
commercial sex. • Increase victim-centered anti-trafficking training 
for police officers, judges, labor inspectors, immigration officials, 
social workers, and other government officials, particularly to enhance 
victim identification. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained prosecution efforts. Articles 91 and 92 
of the 2014 Criminal Code (COIP) criminalized all forms of labor 
trafficking and some forms of sex trafficking and prescribed penalties 
ranging from 13 to 16 years’ imprisonment. These penalties were 
sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate 
with those for other serious crimes, such as kidnapping. Article 91 
defined trafficking broadly to include all labor exploitation, child 
pornography, child labor, illegal adoption, and the sale of tissues, 
fluids, and genetic materials of living persons. During the reporting 
period, the government amended the definition of trafficking within 
Article 91 to better align with the definition of trafficking under 
international law. The amendment correctly established the use of 
force, fraud, or coercion as an essential element of an adult trafficking 
offense. However, the amendment did not include a necessary 
provision indicating that the element was unnecessary in the case of 
sex trafficking offenses involving child victims. Therefore, all forms 
of child sex trafficking were no longer explicitly criminalized under 
Article 91. Observers indicated that the absence of comprehensive 
anti-trafficking legislation remained a challenge in the fight against 
trafficking, due to confusion over the fact that different legal 
provisions, including the Human Mobility Law, the penal code, 
and the labor code, cover different aspects of the government’s 
response to trafficking. 
The Directorate for the Prevention of Trafficking in Persons and 
Migrant Smuggling, the lead anti-trafficking office within the 
Ministry of Government (MOG), indicated authorities initiated 
126 investigations into alleged trafficking cases in 2020, compared 
with 132 in 2019. Police conducted 18 anti-trafficking operations and 
arrested 22 suspected traffickers, compared with 15 operations and 25 
suspected traffickers arrested in 2019. In 2020, authorities prosecuted 
seven trafficking cases involving eight individuals, compared to 
eight trafficking cases involving 12 individuals in 2019. Authorities 
did not prosecute any cases of forced labor, compared with one in 
2019. The government convicted and sentenced eight traffickers, 
compared with nine in 2019. Authorities reported 13 ongoing appeals 
for convictions in trafficking cases from 2020 and previous years. 
During the year, sentences for traffickers ranged from four to 25 
years’ imprisonment. Most traffickers received serious and stringent 
punishments for their crimes, but during the reporting period, an 
appeals court revoked a four-year sentence prescribed for a trafficker. 
Some of the investigations, prosecutions, and convictions may 
have been for crimes that did not meet the definition of trafficking 
according to international law.
The National Investigative Unit for Trafficking in Persons and Illicit 
Migrant Smuggling (NIU), under the National Police Unit for Crimes 
against Children and Adolescents, was the primary law enforcement 
unit responsible for investigating trafficking cases. The National 
Specialized Unit for Investigation to Combat Transnational Organized 
Crime also investigated transnational trafficking crimes. Officials from 
the NIU received training in victim-centered investigative techniques 
but remained understaffed and under-resourced. In 2020, the NIU 
increased the number of investigators to 56 from 49; however, the 
frequent rotation of staff for mandatory police training reduced the 
number of operational staff for most of the year. The Specialized 
Prosecutor’s Office in Transnational and International Organized 
Crime had prosecutorial responsibility for trafficking cases at the 
national level; however, due to its broad mandate, most of its work 
focused on the prosecution of non-trafficking crimes. Authorities 
recognized sex trafficking was most prevalent in coastal provinces; 
however, government efforts to investigate and prosecute traffickers, 
and identify and protect victims in major port cities such as Guayaquil 
were deficient. The MOG—in some cases with the support of an 
international organization—trained 1,092 government officials, 
including police officers, community police chiefs, prosecutors, 
and judges in victim identification, victim-centered engagement, 
and investigating and prosecuting trafficking crimes, compared with 
605 trained in 2019. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government employees complicity in human trafficking 
offenses; and most complicity cases from previous years remained 
unresolved, including a case involving officials in Guayaquil who 
allegedly issued fraudulent identity documents to girls later exploited 
in sex trafficking. With support from an international organization, the 
MOG, the national police, and the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) 
drafted a guide to help law enforcement officials identify, handle, and 
use evidence in trafficking cases. The government developed protocols 
to coordinate the prosecution of transnational trafficking crimes with 
Colombia and Peru. Officials reported cooperating with Peruvian 
counterparts on the investigation of 10 transnational trafficking cases. 
In 2020, the AGO joined the Ibero-American network of specialized 
prosecutors working on human trafficking and migrant smuggling. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained strong protection efforts, despite a slight 
decrease in the number of victims identified. In 2020, authorities 
identified 140 victims and assisted 126 (compared with 186 identified 
and 125 assisted in 2019), of which an NGO identified 10 and assisted 
23. The government had a victim identification manual to aid with the 
proactive identification of victims, and authorities regularly referred 
victims to services. The MOG updated the interagency cooperation 
protocol to guide officials on how to test trafficking victims for 
the COVID-19 virus and provide those infected with appropriate 
medical care. In 2020, authorities dedicated $1.450 million for 
victim protection and assistance, compared with $422,700 in 2019. 
The government—in some cases with the support of international 
organizations—offered 11 training sessions on victim protection and 
identification, reaching 748 government officials from agencies in 
several provinces around the country. In partnership with NGOs, 
authorities continued to provide emergency and medium-term services 
to victims, including medical, legal, psychological, and educational 




The Human Rights Secretariat (SDH) was the entity responsible for 
assisting adult victims of trafficking. It operated five non-specialized 
shelters and 46 care centers where trafficking victims had limited 
options for general ambulatory services by interdisciplinary teams 
that comprised psychologists, social workers, and attorneys. The 
Ministry of Social and Economic Inclusion (MIES) was responsible 
for assisting adolescent trafficking victims. Three specialized shelters 
provided services to female adolescent sex trafficking victims. The 
government exclusively funded two shelters and provided limited 
funding for a third. Civil society organizations noted government 
assistance for victims was good but limited in most parts of the 
country. Police reported challenges finding shelters for victims, 
particularly in provinces outside the capital; thus, police sometimes 
placed victims in non-specialized shelters until space in a shelter 
became available. In 2020—with the support of a foreign government 
and the EU—the SDH and MIES officials developed two separate 
assistance protocols to outline minimum standards of care given to 
female adult and adolescent victims of trafficking in specialized and 
non-specialized shelters. During the pandemic, government officials 
reported identifying and assisting victims but noted measures taken 
to mitigate the spread of the virus, such as lockdowns and travel 
restrictions, hindered these efforts. International organizations 
expressed concern over the lack of protection for all victims, including 
victims of forced labor, boys, adults, individuals with disabilities, and 
girls younger than 12. According to an international organization, in 
2020, NGOs played a crucial role in helping the government carry 
out victim protection services during the pandemic. 
The Office of the Prosecutor General’s formal witness protection 
program (SPAVT) provided immediate support to victims, allowing 
them a 30-day reflection period before deciding whether to participate 
in the penal process against their traffickers. If victims chose to assist 
in the prosecution of their traffickers, the government continued 
to provide services through SPAVT; otherwise, officials referred 
child victims to MIES and adult victims to SHD to help with their 
reintegration. During the reflection period, services offered by 
the SPAVT included shelter, medical assistance, legal support, 
psychological care, job placement, and assistance with school or 
university admissions. The SPAVT program assisted 32 victims 
during the year, including five who received shelter, compared with 
44 assisted in 2019. The law entitled foreign victims to the same 
services as domestic victims. The government had mechanisms to 
repatriate victims, and Ecuadorian diplomatic and consular missions 
abroad had funding to provide food, lodging, and airplane tickets 
to Ecuadorian victims seeking repatriation. In 2020, authorities did 
not repatriate any victims identified abroad and reported six foreign 
victims requested temporary residency status. Officials could seek 
reparations for victims. However, authorities did not report any 
cases where courts ordered restitution compared with the previous 
year when judges sought reparations for victims in eight of the 
nine convictions, totaling $1.28 million. The Human Mobility 
Law guaranteed protection against refoulement to countries where 
the lives of victims’ or their relatives were at risk, including foreign 
victims of trafficking. Authorities reported they could grant temporary 
or permanent residency to foreign victims, and in cases where the 
victims wished to repatriate, the government assisted. 
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. The MOG chaired the 
Inter-Institutional Committee for the Prevention of Trafficking in 
Persons. In 2020, the national committee’s sub-working groups 
met virtually and with less frequency due to the pandemic. The 
prosecution working group met three times, and the protection 
and prevention working groups met twice. During the year, 
the national committee established three new provincial anti-
trafficking committees in Azuay, Imbabura, and Santo Domingo 
de los Tsachilas. The government continued implementing the 
2019-2030 national action plan for the elimination of trafficking 
(PACTA) and allocated funding for all interagency members of 
the anti-trafficking committee to implement PACTA-mandated 
activities. Authorities reported 90 percent progress in the PACTA 
work-plan developed for the year; however, pandemic-related 
funding cuts hindered some of the anticipated activities. The MOG 
began implementing a database to track human trafficking and 
human smuggling cases, an effort officials indicated improved 
interagency coordination. Authorities conducted 21 awareness-
raising events targeting the public, including employees in 
vulnerable sectors, teachers, and some youth; the events reached 
2,188 individuals. The criminal code prohibited sex tourism, but 
the government reported no investigations of child sex tourism 
cases and no prosecutions or convictions of child sex tourists 
in 2020. The Ministry of Tourism worked on a protocol to help 
hotels detect cases of sexual exploitation of children, including 
trafficking. In 2020, authorities shared the protocol for input 
with an international organization’s regional action committee 
focused on the prevention of child sexual exploitation in the 
tourism sector. 
Efforts to combat forced labor were deficient. The government did 
not have labor inspectors dedicated to identifying forced labor. 
While the MOL provided limited training to labor inspectors on 
trafficking indicators in 2019, authorities did not strengthen those 
efforts or close the significant institutional gap in their fight against 
labor trafficking. In 2020, the MOL conducted 522 labor inspections 
reportedly focused on foreign workers, but authorities did not report 
identifying any victims of forced labor or if those inspectors received 
training on trafficking indicators. The MOL reported inspecting some 
banana plantation and flower farms but did not report screening for 
trafficking indicators or inspecting other vulnerable sectors, such 
as hemp, mining, and palm plantations. The pandemic led to an 
economic crisis that created income loss for at-risk communities 
working in the informal sector, increasing their vulnerability to labor 
exploitation and human trafficking. NGOs and some government 
officials expressed concern the MOL did not make sufficient efforts 
to investigate forced labor. In addition, the MOL required employers 
to register the contracts of all foreign workers so authorities could 
verify they had adequate work conditions and salaries. While 
the law did not explicitly prohibit employers from confiscating 
workers’ passports or travel documents, additional provisions against 
collecting, archiving, processing, distributing, or disseminating 
personal data without an individual’s consent existed. However, the 
absence of a specific prohibition against the confiscation of workers’ 
passports or travel documents by a recruiter or employer increased 
the vulnerability of workers to remain on the job. The government 
did not report efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex 
acts. With the support of an international organization, authorities 
developed a guide for journalists to improve reporting on trafficking 
crimes, and separately, began developing an interactive map to track 
trafficking and smuggling cases. The government operated a hotline 
for the public to report crimes. In 2020, calls to the hotline led to 
an investigation that concluded with the arrest of one trafficker and 
the identification of three victims. In 2020, authorities shared the 
new protocols for the care of victims of trafficking in specialized and 
non-specialized shelters with Colombian officials, its communication 
strategy to mitigate trafficking of vulnerable populations with Peru, 
and details of a project for the intervention and restitution of rights 
for child victims of trafficking with Chilean counterparts. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Ecuador, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Ecuador abroad. Traffickers exploit Ecuadorian adults and children 
in sex trafficking and forced labor within the country, including in 
domestic service; begging; banana, hemp, and palm plantations; 
floriculture; shrimp farming; fishing; sweatshops; street vending; 
mining; and other areas of the informal economy. Sex trafficking 
was most prevalent in coastal provinces, including El Oro, Guayas, 






Esmeraldas, Loja, and Sucumbíos. Sixty percent of child female sex 
trafficking victims, whom one of the specialized shelters identified 
and assisted, originated from Quevedo, Los Rios province. Indigenous 
and Afro-Ecuadorians, Colombian refugees, and Venezuelan migrants 
are particularly vulnerable to trafficking. Women, children, LGBTQI+ 
individuals, refugees, and migrants continued to be the most at 
risk for sex trafficking; indigenous persons and Chinese workers 
are vulnerable to forced labor. Traffickers promising a better life to 
migrants from South and Central America, the Caribbean, and to a 
lesser extent, Africa and Asia, confiscate documents, impose debts, and 
threaten or force migrants into prostitution upon the victims’ arrival 
in Ecuador. Traffickers exploit Colombian, Peruvian, Venezuelan, and 
to a lesser extent Central American, women and girls in sex trafficking 
and domestic servitude and forced begging. Traffickers increasingly 
use social media networks to recruit and groom individuals to later 
exploit them in sex and labor trafficking. Haitians migrate through 
Brazil into Ecuador to seek jobs on banana plantations, where they 
are vulnerable to forced labor. Traffickers use Ecuador as a transit route 
for trafficking victims from Colombia, Venezuela, and the Caribbean 
to other South American countries and Europe. Traffickers recruit 
children from impoverished indigenous families under false promises 
of employment and subject them to forced begging, domestic 
servitude, or forced labor in sweatshops and street and commercial 
vending in Ecuador and other South American countries. Ecuadorian 
children are subjected to forced labor in illicit activities, such as 
drug trafficking and robbery. Traffickers exploit Ecuadorian adults 
and children in sex trafficking and forced labor abroad, including in 
the United States and other South American countries, particularly 
Chile and Colombia. Traffickers exploited Ecuadorian children in 
sex trafficking and forced labor in Chile, Colombia, Peru, and to a 
lesser degree in Argentina, Spain, and Suriname. Some Ecuadorian 
trafficking victims are initially smuggled and later exploited in 
commercial sex or forced labor in third countries, including forced 
criminality in drug trafficking. Allegedly, some corrupt Ecuadorian 
officials have alerted traffickers to law enforcement operations, 
and some local authorities assisted traffickers in procuring falsified 
identity documents, which resulted in victims’ lack of confidence 
in the police and a reluctance to report potential cases. Colombian 
illegal armed groups targeted and forcibly recruited Ecuadorian 
children living along the northern border. Traffickers lured vulnerable 
displaced Venezuelans with fraudulent employment opportunities, 
particularly those in irregular status, and later exploited them into 
sex trafficking and forced labor.
EGYPT: TIER 2
The Government of Egypt does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do 
so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts compared 
to the previous reporting period, even considering the impact of 
the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Egypt remained on Tier 2. These efforts included inaugurating a 
new specialized shelter for female and child trafficking victims, 
increasing prosecutions, and expanding efforts to train officials 
and raise public awareness. The government increased convictions, 
although convictions data included organ trafficking cases. However, 
the government did not meet the minimum standards in several 
key areas. The government reported referring a limited number 
of victims to services. Shelter and services for male and foreign 
victims remained insufficient. The government remained without 
effective victim identification and referral procedures; as a result, 
at times authorities penalized potential victims for unlawful acts 
traffickers compelled them to commit, such as immigration and 
prostitution violations. 






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Draft, finalize, disseminate, implement, and utilize country-wide 
procedures and guidelines for law enforcement, judicial, and other 
relevant officials to proactively identify and refer trafficking victims 
to appropriate care. • Increase investigations, prosecutions, and 
convictions of sex and labor trafficking, and punish offenders—
including complicit officials and child sex tourists—with sufficiently 
stringent sentences. • Provide protection services and shelters to 
victims of all forms of trafficking—including male and foreign 
victims—and allocate adequate resources and staffing for these 
services. • Implement measures to ensure authorities do not penalize 
trafficking victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to 
commit, such as immigration or prostitution violations. • Fully utilize 
specialized trafficking courts and continue to train judicial officials 
in these courts on a victim-centered approach for the treatment of 
victims and witnesses of trafficking crimes during investigations 
and court proceedings. • Continue to train all government officials, 
including police, security officials, judges, prosecutors, and social 
workers, on implementation of the anti-trafficking law, victim 
identification techniques, and victim referral procedures. • Provide 
a legal and regulatory environment that allows NGOs to provide 
services to trafficking victims and populations vulnerable to human 
trafficking. • Increase efforts to address and reduce the demand for 
“summer marriages” and commercial sex acts. • Amend the labor 
law to include labor protections for Egyptian and foreign domestic 
workers. • Improve data collection for human trafficking cases and 
disaggregate sex, labor, and other forms of trafficking. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained uneven law enforcement efforts. The 2010 
anti-trafficking law criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed penalties from three to 15 years’ imprisonment and 
a fine of between 50,000 and 200,000 Egyptian pounds ($3,190 
and $12,750) for offenses involving an adult victim, and up to life 
imprisonment and a fine of between 100,000 to 500,000 pounds 
($6,370 and $31,870) for those involving a child victim. These 
penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, 
commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such 
as rape. 
During the reporting period, the government investigated 259 cases of 
alleged sex and labor trafficking crimes involving at least 373 suspects; 
this was an increase compared to 154 investigations initiated during 
the previous reporting period. The 259 investigations included at 
least 52 adult sex trafficking cases, nine child sex trafficking cases, 
two domestic servitude cases, 136 child forced begging cases, one 
adult forced labor case, and two child forced labor cases. In addition, 
the government investigated 16 forced marriage cases. Despite 
a three-month partial closure of courts due to pandemic-related 
restrictions, the public prosecutor referred 41 trafficking cases to 
criminal courts in 2020, an increase from the 25 alleged perpetrators 
the government prosecuted during the previous reporting period. The 
government reported convicting 330 perpetrators for forced labor 
and sex trafficking in 2020, a significant increase from 67 convictions 
during the previous reporting period. However, convictions data 
included organ trafficking cases. Sentences ranged from one-year 
imprisonment and a fine of 100,000 Egyptian Pounds ($6,370) to 15 
years to life imprisonment (in absentia). The government reported 
appellate courts heard 125 trafficking cases between January 2019 and 
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February 2021 resulting in 25 acquittals. In addition, the government 
reported convicting nine officials for child trafficking and organ 
trafficking in public hospitals but did not provide additional details. 
The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) maintained 8 specialized judicial circuits 
in the courts of appeal with 30 judges assigned to prosecute human 
trafficking cases. The government continued to distribute updated legal 
guidelines for evidence collection, prosecution of trafficking cases, 
and victim protection to relevant authorities. During the reporting 
period, the National Coordinating Committee for Combating and 
Preventing Illegal Migration and Trafficking in Persons (NCCPIM & 
TIP) linked the 10 main prosecution offices to the main prosecution 
courts in Cairo via videoconferencing equipment to conduct remote 
capacity-building training in response to COVID-19 pandemic-
related restrictions. The NCCPIM & TIP, at times in partnership with 
international organizations, organized at least 24 anti-trafficking 
training sessions and capacity-building workshops for more than 
675 officials, including prosecutors, judges, diplomats, healthcare 
workers, and aviation officials during the reporting period. Despite 
these training efforts, NGOs and international organizations reported 
limited awareness of trafficking and victim-centered approaches 
impeded government efforts to hold traffickers criminally accountable. 
NGOs also reported law enforcement and judicial officials overly 
focused anti-trafficking investigations on transnational cases rather 
than more prevalent internal forms of trafficking. In addition, 
local officials often did not consider internal forms of trafficking 
to be criminal due to cultural acceptance or lack of awareness, and 
therefore did not consistently pursue investigations or prosecutions 
in these cases. 
PROTECTION
The government increased victim identification and protection efforts 
but services remained insufficient for male and foreign victims and 
unidentified victims continued to be penalized for crimes their 
traffickers compelled them to commit. The government reported 
identifying 519 potential trafficking victims during investigations 
in 2020. Of the 519 victims, at least 362 were Egyptian and three 
foreign nationals; at least 123 were adults (81 men and 42 women) 
and at least 242 were children (148 boys and 94 girls). The 
government reported providing assistance to all potential victims 
but did not specify what that assistance was. The government did 
not report disaggregated data on the type of trafficking involved. 
In the previous reporting period, the government only reported 
victims identified through the National Council for Childhood and 
Motherhood (NCCM) hotline which identified 49 potential child 
trafficking victims. Although NCCPIM & TIP reported providing 
victim identification training to officials, the government did not 
have standardized victim identification procedures operational. 
NCCM – in cooperation with an international organization – used 
standard operating procedures for handling child protection cases, 
which included instructions on handling child trafficking victims. 
NCCM also maintained 339 child protection committees around 
the country and worked with 38 NGOs to identify potential child 
trafficking cases. Despite these efforts, the government remained 
without an effective country-wide victim identification and referral 
system. Although the government maintained a national victim referral 
mechanism, authorities did not use it consistently throughout the 
reporting period. While some NGOs reported they received some 
victim referrals from various governmental entities, NGOs continued 
to report the referral mechanism was ineffective and underutilized, 
and various government stakeholders were unaware that it existed.
NGOs reported victim identification became more challenging due 
to pandemic-related movement restrictions that inhibited protection 
efforts and screenings for trafficking indicators. Authorities typically 
relied on NGO referrals or for victims to self-identify; however, NGOs 
reported that Egyptian and foreign female victims – particularly those 
among African migrants and refugees – were hesitant to report or 
file criminal complaints against traffickers or speak to interpreters 
due to fear of social stigmas. Ineffective victim identification and 
referral procedures contributed to authorities potentially punishing 
or penalizing unidentified victims for illegal acts traffickers compelled 
them to commit, such as immigration violations and prostitution. 
For example, NGOs reported police officers arrested and detained 
female victims of sex trafficking on wrongful charges of prostitution or 
debauchery; judges typically released these victims due to insufficient 
evidence to support the charges of the crimes. Foreign embassies 
in Egypt reported the government required foreign victims to pay 
overstay fees, thus preventing them from leaving the country and 
potentially hindering them from leaving situations of trafficking.
In November 2020, the NCCPIM & TIP inaugurated a specialized 
trafficking shelter in Cairo in cooperation with the Ministry of Social 
Solidarity (MoSS), NCCM, an NGO, an international organization, 
and a foreign government but did not receive victims during the 
reporting period. The shelter could accommodate 30 women and girls 
and was staffed by female psychologists, social workers, and medical 
staff. The government provided 1.25 million pounds ($79,670) for 
shelter operations during its fiscal year (July 2020 through June 2021). 
Foreign victims could not access the shelter, despite recommendations 
from stakeholders to allow foreign victims care at the shelter. Eight 
shelters for violence against women (VAW) run by the MoSS could 
receive female and child trafficking victims; foreign victims could 
access all eight VAW MoSS shelters; and male victims could access the 
remaining 45 MoSS shelters throughout the country. Several NGOs 
stated that MoSS shelters were not appropriate for some trafficking 
victims due to concerns about security and privacy procedures 
and a lack of adequately trained staff. In addition, these shelters 
sometimes required victims to provide identification, creating a 
significant barrier to access for some victims such as foreign victims 
whose traffickers had confiscated their identification documents; 
MoSS bylaws stated victims were able to access the shelters without 
identification documents for up to three days. Despite the new shelter, 
the government’s ability to provide services to trafficking victims, 
especially foreign victims, remained limited and the government was 
dependent on international organizations and NGOs to provide victim 
services, including repatriation. In some cases, embassies, including 
the embassies of Philippines and Indonesia, provided shelter to their 
nationals on a case-by-case basis. Egyptian labor law did not include 
protections for domestic workers, which continued to create greater 
vulnerabilities to trafficking among this population. The government 
continued to rely on international and civil society organizations to 
provide and fund victim assistance, but it did not provide financial 
assistance to these organizations, which affected their ability to offer 
protective services to victims. The government did not report efforts 
to support victim assistance in investigations and prosecutions aside 
from basic services; female victims of domestic servitude or sex 
trafficking reported a reluctance to cooperate in pursuing trafficking 
charges against their traffickers due to the fear of social stigma and 
retaliation. However, in at least one case, the government assigned 
an NCCM expert to provide child victims and their families with 
psychological support throughout the prosecution, including during 
their questioning by prosecutors. In addition, the government 
piloted a courtroom in Giza specialized for child victims of crime, 
including trafficking, which included video conferencing, separate 
waiting rooms for child victims, and a barrier allowing children to 
give testimony while protecting their identity and privacy. Article 27 
of the 2010 anti-trafficking law provided for a victim compensation 
fund but the government did not report establishing the fund. 
The government did not report whether prosecutors could pursue 
restitution in trafficking cases. Victims could file civil suits against 
their traffickers; however, the government did not report whether any 
victims received damages from civil suits during the reporting period.
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent human trafficking. 
The government continued to implement the 2016-2021 National 





strategy was implemented using the budget allocated to NCCPIM 
& TIP and the 29 member agencies of NCCPIM & TIP. NCCPIM & 
TIP continued to coordinate inter-ministerial anti-trafficking efforts 
throughout the reporting period. The government allocated 3.6 
million pounds ($229,450) to NCCPIM & TIP’s budget during its 
fiscal year (July 2020 through June 2021 for technical staff’s salaries 
and allocated an additional 20 million pounds ($1.27 million) to 
anti-trafficking public awareness campaigns in 2020. This represents an 
increase from NCCPIM & TIP’s budget in 2019 of 2.6 million pounds 
($165,710). NCCPIM & TIP’s mandate to address both smuggling and 
trafficking crimes may have impeded the government’s overall efforts 
to raise awareness about human trafficking as a distinctly different 
crime. NCCPIM & TIP and other governmental entities continued 
to conduct multiple awareness-raising activities throughout the 
reporting period, which included some campaigns in partnership 
with international organizations; one such campaign was a panel 
during the Cairo International Film Festival that reportedly reached 
millions of online viewers. The government also partnered with 
international organizations to produce and widely distribute to the 
public videos featuring former league champions of the Egyptian 
national handball team to raise awareness of sex and labor trafficking 
crimes in Egypt. During the reporting period, NCCPIM & TIP also 
continued distributing an anti-trafficking manual for Egyptian 
diplomatic missions and Egyptian laborers abroad. NCCPIM & TIP 
submitted semi-annual reports on its anti-trafficking efforts to the 
Prime Minister during the reporting period. In November 2020, the 
NCHR launched a trafficking-specific hotline; the National Council 
for Women (NCW), NCCM, and Administrative Control Authority 
also operated hotlines to which the public could report trafficking 
cases. NCCPIM & TIP reported the hotlines received 61 potential 
trafficking cases during the reporting period but did not report if any 
victims were identified or referred to protection services as a result. 
The government did not report whether Egyptian law prohibited 
employers, recruiters, or labor agents from switching contracts 
without workers’ consent or withholding wages, and labor laws did 
not include protections for domestic workers. In March 2021, the 
Parliament introduced draft labor legislation to improve protections 
for Egyptian and foreign domestic workers; the bill was pending at the 
end of the reporting period. In the absence of labor law protections 
for domestic workers, the government continued to promote a 
voluntary labor contract that employers of domestic workers could 
choose to use, which offered some protections for Egyptian domestic 
workers, but the voluntary labor contract did not provide protections 
for foreign domestic workers. The government did not make efforts 
to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts or child sex tourism. 
The government reported providing anti-trafficking training to its 
troops prior to their deployment as peacekeepers. Although not 
explicitly reported as human trafficking, the government investigated 
one Egyptian peacekeeper serving in the UN peacekeeping operation 
in the Central African Republic for potential sexual exploitation 
involving transactional sex in an incident from April 2020 with 
trafficking indicators; the investigation was ongoing at the end of 
the reporting period. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Egypt, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Egypt abroad. Traffickers subject Egyptian children to sex trafficking 
and forced labor in domestic service, street begging, drug trafficking, 
quarrying, and agricultural work in Egypt. Traffickers, including 
some parents, force Egyptian children to beg in the streets of Cairo, 
Giza, and Alexandria, or exploit girls in sex trafficking. NGOs report 
the lack of economic and educational opportunities cause family 
members, including parents, husbands, and siblings, to subject 
women and girls to sex trafficking to supplement family incomes; 
in some cases, family members rape women and girls to coerce or 
force them into prostitution. Child sex tourism occurs primarily in 
Cairo, Alexandria, and Luxor. Individuals from the Arabian Gulf, 
including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates, purchase 
Egyptian women and girls for “temporary” or “summer marriages” 
for the purpose of commercial sex, including cases of sex trafficking, 
as well as forced labor; the victims’ parents and marriage brokers, 
who profit from the transaction, often facilitate these arrangements. 
Traffickers reportedly exploit Egyptian children in sex trafficking and 
forced begging in Europe. Traffickers subject Egyptian adults to forced 
labor in construction, agriculture, domestic work, and low-paying 
service jobs in the region. 
Traffickers subject men and women from South and Southeast Asia 
and East Africa to forced labor in domestic service, construction, 
cleaning, and begging, as well as sex trafficking. In 2017, observers 
reported an increase in West African trafficking victims, although it 
was unclear if this was the result of increased victim identification 
or an actual increase in numbers. Male refugees and migrants are 
vulnerable to exploitative labor practices, including forced labor. 
Foreign domestic workers – who are not covered under Egyptian labor 
laws – primarily from Bangladesh, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, Nigeria, Sudan, South Sudan, and Sri Lanka are highly 
vulnerable to forced labor; employers at times require them to work 
excessive hours, confiscate their passports, withhold their wages, 
deny them food and medical care, and subject them to physical, 
sexual, and psychological abuse. Some employers file false claims of 
theft to further exploit domestic workers. Traffickers subject women 
and girls, including refugees and migrants from Asia, Sub-Saharan 
Africa, and the Middle East to sex trafficking in Egypt. In 2018, an 
international organization reported Colombian nationals were 
smuggled into Egypt to work in the entertainment industry, and 
in 2019, an NGO reported that employers in resort towns, such as 
Sharm El Sheikh, sexually exploit dancers from Colombia. Refugees 
from Syria, Sudan, South Sudan, and Yemen who live in Egypt are 
at risk of trafficking. For example, increasingly traffickers target 
Syrian refugees who have settled in Egypt for forced child labor, 
sex trafficking, and transactional marriages of girls that can lead to 
sexual exploitation, including sex trafficking and forced labor. NGOs 
reported in January 2020 that unaccompanied minors (UAMs) among 
the African migrant population are increasingly at risk of trafficking 
in Egypt; Sudanese gangs reportedly target UAMs to force or coerce 
the children to sell drugs or commit other petty crimes. Irregular 
migrants and asylum-seekers from the Horn of Africa, who transit 
Egypt en route to Europe, are increasingly at risk of trafficking along 
this migration route. During the reporting period, there were reports 
trafficking networks fraudulently recruited women from Guinea for 
employment in Egypt; the traffickers then exploited the women in 
domestic servitude or sex trafficking.
EL SALVADOR: TIER 2
The Government of El Salvador does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore El Salvador remained on Tier 2. These efforts included a 
significant increase in new prosecutions and an increase in forced 
labor investigations. The government coordinated with NGOs to 
provide assistance to the majority of identified victims. However, 
the government did not meet the minimum standards in several 
key areas. The government identified and assisted significantly fewer 
victims than the previous year. Only two of the 23 child victims 
identified received care at the government’s shelter. The government 
did not implement procedures to identify potential trafficking victims 
among children apprehended for illicit gang-related activity, and it 




did not initiate any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of 
officials for involvement in human trafficking or report progress on 
investigations from previous years. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
 Increase specialized services for trafficking victims, including shelters 
and access to services for adults, boys, and LGBTQI+ victims. • 
Develop and implement procedures to proactively identify victims 
among vulnerable groups—including individuals in commercial 
sex, children apprehended for illicit gang-related activities, and 
irregular migrants returning to El Salvador—and refer them to 
service providers for assistance. • Increase and institutionalize 
anti-trafficking training for police, prosecutors, and judges, with a 
focus on applying trauma-informed, victim-centered procedures. • 
Strengthen efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, 
including complicit officials, and obtain restitution for victims. • 
Provide reintegration services to support victims’ long-term wellbeing 
and extend witness protection services beyond the duration of a trial, 
particularly for victims who testify against members of organized 
criminal groups. • Amend the 2014 anti-trafficking law to include a 
definition of human trafficking consistent with international law. • 
Develop and allocate resources toward a new national action plan 
to combat trafficking. • Develop a case management system to 
improve data collection, sharing, security, and analysis related to 
trafficking cases. • Expand prevention measures, including through 
raising awareness of fraudulent recruitment for employment in El 
Salvador and abroad and enforcing laws against illegal labor practices 
that facilitate trafficking. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. The 2014 
Special Law Against Trafficking in Persons criminalized sex trafficking 
and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of 10 to 14 years’ 
imprisonment; these penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with 
respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for 
other serious crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent with the definition 
of trafficking under international law, the law considered the use 
of force, fraud, or coercion as an aggravating factor rather than an 
essential element of the crime; the penalties increased to 16 to 20 
years’ imprisonment for trafficking offenses involving these factors. 
The law defined trafficking broadly to include fraudulent adoption 
without the purpose of exploitation. The government also prosecuted 
trafficking crimes under other parts of its penal code. 
Police investigated 30 suspected trafficking cases (16 for sex 
trafficking, five for forced labor, and nine undetermined) in 2020, 
compared with 80 cases investigated in 2019 and 74 in 2018. Despite 
an overall decline in investigations, this marked an increase in the 
number of forced labor cases investigated compared with previous 
years. At least one case, which included the arrest of 10 suspects in 
November 2020, involved gang-related child sex trafficking crimes; 
however, authorities failed to adequately investigate whether one of 
the suspects—who was a child at the time of the alleged crimes—
may have been a victim compelled to commit unlawful acts. In 
2020, authorities initiated prosecution of 39 sex trafficking cases 
involving 31 suspects and convicted 12 traffickers, compared with 
nine traffickers prosecuted and 12 convicted in 2019 and nine cases 
prosecuted and seven traffickers convicted in 2018. Authorities 
did not initiate any labor trafficking prosecutions during the year. 
The government did not report sentences for convicted traffickers. 
Authorities arrested several officials and convicted one for smuggling 
crimes that may have increased migrants’ vulnerability to trafficking. 
However, the government did not report any new investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit 
in human trafficking offences nor progress in investigations from 
previous years. Corruption and complicity, including within law 
enforcement, the prison system, and local government, remained 
significant obstacles to anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts.
The government had 25 active staff members in its specialized 
anti-trafficking police unit and 15 specialized prosecutors in its 
anti-trafficking prosecution unit. Both units lacked sufficient human 
and material resources to effectively investigate and prosecute all 
cases, and the absence of an electronic case-management system 
limited efforts to collect, share, and analyze law enforcement 
information. However, the government relocated the specialized 
anti-trafficking prosecution unit to a building that included improved 
spaces for conducting interviews, including a child-friendly space 
for young victims and witnesses. The specialized prosecution unit 
initially suspended investigations and court proceedings for three 
months in response to the pandemic, then later adapted its efforts 
to continue investigations by phone. The government directed most 
anti-trafficking police to focus on pandemic mitigation efforts rather 
than identifying and investigating suspected cases of trafficking. 
Observers noted the attorney general’s office frequently assigned 
different prosecutors to handle different phases of a single criminal 
case, which hampered its ability to prosecute cases in an efficient 
and cohesive manner and provide consistency to victims. Experts 
noted some police used harsh questioning during victim interviews, 
leading to re-traumatization. Observers reported judges did not have 
an adequate understanding of trafficking laws or sufficient expertise 
in the evidentiary processes for trafficking cases, including the use 
of non-testimonial evidence to corroborate victim testimony. The 
government did not provide sufficient training for law enforcement 
or criminal justice officials, relying primarily on donors to fund 
trainings. The anti-trafficking prosecution unit suspended all 
scheduled trainings due to the pandemic and fewer than half of 
the members of the specialized police unit had been trained in basic 
aspects of human trafficking. The government reported unspecified 
law enforcement cooperation with Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, and the United States. 
PROTECTION
The government decreased victim identification and protection 
efforts. The government identified 37 victims, including 23 children 
and 14 adults, compared with 124 victims identified in 2019 and 53 
victims identified in 2018. Authorities identified 26 of the victims 
via calls to the police 911 emergency division. The attorney general’s 
office provided psychological care to 27 victims and collaborated 
with NGOs to provide financial assistance for lodging, food, basic 
necessities, and job placement to 36 victims; in comparison, the 
government provided assistance to 111 victims in 2019 and 50 
victims in 2018. The government maintained one trafficking victims’ 
shelter, which had the capacity to house 12 girls between the ages 
of 12 and 18, and provided services to two residents in 2020. 
The government repatriated two victims to Guatemala, and an 
international organization facilitated the repatriation of two victims 
to Costa Rica. 
The government’s 2018 Inter-Institutional Action Protocol for the 
Immediate Comprehensive Care of Trafficking Victims outlined the 
roles and responsibilities of government agencies in responding 
to trafficking victims. Immigration agents had a manual to guide 
identification of possible trafficking victims in border regions. 
However, the government lacked formal procedures to identify 
trafficking victims among most vulnerable groups, including 
individuals in commercial sex and children apprehended for gang-








training to officials responsible for receiving returned migrants 
and held a session on basic trafficking concepts for employees 
and residents of the government’s shelter, while an international 
organization conducted a virtual training for 335 front-line 
law enforcement officials in border regions on identifying and 
investigating suspected trafficking. Local experts reported police, 
immigration agents, and other first responders lacked sufficient 
training to properly identify, interact with, and protect victims, who 
were often mistaken for criminals and may have been punished for 
crimes their traffickers compelled them to commit. The Directorate 
General for Migration and Foreigners relocated its two-person 
anti-trafficking unit to the migrant reception center to improve 
its ability to identify potential trafficking victims among returned 
migrants and refer them to service providers, some of whom were 
co-located in the reception center. The center closed temporarily 
in 2020 due to the pandemic and reopened in January 2021. In 
December 2020, the Ministry of Labor (MOL) conducted a series of 
inspections in bars, nightclubs, and restaurants in San Salvador to 
identify child trafficking victims. These efforts were not effective in 
identifying any victims, and the ministry failed to coordinate with 
law enforcement or social service agencies, despite the potential for 
encountering child crime victims. Unlike last year, labor inspectors 
did not receive training on human trafficking. Also in December 
2020, police and immigration officials encountered five Cuban 
citizens they suspected to be trafficking victims. Officials did not 
follow appropriate procedures to investigate the case or refer the 
individuals to protective services, and the subsequent whereabouts 
of the potential victims remained unknown.
The government provided limited assistance to victims. The 
government shelter had a budget of $167,375 and provided 
residents with education and recreation, psycho-social care, and 
protective materials to prevent COVID-19 transmission. There were 
no trafficking shelters that accepted adults, boys, or LGBTQI+ persons 
of any age or gender, and access to government services for these 
groups was nearly nonexistent. The government offered few long-
term support or reintegration services to trafficking victims, leaving 
them at risk of re-trafficking. Judges did not order any convicted 
traffickers to pay restitution to victims in 2020. The government 
provided witness protection and support to identified victims—
including disguising victims’ identities in court and allowing victims 
to provide testimony by deposition or via teleconference—but such 
protection measures were only available through the duration of 
a trial. Observers reported instances of victim information being 
leaked from judiciary systems, undermining victims’ privacy and 
putting their safety at risk. 
Due to a lack of formal identification procedures, particularly among 
children apprehended for gang-related criminal activity, authorities 
may have detained or jailed some unidentified victims for unlawful 
acts their traffickers compelled them to commit. The 2014 trafficking 
law provided foreign victims the right to seek residency status, which 
would allow them to work legally. A 2019 immigration law granted 
foreign victims the right to obtain residency—with multiple entry 
and exit permission and the ability to work—for an initial period 
of up to two years with the option to extend; no foreign victims 
received residency benefits during the year. 
PREVENTION
The government decreased prevention efforts. The national anti-
trafficking council, led by the Ministry of Public Security and 
Justice, coordinated anti-trafficking efforts among 12 government 
institutions. However, the country’s national anti-trafficking action 
plan ended during the previous reporting period, and the council 
did not draft a new plan as required by law. The council did not 
produce or share information on its legally required annual report 
on anti-trafficking efforts for 2020. The government coordinated 
with civil society organizations to conduct awareness campaigns 
for children and young adults, but it did not provide funding for 
these efforts. 
Neither the Labor Code nor the Penal Code specified fines or 
punishment for fraudulent recruitment of workers. The MOL 
managed the majority of El Salvador’s H-2A visa recruitment 
process and maintained its website, which included information 
on Salvadorean workers’ rights and warnings against fraudulent 
recruitment tactics. The MOL did not make similar statements 
against fraudulent recruitment practices for domestic employment. 
The Labor Code prohibits withholding pay, but the government 
did not effectively enforce this provision. In February 2020, the 
supreme court issued a decision requiring within 12 months the 
establishment and implementation of a minimum wage for domestic 
workers through executive decree; the government did not issue 
such a decree during the reporting period. Local experts reported 
the National Registry of Natural Persons closed temporarily as a 
result of the pandemic, creating difficulties for registering births, 
and the government’s imposition of a fee for birth certificates after 
90 days posed a financial barrier to some individuals for obtaining 
documentation for their children, increasing their vulnerability 
to human trafficking. Salvadoran law criminalized sex tourism 
and prescribed penalties of four to 10 years’ imprisonment, but 
authorities did not report any investigations or prosecutions of sex 
tourism crimes. The government did not make efforts to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex acts. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in El Salvador, and traffickers exploit victims 
from El Salvador abroad. Traffickers exploit adults and children 
in sex trafficking within the country; children without parents, 
adolescent girls, and LGBTQI+ persons, especially transgender 
persons, are at particular risk. NGOs reported sex trafficking occurred 
in the tourism industry. Traffickers often exploit victims within 
their own communities or homes, sometimes their own children 
or other family members. Traffickers exploit Salvadoran adults and 
children in forced labor in agriculture, domestic service, begging, 
and the textile industry. Traffickers exploit adults and children 
from neighboring countries—particularly Honduras, Guatemala, 
and Nicaragua—in sex trafficking and forced labor in construction, 
domestic service, or the informal sector. Traffickers recruit victims in 
regions of the country with high levels of violence and capitalize on 
existing fears to coerce victims and their families through threats of 
violence. Limited government presence in gang-controlled territory 
exacerbates trafficking risks among vulnerable groups and limits 
their access to justice and protection. Gangs use the pretense of 
domestic employment to lure women into forced labor; gangs force 
some victims to marry strangers and convince their spouse to take 
out life insurance policies, which the gang members collect after 
murdering the spouse. Transnational criminal organizations and 
gangs recruit, abduct, train, arm, and subject children to forced 
labor in illicit activities—including assassinations, extortion, 
and drug trafficking. These groups subject women and children, 
including LGBTQI+ children, to sex trafficking and forced labor 
in domestic service and child care. Traffickers exploit Salvadoran 
men, women, and children in sex trafficking and forced labor in 
Belize, Guatemala, Mexico, and the United States. Traffickers exploit 
some Salvadorans who irregularly migrate to the United States in 
forced labor, forced criminal activity, and sex trafficking en route or 
upon arrival. Traffickers exploit some Central and South American, 
African, and Asian migrants who transit El Salvador to Guatemala 
and North America in sex and labor trafficking. Individuals without 
personal identification documents are highly vulnerable to trafficking. 
Traffickers increasingly use social media and messaging platforms 
to lure victims, including through false employment offers, and 
facilitate their exploitation. Corruption and complicity, including 
within law enforcement, the prison system, and local government, 




EQUATORIAL GUINEA: TIER 2 
WATCH LIST
The Government of Equatorial Guinea does not fully meet the 
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making 
significant efforts to do so. These efforts included prosecuting two 
potential trafficking cases, developing formal victim screening and 
referral procedures, expanding the inter-ministerial coordinating 
body to include more agencies, and allocating more funding for anti-
trafficking efforts. Additionally, authorities investigated two potential 
cases of trafficking. However, the government did not demonstrate 
overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, 
even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-
trafficking capacity. The government has never convicted a trafficker 
under its 2004 anti-trafficking law and authorities did not identify 
any confirmed victims during the reporting period. Official awareness 
of trafficking remained low despite increasing sensitization and 
training efforts, and the government’s anti-trafficking law did not 
criminalize all forms of trafficking. Further, there were allegations 
military officials were complicit in a sex trafficking ring in Spain. 
Therefore Equatorial Guinea remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the 
second consecutive year.






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Significantly increase efforts to investigate and prosecute traffickers. 
• Establish as a policy priority the proactive identification of victims 
of trafficking—separate from fraudulent adoptions or other forms of 
abuse—including in vulnerable communities such as child laborers 
in markets; women in commercial sex; domestic and construction 
workers; undocumented immigrants; and North Korean and 
Chinese workers. • Amend the 2004 anti-trafficking law—or pass 
amendments to the penal code—removing the requirement of a 
demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion in child sex trafficking 
cases. • Form and provide resources to an independent agency 
mandated to improve the government’s capacity to investigate 
and prosecute traffickers and identify victims. • Draft, finalize, and 
resource an updated anti-trafficking national action plan to enhance 
governmental coordination. • Improve coordination between the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Gender Equality and the Ministries of 
Interior and Local Corporations, Labor, National Security, and other 
agencies, as well as international organizations and civil society, to 
disseminate and implement formal procedures for law enforcement 
and first responders to identify and refer trafficking victims to care. 
• Continue to expand training for law enforcement and judicial 
officials to increase their capacity to investigate, prosecute, and—
following a fair and transparent trial—sentence convicted traffickers 
under the anti-trafficking law. • Continue to train social workers, 
law enforcement, labor inspectors, and immigration officials on 
trafficking indicators. • Increase funding for victim services and 
coordinate with civil society as well as NGOs to provide shelter for 
all identified trafficking victims. • Continue to include local officials 
in the nation-wide anti-trafficking public awareness campaigns to 
educate more individuals on trafficking indicators and enhance 
their ability to report potential victims to first responders using the 
government’s hotline or web-based portal. • Further research the extent 
and nature of human trafficking within the country according to the 
national action plan, and draft an annual public report describing 
the government’s efforts. 
PROSECUTION
The government decreased anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. 
The 2004 Law on the Smuggling of Migrants and Trafficking in Persons 
criminalized some forms of sex trafficking and all forms of labor 
trafficking and prescribed penalties of 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment 
and a fine of at least 50 million Central African francs (CFA) ($94,470) 
if the offense involved an adult victim; an additional five years would 
be added to the principal penalty for offenses involving a child 
victim. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard 
to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other 
serious crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent with international law, 
Equatorial Guinea’s legal framework required a demonstration of 
force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex trafficking offense, 
and therefore it did not criminalize all forms of child sex trafficking. 
Additionally, the law defined trafficking broadly to include illegal 
adoption without the purpose of exploitation. The government drafted 
new penal code articles in 2019 with increased victim protection 
requirements; however, parliament had not approved the articles 
at the end of the reporting period.
The government did not maintain comprehensive law enforcement 
statistics and had severely limited information management 
capabilities. Officials did not report investigating any confirmed 
trafficking cases during the reporting period compared with arresting 
and prosecuting two suspected traffickers in 2019. The Ministry of 
Justice stated it opened investigations into two cases of illegal sale 
of a child that may have included aspects of human trafficking in 
2020. Judicial authorities dismissed an additional possible trafficking 
case in 2021 due to a lack of evidence. Further, officials coordinated 
with a foreign government on a possible trafficking case involving 
an Equatoguinean national and launched a commission of inquiry 
into reports of soldiers sexually exploiting minors; the commission 
referred the case to judicial officials and the investigation was ongoing 
at the end of the rating period. The government has never convicted 
a trafficker under its 2004 trafficking law. Judicial officials noted a 
lack of training results in authorities frequently prosecuting and 
convicting potential trafficking cases under related statutes, such as 
kidnapping, illegal adoption, or physical abuse. 
In October and November 2020, the Director General of Human 
Rights provided training to approximately 200 law enforcement 
officers on victim-centered approaches; in 2019, the government 
provided a related training for 170 individuals. Also during the 
reporting period, Ministry of Justice officials facilitated a training 
workshop for 50 judges and state prosecutors on basic trafficking 
principles. 
The government did not report any prosecutions or convictions of 
government employees complicit in human trafficking offenses; 
however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes 
remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action 
during the year. In February 2021, Spanish authorities reported 
investigating a sex trafficking network exploiting women and girls 
in Spain, allegedly perpetrated with assistance from Equatoguinean 
military officials who may have falsified the victims’ identity 
documents; the investigation was ongoing at the close of the reporting 
period. Equatoguinean authorities opened a formal inquiry into the 
allegations but stated there was insufficient evidence to prosecute 
any of the suspects at the close of the rating period. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained limited efforts to identify victims. In 
2020, the government did not report identifying any confirmed 
trafficking victims, compared with identifying and providing basic 
services for one potential victim in 2019. Over the course of the 
reporting period, the Ministry of Social Affairs coordinated with 
the ministries of National Security and Health to develop standard 
screening and referral procedures to help first responders identify 
victims more effectively; the government did not implement these 











reporting channels for community leaders to share cases of domestic 
violence and other abuses to regional delegates could be used to relay 
suspected trafficking cases; officials disclosed no cases were reported 
via these channels. Pandemic-related movement restrictions affected 
the government’s protection efforts by limiting officials’ ability to 
inspect key sectors for trafficking victims.
Unlike the previous reporting period, the government did not screen 
individuals employed in the regulated commercial sex trade for 
trafficking indicators, despite reports of sex trafficking occurring in 
that sector. Officials continued to designate government housing as 
temporary shelters for victims of trafficking and domestic violence, 
although authorities did not report referring any victims to these 
shelters. 
The government increased its allocated budget for NGOs from 
$100,000 to $566,829 in 2020 to bolster their capacity to provide 
services to trafficking victims and to raise awareness of the crime 
among vulnerable populations. The government had no formal 
policies to provide foreign trafficking victims legal alternatives to their 
removal to countries where they might face retribution or hardship. In 
2020, there were no reports authorities penalized trafficking victims 
for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit; due to a 
lack of widely used formal victim identification procedures, however, 
officials may have deported or arrested some unidentified trafficking 
victims. During the reporting period, government officials in Spain 
provided assistance to Equatoguinean victims identified in a case 
that allegedly involved complicity by some members of the military. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. Civil 
society and government officials’ minimal awareness of the crime, 
as well as the lack of a leading government entity to coordinate key 
actors’ efforts, continued to impede the country’s anti-trafficking 
efforts. To address this deficiency, the government continued its 
nationwide sensitization campaign in 2020 and early 2021 using 
radio and television to increase Equatoguineans’ understanding of 
human trafficking. The Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of 
Information, Press, and Radio initiated multiple awareness raising 
programs leveraging the government’s national television and 
radio station, including interviews with senior officials such as the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, the Director General of 
Human Rights, and with senior officials from a foreign government. 
The Ministry of Labor’s web-based reporting platform and hotline 
remained active and available for individuals to anonymously report 
potential trafficking cases as did the Ministry of National Security’s 
new hotlines for reporting crimes to the police. The government 
disclosed that it did not receive any trafficking-related calls in 2020. 
Restrictions on in-person gatherings to slow the spread of COVID-19 
resulted in authorities postponing multiple planned sensitization 
and training events. Some events, such as a training by international 
experts for government officials, took place virtually. 
Per the country’s 2019-2021 national action plan, the government 
created an interdepartmental committee including representatives 
from the attorney general’s office, Department of Human Rights, 
as well as the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Social Affairs, Interior, 
National Security, Information, Health, Labor, Justice, Education, 
Finance, National Defense, Culture, and Civil Aviation; the committee 
convened monthly to monitor action plan activities. The government 
reported allocating 50 million CFA ($94,470) for the Ministry of 
Justice to bolster its anti-trafficking efforts and 300 million CFA 
($566,830) for NGOs, compared with allocating $149,000 for 
NGOs to implement trainings during the previous reporting period. 
In September 2020, the Ministry of Interior, in collaboration with an 
NGO and a foreign government, hosted two three-day seminars for 
civil society actors on human trafficking in the country’s two largest 
cities: Malabo and Bata. Additionally, officials collaborated with an 
international organization as well as a foreign government to host 
a three-day training seminar in November 2020 to strengthen the 
country’s institutional capacity to combat human trafficking. During 
the previous reporting period, the government funded a nationwide 
anti-trafficking initiative for more than 700 government workers 
and civil society actors to address a widespread lack of knowledge 
of trafficking among officials and the general population.
The Ministry of Labor continued to implement regulations requiring 
all companies to sign formal labor contracts with their employees. 
During the reporting period—except during the March to July 
2020 pandemic lockdown and the partial lockdown that started in 
February 2021—Ministry of Labor officials inspected some businesses 
in the formal and informal sectors for human trafficking; ministry 
representatives did not report identifying any victims through their 
inspections. 
Border security officials stated they increased cooperation with 
Gabonese and Cameroonian counterparts on screening for potential 
victims of trafficking; however, they did not report identifying any 
victims resulting from this coordination during the reporting period 
though they identified potential victims the government suspected 
were in fact fraudulent adoptions. Additionally, the government signed 
an agreement with Burundi in 2020 to formalize labor recruitment 
standards. Commercial sex was legal in the country and, in an attempt 
to decrease exploitation of vulnerable individuals and demand 
for commercial sex acts, the government continued implementing 
regulations requiring all commercial sex establishments to register 
and provide contracts to their workers. Ministry of Culture, Tourism 
and Artisanal Promotion reported that in 2020, it implemented 
preventive measures to fight against sex tourism involving children 
at the national level, including through awareness programs for 
representatives of hotels, hostels, and all tourist venues.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Equatorial Guinea, and traffickers exploit 
victims from Equatorial Guinea abroad. Many civil society members 
and government officials lack an understanding of human trafficking, 
hindering the country’s ability to identify victims and address the 
crime. Observers reported Equatoguineans exploit the majority of 
trafficking victims in forced labor in domestic service and commercial 
sex in the cities of Malabo, Bata, Mongomo, and Ebebiyin, where 
relative wealth and security attracts Central and West African migrant 
workers. Equatoguinean traffickers exploit local and foreign women 
in commercial sex in these cities, with the Malabo neighborhoods 
of Banapa, Paraiso, and the city center primary areas of concern. 
Experts noted the sustained economic downturn due to decreasing 
oil prices and oil production—exacerbated by the global economic 
contraction caused by the pandemic—resulted in Equatoguineans in 
urban centers replacing some foreign domestic workers with children 
from rural areas in Equatorial Guinea, whom they then exploited in 
forced labor. Some business owners involved in the hospitality and 
restaurant sectors exploit hotel and bar workers in forced labor and 
commercial sex within the country’s urban centers. Experts report 
LGBTQI+ youth are often left homeless and stigmatized by their 
families and society, increasing their vulnerability to trafficking. 
Measures to control the pandemic’s spread—including a months-
long border closure and mandatory curfews for the populace—likely 
increased the vulnerability of migrants and informal sector workers. 
Equatoguinean business owners reportedly exploit children from 
nearby countries—primarily Benin, Cameroon, Gabon, Nigeria, and 
Togo—in forced labor as domestic workers, market laborers, vendors, 
and launderers. Observers reported Equatoguinean traffickers—some 
of whom may be associated with the country’s elites—may exploit 
women from Brazil, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Venezuela, and 
China in commercial sex at nightclubs, bars, and brothels in the 
country. Traffickers may exploit Equatoguineans in Spain. During 




Equatoguinean military falsified identity documents to facilitate a 
sex trafficking ring in Menorca, Spain involving women and girls. 
Some business owners recruit women from Benin, Cameroon, 
Ethiopia, and other African countries for work in Equatorial Guinea, 
and exploit them in forced labor or sex trafficking in markets, hair 
salons, or commercial sex. Chinese firms recruit Chinese nationals to 
migrate to Equatorial Guinea for work or to engage in commercial sex; 
some of these businesses then confiscate workers’ passports, which 
increases their vulnerability to forced labor or sex trafficking. A small 
number of North Koreans working in Equatorial Guinea may have 
been forced to work by the North Korean government. Companies 
in the construction sector, among others, also sometimes held the 
passports of foreign workers, increasing their vulnerability to forced 
labor. Experts reported some corrupt and complicit government 
workers—including senior officials as well as elected representatives—
participated in trafficking-related crimes during the reporting period.
ERITREA: TIER 3
The Government of Eritrea does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts 
to do so, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Eritrea remained on 
Tier 3. During the reporting period, there was a government policy or 
pattern of human trafficking. The government continued to exploit 
its nationals in forced labor in its compulsory national service and 
citizen militia by forcing them to serve for indefinite or otherwise 
arbitrary periods. Despite the lack of significant efforts, the government 
took some steps to address trafficking, including coordinating 
with an international organization to contribute to an East Africa 
regional action plan. However, the government did not report any 
trafficking investigations, prosecutions, or convictions and did not 
identify any victims of trafficking. The government did not report 
holding any complicit officials accountable for trafficking crimes. 
Authorities did not report the development of formal procedures 
for the identification and referral of victims to care, nor did the 
government report providing any services directly to victims.






2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Enact and implement an anti-trafficking law that criminalizes all 
forms of trafficking and prescribes penalties that are sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to forced labor, commensurate with 
those prescribed for other grave crimes. • Enforce existing limits 
on the length of active national service to 18 months as set forth 
in the Proclamation of National Service 11/199. • Extend existing 
labor protections to persons performing National Service and other 
mandatory citizen duties. • Develop and implement procedures 
to identify trafficking victims and refer them to services, including 
both domestic and foreign victims. • Provide protective services to 
all trafficking victims, including domestic and foreign victims. • 
Train all levels of the government to identify and address trafficking 
crimes. • Increase partnerships with international organizations and 
NGOs to combat human trafficking.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained negligible anti-trafficking law 
enforcement efforts. The Eritrean Penal Code of 2015 criminalized 
some forms of trafficking in persons. Article 315 criminalized 
trafficking in women and young persons for sexual exploitation, 
which was punishable by up to seven years’ imprisonment; these 
penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, 
commensurate with punishments prescribed for other serious crimes, 
such as kidnapping. Article 297 criminalized enslavement and 
prescribed penalties of seven to 16 years’ imprisonment, which 
were sufficiently stringent. Article 299 criminalized forced labor 
and prescribed penalties from six to 12 months’ imprisonment or 
a fine of 20,000 to 50,000 nakfa ($1,330-$3,330). These penalties 
were not sufficiently stringent.
The government has not reported investigating, prosecuting, 
or convicting any suspected traffickers for the last 13 years. The 
government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government officials complicit in human trafficking 
offenses; however, official complicity in trafficking crimes remained 
a significant concern, inhibiting law enforcement action during the 
year. The government continued to enforce arbitrary limits to the 
compulsory National Service for the 23rd consecutive year. Reports 
alleged some partially or wholly government-funded enterprises 
employed National Service workers. The government did not report 
on efforts to train law enforcement during the reporting period, 
compared with conducting at least two anti-trafficking trainings and 
participating in a regional workshop on police cooperation during 
the previous reporting period. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained inadequate victim protection efforts. 
The government has not reported any efforts to identify or protect 
trafficking victims since reportedly providing repatriation assistance 
to Eritrean victims in 2015. The government did not report having 
formal procedures to proactively identify trafficking victims among 
vulnerable groups. Eritreans fleeing the country and Eritrean refugees 
in neighboring countries remained particularly vulnerable to the 
government indiscriminately arresting, detaining, harassing, or 
forcibly recalling them into the National Service. The government 
did not report having or developing a systematic mechanism for 
the referral of identified trafficking victims to care. In addition, it 
did not provide information on its funding for victim protection or 
provision of incentives for victims to assist in trafficking investigations 
or prosecutions. The government did not report providing foreign 
victims with legal alternatives to their removal to countries where 
they faced retribution or hardship; however, Eritrea maintained a 
policy against forced deportations. Eritrean law requires offenders 
in all crimes to pay restitution, although victims have the option 
of suing for such in civil court rather than have the criminal court 
impose it. If an offender’s assets are too limited to pay both restitution 
and the associated fines, the government mandates restitution be 
paid first. There were no reports that courts imposed this penalty 
for trafficking crimes during the reporting period. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained minimal efforts to prevent trafficking. 
The government continued to subject its nationals to forced labor by 
forcing them to serve for indefinite or otherwise arbitrary periods in 
its compulsory national service and citizen militia. The government 
maintained an interagency steering committee on trafficking and 
migration issues; however, the government did not report any 
action taken by the steering committee during the reporting period. 
The government remained without a formal national action plan 
to combat human trafficking. For the second consecutive year, 
the government participated in a regional anti-trafficking meeting 
sponsored by an international organization. Officials continued 
to coordinate with an international organization’s regional anti-
trafficking project, intended to create an East Africa region-wide action 
plan with complementary national-level plans. The government did 
not report conducting any anti-trafficking awareness campaigns, 






educated its citizens on the dangers of human trafficking through 
awareness-raising events, poster campaigns, and mass convocations 
and exhortations. The government did not report operating a hotline 
to provide potential victims of trafficking with a number to call for 
assistance or information about human trafficking. The government 
did not report on its efforts to reduce the demand for commercial 
sex acts, nor did it report providing anti-trafficking training for its 
diplomatic personnel.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
victims and may exploit foreign victims in Eritrea, and traffickers 
exploit victims from Eritrea abroad. Perennially, thousands of Eritreans 
who flee the country are smuggled migrants seeking to be reunited 
with family members already overseas; are those who sought to escape 
human rights abuses, including arbitrary arrest and detention, lack 
of due process, and religious persecution; were in search of better 
economic opportunities; or hoped to avoid the often indefinite 
periods of service in the government’s mandatory National Service. 
Proclamation 82 of 1995 requires all persons aged 18 to 40 years to 
perform compulsory active national service ostensibly for a period of 
18 months—six months of military training followed by 12 months 
of duty in a variety of military, security, or public service positions. 
However, since the 1998-2000 Eritrean-Ethiopian border conflict, 
the 18-month limit has been suspended; most individuals are not 
demobilized from government work units after their mandatory 
period of service but rather are forced to serve indefinitely under 
threats of detention, torture, or familial reprisal. An international 
organization assesses that many Eritrean asylum seekers, particularly 
those who deserted the National Service when they fled, expressed 
well-founded fears of persecution in Eritrea. There are unconfirmed 
reports that returnees have disappeared. An international organization 
assessed in 2019 that traffickers exploited Eritreans in forced labor 
and sex trafficking primarily in Sudan, Ethiopia, and Libya.
National Service takes a wide variety of forms, and active military 
duty constitutes a small and diminishing percentage; office work 
in government agencies and enterprises (functions ranging from 
lawyers, diplomats, and mid-level managers to skilled technicians and 
mechanics, to clerical, maintenance, and janitorial work); medical 
professionals and support workers; elementary and secondary school 
teachers; and construction or other unskilled physical labor. Reports 
also allege that officials force National Service workers to labor in 
mining enterprises partially owned by the government; specific 
instances alleged to date have involved white collar occupations in 
mine management, technical analysis, and/or government oversight 
responsibilities. Conditions are often harsh for those in military 
service or physical labor, although some National Service members 
experience normal, civilian workplace conditions, albeit with low pay 
and, in many cases, negligible to complete lack of freedom to pursue 
alternative employment opportunities. International organizations 
report that the government often subjects conscripts in the National 
Service to inhuman and degrading punishment, including torture, 
without recourse and punishes individuals that conscientiously 
object to service; the government continues to force conscripts to 
serve for indefinite or otherwise arbitrary periods. Discharge from 
National Service is arbitrary and procedures opaque. Additionally, 
the government broadly restricts recruitment of Eritreans to work 
abroad, denying travel to most Eritreans, including those enrolled 
in National Service and those who have not yet performed National 
Service. In 2012, the government instituted a compulsory citizen 
militia, requiring medically fit adults up to age 70 not currently 
in the military to carry firearms and attend military training or 
participate in unpaid national development programs, such as soil 
and water conservation projects on a part-time basis. Eritreans may 
be released from National Service after an indefinite number of years 
by petitioning the government based on criteria that shift periodically 
and are not fully transparent; policies and practices for obtaining 
release from National Service are inconsistent across organizations 
and job fields, but officials generally release expectant mothers and 
individuals who can show they have become the sole or primary 
source of familial support. Certain professions (e.g., medicine and 
teaching) exist almost exclusively within the ranks of the National 
Service. Wages are low, although pay scales have been revised for a 
number of job functions in recent years, particularly for those with 
higher education or skilled training credentials. Reports suggest that 
approximately 50 percent of National Service workers are eligible to 
receive such pay raises—which range from 800 to 5,000 nafka ($53-
$330) per month. National Service workers without educational or 
vocational qualifications continue to be paid extremely low wages, 
and the government often substitutes food or non-food rations for 
wages. Eritrean officials reportedly have discussed hard-capping 
National Service to 18 months; however, changes in policy have 
never been publicly announced, and those serving in the obligatory 
government program beyond 18 months have yet to be demobilized.
All 12th-grade students are required to complete their final year of 
high school education at the Warsay-Yikealo Secondary School, which 
is embedded within the Sawa military and training academy; those 
who refuse to attend cannot receive high school graduation certificates, 
attain higher education, or be offered some types of jobs. The program 
comprises seven months of academic instruction, followed by five 
months of basic military training. Upon graduation from Sawa, the 
government requires all students to participate in National Service, 
either civilian or military. Although it remains likely some of the 
students are age 17 at the time of their participation in the military 
training component of the Warsay-Yikealo/Sawa academy, there are 
no reports anyone under age 18 began military service. Government 
policy bans persons younger than 18 from military conscription; 
however, as National Service is mandatory starting at age 18, the 
government does not report recruiting any members of the armed 
forces, and it remains unclear if there is an age verification procedure 
that is consistently applied prior to it sending new Sawa graduates 
to active military service. Unaccompanied children continue to be 
vulnerable to violence and exploitation. Some officials detain or 
force into military training children who attempt to leave Eritrea, 
despite some of them being younger than the minimum service 
age of 18. Previous reports alleged international criminal groups 
kidnap vulnerable Eritreans living inside or in proximity to refugee 
camps, particularly in Sudan, and transport them primarily to Libya, 
where traffickers subject them to human trafficking and other abuses, 
including extortion for ransom. Some migrants and refugees report 
traffickers force them to work as cleaners or on construction sites 
during their captivity.
In 2018, the government opened various land border crossing points 
with Ethiopia and ceased requiring exit visas or other travel documents 
for Eritreans crossing to Ethiopia. By January 2019, the government 
unilaterally closed those borders; Ethiopia closed the same border 
in March 2020 in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. During the 
reporting period, on the Eritrean side, both official border crossings 
with Sudan remained closed. Most Eritreans consensually commence 
their outbound journeys by paying smugglers, with the ultimate goal 
of seeking asylum in Europe or, at a minimum, obtaining refugee 
status in Ethiopia, Kenya, Egypt, Israel, or Uganda; some also strive to 
reach the United States. In many cases, once outside Eritrea, traffickers 
subject them to forced labor or sex trafficking. Eritrea’s strict exit 
control procedures and limited issuance of passports compel those 
who cannot obtain exit visas or passports to travel clandestinely and 
increase their vulnerability to trafficking abroad, primarily in Sudan, 
Ethiopia, and to a lesser extent Djibouti. 
ESTONIA: TIER 1
The Government of Estonia fully meets the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued to 
demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting period, 




anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Estonia remained on Tier 1. These 
efforts included investigating and prosecuting more trafficking cases 
and convicting more traffickers under Section 133 of the penal code. 
In addition, the government issued a regulation granting third-country 
nationals temporary stay; extended the permissible length of short-
term foreign worker employment; and amended the Aliens Act to 
enable foreigners with short-term work visas in specified industries 
to continue working past the expiration of their visas. Furthermore, 
the government increased funding for victims’ support services, courts 
ordered traffickers to pay restitution to trafficking victims, and the 
Police and Border Guard implemented a tool to identify trafficking 
indicators among asylum-seekers. Although the government meets 
the minimum standards, only 43 percent of convicted traffickers 
received sufficiently stringent sentences, and authorities identified 
fewer trafficking victims. Moreover, authorities struggled to quantify 
the number of child trafficking victims involved in criminal cases.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Sentence convicted traffickers to significant prison terms, and ensure 
they serve those sentences in practice. • Proactively identify potential 
child trafficking victims and report the number of child trafficking 
victims involved in criminal cases. • Increase efforts to investigate, 
prosecute, and convict traffickers under the anti-trafficking provision 
of the penal code. • Improve sentencing norms by sensitizing judges 
to the severity of trafficking crimes and the full range of penalties 
available. • Expand efforts to train law enforcement, prosecutors, 
judges, and front-line personnel to understand different forms 
of trafficking. • Establish a specialized unit to collect and verify 
information on trafficking-related crimes and allocate funding for 
investigations. • Broaden public awareness efforts to educate at-risk 
communities, such as migrant workers, on the risks of trafficking. • 
Develop, publish, and implement a national action plan for 2021.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Sections 133, 
133¹, and 175 of the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking. Section 133 (trafficking in human beings) criminalized 
placing a person in a situation of exploitation through force, fraud, 
or coercion, and prescribed penalties of between one and seven 
years’ imprisonment for offenses involving an adult victim, and 
three to 15 years’ imprisonment for those involving a child victim. 
Section 133¹ (support to human trafficking) separately criminalized 
the transportation, delivery, escorting, acceptance, concealment, or 
accommodation of an individual into a situation of exploitation 
through force, fraud, or coercion, and prescribed penalties of up to 
five years’ imprisonment for offenses involving an adult victim, and 
between two and 10 years’ imprisonment for those involving a child 
victim. Section 175 (human trafficking in order to take advantage 
of minors) criminalized inducing a child to engage in a criminal 
offense, begging, prostitution, or the production of pornography 
without requiring a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion and 
prescribed penalties of two to 10 years’ imprisonment. The penalties 
under Sections 133, 133¹ and 175 were sufficiently stringent and, 
with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with the penalties 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape.
Overextension of personnel remained the government’s primary 
constraint, limiting specialization and knowledge of trafficking; 
police expressed the need to establish a centralized unit that would 
collect and verify information on trafficking-related crimes and create 
a separate budget line for investigation efforts. During the reporting 
period, police investigated nine new cases (all labor trafficking) under 
Section 133, an increase from five in 2019. Authorities prosecuted 
15 cases, an increase from seven in 2019, and courts convicted 14 
traffickers (two labor trafficking, 12 sex trafficking), compared with 
12 in 2019. Of the 14 convicted traffickers, only six received prison 
terms (43 percent), ranging from three to nine years; the remaining 
received probation, which did not deter the crime or adequately 
reflect the nature of the offense. Similarly, in 2019, only four of 
11 convicted traffickers received prison sentences (36 percent). As 
in previous years, government data regarding Section 175 did not 
differentiate between cases exclusively related to trafficking or cases 
related to other crimes, such as child pornography. Under Section 
175, authorities investigated 26 cases (all sex trafficking), prosecuted 
19 cases, and convicted eight traffickers, compared with 32, 23, 
and three, respectively, in 2019. The government did not report any 
investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government officials 
complicit in trafficking offenses. Estonian and Finnish authorities 
cooperated on a labor trafficking case in Finland, which resulted 
in the arrest and conviction of two traffickers. Experts reported 
the need for increased training for law enforcement, prosecutors, 
judges, and front-line personnel on understanding different forms 
of exploitation. The police included a trafficking module, covering 
national and international law, forms of exploitation, and protecting 
victims, as part of the curriculum for future officers.
PROTECTION
The government marginally increased protection efforts. In 2020, 
authorities identified 34 presumed victims, compared with 67 in 
2019, 14 in 2018, and 12 in 2017. Of the 34 identified victims, 29 
were foreign nationals from Eastern Europe (12 labor trafficking, 17 
sex trafficking), compared with 54 in 2019. Authorities attributed 
the decrease in the number of identified victims to pandemic-related 
travel restrictions enforced at the borders. Separately, authorities 
identified one child labor trafficking victim, the same number as 
in 2019. All identified victims received government-sponsored 
assistance. In 2020, the Social Insurance Board (SIB) allocated 
€158,000 ($193,870) to an NGO providing trafficking victims’ support 
services, such as shelters, an increase from €125,000 ($153,370) in 
2019. During the reporting period, the government implemented a 
new information and data sharing system to expedite the exchange 
of information from the police to social services. The government 
provided identification and referral guidelines, describing all relevant 
authorities’ responsibilities in assisting victims. The Victim Support 
Act and the penal code allowed multiple actors, including NGOs, to 
identify victims and refer them to the SIB, permitting victims to receive 
comprehensive, government-funded, trafficking-specific services 
without first requiring the victim’s cooperation with police or the 
commencement of criminal proceedings. Victims who cooperated 
with law enforcement received services, such as accommodation, 
psychological, medical, and legal assistance, for an unrestricted 
period, while presumed victims who did not participate in criminal 
proceedings could receive government-funded services for up to 60 
days. Authorities placed child trafficking victims and unaccompanied 
children in alternative care facilities, including three dedicated 
centers for child victims of abuse, including sexual violence and 
trafficking, offering specialized services for up to 60 days. Officials 
noted the need to increase procedural capacity regarding child sex 
trafficking victims. Subsequently, the government organized four 
trafficking-related training seminars for child protection and victim 
support personnel; the seminars focused on recognizing trafficking 
indicators and best practices in identifying and supporting child 
victims. The Aliens Act enabled foreign victims to receive temporary 
residence permits, accommodation, and education; the government 
did not grant temporary residence permits to any foreign victims, 
the same as in 2019. The Police and Border Guard implemented a 
questionnaire and checklist to identify trafficking indicators among 
asylum-seekers. Due to the pandemic, the Police and Border Guard 
issued a regulation granting foreign nationals, who were staying in 






emergency and whose return was suspended or not possible due to 
travel restrictions, temporary stay for up to 10 days following the end 
of the state of emergency. The right to stay was automatic, requiring 
no application process. In 2020, courts ordered traffickers to pay four 
victims’ restitution in the amount of €125,000 ($153,370), compared 
with zero in 2019 and €21,000 ($25,770) in 2018.
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. The government 
continued to fund and implement its 2015-2020 plan for reducing 
violence, which included trafficking. The anti-trafficking working 
group, comprising 35 government agencies and NGOs, developed a 
violence prevention accord for 2025-2030, which awaited approval 
from the government, and published an annual report of its activities. 
The government conducted awareness-raising activities and training 
programs targeting students, youth workers, and teachers. The SIB 
created a podcast, in Estonian and Russian languages, discussing 
trafficking and available related social services. In collaboration with 
other Baltic Sea Region countries, the government participated in a 
project establishing long-term cooperation between stakeholders and 
academia to educate future journalists on trafficking issues through 
workshops, panel discussions, and competitions. The government 
made efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts by creating 
a program aimed to change the behavior of sex buyers through 
social measures. Due to the pandemic, the government extended 
the permissible length of short-term foreign worker employment 
to a maximum of 730 days within 913 consecutive days, compared 
with 365 days within 455 consecutive days prior to the pandemic. 
Furthermore, the government amended the Aliens Act to enable 
foreigners with short-term work visas working in crop and plant 
production, hunting, and related services to continue working past 
the expiration of their visas with the potential to extend. Additional 
amendments to the Aliens Act prevented the misuse of employment 
regulations and ensured enterprises pay taxes and migrant workers the 
average monthly salary required by the law. Estonian law prohibited 
recruitment agencies from charging fees to job seekers for placement 
services and required the labor inspectorate to monitor agencies for 
compliance. The inspectorate provided migrant or local workers with 
free legal services regarding work-related problems, such as unpaid 
salary, and maintained an informational phone line and website 
on workers’ rights. In an effort to decrease the number of illegal 
foreign workers, reduce cases of delayed or under payment, and 
improve occupational safety and health, the government established 
a new electronic registration system for construction site employees 
to provide insight into subcontracting relationships and working 
hours. The government conducted a training session for 37 labor 
and occupational safety and health inspectors on recognizing labor 
trafficking among migrant workers. The government managed an 
NGO-operated anti-trafficking hotline, which received 608 calls 
from vulnerable individuals and identified 12 potential trafficking 
victims; the hotline provided counseling and services in Estonian, 
Russian, and English.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Estonia, and, to a lesser extent, traffickers 
exploit victims from Estonia abroad. Traffickers tend to recruit and 
exploit their victims, including children with promises of money or 
video games, via the internet and social media. Authorities report 
a rise in the number of online traffickers from foreign countries. 
Trafficking victims originate from Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa. 
Observers noted the majority of trafficking cases in Estonia are sex 
trafficking and involve women from Ukraine and Russia. The majority 
of cases involving child victims are sex trafficking committed against 
children as young as nine years old. In general, women and children 
are mainly at risk of sex trafficking and men of labor trafficking. Due 
to the pandemic, the number of migrant workers coming to Estonia 
decreased by 31 percent, from 32,272 persons in 2019 to 22,158 in 
2020. Migrant workers are vulnerable to labor exploitation within 
Estonia, particularly in the construction and transportation sectors. 
Officials noted foreign “posted workers,” hired by temporary agencies 
and placed in Estonian companies, and their family members are 
especially vulnerable to trafficking.
ESWATINI: TIER 2
The Government of Eswatini does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Eswatini remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
investigating and prosecuting suspected traffickers, convicting an 
official for sex trafficking, and sentencing him to a 55-year prison 
term. In addition, the government identified trafficking victims, 
referred them to care, and allocated funding for victim services. 
However, the government did not meet the minimum standards 
in several key areas. The government did not have adequate shelter 
facilities or guidelines to ensure quality of care for trafficking victims, 
and officials demonstrated an inconsistent understanding of victim 
protection, at times further traumatizing victims. The government 
did not make efforts to implement its anti-trafficking national action 
plan. Labor inspections, particularly in the informal sector, and 
oversight of the labor recruitment process remained insufficient. 






2017 20182014 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Increase investigations, prosecutions, and convictions of trafficking, 
including internal cases and allegedly complicit officials. • Improve 
shelter and care for trafficking victims, including by developing shelter 
policies or guidelines and allowing victims freedom of movement. • 
Cease the practice of forcing victims to remain in the country to assist 
with law enforcement efforts. • Implement the national anti-trafficking 
action plan. • Address leadership issues at the anti-trafficking secretariat 
and enable the taskforce to fulfill its statutory responsibilities. • 
Identify key NGO partnerships for protective services and strengthen 
coordination. • Train law enforcement, social workers, and other front-
line officials to proactively identify trafficking victims among vulnerable 
populations, including Cuban medical workers. • Improve trafficking 
data collection and analysis of anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. 
• Conduct anti-trafficking public awareness campaigns.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. 
The 2009 People Trafficking and People Smuggling (Prohibition) 
Act criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed 
penalties of up to 20 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving an 
adult victim, and up to 25 years’ imprisonment for those involving 
a child victim. These penalties were sufficiently stringent, and with 
regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for 
other serious crimes, such as rape. The Sexual Offences and Domestic 
Violence Act prescribed penalties of up to 20 years’ imprisonment, 
a fine of up to 100,000 emalangeni ($6,820), or both, for the 
commercial sexual exploitation of an adult and up to 25 years’ 
imprisonment with no option of a fine if the offense involved a child. 




two prosecutions, compared to initiating five investigations and 
prosecutions in the previous reporting period. Of the two cases that 
went to prosecution each involved one defendant. One case involved 
suspected internal trafficking and the other was transnational. The 
government concluded both prosecutions. In the first case, the court 
convicted and sentenced one trafficker, the Director of the Children’s 
Unit in the Deputy Prime Minister’s office, to 55 years in prison for 
kidnapping and sex trafficking a girl from 2017 through 2019. In 
the second case, allegedly transnational trafficking, the government 
awaited the court’s verdict at the close of the reporting period. This is 
comparable to conviction of one trafficker in the previous reporting 
period. The third case remained in the investigation phase. One 
additional prosecution initiated in a previous reporting period 
was delayed because the pandemic prevented the participation of 
foreign witnesses. The government did not report updates on three 
other prosecutions it had initiated in the previous reporting period. 
There were reports of trafficking-related government corruption, 
including immigration officials seeking bribes to issue government 
documents such as visas. 
Systemic judicial issues, including weak data and evidence collection, 
a shortage of judges and courtrooms, and defense attorneys’ 
tactics to create protracted trials, contributed to delays in all cases, 
including trafficking. Rural woman often faced substantial obstacles 
obtaining relief for various crimes because communities pursued 
family intervention first and then traditional courts, which viewed 
female victims of crime as “unruly” and “disobedient.” Due to 
poor performance by leadership at the anti-trafficking secretariat 
that impeded anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts during most 
of the reporting period, the cabinet maintained temporary policies 
to remove the secretariat’s obstacles to such efforts and enhance 
communication. Due to the pandemic, the government postponed 
most planned trainings, compared to training police, prosecutors, 
immigration officers, and social workers on trafficking in the previous 
reporting period. The government continued to provide anti-trafficking 
training at the police college for all in-service and pre-service officers. 
The government continued to cooperate with authorities in Taiwan 
to support and repatriate Swati victims of exploitation in Taiwan.
PROTECTION
The government maintained victim protection efforts. The government 
identified and referred four trafficking victims to care, compared 
to six in the previous reporting period. All identified victims were 
girls, including three from Eswatini and one from Mozambique. 
The government first referred identified victims to a government 
facility for initial food, clothing, toiletries, psychosocial support, 
and medical care. It then reunified the three Swati victims with 
their families. The government owned one facility that provided 
short-term care for victims of crime, including trafficking, and had 
a second training facility with a residential component that could 
house victims. The shelters, however, lacked operational guidelines 
and were of an insufficient quality to house victims, particularly for 
longer term stays; shelter residents did not have a choice of shelter or 
freedom of movement within the shelters. The government continued 
to assist an international organization in constructing a shelter for 
victims of trafficking and gender-based violence. The government 
had formal procedures to identify trafficking victims and refer them 
to care. Government officials continued to proactively screen for 
trafficking at the airport, although they did not identify any victims.
A criminal case remained pending against the government’s primary 
protection officer, who had allegedly threatened and assaulted 
three foreign national trafficking victims while they resided in the 
government’s temporary shelter during the previous reporting period. 
The government had procedures to assist victim-witnesses during 
the court process, including court preparation and counseling and 
use of recorded testimony. The government did not report providing 
any of these protections to trafficking victim-witnesses during the 
reporting period and demonstrated an inconsistent understanding of 
victim rights. For example, the government has refused to repatriate 
foreign trafficking victims until they provide testimony against their 
traffickers. The government did not have formal procedures to provide 
residency to foreign trafficking victims but could do so on an ad hoc 
basis. The government continued to allocate 80,000 emalangeni 
($5,450) annually to a victim protection fund. While Eswatini law 
allowed judges to order restitution for trafficking victims, none did 
so during the reporting period. There were no reports the government 
arrested, fined, or penalized trafficking victims for crimes their 
traffickers forced them to commit, and law enforcement reportedly 
screened for trafficking when arresting individuals for prostitution, 
immigration, and other related offenses.
PREVENTION
The government maintained minimal efforts to prevent trafficking. 
Although the interagency anti-trafficking taskforce, composed 
of government ministries and NGOs, had the mandate for anti-
trafficking efforts, in practice, the anti-trafficking secretariat, 
housed within the Prime Minister’s office, led efforts. Prior to the 
pandemic, a few taskforce members met regularly. The taskforce did 
not report any efforts to implement its 2019-2024 anti-trafficking 
national action plan, although it did have funding devoted to the 
plan’s implementation. Long-standing bureaucratic delays and 
communication gaps within the taskforce and secretariat continued 
to hamper coordination efforts. In addition, while taskforce member 
agencies had individual mandates to address trafficking, only the 
secretariat received funding and staff to implement its trafficking 
mandate. Even the secretariat often received less than requested. 
The pandemic limited most public awareness campaigns, including 
for trafficking, so the government conducted fewer such events than 
in previous reporting periods. The secretariat continued to have 
anti-trafficking posters at various land borders and the airport, and 
anti-trafficking secretariat and immigration authorities continued 
to discuss trafficking through television, radio, and print media 
programs. While the government had a trafficking-specific hotline, 
it was not operational during the reporting period. With support 
from an international organization, the government contributed 
information to a centralized anti-trafficking database that collected 
national data on criminal cases and victims identified and shared it 
with countries in the region. The labor inspectorate made insufficient 
efforts to monitor for forced and child labor. It did not have any funds 
dedicated for inspections and had to request funds from the general 
Department of Labor budget. In addition, when it did receive funds, 
it focused nearly all efforts on the formal sector, while forced labor 
almost exclusively occurred in the informal sector. The government 
did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Eswatini, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Eswatini abroad. Traffickers target poor communities with high HIV/
AIDS prevalence rates. Traffickers exploit Swati girls, particularly 
orphans, in sex trafficking and domestic servitude, primarily in 
Eswatini and South Africa. Some Swati girls in forced domestic work 
are physically and sexually abused by their employers. Sex traffickers 
exploit orphaned Swati girls in “survival sex” in exchange for food and 
money. Traffickers force Swati boys and foreign children to labor in 
agriculture, including cattle herding, and market vending within the 
country. Swati boys, particularly in rural areas, who work on small 
marijuana (“dagga”) farms are vulnerable to employers. Mozambican 
boys migrate to Eswatini for work washing cars, herding livestock, and 
portering; traffickers exploit some in forced labor. Cuban nationals 
working on medical missions in Eswatini may have been forced to 
work by the Cuban government. Traffickers use Eswatini as a transit 
country to transport foreign victims, primarily Mozambicans, to 
South Africa for forced labor. Traffickers reportedly force Mozambican 
women into commercial sex in Eswatini or transport them through 
Eswatini to South Africa. Traffickers entrap Swati forced labor and 







Eswatini or abroad, particularly South Africa. Some traffickers force 
Swatis, including orphaned girls and girls from poor families, into 
commercial sex in South Africa after voluntarily migrating in search 
of work. Reports suggest labor brokers fraudulently recruit and 
charge excessive fees to Swati nationals for work in South African 
mines, means often used to facilitate trafficking crimes. Swati men in 
border communities are recruited for forced labor in South Africa’s 
timber industry. Swati students have been fraudulently recruited for 
educational opportunities in Taiwan and been coerced to work in 
exploitative conditions in chicken factories.
ETHIOPIA: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Ethiopia does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included partnering with international 
organizations and foreign donors to train police, prosecutors, and 
judges on trafficking crimes; continuing efforts to raise awareness of 
trafficking risks among vulnerable populations in rural communities; 
and conducting meetings of the newly established National Council 
and National Partnership Coalition. However, the government did 
not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared to the previous 
reporting period, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity. The government significantly 
decreased the number of trafficking investigations and prosecutions 
and did not convict any traffickers at the federal level during the 
reporting period; overall law enforcement efforts across regional-
level actors also decreased. The government did not report officially 
identifying any trafficking victims or referring any trafficking victims to 
protection services during the reporting period; additionally, officials 
did not report disseminating or implementing standard operating 
procedures for victim identification or the national referral mechanism 
for the second consecutive year. Corruption and official complicity 
in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law 
enforcement action. Officials did not report taking any actions to 
address internal trafficking crimes, including domestic servitude 
and child sex trafficking, despite the scale of the problem. Therefore 
Ethiopia was downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Amend Proclamation 1178/2020 to bring the definition of human 
trafficking in line with international law. • Increase training for police, 
prosecutors, judges, immigration officials, and service providers to 
improve their ability to differentiate between human trafficking 
and migrant smuggling. • Vigorously investigate and prosecute 
traffickers who exploit victims within Ethiopia, as well as illicit labor 
recruiters who facilitate the transport of Ethiopians to the Middle 
East for exploitative labor, and sentence convicted traffickers to 
adequate penalties. • Disseminate, implement, and train officials to 
use the standard operating procedures for victim identification and 
the national referral mechanism to refer all victims to appropriate 
care. • Systematically and proactively identify trafficking victims by 
screening for trafficking indicators among vulnerable populations, 
including individuals in commercial sex, Ethiopian migrant workers 
returning from overseas work, unaccompanied children, and foreign 
nationals such as Eritreans, Somalis, South Sudanese, and Cuban 
medical workers, and refer all victims to appropriate services. • 
Coordinate with international organizations to prevent trafficking 
crimes and potential recruitment and use of child soldiers in Tigray. 
• Collaborate with NGOs and international organizations to increase 
the government’s capacity to provide shelter and protective services to 
more trafficking victims, including adult males and foreign nationals. 
• Fully implement the overseas employment proclamation by 
continuing to strengthen oversight of overseas recruitment agencies, 
deploying labor attachés, and investigating and prosecuting illicit 
recruiters. • Improve screening procedures in the distribution of 
national identification cards and passports to prevent their fraudulent 
issuance to children. • Incorporate information on human trafficking 
and labor rights in Middle Eastern and other countries in pre-departure 
training provided to all migrant workers. • Increase efforts through the 
Attorney General’s Office to accurately report the government’s anti-
trafficking statistics, including authorities’ efforts to hold accountable 
internal traffickers, and disaggregate data on trafficking crimes and 
migrant smuggling. • Coordinate with NGOs and international 
organizations to research the extent of human trafficking within 
Ethiopia and produce a publicly available annual report.
PROSECUTION
The government decreased anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. 
The 2015 anti-trafficking proclamation, No.909/2015, criminalized 
sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of 15 to 
25 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 150,000 to 300,000 Ethiopian 
birr ($3,830 to $7,660) for offenses involving an adult male victim, 
and 25 years’ to life imprisonment and a fine of 200,000 to 500,000 
Ethiopian birr ($5,100 to $12,760) for those involving an adult female 
victim or a child victim. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, 
with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as rape. The Employment Exchange 
Services Proclamation No.923/2016, which governed the work of 
licensed labor recruitment agencies, contained various penalties 
for an employment agency’s failure to comply with its provisions 
and provided that furnishing falsified evidence or documents, or 
advertisements used to recruit or deploy a worker, entailed criminal 
liability; however, it did not specify what portion of the Criminal 
Code applied. In April 2020, the government enacted Proclamation 
1178/2020, A Proclamation to Provide for the Prevention and 
Suppression of Trafficking in Persons and the Smuggling of Persons. 
However, soon thereafter, the government initiated processes to 
correct definitional issues within the proclamation. The government 
had not approved the corrections at the end of the reporting period. 
In 2020, the government provided data from the federal level and 
three regions, compared with providing data from the federal level 
and six regions in 2019; additionally, the government continued to 
report information on human trafficking and migrant smuggling 
cases without a mechanism to disaggregate. At the federal level, the 
government reported investigating 27 potential trafficking cases in 
2020, compared with zero federal investigations reported in 2019. The 
government reported initiating the prosecution of five federal cases 
under the 2015 anti-trafficking proclamation during the reporting 
period, compared with zero cases prosecuted at the federal level 
reported in 2019; all five prosecutions remained ongoing at the 
end of the reporting period. The government did not convict any 
traffickers in federal cases in 2020, compared with 121 potential 
traffickers convicted in 2019. In a high profile case, the government, 
in partnership with an international organization, reportedly arrested 
and prosecuted an internationally known Eritrean trafficker; however, 
the suspected trafficker escaped during trial and remained at-large at 
the end of the reporting period. At the regional level, the government 
reported investigating 145 potential trafficking cases, initiating 
prosecution of 103 potential trafficking cases, and convicting 48 
potential traffickers from July to December 2020. This compared 
with 699 potential trafficking investigations, 30 potential trafficking 
cases prosecuted, and 921 potential traffickers convicted at regional 
levels during the previous reporting period. As reported in prior 
years, officials’ propensity to conflate trafficking and smuggling 




seeking to illegally cross international borders via irregular migration 
(migrant smuggling) and other crimes not involving exploitation 
through forced labor or sex trafficking. Unlike the previous reporting 
period, the government did not provide separate law enforcement 
data encompassing both transnational and internal trafficking 
crimes. The government did not report law enforcement efforts 
related to trafficking crimes involving Ethiopians exploited within 
the country during the reporting period, compared with 2,272 case 
investigations—2,119 for sex trafficking and 153 for forced labor—
and convictions of 711 traffickers—558 for sex trafficking and 153 
for forced labor—in the prior year. In response to the pandemic, 
the government imposed a state of emergency (SOE) from April 
to September 2020. During this time, officials reassigned all anti-
trafficking police units to enforce the SOE and closed all courts, 
except those hearing cases related to gender-based violence. The 
government also redeployed anti-trafficking police units to enforce 
a six-month SOE that began in November 2020 in response to the 
ongoing conflict in Tigray.
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, 
or convictions of government employees complicit in human 
trafficking offenses; however, corruption and official complicity 
in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law 
enforcement action during the year. Corruption among police and 
judicial officials, especially the solicitation of bribes, remained of 
significant concern. Since the Tigray conflict began in November 
2020, international organizations increasingly reported armed actors, 
including Eritrean forces, regional forces, the Ethiopian National 
Defense Force (ENDF), and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front 
(TPLF) were reportedly responsible for committing human rights 
abuses and gender-based violence. and gender-based violence in 
Tigray, including potential trafficking crimes. Observers reported 
unspecified military personnel and other officials forced women 
to have sex in exchange for basic commodities and humanitarian 
assistance. Although not explicitly reported as human trafficking, 
an international organization reported receiving one allegation 
of sexual exploitation with trafficking indicators by one Ethiopian 
peacekeeper serving in the UN peacekeeping operation in Abyei during 
the reporting period; the government did not report investigating 
the allegations during the reporting period.
For the second consecutive year, the government did not report 
any actions taken by the Migration and Human Trafficking Crime 
Team, established in 2019 with 35 investigators and six prosecutors 
to address both human trafficking and smuggling crimes. Financial 
and capacity constraints continued to impede data collection by 
regional police, and ineffective coordination between the regions 
and the federal government hindered law enforcement efforts. The 
government continued to partner with international organizations 
to conduct anti-trafficking trainings, funded by foreign donors, 
for regional and federal government officials. At least 173 legal 
professionals—80 in Dire Dawa, 75 in West Oromia, and 18 in Addis 
Ababa—attended trainings on the root causes of human trafficking, 
preventing trafficking, and prosecuting trafficking cases.
PROTECTION
The government decreased efforts to identify and protect trafficking 
victims and continued to disproportionately focus on transnational 
trafficking versus internal sex trafficking and forced labor cases. 
The government did not report officially identifying any trafficking 
victims during the reporting period. The government considered 
more than 14,518 individuals returning to Ethiopia during the 
reporting period to be vulnerable, compared with identifying 27,877 
vulnerable migrants in 2019; however, it was unclear if traffickers 
had exploited these individuals in sex trafficking or forced labor, and 
the government did not formally distinguish potential trafficking 
victims from other vulnerable returnees, including those potentially 
involved in smuggling crimes. The government also did not report 
identifying any victims of internal trafficking crimes, compared 
with identifying 2,119 potential sex trafficking victims and 153 
potential victims of forced labor exploited within the country in 2019. 
Additionally, the government did not report widely disseminating 
or implementing its standard operating procedures for the proactive 
identification of trafficking victims during the reporting year. Despite 
not identifying trafficking victims during the reporting period, 
the government reported focusing efforts on identifying victims 
of transnational trafficking cases during the year. Officials at Bole 
International Airport and at land border crossings coordinated with 
an international organization to screen Ethiopians returning from 
abroad for trafficking indicators. Observers noted the time allotted 
for interviews—approximately five minutes—was insufficient to 
screen potential victims and the high number of returnees, which 
an international organization reported was more than 73,000 
individuals in 2020, created challenges to expanding the time for 
screening. The government and international organizations reported 
the number of Ethiopian returnees significantly increased in 2020 
due to pandemic-related economic impacts in destination countries. 
The government and observers also reported pandemic-related 
measures, such as social distancing, and limited funding led to staff 
reductions at screening checkpoints, which exacerbated existing 
victim identification challenges. 
As no victims were formally identified, the government did not 
report referring any trafficking victims to services; however, the 
government, in partnership with international organizations and 
NGOs, continued to provide services—such as counseling, family 
reunification, and job training—to thousands of individuals in 
vulnerable populations, which may have included trafficking victims. 
During the previous reporting period, the government finalized a 
national referral mechanism (NRM) in partnership with a donor and 
an international organization; however, it did not report disseminating 
or using the NRM for the second consecutive year. Officials continued 
to jointly operate five migration response centers (MRCs) in Dire 
Dawa, Metema, Moyale, Semera, and Togochale with an international 
organization; the government supported the MRCs in various ways, 
including donating land for infrastructure, providing rent-free 
usage of government facilities, participating in MRC management 
committees, and facilitating referral linkage with front-line agencies. 
The government maintained operation of child protection units 
in Addis Ababa and several major cities. While the units aimed to 
intercept and care for child trafficking victims identified en route from 
rural to urban areas, the government did not report actions taken by 
the units during the year. The government and NGOs could provide 
shelter, food, education, medical assistance, and familial reunification 
to the child trafficking victims, where feasible, but it did not report 
how many children received these services. One NGO reported 
providing basic needs, medical assistance, and education services to 
an unspecified number of adult and child trafficking victims during 
the year. There continued to be a dearth of care available for male 
trafficking victims. Despite reliance on civil society organizations 
to provide victim services, the government did not report providing 
financial or in-kind support to such organizations.
The government, in partnership with NGOs and international 
organizations, provided repatriation assistance to at least 1,588 
Ethiopians in several Gulf states, compared with 7,545 repatriations 
in 2019; however, the government did not report if these individuals 
included potential trafficking victims. The government reported 
coordinated repatriations previously funded by Gulf states did not take 
place during the year; instead, Gulf states conducted mass deportations 
of Ethiopians due to pandemic-related stigmatization of migrants and 
economic impacts among employers. Officials reportedly attempted to 
negotiate with foreign governments to repatriate Ethiopians in smaller 
numbers, but the deportations continued at a rate that overwhelmed 
the Ethiopian response system. Some Ethiopian diplomatic missions 
in Gulf states provided temporary shelter for potential victims on 
respective mission compounds and expanded these accommodations 
in Lebanon from one to three centers during the reporting period. 
The missions engaged with host government authorities on behalf 
of the victims, including facilitating repatriation flights. The 2020 







protection and care. The victim support fund received funding through 
a government budget allocation; fines imposed on, and the sale of, 
confiscated property from traffickers; and foreign donors; however, 
the government did not report administering funds for victim services 
during the reporting period. For the second consecutive year, the 
government did not report whether the specialized witness protection 
unit—established in 2018—took any action to protect trafficking 
victims. Supreme Court officials previously stated children could 
testify against traffickers via video; however, the government did not 
report implementing this protection in 2020. Officials maintained 
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with NGOs to improve 
coordination between law enforcement agencies and service providers 
intended to ensure service providers delivered appropriate care to 
victims throughout the course of legal proceedings; however, the 
government did not report implementing the MOU during the 
reporting period.
Proclamation 1178/2020 allowed foreign national victims to receive 
temporary residence permits or repatriation assistance on an as-
needed basis. The government did not report whether any victims 
received deportation relief during the reporting period. The 2020 
anti-trafficking proclamation provided protections to trafficking 
victims as outlined under the Witness and Whistleblowers Protection 
Proclamation (No.699/2010), which included protection from 
prosecution for crimes committed as a direct result of unlawful acts 
traffickers compelled them to commit. There were no reports the 
government summarily deported any trafficking victims without 
proper screening or detained, fined, jailed, or otherwise penalized 
victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit in 
2020. However, in previous years, the government housed some 
victims at police stations while they were waiting to provide testimony 
in their respective trafficking cases, and, given ad hoc implementation 
of formal identification and referral procedures, authorities may 
have detained or deported some unidentified trafficking victims.
PREVENTION
The government maintained minimal efforts to prevent trafficking. 
Between June and December 2020, the government reorganized its 
anti-trafficking structure in accordance with Proclamation 1178/2020. 
The proclamation established the National Council, chaired by the 
Deputy Prime Minister and responsible for the creation of policies 
and strategies for the prevention of migrant smuggling and human 
trafficking, as well as issuing directives. The proclamation also 
established the National Partnership Coalition, which was led by 
the attorney general’s office and mandated to research polices and 
strategies, develop directives for the national referral system, prepare 
program and action plans for implementation, and lead awareness 
raising. The National Council met once during the reporting period 
to formally establish its structure, while the National Partnership 
Coalition met twice in 2020. The government remained without 
an anti-trafficking national action plan (NAP) for at least the fifth 
consecutive year; despite Proclamation 1178/2020 requiring the 
National Partnership Coalition to draft a NAP, the government did not 
report initiating efforts to do so during the reporting period. The 2016-
2020 National Human Rights Action Plan, which included some anti-
trafficking activities, expired; the government never allocated funding 
to implement this action plan. The government, in partnership with 
international organizations and foreign donors, conducted various 
awareness campaigns on trafficking risks, primarily targeted toward 
children in school, rural communities, teachers, and religious leaders. 
The government did not operate a hotline for potential victims of 
trafficking and did not report tracking trafficking-related call data 
from hotlines operated by civil society.
Despite the government amending the employment proclamation 
in 2016, it did not fully implement the proclamation for the fifth 
consecutive reporting period. The revised overseas employment 
proclamation required greater oversight of private employment 
agencies, placement of labor attachés in Ethiopian embassies 
abroad to assist victims employed there, and establishment of an 
independent agency to identify and train migrant workers. The 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA) trained approximately 
13 labor officers during the previous reporting period to serve abroad 
as foreign service officers and represent Ethiopians working in Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE); however, the 
government did not deploy labor officers in 2020 due to pandemic-
related travel restrictions. The government reported an international 
organization provided continued training to the labor officers as 
deployment remained delayed. MOLSA regional labor officers 
continued to educate rural communities on the risks posed by 
illicit labor recruiters. As reported in previous years, two additional 
components of Proclamation 923/2016 stipulated rules for licensing 
and advertising for overseas employment, as well as penalties for 
employment agencies that contravened the revised employment 
proclamation (e.g., false advertisement, passport confiscation, and 
rights violations). The revised proclamation required employment 
agencies to deposit 1 million Ethiopian birr ($25,520) in a bank 
as insurance, which officials would use to assist and repatriate 
trafficking victims. The government did not report applying these 
requirements to any employment agencies for the second consecutive 
reporting period.
During the reporting year, the government maintained bilateral 
labor agreements with Jordan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE 
on employment treaties. These agreements reportedly required 
signatories to commit to ethical recruitment, legal remedies against 
those who violated the law, and equal protection of Ethiopian 
workers, to include equal wages for equal work, reasonable working 
hours, and leave time; however, the government did not report any 
instances of their implementation. Ethiopian officials maintained 
efforts to implement a 2012 law requiring registration of all births 
nationwide; however, the lack of a uniform national identity card 
continued to impede implementation of the law and allowed for 
the continuous issuance of district-level identity cards, which were 
subject to fraudulent production to exploit potential trafficking 
victims, including children. A foreign donor provided Ethiopian 
troops with anti-trafficking training prior to their deployment abroad 
on international peacekeeping missions. The government did not 
report efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Ethiopia, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Ethiopia abroad. Some families and brothel owners exploit girls 
from Ethiopia’s impoverished rural areas in domestic servitude 
and commercial sex within the country, while some businesspeople 
exploit boys in forced labor in traditional weaving, construction, 
agriculture, and street vending. Brothel owners exploit girls in 
commercial sex in Addis Ababa’s central market. Labor recruiters 
frequently target young people from Ethiopia’s vast rural areas with 
false promises of a better life; increasingly, traffickers are replicating 
legitimate app-based recruitment tools to illegally recruit vulnerable 
populations and exploit them in forced labor. Local NGOs assess 
the number of internal trafficking victims, particularly children 
exploited in commercial sex and domestic servitude, exceeds that 
of external trafficking; experts report a lack of research hinders a 
more complete understanding of the extent of the crime as well as 
the government’s response.
Since November 2020, ongoing internal conflict in the Tigray region 
has resulted in more than 63,000 Ethiopians seeking asylum in Sudan, 
where protection services are limited; this population is increasingly 
vulnerable to trafficking as displacement, food insecurity, and lack 
of economic opportunity continue. International organizations 
increasingly report armed actors, including Eritrean forces, regional 
forces, the ENDF, and the TPLF are reportedly responsible for 
committing human rights abuses and gender-based violence and 
gender-based violence against women and girls in Tigray, including 
potential trafficking crimes. Observers report unspecified military 




for basic commodities and humanitarian assistance. Unaccompanied 
children in the conflict areas may be vulnerable to recruitment by 
non-state armed groups in areas where armed conflict is continuing. 
As of January 2021, an international organization reported there were 
more than 1.9 million IDPs in Ethiopia as a result of internal conflict 
and drought; individuals in resettlement camps or otherwise affected 
are increasingly vulnerable to trafficking due to a lack of access to 
justice and economic opportunity. Ethiopia hosts more than 814,000 
refugees—the majority of whom are from South Sudan, Somalia, 
Eritrea, and Sudan—in 26 camps; international organizations report 
the Hitsats and Shimelba camps closed after being destroyed as a 
result of conflict in the Tigray region during the reporting period. 
Refugees without economic opportunity and those further displaced 
by camp closures are increasingly vulnerable to trafficking. Cuban 
medical professionals working in Ethiopia may have been forced to 
work by the Cuban government.
Trusted community members, known as manamasas, recruit and 
groom vulnerable youth on behalf of local and international human 
trafficking syndicates by exaggerating the advantages of working 
abroad. Scarce economic opportunities and dire poverty, coupled 
with familial encouragement, compel thousands of Ethiopians, 
including a substantial percentage of unmarried individuals under 
age 30, to transit out of Ethiopia via three main routes, where they 
are vulnerable to trafficking. Irregular migrants primarily take the 
northeastern route via Djibouti or Somalia, to Yemen and onward 
to Saudi Arabia and Europe. The southern route often involves 
individuals taking illegal border crossings into Kenya and onward to 
South Africa in hopes of finding work or to connect to onward flights. 
The northwestern route, the most dangerous and least common, 
has traditionally been taken by men through Sudan to Libya and 
onward to Europe; however, during the reporting period, observers 
reported an increase in women using this route to reach Khartoum, 
where they apply for and receive visas to Lebanon. Observers have 
not been able to discern how these women acquire visas or if the 
process is legitimate. Across all three of these migration routes, 
traffickers exploit Ethiopian migrants, who often begin their journeys 
voluntarily, in commercial sex or forced labor in transit countries 
and in their intended destinations. In 2020, use of these routes 
reportedly decreased due to pandemic-related border closures and 
travel restrictions. Additionally, international organizations reported 
the number of Ethiopian returnees significantly increased compared 
with the previous year due to pandemic-related economic impacts; 
more than 73,000 Ethiopians returned in 2020, many of whom 
likely faced increased trafficking vulnerabilities in their destination 
country, along their route, and once back in Ethiopia. Families 
continue to play a major role in financing irregular migration, and 
they may force or coerce their children to go abroad. An international 
organization assesses most traffickers are small local operators, often 
from the victims’ own communities, but well-structured, hierarchical, 
organized crime groups also facilitate irregular migration and likely 
exploit individuals, who may consent to smuggling, in forced labor 
or commercial sex.
Saudi Arabia remains the primary destination for irregular migrants, 
representing 80-90 percent of Ethiopian labor migration; observers 
report approximately 400,000-500,000 Ethiopians reside there 
without valid travel documentation, which increases their vulnerability 
to traffickers exploiting them in forced labor or commercial sex. 
Some Ethiopians arrive in Saudi Arabia through licensed Ethiopian 
employment agencies but are susceptible to trafficking by employers 
or illegal employment agencies. The kafala sponsorship system—
common in Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the 
UAE—binds domestic workers to one employer and prevents their 
freedom of movement. Some families in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and 
other Middle Eastern countries exploit Ethiopian women working in 
domestic service and subject them to physical and emotional abuse. 
Ethiopian women who migrate for work or flee abusive employers 
in the Middle East are also vulnerable to sex trafficking. Ethiopian 
men and boys migrate to Gulf states and other African nations, where 
traffickers exploit some in forced labor. As a result of the pandemic, 
Ethiopians abroad—especially in Lebanon and Saudi Arabia—face 
increased stigmatization and abuse, leading to loss of employment 
and potential deportation. In Lebanon, employers forcibly removed 
Ethiopian domestic workers from their homes, leaving them trapped 
in the country due to pandemic-related travel restrictions, border 
closures, and economic scarcity; unable to find new work or a safe 
way home, these individuals are increasingly vulnerable to trafficking. 
During the reporting period, thousands of Ethiopians—including 
domestic workers and migrant laborers who lost their employment 
due to the pandemic and migrants pushed out by Houthi attacks 
in Yemen—faced increasing vulnerabilities to trafficking after being 
placed in abusive detention centers in southern Saudi Arabia. Some 
families and pimps exploit Ethiopian girls in domestic servitude 
and commercial sex in neighboring African countries, particularly 
Djibouti and Sudan. Some business owners, families, and criminals 
exploit Ethiopian boys in forced labor in Djibouti as shop assistants, 
domestic workers, and street beggars, in addition to forcing children 
to take part in criminal activities. Traffickers exploit women and 
children in forced begging, sometimes via organized begging rings, 
in Saudi Arabia.
FIJI: TIER 2
The Government of Fiji does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts 
to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts 
compared to the previous reporting period, considering the impact of 
the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Fiji 
was upgraded to Tier 2. These efforts included including investigating 
10 suspected trafficking cases involving 102 potential victims, formally 
endorsing a national anti-trafficking strategy for 2021-2026, and 
creating a trafficking case management coordinator office, which 
was set to assume responsibility of coordinating victim support. 
However, the government provided services to only three victims 
of labor trafficking and did not provide services to any victims of 
sex trafficking, despite reports that Fijian children continued to be 
exploited in commercial sex. The government did not convict any 
traffickers during the reporting period and has only convicted one 
trafficker since 2014. Some reports suggested official complicity 
impeded anti-trafficking efforts. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Finalize and implement formal victim identification and referral 
procedures for police, immigration, customs, and labor officials. 
• Proactively screen groups vulnerable to trafficking, including 
persons in commercial sex, migrant workers, and child laborers. 
• Increase efforts to prosecute trafficking crimes, and convict and 
punish traffickers. • Amend trafficking-related provisions of the 
Crimes Act to criminalize all forms of trafficking. • Increase the 
provision of victim services, including by ensuring victims are referred 
to the Case Management Coordinator Office. • Seek methods to 
improve collaboration between police and prosecutors working 
trafficking cases to improve the success of prosecutions. • Deliver 
effective anti-trafficking training to police, prosecutors, immigration, 
customs, and labor officials, including on the case management 




foreign construction workers and increase investigation of labor 
violations involving children and migrant workers for forced labor. 
• Proactively investigate potential official complicity in trafficking-
related crimes. • Enable identified foreign victims to work and 
earn income while assisting with investigations and provide a legal 
alternative to victims’ removal to countries in which they would face 
retribution or hardship. • Increase dissemination of labor and sex 
trafficking awareness campaigns, including to raise awareness of sex 
trafficking laws among foreign tourists.
PROSECUTION
The government modestly increased anti-trafficking law enforcement 
efforts. The 2009 Crimes Act criminalized some forms of labor 
trafficking and all forms of sex trafficking. Sections 112-117 
criminalized trafficking in persons but, inconsistent with international 
law, required either transnational or domestic movement in order 
to constitute a trafficking offense. These articles prescribed penalties 
of up to 20 years’ imprisonment for movement-based trafficking 
offenses involving adult victims, and up to 25 years’ imprisonment 
for those involving child victims; these penalties were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
other serious crimes, such as kidnapping. Sex trafficking offenses that 
did not involve movement could be prosecuted under Sections 106, 
107, 226, and 227 of the Crimes Act. Section 106 criminalized sexual 
servitude by means of force or threat and prescribed penalties of up 
to 15 years’ imprisonment if the offense involved an adult victim and 
up to 20 years’ imprisonment if the offense involved a child victim. 
Section 107 criminalized “deceptive recruiting for sexual services,” 
including inducing and maintaining individuals in prostitution 
through deceptive means, and prescribed penalties of up to seven 
years’ imprisonment if the offense involved an adult victim and up 
to nine years’ imprisonment if the offense involved a child victim. 
Sections 226 and 227 criminalized the buying or selling of children 
for “immoral purposes,” which included prostitution, and prescribed 
penalties of up to 12 years’ imprisonment. The penalties prescribed 
under these sections were sufficiently stringent and commensurate 
with the penalties prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. 
While Sections 103 and 118 criminalized slavery and debt bondage 
respectively, all forms of labor trafficking were not criminalized 
under the Crimes Act. The law prescribed penalties of up to 25 
years’ imprisonment for slavery, and penalties of up to one year 
imprisonment for debt bondage involving an adult victim, and up 
to two years’ imprisonment for those involving a child victim; the 
penalties for slavery were sufficiently stringent, while the penalties 
for debt bondage were not. The government’s National Anti-Human 
Trafficking Sub-Committee on Legislative Desktop Review continued 
to review the governments trafficking legal framework.
Police initiated investigations of 10 suspected trafficking cases during 
the reporting period, an increase compared to two investigations in 
2019. The government initiated prosecutions of two suspected sex 
traffickers (one prosecution in 2019) but did not convict any traffickers 
(one conviction in 2019). The formalization of the police’s human 
trafficking unit (HTU) in 2019, as well as increased information 
sharing between HTU and the department of immigration during 
the reporting period, likely contributed to the increased number 
of investigations, especially for suspected cases of labor trafficking 
among migrant workers. Nonetheless, police did not proactively 
investigate trafficking cases consistently and the government has only 
convicted one trafficker since 2014. The government reported that 
under Fiji’s legal system, the prosecutor’s office acted independently 
from law enforcement investigations, including in cases involving 
human trafficking, which prevented effective coordination between 
police and prosecutors and continued to impair the government’s 
pursuit of trafficking cases. Inadequate victim support, including 
insufficient resources, also weakened the success of prosecutions. 
The government hosted and funded two anti-trafficking trainings 
for immigration officials in March 2021.
Restrictive policies limiting law enforcement officials’ access to 
child victims staying in government shelters may have hindered 
the ability of police and prosecutors to build rapport with victims, 
obtain statements, and prepare victims for trials against their 
traffickers. HTU continued to conduct anti-trafficking trainings 
for police recruits; however, observers reported the one-day anti-
trafficking trainings provided to police recruits were insufficient. Law 
enforcement were often not aware of the definition of trafficking, 
procedures for interviewing victims, or how to proactively identify 
victims. HTU began drafting formal standard operating procedures 
for investigating trafficking cases but these were not completed 
during the reporting period. The office of the director of the public 
prosecution continued to consider charges in a case involving leaders 
of a church that allegedly confiscated the passports of its members 
who worked in various companies owned by the church without pay. 
The Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption investigated 
one allegation of official complicity by immigration officials in a 
suspected trafficking case during the reporting period. However, 
the government did not report any prosecutions or convictions of 
government employees complicit in trafficking offenses.
PROTECTION
The government maintained efforts to identify and protect victims. 
The government investigated cases involving 102 potential victims 
of trafficking; however, it reported only identifying and providing 
assistance to three victims of labor trafficking, compared with one 
victim identified during the previous reporting period. Authorities 
did not provide assistance to any victims of sex trafficking. The 
police anti-trafficking unit had informal guidelines in place to 
assist officers to identify victims, and the Office of the Director of 
Public Prosecutors reported an informal policy that police officers 
must refer any identified victims to the HTU. However, government 
officials did not proactively screen for victims of trafficking among 
vulnerable populations, and the government did not have formal 
victim identification procedures for all relevant agencies. In addition, 
the government’s new anti-trafficking strategy, completed in January 
2021, contained a list of trafficking indicators for officials to use for 
victim identification; however, authorities did not distribute these 
indicators or use them during the reporting period. The Ministry of 
Defense, National Security, and Policing created a Case Management 
Coordinator office (CMC), as well as a case management mechanism 
that created formal procedures for officials to refer victims to the 
CMC. The government reported the CMC would assume responsibility 
of coordinating victim support and overseeing the progression of 
investigations and prosecutions. However, the CMC did not oversee 
any cases or coordinate victim services during the reporting period, 
and the case management mechanism was not implemented in 
practice. 
The government made available to victims accommodation, legal 
aid, medical care, interpreters, and allowances for basic necessities. 
However, observers reported that because the law did not specifically 
mandate the provision of services to victims of trafficking and because 
the government did not allocate funds specifically for trafficking 
victims, victims often relied on NGOs for services. The Department 
of Immigration operated safe houses for foreign individuals awaiting 
deportation, including trafficking victims. The government could place 
victims younger than 21 under the custody of the Department of 
Social Welfare, which operated four children’s homes. There were no 
reports the government penalized victims for crimes their traffickers 
compelled them to commit; however, the absence of proactive 
screening meant authorities may have detained and deported some 
unidentified victims. The government did not offer permanent legal 
alternatives to foreign victims’ removal to countries in which they 
would face retribution or hardship but could issue renewable six-
month work visas to victims assisting with investigations. However, 
during the reporting period the government did not permit identified 




The government modestly increased efforts to prevent trafficking. 
In January 2021, the Fijian Cabinet formally endorsed the national 
anti-trafficking strategy for 2021-2026, as well as a revised national 
action plan, which set annual, specific actions for the government to 
take to achieve the broader objectives outlined in the accompanying 
strategy. The Interagency Working Group on Human Trafficking, which 
convened for the first time in years during the previous reporting 
period, continued to meet. The police anti-trafficking unit continued 
to conduct public awareness campaigns and seminars aimed at 
children and young adults. It was unclear if labor officials continued to 
conduct awareness programs targeted at Fijians who work overseas to 
prevent labor exploitation. The Ministry of Employment, Productivity, 
and Industrial Relations employed 45 labor inspectors dedicated to 
identifying labor law violations, including wage violations. Inspectors 
reportedly did not have an adequate understanding of forced labor 
and the government did not provide training on the enforcement of 
laws related to child labor. Labor inspectors conducted 843 inspections 
in 2020, a significant decrease compared with 3,562 inspections in 
2019, and did not identify any child labor violations (41 identified in 
2019). Authorities did not adequately monitor the labor conditions 
of worksites, including construction sites, of companies with foreign 
owners or that had connections to foreign investors and employed 
migrant workers. The Permanent Secretary for Labor issued certificates 
of authorization for employment agencies, which required agencies 
meet standards under the Employment Relations Regulations of 2008; 
agencies convicted of operating without authorization could be fined 
20,000 Fijian dollars ($9,980), imprisoned for up to four years, or 
both; however, no agencies were convicted during the reporting 
period. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand 
for commercial sex acts. The government trained some diplomatic 
personnel on trafficking. With assistance from two foreign defense 
forces, the government incorporated training on sexual exploitation 
into pre-deployment training but did not provide trafficking-specific 
training to Fijian military personnel prior to their deployment abroad 
as part of international peacekeeping missions. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Fiji, and traffickers exploit victims from Fiji 
abroad. Family members, taxi drivers, foreign tourists, businessmen, 
crew on foreign fishing vessels, and other traffickers have allegedly 
exploited victims from Thailand and China, as well as Fijian women 
and children, in sex trafficking. Traffickers exploit victims in illegal 
brothels, local hotels, private homes, and massage parlors, and 
traffickers sometimes utilize websites and cell phone applications to 
advertise victims for commercial sex. Some Fijian children are at risk 
of sex and labor trafficking, as families follow a traditional practice of 
sending them to live with relatives or families in larger cities, where 
they may be subjected to domestic servitude or coerced to engage in 
sexual activity in exchange for food, clothing, shelter, or school fees. 
Fijian children were at risk for forced labor in agriculture, retail, or 
other sectors. Rising levels of poverty also contributed to increased 
risks of Fijian children being exploited in commercial sex and forced 
labor. Economic crisis related to the pandemic, as well as weather-
related natural disasters, increased the number of street children 
compelled to seek incomes to sustain their families; these children 
are at risk of being exploited in sex trafficking or forced labor. Reports 
indicated children as young as 12 years old were exploited in sex 
trafficking. Observers reported a practice where taxi drivers transported 
Fijian child sex trafficking victims to hotels in popular tourist areas at 
the request of foreign tourists seeking commercial sex acts. Foreign 
yacht owners and foreigners hiring locally-owned yachts dock in rural 
Fijian islands seek young women, usually children, for marriage; 
some of these women and children subsequently become at risk to 
forced labor or sex trafficking. However, border restrictions related 
to the pandemic led to a reduction of the number of foreign yachts 
entering Fiji, subsequently resulting in fewer reports of this practice 
occurring during the reporting period. Traffickers exploit Fijian and 
Chinese women and children in Chinese-operated massage parlors 
and brothels, particularly in Suva. In some cases, massage parlor 
owners arrange for female Fijian employees to engage in commercial 
sex acts with clients in local hotels and brothels. Anecdotal reports 
indicated traffickers transported Chinese victims into Fiji on small 
boats, avoiding ports. 
Some Fijian men reportedly marry women from Nepal and Pakistan 
and subject them to domestic servitude in Fiji. Labor traffickers exploit 
workers from South and East Asian countries in small, informal 
farms and factories, and in construction. Recruitment agencies 
operating in victims’ home countries, vessel owners, and other crew 
exploit migrant fisherman from Southeast Asian countries, especially 
Indonesia, in forced labor on Fijian flagged fishing vessels, or foreign 
flagged fishing vessels (mainly China- and Taiwan-flagged) transiting 
Fijian ports and waters. Victims of forced labor experience threats 
of violence, passport confiscation, debt-based coercion, excessive 
working hours, and abusive living and working conditions. Reports 
indicated low-level official complicity impeded anti-trafficking 
efforts. Corruption among some officials prevented the investigation 
of trafficking, including in Chinese-operated brothels. In addition, 
immigration officials allegedly took action that indirectly facilitated 
or enabled human trafficking. Fijian workers in Australia and New 
Zealand were at risk of labor trafficking. 
FINLAND: TIER 1
The Government of Finland fully meets the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued to 
demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting 
period while considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Finland remained 
on Tier 1. These efforts included identifying more trafficking 
victims; investigating more trafficking cases; and establishing anti-
trafficking units in the police and prosecutor’s office. Additionally, 
the government developed guidelines and a checklist for identifying 
labor trafficking, established a working group focused on due 
diligence regulation for company supply chains and commissioned 
related training courses, and approved the hiring of 15 new labor 
inspectors. Although the government meets the minimum standards, 
courts convicted fewer traffickers and reports persisted that police 
penalized trafficking victims for crimes their traffickers compelled 
them to commit. Municipalities continued to lack the capabilities 
to address the needs of victims, and implementation of the national 
referral mechanism remained at a standstill.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Investigate and prosecute sex trafficking and labor trafficking cases 
using the trafficking statute, and sentence convicted traffickers to 
significant prison terms. • Enforce the non-punishment provision and 
cease prosecuting victims for unlawful acts their traffickers compelled 
them to commit. • Ensure all municipalities have policies and 
procedures consistent with national standards and allocate resources 
so that local service providers and municipal government officials 
are familiar with victims’ rights to assistance and know how to offer 
high-quality services. • Implement the national referral mechanism 
for identification and assistance with improved identification and 
referral guidelines, train front-line workers, particularly social workers 






implementation. • Ensure all victims have full access to services, 
such as residence permit applications, shelters, and health and social 
services, regardless of whether and under which statutes a suspected 
trafficker is prosecuted. • Develop clear guidance for national victim 
assistance system personnel on treating victims who do not choose 
to involve the police. • Train judges, law enforcement officials, 
and prosecutors on applying the trafficking law. • Develop and 
implement a centralized database on trafficking that allows for the 
disaggregation of data, including the demographics of victims and 
type of exploitation. • Publish, resource, and implement a national 
action plan for 2021. • Conduct public awareness campaigns targeting 
vulnerable populations.
PROSECUTION
The government increased law enforcement efforts. Chapter 25, 
Section 3 of the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking and prescribed sentences of between four months and 
six years’ imprisonment for offenses involving an adult victim and 
between two and 10 years’ imprisonment for those involving a 
child victim. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with 
regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for 
other serious crimes, such as rape. The government continued to 
use laws against pandering, discrimination, and usury, among 
others, to investigate and prosecute some suspected traffickers; the 
penalties for these crimes were generally far less severe than those 
for trafficking crimes. In 2020, the National Bureau of Investigation 
(NBI) investigated 87 cases, an increase from 81 cases in 2019. 
Authorities prosecuted 14 cases (15 cases in 2019). Finnish courts 
convicted one trafficker (two in 2019) and issued a sentence of three 
years and two months’ imprisonment. The NBI cooperated with 
foreign governments on transnational investigations, which resulted 
in prosecutions. The government did not report any investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit 
in trafficking offenses.
During the reporting period, the government established a 20-person 
anti-trafficking task force, comprising members from the Helsinki 
police and the NBI, to investigate major trafficking cases. In addition, 
the prosecutor’s office of Southern Finland established a parallel 
anti-trafficking unit composed of 10 specialized prosecutors and 
developed a plan to create a detailed database for all trafficking-
related cases. Southern Finland, which included Helsinki, remained 
the most populous district in the country and the primary location 
for trafficking crimes. As in previous years, experts raised concerns 
that police prioritized other types of conventional cases and crimes 
and prosecutors were often unwilling to pursue trafficking charges 
due to the high legal standard for trafficking-related convictions. At 
the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, district courts closed, which 
delayed judicial processing and compounded the perennial problem 
of lengthy investigations and prosecutions, possibly leading to law 
enforcement prosecuting trafficking cases under less serious offenses. 
The government supported educational efforts during the reporting 
period by providing annual training for prosecutors, police, and 
immigration officers.
PROTECTION
The government maintained protection efforts. Multiple actors within 
the government and civil society were empowered to identify and 
refer trafficking victims. Although police and immigration officials 
used written guidelines for identification and referral, the national 
anti-trafficking coordinator acknowledged authorities required more 
training on these guidelines. As a result, the government created a 
national referral mechanism for victim identification and assistance 
but did not implement it due to the pending completion of the 
national action plan. The victim assistance system was the main 
channel for identifying victims via referrals, and through it, the 
government provided both direct care and funding for third-party 
care. The government received 394 potential trafficking victim 
referrals, and the assistance system admitted 247 potential trafficking 
victims (10 children), a notable increase from 303 and 229 (14 
children), respectively, in 2019. The assistance system reported 25 
percent of new recipients were sex trafficking victims, 49 percent 
were labor trafficking victims, and the remaining percentage were 
victims of forced marriage or other crimes classified as trafficking 
under Finnish law. Authorities noted 120 of the new recipients (49 
percent) became trafficking victims in Finland rather than abroad, a 
sharp increase from 70 in 2019 and the most recorded since 2015. 
Of the 120, authorities registered 11 as sex trafficking victims, the 
same number as in 2019. All victims accepted into the assistance 
system consented to cooperate with police in the prosecution of 
their traffickers; however, in cases where victimization occurred 
outside of Finland and the conditions of the relevant jurisdiction 
made law enforcement cooperation unlikely, police did not open 
a criminal investigation. Finnish law required police to pursue 
cases specifically as trafficking crimes in order for victims to receive 
services through the assistance system. The government did not 
provide guidance to assistance system personnel regarding referrals 
of victims who were exploited in trafficking domestically and 
did not wish to contact the police. Furthermore, according to the 
national rapporteur, the placement of the assistance system within 
immigration services misrepresented trafficking as a crime requiring 
migration and reduced the focus on trafficking committed within 
Finland. The government continued to consider the transfer of 
the victim assistance system to the Ministry of Social Affairs and 
Health to address this concern and to weaken the link between 
the provision of assistance to victims and their participation in the 
justice process, which acted as an obstacle to victims’ willingness to 
come forward. Finnish police were not prohibited from prosecuting 
victims who, as a result of being trafficked, committed acts that 
violate national law. Observers continued to point out that the 
non-punishment provision existed in theory, but in practice, the 
police treated users of illegal drugs, potential victims who had 
been forced into criminality, and foreigners in the commercial sex 
industry as perpetrators of crimes.
Once victims were referred to the assistance system, consultants 
evaluated the case and decided on the victim’s course of care, which 
could include transportation to a safe house; psychological, medical, 
and legal assistance; or shelter. There was one government-funded 
shelter specifically for trafficking victims, though it accepted only 
women and their children—there were no shelters dedicated to 
male victims. Care providers sheltered most trafficking victims in 
private accommodations. Child services assigned unaccompanied 
child victims a guardian to serve as a legal representative. Authorities 
placed Finnish children who could not return to their families in 
foster care, while authorities placed unaccompanied migrant children 
in a migrant reception center specifically for children. Officials noted 
some municipalities lacked the knowledge and resources to provide 
assistance to trafficking victims. The Parliamentary Ombudsman 
reprimanded the City of Helsinki for failing to provide adequate 
support to victims and indicated that social workers employed by 
the city often did not know what benefits were available to victims 
and that benefits were in some cases denied even when the assistance 
system told the municipality what the victim was entitled to and 
that the state would reimburse the costs. Helsinki’s head of adult 
social work noted the legislation concerning benefits for victims 
was unclear and originally intended to assist undocumented victims 
and not legal residents of Finland. Observers noted municipalities 
experience difficulties with victim service provision because they 
functioned under the general framework of social welfare and were 
not sufficiently equipped with the resources to deal with crime-
related issues such as trafficking or victims of trafficking. In 2020, the 
government spent €1.1 million ($1.3 million) on trafficking victim 
assistance and protection, approximately the same as in 2019 and 
2018. In addition, the government allocated €200,000 ($245,400) 




Finnish Immigration Services conditioned eligibility to receive a 
specialized residence permit on the victim’s cooperation with police to 
commence a criminal investigation. Delayed investigations and police 
failure to submit the appropriate paperwork requesting victims to 
remain in the country left victims susceptible to deportation. Finnish 
law allowed foreign victims a six-month reflection period during which 
they could receive care and assistance while considering whether to 
assist law enforcement, and the law allowed legal residents a recovery 
period of up to three months. According to the assistance system, 
24 victims took advantage of the reflection period in 2020 (23 in 
2019). Victims could receive renewable temporary residence permits, 
which were valid for six to 12 months and allowed victims to seek 
employment. Authorities provided temporary residence permits to 
seven victims and renewed 11 permits, compared with 15 and three, 
respectively, in 2019. During the reporting period, the government in 
partnership with NGOs and other organizations developed a pilot 
project to provide training and full-time jobs to victims residing in 
Finland; the project was not yet operational.
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention activities. The national anti-
trafficking coordinator reported a new national action plan was 
pending approval and publication; the government’s previous action 
plan expired in 2017. The government continued to implement and 
fund anti-trafficking initiatives. However, the government did not 
conduct or fund any domestic anti-trafficking awareness campaigns. 
Globally, the government funded a wide range of anti-trafficking 
programs, including training in Laos and a prevention project in 
Burundi, investing nearly €335,000 ($411,000) in 2020. As a result 
of a multi-year international project profiling trafficking in regional 
supply chains, the government developed guidelines and a checklist 
for law enforcement and labor inspectors to better identify and 
counter labor trafficking. During the reporting period, the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and Employment published a judicial analysis 
outlining due diligence obligations that could be imposed on 
companies. The report explored possible regulatory options, their 
scope of application, supervision, and sanctions under corporate 
social responsibility legislation. The ministry established a working 
group supporting the preparation of mandatory due diligence 
regulation and commissioned two training courses for companies. 
Following an incident involving seasonal berry pickers, the ministry 
began an investigation into the exploitation of migrant workers and 
initiated changes to strengthen the regulation of seasonal workers, 
including new protections for laborers and legal obligations for those 
contracting their services, such as banning the use of recruitment fees 
and requiring employers to accept responsibility for the condition 
and treatment of the laborers. The government approved hiring 
15 new labor inspectors to monitor forced labor. In 2020, the 
Occupational Safety and Health Agency conducted approximately 
800 inspections related to the use of foreign labor and 408 related to 
the proper payment of salaries to foreign workers. The government 
did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. 
The national assistance system maintained a hotline and website in 
multiple languages exclusively for trafficking victims and reported 
assisting approximately 25 potential victims.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
domestic and foreign victims in Finland, and to a lesser extent, 
traffickers exploit victims from Finland abroad. Traffickers operate 
from abroad using threats of violence, debt leverage, and other forms 
of coercion. Authorities express concern about Romanian criminal 
organizations exploiting individuals from their home countries in 
Finland. Experts note most labor trafficking involves small-scale 
operations in businesses, rather than larger criminal syndicates. 
Victims primarily originate in Eastern Europe, Africa, South and 
Central Asia, and the Middle East. Authorities report asylum-seekers 
and other migrants, many of whom continue to reside in Finland for 
years after receiving a negative decision on their asylum claim, are 
the two groups most vulnerable to trafficking. Traffickers threaten to 
expose their unlawful residency if they complain of their exploitation 
in sex or labor trafficking. Foreign-born workers and immigrants, 
many of whom arrive in Finland legally, are especially vulnerable to 
exploitation in the construction, restaurant, agriculture, and transport 
industries and as cleaners, gardeners, and domestic workers. Staff at the 
Ombudsman for Nondiscrimination report traffickers force victims to 
pay for jobs and unpaid internships, particularly in the construction 
industry, before transporting them to Finland. Authorities report the 
recruitment and exploitation of foreign workers from Nepal in the 
restaurant sector. Seasonal berry pickers continue to be especially 
vulnerable to labor exploitation and trafficking.
FRANCE: TIER 1
The Government of France fully meets the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued to 
demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting 
period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its 
anti-trafficking capacity; therefore France remained on Tier 1. These 
efforts included increasing its funding to one NGO that provided 
victim protection assistance, providing assistance to more victims than 
the prior year, and increasing efforts to address official complicity. 
The government also established a new inter-ministerial working 
group on child sex trafficking. Although the government meets the 
minimum standards, it prosecuted fewer suspects and convicted 
fewer traffickers compared to the prior year, which could not be 
attributed to the pandemic. For the second year, the government 
did not report investigating any traffickers, and it did not report 
sufficiently disaggregated data on the number of trafficking victims 
it identified. The government continued to lack a national victim 
identification and referral mechanism to ensure proactive referral to 
care; it lacked coordinated and comprehensive data on trafficking; 
and it did not increase its efforts to address labor trafficking. Police 
continued to arrest and prosecute child victims of forced begging 
and forced criminality and deport irregular migrants from Mayotte, 
an overseas French department, without screening for trafficking 
indicators. Further, the government again did not take steps to 
address the 3,000 to 4,000 unaccompanied Comorian children at 
risk for sex and labor trafficking in Mayotte. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Coordinate and centralize the timely collection of trafficking data 
across the government, including sufficiently disaggregating data 
between trafficking and other forms of exploitation, as well as between 
sex and labor trafficking. • Create a national identification and 
referral mechanism for all forms of trafficking and increase efforts to 
proactively identify and provide assistance to trafficking victims in all 
regions and departments, both domestic and overseas. • Vigorously 
investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, and sentence those 
convicted to significant prison terms. • Increase funding and resources 
specifically for anti-trafficking coordination and victim assistance, 
including adequate funding for NGOs providing assistance. • Increase 
interagency coordination to investigate and prevent labor trafficking. 
• Ensure adequate training for law enforcement investigators on 
techniques to dismantle human trafficking organizations operating 
on the internet and other technologies. • Systematically train all 





and judges, on a victim-centered approach to investigating and 
prosecuting labor trafficking and identifying victims. • Vigorously 
investigate labor trafficking and prosecute these crimes as trafficking 
rather than labor code violations. • Allow formal victim identification 
without requiring cooperation or interaction with law enforcement 
and by entities other than law enforcement officials, including by civil 
society, social workers, and healthcare professionals. • Consistently 
screen all migrants for trafficking indicators, including unaccompanied 
children in Mayotte. • Implement the second national action plan 
and include a defined timeframe and dedicated budget as well as 
other recommendations from the national rapporteur. • Provide 
adequate resources for child victims, including improving the quality 
of shelters and specialized assistance, especially of forced begging 
and criminality. • Increase efforts to award restitution to all victims 
of trafficking and ensure victims lacking legal status were eligible 
to receive restitution and damages. • Offer the reflection period to 
all victims, including migrants and victims of forced begging and 
criminality. • Strengthen international law enforcement cooperation 
to prevent and investigate child sex tourism and continue to prosecute 
and convict perpetrators. • Ensure sufficient resources are provided to 
the national rapporteur and the anti-trafficking coordinator. • Utilize 
the witness protection program for trafficking victims and improve 
assistance provided during court trials. • Increase worker protections 
by eliminating recruitment or placement fees charged to workers by 
French labor recruiters and ensuring employers pay any recruitment 
fees. • Given significant concerns about forced labor indicators in 
Cuban Medical Missions, screen Cuban medical professionals in all 
regions and departments and refer them to appropriate services. • 
Establish adequate accommodation centers dedicated to adult male 
trafficking victims that take into account the specific needs of these 
trafficking victims. 
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. Article 225-4 of 
the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and 
prescribed penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 
up to €1.5 million ($1.84 million). These penalties were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
those prescribed for other serious offenses, such as rape. The increased 
occurrence of other crimes, notably domestic violence, during the 
pandemic lockdowns caused a shift in government priorities and 
resources away from human trafficking—although NGOs asserted 
the government had prioritized other crimes for many years prior to 
the pandemic. The government did not report comprehensive and 
disaggregated law enforcement data, but provided information from 
all French departments and territories, including those overseas. The 
government did not report the number of cases it investigated in 2020 
or 2019, compared with 313 cases involving 944 suspects in 2018. 
In 2020, the government reported investigating and dismantling 53 
networks involved in facilitating human trafficking and commercial 
sex crimes, leading to the arrests of 875 suspects. In 2020, the 
government changed its methodology for recording trafficking 
prosecutions and convictions to include cases heard in courts of 
first instance as well. The government reported prosecuting 129 
trafficking suspects in 2019, the most recent year data was available, 
a decrease compared with 184 suspects in 2018. The government 
reported convicting 91 traffickers in 2019, the most recent year for 
which data was available; compared with 104 in 2018. While the 
government did not report comprehensive and specific sentencing 
data in a format that allowed for an accurate assessment of significant 
sentencing, it provided a five-year average (2015-2019) of 3.6 years’ 
imprisonment. However, the media reported on sentences for 55 of 
91 convicted traffickers in 2019, the year required to be assessed, of 
which at least 51 of 91 (56 percent) traffickers received significant 
prison sentences, compared with significant sentences issued to 40 
percent of traffickers in 2018, as reported by the media. 
In 2020, the government reported it took steps to address government 
complicity in human trafficking crimes by indicting a high-level 
court official on sex trafficking-related charges; authorities also 
indicted a high-level magistrate, and former children’s judge, on 
child sex trafficking-related charges. The National Consultative 
Commission for Human Rights (CNCDH) urged courts to issue more 
consistent and stringent penalties to convicted human traffickers and 
NGOs expressed concerns about the inconsistency of anti-trafficking 
prosecutions across the country, which could vary depending on the 
level of engagement of local prosecutors. The media also reported 
that in October 2019, the government convicted a former Burundian 
diplomat and his spouse for labor trafficking and the exploitation of 
a domestic worker and sentenced them to 10 years’ imprisonment. 
Courts suspended both sentences and issued a fine; the defendants 
appealed the sentences in 2020, which remained pending at the end 
of the reporting period. During the reporting period, the government, 
through Operation Barkhane, provided support to Malian armed 
groups who used and recruited child soldiers. The pandemic caused 
courts to shut down for two months in 2020, which delayed the 
processing of all cases. The government did not report the amount 
of assets seized from convicted traffickers in 2020, but in 2019, the 
government seized €250 million ($306.75 million) and €10 million 
($12.27 million) in 2018. 
The government had several bodies that were responsible for 
investigating trafficking crimes: the Ministry of Interior’s Central 
Office for Combating Human Trafficking, comprising 25 investigators, 
was responsible for cases of sex trafficking, and the Central Office for 
Combatting Illegal Labor and the Central Office for the Suppression 
of Irregular Migration and the Employment of Irregular Migrants were 
responsible for labor trafficking cases. The government continued 
anti-trafficking training programs, some of which included victim 
identification training, for magistrates, prosecutors, police, social 
workers, civil servants, NGOs, and the hospitality sector; however, 
the government did not report the number of individuals who 
received training during the reporting period. In September 2020, 
the government reported hosting a conference on forced labor with 
representatives from 24 European countries as well as a training on 
identifying sex trafficking victims for 40 members of the French and 
Belgian security forces. Further, a local government hosted a training 
conference for 30 lawyers on the recognition of refugee status for 
female sex trafficking victims, especially from the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo and Nigeria. These training efforts compared with 88 
people trained in 2019. The CNCDH and several other government 
bodies raised concerns regarding the lack of adequate training 
for many police investigators on techniques to dismantle human 
trafficking organizations that operated on the internet and other 
technologies—a trend that rapidly increased during the pandemic. 
A June 2020 government report asserted law enforcement also lacked 
sufficient awareness of trafficking organizations that exploited male 
and transgender victims, despite the extreme violence often used by 
these organizations. The CNCDH recommended training on the use 
of new technologies in human trafficking cases and for investigators 
who already had the capacity to track these networks to prioritize 
human trafficking cases over other crimes. Further, an NGO asserted 
police sometimes recorded sex and labor trafficking complaints as 
lesser crimes that did not necessitate an official investigation or failed 
to register the complaint at all. NGOs also observed that judges and 
prosecutors were sometimes reluctant to formally certify forced 
labor victims because of the protections subsequently granted to 
them and recommended additional targeted training. In 2020, the 
government collaborated in international investigations, including 
with EUROPOL, INTERPOL, Bulgaria, Hungary, Luxembourg, and 
Romania, which resulted in the identification of 11 victims and 
the arrest of 10 trafficking suspects; a decrease compared with four 
identified victims, 42 arrests, four prosecutions, and 17 convictions in 
2019. The government continued to maintain a French police liaison 
in Nigeria to facilitate cooperation with local law enforcement on 
investigations of human trafficking. The government also signed an 
information sharing agreement with the United Kingdom on human 
trafficking and cooperated with the Government of Georgia, but did 




The government maintained inadequate victim identification and 
protection efforts. The government reported police identified 892 
victims of exploitation in 2020, including 217 children; however, 
contrary to prior years, the number of trafficking victims identified 
by the government was not sufficiently disaggregated and a broader 
data set was reported, which may have included victims of adult and 
child sex trafficking. This compared with 175 victims of trafficking, 
717 victims of aggravated sexual exploitation, and 39 victims of 
exploitation in 2019, for a total of 931. Gaps in victim identification 
remained, as the government did not report identifying any French 
national or labor trafficking victims. Victim protection data included 
all French departments and territories, including those overseas. 
Pandemic lockdowns led to decreased use of bars and nightclubs 
and the increased use of private locations and the internet as 
venues for exploitation, which exacerbated vulnerabilities for sex 
trafficking victims and decreased victim visibility to authorities. The 
pandemic also exacerbated vulnerabilities for labor trafficking victims 
through increased isolation of migrant and domestic workers, which 
complicated detection by officials and NGOs. 
The Ministry of Solidarity and Health and the City of Paris provided 
funding for the Ac-Se system, an NGO-managed network of 50 
NGO-run shelters and specialized NGOs assisting adult victims of 
sex and labor trafficking. Both police and NGOs referred victims to 
Ac-Se. The government provided Ac-Se with €234,000 ($287,120) in 
2020, in addition to an unreported amount of funding it dispersed 
to individual NGOs supporting the Ac-Se network. This amount 
compared to €240,000 ($294,480) provided in 2019. In addition 
to its regular funding, the government provided Ac-Se with an 
additional €563,000 ($690,800) in November 2020 for an 18-month 
period to provide additional victim assistance; this funding was 
confiscated from seized assets of convicted traffickers. However, 
NGOs criticized the amount of funding generally provided by the 
government to all NGOs for victim assistance as insufficient and 
asserted that the government often funded anti-trafficking efforts 
from the women's rights budget with little transparency in how 
much it allocated specifically to human trafficking. NGOs also raised 
concerns pertaining to the lack of a dedicated budget allocation to 
NGOs providing victim assistance to trafficking victims, resulting 
in their need to continually obtain private funding. In addition to 
victims identified by the government, NGOs reported identifying at 
least 6,457 human trafficking victims and assisting 2,573 in 2020, 
but many of the NGOs did not receive government funding and 
the government did not provide further details. Experts and NGOs 
expressed concerns regarding the government’s national statistics 
on victim identification and asserted the scale of human trafficking 
in France was likely much higher. 
Only the police, gendarmerie, judiciary, and labor inspectors could 
formally identify victims and formal victim identification was 
dependent upon cooperation with law enforcement. The CNCDH, 
which functioned as the independent national rapporteur, urged 
the government to allow formal victim identification without a 
requirement to cooperate with law enforcement and also by entities 
other than law enforcement, including by civil society, healthcare 
workers, and social workers; however, the government did not 
report efforts to allow other entities to formally identify victims. 
Further, NGOs reported that recognition as a trafficking victim was 
difficult; such status offered additional protections and in practice 
was necessary to obtain asylum or a residence permit, residency 
papers, healthcare, and housing. 
In both its 2013 and 2017 reports, GRETA urged the government 
to adopt a national identification and referral mechanism. The 
government has never had a national identification and referral 
mechanism to ensure uniform and equal treatment of victims and 
did not take concrete steps in the reporting period to adopt one. 
However, most ministries and regions had formal procedures for 
identifying victims and authorities continued to use an NGO-run 
referral mechanism. Experts, NGOs, and the national rapporteur 
reported gaps in authorities’ proactive victim identification efforts 
persisted during the reporting period; they called for improving 
victim identification as a top priority in the anti-trafficking national 
action plan. The government assumes the majority of individuals in 
commercial sex and all foreign adult individuals in commercial sex 
are trafficking victims, and the government systematically screens 
this population for trafficking indicators. However, this assumption 
could have led to a misunderstanding of sex trafficking amongst 
front-line officials and conflation with commercial sex. Further, 
authorities often mischaracterized victims of forced criminality as 
delinquents or illegal workers and consequently excluded them from 
assistance. Victims of forced labor experienced difficulty in formal 
recognition as victims. 
Both police and NGOs referred victims to Ac-Se. While only partial 
data on victim assistance was available, government-funded NGOs 
reported assisting 260 trafficking victims in 2020, an increase 
compared with 64 victims in 2019, 86 in 2018, and 79 in 2017. Ac-
Se provided victims with shelter, legal, medical, and psychological 
services; in 2020, 48 victims and nine child dependents received 
shelter and three victims were assisted with voluntary repatriation. 
This compared with 57 victims, including 12 children, who received 
shelter and seven who were assisted with voluntary repatriation 
in 2019. In 2020, a government-funded NGO reported providing 
assistance to more than 200 victims, including 51 new victims, 
most of whom were victims of forced labor and domestic servitude. 
Not all trafficking victims were eligible for admittance into Ac-Se’s 
shelter program, unless they were in immediate danger or in a 
highly vulnerable situation that required geographic relocation; 
NGOs observed that migrants without legal status often struggled 
to find housing, which increased their risk of exploitation. Although 
formal victim identification required law enforcement cooperation, 
victims who chose not to cooperate could still receive free medical 
attention. Local governments provided French language classes to 
victims, and some victims could qualify for subsidized housing and 
job training programs, but the government did not report the number 
of victims provided with these benefits. The national employment 
agency provided some foreign victims with an initial stipend of 
€350 ($429) a month but did not report the number of victims 
that received this stipend during the reporting period; civil society 
organizations reported the conditions for being granted a stipend 
were not uniform and varied by region. Although NGOs sometimes 
provided psychological support to victims, the government did 
not fund this service and NGOs raised concerns the government 
provided little psychological counseling to victims. The central and 
municipal governments continued to partially fund the operation 
of a shelter in Paris that could accommodate 12 victims, as well 
as a small number of emergency apartments external to the Ac-Se 
system. There were no accommodation centers dedicated to adult 
male trafficking victims, but communal homes or homeless shelters 
were sometimes used; however, these accommodations did not take 
into account the specific needs of trafficking victims. Police referred 
child trafficking victims to the Child Welfare Services (ASE) system, 
which provided the children with shelter. However, following a 
documentary revealing ASE’s past practice of placing child victims 
alone in hotels, the government ceased this practice in January 
2021 and began placing children in secure housing. GRETA and 
the national rapporteur reported a lack of adequate resources for 
the special assistance needs of child trafficking victims. To adapt to 
pandemic-related restrictions, the government found new lodging 
accommodations for 50 child victims of trafficking. Some shelters 
were required to limit capacities to adhere to pandemic-related social 
distancing requirements and ensure the continued safety of victims. 
The government had an NGO-run referral program to transfer 
victims detained, arrested, or placed in protective custody by law 
enforcement authorities to institutions that provided short-term care. 
Judges heard criminal trials for trafficking in private at the victim’s 





limit re-traumatization, victims usually had access to a psychologist 
during court proceedings and the law limited the interview of child 
victims to one time. NGOs noted the government did not consistently 
provide interpreters to victims or information in a language they 
understood, the responsibility of which would then pass to the NGO. 
The government had a witness protection program that trafficking 
victims could use; however, despite the government reporting that 
traffickers often threatened trafficking victims and their families 
to not speak to law enforcement, especially if the trafficker was 
wealthy, well-connected, or had diplomatic immunity, authorities 
rarely used the program. The government did not report utilizing 
the witness protection program for any trafficking victims during 
the reporting period, which may have decreased the willingness 
of some victims to cooperate with law enforcement. The CNCDH 
urged the government to improve assistance provided to victims 
during their trials, but the government did not make efforts to do 
so during the reporting period. Victims were entitled to receive a 
30-day reflection period during which they could decide whether 
to lodge a complaint or participate in criminal proceedings against 
a trafficker; however, some authorities were not familiar with the 
reflection period and did not offer it. 
The government did not report the number of temporary residence 
permits granted to formally recognized trafficking victims; it issued 
such permits only when victims cooperated with police investigations 
or enrolled in the government’s reintegration program, which required 
ceasing engagement in commercial sex and often required paperwork 
victims could not obtain. Authorities generally offered permanent 
residency to trafficking victims following a successful conviction of 
their trafficker. Trafficking victims were also eligible for international 
protection under refugee status or subsidiary protection status in 
cases where victims had a credible fear of retaliation, including from 
public authorities in their country of origin, if returned; however, the 
government did not report the number of victims granted such status 
during the reporting period. The government offered a specialized 
support program for asylum-seekers who were also victims of violence 
or human trafficking, but it required the victims to be formally 
recognized; the program provided secure lodging, psychological 
support, and a path to request asylum, but the government did not 
report how many asylum-seekers utilized this program during the 
reporting period. In response to the pandemic, the government 
extended the expiration dates of residence permits for asylum-seekers 
by six months in 2020. The government had internal guidelines to 
evaluate and process asylum claims on the basis of labor trafficking. 
A large collective of anti-trafficking NGOs believed the new law 
on asylum and immigration, which eased restrictions on migrant 
deportation, limited victims’ ability to receive temporary residence 
due to new time-bound restrictions on permit applications and more 
stringent approval criteria. The government reported conducting an 
unknown number of training sessions for the French Office for the 
Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons on identifying human 
trafficking victims and included training on internal guidelines 
pertaining to protection needs. GRETA reported police arrested and 
prosecuted child victims of forced begging and forced criminality 
without screening for trafficking indicators. In 2020, the government 
did not report uniformly screening irregular migrants, who were 
vulnerable to trafficking, in Mayotte for trafficking indicators prior 
to their deportation, which could have left some trafficking victims 
unidentified. The government also did not report taking steps to 
address the 3,000 to 4,000 unaccompanied Comorian children 
at risk for sex and labor trafficking in the French department of 
Mayotte by offering protection services such as medical care, shelter, 
or education. Further, the government did not uniformly screen 
vulnerable migrants from settlements in Calais prior to their removal, 
nor allow NGOs the opportunity to do so, which could have left 
some trafficking victims unidentified. Criminal courts could order 
traffickers to pay restitution to victims who were citizens of France 
or when the act was committed on French territory, the European 
Economic Community (ECC), or had legal immigration status; the 
government reported awarding restitution to at least three victims 
in 2020. Victims who were citizens of France, the ECC, or had legal 
immigration status could also bring a civil suit against a trafficker 
for damages; however, authorities did not report awarding damage 
to any victims during the reporting period. Victims lacking legal 
status were ineligible for restitution or damages. GRETA and NGOs 
reported victim restitution was rare. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained uneven prevention efforts. MIPROF 
continued to coordinate government-wide efforts on anti-trafficking 
and the prevention of violence against women; however, NGOs 
expressed concern regarding insufficient personnel and resources 
allocated to the office. MIPROF’s anti-trafficking steering committee 
included national, regional, and local governments, as well as 
NGOs; it met once during the reporting period, but NGOs noted 
an overall decrease in the government’s engagement with NGOs. In 
September 2020, the government established a new inter-ministerial 
working group on child sex trafficking, which included NGOs, 
targeting improved victim identification. The CNCDH continued 
to serve as the independent national rapporteur for trafficking, but 
resources remained insufficient. The government had a national anti-
trafficking action plan; however, the rapporteur criticized the plan, 
noting obstacles and deficiencies including the absence of a defined 
timeframe or budget. Further, the national rapporteur noted the 
action plan did not address the flaws of the first plan, which included 
prioritizing sex trafficking over labor trafficking, unequal efforts that 
varied by region, and the continued conflation of commercial sex 
and human trafficking by authorities. In the prior reporting period, 
the national rapporteur recommended annual plans incorporating 
specific deadlines, detailed measures, monitoring indicators, separated 
costs, and a dedicated source of funding; however, the government 
did not report taking any concrete steps on these recommendations. 
The continued prioritization of sex trafficking led to insufficient 
efforts to combat labor trafficking and the CNCDH recommended 
increased training on labor trafficking for all front-line officials as 
labor trafficking was often categorized as labor code violations, 
undeclared work, undignified work conditions, or employing illegal 
migrants. The tendency for authorities to categorize labor trafficking 
as lesser crimes resulted in decreased deterrence. The government 
continued to make limited efforts to raise national awareness of 
human trafficking; efforts included continued participation in an 
awareness campaign implemented by an international organization 
and the dissemination of a previously published trafficking awareness 
manual, as well as an unknown number of awareness-raising seminars. 
During the reporting period, the government continued participation 
in a joint awareness campaign on sex trafficking with the Government 
of Sweden that was supplemented by a joint cooperation action plan 
in 2020; however, the government did not provide further information 
or results of this international cooperation. The government continued 
to lack a comprehensive and centralized data system on trafficking. 
The government did not report having a licensing or accreditation 
process for labor recruiters, and they could charge recruitment or 
placement fees to workers. Passport withholding, contract switching, 
and wage withholding was illegal, and workers could pursue legal 
recourse. Although fraudulent labor recruitment remained a concern 
during the reporting period, the government did not report holding 
any labor recruitment or placement agencies accountable for labor 
trafficking during the reporting period. In 2020, the government 
conducted 31,390 labor inspections, which resulted in the initiation 
of 16 trafficking investigations and the identification of 450 victims 
of exploitation; however, the government did not report whether 
it identified any trafficking victims as a result. This compared with 
49,522 inspections conducted in 2019. NGOs reported satisfactory 
cooperation with labor inspectors on human trafficking. French 
law required large companies (with more than 5,000 employees) 
to have plans to eliminate labor exploitation by subcontractors. 
The government made efforts to reduce the demand for child sex 
tourism by funding programs to raise awareness in airports and 
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with tourism operators of the illegality of and penalties associated 
with child sex tourism, as well as requiring students to complete an 
awareness course on sex tourism prior to their departure abroad. 
For destinations with higher incidences of child sex tourism, like 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, and Madagascar, the government included 
warnings on its website for travelers. In 2020, the government also 
convicted one French national for child sex tourism in Cambodia 
and Nepal; however, the government did not provide further details 
on previously reported investigations into at least 16 suspects of 
child sex tourism. The Government of Indonesia reported arresting a 
French national for child sex tourism in June 2020. The government 
made efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex by convicting 
464 purchasers of commercial sex and requiring 176 to attend an 
awareness-raising course to combat the purchase of commercial 
sex, though efforts were inconsistent throughout the country. The 
government maintained several liaisons and advisors located in 
source countries to facilitate international anti-trafficking efforts. 
The government continued to contribute to several anti-trafficking 
programs, implemented in partnership with international 
organizations, including in Morocco and Nigeria, as well as 
implementing a regional cooperation strategy for 11 countries in 
Southeast Europe. The government also continued to station liaison 
officers and judges abroad, including in Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and 
Southeast Europe, who helped coordinate law enforcement efforts 
against traffickers. The government continued to fund anti-trafficking 
capacity-building programs across Africa’s Gulf of Guinea region 
and victim support operations in Libya. Ac-Se continued to operate 
a hotline for trafficking victims as well as a hotline for children in 
abusive situations, including trafficking; however, neither hotline 
reported the number of trafficking-related calls received during 
the reporting period. The government continued to host an online 
platform that allowed citizens to flag inappropriate content, which 
led to several human trafficking investigations. The government did 
not provide systematic anti-trafficking training for its diplomatic 
personnel, although consular officials received training on identifying 
forced domestic servitude. NGOs also noted there was insufficient 
follow-up by the government regarding domestic workers who were 
employed by diplomats in France and that little could be done to 
assist victims because of the diplomatic immunity of the trafficker.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit foreign 
victims, and to a limited extent, domestic victims in France. The 
pandemic exacerbated vulnerabilities for trafficking victims, including 
increasing the isolation of migrant and seasonal workers as well 
as sex trafficking victims, which complicated detection by officials 
and NGOs. Sex and labor traffickers exploit foreign victims from 
Eastern Europe, West and North Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean. 
In 2020, the government released the results of a large-scale victim 
survey completed by 37 NGOs. It found that in 2019, 81 percent 
were victims of sex trafficking, 8 percent were victims of forced labor, 
3 percent were victims of forced criminality, and 1 percent were 
victims of forced begging. One third of victims surveyed came from 
West Africa, mostly Nigeria, followed in frequency by victims from 
North Africa and Eastern Europe. Authorities noted an increase in 
French girls as sex trafficking victims, as well as a general increase 
in child victims since 2016. NGOs estimate that between 6,000 and 
8,000 French teenagers are victims of child sex trafficking, with more 
than half between the ages of 15 and 16. Nigerian females make 
up the majority of sex trafficking victims. During the pandemic, sex 
traffickers increased the usage of online platforms to recruit and 
exploit victims and book apartment rentals to make their illicit 
operations difficult to track; NGOs estimate that more than half of 
commercial sex encounters were organized online. NGOs report 
an increase in the number of Nigerian women in commercial sex; 
pandemic-related lockdowns also exacerbated unsafe living conditions 
and increased vulnerabilities to sex trafficking. Authorities report 
traffickers encourage Nigerian victims to claim asylum to obtain legal 
residency and facilitate their continued exploitation. Sex trafficking 
networks, controlled by Bulgarian, Chinese, French, Hungarian, 
Nigerian, Romanian, and South American traffickers, exploit women 
through debt bondage, physical force, and psychological coercion, 
including the invocation of voodoo and drug addiction. Chinese 
criminal networks also use as many as 400 massage parlors as fronts 
for the purchase of commercial sex, raising concerns about sex 
trafficking. The government estimates the majority of the 40,000 to 
50,000 individuals in commercial sex in France, about 90 percent 
of whom are foreign, are likely trafficking victims. Members of the 
LGBTQI+ community are vulnerable to trafficking and traffickers 
increasingly exploit transgender victims in sex trafficking. Traffickers 
exploit children, primarily from Romania, West and North Africa, 
and the Middle East, in sex trafficking in France. Traffickers often 
lure victims with fraudulent offers of economic opportunities and 
target undocumented workers already in France. In suburban areas, 
there has been a sharp rise in sex traffickers known as “lover boys” 
coercing vulnerable girls into sex trafficking, often through a sham 
romantic relationship. French citizens sometimes engage in child 
sex tourism abroad.
Labor trafficking most frequently occurs in domestic work, followed by 
construction, small commerce, agriculture, fishing, and livestock; the 
majority of identified labor trafficking victims are women. Expansive 
criminal networks force children to commit crimes; most victims 
are from Romania and North Africa, many of whom are addicted 
to controlled substances. Seasonal migrant workers are vulnerable 
to labor trafficking while harvesting grapes for winemakers in the 
Champagne region and are often hired through subcontractors 
using fraudulent job descriptions and wages. Traffickers exploit the 
large influx of unaccompanied children who have entered France in 
recent years. Roma and unaccompanied children in France are at risk 
for forced begging and forced theft. The families of Roma children 
are often also their traffickers. In 2020, the government found that 
immediate or extended family members are the traffickers for 88 
percent of victims of forced crime and forced begging; 62 percent of 
sex trafficking victims knew their traffickers beforehand. Traffickers 
exploit mentally disabled victims in forced labor in agriculture and 
begging. The estimated 3,000 to 4,000 unaccompanied Comorian 
children on the island Mayotte, a French department, remained 
at risk for labor and sex trafficking. Protection services, such as 
medical, shelter, and education, are not available to unaccompanied 
children on Mayotte, and previous efforts of the Comorian National 
Human Rights Commission to investigate further were denied by 
the French embassy in Comoros. In 2020, the government, through 
Operation Barkhane, provided support to Malian armed groups who 
used and recruited child soldiers. Labor traffickers exploit women 
and children in domestic servitude – the most frequent case being 
when families exploit relatives brought from Africa to work in their 
households; according to a 2020 report, domestic servitude makes 
up approximately 10 percent of all trafficking in France. Nigerian 
trafficking networks use migrant and drug trafficking routes through 
Niger, Libya, and Italy to transport women and girls to France, 
where they exploit them in trafficking and debt bondage. Nigerian 
victims report experiencing trafficking in Italy while awaiting legal 
residency. Cuban medical professionals working in Martinique, a 
French department, during the pandemic may have been forced to 
work by the Cuban government. 
GABON: TIER 2
The Government of Gabon does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Gabon remained on Tier 2. These efforts included courts 
convicting more traffickers and officials identifying more child 





minimum standards in several key areas. Authorities investigated 
and prosecuted fewer suspected trafficking crimes. For the second 
consecutive year, the government failed to adopt the country’s anti-
trafficking national action plan, which would have created a national 
inter-ministerial commission to address longstanding coordination 
challenges. Officials did not report identifying any adult victims or 
initiating law enforcement action targeting the trafficking of adults. 
Further, authorities did not report investigating allegations of judicial 
corruption related to trafficking crimes. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Finalize, resource, and implement the National Action Plan and 
create an inter-ministerial national anti-trafficking commission. 
• Investigate credible reports of government corruption related to 
trafficking and prosecute complicit officials. • Amend the penal code 
to define trafficking in line with the international definition and to 
ensure the penalties for adult sex trafficking are commensurate with 
penalties for other grave crimes, such as a rape. • Vigorously investigate 
and prosecute suspected traffickers and convict perpetrators if found 
guilty following independent and fair trials. • Increase financial 
or in-kind support—including donated land where feasible—to 
government and NGO shelters. • Develop and implement standard 
operating procedures for identifying and referring adult victims to 
care. • Increase efforts to identify adult and child victims of trafficking 
proactively, focusing on key sectors to include domestic servitude, 
markets, and individuals in commercial sex. • Regularly convene 
the Special Criminal Session in order to increase the number of 
trafficking cases heard. • Develop and institute a course on victim-
centered trafficking investigations in Gabon’s National Magistrate 
School to increase judicial officials’ ability to prosecute trafficking 
cases while preventing the re-traumatization of victims. • Conduct a 
nationwide sensitization campaign to raise awareness of trafficking 
in markets and domestic servitude. • Expand training for social 
workers, law enforcement officers, labor inspectors, and judicial staff 
on the penal code to promote effective investigations, prosecutions, 
and convictions of traffickers found guilty following an independent 
and fair trial. • Develop an information management system to 
capture nationwide investigation and victim identification data in 
partnership with international organizations.
PROSECUTION
The government marginally increased law enforcement efforts. 
Articles 225 to 225-7 of the 2020 revised penal code criminalized sex 
trafficking and labor trafficking, prescribing penalties of up to seven 
years’ imprisonment and a fine of 100 million Central African francs 
(CFA) ($188,940) for trafficking offenses involving adult victims, 
and up to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to 100 million 
CFA ($188,940) for those involving child victims. These penalties 
were sufficiently stringent, but with respect to adult sex trafficking, 
not commensurate with penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, 
such as rape. Inconsistent with the definition of trafficking under 
international law, the penal code established the use of force, fraud, 
or coercion as aggravating factors rather than essential elements of 
the crime; penalties were increased to up to 10 years’ imprisonment 
and a fine of 100 million CFA if such factors were involved. Finally, 
the penal code conflated the crimes of human smuggling and 
trafficking in persons.
A lack of high-level coordination between ministries exacerbated the 
government’s limited capacity to collect and manage anti-trafficking 
law enforcement data. The government did not report the number of 
new investigations in 2020, compared to initiating three investigations 
in 2019. Officials reported investigating 16 suspected traffickers 
and referring their cases for prosecution in 2020, compared with 
prosecuting 20 suspects in 2019 under the penal code’s trafficking 
articles. At the close of the reporting period, the suspects remained 
incarcerated and awaiting the country’s next Special Criminal Session, 
for which the government had not announced a date. Only the 
country’s Special Criminal Session court was authorized to hear 
trafficking cases because it is a crime equivalent to murder in the 
Gabonese legal system. Authorities reported convicting three traffickers 
for coercing children into forced labor during the Special Criminal 
Session held in October 2020, although judicial officials did not 
report sentencing details. The government reported convicting one 
trafficker in 2019. Additionally, the chief of the vice squad stated 
police continued to investigate three cases of forced labor opened in 
2019 under the penal code’s trafficking articles. Further, pandemic-
related movement restrictions hindered efforts by law enforcement to 
investigate potential trafficking crimes and limitations on in-person 
meetings impeded judicial proceedings during the reporting period; 
the government postponed a Special Criminal Session scheduled for 
April 2020 to October due to pandemic restrictions. 
Due to corruption and a lack of training, prosecutorial judges tasked 
with investigating trafficking cases did not always investigate cases 
brought to their attention, which prevented the prosecution of some 
trafficking cases. Experts alleged some traffickers bribed judges to 
actively delay or dismiss trafficking cases, while the government 
stated delays were the result of insufficient knowledge of trafficking 
laws. Although corruption and official complicity in trafficking 
crimes remained significant concerns, the government did not report 
investigating, prosecuting, or convicting complicit government 
employees. In November, officials collaborated with an international 
organization to provide training for 22 government officials on 
human trafficking and transnational crime.
PROTECTION
The government increased efforts to identify and protect victims. 
The government used a Trafficking in Persons Procedural Manual, 
developed in coordination with an international organization that 
defined standard procedures for the identification, extraction from 
exploitive situations, short-term care, and repatriation of child victims. 
Experts described the referral process as appropriate for children, 
although the government did not have standard procedures for 
identifying adult victims. The government reported identifying and 
referring to care 41 child victims of forced labor (37 girls and four 
boys) during the reporting period. Officials reported identifying 30 
child trafficking victims and one adult victim 2019. 
The government contributed inadequate funding to NGOs providing 
shelter and services to victims, and a lack of shelter space to 
accommodate trafficking victims persisted. During the reporting 
period, observers stated shelters were operating over capacity. The 
dearth of shelter space resulted in some law enforcement officers 
declining to pursue trafficking cases due to their belief they would 
not be able to place victims in suitable facilities, according to experts. 
The government continued to fund two NGO-run shelters offering 
holistic services to child trafficking victims, orphans, and homeless 
children, providing financial and in-kind support, including funding 
for social workers, medical support, psychological services, legal 
assistance, and tuition. Authorities suspended repatriations in 2020 
due to the pandemic, resulting in some children staying in shelters 
longer, which exacerbated longstanding overcrowding issues. 
Some shelter and law enforcement personnel used their own money 
to fill gaps in government funding to assist victims. The same services 
were available for male, female, foreign, and Gabonese victims, 
including those repatriated from abroad. There were no government 
or NGOrun shelters specifically designated for adult victims, although 




of domestic abuse or other forms of maltreatment. The government 
did not report any adult victims using these services during the 
reporting period. Shelters provided services to adults of other forms 
of abuse and some allowed child trafficking victims to remain after 
they reached 18 years of age; however, the government did not 
report referring any adults to such facilities during the reporting 
period. Officials had the authority to permit adult male victims to 
leave shelters unchaperoned, but not adult female victims, based on 
concerns related to safety and a risk of re-trafficking.
Officials did not disclose how many victims the government repatriated 
during the reporting period, although authorities suspended the return 
process in 2020 as one measure to slow the pandemic’s spread. The 
Ministry of National Solidarity coordinated with foreign embassies 
to repatriate 12 child victims in 2019. The government could provide 
a victim with immigration relief and resettle them in Gabon if the 
victim faced threats to their safety in their country of origin, but 
officials did not report any victims utilizing this legal alternative 
during the reporting period. 
While the government encouraged victims to cooperate with 
authorities to provide testimony for the prosecution of alleged 
traffickers, law enforcement officers admitted they sometimes took 
victims’ testimony at the time of the arrest of the suspected traffickers 
or identification of the victim, acknowledging this approach was 
neither victim-centered, nor the most effective. Some police officers in 
Libreville reported they had modified their approach to interviewing 
victims, causing them to delay questioning until the victim was 
prepared to cooperate, after receiving training in prior years from 
the government and an international organization. 
While the government had sought restitution for trafficking victims 
in the past, it did not report doing so during this reporting period. 
Victims could file civil suits against their traffickers, but there were 
no known cases of such action, in part due to lack of knowledge 
of the option. There were no reports authorities detained, fined, or 
jailed victims for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of being 
subjected to trafficking; however, due to nascent efforts to identify 
adult trafficking victims, some may have remained unidentified 
within the law enforcement system.
PREVENTION
The government decreased prevention efforts. For the second 
consecutive year, the president did not sign the country’s anti-
trafficking national action plan into law, which would create a 
national commission to combat trafficking. In June, the government 
organized a training and awareness campaign to improve victim 
care, reaching 626 law enforcement officers, compared with 861 
individuals in 2019. Officials did not disclose funding levels for 
Gabon’s antitrafficking programming. Pandemic-related constraints 
on convening in person, state budgetary impacts resulting from 
decreasing oil revenue, and multiple ministerial reshuffles in 2020 
contributed to a lack of high-level coordination, which hindered 
the government’s ability to support law enforcement officers, social 
welfare officials, and civil society representatives. 
The government did not report efforts to reduce the demand for 
commercial sex acts. Officials – with foreign donor support – 
continued to provide anti-trafficking training to approximately 
450 Gabonese troops prior to their deployment on an international 
peacekeeping mission in the Central African Republic. Although not 
explicitly reported as human trafficking, an international organization 
reported receiving eight allegations within the reporting period 
of sexual exploitation with trafficking indicators by Gabonese 
peacekeepers deployed to UN peacekeeping missions (with the dates 
of the incidents as follows: two in 2020, one in 2016, four in 2015, and 
one in 2014). Although not explicitly reported as human trafficking, 
there were also seven open allegations of sexual exploitation with 
trafficking indicators by Gabonese peacekeepers deployed to UN 
peacekeeping missions from previous rating periods, including one 
reported in 2020 (from 2014), three in 2019 (one from 2015 and 
two from 2019), one in 2018 (from 2018), and two in 2016 (from 
2013 and 2014). These cases remained ongoing during the reporting 
period. The Minister of Defense and the Minister of Justice stated 
that investigations of the allegations continued and authorities were 
following the Gabonese judicial process. The government did not 
provide training specifically on human trafficking for its diplomatic 
personnel, although it does explicitly require diplomats to adhere 
to the local laws of their assigned countries.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Gabon, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Gabon abroad. Intended to slow the spread of the pandemic, the 
government’s lockdown, in effect from March 2020 to the end of 
the rating period on much of the economy – as well as schools and 
travel – likely increased the vulnerability of Gabonese children, 
informal sector workers, and immigrants to exploitation. Poverty 
continues to represent a key risk factor in forced labor and sex 
trafficking in the country.
Traffickers exploit girls in forced labor in domestic service, markets, or 
roadside restaurants; force boys to work as street vendors, mechanics, 
microbus transportation assistants, and laborers in the fishing sector; 
and coerce West African women into domestic servitude or commercial 
sex within Gabon. Criminals may exploit children in illegal gold mines 
and in wildlife trafficking in the country’s interior. NGOs reported 
Cameroonian and Gabonese labor recruiters associated with large 
agricultural firms exploit English-speaking Cameroonians displaced 
by the Anglophone crisis. The recruiters force some Cameroonians to 
labor on rubber and palm oil plantations around Bitam in northern 
Gabon. West African traffickers reportedly exploit children from their 
countries of origin to work in Libreville markets, such as N’Kembo, 
Mont Bouët, and PK7, as well as in other urban centers, including 
Port-Gentil. In Gabon’s eastern provinces, shopkeepers force or coerce 
Gabonese children to work in markets. In some cases, smugglers who 
assist foreign adults migrating to Gabon – or through the country 
to Equatorial Guinea – subject those irregular migrants to forced 
labor or commercial sex after they enter the country via plane or 
boat with falsified documents. 
Traffickers appear to operate in loose, ethnic-based criminal networks, 
at times involving female traffickers – some of whom are former 
trafficking victims – in the recruitment and transportation of victims 
from their countries of origin. In some cases, families willingly give 
children to intermediaries who fraudulently promise education 
or employment and instead subject the children to forced labor 
through debt bondage. Roadside bars—or “macquis”—are a common 
sector where traffickers sexually exploit women, and the Libreville 
neighborhood of Lalala is an area where some brothel owners 
reportedly exploit children in child sex trafficking. 
Some criminals procure falsified documents for child trafficking 
victims identifying them as older than 18 years of age to avoid 
prosecution under the child trafficking law. Traffickers often operate 
outside the capital to avoid detection by law enforcement and take 
advantage of Gabon’s porous borders and unguarded beaches to 
import victims by car or boat. Authorities report some transnational 
criminal organizations profit from human trafficking in addition to 
smuggling counterfeit medication and illicit drugs. Experts report the 
nationality of the actors involved in such trafficking generally depends 
on the stage of the process. Fraudulent recruiters in source countries, 
such as Benin and Togo, often share the nationality of the victim; 
transporters or “passeurs” generally come from transit countries, such 
as Nigeria and Cameroon; and West African residents or Gabonese 





GAMBIA, THE: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of The Gambia does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included adopting a new national 
referral mechanism (NRM) and training government officials and 
service providers on its implementation. The government identified 
more victims and continued efforts to raise public awareness of 
trafficking. However, the government did not demonstrate overall 
increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, even 
considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-
trafficking capacity. The government did not convict any traffickers 
for the fourth consecutive year. Government agencies charged with 
combating trafficking continued to lack resources and training, and 
victim services remained inadequate. Therefore The Gambia remained 
on Tier 2 Watch List for the second consecutive year.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, 
including allegations of child sex tourism. • Direct and fund law 
enforcement to investigate all reported trafficking cases, including 
those brought forward by civil society. • Ensure human trafficking 
cases are resolved through the judicial system rather than extra-judicial 
or administrative means. • Cohesively train government officials, 
including law enforcement, diplomatic personnel, and service 
providers, on comprehensive standard procedures to proactively 
identify trafficking victims and refer them to care, including among 
Gambian migrant workers, people in commercial sex, and other 
vulnerable groups. • Provide resources, including funding and in-kind 
support, for victim services and training for social workers. • Ensure 
access to a child-friendly and confidential reporting mechanism 
allowing victims to report abuse without fear of intimidation, 
stigmatization, or revictimization. • Improve witness and victim 
protection measures to ensure victim confidentiality and privacy. • 
Train law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges to investigate and 
prosecute all forms of trafficking using the 2007 Trafficking in Persons 
Act. • Strengthen international law enforcement cooperation to 
prevent and investigate child sex tourism. • Raise awareness of child 
sex trafficking among civil society, including how to report cases. 
• Regulate and monitor labor recruitment agencies and investigate 
entities suspected of fraudulently recruiting workers for exploitation 
abroad. • Develop and implement pre-departure trainings for labor 
migrants, including sessions on labor rights and methods to access 
justice and assistance in destination countries, to prevent exploitation 
abroad. • Amend the labor law to extend protections to domestic 
workers. • Adopt a new national action plan and allocate resources 
to its implementation. • Screen foreign workers, including Cuban 
medical workers, for forced labor indicators and refer them to 
appropriate services.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained insufficient law enforcement efforts. The 
2007 Trafficking in Persons Act, as amended in 2010, criminalized sex 
trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of 50 years to 
life imprisonment and a fine of between 50,000 and 500,000 dalasi 
($960-$9,620). These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with 
respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as rape. 
The government investigated 23 cases involving at least 20 suspects 
(11 for sexual exploitation and nine for forced labor), compared with 
investigating 15 cases in the previous reporting period. Authorities 
initiated prosecutions of two defendants and continued prosecutions 
of three defendants from previous reporting periods, a slight increase 
compared with continuing three prosecutions in the previous reporting 
period. As required by law, courts released all five alleged traffickers 
on bail. Of the five alleged traffickers, one suspect absconded; the 
government had not yet issued an extradition request by the end of 
the reporting period. For the fourth consecutive year, the government 
did not convict any traffickers. Corruption and official complicity 
in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law 
enforcement action during the year. Some observers alleged some 
border authorities did not follow anti-trafficking procedures, and 
in past years, that some police officers requested bribes to register 
trafficking complaints. An NGO reported former government officials 
had procured women through fraud and coercion to engage in sex acts 
with former president Jammeh while he was in office; the allegedly 
complicit officials were no longer in The Gambia, nor was the former 
president. Two of the sexual exploitation victims testified to Jammeh’s 
abuses in the government’s Truth, Reconciliation, and Reparations 
Commission (TRRC) during the previous reporting period. The law that 
created the TRRC specified that upon submission of the TRRC’s final 
report, the government will decide whether to initiate prosecutions 
based on the allegations. The TRRC remained ongoing at the end 
of reporting period. Aside from the TRRC process, the government 
did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of 
government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes.
In September 2020, the National Agency Against Trafficking in 
Persons (NAATIP) coordinated with an international organization 
to train law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges on trafficking 
investigations and prosecutions. However, training and resources for 
law enforcement and judicial officials remained severely inadequate. 
The government increased judicial officials’ salaries to limit turnover 
and increase institutionalized knowledge among prosecutors and 
judges. General case backlogs, weak case management infrastructure, 
and low judicial capacity inhibited prosecutions and convictions. 
Defendants accused of trafficking were eligible for bail and sometimes 
absconded. Designated child welfare and gender units within the 
police force and immigration department received anti-trafficking 
training; however, frequent turnover, lack of resources, and limited 
capacity to monitor regions outside of the capital limited their 
effectiveness. The pandemic further reduced law enforcement’s 
capacity to conduct investigations; units worked in smaller teams and 
were dually mandated to enforce public health measures. NGOs and 
international organizations attributed underreporting of sexual crimes, 
including sex trafficking and child sex tourism, to cultural taboos 
and a penchant to rely on informal resolution mechanisms rather 
than the formal justice system; in some cases, the police or judiciary 
encouraged parties to settle child sexual exploitation cases privately. 
Low confidence in the justice system, lengthy investigations and court 
proceedings, and a lack of meaningful protection, including accessible, 
child-friendly reporting channels, also led to underreporting of child 
trafficking. An international organization reported low awareness of 
anti-trafficking laws; lack of human, technical, and financial capacity; 
and inadequate specialized victim services further impeded effective 
enforcement of child protection laws, including provisions on child 
sex trafficking. A lack of international law enforcement cooperation 
hampered efforts to identify, investigate, and prosecute child sex 
tourism and trafficking cases.
PROTECTION
The government increased overall protection efforts, including victim 
identification, but it did not adequately assist victims identified 
abroad. The government identified 18 victims, an increase compared 
with identifying 12 victims in the previous reporting period. This 
included 11 Nigerian women and girls exploited in sex trafficking 
within the country and seven Gambian women exploited in domestic 




women exploited in domestic service in Lebanon, Kuwait, and Oman. 
In collaboration with an international organization, the government 
adopted an NRM with standard operating procedures to identify 
and refer trafficking victims to care; the NRM included mechanisms 
to screen vulnerable populations, including child migrants and 
individuals in commercial sex, for trafficking indicators. NAATIP, in 
collaboration with an international organization, trained government 
social workers, NGOs, prosecutors, and Ministry of Justice officials on 
the NRM; however, coordination among law enforcement, prosecutors, 
and social service providers to implement the NRM remained weak.
The government operated one short-term shelter for vulnerable 
persons, including both foreign and domestic trafficking victims, 
abandoned children, the elderly, and victims of domestic violence. 
The shelter had an 80-person capacity, offered basic services such as 
medical care, and provided limited counseling to children and women; 
adult victims could leave the shelter unchaperoned. Despite resource 
constraints caused by the pandemic and spending restrictions imposed 
by international creditors, the government maintained funding for the 
shelter; it allocated 600,000 dalasi ($11,540) to the shelter in 2020, 
the same amount provided in 2019. During the reporting period, 
NAATIP referred one Nigerian trafficking victim to the shelter, and 
four victims opted to live at their own residences; the government 
did not report whether it referred the remaining victims to care. 
The government improved shelter security by providing additional 
police officers and installing perimeter fencing. The government 
and civil society jointly operated daytime centers providing services, 
including psycho-social, food, and medical assistance, to trafficking 
victims and vulnerable children. Shelter services were concentrated 
around the capital, leaving some victims in rural areas without 
access to assistance. In some cases, law enforcement and child 
protection actors temporarily sheltered child victims in their own 
homes or provided care at their own expense until shelter space 
became available. A small country with few overseas diplomatic 
missions, select Gambian embassies had welfare offices trained to 
recognize and support suspected victims of trafficking, but in one 
high-profile case, the government failed to adequately identify and 
protect victims abroad. An NGO, in coordination with the Gambian 
government, repatriated 38 Gambian trafficking victims from Lebanon 
in September 2020, including 36 women and two children exploited 
in domestic servitude; the women requested assistance from The 
Gambian Honorary Consul following the August 2020 explosion in 
Beirut. According to international organizations and media reports, 
the Honorary Consul denied assistance to the victims and publicly 
dismissed their claims. However, the government helped facilitate 
their repatriation and provided travel documents following protests 
outside of The Gambian Honorary Consul’s offices. The Ministry of 
Justice created a select committee led by the National Human Rights 
Commission and NAATIP to investigate the incident; the government 
did not publicly report its findings before the end of the reporting 
period. The government repatriated two additional trafficking victims 
from Kuwait and Lebanon, and it provided reintegration services to 
one repatriated victim from Oman. 
Authorities did not condition access to victim services on 
cooperation with law enforcement; the government provided legal 
aid and transportation to victims who chose to cooperate with 
law enforcement proceedings. The government did not have a 
formal witness protection policy and it did not always keep victims’ 
identities confidential; victims at times were reluctant to cooperate 
in investigations due to fear of retaliation by their traffickers. The 
government allowed victims to provide testimony via video or 
written statements; however, no victims reportedly did so during 
the reporting period. The 2007 anti-trafficking law allowed foreign 
victims to obtain temporary residence visas during legal proceedings, 
but the government did not provide legal alternatives to the removal 
of foreign victims to countries where they may face hardship or 
retribution. Victims could file civil suits against their traffickers; the 
government did not report any victims doing so, in part due to lack 
of awareness of the option. There were no reports the government 
detained or otherwise penalized trafficking victims for unlawful acts 
traffickers compelled them to commit; however, due to inconsistent 
application of victim identification procedures, authorities may have 
detained some victims. During the reporting period, authorities 
used provisions in the NRM to identify trafficking victims among 
individuals in commercial sex. However, the screening mechanisms 
did not include LGBTQI+ persons among vulnerable populations; 
due to social stigmatization and lack of screening, LGBTQI+ persons 
remained vulnerable to trafficking.
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. The Department of 
Strategic Policy and Delivery (DSPD) in the Office of the President 
coordinated NAATIP and the government’s anti-trafficking efforts; 
NAATIP convened quarterly task force and regular board meetings 
with support from an international organization. The government 
allocated 3.6 million dalasi ($69,230) to NAATIP in fiscal year 
2020, the same amount provided in 2019. NAATIP continued to 
use its budget to implement the 2016-2020 national action plan. In 
coordination with an international organization, NAATIP validated 
an updated anti-trafficking national action plan and national 
communications strategy; final adoption of the plan remained 
pending at the end of the reporting period. NAATIP, in coordination 
with an international organization, trained 20 media personnel on 
reporting on trafficking and organized public awareness activities, 
including a public procession to commemorate World Day against 
Trafficking in Persons in July 2020; sensitization campaigns in 
border towns, schools, tourist areas; and community radio programs, 
throughout the reporting period. NAATIP conducted an awareness 
campaign targeting minibus drivers, passengers, and community 
members; minibuses were the primary method of transportation in 
the country and a critical link in trafficking networks.
In partnership with an NGO, the Ministry of Education continued its 
program with reputable Quranic school teachers to educate students 
on trafficking and prevent forced begging by providing monthly cash 
transfers and food rations to 17 schools it regularly verified did not 
exploit students in forced begging. NGOs reported only two of the 11 
Department of Social Welfare (DSW)-organized neighborhood watch 
groups to monitor urban areas near tourist resorts for possible cases of 
child abuse or child sexual exploitation remained occasionally active; 
both groups were untrained and lacked the capacity to effectively 
investigate or report potential cases. Despite reports of women 
exploited through fraudulent labor recruitment, the government did 
not effectively regulate foreign labor recruiters or penalize them for 
fraudulent recruitment. There were no laws regulating recruitment 
agencies or international labor recruitment. The government did 
not license recruitment agencies or require registration, making it 
difficult for authorities to estimate how many agencies operated 
in the country. Private, and often informal, recruitment agencies 
placed many Gambian workers abroad, including in the Gulf and 
sometimes in coordination with agents in the destination countries. 
Informal agents recruited workers through social and family networks 
or posed as tourism or human resource agencies. An international 
organization reported informal recruitment agencies used fraudulent 
or predatory contracts; due to the lack of regulations, agents charged 
migrant workers en route to the Gulf recruitment fees between 5,000 
and 40,000 dalasi ($96-$769). Select Gambian embassies had welfare 
offices trained to recognize and support suspected trafficking victims, 
though as a small country, The Gambia has relatively few embassies. 
In December 2020, the government launched its national migration 
policy to protect Gambian migrants, reduce irregular migration, and 
increase domestic youth employment opportunities. The government 
established a national coordination mechanism on migration to 
streamline policy and coordinate with civil society. The Ministry of 
Trade, Regional Integration, and Employment’s migration working 
group also drafted pre-departure training manuals, ethical recruitment 
materials, and other resources for Gambians working or intending to 
work overseas; however, the government did not finalize the materials 








The government maintained memoranda of understanding (MOUs) 
with the Governments of Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
for the protection of Gambian workers but did not report taking steps 
to implement the agreements during the reporting period. Domestic 
workers were not protected under the national labor law, rendering 
them vulnerable to exploitation. The government made limited 
efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts and child sex 
tourism by displaying posters and large billboards in resort areas 
targeting potential buyers of sex and by posting Tourism Security Unit 
officers in the Tourism Development Area. Gambian law allowed for 
prosecution of suspected sex tourism offenses committed abroad. 
The government provided anti-trafficking training to some of its 
diplomatic personnel; however, the government did not uniformly 
implement the training, and diplomatic missions’ ability to identify 
and assist trafficking victims remained weak.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in The Gambia, and traffickers exploit victims 
from The Gambia abroad. Within The Gambia, women, girls, and, 
to a lesser extent, boys are subjected to sex trafficking and forced 
labor in street vending and domestic work. Traffickers recruit women 
and children from West African countries for sex trafficking in The 
Gambia. Some families encourage their children to endure such 
exploitation for financial gain. Reporting from an international 
organization indicates that the number of boys exploited in sex 
trafficking is growing. Some observers alleged in the past that child 
sex tourists, primarily from Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Scandinavian countries, and the United Kingdom, subject child 
victims to sexual exploitation. A local organization alleged organized 
sex trafficking networks use European and Gambian travel agencies 
to promote child sex tourism. An international organization alleged 
some sex tourists established relationships with children through 
organizations registered as charities or approached children under 
the guise of sponsorship for their education. The same organization 
claimed that sex tourists gain access to children through intermediaries 
or already have information from the internet about areas where 
they can have access to children. One international organization 
alleged sex traffickers increasingly host child sex tourists in private 
residences outside the commercial tourist areas of Banjul, making 
the crime harder to detect. Gambian boys attend Quranic schools 
in The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, and Senegal, and some boys from 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali and Senegal attend Quranic schools in 
The Gambia; some corrupt teachers force their students into begging, 
street vending, and agricultural work. NGOs identified Gambian 
children in forced labor in neighboring West African countries 
and Mauritania. Individuals without birth registrations, especially 
children of single mothers and those in rural areas, are vulnerable 
to exploitation. Traffickers allegedly exploit Sierra Leonean children 
as “cultural dancers” in The Gambia. Traffickers exploit Nigerian 
women and girls in sex trafficking in The Gambia. Cuban medical 
professionals working in The Gambia may have been forced to work 
by the Cuban government. Traffickers exploit Gambian women in 
forced labor trafficking in the Middle East, including Lebanon and 
Kuwait. Gambian authorities have identified Sierra Leonean victims en 
route to exploitation in the Middle East. Some recruitment agencies 
and agents engage in fraudulent practices facilitating forced labor; 
authorities have identified Gambian male and female trafficking 
victims recruited by agents and exploited in Egypt, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
and the UAE in domestic work, hospitality, construction, and mining. 
Traffickers are increasingly recruiting victims using social media 
platforms for domestic servitude in the Middle East. Authorities 
have identified potential Gambian trafficking victims in Algeria, 
Cyprus, Finland, and Italy. Gambian migrants, particularly young 
men from impoverished backgrounds, attempting to travel to Europe 
through irregular routes, known as “the Backway,” are vulnerable 
to trafficking and abuse. 
GEORGIA: TIER 1
The Government of Georgia fully meets the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued to 
demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting period, 
considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-
trafficking capacity; therefore Georgia remained on Tier 1. These efforts 
included convicting more traffickers and providing comprehensive 
victim assistance, including robust pandemic mitigation efforts at 
government-run shelters. The government created guidelines for 
mobile victim identification units (mobile units) on identifying child 
victims and adopted the 2021-2022 national action plan (NAP). The 
government established the Labor Inspection Service (LPS) with a 
special unit for forced labor; and, the process of obtaining official 
victim status through the Permanent Group, a five-member board 
of NGO and international organization representatives, improved in 
comparison to 2019. Although the government meets the minimum 
standards, it investigated and prosecuted fewer suspects and identified 
fewer victims. Labor inspectors continued to lack the staff, resources, 
and training to fulfill labor oversight responsibilities. The government 
did not establish a work permit system for migrant workers, nor 
did it license and monitor recruitment agencies. Police conducted 
some ad hoc raids on commercial sex establishments without clear 
strategy or victim identifications. The government did not adequately 
publicize provide adequate public assessments or information on 
its efforts and at times lacked transparency.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers under 
Articles 143-1 and 143-2 of the criminal code. • Increase efforts to 
identify victims proactively, particularly individuals in commercial 
sex, child laborers and/or homeless children, and Georgian and 
foreign victims in vulnerable labor sectors. • Increase resources 
to plan intelligence and evidence-led law enforcement operations 
with victim-centered approaches. • Encourage victims’ participation 
in investigations and prosecutions through victim-centered court 
procedures, including remote testimony or funding for travel and 
other expenses for victims to attend court hearings. • Implement 
procedures to improve the Permanent Group’s ability to identify 
victims consistently and accurately. • Improve law enforcement 
capacity to investigate complex cases, including advanced training 
on money laundering, organized crime, and digital evidence. • 
Further incorporate the Labor Inspectorate into anti-trafficking 
efforts and increase its capacity and training to identify victims. • 
Improve measures to order restitution for victims, including training 
prosecutors and judges, on asset seizure, and legal assistance. • 
Establish procedures to license and monitor recruitment agencies and 
create a work permit system for foreign migrant workers to prevent 
recruitment fees and other trafficking vulnerabilities. • Increase 
awareness-raising campaigns about the existence of trafficking, legal 
recourse, and available protection services to vulnerable groups. • 
Increase transparency of the inter-ministerial trafficking coordination 






The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Articles 143-
1 and 143-2 of the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and 
labor trafficking, and prescribed penalties ranging from seven to 
12 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving an adult victim, and 
eight to 12 years’ imprisonment for those involving a child victim. 
These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with those for serious crimes, such as 
rape. Law enforcement investigated 13 cases (17 in 2019)—nine sex 
trafficking cases and four labor trafficking cases, including two forced 
begging cases. Law enforcement continued to investigate 13 cases 
from the previous reporting period. The government prosecuted eight 
defendants in five cases (29 defendants in 2019); three defendants for 
child sex trafficking and five defendants for forced labor, including 
two defendants for forced begging. Courts convicted 26 child sex 
traffickers, a notable increase from the conviction of three traffickers 
for forced begging in 2019. Judges sentenced three traffickers to 20 
years’ imprisonment, two traffickers to 17 years’ imprisonment, 
one trafficker to ten years’ imprisonment and a fine of 20,000 lari 
($6,120), three traffickers to seven years’ imprisonment and a fine 
of 20,000 lari ($6,120), one trafficker to six years’ imprisonment, 
15 traffickers to five years’ imprisonment, and one trafficker to three 
years’ imprisonment. 
The government maintained several specialized trafficking units, 
including the Anti-Trafficking and Illegal Migration Unit within the 
Central Criminal Police Department and six mobile units under the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MOIA). The Prosecutor General’s Office 
(PGO) maintained five specialized prosecutors dedicated to trafficking 
cases and operated a task force with MOIA in the Adjara region with 
specialized investigators and prosecutors. Mobile units and the task 
force proactively investigated trafficking and inspected hotels, bars, 
bathhouses, nightclubs, casinos, and other high-risk businesses; 
mobile groups and the task force inspected 67 businesses (107 in 
2019). The Tbilisi City Court maintained six specialized judges and 
the Tbilisi Court of Appeals maintained seven specialized judges 
assigned to handle “crimes against human beings,” which included 
trafficking, but the remaining 27 courts did not have specialized 
judges. In response to the pandemic, courts transitioned to remote 
hearings, and the PGO supplied prosecutors with technical equipment 
and software, so trials, including those for trafficking cases, could 
continue. Observers reported the government lacked the knowledge 
and capacity to investigate forced labor, and authorities continued to 
require training on corroborating victim testimonies and evidence 
collection in complex cases involving financial crimes, organized 
crime, and digital evidence. Police raided some commercial sex 
establishments randomly rather than conducting intelligence-led 
operations, and, in previous years, observers reported a lack of 
transparency following police raids, including information on what 
happened to the individuals in commercial sex. The government 
did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of 
government employees complicit in trafficking. All police cadets 
received basic training on trafficking issues, and the government, 
at times in cooperation with international organizations, trained 
investigators, border patrol, prosecutors, labor inspectors, and 
judges on various anti-trafficking issues. The government assisted 
Turkey with five mutual legal assistance trafficking-related requests, 
received one extradition request from the Russian Federation, signed 
a cooperation agreement with Spain to establish a joint analysis 
team on organized crime, and detailed two officers to France for six 
months to support investigations of Georgian organized criminal 
groups. The government reported the continued inability to conduct 
anti-trafficking efforts within the Russian-occupied Georgian territories 
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained protection efforts. The government 
identified seven victims (30 in 2019 and five in 2018); two were 
victims of sex trafficking and five were victims of forced labor, 
including three victims of forced begging; two adults were female, 
three adults were male, and three were children. In 2019, 24 were 
victims of sex trafficking and six were victims of forced begging; 28 
were female and two were male; all were children. Mobile units and 
the task force screened 467 individuals (651 in 2019) in commercial 
sex or employed in vulnerable sectors for trafficking indicators. 
Authorities interviewed an additional two individuals deemed “high-
risk” (two in 2019) due to work at businesses that violated labor 
standards. Authorities screened 1,177 Georgian nationals deported 
from other countries for trafficking indicators at the international 
airport and border crossings (2,521 in 2019). While the government 
reported fewer inspections and interviews because of business and 
border closures in response to the pandemic, observers reported 
a lack of government capacity to identify victims of forced labor 
and alleged that victim identification efforts, particularly raids on 
commercial sex establishments, were proven ineffective by the low 
number of identified victims. The government continued to use 
guidelines for victim identification, including the proper treatment 
of victims, screening for indicators, and victim-centered interview 
practices. The government drafted guidelines for mobile units on 
identifying child victims among children in labor and/or in homeless 
situations. A multidisciplinary national referral mechanism (NRM) 
provided standard operating procedures for officially identifying and 
referring victims to services. Law enforcement officially recognized 
victims who participated in investigations, and the Permanent 
Group assessed and officially recognized victims who declined 
to participate in investigations; both recognitions granted victims 
access to the same protection and assistance services. The Permanent 
Group comprised a five-member board of NGO and international 
organization representatives and was required by statute to convene 
and assess a potential victim within 48 hours. Law enforcement 
officially recognized seven victims, and the Permanent Group officially 
recognized three victims during the reporting period. GRETA and 
other experts reported the threshold to obtain victim status through 
the Permanent Group was high and shifted the burden of proof to 
victims. For example, the Permanent Group did not grant victim 
status in 2019, while law enforcement officially recognized all 30 
identified victims. IOM reported the work of the Permanent Group 
improved in 2020, after the government adopted improvements to 
the procedures of the Permanent Group in 2019. 
Government-run crisis centers in five cities and NGOs provided 
initial psychological care, medical assistance, legal support, and 
temporary shelter for potential victims awaiting official victim 
status. Additionally, the government operated anti-trafficking shelters 
in Tbilisi and Batumi and other victim assistance programs; the 
government allocated 760,750 lari ($232,640) to the government-run 
anti-trafficking shelters, compared with 591,000 lari ($180,730) in 
2019. The government offered medical aid, psycho-social support, 
legal assistance, childcare services, reintegration support, and a 
one-time financial payment of 1,000 lari ($310) to victims. Child 
victims received the same specialized assistance, in addition to 
custodial care, education, and family reintegration programs. The 
government-run shelters were staffed by a nurse and psychologist 
and offered separate sections for men, women, and children. Victims 
can initially stay at the shelter for three months, which authorities 
may extend upon the victim’s request; the government-run shelters 
accommodated nine victims (six in 2019). Shelter staff chaperoned 
victims when leaving the shelter, but victims could request to leave 
the shelter unchaperoned. Five victims received medical care and 
psycho-social support, six received legal aid, and three received 
1,000 lari ($310) in cash assistance, compared with one victim 
receiving legal aid, one receiving medical care, and none receiving 
the 1,000 lari ($310) in cash assistance in 2019. In March 2021, 
the government amended the law to remove a clause that denied 
victims the 1,000lari ($310) cash assistance if they received restitution 
from their trafficker in court. Government-run shelters provided 
personal protective equipment, disinfectants, and COVID-19 tests 
and adopted social distancing measures, including a space for 






government-run shelter also organized an epidemiologist to train 
nine staff members on victim assistance during a pandemic. While 
observers occasionally visited the two government-run shelters, 
experts reported an inability to assess the quality of services at the 
shelters due to a lack of independent evaluations of the operations 
and conditions. In previous years, observers reported government-
run shelters focused on victims of domestic violence due to the low 
number of identified trafficking victims and were unable to provide 
specialized services to trafficking victims. 
There were no reports the government penalized victims for crimes 
their traffickers compelled them to commit. The government provided 
equal services for domestic and foreign victims and granted foreign 
victims renewable one-year residence permits with the ability to 
seek legal employment; five victims received a residence permit (one 
in 2019). The government could provide repatriation assistance to 
Georgian victims returning to Georgia and foreign victims wishing 
to leave Georgia, but it reported no victims required repatriation 
assistance (none in 2019). The law required closed-door sessions for 
court proceedings and allowed victims to leave the country pending 
trial; however, experts reported law enforcement required victims to 
remain in country through the end of the trial, likely hindering victim 
cooperation, particularly from foreign victims wanting to repatriate, 
due to slow court proceedings. Six victims assisted law enforcement 
(24 in 2019). PGO’s victim-witness coordinators provided counsel 
to victims from the beginning of the investigation through the end 
of the court proceedings; victim-witness coordinators provided 
assistance to 12 child victims and six adult witnesses. The law 
allowed recorded testimony or testimony by other technological 
means; three witnesses and one minor victim testified remotely 
using video conference devices (none in 2019). The law also allowed 
the possibility of placing a victim into the state’s witness protection 
program; no victims required the use of witness protection in 
2019 or 2020. Victims could obtain restitution through criminal 
proceedings or compensation through civil suits; however, judges 
have never awarded restitution or compensation to victims, and 
observers highlighted the failure to freeze and seize criminal assets 
as an obstacle to pursuing restitution from traffickers. 
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. The Inter-Agency 
Council on Combatting Trafficking in Persons (TIP Council) 
composed of representatives from various ministries, the international 
community, and civil society, implemented the 2019-2020 NAP and 
drafted and adopted the 2021-2022 NAP. The TIP Council produced 
a newsletter every three months and published information and 
statistics on anti-trafficking efforts on the Ministry of Justice’s 
website; however, observers continued to report the TIP Council 
did not provide public assessments of government efforts and 
lacked transparency. The PGO managed a working group on forced 
labor, which met once in 2020 (four times in 2019). While the 
government organized a mock court competition for students and 
awareness campaigns targeting students, children, parents, and 
IDPs, an international organization continued to report Georgian 
authorities were reluctant to implement large-scale awareness 
campaigns in major cities due to the negative impact they believed 
it would have on the tourism industry. MOIA and the State Fund 
continued to operate anti-trafficking hotlines. The MOIA hotline 
received 46 calls related to trafficking (35 in 2019), and the State 
Fund hotline received 32 calls (25 in 2019). Authorities issued six 
temporary identification documents for homeless children and 
four for child victims of violence, compared with 14 temporary 
identification documents to homeless children and five for child 
victims of violence in 2019. 
The Law on Labor Safety entered into force in September 2019 and 
expanded occupational safety and health standards and regulations, 
including unannounced inspections. In January 2021, the government 
established LPS with 60 labor inspectors, including a special unit for 
forced labor and labor exploitation. Labor inspectors inspected 120 
businesses (149 in 2019); of these, all were unannounced inspections, 
and no cases were referred to the police for further investigation 
(one in 2019). However, experts continued to report labor inspectors 
did not have the staff, resources, and training to fully implement 
their labor oversight responsibilities, including for forced labor. 
Additionally, the government did not have a work permit system for 
migrant workers, nor did it license and monitor recruitment agencies. 
The Ministry of Internally Displaced Persons, Labor, and Health and 
Social Affairs required intermediary companies in Georgia assisting 
Georgian citizens in finding employment abroad to submit annual 
reports. The government fined intermediary companies that did not 
submit a report 300 lari ($92); five companies were fined (none 
in 2019). The government signed a labor agreement with Israel to 
facilitate temporary employment of Georgian migrant workers in 
medical facilities. Due to the pandemic, the government-chartered 
flights to help return stranded Georgian migrant workers and 
extended the right to legal stay for all foreign migrants legally in 
Georgia until July 30, 2021. The government did not make efforts to 
reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government drafted 
a law to prevent forced labor in public procurement supply chains 
and shared it with the EU Commission for comment. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
domestic and foreign victims in Georgia, and traffickers exploit 
victims from Georgia abroad. Traffickers recruit victims with false 
promises of well-paying jobs in tea processing plants, hospitals, 
salons, restaurants, and hotels. Traffickers exploit women and girls 
from Georgia in sex trafficking within the country and in Cyprus, 
Egypt, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Georgia is 
also a transit country for women from Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan exploited in Turkey. Traffickers exploit women from 
Azerbaijan and Central Asia in sex trafficking in the tourist areas 
of the Adjara region and larger cities, like Tbilisi and Batumi, in 
saunas, brothels, bars, strip clubs, casinos, and hotels. Georgian 
men and women are exploited in forced labor within Georgia and 
in Cyprus, Egypt, Turkey, and UAE. Georgian, Romani, and Kurdish 
children are subjected to forced begging and sometimes coerced 
into criminality in Georgia. Chinese women in commercial sex and 
Southeast Asian women working in massage parlors are vulnerable 
to sex trafficking. No information was available about the presence 
of human trafficking in the Russian-occupied Georgian regions of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia; however, the government and NGOs 
consider IDPs from these occupied territories particularly vulnerable 
to trafficking. Separately, some observers report anecdotal evidence 
of migrants being subjected to forced labor. Additionally, North 
Korean nationals working in Abkhazia may have been forced to 
work by the North Korean government.
GERMANY: TIER 2
The Government of Germany does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Germany remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
prosecuting more suspected traffickers and convicting more traffickers 
than the prior year, as well as increasing funding for victim protection. 
The government also passed a law and an amendment aimed at 
increasing protections for vulnerable migrant workers against labor 
trafficking. However, the government did not meet the minimum 
standards in several key areas. Lenient sentencing, resulting in 72 
percent of traffickers receiving fully suspended sentences, fines, or 
less than one year imprisonment undercut efforts to hold traffickers 
accountable. The government investigated fewer suspected traffickers 




mechanism for all forms of trafficking. The government continued 
to report incomplete data on victims provided with care, and labor 
trafficking law enforcement efforts remained low compared with 
sex trafficking. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate and prosecute suspected labor and sex 
traffickers, and sentence convicted traffickers to adequate penalties, 
which should involve serving significant prison terms. • Increase 
prioritization of labor trafficking, including victim identification 
and investigation and prosecution of labor traffickers. • Ensure 
equitable treatment of victims by creating a national identification and 
referral guideline for all forms of trafficking across all states. • Ensure 
systematic and continuous anti-trafficking training for immigration 
officers to increase proactive victim identification among foreign 
migrants and asylum-seekers. • Ensure systematic provision of care 
for child victims and extend more specialized care, services, and 
accommodations for male victims. •Adopt a national anti-trafficking 
action plan for all forms of trafficking. • Increase awareness and 
availability of robust human trafficking training courses for judges that 
adjudicate trafficking cases. • Increase the capacity of investigators, 
prosecutors, and courts with specific expertise on trafficking cases to 
minimize delays in bringing cases to trial and consider additional 
dedicated human trafficking units. • Increase worker protections by 
eliminating recruitment or placement fees charged to workers by 
German labor recruiters and ensuring employers pay any recruitment 
fees. • Implement effective regulations and oversight of recruitment 
companies and industries composed predominantly of migrant 
workers, which are consistently enforced, including prosecution 
for fraudulent labor recruitment and labor trafficking. • Appoint a 
national rapporteur to provide independent review of government 
efforts on both labor and sex trafficking. • Establish a uniform and 
comprehensive data collection system, including publicly available 
disaggregated data on sentencing where courts convict defendants 
of both trafficking and one or more other serious crimes. • Appoint 
a national coordinating body, responsible for both sex and labor 
trafficking, to increase harmonization of the institutional framework 
and coordination structures at the federal and state levels. • Increase 
efforts to order restitution for victims.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained mixed law enforcement efforts; 
prosecutions and convictions increased while investigations decreased 
and sentencing of convicted traffickers remained lenient. The criminal 
code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking under Sections 
232, 232(a), 232(b), 233, and 233(a) and prescribed punishments 
of six months to 10 years’ imprisonment, which were sufficiently 
stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. The law 
did not require proof of force or coercion to prosecute suspected 
sex traffickers when victims were younger than 21. The complex 
wording and scope of the trafficking and exploitation sections in the 
Criminal Code (Sections 232 to 233a) reportedly resulted in state 
prosecutors sometimes charging suspected traffickers with offenses 
considered easier to prove than coercion in labor and sex trafficking. 
As a federal system, jurisdiction for criminal prosecutions in Germany 
rested with state courts and consequently procedures, staffing, and 
funding varied from state to state. 
State governments completed 313 pre-trial trafficking investigations of 
472 suspects in 2019, the most recent year for which the government 
had comprehensive statistics, a decrease compared with 386 
investigations into 602 suspects in 2018. Of the investigations, 
there were 287 for sex trafficking (compared with 356 in 2018), 
14 for labor trafficking (compared with 21 in 2018), one for forced 
begging (compared with two in 2018), and 11 for forced criminality 
(compared with seven in 2018). Police identified 430 suspects for 
sex trafficking (compared with 552 in 2017), 22 for labor trafficking 
(compared with 30 in 2018), one for forced begging (compared with 
10 in 2018), and 19 for forced criminality (compared with 10 in 
2018). Sex trafficking suspects were primarily German, Romanian, 
and Bulgarian. Half (50 percent) of the suspects were acquainted 
with the victim prior to exploiting them in sex trafficking. 
For each case in which a court convicted a defendant of multiple 
crimes, published government statistics reported it only under the 
charge with the highest statutory sentence. Therefore, previously 
reported statistics did not include cases in which the court convicted 
a defendant of trafficking and where that defendant received an 
aggregate sentence for another crime that carried a higher statutory 
sentence. Historically, the government only provided prosecution 
and conviction statistics for human trafficking cases where it was the 
primary charge; however, for the first time the government provided 
statistics for the number of suspects it prosecuted and convicted with 
human trafficking as a secondary charge. In 2019, the states collectively 
prosecuted 81 defendants with trafficking as the primary charge, a 
decrease compared with 96 in 2018. The government prosecuted at 
least 134 suspects with human trafficking as the secondary charge 
in 2019, an increase compared with at least 99 from 2018. Total 
prosecutions for 2019 were at least 215, while total prosecutions 
for 2018 were at least 195. Courts convicted 61 traffickers with 
trafficking as the primary charge in 2019, compared with 68 in 2018. 
For convictions with human trafficking as the secondary charge, 
courts convicted 134 traffickers in 2019, an increase compared with 
99 in 2018. The total convictions for 2019 were 195, compared with 
167 in 2018. The government only provided sentencing statistics 
for convictions with trafficking as the primary charge. Of the 61 
convictions with trafficking as the primary charge in 2019, 36 (59 
percent) resulted in fully suspended sentences with traffickers serving 
no prison time (the same percentage as in 2018), six traffickers (10 
percent) received only fines (compared with 17 percent in 2018), 
and two traffickers (3 percent) were sentenced to under one year in 
prison (compared with 1 percent in 2018). This resulted in 72 percent 
of convicted traffickers receiving either a fully suspended sentence, 
a fine, or less than year in prison, which did not serve to deter the 
crime or adequately reflect the nature of the offense. Seventeen of 
the 61 convicted traffickers received significant prison sentences (28 
percent) of more than one year in prison (compared with 23 percent 
in 2018). Of the 17 significant sentences, one trafficker was sentenced 
to between one and two years, eight traffickers were sentenced to 
between two and three years, seven traffickers were sentenced to 
between three and five years, and one trafficker was sentenced to 
between five and 10 years’ imprisonment. However, in comparison, 
about the same percentage of defendants, 49 percent, convicted of 
rape in 2019 served prison time, as those convicted specifically for 
sex-trafficking crimes, 43 percent. Under German sentencing practices, 
judges typically suspended sentences under two years, particularly 
for first-time offenders, for most crimes including human trafficking. 
This practice weakened deterrence, potentially undercut efforts of 
police and prosecutors, and created potential security and safety 
concerns, particularly for victims who cooperated with investigations 
and prosecutions. Current standards in classification and procedure 
in data collection, in addition to strict privacy laws, continued to 
result in incomplete data and underreporting. This likely lowered 
both the reported number of trafficking convictions and the average 
length of sentences.
Prioritization of labor trafficking remained a concern during the 






with sex trafficking. Compared with 2018 (21 investigations), the 
government decreased its labor trafficking investigations in 2019 
(14 investigations). In 2019, six suspects were prosecuted for labor 
trafficking and four traffickers were convicted, but only one labor 
trafficker served jail time, although it was under one year and therefore 
not a significant sentence. This compared with five prosecuted and 
four convicted in 2018, though none served jail time. Notable cases 
during the reporting period included four criminal proceedings, 
three of which remained ongoing, involving suspected Islamic 
State members accused of enslaving Yezidi women and children, 
with several charged with human trafficking offences committed 
outside Germany. The trials conducted in Germany are considered 
the first in the world for international crimes committed against 
the Yezidi population. In 2020, there were also several notable 
human trafficking cases that were overturned on appeal of the public 
prosecutor because the sentences were inadequate as the defendants 
were initially charged with lesser crimes instead of human trafficking; 
when the cases were heard again, courts issued more stringent 
penalties for human trafficking. The government did not report any 
investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of officials complicit in 
human trafficking offenses. 
Frequent turnover, insufficient personnel, and limited dedicated 
trafficking resources hindered law enforcement efforts, sometimes 
leading to protracted court cases that were ultimately dismissed 
due to the statute of limitations or the unwillingness of victims to 
participate in prolonged proceedings. The federal criminal police 
(BKA) had dedicated human trafficking investigators. Most, but not 
all, states had dedicated anti-trafficking investigation units, and a 
couple of states had specialized prosecutors. Although prosecutors 
with experience assisting victims through trial processes frequently 
led sex trafficking cases, labor trafficking cases were more often 
assigned to financial, economic, or organized crime sections that 
lacked similar experience. The government and state-funded NGOs 
continued to organize and provide training to law enforcement 
officials, although civil society recommended increased labor 
trafficking training, specifically with regard to identifying migrant 
workers as trafficking victims. The government’s counseling centers 
for agencies and professionals working on trafficking cases continued 
to provide training to prosecutors on forced labor and provided new 
anti-trafficking training to local job center personnel; the government 
did not report how many officials it trained during the reporting 
period. A government-funded NGO delivered an online trafficking 
training for police and the Justice Ministry and another training at 
a police training academy but did not report how many officials 
received training. One state police academy held a two-day training 
on victim protection and a government-funded NGO held a labor 
trafficking training attended by 50 law enforcement and immigration 
officials from all 16 states. While judges could not be compelled 
to attend training courses, many voluntarily participated in some 
form of training including at the German Judicial Academy, though 
there were no human trafficking-specific courses available in 2020. 
The BKA maintained an information portal for federal and state 
police forces with information on current trends, guidelines, and 
investigative tools for combating trafficking. The Service Center against 
Labor Exploitation, Forced Labor and Trafficking in Human Beings 
(Servicestelle) also maintained an online platform that provided access 
to information on guidelines, agreements, and counseling centers for 
victims. Federal and state-level police continued to collaborate with 
EUROPOL and foreign governments, notably Kosovo, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Nigeria, Romania, and Switzerland on international 
trafficking investigations, which resulted in the arrest of at least one 
suspect. In 2019, Germany extradited 33 suspected traffickers to 12 
countries and received eight trafficking suspects from three countries. 
The government began a joint investigation with the Government of 
Brazil of a suspected German sex tourist; at the close of the reporting 
period the investigation was ongoing. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained overall protection efforts, while 
increasing funding for NGO-run counseling centers. In 2019, the 
most recent year for which comprehensive statistics were available, 
state government authorities, who are responsible for protection 
efforts, identified 494 trafficking victims, similar to 503 victims 
identified in 2018. In 2019, government-funded NGOs identified 987 
trafficking victims, although these victims may also have been counted 
in the government statistics, making the total number of identified 
victims uncertain. Of the government-identified victims, 427 were 
victims of sex trafficking (430 in 2018) and 67 of labor trafficking, 
which included one forced begging victim and 23 forced criminality 
victims. This compared with 73 labor trafficking victims identified 
in 2018, which included two forced begging victims and 8 forced 
criminality victims. Almost all sex trafficking victims were female (95 
percent) and approximately 14 percent of all sex trafficking victims 
were children. The majority of identified sex trafficking victims were 
from Germany (22 percent), Thailand (21 percent), and Romania 
(17 percent). The majority of labor trafficking victims were from 
Ukraine and the majority of victims in forced criminality were from 
Belarus and Poland. Most labor trafficking victims were identified in 
the construction sector and private households in 2019. While the 
government did not report the total number of victims that received 
care, of the 427 identified sex trafficking victims, at least 116 received 
care, including 89 from specialized counseling centers and 27 from 
youth welfare offices. This was a decrease compared with 157 sex 
trafficking victims and 16 children referred to specialized counseling 
centers and youth welfare offices in 2018. The police continued to 
proactively identify human trafficking victims, but unlike prior years, 
the majority of sex trafficking victims in 2019 were self-identified. 
However, in its 2019 report, GRETA noted that the official figures of 
identified trafficking victims did not reflect the true scale of human 
trafficking in Germany due to the absence of a comprehensive and 
coherent approach to detecting and identifying victims, including 
among migrants and asylum seekers, problems with data collection, 
and insufficient prioritization of labor trafficking. Some NGOs 
reported the number of sex trafficking victims increased following the 
implementation of the prostitution law, while other NGOs continued 
to express concern that trafficking victims would either not register 
or register without disclosing trafficking crimes; despite this, sex 
trafficking victim identification did not correspondingly increase. 
Germany did not have a single national victim identification or 
referral mechanism to address all forms of trafficking and both 
children and adults remained without systematic provision of 
care, though there was a national identification and cooperation 
guideline tool for children. At the federal level, there were procedures 
in place to identify and refer victims to care, but most victim care 
was handled at the state level. Each state had a separate system to 
refer victims to either state-run support or NGOs, and several states 
had written identification guidelines. In 2020, two government-
funded NGOs published trafficking identification and indicator 
brochures, one of which included contact information for counseling 
centers in 15 of 16 states. Thirteen of 16 states also had formal 
cooperation agreements in place between police and NGOs for 
various purposes, but not all included all forms of trafficking, such 
as labor trafficking, forced begging, and forced criminality. The 
Federal Agency for Migration and Refugees (BAMF) continued to 
utilize its standard operating procedures and trafficking indicator 
lists to identify potential victims in the asylum protection system 
and made referrals to counseling centers, though NGOs continued 
to suggest improvements in victim identification. While foreign 
migrant and asylum-seeking victims were entitled to social benefits 
and deportation relief, unidentified victims among the asylum-seeking 
population remained vulnerable as they could be deported back to 
their first country of EU entrance without first receiving protection 
services. The government occasionally returned trafficking victims 
seeking to transfer asylum claims to Germany to their original 
arrival country, which sometimes included their traffickers. An 




scrutiny of trafficking victims seeking asylum, which could have left 
some victims unidentified within the asylum-seeking system. Civil 
society noted that non-specialized immigration and police officers 
rarely identified trafficking victims among the asylum-seeking and 
migrant populations, even when victims directly referenced trafficking 
experiences, especially if NGOs or counseling centers were not 
involved. A November 2020 NGO policy paper concluded that BAMF 
officers required additional training and resources to manage their 
workloads. Each BAMF branch office in Germany included at least 
one representative to assist in identifying and supporting potential 
trafficking victims, and BAMF had a total of 210 specialized personnel 
that could adjudicate asylum cases. The Prostitute Protection Act 
of 2016 required officials across all states to screen for trafficking 
indicators during registration of individuals in commercial sex and 
frequently resulted in officials identifying numerous individuals 
subjected to force, fraud, or coercion. The criminal procedure code 
exempted trafficking victims from criminal prosecution for minor 
unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit; however, 
authorities occasionally arrested victims for immigration violations 
that may have been a result of their exploitation. 
The government provided victim services through the Network against 
Trafficking in Human Beings (KOK), the government-funded NGO 
network charged with coordinating and overseeing victim support 
efforts across Germany. In 2020, national government funding 
for the KOK’s management operations was €500,000 ($613,500), 
the same as 2019. The government also allocated approximately 
€271,000 ($332,520) to the NGO that operated the Servicestelle, an 
increase from approximately €176,000 ($215,950) in 2019. State 
governments also supported trafficking victims and in 2020 allocated 
approximately €3.3 million ($4.05 million) to human trafficking 
NGOs. In 2020, the federal and state governments also funded several 
specific programs to directly address increasing costs of care due 
to the pandemic; the programs were broad and included funding 
for shelters and counseling centers for victims of crime, including 
trafficking victims. Government-funded NGO counseling centers 
served both labor and sex trafficking victims, although many centers 
only had a mandate to work with female sex trafficking victims. 
Trafficking-specific NGO service providers operated in 45 cities and 
15 of 16 states, providing shelter, medical and psychological care, 
legal assistance, vocational support, and assistance acquiring residence 
permits. Trade union-affiliated and NGO-run migrant counseling 
centers also supported labor trafficking victims and had offices in 
every state. There was limited long-term or comprehensive support, 
including shelter, within these centers for children, transgender 
females, and male trafficking victims; KOK noted overall availability 
of services and shelters was inconsistent across states. In 2020, due to 
the pandemic, many shelters and counseling centers were temporarily 
closed or operated at a significantly reduced capacity, while other 
victim assistance services transitioned to virtual platforms, which 
limited access for some victims without internet. 
Prosecutors, together with other authorities, offered undocumented 
victims a reflection period of three months to decide if they would 
testify in court, but the government did not report how many victims 
received this reflection period. Victims who agreed to testify were 
eligible for temporary residence permits, which allowed them to 
remain and work in Germany through the duration of the trial; 
however, the government did not report how many victims received 
permits during the reporting period. The law entitled victims to 
an interpreter and a third-party representative from a counseling 
center to accompany them to all interviews. The law provided legal 
alternatives to removal to countries in which victims would face 
retribution or hardship. After the completion of their trafficker’s trial, 
the law granted officials the authority to issue residence permits to 
victims in cases of humanitarian hardship, for public interest, or who 
faced injury or threats to life or freedom in their countries of origin; 
however, GRETA noted there were significant discrepancies from state 
to state in the application of the law. Further, in September 2020, the 
federal court ruled that immigration authorities failed to properly 
take into account the human trafficking situation an applicant would 
face upon deportation to their home country when they rejected the 
applicant and referred the application for reconsideration. Counseling 
centers reported specialized trafficking BAMF officers were not always 
involved or included in deportation hearings. Family members were 
eligible for residency in certain circumstances. Subject to certain 
requirements, victims could join criminal trials as joint plaintiffs and 
were entitled to free legal counsel, an interpreter, and pursuit of civil 
remedies as part of the criminal proceeding. While the law allowed 
for compensation from the government, it could only be awarded 
to victims who had experienced direct physical violence and the 
government did not report whether it awarded compensation to any 
victims during the reporting period. The government amended the 
Victims of Crime Act in November 2019 to address the requirement 
of physical violence and expand protections to include psychological 
violence once it enters into force in January 2024; this may result 
in more restitution awards to trafficking victims. The government 
reported awarding restitution to two sex trafficking victims during 
the reporting period as a result of civil suits filed in conjunction with 
criminal charges (compared to none in the prior reporting period). 
NGOs and GRETA reported that victims were not systematically 
informed of their rights. The law allowed victims to submit video 
testimony. During the reporting period, the government took measures 
to lessen the burden on victims and their potential re-traumatization 
by trying to reduce the number of times they had to testify in trials, 
sometimes not requiring them to do so. The government offered 
witness protection as needed, and police would accompany witnesses 
to trials; in 2020, the government provided a total of 13 trafficking 
victims witness protection compared with 17 in 2019. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. Germany 
remained without a national action plan for all forms of trafficking; 
however, the government did have a draft strategy to combat labor 
trafficking. The government did not have a dedicated national 
anti-trafficking coordination committee addressing all forms of 
trafficking but had three federal-state interagency working groups that 
coordinated with each other and addressed all forms of trafficking. The 
government working groups met four times in 2020 to discuss a variety 
of antitrafficking efforts, including the appointment of a national 
rapporteur, identification of and services to child victims, online 
exploitation, and worker protections in the construction industry. 
Additionally, in 2020, the government created a separate division 
in the Federal Ministry for Families, Seniors, Women, and Youth 
(BMFSFJ) to coordinate human trafficking efforts at the international 
level and national efforts on sex trafficking, whereas the Federal 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs coordinated efforts on labor 
trafficking. BMFSFJ facilitated the development of several pandemic-
related response programs for trafficking victims and advocated for 
increased attention for labor and child trafficking. The government 
remained without a national rapporteur, a key recommendation 
of GRETA’s 2019 and 2015 reports. The government continued to 
publish its annual report on human trafficking. The government 
directly organized one national awareness raising campaign, which 
focused on violence against women but included information on sex 
trafficking; the government also organized one regional awareness 
campaign that focused on sex trafficking and displayed 2,000 posters 
in strategic places. The federal government, through NGOs, co-
funded various awareness events and conferences, including a project 
implemented by KOK targeting trafficking victims in the context 
of asylum and international protections, a seminar attended by 70 
participants from the government and NGOs, and 19 other events 
during the reporting period. The federal government did not have a 
trafficking-specific hotline but continued to fund a 24/7 hotline in 
17 languages for women affected by violence; in 2019, the hotline 
received calls from 96 potential trafficking victims (compared with 
68 in 2018), but no further information was available. Additionally, 
the government had several other national and regional hotlines for 
sexual violence and male victims of violence, including trafficking, in 






for migrant workers; however, statistics on trafficking victims were 
unavailable for these hotlines. 
Inadequate oversight, fraudulent labor recruitment, and the continued 
vulnerability of migrant and seasonal workers remained concerns 
during the reporting period. While there were some regulations 
in place to protect migrant workers from labor recruiters and 
exploitative companies, including subcontracting companies, they 
were not effective, and the government did not report holding 
any civilly or criminally liable for fraudulent recruiting or labor 
trafficking during the reporting period. The law allowed German 
labor recruiters to charge up to €2,000 ($2,450) in recruitment 
fees to non-temporary workers. Private labor recruiters did not 
require a license to operate. Though the government limited the 
number of seasonal workers during the reporting period due to the 
pandemic, some of the measures put into place increased trafficking 
vulnerabilities, including the inability for many workers to change 
their employer after arrival. There were also reports from NGOs that 
German agricultural companies were withholding identification 
documents from migrant workers and not complying with regulations 
regarding minimum wage, working hours, and hygiene conditions. 
In 2020, the government passed laws aimed at increasing protections 
for migrant workers by requiring government funding for counseling 
services, limiting the number of subcontracting companies in the 
meat processing industry, expanding inspection mandates, increasing 
penalties, and electronically tracking work hours. The Federal Customs 
Financial Control of Illegal Work (FKS) office reported conducting 
44,702 labor inspections in 2020 compared with 54,733 in 2019. In 
one operation, FKS investigated 45 people and initiated 19 criminal 
proceedings, the majority of which were against foreign workers for 
illegal employment-related crimes, but also included several cases of 
wage-related labor exploitation and false documentation. 
While the government did not systematically provide anti-trafficking 
training to its diplomatic personnel prior to their departure, for 
domestic workers employed by embassies in Berlin, authorities 
conducted annual in-person interviews without employers present 
and required proof of salary and informed workers of their rights. 
The government previously extended the mandate of FKS to include 
trafficking, thereby increasing staff that could potentially identify 
forced labor victims. However, FKS did not have the authority to 
perform labor inspections of workers in domestic households – 
where most labor trafficking victims were identified – without the 
homeowners’ consent, increasing vulnerability to trafficking. In 
2020 the government initiated a bilateral labor agreement with the 
Government of Romania and signed two bilateral labor agreements 
with the Governments of Bulgaria and Georgia, which focused on 
the protection of vulnerable migrant workers, but they have yet to be 
implemented. The government partnered with Bulgaria and produced 
a brochure on Bulgarian workers’ rights and available services for 
distribution in Germany. The government provided funding to several 
anti-trafficking programs abroad, including Mauritania and Niger. 
The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for 
commercial sex acts. During the reporting period, the government 
demonstrated efforts to reduce the demand for international sex 
tourism by German nationals through an awareness campaign and 
through a joint investigation of a suspected German sex tourist with 
the Government of Brazil. In May 2020, the Government of Kenya 
arrested a German national for sex trafficking and child sex tourism; 
however, information on cooperation with Germany was unavailable. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
domestic and foreign victims in Germany. The pandemic exacerbated 
vulnerabilities for trafficking victims, including increased isolation 
of migrant and seasonal workers as well as sex trafficking victims, 
which complicated detection by officials and NGOs. Sex traffickers 
increasingly use online platforms to recruit, exploit victims, and book 
apartment rentals to make their illicit operations difficult to track, in 
part because of the pandemic. Most identified sex trafficking victims 
in Germany are EU citizens, primarily German citizens, Bulgarians, 
and Romanians (of which a significant percentage are ethnic Roma). 
Victims also come from most other regions of the world, particularly 
China, Thailand, Nigeria, and other parts of Africa. Transgender 
women from Thailand are particularly vulnerable to sex trafficking and 
are often misled regarding their working conditions and wages prior 
to their arrival. Family members in organized groups force victims 
into trafficking situations and reports estimate around 11 percent 
of sex trafficking victims are recruited by trusted family members. 
Similarly, Roma families sometimes force their children, both male 
and female, into commercial sex on the streets. Authorities continue 
to report the prevalence of young male traffickers, known as “lover 
boys,” coercing girls and women into sex trafficking, often through a 
sham romantic relationship. Traffickers continued to target migrants 
and refugees upon arrival. Traffickers, namely Nigerian “madams”, 
continue to fraudulently recruit and later coerce Nigerian women 
and girls to stay in exploitative situations using a “voodoo oath” 
they are forced to swear, while Nigerian “fraternities” increasingly 
recruit victims through force. Some NGOs report that the number 
of sex trafficking victims increased over the first few years following 
the implementation of the 2016 prostitution law. The Nigerian and 
European mafias increasingly cooperate to facilitate human trafficking 
from Africa. Several foreign governments continue to report German 
citizens engage in sex tourism abroad. Labor trafficking victims are 
predominantly male and European, including from North Macedonia, 
Latvia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania, but also Afghanistan, 
Pakistan, and Vietnam. Traffickers exploit victims of forced labor 
primarily at construction sites, but also in hotels, seasonal industries, 
restaurants, and in private homes, with reported increases in the 
number of child victims. Foreign workers are vulnerable to labor 
trafficking, particularly in meat processing plants, and especially when 
companies hire employees through subcontractors, who may have 
used fraudulent practices to recruit workers to the jobs. Traffickers 
subject Roma and foreign unaccompanied minors to sex trafficking, 
forced begging, and other coerced criminal behavior.
GHANA: TIER 2
The Government of Ghana does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Ghana remained on Tier 2. These efforts included convicting 
more labor traffickers, opening a dedicated shelter for child trafficking 
victims, and increasing funding for victim services. The government 
trained law enforcement, judicial officials, community leaders, and 
service providers, and held numerous public awareness raising 
activities. However, the government did not meet the minimum 
standards in several key areas. The government did not prosecute 
or convict any alleged sex traffickers and identified fewer victims. A 
lack of adequate resources for law enforcement continued to hinder 
investigations and prosecutions, and shelter capacity remained 
insufficient. The government did not adequately address corruption 
in trafficking crimes, including alleged complicity from officials who 
facilitated trafficking, and it did not amend the anti-trafficking act 
regulations to remove the option of a fine in lieu of imprisonment in 
cases where the trafficker was a parent or guardian of the child victim.











Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and sentence convicted 
traffickers under the 2005 human trafficking law, including complicit 
officials, and apply significant prison terms as prescribed by law to 
those convicted. • Increase funding and resources for law enforcement 
to enable criminal investigations and victim identification. • Train 
law enforcement and judicial officials on how to identify, investigate, 
and prosecute trafficking cases under the 2005 human trafficking 
law. • Amend the 2015 implementing regulations for the 2005 
human trafficking law to remove the option of a fine in lieu of 
imprisonment in cases where the trafficker is a parent or guardian 
of the child victim. • End the ban on recruitment of Ghanaian 
workers to countries in the Gulf; implement the 2020 National 
Labor Migration Policy and ensure employers pay any recruitment 
fees; and investigate and prosecute recruitment agents suspected 
of participating in trafficking Ghanaian migrant workers. • Train 
law enforcement and service providers on the standard operating 
procedures to identify victims and refer them to services; implement 
the procedures in all regions. • Proactively screen for trafficking 
indicators among vulnerable populations—including Ghanaian 
women traveling abroad for domestic work, returning migrants, 
domestic and foreign workers on Chinese-operated fishing vessels, 
and Cuban medical professionals—and refer victims to services. 
• Train law enforcement on advanced investigative techniques in 
trafficking cases, including surveillance and evidence collection. • 
Increase cooperation between law enforcement and prosecutors on 
case development. • Improve data collection on law enforcement 
statistics and victim identification.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. 
The 2005 Human Trafficking Act, amended in 2009, criminalized 
sex trafficking and labor trafficking. The Human Trafficking Act 
prescribed penalties of a minimum of five years’ imprisonment, 
which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, 
commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such 
as rape. However, the 2015 regulations for this Act, which are non-
discretionary and have the force of law, provided specific guidance 
on sentencing depending on the circumstances; in general, the 
term is not less than five years’ imprisonment and not more than 
25 years’ imprisonment, but if a parent, guardian, or other person 
with parental responsibilities facilitates or engages in trafficking, 
they are liable to a fine, five to 10 years’ imprisonment, or both. By 
allowing for a fine in lieu of imprisonment, these penalties were 
not commensurate with those for other serious crimes, such as rape.
Authorities investigated 87 trafficking cases, including 63 labor 
trafficking and 24 sex trafficking cases, in 2020, compared with 
investigating 137 cases in 2019. The government initiated prosecutions 
of 18 alleged labor traffickers and continued prosecutions of four 
alleged labor traffickers, compared with prosecutions of 37 defendants 
in 2019. Additionally, the government prosecuted four defendants for 
exploitative child labor using the Children’s Act of 1998, compared 
with five in 2019; in some cases, the government prosecuted trafficking 
cases under the Children’s Act when there was insufficient evidence 
of trafficking. The courts convicted 13 labor traffickers in 2020, an 
increase compared with convictions of 10 traffickers in 2019. The 
government did not report prosecuting or convicting any alleged 
sex traffickers, compared with prosecutions of 15 defendants and 
convictions of three sex traffickers during the previous year. Of the 
13 traffickers convicted, the courts sentenced nine traffickers between 
five years’ and 18 years’ imprisonment, which was in compliance 
with penalties prescribed under the 2005 human trafficking law. The 
courts sentenced one trafficker to 14 days’ imprisonment and a 6,000 
Ghanaian cedis ($1,030) fine, fined one trafficker 3,600 cedis ($620), 
and fined two defendants 240 cedis ($41) for child labor violations. 
In 2019, the government initiated prosecutions of two defendants for 
operating a labor recruitment firm without a license; the government 
did not report if it continued the prosecutions in 2020. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government officials allegedly complicit in human 
trafficking crimes; however, official corruption and complicity in 
trafficking remained concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action 
during the year. Observers alleged that traffickers operated with 
the support or acquiescence of law enforcement or justice officials, 
and that some government officials interfered in law enforcement 
proceedings. Although not explicitly reported as human trafficking, an 
international organization reported two cases of sexual exploitation 
and abuse with trafficking indicators from previous reporting periods 
involving Ghanaian peacekeepers deployed to the UN peacekeeping 
mission in South Sudan; the international organization substantiated 
the allegations and repatriated the individuals. The government 
initiated investigations of both cases, and in at least one case, 
dismissed the charges for lack of evidence after unsuccessful attempts 
to obtain witness testimony. 
Government officials and NGOs reported the government did not 
provide sufficient resources, facilities, land and marine vehicles, or 
funds for operation to law enforcement for investigations of trafficking 
cases. This, combined with a lack of shelter facilities for identified 
victims in most regions, delayed investigations, operations to remove 
potential victims from exploitative situations, and prosecutions. 
Inadequate evidence collection, weak collaboration between 
prosecutors and police, and a lack of experienced state attorneys 
hampered prosecution of suspected traffickers. The government 
continued providing introductory anti-trafficking training for Ghana 
Police Service and Ghana Immigration Service (GIS) recruits. In 
collaboration with NGOs and foreign donors, the government trained 
58 law enforcement officials on trafficking, investigative techniques, 
and victim support and conducted capacity building training for 97 
justice officials and 55 staff members on gender-based violence and 
human trafficking.
PROTECTION
The government decreased victim identification efforts, but increased 
protection efforts, including victim services and shelter capacity. The 
government reported identifying and referring to care 391 trafficking 
victims in 2020, compared with identifying 611 victims in 2019. 
Additionally, NGOs identified 108 trafficking victims, compared wth 
identifying 172 during the previous year. Of the total 499 victims, 
there were 454 victims of labor trafficking and 45 victims of sex 
trafficking, compared with 508 labor trafficking and 98 sex trafficking 
victims in 2019. Unlike the previous year, the majority of identified 
victims were children (417 child victims identified in 2020, compared 
with 200 child victims in 2019), and a majority were Ghanaian (442 
Ghanaian victims identified in 2020, compared with 276 Ghanaians 
in 2019). Most of the 57 foreign national victims identified were 
Nigerian. Officials referred all 499 victims to government shelter 
services or NGOs for care. 
The government had standard operating procedures (SOPs) to identify 
trafficking victims and refer them to services; however, officials did 
not consistently apply the SOPs, and NGOs reported that a lack 
of logistical resources sometimes hampered implementation. The 
government operated one shelter for adult female trafficking victims, 
which cared for 67 trafficking victims in 2020. The government, with 
an international organization’s support, opened a dedicated shelter for 
child trafficking victims in August 2020, which cared for 27 children 
during the reporting period. A government-run shelter for victims 
of child abuse could also accommodate child trafficking victims. 
There were no shelters for adult male victims, and most men received 
short-term housing followed by reintegration support. Government 
services for women and children included shelter, medical care, 
needs assessments, psycho-social care, education and skills training, 
interpretation for foreign national victims, assistance obtaining 
identity documents, registration with the national health service, 
and assistance during legal proceedings. The government expended 
450,000 cedis ($77,450) for victim services and an additional 140,000 





was an increase compared to expending 219,580 cedis ($37,790) 
for victim care in 2019. Relying on private facilities operated by 
NGOs and faith-based organizations, the government referred most 
child trafficking victims to one of 11 privately operated shelters that 
provided or coordinated provision of services. However, overall shelter 
capacity for child trafficking victims remained insufficient. Foreign 
victims reportedly had the same access to care as domestic victims, 
and the government provided care and repatriation assistance to 
37 foreign national victims. Foreign victims could seek temporary 
residency during legal proceedings and, with the interior minister’s 
approval, permanent residency if deemed to be in the victim’s 
best interest; officials reported no victims sought temporary or 
permanent residency during the year. The government helped facilitate 
repatriations of 4,000 Ghanaian workers from Gulf states, including 
potential trafficking victims, and provided reintegration assistance. 
An international organization identified and assisted at least 48 
Ghanaian trafficking victims exploited in the Middle East in 2020. 
The government trained more than 120 social workers, care providers, 
and shelter staff on topics ranging from trafficking indicators and 
trends, comprehensive screening, victim care, support for child 
victims, shelter management, and shelter security with support from 
NGOs and a foreign donor.
The government, in cooperation with NGOs, assisted victims who 
chose to participate in law enforcement proceedings against their 
traffickers, including funding for lodging, transportation, and psycho-
social support. Victims could provide video or written testimony, 
and some courts had child-friendly spaces that allowed child victims 
to testify from a separate room via video. The government did not 
report how many victims, if any, participated in proceedings against 
their alleged traffickers in 2020, compared to 73 adults in 2019. 
Officials and NGOs reported that prolonged adjournments slowed 
prosecutions and impeded victims’ participation. Ghanaian law 
allowed trafficking victims to obtain restitution, and in one case, the 
court awarded one victim 5,000 cedis ($861). Victims could file civil 
suits against their traffickers; the government did not report whether 
any victims did so during the reporting period. There were no reports 
the government detained or otherwise penalized trafficking victims 
for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit.
PREVENTION
The government modestly increased anti-trafficking prevention 
efforts. The Human Trafficking Management Board—the inter-
ministerial committee mandated to administer the Human Trafficking 
Fund (HTF), advise the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social 
Protection (MOGCSP) on anti-trafficking policy, promote prevention 
efforts, and facilitate the protection and reintegration of trafficking 
victims—continued meeting quarterly. The government continued 
implementing the 2017-2021 National Plan of Action for the 
Elimination of Human Trafficking in Ghana (NPA). The government 
allocated 1 million cedis ($172,120) to the HTF and 160,000 cedis 
($27,540) for the NPA’s implementation, compared with allocating 
1 million cedis ($172,120) to the HTF and 181,510 cedis ($31,240) 
to the NPA in 2019.
The government conducted trainings and public awareness-raising 
activities with a wide array of government officials, civil society 
stakeholders, and community leaders at the national, regional, 
district, and local levels, often in collaboration with NGOs and 
international organizations. This included sensitizing 600 residents 
in four fishing communities with documented cases of child 
trafficking on human trafficking and child labor, in coordination 
with a foreign donor. Community and district child protection 
committees supported and participated in NGO-led capacity building 
trainings. The government disseminated anti-trafficking educational 
materials, including posters, flyers, digital materials, radio ads, and 
documentaries, and commemorated World Day against Trafficking 
in Persons by conducting media outreach and engaging over 85 
traditional leaders and stakeholders. In collaboration with an NGO 
and in fulfillment of a bilateral partnership, representatives of the 
enforcement and protection agencies responsible for addressing child 
trafficking met at least twice to improve coordination of anti-trafficking 
efforts. Local government authorities and community leaders in 54 
communities in six regions continued to partner with an NGO to 
conduct community-level activities on child trafficking prevention, 
identification, and reintegration of child trafficking victims, and on 
increasing access to social and economic services. The government 
continued implementing a standardized trafficking data collection 
system in three regions with an international organization’s support, 
and began expansion to two additional regions; however, the system 
was not widely used during the reporting period. The MOGCSP 
operated a hotline in English and six local languages for victims of 
abuse, although it did not report identifying any trafficking victims 
or initiating any trafficking investigations as a result. The government 
did not report if labor inspectors identified any trafficking victims or 
removed any children from exploitive labor situations. Insufficient 
funding, facilities, and transportation impeded inspectors’ efforts, 
and pandemic-related travel restrictions further hampered their ability 
to conduct site visits. The government, with donor support, drafted 
a forced labor training manual for labor inspectors, which was not 
yet operational at the end of the reporting period. 
The government regulated labor recruitment and required private 
employment agencies to register; it also provided pre-departure 
trainings to migrant workers, and the Ministry of Employment and 
Labor Relations and GIS screened for trafficking indicators. However, 
informal recruitment agencies continued to operate and facilitate 
recruitment through informal channels; an international organization 
reported informal agencies used predatory tactics, including high 
recruitment fees and false job advertising. The government continued 
its 2017 ban on labor migration to Gulf states; the policy restricted 
Ghanaians’ access to safe and legal migration, subsequently increasing 
their vulnerability to trafficking. In the previous reporting period, 
observers noted registered and unregistered agents recruited Ghanaian 
workers and, with the assistance of some immigration officials, 
facilitated their travel out of the country without the required exit 
documents. The government continued negotiating labor agreements 
with Gulf states but did not implement its 2018 labor agreement 
with Qatar or 2019 agreement with the United Arab Emirates. The 
government adopted the 2020 National Labor Migration Policy and 
2020-2024 policy implementation plan strengthening protections for 
migrant workers; the policy included provisions on providing pre-
departure trainings, building Ghanaian embassies’ capacity to assist 
migrant workers abroad, prohibiting seizure of travel documents, 
and protecting foreign workers in Ghana. The government did not 
make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The 
government provided anti-trafficking training to its troops prior to 
their deployment as peacekeepers; although not explicitly reported 
as human trafficking, there were cases of alleged sexual exploitation 
with trafficking indicators by Ghanaian peacekeepers deployed to 
the UN peacekeeping mission in South Sudan in 2018.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Ghana, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Ghana abroad. Traffickers exploit Ghanaian children in forced labor 
within the country in inland and coastal fishing, domestic service, 
street hawking, begging, portering, artisanal gold mining, quarrying, 
herding, and agriculture, especially cocoa. Donor-funded research 
focused on the fishing industry on Lake Volta indicated that more 
than half of the children working on and around the lake were born 
in other communities, and many of these children are victims of 
forced labor, not allowed to attend school, given inadequate housing 
and clothing, and controlled by fishermen through intimidation, 
violence, and limited access to food. Traffickers force boys as young 
as five years old to work in hazardous conditions, including deep 
diving, and many suffer waterborne infections. Girls perform work on 
shore, such as cooking, cleaning fish, and preparing fish for market, 
and are vulnerable to sexual abuse and forced marriage for the 




in selected communities in the Volta and Central Regions indicated 
traffickers had subjected children from nearly one-third of the 1,621 
households surveyed to forced labor, primarily in inland fishing and 
domestic work. Organized traffickers who target vulnerable parents 
and communities facilitate child trafficking in the fishing industry in 
Ghana and other West African countries. Relatives often send girls 
via intermediaries to work in harsh conditions in forced labor in 
domestic work. Children in northern regions of Ghana whose parents 
use intermediaries or relatives to send them to work in agriculture 
in the south during school breaks or the dry season are at increased 
risk for forced labor. Ghanaian children who do not have access to 
school or who can attend only intermittently due to limited space 
and the double-track school schedule are also at risk for sex and labor 
trafficking. Ghanaian girls and young women from northern regions 
move to urban centers throughout Ghana to seek work as porters, 
and traffickers sometimes exploit them in sex trafficking and forced 
labor. Traffickers subject Ghanaian girls, and to a lesser extent boys, 
to sex trafficking in urban areas and mining regions across Ghana. 
Traffickers subject children from West African countries to forced 
labor in Ghana in fishing and domestic servitude. Cuban medical 
professionals working in Ghana may have been forced to work by the 
Cuban government, and Chinese nationals are reportedly subjected 
to forced labor in the formal and informal mining sectors and in 
fishing. Observers allege Chinese-owned and operated industrial 
vessels flagged to Ghana, often through shell companies, exploit 
Ghanaian workers in forced labor; one organization documented 
cases of physical abuse, underpayment or nonpayment of wages, 
restricted medical care, and poor living conditions against Ghanaian 
men aboard these fleets. Traffickers exploit Ghanaian and Nigerian 
women and girls in sex trafficking in Ghana, including in mining 
regions, border towns, and commercial centers. Traffickers lure 
Nigerian women and girls to Ghana with the promise of good jobs 
and coerce them into commercial sex to pay exorbitant debts for 
transportation and lodging. Traffickers also exploit some Ghanaian 
and Nigerian labor migrants in commercial sex and demand more 
money for transit and document costs.
Traffickers exploit Ghanaian women and children in forced labor and 
sex trafficking in the Middle East, Europe, and other parts of West 
Africa. Fraudulent recruiters lure Ghanaian men to the Middle East 
under false pretenses, where traffickers subject them to forced labor 
and sex trafficking. Unscrupulous agents recruit Ghanaians seeking 
employment, transport them through North Africa, and exploit them 
in sex and labor trafficking in Europe and the Middle East. NGOs 
report traffickers use internet platforms to recruit Ghanaians seeking 
work overseas. In one research study, an international organization 
reported the majority of Ghanaian migrants recruited for employment 
in the Middle East are female domestic workers. Of the 113 returning 
Ghanaian domestic workers surveyed in the study, most reported the 
recruiters or intermediaries used informal recruitment procedures, 
and their contracts lacked worker protection provisions; some 
contracts were verbal, vague, or contained false information. Nearly 
all Ghanaian domestic workers were employed directly by families, 
rather than through a company, and most reported the work did not 
match the recruiters’ descriptions; workers reported traffickers seized 
their passports and physically and sexually abused them. Ghana is a 
transit point for West Africans subjected to sex trafficking in Europe, 
particularly Italy and Germany.
GREECE: TIER 2
The Government of Greece does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Greece remained on Tier 2. These efforts included convicting 
more traffickers and identifying more victims. A prosecutor officially 
recognized a victim for the first time based on the recommendations 
of NGO experts, social workers, and psychologists, and the Anti-
Trafficking Unit (ATU) consistently identified victims with NGOs 
reporting excellent cooperation. The Office of the National Rapporteur 
on Human Trafficking (ONRHT) coordinated with relevant ministries 
and regional governments to ensure trafficking victims had access to 
COVID-19 tests and organized a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) with two regional governments to strengthen cooperation 
on various anti-trafficking efforts. However, the government did not 
meet the minimum standards in several key areas. The government 
lacked efforts to screen asylum-seekers and migrants for trafficking 
at entry points to Greece. In addition, reports from credible sources 
documented numerous, sometimes violent, forcible returns, or 
“pushbacks,” against migrants and asylum-seekers who had entered 
Greek territory, including women and children. The pushbacks 
discouraged potential victims from self-identifying or cooperating 
with authorities. The government required victims to obtain a negative 
COVID-19 test before staying at government-run shelters, but victims 
lacked access to medical services, and COVID-19 tests were initially 
scarce and expensive. Government-run shelters continued to reject 
some victims from accessing support due to the lack of capacity, 
resources, and space to provide assistance and accommodation due to 
increased numbers of domestic violence cases during the pandemic. 
Court proceedings continued to last two to six years, hindering 
cooperation from victims and key witnesses and consequently 
resulting, at times, in acquittals of suspected traffickers. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Increase proactive identification efforts for victims of forced labor 
and victims among vulnerable populations, such as unaccompanied 
children, migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers. • Institutionalize 
and implement robust screening procedures for migrant flows, 
including asylum-seekers and unaccompanied minors. • Strengthen 
specialized services including shelter and psycho-social support for all 
victims, including children, adult males, and victims in rural areas. • 
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, including 
complicit officials • Decrease the length of court proceedings for 
trafficking cases. • Encourage victims’ participation in investigations 
and prosecutions by providing alternative methods to testify, including 
remote testimony or funding for travel and other expenses for victims 
to attend court hearings. • Take concrete steps to expedite the official 
victim identification process irrespective of victim cooperation in law 
enforcement efforts. • Allocate sufficient resources to implement the 
national action plan for combating trafficking. • Develop policies 
for victim-centered prosecutions and implement witness protection 
provisions already incorporated into law. • Provide training to judges, 
prosecutors, and law enforcement on trafficking investigations and 
prosecutions, particularly in rural areas and for non-specialized 
staff. • Standardize data collection and produce accurate data on 
anti-trafficking efforts. • Improve measures to order restitution and 
compensation for victims, including training prosecutors and judges, 
asset seizure, and legal assistance.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Article 323A 
of the criminal code criminalized sex and labor trafficking and 
prescribed penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine. 
These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex 





rape. Police investigated eight sex trafficking cases with 15 suspects, 
a decrease compared with 25 cases with 148 suspects in 2019. The 
government prosecuted 16 defendants, a decrease compared with 
33 in 2019; of the 16, seven were prosecuted for sex trafficking and 
nine for forced labor. First instance courts convicted 19 traffickers, 
a slight increase from 15 in 2019; 11 for sex trafficking and eight 
for forced labor. Courts acquitted seven individuals (23 in 2019); 
five individuals suspected of sex trafficking and two individuals 
suspected of forced labor. Judges issued sentences ranging from 
one to 17 years’ imprisonment, compared with four months to 27 
years’ imprisonment with fines from €50,800 ($62,330) to €100,000 
($122,700) in 2019. With courts closed due to pandemic lockdown 
measures for a total of seven months from March 2020 to June 
2020 and November 2020 to January 2021, judges prioritized cases 
with expiring statutes of limitation and/or felonies with defendants 
about to complete the maximum duration of pre-trial detention; as 
a result, judges suspended decisions on 19 sex trafficking cases and 
11 forced labor cases. 
The Hellenic Police maintained an ATU within the Organized 
Crime Division composed of two units with 37 officers in Athens 
and 10 officers in Thessaloniki who investigated trafficking and vice 
crimes and 12 smaller units across municipalities that investigated 
trafficking and organized crime. ATU officers did not conduct joint 
inspections with labor inspectors and social workers from the 
National Social Solidarity Center (EKKA) due to limited economic 
activity from lockdown measures and increased responsibilities 
to enforce pandemic mitigation efforts (347 joint inspections in 
2019). ATU limited unannounced inspections on brothels, bars, and 
massage parlors due to lockdown measures but continued proactive 
investigations on trafficking cases. In previous years, observers reported 
ATU’s 12 smaller units often consisted of three or four officers 
to handle trafficking cases among many other duties and lacked 
the resources and staff to conduct proactive investigations. NGOs 
continued to report good cooperation with law enforcement and 
excellent cooperation with ATU. While the government maintained 
trained prosecutors in Athens and Thessaloniki to handle trafficking 
cases, observers reported that non-specialized police, prosecutors, and 
judges, particularly in rural areas and islands, lacked an understanding 
of trafficking. In 2019, the government removed pimping from 
the criminal code, which had been used by police, prosecutors, 
and judges to justify inspections on brothels and to prosecute 
traffickers when stronger evidence was unavailable; subsequently, 
some possible trafficking cases may not have been investigated or 
prosecuted at all. The government maintained institutionalized 
training programs on trafficking for police, the coast guard, judges, and 
the asylum service. In addition, the government, in cooperation with 
NGOs and international organizations, trained police, prosecutors, 
judges, social workers, asylum officers, and labor inspectors on 
various anti-trafficking issues. The government did not report any 
investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees 
complicit in trafficking offenses, but media reported authorities 
investigated 15 police officers affiliated with a gang that provided 
protection for brothels, casinos, and massage parlors. Additionally, 
authorities reported an ongoing investigation into the wife of a 
former Greek ambassador accused of conducting domestic servitude 
in the ambassadorial residence in Slovenia. The government assisted 
with three European arrest warrants, four European investigative 
orders, and three requests for judicial assistance. The government 
also shared information with Albanian and Bulgarian authorities 
and signed a bilateral agreement with Albania to establish a security 
center focusing on organized crime, including trafficking. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained victim protection efforts. The government 
identified 167 victims (150 in 2019) some of whom fell into more 
than one category of exploitation; 75 were sex trafficking victims, 94 
were forced labor victims, including 73 victims of forced begging, 
two victims of forced criminality, and one victim of “slavery;” 78 
were women and 15 were men; 35 were girls and 39 were boys; 
and 140 were foreign victims. Observers commended ATU’s ability 
to consistently identify victims but noted other government efforts 
were largely reactive and reliant on self-identification. The Hellenic 
National Public Health Organization and regional reception 
service and asylum officers screened migrants, asylum-seekers, and 
unaccompanied children for trafficking indicators at island Reception 
and Identification Centers (RIC) and identified 10 possible cases 
involving abuse and exploitation in the country of origin or transit 
countries (15 in 2019), of which four cases were referred to the 
national referral mechanism (NRM). In previous years, asylum-
seekers waited more than a month for their screening due to a lack 
of training, staff, and resources and, as a result, a trafficking survivor 
was re-victimized in a migrant camp in 2019 while waiting for legal 
documents and RIC screening procedures. The government expedited 
the registration and screening process of migrants and asylum-seekers 
at the RICs but, in some cases, unidentified trafficking victims stayed 
in the same facility with their traffickers or were re-victimized due 
to pandemic-related restriction measures prevented movement 
between facilities and regions. Additionally, positive COVID-19 
cases among staff and reduced capacity due to pandemic mitigation 
efforts exacerbated delays in identification procedures. Each RIC 
designated a trafficking focal point who collected information on 
potential trafficking cases, but many staff working at RICs were on 
short-term contracts, which limited their experience and training 
to identify victims. International organizations, NGOs, and media 
continued to report a serious lack of government efforts to screen 
migrants and asylum-seekers, including unaccompanied children, 
at border crossings. Reports documented violent pushbacks of 
migrants and asylum-seekers into Turkey, while civil society and 
media reported allegations that border police assaulted and harassed 
migrants and asylum-seekers, including women and children, which 
strongly discouraged victims from self-identifying or cooperating 
with authorities. In previous years, observers reported a lack of 
identification efforts for victims of forced labor, particularly in the 
agriculture sector, cleaning and domestic service, and the tourism 
industry; however, labor inspectors reported difficulties in conducting 
inspections in rural areas and on islands due to the community 
receiving prior notice before inspections from local citizens. Civil 
society reported some first responders could not distinguish between 
sex trafficking and commercial sex, rejected sex trafficking victims 
who self-identified and, at times, sent them back to the traffickers. 
The government maintained a multi-disciplinary NRM, including 
appropriate standard operating procedures (SOPs) and referral forms. 
The NRM required first responders to inform and coordinate with 
EKKA when potential victims were identified for victim care and 
placement; government entities referred 39 victims in 2020 (68 in 
2019) and civil society organizations referred 113 victims (82 in 2019). 
The government, separately and in cooperation with international 
organizations and NGOs, trained law enforcement, immigration 
officers, social service workers, labor inspectors, and asylum officers 
on victim identification and referral procedures. The law authorized 
public prosecutors to officially recognize victims based on information 
collected by law enforcement, or a psychologist and a social worker 
if a victim did not want to cooperate with law enforcement. In 2020, 
a prosecutor officially recognized a victim for the first time based 
solely on the recommendations of NGO experts, social workers, 
and psychologists; however, observers reported inconsistent use 
of psychologists and social workers for identification procedures, 
cooperation with investigations was often required to receive official 
victim status, and procedures were lengthy and sometimes took years 
for victims to receive. Official victim status entitled foreign victims 
to a renewable one-year residence and work permit; victims without 
this status only had access to immediate support and assistance. 
Additionally, the government did not recognize victims who were 
exploited abroad but identified in Greece. Of the 167 victims identified 
by the government, public prosecutors granted official victim status 
to only four victims (two in 2019), while six victims were in the 
process of receiving official victim status (25 in 2019). Forty-seven 
victims were EU citizens, and 27 were Greek citizens who did not 
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need a residence and work permit, including 33 child victims from 
Bulgaria, 23 child victims from Greece, and nine from Romania. 
The government, in cooperation with NGOs, provided shelter, psycho-
social support, medical care, legal aid, and reintegration support. 
While the government provided personal protective equipment and 
virtual assistance to victims, observers reported virtual assistance for 
victims was nonexistent or not effective. The government was unable 
to determine how much total funding was spent on victim protection 
and did not allocate funding to civil society, with the exception of 
projects co-financed by the EU and state budget funds. EKKA secured 
€631,840 ($755,260) from EU security funds to support the NRM 
from 2018 to 2022 and maintained a MOU with an NGO to host 
a legal consultant and two anti-trafficking advisors. Two agencies 
provided shelter and general support services to trafficking victims: the 
General Secretariat for Family Policy and Gender Equality (GSFPGE) 
operated 21 shelters and 40 counseling centers for female victims of 
violence and EKKA operated two long-term shelters, an emergency 
shelter, and two Social Support Centers for vulnerable populations 
in need of assistance. GSFPGE and EKKA shelters assisted 22 victims 
(12 in 2019). However, EKKA and GSFPGE shelters continued to 
reject some victims from accessing support due to the lack of capacity, 
resources, and space to provide assistance and accommodation. For 
example, during lockdown measures in 2020, government-run shelters 
did not have space to accommodate some trafficking victims due to 
an increase in domestic violence cases, while some shelters stopped 
receiving new cases all together. Experts reported the government did 
not transfer trafficking victims identified at RICs to the mainland for 
victim assistance due to the lack of accommodation and housing. 
The government also required victims to obtain a negative COVID-19 
test before staying at a government-run shelter, but victims lacked 
access to medical services and COVID-19 tests were initially scarce 
and expensive; however, once ONRHT was notified of the need, it 
coordinated with relevant ministries and regional governments to 
ensure identified trafficking victims had access to COVID-19 tests. As 
in previous years, victims in rural areas and islands had little access 
to support services and often were accommodated in police stations, 
hospital wards, or received no assistance. Observers reported a lack 
of specialized shelters for victims with only one NGO-run shelter 
providing specialized assistance for female trafficking victims and 
an NGO-run shelter for sexually exploited men and short-term 
government shelters for asylum-seekers or homeless persons for male 
victims. Government-run shelters, NGO-run shelters, and facilities 
for unaccompanied children accommodated child victims but did 
not provide specialized support. Central and local governments 
maintained cooperation agreements with some NGOs to house, 
protect, and assist vulnerable children, including trafficking victims, 
and allocated buildings to use as shelters. Victims who did not apply 
for official recognition could receive a residence and work permit 
by applying for asylum or for a residence permit on humanitarian 
grounds. The government issued one residence permit (two in 2019) 
and renewed an additional one for a certified victim (13 in 2019); 
the government did not provide statistics on residence permits or 
granting of asylum to victims who lacked official recognition. The 
process to receive residence permits was difficult without an attorney 
and took time. 
There were no reports the government penalized victims for crimes 
traffickers compelled them to commit; however, due to a lack of 
consistent screening efforts for trafficking indicators in migrant 
flows, authorities likely detained some unidentified migrants and 
asylum-seekers. Prosecutors relied heavily on victim testimony 
without corroborating evidence, and court proceedings often lasted 
two to six years, which hindered cooperation from victims and 
key witnesses. The government did not provide funding for travel 
and other expenses for victims to attend court hearings, and some 
suspected traffickers intentionally postponed court appearances to 
increase the chances of victims being unwilling to testify in court and/
or may have paid bribes to repatriated victims to preclude them from 
testifying. The law entitled victims to mental health professionals 
during court proceedings and the use of audiovisual technology 
for remote testimony, but many courts lacked the capabilities to 
deploy these resources. Additionally, some judges did not allow 
remote testimony because they wanted to examine the victim and 
the witnesses in person, even in cases where testimony could cause 
re-traumatization. The law provided for witness protection and 
non-disclosure of the witness’ personal information; however, no 
trafficking victims received full witness protection privileges to date, 
police only escorted victims during trials, and courts revealed victims’ 
identities during proceedings. Judges have never issued restitution 
for victims in criminal proceedings. Greek law entitled victims to file 
civil suits against traffickers for compensation; however, no victims 
to date had filed for or subsequently received compensation from 
their traffickers in part due to their reluctance to wait for the case to 
obtain a decision in a lengthy court process. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. ONRHT 
continued to coordinate government-wide anti-trafficking efforts 
despite lacking sufficient resources. The government continued to 
implement the national action plan (NAP) for 2019-2023, monitored 
anti-trafficking efforts, and made assessments publicly available; 
however, experts reported the government did not allocate sufficient 
resources to anti-trafficking efforts and implementation of the 
NAP. ONRHT, in cooperation with international organizations, 
created awareness campaigns targeting the general public, migrants, 
refugees, local authorities, public institutions, and the private sector. 
ONRHT signed an MOU with two regional governments to strengthen 
cooperation on various anti-trafficking efforts, including preventing 
forced labor in public procurement supply chains. The government 
provided free airtime for public service announcements for NGOs and 
agencies on trafficking issues. Private labor recruitment agencies could 
be subjected to government inspection, but the lack of competent 
staff to conduct such inspections resulted in limited oversight. Labor 
inspectors conducted inspections of businesses and issued fines to 
37 foreign nationals totaling €185,000 ($226,990) for undeclared 
labor-related violations. The government made efforts to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex acts by conducting awareness campaigns. 
The government operated three hotlines, one for female victims of 
violence, one for individuals in vulnerable situations, and another 
for labor infringement and undeclared work complaints; hotlines 
did not receive any calls related to trafficking in 2020. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Greece, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Greece abroad. Traffickers operating in Greece are primarily Greeks 
and other Western and Eastern Europeans, but some are also from 
the Caucasus and Central Asia. Traffickers subject some women 
and children from Eastern and Southern Europe, South and Central 
Asia, Cameroon, China, Georgia, Iraq, Nigeria, and Russia to sex 
trafficking in unlicensed brothels, on the street, in strip clubs, in 
massage salons, and in hotels. Victims of forced labor in Greece are 
primarily children and men from Africa, Eastern Europe, and South 
Asia. Migrant workers from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iran, and 
Pakistan are susceptible to debt bondage, reportedly in agriculture. 
Traffickers force marginalized Romani children from Albania, Bulgaria, 
and Romania to sell goods on the street, beg, or commit petty theft. 
An increase in unaccompanied children has increased the number 
of children susceptible to exploitation. Unaccompanied children, 
primarily from Afghanistan, engage in survival sex and are vulnerable 
to trafficking. Refugee and migrant women, especially those living in 
the island RICs, were highly vulnerable to trafficking. NGOs report 
rapes of migrant women in migrant and refugee camps and allege 
organized criminal groups in camps use tents and shipping containers 
as brothels. Most migrants and asylum-seekers are believed to rely on 
smugglers at some point during their journey and in some instances 






The Government of Guatemala does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Guatemala remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
expanding the jurisdiction of the specialized courts, signing a high-
level trilateral agreement with neighboring countries to combat 
trafficking, assisting and referring more victims to care, and increasing 
funding for government-run shelters and services. However, the 
government did not meet the minimum standards in several key 
areas. The government initiated fewer investigations and prosecutions, 
achieved fewer convictions, and maintained insufficient specialized 
victim services given the scope of the problem. In addition, authorities 
did not increase efforts to combat forced labor, and corruption and 
complicity remained significant concerns. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate cases, prosecute trafficking crimes, and 
convict traffickers with increased focus on suspected cases of forced 
labor. • Increase efforts to proactively look for indicators of forced 
labor, particularly in the agricultural sector and domestic service. • 
Increase funding for and access to victim protection, particularly 
shelters and specialized services, to include vulnerable populations. 
• Investigate and hold government officials criminally accountable 
for complicity in trafficking. • Increase training efforts to identify 
trafficking victims, particularly among vulnerable populations, such 
as working children, returning migrants, individuals in commercial 
sex, and children apprehended for illicit gang-related activities. • 
Improve the monitoring, oversight, and capacity of shelter operations 
for child trafficking victims nationwide to address overcrowding, 
abuse, and neglect. • Given significant concerns about forced labor 
indicators in Cuban medical missions, screen Cuban medical 
professionals and refer them to appropriate services. • Amend the 
2009 anti-trafficking law to include a definition of human trafficking 
consistent with international law. • Increase efforts to investigate, 
prosecute, and convict child sex tourists and others engaged in sex 
trafficking of children. • Expand training for judges and prosecutors 
to include training on the use of forensic and other evidence to 
ensure trafficking cases are investigated and prosecuted as such 
rather than as lesser offenses. • Provide reintegration and witness 
protection support to victims once they leave shelters to prevent 
re-trafficking. • Increase funding for public awareness campaigns. 
• Create a trafficking-specific hotline capable of answering calls in 
Spanish and indigenous languages. 
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. The anti-trafficking 
law of 2009 criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and 
prescribed penalties from eight to 18 years’ imprisonment and a fine. 
These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other serious 
crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent with the definition of trafficking 
under international law, the law did not consider the use of force, 
fraud, or coercion as an essential element of an adult trafficking 
offense. The law defined trafficking broadly to include all labor 
exploitation and illegal adoption without the purpose of exploitation. 
In 2020, the government investigated 165 trafficking complaints, 
compared with 211 in 2019 and 140 in 2018. The Human Rights 
Ombudsman (PDH) reported receiving 16 complaints of potential 
trafficking, which it referred to the Public Ministry (MP), compared 
with 24 complaints in 2019. Authorities prosecuted 37 defendants for 
trafficking crimes, compared with 71 in 2019, 32 in 2018, and 52 in 
2017. Some of these prosecutions may have been for crimes that did 
not meet the definition of trafficking according to international law. 
Authorities noted pandemic-related restrictions hindered prosecutors’ 
ability to collect evidence necessary to bring charges in cases of 
trafficking. In addition, observers indicated prosecutors did not 
utilize the criminal charge of trafficking in some parts of the country, 
which resulted in some suspected trafficking crimes being prosecuted 
as sexual assault. In 2020, authorities secured two convictions for 
trafficking crimes, compared with 25 in 2019 and 22 in 2018. MP 
officials reported traffickers received prison sentences of between 
eight to 13 years and four months and fined of 300,000 quetzals 
($38,560). There were two specialized first instance criminal courts 
to prosecute trafficking-related crimes. In 2020, the government 
expanded these courts to cover five additional departments. The 
Guatemala City court’s jurisdiction included central, eastern, and 
southern departments, and Quetzaltenango’s jurisdiction comprised 
the western departments of Huehuetenango, Quetzaltenango, El 
Quiché, Retalhuleu, Sololá, Suchitepéquez, and Totonicapán. Despite 
these changes, the judicial system continued to be an obstacle in 
seeking justice for trafficking crimes. Prosecutorial investigations 
required approval from a judge and as a result, cases often took 
longer than one year due to the judicial system’s limited capacity, the 
MP’s lack of resources, and the lengthy appeals process that could 
last two to three years. Pandemic-related mitigation measures further 
delayed court cases, despite some courts moving to virtual platforms 
in May 2020. In 2020, judges around the country underwent training 
on handling trafficking crimes; however, judicial officials still had 
difficulty applying a victim-centered approach and understanding 
the elements and indicators of trafficking, labeling many trafficking 
cases as labor exploitation. Some judges, especially outside the major 
urban areas, lacked adequate training to apply forensic evidence in 
prosecutions, which led to cases tried as sexual assault rather than 
trafficking. 
The National Civil Police maintained the Special Directorate for 
Criminal Investigation (DEIC), which had a unit assigned specifically 
to combat trafficking. However, DEIC staff remained in constant 
rotations, which reduced awareness and understanding of trafficking 
investigation protocols. Observers indicated that National Civil Police 
officers across the country had a lack of understanding of human 
trafficking. MP officials noted freedom of movement restrictions 
adopted to mitigate the pandemic hindered law enforcement officials’ 
capacity to investigate cases of trafficking as they were unable to 
travel to remote areas. The government had specialized police and 
prosecutors to handle cases of human trafficking, including forced 
labor, although local experts reported some prosecutors lacked 
adequate training. 
Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained 
significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action during the 
year. Authorities did not have specific measures to deter, prosecute, and 
penalize government complicity in trafficking crimes. The government 
did not provide an update to the 2018 case of two government officials 
charged with trafficking crimes. The government signed a trilateral 
agreement—at the vice-presidential level—with the governments of 
El Salvador and Honduras to strengthen international coordination 
to address trafficking cases. Authorities reported coordinating with 
foreign governments on cases of trafficking but did not provide 
specific details. In 2020, the Secretariat against Sexual Violence, 
Exploitation, and Trafficking in Persons (SVET) organized trafficking-
related training for members of the judicial sector, law enforcement, 
immigration officials, and local leaders in municipal governments, 




to assist in human trafficking investigations. In addition, PDH 
conducted anti-trafficking training for judges in collaboration with 
the judicial studies school. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained protection efforts; while it identified 
fewer victims, the government increased their access to care. Authorities 
identified 439 potential trafficking victims, of which 352 identified as 
female, 78 identified as male, and nine LGBTQI+, compared with 678 
in 2019, 371 in 2018, 316 in 2017, and 484 in 2016. SVET, in close 
coordination with members of the Inter-institutional Commission 
Against Trafficking-in-Persons (CIT), continued to use a national 
database to track trafficking victim information. Of the 439 potential 
victims identified, SVET referred 170 to NGO and government-funded 
shelters and services, compared with 217 in 2019 and 238 in 2018. 
Of those referred, 113 were victims of sexual exploitation, 41 victims 
of forced labor, four victims of forced criminality, two victims of 
domestic servitude, two victims of sex and labor exploitation, and 
two individuals in forced marriage. The remaining eight individuals 
did not appear to be victims of trafficking crimes as defined by 
international law. There were two government-run shelters and four 
main NGO-run shelters that could house trafficking victims. Shelters 
provided differentiated and specialized services and treatment plans 
for trafficking victims as compared with those of sexual exploitation. 
In 2020, authorities reported difficulty placing victims in shelters, 
as there was a reduced number of spaces available in government 
facilities due to social distancing protocols implemented to reduce the 
spread of the COVID-19 virus. In addition, according to sources, some 
judges were hesitant to mandate shelter placement for victims given 
the pressing need to mitigate the spread of the virus by maintaining 
social distancing protocols. The government housed 83 victims (80 
females and three males) in government-run shelters, compared with 
77 victims (74 females and three males) in 2018, and 89 victims 
(82 females and seven males) in 2017. In cooperation with other 
government agencies and NGOs, the government provided services 
to victims such as food, housing, psychological care, health care, 
education, and apprenticeships. Foreign victims had the same access 
to care as domestic trafficking victims. Shelters could also provide 
services and housing to victims with disabilities. 
While authorities made progress to improve specialized victim 
protection, some challenges remained. There were limited options 
for adult victims of trafficking and no services for non-transgender 
adult men. There were limited options for adult victims of trafficking 
and no services—government of NGO-run—for adult men. In 
addition, the government did not provide sufficient long-term care and 
reintegration support to victims, and case follow-up was inadequate. 
The government provided 8.9 million quetzals ($1.15 million) in 
funding in 2020 for government-run shelters and specialized services, 
compared with 7.04 million quetzals ($904,880) in 2019, 19.4 million 
quetzals ($2.49 million) in 2018, and 17.6 million quetzals ($2.26 
million) in 2017. The PDH’s office focused on ensuring the rights 
of trafficking victims were not violated. In 2020, ongoing political 
disputes and congressional attempts to replace the ombudsman 
put its capacity and anti-trafficking activities at risk. Officials had an 
inter-institutional protocol for the screening, protection, and referral 
of trafficking victims. SVET also had a protocol for its Immediate 
Response Team, which had a formal process for identifying, referring, 
and protecting victims in the short-term. In 2019, SVET created new 
protocols for victims of sexual violence, including trafficking: Integral 
First Response Model of Attention for Adult Victims of Violence, 
Sexual Exploitation and Trafficking; Protocol of Action in Temporary 
Specialized Shelter for the Care of Adult Women Migrants Victims of 
the Crime of Trafficking in Persons; and Updated Social Assistance 
Directory containing information about shelters and other social 
welfare organizations in the country. In 2020, SVET and the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs updated the protocols to regulate the safe repatriation 
of victims during the pandemic. However, authorities did not take 
steps to familiarize the interagency on the existence of these protocols 
or train officials on the implementation of these tools. In addition, 
officials did not update the protocols to include thorough screening 
of vulnerable populations. The courts referred child trafficking victims 
to shelters. Officials from the Solicitor General’s Office and National 
Police accompanied child victims to the shelters. The Ministry of 
Development had a care program to support victims, including 
trafficking victims, of sexual violence under 14 years old. In the 
past, some observers noted instances of interagency competition 
and lack of coordination between SVET and the Secretariat of Social 
Welfare (SBS) affected shelter functioning and complicated victim 
care processes. In addition to its help with processing trafficking 
crimes involving children, the Public Ministry’s facility (MAINA) 
could provide specialized services, including medical, psychological, 
socioeconomic, and legal assistance, for child victims of crime, 
including trafficking, sexual violence, and abuse. However, Authorities 
did not report how many victims of trafficking officials assisted at the 
MAINA facility. SVET operated a repurposed and renovated shelter 
in Coban for adult trafficking victims, which included transgender 
women, but the number of victims assisted was unknown. An NGO 
maintained a specialized shelter for unaccompanied migrant children 
that assisted with repatriation, discouraged irregular migration, and 
screened for trafficking. 
Although Guatemalan law required judges to make all referrals to 
public or private shelters, in practice, judges often did not make timely 
referrals, delaying access to needed assistance. Judges at times referred 
child victims to their families, leaving some vulnerable to re-trafficking, 
as family members often were involved in their exploitation. Experts 
noted there was a shortage of shelters for child trafficking victims. 
The government screened returning unaccompanied migrant children 
for trafficking indicators using SBS protocols for the attention and 
reception of such children in two government shelters. Authorities 
reported shelter locations were not disclosed and the shelters had 
basic security protocols to protect victims; however, some observers 
noted some government and private shelters lacked basic security 
features, such as sufficient security cameras and/or security guard 
presence on the shelter compound. The government made efforts 
to improve operations at its shelters, but overall monitoring and 
oversight, especially for facilities serving children, remained weak. 
The government still had not implemented structural changes to 
overhaul the system in the aftermath of the March 2017 fire in an 
overcrowded government-managed shelter, which resulted in the 
deaths of 41 girls and injuries to others. The shelter had previously 
faced allegations of corruption and sexual exploitation and was the 
subject of a UN investigation into the shelter’s management. In 
2019, the Ministry of Labor, National Police, and the MP signed an 
agreement for expanded inter-institutional coordination focused 
on identification and referrals for victims of labor exploitation and 
forced labor but did not report implementing the agreement. 
Authorities encouraged victims to assist in the investigation and 
prosecution of traffickers and made options available for victim 
testimony either via video, in a Gesell Chamber, or from behind a 
partition in the courtroom to protect the victim’s identity and privacy; 
victims could also participate in a witness protection program. The 
two new specialized first instance courts had specialized psychological 
services for victims and procedures to ensure confidentiality for 
victim-witnesses who might be traumatized and/or intimidated to 
testify. The MP employed social workers and psychologists to serve as 
liaisons between the office and victims, accompany victims through 
the proceedings against their traffickers, and assist victims in accessing 
medical services. For the second year in a row, authorities did not 
report how many victims it assisted with these services, compared 
with 270 in 2018. The law required judges to order restitution when 
sentencing traffickers. The government, however, did not report any 
victims as having received restitution from 2017-2020, compared to 
seven victims who received restitution in 2016. The judiciary reported 
judges consistently ordered restitution, but observers reported a 
gap in enforcement of ordered for payments and the inability of 
those convicted to pay restitution. Guatemalan law provided legal 







retribution upon return to their home countries. In 2020, authorities 
updated the inter-institutional protocol for the repatriation of 
trafficking victims to incorporate the safe repatriation of victims 
during the pandemic. Although officials reported repatriating some 
victims to countries not considered to be at high risk for COVID-19, 
it did not indicate how many were repatriated or to where they were 
repatriated. Finding legal employment remained a problem for 
victims, with no specific system or program in place to help victims 
find employment. Civil society expressed concern some adult foreign 
victims chose to leave shelters and return to their home countries 
due to the lengthy investigation processes. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. SVET served as the 
secretariat for CIT, coordinated government efforts against trafficking, 
and implemented the national anti-trafficking action plan for 2018-
2024. In 2020, SVET held virtual meetings and signed 11 inter-
institutional agreements to strengthen collaboration on trafficking 
issues within the country. SVET published its work plans and statistics 
on trafficking cases as well as government responses on its public 
website; SVET and PDH published their annual trafficking reports. 
The MP anti-trafficking unit compiled an assessment of trafficking 
cases over the year. Experts commented SVET had a relatively small 
budget and limited reach, operating primarily in urban areas. SVET 
officials trained 8,959 individuals on trafficking awareness—in 
person and virtually—including children, community leaders, 
teachers, judges, prosecutors, university officials, members of public 
services, and the general population. It held training events in 10 
different languages to reach vulnerable indigenous communities and 
continued to use social media platforms, local radio broadcasts, and 
the internet to raise anti-trafficking awareness. In 2020, the Ministry 
of Labor (MOL), the national police, and SVET formed a new inter-
institutional commission against labor exploitation and child labor. 
The commission operated an online webpage and hotline where 
complaints could be registered. During the reporting period, officials 
reported receiving 30 complaints; however, the commission did not 
report how many were cases of forced labor or if it referred any to 
law enforcement for criminal investigation. In the past, authorities 
reported the MOL faced human and financial resource shortages 
in its ability to conduct labor inspections and identify forced labor 
cases. The pandemic exacerbated existing gaps. MOL officials reported 
being overwhelmed with other responsibilities, such as the number 
of unemployment and worker compensation requests. Officials 
worked with members of the hotel industry to train employees on 
trafficking indicators and increase awareness. The government did 
not have a trafficking-specific hotline but encouraged the public to 
call three hotlines operated by the National Civil Police, the Attorney 
General’s office, and the PDH ombudsman, which operated 24 
hours a day year-round, were available in the Spanish and Mayan 
languages, and accepted reports anonymously. The government did 
not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. 
With the support of a foreign government, authorities hosted an 
international symposium to strengthen regional efforts to combat 
and prevent trafficking in persons. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Guatemala, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Guatemala abroad. Traffickers exploit Guatemalan women, LGBTQI+ 
persons, girls, and boys in sex trafficking within the country and in 
Mexico, the United States, Belize, and other foreign countries. Foreign 
child sex tourists, predominantly from Canada, the United States, 
and Western Europe, as well as Guatemalan men, patronize child 
sex trafficking victims for commercial sex acts. Traffickers exploit 
women and children from other Latin American countries and 
the United States in sex trafficking in Guatemala. The government 
has noted an increasing number of women traffickers. Traffickers 
exploit Guatemalan adults and children in forced labor within the 
country, often in agriculture or domestic service, and in the garment 
industry and domestic service in Mexico, the United States, and other 
countries. Experts identified the coffee, broccoli, sugar, stone quarry, 
and fireworks manufacturing sectors as at risk for the potential use 
of forced child labor. Forced labor in domestic service in Guatemala 
sometimes occurs through forced marriages. Traffickers particularly 
target indigenous Guatemalans, including children, for forced labor, 
including in tortilla-making shops in Guatemala and foreign countries. 
Traffickers exploit Guatemalan children in forced begging, street 
vending, and as street performers, particularly within Guatemala City 
and along the border with Mexico. Child victims’ families are often 
complicit in their exploitation. Criminal organizations, including 
gangs, exploit girls in sex trafficking and coerce young males in 
urban areas to sell or transport drugs or commit extortion. Traffickers 
exploit some Latin American migrants transiting Guatemala en route 
to Mexico and the United States in sex trafficking or forced labor in 
Mexico, the United States, or Guatemala. Children were increasingly 
vulnerable to trafficking as online recruitment increased due to 
pandemic-related lockdowns and school closures. Traffickers have 
exploited victims in migrant shelters. Authorities have investigated 
police, military, and elected officials for paying children for sex acts, 
facilitating child sex trafficking, or protecting venues where trafficking 
occurs. In 2020, authorities reported there were 432 Cuban medical 
workers in the country; these individuals may have been forced to 
work by the Cuban government.
GUINEA: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Guinea does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included prosecuting and convicting more 
traffickers and identifying more victims. The government approved 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) for victim identification and 
allocated resources to the anti-trafficking committee (CNLTPPA) 
for the first time in five years. However, the government did not 
demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared to the previous 
reporting period, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity. Shelter services for victims 
remained insufficient, and the government did not support NGOs 
providing care to victims. The government did not provide sufficient 
funding to the Office for the Protection of Gender, Children, and 
Morals (OPROGEM), the police unit responsible for trafficking 
investigations. Despite the prevalence of forced child begging in 
Quranic schools, Guinean authorities have never prosecuted a 
Quranic teacher for forced begging. Therefore Guinea remained on 
Tier 2 Watch List for the second consecutive year.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict suspected 
traffickers, including corrupt Quranic teachers and complicit officials, 
and sentence convicted traffickers to significant prison terms. • 
Amend the penal code to remove sentencing provisions that allow 
fines in lieu of imprisonment and ensure penalties prescribed for 
forced begging are commensurate with those prescribed for other 
serious crimes. • Significantly increase efforts to identify trafficking 
victims among vulnerable populations, including children in Quranic 
schools, workers in artisanal mining sites, women traveling to the 
Middle East in potential fraudulent recruitment schemes, Cuban 
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medical professionals, and North Korean workers, and refer victims 
to appropriate services. • Allocate dedicated funding to OPROGEM 
to enable criminal investigations. • Increase funding and in-kind 
support for NGOs to ensure all identified victims receive services. • 
Train law enforcement and service providers on standard procedures 
to identify trafficking victims and refer them to services. • Provide 
OPROGEM and labor inspectors the resources and training necessary 
to monitor recruitment agencies and investigate forced labor cases. 
• Establish a uniform and comprehensive data collection system on 
anti-trafficking efforts, distinguishing human trafficking from other 
crimes. • Increase efforts to raise public awareness of trafficking, 
including internal trafficking, child forced labor, and forced begging in 
Quranic schools. • Strengthen the CNLTPPA’s authority to implement 
anti-trafficking policy and coordinate activities and information 
sharing among agencies conducting anti-trafficking work. • Develop 
and implement extradition agreements for traffickers with countries 
in Africa and the Middle East. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained mixed anti-trafficking law enforcement 
efforts. Article 323 and 324 of the penal code criminalized sex 
trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of three to 
seven years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both for trafficking offenses 
involving an adult victim, and five to 10 years’ imprisonment, a 
fine, or both for those involving a child victim. These penalties 
were sufficiently stringent; however, by allowing for a fine in lieu of 
imprisonment, the penalties for sex trafficking were not commensurate 
with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Under 
Article 893 and 894 of the revised children’s code, which came 
into effect in March 2020, child trafficking crimes were prescribed 
penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 50 million 
to 100 million Guinean francs ($5,010-$10,010); these penalties were 
commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as 
rape. Article 343 of the penal code separately criminalized forced 
begging and prescribed penalties of one to three years’ imprisonment 
and a fine; these penalties were not sufficiently stringent. 
The gendarmes and OPROGEM were the lead government entities 
responsible for investigating trafficking cases, and the General 
Secretary for Special Services, Counter-Narcotics, and Combating 
Organized Crime could investigate transnational trafficking cases. 
Designated magistrates in the Ministry of Justice prosecuted trafficking 
cases. The government did not report comprehensive law enforcement 
data, and due to poor record keeping and the conflation of trafficking 
with other crimes, law enforcement data on trafficking cases likely 
included smuggling or child labor cases. In 2020, with data from 33 
prefectures and one special zone, the government reported at least one 
investigation, prosecutions of 45 defendants, and convictions of 20 
defendants. Authorities also investigated seven pimping cases and 22 
cases of soliciting a minor. This compared with three investigations, 
three prosecutions, and zero convictions reported in 2019 with data 
from five prefectures. Despite the prevalence of Guinean children 
exploited in forced begging in Quranic schools in Guinea and 
surrounding countries, the government has never prosecuted a 
corrupt Quranic teacher for child forced begging. An NGO reported 
magistrates, who did not understand the serious nature of trafficking, 
often refused to sentence convicted traffickers to prison terms. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking 
crimes; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking 
crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement 
action during the year. Although not explicitly reported as human 
trafficking, the UN initiated an investigation of one Guinean police 
officer serving in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) for 
alleged sexual exploitation in an incident from 2019 with trafficking 
indicators; the government did not report initiating an investigation 
or taking any actions regarding the incident during the reporting 
period. The government did not report whether it continued an 
investigation initiated in 2017 of three airport officials who were 
reportedly complicit in the sex trafficking of Guinean women in 
transit to Kuwait. The lack of extradition agreements with countries 
in Africa and the Middle East impeded prosecutions of traffickers 
from those countries. 
The government did not provide sufficient resources to OPROGEM, 
thereby continuing to inhibit its ability to investigate potential 
trafficking crimes; the government has not dedicated a budget to 
OPROGEM since 2016. Officials reported a lack of general knowledge 
about trafficking and trafficking provisions under the 2016 penal 
code persisted among government officials, especially judges and 
prosecutors in lower courts. The government rarely provided anti-
trafficking training to law enforcement and judicial officials working 
outside of the capital and did not report training incoming prosecutors 
or judges on trafficking. The CNLTPPA, in partnership with an 
international organization and a foreign donor, developed a training 
curriculum on victim identification for airport officers and trained 
30 airport officials during the reporting period. The Ministry of 
Security included anti-trafficking training, developed in coordination 
with a foreign donor and an international organization, in the core 
curriculum of Guinea’s two national police academies. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained insufficient protection efforts, but 
increased efforts to identify victims. Lack of training and coordination 
between ministries, as well as inconsistent and sometimes unavailable 
government services, continued to inhibit victim identification 
and assistance efforts. The government reported identifying 212 
trafficking victims and 62 potential trafficking victims. Of the 212 
victims, the CNLTPPA and National Union for Domestic Workers 
identified 200 forced labor victims, including 80 children, exploited 
in domestic servitude; authorities identified 12 children exploited in 
sex trafficking. This was a significant increase after identifying eight 
trafficking victims and 29 potential child trafficking victims during 
the previous reporting period. The government did not report how 
many of the victims, if any, it referred to care. The CNLTPPA approved 
SOPs for victim identification and referral to services, developed in 
collaboration with an international organization; the government 
distributed written materials and trained 28 government officials and 
civil society stakeholders on the SOPs in September 2020. 
The government continued to rely on NGOs and foreign donors to 
provide and finance the majority of victim care. However, NGOs 
lacked adequate resources for victim services, and observers reported 
there were not enough shelters to support victims. An NGO that 
provided care to child trafficking victims and closed its last two shelters 
during the previous reporting period due to lack of funding did not 
reopen any shelters during the reporting period. An international 
organization-funded transit center for returning migrants was the 
only available shelter to host trafficking victims at the end of the 
reporting period; the government did not report providing support 
for this shelter or referring victims to the shelter. Government health 
facilities and social workers could provide medical and psycho-
social services. The government, with a foreign donor, operated 
one reception center for child trafficking victims; the center could 
provide emergency and short-term services before referring children 
for long-term care. NGOs reported law enforcement referred child 
trafficking victims to NGOs on an ad hoc basis. If NGO shelters were 
unavailable, the Ministry of Social Action could place victims with 
host families. The government and an NGO provided employment 
assistance to 40 trafficking victims during the reporting period.
The government did not have a formal policy to encourage victims 
to assist in investigations and prosecutions against their alleged 
traffickers. Reports indicated victims and their parents were reluctant 
to file claims against traffickers due to a lack of confidence in the 
judicial system. Judges could allow victims to provide testimony 
via video or written statements; however, no victims reportedly 
did so during the reporting period. The government partnered 





child trafficking victims but did not report providing assistance to 
any victims during the reporting period. NGOs operated general 
legal clinics to advise women and child victims of crime, including 
trafficking. Officials reported victims underutilized the legal clinics 
due to lack of awareness; in response, the CNLTPPA and an NGO 
conducted an outreach campaign to increase awareness of the 
program. Neither the government nor NGOs offered legal assistance 
to male victims. The 2016 penal code allowed NGOs to become 
plaintiffs on behalf of victims; the government did not report if 
NGOs utilized this provision during the reporting period. Victims 
could legally obtain restitution from the government; in one case, 
the court awarded restitution to one child trafficking victim’s parents 
during the reporting period. Victims could file civil suits against their 
traffickers; however, no victims pursued this option, largely due to 
lack of awareness. The government did not have formal policies to 
provide temporary or permanent residence to victims from countries 
where, if repatriated, they would face hardship or retribution, but 
could provide work and residency permits to victims on an ad hoc 
basis; ECOWAS nationals did not require special status to remain 
in Guinea. The government did not report any victims requested 
these services during the reporting period. There were no reports 
the government detained, fined, or jailed victims for unlawful acts 
traffickers compelled them to commit; however, due to weak victim 
identification, authorities may have detained some victims.
PREVENTION
The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking. The CNLTPPA 
adopted a new 2020-2022 anti-trafficking national action plan (NAP). 
The government allocated 2 billion Guinean francs ($200,200) over 
two years to the CNLTPPA for implementation of the NAP, as well as 
an additional 500 million Guinean francs ($50,050) for operational 
expenses, for the first time in five years. Despite this, a lack of 
personnel and coordination, social unrest, and the pandemic hindered 
the government’s efforts to combat trafficking, conduct trainings, and 
hold public awareness raising events during the reporting period. 
Observers noted the CNLTPPA, led by the Ministry of Social Action 
and the Promotion of Women and Children’s Judicial Counselor, 
lacked authority to effectively implement anti-trafficking policy 
and coordinate government activities. The CNLTPPA held quarterly 
meetings and, in partnership with civil society and foreign donors, 
organized several awareness campaigns on trafficking prevention. In 
addition, NGOs trained 25 journalists on reporting and sensitizing 
the public on trafficking issues. The government operated a toll-free 
hotline to report violence against women and children, which could 
include trafficking cases; the hotline received 2,196 calls during the 
reporting period, but the government did not report identifying any 
trafficking victims or initiating any investigations as a result. The 
government had policies to regulate foreign labor recruiters and 
hold them civilly and criminally liable for fraudulent recruitment; 
however, neither OPROGEM nor the Ministry of Labor had the 
resources or the trained personnel to monitor and enforce these 
policies consistently and did not report referring any potential cases 
for investigation. The government did not report making efforts 
to address forced begging of Guinean boys in Quranic schools in 
neighboring West African countries, nor did it report if the Ministry 
of Social Action continued coordinating interagency border control 
units to ensure children crossing international borders were traveling 
with their families. The government did not make efforts to reduce 
the demand for commercial sex acts. The government did not report 
providing anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel. 
The government provided human rights training, including anti-
trafficking training, to its troops prior to their deployment as 
peacekeepers; international and Guinean officials provided this 
training to 698 Guinean MINUSMA personnel to date. Although not 
explicitly reported as human trafficking, there was one open case of 
alleged sexual exploitation with trafficking indicators by a Guinean 
peacekeeper deployed to the UN peacekeeping mission in DRC in 
2019; the UN investigation of the incident remained pending at the 
end of the reporting period.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Guinea, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Guinea abroad. Most identified victims were women and children. 
Traffickers exploit boys in forced labor in begging, street vending, 
shoe shining, mining for gold and diamonds, herding, fishing, 
and agriculture, including in farming and on coffee, cashew, and 
cocoa plantations. Some government entities and NGOs allege that 
within Guinea, forced labor is most prevalent in the mining sector. 
Traffickers exploit adults and children in forced labor in agriculture. 
Reports indicate children are sent to the coastal region of Boke for 
forced labor on farms. Children from villages in Middle and Upper 
Guinea may be more vulnerable to trafficking due to the region’s lack 
of schools and economic opportunities. Due to pandemic-related 
economic disruptions in the informal sector and school closures, 
observers reported an increase in Guinean adults and children 
seeking employment in artisanal gold mines and, subsequently, being 
exploited in forced labor and sex trafficking. Government officials 
recognize the town of Koundara in northwestern Guinea as a transit 
point for traffickers. Traffickers, often distant relatives, promise to 
care for or provide an education to poorer relatives’ children and, 
instead, exploit them in domestic servitude or forced begging. Some 
corrupt Quranic teachers force boys attending Quranic schools to 
beg. Some traffickers take children with parents’ consent or under the 
false pretenses of providing an education and exploit them in forced 
begging in Quranic schools in Senegal—via Koundara—Mauritania, 
and Guinea-Bissau, or forced labor in West African gold mines. During 
the reporting period, NGOs alleged organized networks exploited 
children in forced begging. Traffickers exploit Guinean children in 
forced labor in Cote d’Ivoire. Guinea is a transit country for West 
African children subjected to forced labor in gold mining throughout 
the region. A small number of girls from West African countries 
migrate to Guinea, where traffickers exploit them in domestic service, 
street vending, and—to a lesser extent—sex trafficking. Child sex 
trafficking is prevalent in Conakry and in mining cities such as 
Kamsar, Lero, and Siguiri. North Koreans working in the mining, 
construction, fishing, and health sectors and in commercial sex may 
have been forced to work by the North Korean government. Cuban 
medical professionals working in Guinea may have been forced to 
work by the Cuban government. Guinean authorities alleged traffickers 
coerce Chinese women into commercial sex in Chinese-owned bars 
and restaurants in Conakry. 
Traffickers exploit Guinean women and girls in forced labor for 
domestic service and sex trafficking in West Africa, Europe, and the 
Middle East, as well as the United States. Guinean-Egyptian trafficking 
networks fraudulently recruit women for domestic work in Egypt 
and exploit them in commercial sex. Irregular migrants traveling 
to Europe are vulnerable to trafficking networks facilitating travel 
by land from Guinea to North Africa, and subsequently exploiting 
migrants in forced labor or sex trafficking. In a previous reporting 
period, an international organization estimated approximately 1,040 
Guineas were victims of trafficking in North Africa. Reports indicate 
trafficking networks fraudulently recruit Guinean, Liberian, and 
Sierra Leonean women for work abroad, using the Conakry airport 
to transport victims to exploitative situations in Kuwait and Qatar; 
an international organization reported an increase in fraudulent 
recruitment for forced labor in domestic service in the Middle East, 
especially Egypt and Kuwait. There have been reports some Guinean 
men marry Guinean girls, take them to Angola, and sell the girls to 
local brothels, while the men work in diamond mines. In previous 
years, authorities identified Guinean forced labor victims in Finland. 
Sex traffickers have exploited Thai and Chinese women in Guinea. 
GUINEA
264
GUINEA-BISSAU: TIER 3 
The Government of Guinea-Bissau does not fully meet the 
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not 
making significant efforts to do so, even considering the impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Guinea-Bissau was downgraded to Tier 3. Despite the lack 
of significant efforts, the government took some steps to address 
trafficking, including initiating more investigations and continuing 
to identify child forced begging victims. However, the government 
has never convicted a trafficker, and authorities did not prosecute any 
alleged traffickers for the second consecutive year. The government 
did not have formal procedures to identify victims and refer them 
to care, while draft victim identification procedures and a national 
referral mechanism begun in previous reporting periods remained 
unfinished. The government continued to lack resources and political 
will to comprehensively combat human trafficking.
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2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, 
including corrupt Quranic teachers who subject boys to forced 
begging and hotel staff who facilitate child sex tourism in the Bijagos; 
sentence convicted traffickers to adequate penalties, which should 
involve significant prison terms prescribed in the law. • Cease using 
extra-judicial or administrative remedies to resolve human trafficking 
cases. • Hold government officials accountable for trafficking-related 
complicity, including failure to investigate alleged trafficking offenses 
and interference in ongoing investigations. • Provide resources to 
the Judicial Police to expand its area of operation, such as in the 
Bijagos and Catió, and enable criminal investigations. • Develop 
and train law enforcement on standard procedures to identify and 
refer trafficking victims to services. • Train officials—including local 
police, the National Guard, and judicial officials—on the 2011 
anti-trafficking law and procedures to refer trafficking cases to the 
Judicial Police. • Increase funding and in-kind support for NGOs 
to ensure all identified victims—especially child victims of forced 
begging—receive services and foreign victims are safely repatriated 
to minimize the potential for re-trafficking. • Allocate sufficient 
financial and in-kind resources to implement the anti-trafficking 
national action plan and hold regular anti-trafficking committee 
meetings. • Increase efforts to coordinate repatriation of trafficking 
victims with the Government of Senegal and effectively monitor 
the return and reintegration of victims, especially child victims. • 
Significantly increase efforts to raise public awareness of human 
trafficking, especially forced begging and child sex trafficking. • In 
collaboration with NGOs, allocate adequate space and facilities for 
a victim shelter in Bissau and expand shelter services for adults. • 
Strengthen international law enforcement cooperation to prevent 
and investigate cases of child sex tourism.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained inadequate law enforcement efforts. 
Public Law 12/2011 criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed penalties of three to 15 years’ imprisonment and the 
confiscation of any proceeds from the crime. These penalties were 
sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate 
with penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. In 
February 2019, the government drafted amendments to the Code of 
Child Protection that would harmonize it with international laws 
on human trafficking, but the legislature had not yet adopted the 
amendments by the end of the reporting period. 
The government investigated 34 trafficking cases during the reporting 
period, including eight forced begging and 26 sex trafficking cases. 
This compared with investigating nine cases of child forced begging 
during the previous reporting period. The government did not report 
any prosecutions for the second consecutive year. The government 
has never convicted a trafficker under the anti-trafficking law. During 
the previous reporting period, the Judicial Police cooperated with 
the Government of Morocco to investigate a case of fraudulent 
recruitment for forced labor in domestic service after Moroccan 
authorities identified two Bissau-Guinean women in Morocco; the 
government did not report continuing this investigation during the 
reporting period. The government did not report any investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government officials complicit in 
human trafficking crimes; however, official corruption and complicity 
in trafficking remained concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action 
during the year. Guinea-Bissau’s judicial system lacked sufficient 
human and physical capital to function effectively, and corruption 
remained pervasive. The government did not demonstrate political 
will at the highest levels of government to address trafficking. 
The Judicial Police had a specialized unit that investigated trafficking 
cases; however, it did not have nationwide coverage or a dedicated 
budget. The police, National Guard, judiciary, and prosecutors 
all suffered from a chronic lack of funding, which hindered their 
efforts to combat human trafficking. The Judicial Police were largely 
absent outside the capital. The National Guard and local police in 
rural areas had neither the training nor the capacity to investigate 
trafficking crimes and did not always refer such cases to the Judicial 
Police, which impeded investigations into forced child begging in 
eastern regions and child sex trafficking in the Bijagos. Police and 
judges often resolved intra-familial labor and abuse cases—which 
could include forced child labor and child sex trafficking by family 
members—through non-judicial means or tried them as domestic 
violence cases. When parents broke non-judicial agreements and 
police transferred the cases to court, officials noted community leaders 
often pressured courts to drop the cases. Due to pandemic-related 
gathering restrictions, the government did not provide anti-trafficking 
training to law enforcement or judicial officials during the reporting 
period, and some law enforcement and judicial officials remained 
unaware of the 2011 anti-trafficking law. During the previous reporting 
period, the government supported an international organization 
in training police officers and civil society actors on the 2011 anti-
trafficking law, national referral mechanisms, trauma-informed care, 
and data management. 
PROTECTION
The government decreased already insufficient efforts to identify and 
protect victims. The government identified and referred to care 75 
child forced begging victims and 24 child forced marriage victims, 
including potential trafficking victims. This compared with identifying 
and referring to care 158 child forced labor and child forced begging 
victims and 22 forced marriage victims during the previous reporting 
period. In addition, an NGO reported assisting 65 vulnerable children, 
including potential trafficking victims. The government did not have 
formal procedures to identify trafficking victims or refer them to care; 
draft victim identification procedures written in a previous reporting 
period with the assistance of an international organization remained 
unfinished. During the reporting period, the Institute for Women and 
Children (IMC) began implementing a victim identification form 
developed with an international organization. High illiteracy rates, 
including among security services, hampered the government’s ability 
to develop and implement written victim identification procedures. 
The government did not implement the national referral mechanism 
adopted in the previous reporting period, which was developed with 
funding from a foreign donor and the assistance of local facilitators. 









services among various entities; however, it had no operating budget 
or vehicles. The government did not have a specific fund for victim 
services and relied on international organizations and local NGOs 
to provide nearly all victim services; these NGOs subsequently 
relied on international donors for funding. The government did not 
provide financial or in-kind assistance to NGOs providing assistance 
to trafficking victims for the second consecutive year. Three NGO 
shelters were accessible to child trafficking victims but were severely 
overcrowded and underfunded; one was unable to receive victims 
due to a lack of funding, and some shelter volunteers used their 
own homes to house victims temporarily. Shelter was only available 
for child victims, and only one NGO shelter provided trafficking-
specific services. 
The government did not have formal procedures to encourage 
victims to participate in investigations or prosecutions against their 
traffickers. Victims could not obtain restitution or file civil suits against 
their traffickers. The government did not provide legal alternatives 
to the removal of foreign victims to countries where they may face 
hardship or retribution. There were no reports the government 
detained or otherwise penalized trafficking victims for unlawful 
acts traffickers compelled them to commit; however, due to a lack of 
formal identification procedures, some victims may have remained 
unidentified within the law enforcement system. The government 
collaborated with the Senegalese government to repatriate 18 child 
trafficking victims from Senegal. However, observers noted that more 
coordination was needed between the Governments of Guinea-Bissau 
and Senegal in repatriating child forced begging victims.
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The inter-
ministerial committee—led by the IMC and including government 
agencies, NGOs, and religious groups—met seven times during 
the reporting period, compared with four meetings held during 
the previous reporting period. However, the committee lacked 
funding for anti-trafficking activities, which weakened its capacity 
to respond to trafficking and coordinate national anti-trafficking 
efforts. The government adopted a new national action plan to 
address human trafficking but did not report allocating any resources 
to its implementation. NGOs and the National Guard sometimes 
duplicated efforts due to lack of communication and coordination 
between government and civil society actors. The government did not 
report conducting awareness campaigns during the reporting period. 
IMC and the Ministry of Tourism maintained a code of conduct 
against sexual exploitation in the tourism sector in the Bijagos islands, 
Bubaque, Sao Domingos, and Bissau. The code included provisions 
for raising public awareness of child sex trafficking and increasing 
awareness of hotel workers and tourism labor inspectors to combat 
these crimes; although the code remained in effect, the government 
did not report conducting any of the activities described during the 
reporting period, in part due to the pandemic’s impact on the tourism 
sector and gathering restrictions. The labor inspectorate, housed within 
the Ministry of Labor, Civil Service and Public Administration, lacked 
funding, personnel, material resources, and training to investigate 
forced labor nationwide. The government did not have the means 
to inspect local daaras (Quranic schools) to ensure they did not 
force children to beg. Domestic workers were not covered by labor 
laws, which left them vulnerable to trafficking; amendments to the 
labor code that would extend protections to domestic workers have 
been pending in the national assembly since 2015. The government 
began issuing birth registrations to all trafficking victims and child 
victims’ parents. The government did not make efforts to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex acts. The government did not provide 
anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Guinea-Bissau, and traffickers exploit victims 
from Guinea-Bissau abroad. Many Bissau-Guinean boys attend 
Quranic schools led by corrupt Quranic teachers. Some exploitative 
Quranic teachers force or coerce their students, called talibés, to beg 
and do not provide an education, including at some schools in 
Bissau’s Afia neighborhood. The traffickers are principally men from 
the Bafata and Gabu regions—often former talibés or men who claim 
to be working for a Quranic teacher—and are generally well-known 
within the communities in which they operate. Corrupt Quranic 
teachers increasingly force Guinean, Gambian, and Sierra Leonean 
boys to beg in Bissau and exploit Guinea-Bissau’s weak institutions 
and porous borders to transport large numbers of Bissau-Guinean 
boys to Senegal—and to a lesser extent Mali, Guinea, and The 
Gambia—for forced begging in exploitative daaras. 
Traffickers force Bissau-Guinean boys into street vending and forced 
labor in the agricultural and mining sectors in Senegal, especially in 
the southern cities of Kolda and Ziguinchor. Traffickers force West 
African boys to harvest cashews during Guinea-Bissau’s annual 
harvest, and some boys recruited for work in the harvest are then 
forced to beg. Traffickers exploit some Guinean boys for forced 
labor in shoe shining in Guinea-Bissau. Traffickers exploit Bissau-
Guinean girls in sex trafficking and forced labor in street vending 
and domestic work in Guinea, The Gambia, and Senegal, as well 
as in Spain. Senegalese trafficking networks recruit Bissau-Guinean 
girls for modeling jobs or traveling football clubs but subject them 
to sex trafficking. Bissau-Guinean girls are exploited in domestic 
servitude and in sex trafficking in bars, nightclubs, and hotels in 
Bissau. Bissau-Guinean girls from the Bijagos—and to a lesser extent 
mainland girls and boys—are exploited in child sex tourism in the 
Bijagos, an archipelago off the coast of Guinea-Bissau that is far from 
the mainland and largely devoid of government and law enforcement 
presence. Although the extent of child sex tourism is unknown, it 
is widely acknowledged among civil society, NGOs, and mid-level 
government officials. In most cases, French nationals own hotels 
on the islands and use Bissau-Guinean intermediaries to exploit 
island girls 13-17 years old for French and Belgian child sex tourists. 
International sources report these same hotel owners provide jobs 
and significant support to the island community, wielding influence 
that can deter victims from notifying law enforcement. Some families 
may encourage their children to endure such exploitation for financial 
gain. Bissau-Guinean men from the mainland fuel local demand for 
commercial sex on the islands. During previous reporting periods, 
there were reports of official complicity in human trafficking among 
island officials and in the judiciary. According to an international 
organization, Guinea-Bissau’s birth registration rate is less than 25 
percent, increasing vulnerability to trafficking, especially among 
children. Cuban nationals working in Guinea-Bissau on medical 
missions may have been forced to work by the Cuban government; 
however, the doctors left the country in November 2020. 
GUYANA: TIER 1
The Government of Guyana fully meets the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking. Despite the documented impact 
of the pandemic on the government’s anti-trafficking capacity, 
the government continued to demonstrate serious and sustained 
efforts during the reporting period; therefore Guyana remained on 
Tier 1. These efforts included increasing investigations, identifying 
and assisting more victims, creating the first anti-trafficking hotline 
in Spanish, opening an additional shelter, and creating standard 
operating procedures for victim identification. Although the 
government meets the minimum standards, it did not prosecute as 
many traffickers or provide adequate screening and shelter for child 
and male victims; it also lacked capacity and training to identify and 










2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Increase prosecutions and convictions in sex and labor trafficking 
cases and pursue them under the 2005 TIP Act, including for those 
cases involving child victims. • Investigate trafficking cases in remote 
regions of the country. • Fund specialized victim services, particularly 
for child, adult male, and Venezuelan victims in their native language. 
• Reduce delays in court proceedings and pretrial detention of 
suspects. • Monitor the working conditions of Cuban medical 
workers, proactively screen participants for trafficking indicators, and 
protect trafficking victims identified. • Hold convicted traffickers, 
including complicit public officials, accountable by imposing strong 
sentences. • Prohibit recruitment and placement fees charged to 
workers. • Develop standard trauma-informed victim identification 
and referral procedures and train law enforcement officials and 
front-line responders in their use. • Renew implementation of a data-
sharing system in coordination with an international organization. 
• Complete a training manual for diplomats.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained minimal law enforcement efforts. The 
Combating Trafficking of Persons Act of 2005 (Act) criminalized 
sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of 
three years to life imprisonment. These penalties were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. In 2020, authorities 
reported 31 new investigations (23 for sex trafficking and eight for 
labor trafficking), compared to 27 in 2019 and 30 in 2018. The 
government reported continuing one labor trafficking investigation 
from the previous reporting period. The government reported one 
new prosecution for sex trafficking in 2020, compared with three 
prosecutions in 2019 and 11 in 2018. The prosecution was for one 
case of solicitation of trafficking victims. Prosecutions continued 
against two defendants in previously initiated cases. Authorities 
convicted one trafficker during the reporting period, compared with 
one in 2019 and one in 2018. In February 2021, a non-Guyanese 
was convicted of trafficking a Venezuelan woman for sex, following 
charges brought in June 2020. The punishment included four years 
imprisonment, which excluded time spent on remand, and payment 
of 1 million Guyanese dollars (GYD) ($4,650) in restitution to the 
survivor. The government did not report on the appeal of a former 
police officer convicted of sex trafficking and released on bail in 
2016; the appeal was still pending at the end of the reporting period. 
Limited human and financial resources, in part due to the pandemic, 
hindered the government’s ability to identify and investigate trafficking 
cases in the country’s remote regions. The Guyana Police Force (GPF) 
Counter-Trafficking Unit did not have a fixed, discrete budget. Two 
key entities prosecuted criminal matters in Guyana: the office of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) prosecuted felonies such as 
murder and rape at High Court trials, and the Guyana Police Force 
(GPF) prosecution unit prosecuted hybrid offenses, including human 
trafficking in the Magistrates Court. Police prosecutors were not 
licensed attorneys, but some had law degrees and received specialized 
training in legal procedure. GPF prosecutors were advised to request 
the advice and guidance of the DPP to strengthen cases for prosecution 
before initiating legal proceedings, but the government reported this 
was not often done. The government reported deficiencies in police 
trafficking investigative skills and that victims were often unwilling 
to testify against traffickers out of fear or due to financial incentives; 
the Act required witness testimony of victims in order to prosecute. 
The government reported both of these factors contributed to the low 
prosecution rate. The judicial process remained slow, with human 
trafficking and other major criminal trials taking an average of two 
years and up to three years to complete due to shortages of trained 
court personnel, postponements at the request of the defense or 
prosecution, allegations of bribery, poor case tracking, and delays in 
preparing cases for trial. The government did not have a specialized 
trafficking court. The government reported both virtual and in-person 
hearings took place during the pandemic and it was able to handle 
a normal caseload, but courts did not have trials and sat only for 
guilty pleas or to accept new cases. The government funded training 
for 144 police, investigators, probation officers, and prosecutors on 
trafficking, trauma-informed investigations, and prosecution. The 
government did not report any new investigations, prosecutions, 
or convictions of government employees complicit in trafficking 
offenses. The government reported cooperation and information 
sharing on trafficking cases with CARICOM, INTERPOL, and the 
Response for Venezuela Coordinating Group. 
PROTECTION
The government increased protection efforts. In 2020, the government 
identified 199 victims and NGOs an additional five victims (127 
sex trafficking victims and 77 labor trafficking victims), a significant 
increase from 102 victims identified by the government and three 
additional victims identified by an international organization in 
2019. Of the 204 victims, 127 were Venezuelan, 27 Haitian, 24 
Dominican, 22 Guyanese, three Jamaican, and one Cuban. Of these, 
151 were female and 53 male, with ten of them being children. The 
Ministry of Human Services and Social Security’s (MHSSS’s) Counter-
Trafficking (C-TIP) Unit identified victims and provided social 
welfare and assistance to victims. In fiscal year 2020, the government 
reported that the C-TIP Unit received a budgetary allocation of 25.86 
million GYD ($120,270) and in fiscal year 2021, 37.67 million GYD 
($175,230). In cooperation with an international organization and 
a foreign donor, authorities developed but did not yet implement 
standard operating procedures for victim identification pending an 
additional government review. 
During the reporting period, the government referred 100 victims 
to shelter or protective services, compared with 99 victims in 2019. 
Authorities opened a new shelter for trafficking victims in a rural 
district, bringing the total number of government-operated shelters 
offering specialized care, including food, training, translation, legal 
services, medical services, and psychological therapy, for trafficking 
victims to five. The government also provided 62.35 million GYD 
($290,000) in 2020 to two NGO-managed shelters providing housing 
for adult female victims of gender-based violence and human 
trafficking, an increase from 2.35 million GYD ($10,930) in 2019. The 
NGO shelters provided victims with the same range of services as the 
government-operated shelters. The government provided 4.52 million 
GYD ($21,000) in direct financial assistance to victims who chose 
not to stay in a shelter, an increase from 2 million GYD ($9,300) last 
year. Authorities also provided counseling and other humanitarian 
assistance to 125 victims who opted not to access shelter services. 
Humanitarian assistance included food, clothing, translation, and 
immediate medical services. The government provided a total of 226 
victims with some form of assistance during the reporting period. 
The government reported shelter care was voluntary; victims could 
leave shelters at will and choose between shelter options, although 
shelters had curfews and occasionally measures were necessary to 
prevent victims from giving out shelter locations. Shelter services 
were not time limited and the government reported some victims 
staying up to 24 months at the shelters. Foreign and Guyanese 
victims received the same access to care and assistance. There were 
inadequate trafficking shelters for male or child trafficking victims 
and few employed trauma-trained staff. For child victims, the MHSSS 
provided intake counseling and then placed them either in a shelter 
co-managed with NGOs, which also could attend to adult victims in 
special circumstances, or in children’s homes the government owned 





reintegrated them with their families, while authorities placed adult 
male victims at non-specialized night shelters on an ad hoc basis. 
According to authorities, law enforcement officials and social workers 
screened all individuals for indicators of human trafficking during 
raids for commercial sex violations and victims identified during 
such operations were not arrested. By the end of the reporting 
period, the government had not renewed a data sharing agreement 
with an international organization to collect data from vulnerable 
populations, including migrants. Victim assistance remained a 
serious concern in areas outside the capital and for Venezuelan, 
child, and male victims. In some instances, officials did not screen 
for trafficking indicators among vulnerable populations, including 
Venezuelans, those working in the mining sector, and Cuban medical 
professionals working in the country. In February 2021, the GPF 
inadvertently publicly identified a potential trafficking victim and 
a witness; the MHSSS subsequently reprimanded the GPF and the 
GPF opened a criminal investigation. Courts ordered some human 
trafficking hearings or trials to be partially closed to the public in 
order to protect victims’ privacy and identities, and the government 
strongly advised the media to avoid taking photos of victims. The 
MoSP funded transportation costs and police escorts for victims 
staying outside a shelter who were willing to attend court proceedings. 
A victim provided testimony via video during the reporting period; 
authorities also permitted recorded statements. The government 
reported the quality of saved video recordings was generally poor 
and often compromised the viability of video evidence in trafficking 
prosecutions. Authorities allowed victims to obtain other employment 
or to leave the country pending trial proceedings and offered them 
psychological therapy before and after trial proceedings to help 
prevent re-traumatization. The government reported the appeal of 
a 2017 case in which the government required the trafficker to pay 
restitution without imprisonment, a penalty inconsistent with the 
law, was still pending at the end of the reporting period. Authorities 
offered deportation relief to 10 non-Venezuelan foreign victims, 
significantly fewer than the 135 foreign victims in 2019. Deportation 
relief allowed a victim to remain in Guyana regardless of being in 
breach of immigration laws; Venezuelans have been allowed to 
remain automatically since 2018. The government was authorized 
to grant foreign victims temporary residence status and work permits 
but received no such requests during the reporting period. Foreign 
victims received services irrespective of their cooperation with law 
enforcement, their participation in a trial, or whether their trafficker 
was convicted. The government regularly screened foreign potential 
victims for trafficking indicators before deportation. The government 
funded training for 168 MHSSS, labor, compliance, and forestry 
officials on victim identification and referral.
PREVENTION
The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking. The Ministerial 
Taskforce on Trafficking in Persons (the Task Force), co-chaired by 
the Minister of Home Affairs and the MHSSS, coordinated national 
anti-trafficking efforts and served as the decision-making body. The 
technical arm of the Task Force included representatives (technical 
advisors, legal assistants, social workers) of the Ministers who sit 
on the task force and worked on suggested anti-trafficking activities 
and engagements including trainings. The Task Force met monthly 
during the reporting period, while ministerial Task Force sessions 
met quarterly. The government reported the subcommittee met in 
emergency session in April 2020, May 2020, and July 2020 outside 
of its monthly statutory meetings three times to discuss the impact 
of the pandemic on trafficking in order to improve the government’s 
response. The government began consultations, including with 
human trafficking survivors, to draft a National Action Plan (NAP) 
for 2021–2023, to replace the plan that concluded at the end of 
2020. The government provided funding for the completion and 
implementation of the NAP in the 2021 budget. The government 
developed an anti-trafficking work plan based on the draft NAP; 
authorities monitored and evaluated the work plan on a monthly 
basis. The Task Force created and disseminated a Code of Conduct of 
ethical standards for its members, including law enforcement officers. 
The government created a third 24/7 hotline that could accommodate 
Spanish speakers for the first time. Authorities planned and executed 
several sensitization and awareness sessions in mining and logging 
regions and at secondary schools, NGOs, malls, and markets across 
the country, and hosted a digital symposium on human trafficking. 
The government publicized the results of research on the scope and 
impact of trafficking in the country; the research included the impact 
on human trafficking trends from the influx of asylum seekers and 
migrants from Venezuela, Haiti, and Cuba – along with poverty and 
other vulnerabilities within some communities – through victim 
testimonies and community outreach and awareness activities. 
In December 2020, an international organization called on the 
government to put in place simpler systems for Venezuelan asylum 
seekers and migrants to access work permits to avoid becoming 
victims of human trafficking. The government began to develop a 
human trafficking manual for diplomats and provided training to 
them. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand 
for commercial sex acts. The government did not have any laws 
prohibiting employers, recruiters, or labor agents from charging 
workers recruitment fees, switching contracts without the workers’ 
consent, or withholding wages as a means of keeping workers in 
a state of compelled service. Labor officers frequently conducted 
impromptu visits to work sites and business premises in the mining 
and logging districts and in the capital city to investigate suspect 
labor practices and possible violations. The Ministry of Labor also 
promoted public messaging on the dangers of child labor. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the last five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Guyana, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Guyana abroad. Traffickers exploit victims in labor trafficking in 
mining, agriculture, forestry, domestic service, and in shops. The 
government reported 78 percent of human trafficking perpetrators in 
2020 were men, predominantly Guyanese; 14 percent of traffickers 
were from Venezuela, while less than three percent were Dominican 
and Haitian. NGOs reported that traffickers are often middle-aged 
men who own or operate nightclubs. Some traffickers are also 
family members of the victims. Migrants, young people from rural 
and indigenous communities, and those without education are the 
most vulnerable to human trafficking. Women and children from 
Guyana, Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Suriname, and 
Venezuela become sex trafficking victims in mining communities in 
the interior and urban areas. While both sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking occur in remote interior mining communities, limited 
government presence in the country’s interior renders the full extent 
of trafficking there unknown. Some Cuban nationals working in 
Guyana may have been forced to work by the Cuban government. 
Traffickers exploit Guyanese nationals in sex and labor trafficking 
in Suriname, Uruguay, Jamaica, and other Caribbean countries. 
HAITI: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Haiti does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts 
to do so. These efforts included prosecuting and convicting more 
traffickers, updating the penal code, forming regional anti-trafficking 
subcommittees, and continuing to implement a national identification 
card program. However, the government did not demonstrate overall 
increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, even 
considering the documented impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on 
its anti-trafficking capacity. Impunity and complicity, particularly 
in high-profile cases, remained serious problems. The government 
conducted fewer investigations and made fewer arrests compared to 
the previous reporting period; it also identified fewer victims. The 




efforts or victim services and did not finalize development of its 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) for victim identification. 
The government did not make efforts to combat the system of child 
domestic servitude (restavek). Therefore Haiti was downgraded to 
Tier 2 Watch List.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, including 
complicit officials and those responsible for domestic servitude and 
child sex trafficking. • Fund and continue to implement the national 
anti-trafficking action plan, in particular funding victim assistance 
and establishing victim shelters. • Finalize and implement the SOPs 
for victim identification. • Train police, prosecutors, judges, and 
victim service providers in victim-centered and trauma-informed 
formal procedures to identify, protect, and refer trafficking victims to 
appropriate shelters and services. • Implement a witness protection 
program and train law enforcement and judicial officials on a 
victim-centered approach for the treatment of victims and witnesses 
of trafficking crimes during investigations and court proceedings, 
especially to ensure they are not coerced into testifying. • Regularly 
screen Cuban medical workers for trafficking indicators and refer 
victims to services. • Educate the Haitian public with traditional and 
social media about children’s rights to freedom and education and 
ban domestic servitude. • Continue to develop Haiti’s nascent foster 
care system and alternative residential care for children, and ensure 
orphanages are properly accredited and registered. • Train more labor 
inspectors in trafficking indicators, increase worksite inspections for 
indicators of labor trafficking, and increase collaboration with law 
enforcement to prosecute labor trafficking cases. • Develop laws or 
policies to regulate foreign labor recruiters, ensure workers do not 
pay recruitment fees, and raise awareness among potential migrant 
laborers. • Implement measures to address the vulnerabilities leading 
to domestic servitude, including establishment of a minimum age 
for domestic work and protecting child victims of neglect, abuse, 
and violence. • Fully implement the national ID program. 
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. The 2014 Anti-
Trafficking (TIP) Law (No.CL/20140010) criminalized sex trafficking 
and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of seven to 15 years’ 
imprisonment and a fine ranging from 200,000 to 1.5 million 
Haitian gourdes (HTG) ($2,790 to $20,950), which were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. The law 
provided for increased penalties of up to life imprisonment when 
the victim was a child. 
The government initiated investigations of three trafficking cases 
during the reporting period, compared with nine trafficking cases each 
in 2019 and 2018, and two cases in 2017. In 2019, the police Brigade 
for the Protection of Minors (BPM) reported investigating cases 
involving 33 defendants for forced child labor. The Haitian National 
Police border patrol unit (POLIFRONT) and the National Committee 
for the Fight Against Human Trafficking (CNLTP) authorities reported 
a total of six arrests during the reporting period, compared to 51 
individuals arrested in 35 trafficking cases in 2019. The government 
reported initiating two prosecutions during the reporting period, 
compared to one in 2019, seven prosecutions in 2018, and two 
prosecutions in 2017. The government reported convictions of two 
traffickers during the reporting period, compared to none in 2019, 
one in 2018, and three in 2017. In April 2020, a court convicted and 
sentenced a Haitian male trafficker to seven years’ imprisonment 
and 15,000 HTG ($209) fine for exploiting a child in sex trafficking 
in the Dominican Republic. There were 21 total human trafficking 
cases pending in Haitian courts at the end of the reporting period, 
three of which were initiated in the current reporting period. In 
February 2021, authorities began an investigation into a potential 
trafficking case involving a total of 23 Dominican and Venezuelan 
women. In August 2020, authorities on the Haitian-Dominican 
border arrested a man for traveling with five children unrelated to 
him; authorities suspected him of human trafficking. In December 
2020, authorities arrested a man at an airport on charges of human 
trafficking of four children; authorities had not assigned the case 
to an investigative judge by the end of the reporting period. In 
July 2020, an investigative judge ordered two orphanage operators 
from a foreign-operated faith-based NGO charged with trafficking, 
neglect, and criminal association after an investigation found that 
the children were being used to solicit funding while care standards 
were poor. The orphanage was not registered with or accredited by 
the government, and the children who were at the facility were not 
reported to the government.
In 2020, BPM carried out 585 investigations for child neglect, abuse, 
kidnapping, forcible confinement, sexual assault, assault, and child 
trafficking, among other categories. The brigade did not specify how 
many of these investigations focused on child trafficking allegations. 
The investigations included unannounced site visits and closures 
of nightclubs, residences, and orphanages in cooperation with the 
Haitian Social Welfare Agency (IBESR). BPM reported 424 cases of 
law violations related to children in forced labor, trafficking, and 
illicit activities, but did not disaggregate the trafficking cases. IBESR, 
in collaboration with the CNLTP, an NGO, and a foreign donor, 
closed two privately-owned orphanages in Croix des Bouquets 
during the reporting period due to suspicions of child trafficking 
and sexual abuse. 
Impunity and complicity in high-profile trafficking cases continued 
to be significant concerns. The government did not report any 
investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees 
complicit in human trafficking offenses; however, corruption and 
official complicity in trafficking crimes inhibited law enforcement 
action during the year. Observers reported allegations that judicial 
officials in border jurisdictions, such as justices of the peace, 
sometimes took bribes to free detained suspected human traffickers, 
which contributed to an environment in which traffickers largely 
operated with impunity. Authorities took no action during the 
reporting period against the former president of the Haitian Football 
Federation, banned for life by the International Federation of Football 
Association (FIFA) and fined 1 million Swiss francs ($1.14 million) 
and procedural costs for the rape and sexual abuse – at times including 
sex trafficking – of up to 34 females, including at least 14 girls, between 
2014 and 2020 in a decision by the FIFA Ethics Committee that was 
referred for review to the FIFA Appeal Committee at the end of the 
reporting period. As of the end of the reporting period, authorities also 
had not acted against ten other perpetrators and accomplices in the 
case, including the head of the Haitian National Referees Committee 
who FIFA provisionally suspended for 90 days as part of its ongoing 
investigation. Furthermore, immunity for high-level officials and 
difficulty in initiating prosecutions against lower ranking public 
officials made it difficult to prosecute complicit officials. At the end 
of the reporting period, an investigative judge had not determined 
what charges to bring, if any, regarding two August 2020 raids of 
the La Mansion brothel in which authorities identified 12 female 
Venezuelan sex trafficking victims. The media reported high-level 
government officials had patronized the brothel before the raid and 
some of those involved had political influence. Authorities arrested 
a driver of the main suspected trafficker but subsequently released 
him; the judge issued a travel ban against the facility’s owner. The 
government did not take steps to prosecute anyone in the 2017 
Kaliko Beach Club case in which authorities identified 31 trafficking 





not explain why they did not process some cases, including a case 
where a justice of the peace investigated an orphanage suspected of 
sexual abuse and child trafficking but never questioned the suspects. 
Authorities and NGOs reported the pandemic had relatively little 
impact on counter-trafficking efforts, although some courts closed 
temporarily, and social-distancing restrictions hampered orphanage 
inspections. From March 2020 to July 2020, government agencies 
used a rotation system where only some staff physically went to 
work, thereby limiting the government’s capacity to investigate 
and prosecute trafficking crimes. The pandemic also exacerbated a 
backlog in cases that already existed due to general court inefficiency. 
The justice system experienced multiple strikes by lawyers, judges, 
clerks, and prosecutors. 
During the reporting period, the CNLTP established cross-sectoral 
anti-trafficking task forces. The task forces identify offenders, facilitate 
access to trafficking investigations, and follow up on prosecutions. 
Members of the task forces included judiciary authorities (prosecutors, 
deputy prosecutors, judges), CNTLP, and BPM. With the assistance of 
a foreign donor, during the reporting period, the government updated 
its outdated and complex penal and criminal procedural codes and 
will implement the new codes over a two-year transition period. 
Debate continued about some of the new codes’ provisions, while 
the outdated and overly complex existing codes continued to delay 
prosecution of trafficking cases. The Superior Council of the Judiciary 
(CSPJ), charged with independently overseeing the judiciary, did not 
adequately promote prosecution of trafficking cases. Government 
officials rarely used the anti-trafficking law to prosecute and convict 
the perpetrators of exploitation of child domestic workers. The lack 
of a minimum age for domestic work and exceptions in the laws 
governing child labor hindered investigations and prosecutions of 
child domestic servitude. 
The government provided in-kind support for a series of training 
sessions for human trafficking officials in cooperation with 
international partners. In June 2020, the CNLTP president co-
hosted a training with an international donor for nine members of 
the CNLTP’s task forces regarding the law on trafficking in persons. 
In September 2020, the Haitian Magistrates’ School trained eight 
CNTLP members on the anti-trafficking law and the new penal 
code. In September 2020, an NGO and a foreign donor provided 
training regarding the 2014 law for 22 members of HNP, IBESR, and 
the Office for the Protection of Citizens, which led to the formation 
of anti-trafficking regional sub-committees. In collaboration with 
INTERPOL and a foreign donor, in December 2020 the CNLTP 
facilitated training for 23 police officers on the role of INTERPOL 
and the Haitian police detective service in the prevention of human 
trafficking. The government worked with the Dominican Republic to 
identify three Haitian nationals arrested in September 2020 in the 
Dominican Republic on charges of trafficking in persons and migrant 
smuggling. The Haitian National Police signed a memorandum of 
understanding with a foreign NGO and a foreign technology company 
to equip officers to use advanced forensic technology to fight human 
trafficking. The foreign-funded program will equip authorities with 
best-practice digital platforms and digital forensics training to allow 
better collection and analysis of information and evidence related to 
human trafficking. The program will also train investigative judges 
and members of the national anti-trafficking committee. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained inadequate efforts to identify and 
protect victims of trafficking. Outside observers and government 
interlocutors noted the government provided limited services to 
victims of trafficking and largely depended on partners to fund and 
provide services. POLIFRONT and the CNLTP identified a total of 
16 victims during the reporting period, compared with 24 victims 
POLIFRONT identified and three victims an NGO identified in 
2019. The CNLTP and an international organization reported the 16 
victims received care. Additionally, POLIFRONT referred 21 minors 
to IBESR between March and October 2020. Authorities also cared 
for 32 children from the Croix des Bouquets orphanages at a special 
transit center while finding them other housing, and a justice of 
the peace took testimony from the children to confirm the abuse.
The anti-trafficking law tasked the CNLTP with developing SOPs 
to guide officials in the identification and protection of trafficking 
victims. In September 2020, the CNLTP, in coordination with an 
international organization and a foreign donor, relaunched the SOP 
coordination project, but authorities had still not finalized the SOPs 
at the end of the reporting period. The law required the government 
to provide protection, medical, and psychosocial services to victims 
and to create a government-regulated fund to assist victims, but in the 
continued absence of a national budget the government remained 
reliant on international organizations and NGOs to provide most 
care. IBESR and BPM both reported being severely under-resourced 
even prior to the pandemic; however, they continued to provide 
limited services to victims. IBESR offered psychological care and 
placed trafficking victims in short- and long-term shelters that received 
some government support, although NGOs provided the majority 
of the funding. The BPM also provided some services to victims, 
including medical, psychological, and, along with the Ministry of 
Justice, legal aid. The Ministry of Public Health provided free health 
services, including HIV post-exposure prophylaxis, to victims of 
sexual violence and trafficking as part of its action plan against sexual 
and gender-based violence. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor 
offered temporary shelter, meal kits, and medical aid to trafficking 
victims via the National Migration Office and the government’s 
Social Assistance Fund. The CNLTP indicated that victims received 
economic assistance and physical security, including guards, in 
some cases, and authorities also assisted with family tracing and 
pre-return assessments before returning children to families. IBSER 
operated a single transitional facility that housed approximately 28 
children. Children were typically in this facility until placed with a 
family member, foster family, or a registered and accredited private 
orphanage. IBESR reported children did not live in this facility for 
more than 90 days. All privately run orphanages should be licensed, 
but in practice some were not. The anti-trafficking law also stipulated 
money and other assets seized during trafficking investigations should 
fund services for trafficking victims and the CNLTP; however, there 
was no evidence this occurred. There was no government agency 
with overall responsibility for providing care for adult trafficking 
victims, and the lack of resources and a system for tracking meant 
the government failed to identify some victims. 
The government did not have a formal program to assist victims 
who returned to Haiti, but authorities worked with other countries’ 
maritime and airline services to receive and screen returned Haitians 
for trafficking indicators and facilitated their reintegration with 
family members. The government, supported by an international 
organization, screened and provided services to potential trafficking 
victims identified during migrant interdictions at sea. Observers 
reported the referral process for child trafficking victims functioned 
well during the reporting period, as labor inspectors, police, and other 
governmental actors contacted IBESR and the BPM in relevant cases. 
NGOs reported that victim protections codified within the law 
were extensive and robust. For foreign victims, the law included 
provisions for voluntary repatriation, temporary residency during 
legal proceedings and permanent residency if the country of origin 
could not ensure victims’ safety or well-being; the government did 
not report receiving any such requests, although it reported being 
willing to use these measures for specific victims identified during 
the reporting period. The law mandated that legal assistance must be 
provided to trafficking victims, and protected victims from liability 
for unlawful acts their traffickers compelled them to commit. The 
law allowed prosecutors to pursue claims even if victims withdrew 
their complaints or refused to cooperate with an investigation or 
prosecution. Judges could mandate civil restitution for related crimes 
under Haiti’s civil code without a separate civil process, but there were 




no facilities for video deposition or child-friendly facilities during 
legal proceedings. Experts noted that the lack of government-run 
child shelter facilities impeded prosecution because the government’s 
policy of returning child victims to their families made it difficult 
to locate witnesses to testify against the accused. The government 
may have failed to identify some victims due to a lack of formal 
identification procedures. There were no reports of the government 
improperly detaining or deporting victims. Authorities temporarily 
subjected two victims to a travel ban to require them to submit 
statements and took other measures that may have compromised 
their security. Authorities did not screen approximately 400 Cuban 
medical personnel for trafficking indicators. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
president appointed members of the CNLTP, which included 
representatives from nine agencies, two civil society organizations 
designated as “counselors,” and one from the Office of the Human 
Rights Ombudsman. The CNLTP actively monitored trafficking cases 
in the court system and sent members to towns outside of the capital 
to observe the prosecution of trafficking-related cases and advocate 
for the victims. The CNLTP held trafficking-related working group 
meetings. The CNLTP’s executive secretariat, created in the previous 
reporting period, was responsible for monitoring trafficking and 
issuing annual reports, but did not issue any reports during the 
reporting period. The CNLTP continued efforts, in collaboration 
with an international organization, to develop an anti-trafficking task 
force of law enforcement, judicial actors, and IBESR representatives 
to focus on identification of trafficking cases and victims, support 
investigations and prosecutions, and support the establishment of 
CNLTP sub-committees in all ten regions. In cooperation with an 
NGO and a foreign donor, during the reporting period the CNLTP 
founded three of these regional sub-committees, which coordinated 
all civil society and local governmental anti-trafficking activities in 
the Southeast, Northeast, and Central Departments. The government 
lacked a national, centralized database, but began developing one 
with the assistance of an NGO and a foreign donor. The government’s 
2020 budget included 20 million HTG ($279,310) for the CNLTP. 
The 2021 budget passed in September 2020 and allocated 24 million 
HTG ($335,170) to the CNLTP. The CNLTP had not yet received any 
distributions from either budget, which may have been the result of 
bureaucratic delays; it instead relied on non-governmental partners to 
fund its activities. In 2016, the most recent year the committee received 
funding, it received 10 million gourdes ($139,650). Observers reported 
the government generally underfunded anti-trafficking efforts. The 
CNLTP did not have permanent office space or assigned vehicles to 
conduct work. A foreign donor provided the committee logistical 
support, including transportation, during field visits. Additionally, 
although multiple ministries were a part of the committee, the CNLTP 
reported it did not consistently receive technical support from the 
ministries, and there was a lack of coordination between ministries. 
Civil society observers noted some CNLTP members appeared to 
have responsibilities and priorities separate from trafficking. The 
government continued to fail to establish a special fund for trafficking 
in persons as stipulated in the 2014 anti-trafficking law. The fund 
would support anti-trafficking initiatives and assist victims from the 
sale of assets seized from traffickers. 
During the reporting period, BPM conducted anti-trafficking awareness 
assemblies for children. During the 16 Days of Activism against 
Gender-based Violence and the 20th anniversary of the Palermo 
Protocol, the government led awareness-raising activities for various 
stakeholders, including families, students, Vodou priests, judiciary 
authorities, and civil society organizations, on the link between 
gender-based violence and human trafficking in cooperation with 
a foreign donor. The government also publicized press releases and 
conducted webinars and roundtable discussions. The Directorate 
of Immigration and Emigration (DIE) continued to install the 
Migration Information and Data Analysis System at the Cap Haitien 
airport and two official border crossing points with support from an 
international organization and a foreign donor. The system records 
incoming and outgoing travelers’ biometric data at official ports 
of entry to strengthen border security and help prevent trafficking. 
Additionally, the government implemented a separate biometric 
scanning system at Port au Prince’s airport. As part of a border 
security program supported by an international organization and a 
foreign donor, authorities conducted training programs on general 
trafficking, victim identification, smuggling, and relevant laws for 
at least 100 civil society and state government officials between 
October and December 2020 at four border areas. In September 
2020, the School of Magistrates (EMA), an NGO, and a foreign donor, 
trained task force members on the socio-cultural context of human 
trafficking. BPM and an international organization each operated 
trafficking hotlines. The BPM hotline operated 24 hours a day in both 
Haitian Creole and French and allowed the public to report child 
exploitation and abuse cases, including child trafficking. In 2020, the 
BPM reported 90 calls to its hotline, but did not report how many 
of these calls were trafficking incidents. The other hotline received 
101 calls during the reporting period, of which 28 were regarding 
children; the hotline operated 24 hours a day and served Creole, 
French, and Spanish speakers. Additionally, the government set up 
an online reporting portal with the assistance of several NGOs. The 
National Migration Office (ONM) published illicit migrant deterrent 
messaging via public radio and other media platforms; this was 
the only substantive ONM awareness-raising campaign during the 
reporting period. 
The continued dysfunction of the Haitian civil registry system and 
weak consular capacity to provide identification documentation left 
many Haitians at risk of remaining undocumented in the Dominican 
Republic and subject to deportation – recognized risk factors for 
vulnerability to trafficking. In the previous reporting period, the 
National Office of Identification (ONI) began issuing biometric ID 
cards with unique identification numbers (CIN) to Haitian citizens. 
In June 2020, the government issued a decree requiring citizens to 
obtain the new cards. Beginning in October 2020, old forms of 
identification were no longer valid for access to government services, 
conduct of civic duties, and obtaining certain professional positions. 
The government also required the card in order to vote in elections, 
occupy a public service position, register for school, obtain a passport, 
and access financial services. Since the decree, ONI carried out a 
campaign to encourage all Haitian adults to register for the new IDs. 
The government continued to digitize birth certificates and other 
vital records, and ONI merged its records with the Civil Registry to 
improve accuracy and efficiency. As of March 2021, approximately 
4.3 million of an estimated six million Haitian voters had registered 
for the required ID.
The government had no clear strategy for conducting labor inspections. 
Although the labor code required recruiters and businesses to obtain 
a license and did not allow them to charge fees, Haiti did not have 
effective laws or policies to regulate foreign labor recruiters, prevent 
fraudulent recruiting, or plans to raise awareness of the risks for 
potential migrant laborers. The government lacked staff and resources 
to inspect worksites for indicators of labor trafficking, although the 
government trained at least 10 labor inspectors to detect forced labor 
in labor sites. However, authorities reported being unable to conduct 
any inspections in 2020 due to the pandemic. The government 
reported IBESR staff and labor inspectors had not received sufficient 
training on child labor issues, despite a study indicating that more 
than 286,000 children were working in domestic service, some of 
whom were likely exploited in forced labor. The government did 
not report or publish data on child work, child labor, or the worst 
forms of child labor. According to an international organization, a 
labor Child Protection Working Group coordination meeting was 
supposed to be held monthly between enforcement agencies with the 
participation and technical support of international child protection 
partners, but was unable to meet monthly due to the pandemic. 
Authorities reported improved coordination on child labor cases 
over the reporting period, but international organizations stated 





continued political unrest. The government did not report proactive 
measures to prevent trafficking by its diplomats although the 2014 
anti-trafficking law provided strict sanctions for public officials 
complicit in trafficking. The government did not make efforts to 
reduce demand for commercial sex acts. Authorities did not make 
efforts against sex tourism. No explicit prohibition existed in Haitian 
law against Haitian nationals engaging in sex tourism abroad. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Haiti, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Haiti abroad. Most of Haiti’s trafficking cases involve children 
in forced labor in domestic service, commonly called restavek, 
who often are physically abused, receive no payment for services 
rendered, and have significantly lower school enrollment rates. At 
the end of the reporting period, NGOs estimated between 150,000 
and 300,000 children worked in domestic servitude. Many children 
flee these situations and become street children, facing further risk 
of re-trafficking. The number of street children likely increased in 
2020. “Orphanage entrepreneurs” operate unlicensed orphanages 
where children are trafficked. At the end of the reporting period, 
only 105 of the total 754 orphanages housing 23,723 children 
were either licensed or becoming officially licensed, and 398 were 
considered high-risk for child safety. Approximately 80 percent of 
children in orphanages have at least one living parent, and almost 
all have other family members. Female foreign nationals, especially 
citizens of the Dominican Republic and Venezuela, are particularly 
at risk for sex and labor trafficking in Haiti, including on social 
media. Emerging practices include “bride-buying,” in which men 
pay between $100 to $200 to the families of girls as young as 14. 
Traffickers also target: children in private and NGO-sponsored 
residential care centers; Haitian children working in construction, 
agriculture, fisheries, domestic work, begging, and street vending in 
Haiti and the Dominican Republic; IDPs, including those displaced 
by Hurricane Matthew, and gang violence; Haitians living near the 
border with the Dominican Republic; including those who are 
stateless or at risk of becoming stateless; Haitian migrants, including 
those traveling to or returning from the Dominican Republic, The 
Bahamas, Turks and Caicos, Brazil, Mexico, or the United States; 
and LGBTQI+ youth often left homeless and stigmatized by their 
families and society. Haitian adults and children are at risk for 
fraudulent labor recruitment and forced labor, primarily in the 
Dominican Republic, other Caribbean countries, South America, 
and the United States. According to NGOs, international child sex 
tourism occurs in Haiti, with the primary tourists being from the 
United States and Europe. Although the impact of the pandemic in 
Haiti was not severe, the temporary closure of schools and pressure 
due to economic difficulties exacerbated vulnerability. The pandemic 
also likely increased risks of trafficking for approximately 220,000 
Haitian migrants in the Dominican Republic who returned to Haiti, 
and for other Haitian migrants throughout Latin America unable 
to proceed in their journeys due to health restrictions. A December 
2020 survey found that many Haitians lacked basic knowledge 
about human trafficking and the resources available to get help; 71 
percent of respondents were unable to differentiate between human 
trafficking and gender-based violence, only 18 percent knew of a 
phone number to report a suspected trafficking crime, and just three 
percent had heard of the CNLTP. 
HONDURAS: TIER 2
The Government of Honduras does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Honduras remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
identifying more victims of labor trafficking, including children 
forced to commit unlawful acts, and increasing funding for the 
Inter-institutional Commission to Combat Commercial Sexual 
Exploitation and Trafficking in Persons (CICESCT). CICESCT sustained 
its efforts to provide immediate protection to victims and coordinate 
additional services among other stakeholders without interruption 
throughout the pandemic. The government adapted its training and 
awareness-raising activities targeting groups at high risk of trafficking 
and potential first responders to online platforms, reaching a broader 
geographic range of stakeholders. The government also enacted a new 
penal code provision that brought the definition of trafficking in line 
with the definition under international law. However, the government 
did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. The new 
amendments to the penal code lowered the penalties for trafficking 
crimes, resulting in penalties that were not commensurate with those 
prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. The government 
identified fewer victims overall and investigated, prosecuted, and 
convicted fewer suspects. The government did not report penalizing 
any employment agencies for fraudulent recruitment practices or 
charging recruitment fees to workers. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
 Increase investigations, prosecutions, and convictions of suspected 
traffickers, including complicit officials and forced labor crimes. • 
Amend the penal code to ensure the penalties prescribed for trafficking 
crimes are commensurate with the penalties prescribed for other 
grave crimes, such as rape. • Develop and implement standardized 
procedures for victim identification and referral, including screening 
for indicators of forced criminal activity among children involved in 
gang-related crimes. • Increase government funding for victim services, 
including to NGOs, and anti-trafficking police and prosecutorial units. 
• Increase efforts to identify victims, including among particularly 
vulnerable populations such as adult migrants, and provide assistance 
to all victims, including forced labor victims. • Enforce laws punishing 
brokers for illegal practices that facilitate trafficking, such as fraudulent 
offers of employment or illegal fees for migration or job placement. 
• Institutionalize training for anti-trafficking police and prosecutorial 
units, judges, and CICESCT’s immediate response team.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained prosecution efforts. Article 219 of 
the Honduran penal code, which came into effect in June 2020, 
criminalized sex and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of 
five to eight years’ imprisonment. These penalties were sufficiently 
stringent. However, with respect to sex trafficking, these penalties 
were not commensurate with those prescribed for other serious 
crimes, such as rape. 
The government reported investigating 82 cases of suspected sex 
trafficking and related crimes in 2020, compared with 91 suspected 
cases investigated in 2019 and 145 in 2018. Authorities initiated 
prosecutions of nine suspects (seven for sex trafficking and two 
for forced labor), compared with 55 initiated in 2019 (53 for sex 
trafficking including procuring commercial sex acts and two for forced 
labor) and 35 in 2018. The government convicted 14 traffickers, 
including 10 for sex trafficking, two for forced labor, and two for 
both sex trafficking and forced labor, compared with 34 traffickers 
convicted in 2019 (33 for sex trafficking/procuring commercial sex 
acts and one for forced labor) and 16 traffickers (including six for 




prison sentences ranging from three to 13 years for convicted adult 
traffickers and ordered some of them to pay monetary fines to the 
government. The juvenile penal system issued a sentence of six 
months’ house arrest for one convicted trafficker who was a child. The 
government investigated two police officials for suspected trafficking 
crimes and six police officials for smuggling crimes that may have 
increased migrants’ vulnerability to trafficking. Authorities convicted 
two government officials, one on pimping charges and one for paid 
sexual relations, for their involvement in sex trafficking crimes in 
2017. The government did not provide an update on its investigation 
of alleged sexual exploitation of a female prisoner in a correctional 
facility from the previous year. Corruption and official complicity 
in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law 
enforcement action during the year. 
The government maintained a specialized anti-trafficking prosecution 
unit, but experts observed the unit remained understaffed and 
lacked sufficient resources to investigate and prosecute trafficking 
crimes. Authorities reported restrictions implemented to mitigate 
the pandemic impeded investigations in commercial venues where 
trafficking has been known to occur and slowed investigations and 
prosecutions of trafficking crimes. An NGO noted courts continued to 
delay trafficking cases despite a requirement in the anti-trafficking law 
to process such cases in a timely manner, an issue further exacerbated 
by the pandemic. The Public Ministry trained 160 prosecutors on 
human trafficking including on new provisions in the penal code, and 
the government’s judicial training school trained select magistrates, 
judges, and justices of the peace on human trafficking issues. Experts 
observed that judges’ lack of specialized knowledge or experience 
in handling trafficking cases impeded successful prosecution and 
conviction of cases. The government cooperated with the Governments 
of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Mexico to investigate trafficking cases 
and detain suspects. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained strong protection efforts, with CICESCT’s 
immediate response team providing robust assistance to victims 
throughout the year. The government and NGOs identified 42 
trafficking victims in 2020, including 31 exploited in sex trafficking and 
11 in forced labor; two of the labor trafficking victims were children 
forced to commit unlawful acts. In comparison, the government 
identified 75 victims (66 in sex trafficking and 9 in forced labor) 
and NGOs identified 78 victims in 2019, and the government 
identified 73 victims (63 in sex trafficking and 10 in forced labor) 
in 2018. Authorities identified five of the victims through calls to 
government hotlines, and 16 were identified in Mexico or Guatemala 
and repatriated to Honduras. The government’s disaggregated 
victim data included some victims of related crimes such as child 
pornography; all identified victims were Honduran citizens and 
included 43 children and 24 adults, 56 females and 10 males, and 
one LGBTQI+ individual. First responders referred potential trafficking 
victims to CICESCT’s immediate response team, composed of two 
psychologists and a social worker, for immediate support. This 
team continued to operate during the pandemic despite restrictions 
on movement and inadequate funding for personal protective 
equipment. The immediate response team provided 67 victims of 
trafficking and related crimes with assistance, including legal advice, 
immediate protection, and psychological services. In accordance 
with the government’s intersectoral protocol on victim protection, 
CICESCT coordinated with relevant government institutions and 
NGOs to provide additional services to victims, including mental 
health counseling, legal services, medical care, lodging, food, family 
reintegration, and repatriation. CICESCT referred 37 victims—five 
boys, 22 girls, and 10 women—to government and NGO shelters 
for additional care. Victims who tested positive for COVID-19 
faced delays or limitations in receiving services from shelters. The 
government provided 31 victims with witness protection services 
including measures to protect their identity; shelter; and economic, 
medical and psychosocial assistance. 
Law enforcement, immigration, and social service providers had 
written procedures for identifying and assisting victims, including 
screening for indicators of trafficking among vulnerable populations 
and referring potential victims to CICESCT’s immediate response 
team. CICESCT and the anti-trafficking prosecution unit each 
operated trafficking-specific hotlines that functioned throughout 
the pandemic. The government reported 41 calls to the CICESCT 
hotline led to 22 potential cases referred for investigation. Officials 
in the Returned Migrant Assistance Center conducted evaluations 
of returned Hondurans and referred suspected trafficking cases 
to CICESCT; however, screening for trafficking indicators was not 
systematic among returned migrants, and the government did not 
report whether these efforts resulted in identification of any victims 
during the year. The government followed a regional protocol to 
facilitate the repatriation of victims identified abroad and funded 
food, transportation, and lodging for such victims through a fund 
administered by the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs and International 
Cooperation. Child victims could receive care from government or 
NGO shelters, while women had the option of receiving assistance 
from NGO shelters; there were no specialized shelters for trafficking 
victims and no shelters that accepted men. The government offered 
services to both forced labor and sex trafficking victims but identified 
a disproportionately low number of forced labor victims compared 
to the estimated prevalence of forced labor in the country. 
The government initially allocated 8.93 million lempiras ($357,150) 
to CICESCT but later decreased its actual disbursement to 6.18 million 
lempiras ($247,020) due to pandemic-related funds redistribution and 
budget cuts. This amount was an increase from 5.53 million lempiras 
($221,400) provided in 2019, though officials reported they lacked 
adequate financial and human resources to provide comprehensive 
victim care, support victims throughout the country, and collect and 
analyze victim data. CICESCT provided 76,970 lempiras ($3,080) 
to an NGO operating a shelter that accommodated women, girls, 
and boys up to age 12 and dedicated 318,040 lempiras ($12,720) 
to victims’ immediate needs including food, hygiene supplies, and 
lodging. Other Honduran government agencies also provided funds 
from their budgets for victim assistance. 
Some victims provided testimony through pre-recorded interviews 
in secure Gesell chambers or, due to the pandemic, video calls. 
Honduran law prohibited the prosecution of victims for unlawful 
acts traffickers compelled them to commit. However, the government 
lacked formal procedures for identifying victims among children 
apprehended for gang-related criminal activity. NGOs reported 
authorities did not properly identify children forced to engage in 
illegal activities by criminal groups, reporting that the government 
may have inappropriately treated such children as criminals instead of 
victims. Honduran law allowed foreign victims to receive temporary 
or permanent residency status, including authorization to work, 
though the government did not identify any foreign victims in 2020. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. The CICESCT 
convened a network of 32 government agencies and NGOs and 
coordinated the government’s anti-trafficking efforts, including 
implementation of the 2016-2020 national anti-trafficking action 
plan. The government allocated insufficient funds for implementation 
of the plan and relevant agencies relied on additional support from 
foreign donors to implement its activities. CICESCT maintained 
a public website and launched social media accounts to share 
information on human trafficking with the public. Government 
agencies, including CICESCT, its local committees, the Public Ministry, 
the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, the 
Supreme Court of Justice, and the Secretariat of Education, provided 
anti-trafficking trainings to police, lawyers, judges, other government 
officials, tourism professionals, civil society organizations, teachers, 
and members of the public throughout the country; due to the 
pandemic, the government conducted the majority of trainings 






costs. The events targeted members of at-risk groups—including 
children and students, individuals with disabilities, and indigenous 
persons—as well as potential first responders and officials from key 
sectors such as education and tourism. CICESCT reported using 
online training platforms to educate stakeholders on the impact 
of pandemic-related restrictions on trafficking trends and how 
to adapt. Officials from several ministries conducted additional 
trainings and awareness-raising activities with support from NGOs 
and international organizations. 
First Lady Ana Garcia de Hernandez’s Migration Task Force continued 
to coordinate a whole-of-government approach to informing 
Hondurans about the dangers of irregular migration, including 
trafficking risks, and the government continued public awareness 
campaigns warning of trafficking risks along migratory routes 
through Guatemala and Mexico. The government conducted law 
enforcement operations targeting irregular migration and increased 
border enforcement, leading to 160 arrests for smuggling crimes that 
increased migrants’ vulnerability to trafficking. Labor inspectors did 
not identify any suspected trafficking cases in 2020. The Secretariat of 
Labor and Social Security (STSS) monitored and regulated compliance 
with labor laws and policies that could decrease workers’ vulnerability 
to trafficking, including those regulating private employment agencies 
and establishing protections for vulnerable classes of workers such 
as domestic workers, seafarers, and temporary workers in Canada; 
however, the government did not provide details on enforcement. 
Honduran regulations prohibited charging recruitment fees to workers, 
but the government did not report enforcement of these regulations 
in 2020. The government modernized its national identification card 
system and began distributing new national identification cards in 
February 2021. The government did not make efforts to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex acts. Honduras removed the offense 
of sex tourism from its amended penal code, and the government 
did not investigate or prosecute any suspected trafficking cases in 
the tourism sector. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Honduras, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Honduras abroad. Traffickers exploit Honduran women and children 
in sex trafficking within the country and in other countries such as 
Belize, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Spain, and the United States. 
Traffickers particularly target LGBTQI+ Hondurans, migrants, IDPs, 
persons with disabilities, children in child labor, children whose 
parents have migrated, and individuals living in areas controlled 
by organized criminal groups. Officials report family problems, 
unemployment, and lack of access to healthcare exacerbate these risks. 
Traffickers exploit victims within their own homes or communities, 
including sometimes their own family members or friends. Traffickers 
exploit Honduran adults and children in forced labor in street 
vending, forced begging, domestic service, drug trafficking, and 
the informal sector in their own country, as well as forced labor in 
other countries, particularly Guatemala, Mexico, and the United 
States. Children, including from indigenous and Afro-descendant 
communities, particularly Miskito boys, are at risk for forced labor in 
the agricultural, construction, manufacturing, mining, and hospitality 
industries. Children living on the streets are at risk for sex and labor 
trafficking. Criminal organizations, including gangs, exploit girls in 
sex trafficking, force children into street begging, and coerce and 
threaten children and young adults to transport weapons, sell drugs, 
commit extortion, or serve as lookouts; this occurred primarily in 
urban areas, but one NGO reported an increase in gang activity in 
rural areas. Criminals expanded the use of social network platforms 
to recruit victims, often with false promises of employment, and 
continued to target vulnerable populations. The pandemic, as well as 
Hurricanes Eta and Iota, negatively affected economic opportunity and 
furthered inequality, resulting in an increased number of individuals 
vulnerable to trafficking. Among the 45 Cuban medical professionals 
the government contracted to assist during the pandemic, some may 
have been forced to work by the Cuban government. Honduras is 
a destination for child sex tourists from Canada and the United 
States. Migrants from Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, Central America, 
the Middle East, and South America who transit Honduras en route 
to the United States are vulnerable to being exploited in trafficking. 
Overall corruption helped facilitate trafficking crimes.
HONG KONG: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Hong Kong does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included investigating more potential 
cases of sex and labor trafficking than in the previous reporting 
period, including a case involving a money lending business alleged 
to have charged foreign domestic workers excessive fees that likely 
increased their risk of facing debt-based coercion. The government 
screened more than 6,900 vulnerable individuals for trafficking, 
trained 880 officials from various agencies, and continued to allocate 
62.23 million Hong Kong dollars ($8.03 million) in its annual 
budget to fund 98 positions within various agencies dedicated to 
trafficking issues. However, the government did not demonstrate 
overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting 
period, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 
on its anti-trafficking capacity. The government did not prosecute 
or convict any labor traffickers and convicted fewer offenders for 
sex trafficking-related crimes compared with the previous reporting 
period. Despite the government screening thousands of vulnerable 
persons for trafficking indicators, it identified only three victims for 
the second consecutive year. Ineffective implementation of victim 
identification procedures continued to result in few victims identified 
and contributed to authorities penalizing victims for crimes their 
traffickers compelled them to commit. The government did not enact 
legislation to fully criminalize all forms of trafficking. Therefore Hong 
Kong remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the second consecutive year.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Improve the quality of screenings conducted to identify trafficking 
victims, including by ensuring all children in commercial sex are 
identified as trafficking victims. • Cease penalization of victims 
for unlawful acts traffickers compel them to commit and increase 
interagency coordination to ensure victims are not punished through 
immigration proceedings, including before investigating their 
traffickers. • Vigorously investigate and prosecute suspected sex 
and labor traffickers, and sentence convicted traffickers to significant 
prison terms. • Engage in continuous and regular collaboration with 
NGOs and social welfare experts to update anti-trafficking policies, 
to review victim-centered interview processes and investigations, to 
establish improved services for trafficking victims, and to create in-
depth training programs for the judiciary, labor tribunal, and other 
task force stakeholders. • Enact a comprehensive anti-trafficking 
law that criminalizes all forms of trafficking in accordance with 
the definition set forth in the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. • Ensure 
authorities offer and refer trafficking victims to services. • Ensure 
non-resident victims, including children, are provided adequate 
services in Hong Kong, including before their repatriation. • Increase 
protections for foreign domestic workers to reduce their vulnerability 
to trafficking, including by prohibiting worker-charged recruitment 





an option to live outside their place of employment, and creating 
legal maximum working hours. • Proactively investigate unscrupulous 
employment agencies and money lenders for their complicity in 
labor trafficking and sufficiently penalize convicted agency operators. 
• Allow foreign victims to work and study in Hong Kong while 
participating in judicial proceedings against their traffickers. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained anti-trafficking law enforcement 
efforts; the absence of laws that fully criminalize trafficking made 
it difficult both to accurately assess the government’s prosecution 
efforts compared with the previous year and to determine which 
law enforcement actions involved human trafficking as defined by 
international law. Hong Kong law did not criminalize all forms of 
human trafficking, and the government relied on various provisions 
of laws relating to prostitution, immigration, employment, and 
physical abuse to prosecute trafficking crimes. Inconsistent with 
international law, Section 129 of the crimes ordinance, which 
criminalized “trafficking in persons to or from Hong Kong,” required 
transnational movement and did not require the use of force, fraud, 
or coercion. Section 129 prescribed penalties of up to 10 years’ 
imprisonment, which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to 
sex trafficking, commensurate with punishments prescribed for other 
serious crimes, such as rape. Section 130 criminalized the harboring, 
controlling, or directing of a person for the purpose of prostitution 
and prescribed penalties of up to 14 years’ imprisonment. Section 
131 criminalized procuring a person to engage in commercial sex acts 
and prescribed penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment. Section 
137 criminalized living on the earnings of commercial sex acts of 
others and prescribed penalties of up to 10 years. 
Authorities investigated 27 cases related to sex trafficking in 2020, 
compared with nine investigations in 2019 and 136 in 2018. The 
government initiated investigations of three potential labor trafficking 
cases but did not report prosecuting or convicting any cases of labor 
trafficking for the second consecutive year. The government did not 
report the number of sex trafficking prosecutions initiated in 2020, but 
it reported arresting 27 suspects (five in 2019) during investigations 
for offenses related to sex trafficking, including for violations of 
sections 130 and 137 of the crimes ordinance. Courts convicted one 
offender for sex trafficking-related crimes in 2020 (10 convictions in 
2019) and sentenced them to three months’ imprisonment. Short 
sentences, such as this, did not serve to deter trafficking crimes or 
adequately reflect the nature of the offense. The government did not 
report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government 
employees complicit in human trafficking offenses. 
Law enforcement officials often did not adequately investigate 
trafficking cases, including those referred to them by NGOs, 
sometimes closed cases with clear indicators of trafficking, and 
did not employ a victim-centered, trauma-informed approach 
when interviewing victims. The government reported using a “joint 
investigative process” in trafficking cases to coordinate interviews 
of victims among law enforcement agencies; however, in previous 
reporting periods, observers reported weak coordination between 
law enforcement agencies in practice, which resulted in agencies 
separately investigating different aspects of cases. Law enforcement 
generally did not adequately investigate operators of unscrupulous 
employment agencies or money lenders for their roles in facilitating 
labor trafficking through debt-based coercion. However, in response 
to information provided from a local NGO, police investigated one 
money lender during the reporting period for allegedly charging 
foreign domestic worker’s interest rates of nearly 100 percent for 
loans paid to employment agencies in the workers’ home country, 
significantly increasing their risk of experiencing debt-based coercion. 
Police arrested four suspects associated with the money lending 
company on charges of conspiracy to lend money at an excessive 
rate and money laundering; however, authorities reported they did 
not identify indicators of trafficking during the reporting period. 
The absence of laws criminalizing all forms of trafficking impeded 
officials’ ability to investigate or charge suspected traffickers. This 
also resulted in the prosecution of trafficking crimes under laws with 
weak penalties. NGOs previously reported judicial officials lacked an 
awareness of trafficking. Well-founded fears of penalization and the 
absence of adequate services resulted in many victims choosing not 
to report their exploitation or declining to cooperate with authorities 
in investigations. 
The government provided trafficking-related training to approximately 
880 officials from various agencies in 2020, compared with 1,400 
trained in 2019. Adjusting to pandemic-related travel restrictions, 
which prevented their ability to attend overseas trainings, officials 
also joined online workshops and webinars during the reporting 
period. The Security Bureau cosponsored a training program with 
the EU for officials from various agencies, the hospital authority, 
NGOs, and IOM. The government did not report if it continued to 
distribute an information packet on trafficking for officials likely 
to come into contact with victims, which it initially distributed 
in December 2019. The justice department continued to employ 
a designated team responsible for prosecuting trafficking-related 
crimes, and the customs department had a four-person team that led 
its anti-trafficking efforts. The police force employed dedicated teams 
for investigating trafficking and the exploitation of foreign domestic 
workers. The government also reported having designated points 
of contact for trafficking issues within relevant agencies since 2018. 
Nonetheless, civil society organizations continued to report being 
unable to reach these designated contacts and teams, including when 
attempting to refer victims to police and some reported government 
officials were unable to direct them to a person responsible for 
trafficking in their agency. 
PROTECTION
The government continued to make minimal efforts to protect 
victims. Police, immigration, and customs officials used a two-tiered 
identification mechanism to screen vulnerable populations for 
indicators of trafficking. Through this mechanism, officials referred 
potential victims for a full identification “debriefing” after determining 
whether an individual met at least one of seven indicators listed 
on the standard screening form of the first tier of the identification 
mechanism. Officials screened 6,912 individuals in 2020, but for the 
second consecutive year identified only three victims. Two victims 
identified by authorities were foreign domestic workers exploited 
in labor trafficking, but the government did not report if the third 
victim was exploited in forced labor or sex trafficking. The labor 
department’s (LD) 10 labor relation division offices continued 
to use the standard screening mechanism and conducted 1,500 
screenings in 2020, which led to the identification of one victim 
in 2020. The immigration department’s Foreign Domestic Helper 
Special Investigation Section, which the government reported was 
designed to identify victims at the earliest possible stage, screened 
2,500 visa applications of foreign domestic workers, which led to 
the identification of one victim in 2020. 
Ineffective implementation of the screening mechanism and a lack 
of understanding of psychological trauma associated with trafficking 
continued to result in few victims identified. In addition, the standard 
screening form listed the vulnerable populations authorities were 
required to screen, but it did not include any groups that would 
include Hong Kong citizens. Law enforcement interviews of victims 
during the identification process often lacked a trauma-informed 
approach, exacerbated victims’ emotional distress, were sometimes 
conducted over many hours without adequate breaks, and, therefore, 
often did not successfully identify indicators of trafficking. NGOs 
reported identifying victims of trafficking among those who were not 
recognized by government officials despite undergoing the official 
screening process. Hong Kong’s low age of consent, 16, further 
complicated efforts to identify child victims exploited in commercial 
sex as trafficking victims. The failure to consistently provide potential 
victims with immediate stabilizing care upon their initial contact 







likely impeded officials’ ability to effectively interview victims and 
identify trafficking indicators. 
The government did not report providing services to any of the 
three identified victims. Victims commonly preferred to receive 
services provided by foreign consulates or NGOs, rather than services 
offered by the government. The government partially subsidized six 
NGO-operated and three government-operated shelters that served 
victims of violence, abuse, and exploitation, including trafficking 
victims. These shelters could provide temporary accommodation, 
counseling, and medical and psychological services to local and 
foreign victims, regardless of gender or age. However, contacts 
reported no trafficking victims stayed in government shelters, likely 
due to fears the government would not provide adequate services 
or compensation. 
The government could assist exploited foreign victims, including 
domestic workers, to return to Hong Kong to serve as witnesses in 
trials by providing financial assistance; but, due to travel restrictions 
associated with the pandemic, this likely did not occur during the 
reporting period. To enable foreign victims to temporarily remain 
in Hong Kong, the government could provide visa extensions with 
fee waivers and could provide victims who were foreign domestic 
workers with permission to change their employer; the government 
granted one identified victim permission to change their employer. 
Inconsistent coordination between immigration officials and police 
made it difficult for victims to obtain visa extensions in practice. 
Foreign victims, including those allowed temporary residency via 
visa extensions, were generally not permitted to work or study while 
they remained in Hong Kong. Hong Kong law allowed victims to 
seek compensation from traffickers through civil suits and labor 
tribunals. Nonetheless, poor interpretation services, lack of trained 
attorneys, the inability to work while awaiting a decision, and judges’ 
inexperience with forced labor cases sometimes impaired victims’ 
attempts to claim back wages or restitution through labor tribunals 
and deterred some from bringing claims forward. 
Although there were no direct reports during the reporting period that 
authorities penalized trafficking victims for crimes their traffickers 
compelled them to commit, ineffective victim identification and 
ongoing reports that authorities were more likely to penalize victims 
than their traffickers meant this likely occurred in practice. The 
government typically initiated immigration proceedings against 
victims, rather than investigating or prosecuting their traffickers. 
In previous years, some law enforcement officials also reportedly 
threatened victims with penalization during victim identification 
interviews. In addition, anecdotal reporting suggested victims of 
forced criminality, specifically those coerced to carry drugs into 
Hong Kong, continued to be penalized by authorities without being 
screened for trafficking indicators. The government continued to 
intercept mainland Chinese child victims of sex trafficking during 
anti-vice operations—one in 2020 compared with 15 in 2019—and 
failed to identify them as trafficking victims or provide them with 
adequate assistance. Authorities screened the one child identified in 
commercial sex in 2020 but failed to identify the child as a victim of 
sex trafficking, despite this being a form of sex trafficking according 
to definitional standards under international law. Although the 
government coordinated with the authorities in their country of 
origin to repatriate these victims, it did not report providing them 
with sufficient stabilizing services after their initial identification 
in Hong Kong.
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. Although 
many agencies were fully occupied with implementing new public 
health measures as part of the government’s pandemic mitigation 
efforts, the government reported it did not divert resources from 
implementing the 2018 anti-trafficking action plan. The government 
continued to publicly deny that trafficking is a prevalent crime in Hong 
Kong, undercutting the anti-trafficking efforts of government officials 
and the NGO community. An anti-trafficking steering committee led 
by the Chief Secretary for Administration and the inter-departmental 
working group led by the security bureau continued to meet. The 
government continued to allocate 62.23 million Hong Kong dollars 
($8.03 million) in its annual budget to fund 98 positions within 
various agencies dedicated to trafficking issues. Except for working 
with an NGO to investigate one potential case of labor trafficking, the 
government did not report efforts to improve collaboration with civil 
society. In addition, following the imposition of the National Security 
Law by the Chinese National People’s Congress on Hong Kong in 
June 2020, under which any speech critical of the government or its 
policies could be construed as pro-secession, subversive, or inciting 
hate against the government, along with increased restrictions to 
freedom of expression, NGOs and other civil society organizations 
were less willing to engage with the government, including on 
human trafficking.
The government did not conduct campaigns to raise awareness of sex 
trafficking. To improve awareness of the rights of foreign domestic 
workers and the responsibilities of employers, the government 
continued to distribute information packets to workers and employers, 
publish advertisements in Filipino and Indonesian language 
newspapers, operate workers’ rights information kiosks in public 
areas, work with the Philippine and Indonesian consulates to provide 
briefings to newly arriving domestic workers, and publish translated 
versions of standard employment contracts in 11 foreign languages. 
The government continued to distribute information cards created 
by an international organization that listed information on support 
services available to foreign domestic workers and trafficking victims. 
The government’s process for evaluating non-refoulement claims, 
which did not allow claimants to legally work in Hong Kong, made 
some refugees vulnerable to trafficking. In addition, the government’s 
policies requiring foreign domestic workers to live with their employer 
and to return to their home countries within two weeks after their 
contracts’ termination (“two week rule”) increased the ability of 
abusive employers and unscrupulous employment agencies to subject 
workers to trafficking. In September 2020, the Court of Appeals 
upheld the government’s live-in requirement. The requirement that 
workers live with their employers enabled exploitative employers 
to limit workers freedom of movement and communications, and 
sometimes required workers to live in inadequate conditions. The 
lack of regulations setting a maximum number of legal working hours 
for foreign domestic workers also contributed to their vulnerability. 
Throughout the pandemic, the live-in requirement contributed to 
many workers facing increased workloads and daily work hours, and 
some employers denied workers’ the ability to take their mandated 
day off. Observers reported the “two week rule” continued to deter 
workers from reporting or exiting exploitative conditions. Due to 
travel restrictions related to the pandemic in both Hong Kong and 
workers’ home countries, the government temporarily suspended the 
“two week rule,” allowing some workers to remain in Hong Kong 
and seek new employment after their contracts ended. Although 
the government requested employers pay the costs associated with 
quarantine requirements for workers entering Hong Kong during the 
pandemic, this was not a requirement, and NGOs reported some 
employment agencies charged both employers and workers, who 
incurred additional debt from employment agencies from these 
expenses, further increasing their vulnerability to debt-based coercion. 
The government reported convicting eight employers of foreign 
domestic workers for illegally using workers to perform duties 
outside their contracts (34 in 2019) but did not report the number 
convicted for non- or under-payment of wages (three in 2019); 
sentences included community service and up to two months’ 
imprisonment, which were suspended for two years. The government 
allowed employers previously convicted for exploiting foreign 
domestic workers to continue to hire workers. Temporary closures 
of labor tribunals during pandemic-related lockdowns throughout 





some foreign domestic workers with pending cases were required to 
apply for multiple visa extensions to remain in Hong Kong. Each visa 
extension lasted two weeks and cost workers 230 Hong Kong dollars 
($30), and the government did not permit these workers to work 
under visa extensions. At the onset of the pandemic, the government 
reported it would grant free visa extensions on a case-by-case basis. 
However, workers still faced difficulties obtaining extensions in 
practice. In June, the government began to grant automatic 30-day 
free visa extensions to the majority of workers’ applications.
Hong Kong law permitted employment agencies to charge job 
seekers, including foreign domestic workers, up to 10 percent of 
their first months’ salary in recruitment fees. Since enforcement 
of this rule was lacking, agencies often charged much higher fees 
and confiscated workers’ passports and/or contracts as collateral, 
practices which perpetuated debt-based coercion. The government 
required employment agencies to comply with a code of practice 
covering statutory requirements and standards for Hong Kong-
based employment agencies. Despite being a violation of the code 
of practice, observers reported money lenders and employment 
agencies often operated at the same address without consequence; 
this enabled employment agencies complicit in labor trafficking to 
indebt workers through loans for recruitment fees that were often 
beyond the legal limits. The government did not report the number of 
inspections of employment agencies conducted by the Employment 
Agencies Administration (EAA) in 2020, compared with approximately 
2,000 inspections in 2019. The EAA lacked sufficient resources, and 
its inspections of agencies were ineffective and often only consisted 
of cursory reviews of documentation. In addition, the EAA did not 
proactively investigate unscrupulous agencies and typically required 
a victim to make a complaint against an agency before initiating 
an investigation. The EAA was not regularly open on Sundays—the 
only non-work day for most foreign domestic workers—preventing 
some workers from filing complaints. To facilitate the ability of 
foreign domestic workers to make inquiries and complaints, LD 
operated an online portal as well as a 24-hour hotline available in 
nine languages. In 2020, LD prosecuted 11 agencies for overcharging 
workers, operating without a license, or other violations, but it did 
not report the number convicted (10 agencies convicted in 2019). LD 
cited non-compliance of the code of practice in decisions to revoke or 
reject the renewal of licenses of seven employment agencies in 2020 
(13 in 2019). Nevertheless, some employment agencies reportedly 
continued to operate—and unlawfully retain workers’ passports 
with impunity—after losing their licenses, sometimes reopening 
under different names. In addition, NGOs reported fines and other 
penalties given to employment agencies exploiting foreign domestic 
workers were too light and did not act as a deterrent. Despite having 
the legal discretion to revoke agency licenses administratively, 
observers reported the EAA over-relied on criminal convictions of 
agencies to do so. The government did not make efforts to reduce 
demand for commercial sex acts. The government did not provide 
anti-trafficking training to its personnel posted overseas. While the 
People’s Republic of China included Macau in its accession to the 
2000 UN TIP Protocol in 2010, it stated the Protocol “shall not 
apply” to Hong Kong.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Hong Kong, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Hong Kong abroad. Victims include citizens from mainland China, 
Indonesia, Kenya, the Philippines, Thailand, Uganda, and other 
Southeast Asian countries, as well as countries in South Asia, Africa, 
and South America. Traffickers exploit foreign women, including 
from Eastern Europe, Africa, and Southeast Asia, in sex trafficking. 
There were reports that some women in Hong Kong—often with the 
assistance of their families—deceive Indian and Pakistani men into 
arranged marriages that involve domestic servitude, bonded labor in 
construction and other physically demanding industries, and other 
forms of abuse via exploitative contracts. Traffickers exploit migrant 
workers in construction, electronic recycling facilities, nursing homes, 
and private homes. Drug trafficking syndicates coerced foreign 
women, including through the use of physical violence, to carry 
drugs into Hong Kong. 
Traffickers recruit victims from the Philippines, South America, and 
mainland China using false promises of lucrative employment and 
force them into commercial sex. Some foreign victims enter Hong 
Kong on two-week tourist visas, as part of a circuit of major cities 
in the region used by traffickers, including Bangkok and Taipei, 
and are coerced into commercial sex through debt-based coercion. 
Following increased travel restrictions related to the pandemic, 
there were fewer foreign individuals in commercial sex in Hong 
Kong throughout 2020, including trafficking victims. However, 
NGOs reported increasing occurrences of online solicitation of 
commercial sex acts, which reduced their access to individuals in 
commercial sex and may have increased individuals’ vulnerability to 
coercive tactics. Traffickers use coercive methods such as threats of 
reporting victims to police or immigration authorities, withholding 
of identification documents, and blackmailing victims with threats of 
online distribution of photographs to coerce them to engage in online 
commercial sex acts. “Compensated dating” continues to facilitate 
commercial sexual exploitation of Hong Kong children and adults, 
making them vulnerable to trafficking. Traffickers exploited victims 
from Hong Kong in North America in commercial sex.
Approximately 400,000 foreign domestic workers, primarily from 
Indonesia and the Philippines, work in Hong Kong. Some foreign 
domestic workers become victims of debt bondage in the private 
homes in which they are employed. A 2018 NGO task force survey of 
migrant workers found one-third of Indonesian workers in Hong Kong 
were asked to sign debt agreements as conditions of their employment. 
In addition, 56 percent of surveyed workers reported having to pay 
illegal recruitment fees, and 24 percent had their personal documents 
withheld by employment agencies or employers. Recent estimates 
suggest that as many as one in six foreign domestic workers are 
victims of labor exploitation in Hong Kong. Some operators of 
employment agencies subject victims to labor trafficking through 
debt-based coercion by charging workers job placement fees above 
legal limits, and sometimes withholding their identity documents. 
The accumulated debts sometimes amount to a significant portion 
of a worker’s first-year salary, and unscrupulous agencies sometimes 
compel workers to take loans from money lenders to pay excessive 
fees; a 2017 study estimated foreign domestic workers spend up 
to 35 percent of their monthly salary paying back money lenders. 
Some employers, money lenders, and employment agencies illegally 
withhold passports, employment contracts, or other possessions 
until the debt is paid. Some workers are required to work up to 17 
hours per day; experience verbal, sexual, or physical abuse in the 
home; live in inadequate conditions; and/or are not granted a legally 
required weekly day off. Throughout the pandemic, many workers 
faced increased workloads and daily work hours, and some employers 
denied workers the ability to take their mandated day off. In addition, 
many workers incurred additional debt from employment agencies 
for expenses related to quarantine requirements, further increasing 
their risk of experiencing debt-based coercion. Observers also reported 
that brothels, bars, and clubs increasingly recruited foreign domestic 
workers to engage in commercial sex acts, sometimes through 
fraudulent recruitment methods. Some foreign domestic workers sign 
contracts to work in Hong Kong, but upon arrival, traffickers coerce 
or lure them to work in mainland China, the Middle East, or Russia. 
As demand for foreign domestic workers in Hong Kong increased, 
NGOs reported workers from countries other than Indonesia and 
the Philippines were increasingly vulnerable to exploitation. Some 
employment agencies reportedly hired foreign domestic workers 








The Government of Hungary does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking 
capacity; therefore Hungary remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
investigating significantly more trafficking cases; convicting more 
traffickers; and identifying and assisting significantly more trafficking 
victims. Additionally, the government opened a crisis intervention 
home, a new shelter and two halfway houses connected to the shelter, 
three victim support centers, and an interdisciplinary center for child 
victims and witnesses. The government and an NGO implemented a 
two-year reintegration pilot project and conducted research on the 
development of an institutional support system aimed at facilitating 
victims’ reintegration and decreasing their chances of re-victimization. 
Furthermore, 2020 amendments to the law entered into force, 
including a non-punishment provision and a general protection 
measure for child trafficking victims. However, the government did not 
meet the minimum standards in several key areas. The government’s 
trafficking victim identification mechanism did not apply to foreign 
victims without legal residency. As a result, government officials did 
not adequately screen for trafficking indicators or identify victims 
among third-country nationals, such as asylum-seekers, as well as 
other vulnerable populations, including domestic workers or children 
in state-run institutions. The government did not have a specialized 
framework for identifying, referring, or assisting child victims, and 
penalized child sex trafficking victims. Overall services for victims 
remained scarce, uncoordinated, and inadequate, especially for 
foreigners and children, for whom there were no dedicated shelters; 
these gaps left victims at risk of re-trafficking. Finally, the government 
introduced a new asylum system that undermined access for those 
facing retribution or hardship in other countries and exacerbated 
the risks of trafficking among asylum-seekers, and extended again 
the “crisis situation due to mass migration” authorizing police to 
automatically remove third-country nationals, some of whom could 
be or could become trafficking victims, intercepted for unlawfully 
entering and/or staying in Hungary without screening for trafficking 
indicators.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Screen for trafficking indicators and proactively identify potential 
victims, especially among vulnerable populations, such as migrants 
and asylum-seekers, children in state-run institutions and orphanages, 
domestic workers, and individuals in commercial sex. • Significantly 
increase the quality and availability of specialized victim services for 
adults and children, including by expanding the national referral 
mechanism (NRM) to formally include foreign victims without 
legal residency and providing sufficient funding to NGOs for victim 
care. • Develop and fund protocols for identification and referral 
of victims and enhance training for law enforcement and social 
workers on recognizing indicators of exploitation. • Grant residence 
permits to asylum-seekers who could be or could become trafficking 
victims. • Implement the non-punishment provisions to ensure 
trafficking victims are not inappropriately incarcerated, fined, or 
otherwise penalized solely for unlawful acts their traffickers compelled 
them to commit. • Bolster efforts to protect against the trafficking 
of vulnerable children residing in state-run institutions and of 
individuals who leave these institutions. • Amend the anti-trafficking 
law to ensure that force, fraud, or coercion are not required for sex 
trafficking offenses involving child victims. • Investigate, prosecute, 
and convict traffickers under the trafficking statute and punish 
them with significant prison terms. • Enhance the collection and 
reporting of reliable prosecution data. • Train law enforcement, 
prosecutors, and judges on the severity of trafficking crimes and 
the irrelevance of a victim’s consent for proving a trafficking crime. 
• Develop a clear framework for and allocate dedicated resources 
to regulating foreign labor recruitment in Hungary. • Empower 
the labor authority to regulate labor recruitment agencies and 
impose fines or punishments on agencies that committed trafficking 
crimes. • Increase victim-centered, trauma-informed training for law 
enforcement, prosecutors, judges, and front-line workers. • Conduct 
public awareness campaigns on trafficking that target vulnerable 
populations, such as foreign and domestic workers and children in 
state-run institutions and orphanages.
PROSECUTION
The government increased prosecution efforts. Article 192 of the 
criminal code, in force since July 2020, criminalized all forms of 
labor trafficking and some forms of sex trafficking. Article 192 
prescribed penalties of one to 10 years’ imprisonment for offenses 
involving an adult victim, and five to 20 years’ or life imprisonment 
for those involving a child victim. These penalties were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. The 2020 
amendments helped align the Hungarian definition of trafficking with 
the international definition by more precisely defining exploitation 
and including force, fraud, or coercion as an essential element of 
the base offense of adult trafficking. However, inconsistent with 
international law, the amended Article 192 required a demonstration 
of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex trafficking offense, 
thereby not criminalizing all forms of child sex trafficking. Article 
203 of the criminal code, which criminalized offenses relating to the 
“exploitation of child prostitution,” could be utilized to prosecute 
some child sex trafficking offenses that did not necessarily involve 
force, fraud, or coercion. Article 203 prescribed penalties of up to 
three years’ imprisonment, which were not sufficiently stringent 
nor commensurate with penalties prescribed for other grave crimes, 
such as rape. Penalties under this provision increased only if a 
person was “supported partly or wholly by profiting” from such 
exploitation of a child or for maintaining or operating a brothel for 
the purposes of such exploitation of a child. Additionally, Article 
193 criminalized forced labor, with sentences ranging from one to 
five years’ imprisonment for offenses involving an adult victim and 
two to eight years’ imprisonment for those involving a child victim. 
Observers noted a gap in the law remained that could allow the 
prosecution of a victim if that victim consented to the crime without 
coercion. The Office of the Prosecutor General (PGO) instructed 
prosecutors not to prosecute such victims.
The government reported the number of registered crimes rather 
than the number of closed investigations because the data on 
closed investigations provided in previous years contained possible 
duplications. Despite the data on prosecutions also containing 
duplications, the government reported all prosecutions, thereby 
misrepresenting the number of suspected traffickers in the criminal 
justice system and making it difficult to assess efforts. Additionally, 
the government noted prosecutorial guidelines issued in 2018 resulted 
in a number of pandering cases reclassified as trafficking cases. In 
2020, police registered 95 trafficking crimes (57 under Article 192, 
four under Article 193, 34 under Article 203), a notable increase 
from 49 in 2019 and 47 in 2018. Officials prosecuted 209 suspected 
traffickers (155 under Article 192, six under Article 193, 48 under 
Article 203), compared with 88 in 2019 and 29 in 2018. Courts 
convicted 10 traffickers (nine under Article 192, one under Article 
193), compared with seven in 2019 and 11 in 2018. All 10 convicted 
traffickers received prison sentences, ranging from one year and eight 
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months’ to 12 years and six months’ imprisonment; however, courts 
suspended four of those sentences. The more lenient sentences raised 
concerns about weakened deterrence and undercutting broader 
efforts to fight trafficking. For the third consecutive year, there were 
no convictions under Article 203; observers raised concerns that 
authorities regularly underutilized the statute. The government 
did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of 
government employees complicit in trafficking crimes. The National 
Bureau of Investigations (NNI) maintained a specialized unit for 
investigating trafficking cases with an international or organized crime 
connection. NNI cooperated with foreign law enforcement agencies 
on 10 investigations and participated in one Joint Investigation 
Team, compared with 15 in 2019. In October 2020, authorities from 
Hungary, Germany, and Romania investigated a group of Romanian 
traffickers who exploited Hungarian and Romanian citizens in forced 
begging in Germany. The government extradited two suspected 
traffickers in 2020, compared with six in 2019.
Observers continued to underscore that the government lacked 
experts working on trafficking cases and a sophisticated perspective 
on addressing all aspects of trafficking. In 2020, NNI approved four 
additional positions to the 11-person trafficking unit. Furthermore, 
a research institute within the PGO conducted two studies on 
criminological and sociological characteristics of trafficking; the 
Ministry of Interior (MOI) funded related training sessions for 
investigators, prosecutors, and judges on the studies’ topics, as well 
as the victim support system and the new statutory definition of 
trafficking. The National Office for the Judiciary held trainings for 
judges on the amended law with 237 participants. Some judges 
believed the new law defined exploitation more clearly and provided 
better clarity as to the difference between voluntary commercial 
sex work and sexual exploitation but noted labor trafficking cases 
remained difficult to try in court. The Curia (Supreme Court) set up a 
case law analysis group to learn about judicial practice in interpreting 
trafficking, and the PGO conducted a survey to better understand 
prosecutors’ views on trafficking and victim cooperation. The National 
Police held an online training session focused on victim identification 
for 50 investigators from local police units. In the framework of an 
EU project implemented by the Ministry of Human Capacities, 48 
police officers participated in a training focused on the identification 
and management of domestic violence and trafficking.
PROTECTION
The government increased efforts to protect victims. The government 
reported 188 registered trafficking victims (94 sex trafficking, 25 
labor trafficking, eight sex and labor trafficking, 61 uncategorized), 
a significant increase from 81 in 2019 and 30 in 2018. Of these 
victims, 21 were children (seven in 2019). The government decree on 
the trafficking victim identification mechanism, which established 
the NRM, regulated the identification and referral of victims to 
assistance. The decree listed the authorities responsible for identifying 
victims, such as police, border guards, and health professionals, 
the questionnaire to be completed with suspected victims, and 
procedural protocols. Experts expressed concern that the decree did 
not apply to foreign victims without legal residency. Experts also 
expressed concern about the lack of efforts made to identify trafficking 
victims among asylum-seekers and irregular migrants in Hungary. 
Overall, the government did not screen or adequately identify victims 
among vulnerable populations, such as asylum-seekers, domestic 
and foreign workers, unaccompanied children, children living in 
government-run institutions, and adults and children exploited in 
commercial sex. Some experts noted the need for further training for 
local police on the vulnerability of individuals in commercial sex to 
trafficking, including children, screening for trafficking indicators, 
and applying the non-punishment provision to trafficking victims. 
Furthermore, the government often did not implement a 2011 EU 
directive requiring authorities to treat individuals subjected to sex 
trafficking as trafficking victims regardless of victim consent – per 
the government decree, authorities required victims’ written consent 
for identification and access to assistance. According to NGOs, 
identification, referral, and assistance took place on an ad hoc basis, 
and NGOs and social service providers mainly based the process 
on their personal networks and connections. NGOs expressed the 
need for the government to allocate more effectively its resources, 
particularly in the identification and referral of victims. They also 
continued to criticize the lack of dedicated state funding for victim 
assistance services.
Victim assistance services remained scarce and uncoordinated, 
especially for foreigners and children, and exposed victims to the risk 
of re-victimization. In 2020, NGOs reported assisting 80 trafficking 
victims (58 in 2019, 79 in 2018) of which 13 were children (16 in 
2019). Seventy-nine of the victims were Hungarian citizens, and 
one was a foreign citizen. While the NRM did not apply to foreign 
victims without legal residency, the government granted ad hoc 
approval to a government-funded NGO to provide services, such as 
financial support, shelter, and health care, in cases when the NGO 
requested it; during the reporting period, the government assisted 
a sex trafficking victim from Mozambique. Foreign victims could 
receive a 30-day reflection period to decide whether to assist law 
enforcement, during which they were eligible for a certificate of 
temporary stay for up to six months. Those who cooperated with 
authorities were entitled to a residence permit for the duration of 
their cooperation. In 2020, the government issued one temporary 
residence permit to the Mozambican, compared with zero in 2019.
Following the European Court of Justice’s ruling that the automatic 
and indefinite placement of asylum-seekers in border transit zones 
constituted unlawful detention, the government moved nearly 300 
people to reception centers around the country and closed the transit 
zones. The government introduced a new asylum system in which 
asylum requests could only be submitted through its embassies 
in Belgrade or Kyiv; requests required asylum-seekers to submit 
a statement of intent, including general questions but excluding 
trafficking-specific questions. While NGOs welcomed the closure of 
the transit zones, they expressed concern that the new system restricted 
access to asylum and exacerbated the risks of trafficking among 
asylum-seekers. Additionally, the government once again extended 
the “crisis situation due to mass migration,” which authorized 
police to automatically remove third-country nationals, some of 
whom could be or could become trafficking victims, intercepted for 
unlawfully entering and/or staying in Hungary. Experts expressed 
concern that the new asylum system precluded those people already 
in the country’s territory and in need of international protection from 
applying, undermining access to asylum for those facing retribution 
or hardship in other countries.
All Hungarian and EU victims were eligible for government-provided 
financial support, psychological services, legal assistance, witness 
care, and shelter. In 2020, the government allocated 24.3 million 
Hungarian forint (HUF) ($81,880), the same amount as in 2019, to 
an NGO operating two temporary shelters. Both shelters could assist 
up to 12 adult victims each with accommodation, transport, psycho-
social support, and legal information. Additionally, the government 
provided 80 million HUF ($269,580) for the establishment of a 
crisis intervention home and a new shelter; both opened in 2020. 
The government allocated an additional 15 million HUF ($50,550) 
annually for the operation of the new shelter, which could assist up 
to 12 victims. Two halfway houses connected to the new shelter also 
opened in 2020, for which the government provided 8 million HUF 
($26,960) annually. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) opened three 
victim support centers in 2020 with the goal to open three centers 
per year until 2025, creating a nationwide network of victim support 
centers; trained the staff at the centers on identifying and registering 
trafficking victims; and allocated 450 million HUF ($1.52 million) 
for the operation of the centers as well as the MOJ-run victim support 
hotline. Additionally, the MOJ provided financial aid, certificates of 
victim status, and witness counseling, if the government initiated 
criminal proceedings against a trafficker. In 2020, the government 
provided 781,900 HUF ($2,630) in financial aid to 12 trafficking 






provided witness counseling to 15 victims (one younger than the age 
of 14). The government repatriated one adult victim, the same as in 
2019. The government did not have a dedicated program to provide 
return and reintegration assistance for Hungarian victims identified 
abroad. However, in 2020, the government and an NGO implemented 
a two-year pilot project aimed at providing 50 potential trafficking 
victims with reintegration support. The government partially funded 
the project, contributing 25 million HUF ($84,240). Under the 
auspices of the project, each victim was eligible for up to 500,000 
HUF ($1,680) in financial support; during the reporting period, 
three victims received payments. The government, in partnership 
with another NGO, conducted research on the development of an 
institutional support system aimed at facilitating victims’ reintegration 
and decreasing the chances of re-victimization, providing 5 million 
HUF ($16,850) in research funding.
During the reporting period, anti-trafficking amendments to the 
criminal code entered into force. The amendments included a non-
punishment provision for child trafficking victims and a general 
protection measure provision authorizing police to place child 
trafficking victims in designated shelters for up to 60 days. Observers 
generally were optimistic about the new legislation, but some 
noted there remained a lack of awareness among professionals 
about the general protection measure, as information was not 
widely disseminated. In September 2020, the government formed 
an intersectoral working group to implement the measure among 
stakeholders, such as police and designated children’s homes. There 
were five such homes (one exclusively for boys) designated in 2020 for 
the reception of child victims; the working group referred two child 
victims during the reporting period. Perennial issues persisted with 
protecting and providing assistance to child victims. The government 
lacked a framework for identifying, referring, or assisting child victims 
other than the general child protection system and state-run homes, 
which had insufficient staff and resources to provide appropriate 
care or security, leaving victims at risk for re-trafficking. Some experts 
criticized the chronic lack of assistance and specialized services in 
state-run homes. Experts continued to express concern that children 
in state-run homes or orphanages were vulnerable to trafficking 
– approximately 23,000 children lived in state-run institutions, 
including 300 younger than three years of age. EU and national 
requirements required child protection institutions and state-run 
homes to report all suspected cases of children exploited in sex 
trafficking; however, according to observers, some law enforcement 
did not treat them as victims. The failure to eliminate the requirement 
of force, fraud, or coercion from the anti-trafficking law for child sex 
trafficking offenses contributed to this inappropriate penalization. 
In 2020, authorities penalized 19 children (30 in 2019, 54 in 2018), 
all of whom were girls, for commercial sex offenses—11 children 
received a warning, six received a fine, and two received community 
service. Experts questioned the accuracy of government data on the 
penalization of children noting children were most likely detained 
by authorities for short periods of time. In 2020, the government 
allocated 31.5 million HUF ($106,150) to the operation of a newly 
opened interdisciplinary center for child victims and witnesses in 
Budapest, and 42.5 million HUF ($143,210) for the operation of 
another center in Szombathely. Through the Ministry of Human 
Capacities, 2,447 child protection professionals received a 30-hour 
vocational training on child trafficking. The government operated 
a 24-hour child protection hotline, which received three alerts in 
connection with a potential child sex trafficking victim in state care.
PREVENTION
The government maintained minimal prevention efforts. During the 
reporting period, the government adopted a 2020-2021 national action 
plan to implement the 2020-2023 national anti-trafficking strategy, 
allocating 91 million HUF ($306,650) for the 2020 plan, a decrease 
from 159 million HUF ($535,790) for the 2019 plan. The police 
conducted an awareness campaign designed to educate children about 
the dangers of trafficking. The government supported the operation 
of an NGO-run, 24-hour national hotline, providing approximately 
202.5 million HUF ($682,370), an increase from 52.5 million HUF 
($176,910) in 2019. The hotline provided services in Hungarian and 
English and assisted victims of domestic violence and trafficking. In 
2020, the hotline assisted 51 potential victims and referred 19 victims 
to shelter (56 and 16, respectively, in 2019). The MOI researched 
the effectiveness of victim assistance among male labor trafficking 
victims and prepared the findings for publication and incorporation 
into the national strategy, allocating 1.8 million HUF ($6,070) for 
this research. The government did not have a clear framework and 
dedicated resources to regulate foreign labor recruitment, which 
exposed foreign nationals to the risk of exploitation. The labor 
authority did not have the competency to inspect labor recruitment 
agencies or impose fines or punishment on foreign labor exchange 
agencies that committed trafficking offenses. It could assess agencies’ 
compliance with regulations concerning temporary work but did 
not report identifying any victims while conducting this type of 
inspection. The government did not make efforts to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Hungary, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Hungary abroad. Vulnerable groups include Hungarians in extreme 
poverty, undereducated young adults, Roma, single mothers, asylum-
seekers, unaccompanied children, and homeless men. Traffickers 
exploit Hungarian women, boys, and girls in sex trafficking within 
the country and abroad, mostly within Europe, with particularly 
high numbers in Germany, Austria, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom (UK). Traffickers exploit Hungarians in labor trafficking 
in agriculture, construction, hospitality, and factories domestically 
and abroad, particularly in Belgium, the UK, and the Netherlands. 
NGOs report domestic labor trafficking is an increasing concern, 
particularly in rural areas, among Ukrainians and other third-
country nationals who come to Hungary to assist with the country’s 
labor shortage. Authorities note a rise in forced labor in domestic 
service among homeless or elderly individuals. Approximately 
23,000 Hungarian children live in state-run childcare institutions, 
including 300 younger than three years of age, who are vulnerable to 
trafficking. A large number of child sex trafficking victims exploited 
within the country and abroad come from state-run institutions 
and correctional facilities, and traffickers recruit them when they 
leave these institutions. Trafficking victims from Eastern European 
countries, as well as asylum-seekers and irregular migrants, some of 
whom may be or may become trafficking victims, transit Hungary 
en route to Western Europe. Seasonal workers are at risk for labor 
trafficking in the agriculture and construction sectors.
ICELAND: TIER 2
The Government of Iceland does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Iceland remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
investigating more trafficking cases; identifying more potential 
trafficking victims; adopting and implementing a national referral 
mechanism (NRM); and establishing a centralized database for 
collecting victim information and case history. Furthermore, the 
government opened a new women’s shelter and a counseling and 
support center for victims and signed two agreements with dedicated 
funding to support additional accommodations for potential victims. 
However, the government did not meet the minimum standards 
in several key areas. Authorities continued to charge suspected 
traffickers under non-trafficking statutes, such as smuggling, and the 
government did not prosecute or convict any suspected traffickers 
for the tenth consecutive year.
ICELAND
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2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Significantly increase efforts to prosecute and convict suspected 
traffickers. • Vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking cases 
under the trafficking statute. • Proactively identify trafficking victims 
and refer them to care facilities for assistance. • Screen all vulnerable 
individuals for trafficking indicators and stay deportation of potential 
victims prior to identification and care. • Enhance training for 
investigating cases and collecting evidence against suspected traffickers. 
• Increase training for police, prosecutors, judges, and other officials 
on all aspects of trafficking, particularly on proactive identification of 
victims among migrant workers, asylum-seekers, and unaccompanied 
children.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Article 227a of 
the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed penalties of up to 12 years’ imprisonment. These 
penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, 
commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such 
as rape. In 2020, authorities initiated 22 investigations (eight sex 
trafficking, 10 labor trafficking, and four uncategorized), a significant 
increase from five in 2019 and 15 in 2018. As in the past decade, the 
government did not prosecute or convict any trafficking cases, but 
police referred one labor trafficking case to prosecutors, compared 
with two (one sex trafficking and one labor trafficking) in 2019. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government officials complicit in trafficking offenses. 
Icelandic authorities maintained cooperation with EUROPOL and 
INTERPOL on international investigations.
Experts noted that limitations of a small government administration 
and a lack of clear policy, structure across government institutions, 
and resources restricted progress and coordination. Government 
officials acknowledged flaws in the criminal justice system. For 
instance, lengthy investigations, inadequate evidence collection, and 
overly stringent requirements, such as a high bar for prosecutions, 
led prosecutors to charge suspects under non-trafficking statutes, 
such as smuggling, that carried more lenient penalties and were 
easier to convict. Consequently, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) 
developed amendments to the law to facilitate prosecutions by 
lowering the threshold for evidence required; the amendments 
were pending approval by Parliament at the end of the reporting 
period. A government official noted that maintaining statistics on 
trafficking cases also remained a challenge as trafficking was often 
one component of larger prosecutions linked to organized crime. 
As a result, the MOJ allocated 350 million Icelandic krona (ISK) 
($2.75 million) to law enforcement to combat organized crime; 
authorities reported 15 organized crime groups in Iceland involved 
in a range of illegal activities, including trafficking. Officials and 
observers acknowledged the need to develop the capacity and 
expertise to combat organized crime and identified training as an 
area for improvement. Subsequently, the government continued to 
allocate 17.5 million ISK ($137,680) to the commissioner’s office 
to conduct training on organized crime and preventing trafficking, 
money laundering, and terrorism. Experts underscored the need 
for consistently educating law enforcement, prosecutors, and 
judges on all aspects of trafficking, noting a shortfall of trafficking 
expertise in law enforcement. In response, the National Police 
Commissioner published comprehensive guidelines for police 
officers on investigating trafficking cases. Additionally, the Reykjavik 
Metropolitan Police maintained a three-person unit for combating 
trafficking and commercial sex with a budget of 52.5 million ISK 
($413,030) supported by a cyber-crime unit that monitored the 
internet for trafficking activity. Moreover, the North Iceland Police 
maintained a two-person team focused on commercial sex and 
labor violations and a 33 million ISK ($259,620) budget, and 
the Southwestern District Police, which covered the border police 
at Keflavik International Airport, operated a unit specializing in 
major crime investigations, including trafficking. Furthermore, the 
police college curriculum included a legal course and instruction on 
investigating trafficking cases.
PROTECTION
The government increased victim protection efforts. The government 
identified nine potential trafficking victims (eight sex trafficking, 
one sex and labor trafficking), compared with seven in 2019; all 
of the identified victims were adult foreign nationals. The police 
established identification procedures and maintained standardized 
referral procedures requiring them to contact welfare services in 
the municipality and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOW) to 
coordinate victim care and placement. During the reporting period, 
the government adopted a NRM and implemented it at the Bjarkarhlíð 
Family Justice Center. The center assumed the responsibility in July 
and continued to serve as a “one stop shop” for victims of violence, 
including trafficking. The government’s action plan on preventing 
violence and its consequences, which included action items to combat 
trafficking and provide services for victims, allocated 6 million ISK 
($47,200) to open and operate the center in northern Iceland. 
Additionally, the government allocated 3 million ISK ($23,600) for 
the NRM for one year. Through the NRM, the center coordinated 
social services and law enforcement involvement; provided victims 
with assistance; and compiled victim information and case history 
into a new centralized database developed to reflect accurately the 
scope of trafficking in Iceland. Furthermore, under the auspices of the 
NRM, officials developed a standardized questionnaire for victims 
to better quantify and identify vulnerable groups. A team of experts 
worked to refer victims to relevant NGOs or institutions providing 
short- or long-term care. The action plan on preventing violence and 
its consequences called for the creation of standardized guidance for 
all anti-trafficking service providers, and allocated 15 million ISK 
($118,010) annually until 2023 to ensure the implementation of the 
guidance as well as all action items no later than 2022. During the 
reporting period, the government partnered with an NGO to open 
a new women’s shelter in Akureyri, the largest town in northern 
Iceland, as a two-year pilot project. The government also signed 
an agreement providing 100 million ISK ($786,720) to support 
building the shelter with additional housing units in Reykjavik. 
Separately, as part of its pandemic-stimulus package in November 
2020, the government signed an agreement with the same NGO for 
a new emergency shelter in Reykjavik using donated funds—100 
million ISK ($786,720)—from last reporting period. Additionally, 
the government provided 1.5 million ISK ($11,800) to create a new 
counseling and support center for victims of gender-based violence, 
including trafficking, in southern Iceland. The center opened at the 
end of the reporting period.
Overall, the government maintained a well-managed social welfare 
system with robust protections. Victims had access to free legal, 
medical, psychological, and financial assistance, whether or not 
they stayed at a shelter or cooperated with authorities. In 2020, three 
potential victims received assistance from social services, compared 
with one potential victim in 2019. Municipal and national child 
protection services were responsible for assisting unaccompanied 
children, including child trafficking victims. Observers noted 
shortcomings in the assistance process for unaccompanied children, 
noting that the Directorate of Immigration placed such children in 
an unsupervised reception center with no child protection staff, only 
one security guard, and free access from other residents, putting 
them at risk to trafficking. There were no accommodations available 






services and receive referrals to NGOs providing food, shelter, legal 
advice, and health care. Municipal social service agencies provided 
services and financial assistance to trafficking victims, and the MOW 
reimbursed the municipalities for all associated expenses. Foreign 
trafficking victims could obtain either a nine-month residence permit 
or a one-year renewable residence permit, which was available to 
victims who faced retribution or hardship in their home countries or 
cooperated with law enforcement. Officials noted, in most instances of 
suspected trafficking, foreign victims opted to leave the country instead 
of cooperating with investigations. In response to the pandemic, 
the government amended the regulation for foreign nationals who 
could not return to their country of origin or legal residency, granting 
them the right to remain lawfully in Iceland until November 10, 
2020; these regulations also applied to trafficking victims. Despite 
reports that the government screened all deportees for trafficking 
indicators, observers expressed concern over removals of West 
African asylum-seekers who reported being trafficking victims prior 
to arriving in Iceland.
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. The government 
continued to implement its national action plan (NAP), which 
included proposed revisions to legislation, regulations, and 
administrative directives and action items focused on bolstering 
public awareness, education, and institutional knowledge. Three task 
forces, which included a range of government and non-government 
stakeholders, each assigned with developing specific policy proposals 
to implement the NAP, comprised the MOJ-led national steering 
group, which coordinated interagency anti-trafficking efforts. One 
of the task forces noted the need to raise awareness as well as bolster 
education for authorities and the general public. Accordingly, the 
police collaborated with airport authorities to educate employees 
on trafficking and created a video detailing the different types of 
trafficking, victim identification, and notification procedures. The 
police, in partnership with an international airline, conducted 
training and instituted procedures for front-line personnel to respond 
to trafficking situations. Furthermore, the government allocated 5 
million ISK ($39,340) for awareness and education campaigns, 
informing foreign workers about their rights in the Icelandic labor 
market. Separately, an Icelandic research institute received 4 million 
ISK ($31,470) from the government to produce educational videos 
about trafficking to help workplace inspectors detect potential 
incidents. The government granted approximately 2 million ISK 
($15,730) to the Icelandic Confederation of Labor for educational 
materials on organized labor trafficking. The Directorate of Labor 
(DOL) maintained a three-person team to respond to suspected 
trafficking cases and educate government employees on trafficking 
and identifying potential victims. The DOL also maintained a 
website providing information on the rights of foreign workers in 
Iceland and the resources available to them. In cooperation with EU 
countries, the DOL participated in a project aimed at reducing labor 
market violations and labor trafficking, by combating black-market 
employment and social dumping, whereby workers are given pay or 
living or working conditions that are sub-standard compared to the 
law. In 2020, the government included supply chain responsibility 
provisions in the Public Procurement Act stipulating the liability 
of principal contractors to ensure all sub-contractors get paid in 
accordance with collective bargaining agreements. The Act also 
stipulated if a bidder or a participant was a convicted trafficker, 
they were barred from procurement bids for a minimum of three 
years. Due to the economic consequences of the pandemic and 
companies reducing the number of hours their employees worked, 
the government passed a temporary provision entitling payment 
of unemployment benefits—up to 75 percent of salaries; most 
applications came from employees in the tourism industry, which 
comprised mainly migrant workers who remained vulnerable to 
labor trafficking. Government efforts to combat child sexual abuse, 
including trafficking, extended abroad with the allocation of 36 
million ISK ($283,220) to a project in Togo. The government made 
efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts by investigating 
48 individuals suspected of purchasing commercial sex.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Iceland, and, to a lesser extent, traffickers 
exploit victims from Iceland abroad. Authorities report that most 
trafficking cases involve small businesses or individual traffickers, 
who are foreign nationals living legally in Iceland and engaging in 
other criminal activities but note a rise in organized crime. Traffickers 
exploit women from Africa, Eastern Europe, the Baltics, and South 
America in sex trafficking and men and women from Asia, the Baltics, 
Eastern Europe, and West Africa in forced labor. Labor trafficking 
continues to be the largest concern in Iceland with migrant workers 
in the construction, tourism, and restaurant industries as well as 
domestic service particularly vulnerable. However, labor union 
officials report fewer migrant workers in Iceland due to the pandemic. 
Foreign “posted workers” are at particular risk of forced labor as the 
traffickers pay them in their home countries and contract them to 
work for up to 183 days in Iceland to avoid taxes and union fees, 
limiting tax authorities’ and union officials’ ability to monitor their 
work conditions and pay. Asylum-seekers and foreign students in 
Iceland are especially vulnerable to trafficking. A 2019 police threat 
assessment report notes a nascent nexus between asylum abuse and 
organized crime through which traffickers seek to manipulate the 
asylum system.  Traffickers reportedly exploit the visa-free regime 
in the Schengen Zone and the European Economic Area to bring 
victims to Iceland for up to three months and move them out of the 
country before they must register with local authorities.
INDIA: TIER 2
The Government of India does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts 
to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts 
compared to the previous reporting period, considering the impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
India remained on Tier 2. These efforts included identifying more 
victims and investigating and prosecuting more trafficking cases. In 
response to heightened vulnerabilities to trafficking as a result of the 
pandemic, the government allocated funding for the strengthening 
of existing and establishment of new Anti-Human Trafficking Units 
(AHTUs) around the country, and media reported railway and 
transit police increased patrolling of transportation hubs to prevent 
and intercept perpetrators and victims of human trafficking. The 
government allocated funding to establish “women help desks” in 
10,000 police stations across the country and facilitated services for 
victims of crime, including human trafficking. Indian courts expanded 
the use of video testimony for trafficking victims during the pandemic. 
Some states also made notable efforts to include issuing standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) for victim identification of bonded 
labor and granting the maximum amount of compensation outlined 
in policy to bonded labor victims. However, the government did not 
meet the minimum standards in several areas. Overall anti-trafficking 
efforts, especially against bonded labor, remained inadequate. The 
government achieved fewer convictions, and the acquittal rate 
for traffickers remained high at 73 percent. Official complicity in 
trafficking remained a concern; the government did not report any 
prosecutions or convictions. Although law enforcement increased 
victim identifications, they identified disproportionately few victims 
compared with the scope of the problem, with some organizations 
estimating eight million trafficking victims in India. Efforts to 
audit government-run or -funded shelters remained inadequate, 
and significant shortcomings in protections for victims, especially 
children, remain unaddressed. Many victims waited years to receive 
central-government mandated compensation, and often state and 
district legal offices did not proactively request the compensation or 
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assist victims in filing applications. Some foreign trafficking victims 
remained in state-run shelters for years due to lengthy or non-existent 
repatriation processes. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase investigations, prosecutions, and convictions of all forms 
of trafficking, including bonded labor. • Vigorously investigate 
allegations of official complicity in human trafficking and sentence 
perpetrators to significant prison terms. • Criminally investigate all 
reports of bonded labor. • Develop and immediately implement 
regular monitoring mechanisms of shelters to ensure adequate care, 
and promptly disburse funding to shelters that meet official standards 
for care. • Improve clarity on central and state government mandates 
for and implementation of protection programs and compensation 
schemes for trafficking victims, especially children, to ensure states 
provide release certificates, compensation, and non-cash benefits to 
all victims immediately. • Urge prosecutors to routinely request and 
judges to award, as appropriate, trafficking victim compensation, 
and urge legal aid offices to routinely inform trafficking victims of 
available compensation mechanisms. • Encourage state and territory 
compliance with the Supreme Court’s recommendation to audit all 
government-run and -funded shelter homes. • Cease penalization 
of trafficking victims. • De-link provision of the 2016 bonded labor 
scheme’s overall victim compensation from conviction of the trafficker. 
• Cease detention of adult trafficking victims in government-run 
and government-funded shelters. • Strengthen existing AHTUs 
through increased funding and trainings of staff and ensure newly 
created AHTUs are fully operational. • Continue to disseminate and 
implement standard operating procedures for victim identification 
and referral, and train officials on their use. • Amend the definition of 
trafficking in Section 370 of the Penal Code to include labor trafficking 
and ensure that force, fraud, or coercion are not required to prove a 
child sex trafficking crime. • Eliminate all recruitment fees charged 
to workers. • Increase oversight of, and protections for, workers in 
the informal sector, including home-based workers. • Lift bans on 
female migration through agreements with destination countries 
that protect Indian workers from human trafficking. • Update and 
implement a national action plan to combat trafficking. • Provide 
anti-trafficking training for diplomatic personnel.
PROSECUTION
The government modestly increased anti-trafficking law enforcement 
efforts, although efforts remained inadequate compared to the scale 
of the problem. Indian law criminalized sex trafficking and some 
forms of labor trafficking. Section 370 of the Indian Penal Code 
(IPC) criminalized trafficking offenses that involved exploitation 
that included any act of physical exploitation or any form of sexual 
exploitation, slavery or practices similar to slavery, and servitude. 
The law did not explicitly address labor trafficking. Section 370 
prescribed penalties ranging from seven to 10 years’ imprisonment 
and a fine for offenses involving an adult victim, and 10 years’ to 
life imprisonment and a fine for those involving a child victim; 
these penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other serious 
crimes, such as kidnapping. Inconsistent with international law, 
Section 370 required a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion 
to constitute a child sex trafficking offense and therefore did not 
criminalize all forms of child sex trafficking. However, Sections 
372 and 373 of the IPC criminalized the exploitation of children 
through prostitution without requiring a demonstration of such 
means, thereby addressing this gap. These sections prescribed 
penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine, which were 
also sufficiently stringent and commensurate with those prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as kidnapping. Bonded labor was 
specifically criminalized in the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled 
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and the Bonded Labor System 
(Abolition) Act (BLSA), which prescribed penalties of up to five years’ 
imprisonment and up to three years’ imprisonment, respectively. The 
penalties prescribed under the BLSA were not sufficiently stringent. 
Police continued to file trafficking cases under the Juvenile Justice 
Act and other sections of the IPC, which criminalized many forms 
of forced labor; however, these provisions were unevenly enforced, 
and some of their prescribed penalties were not sufficiently stringent, 
allowing for only fines or short prison sentences. Additionally, the 
government prosecuted sex trafficking crimes under other laws like 
the Protection of Children from Sexual Offenses Act (POCSO) and 
the Immoral Traffic Prevention Act (ITPA), which criminalized 
various offenses relating to commercial sexual exploitation. The 
recruitment of children younger than age 18 by non-state armed 
groups is criminally prohibited by Section 83 (1) of the Juvenile 
Justice Act. A draft anti-trafficking bill from 2018 lapsed with the 
dissolution of the lower house in 2019. The government was working 
on a revised bill, which was yet to be presented to Parliament at the 
close of the reporting period. 
During the reporting period, the National Crime and Records 
Bureau (NCRB) issued its 2019 Crime in India Report. In 2019, the 
government reported 2,088 trafficking cases under the IPC compared 
with 1,830 trafficking cases in 2018 and 2,854 trafficking cases 
reported in 2017. The government did not report what sections of 
the IPC were included in the data, and the government reported the 
same number of cases for West Bengal in 2018 and 2019 because West 
Bengal did not provide new data. In 2019, the government completed 
prosecution in 600 trafficking cases, convicted 306 traffickers in 160 
cases, and acquitted 1,329 suspects in 440 cases. The acquittal rate 
for trafficking cases was 73 percent in 2019. These statistics were 
compared with the government completing prosecution in 545 
cases, convicting 322 traffickers in 95 cases, and acquitting 1,124 
suspects in 450 cases in 2018, with 83 percent of cases resulting 
in acquittal. Three of India’s 36 states and territories reported a 
third of all trafficking cases, most likely due to more sophisticated 
reporting in those states and territories rather than larger trafficking 
problems. The government ordered a nationwide lockdown due 
to the pandemic from March to May 2020; subsequently, regular 
court proceedings and evidence collection were suspended. Courts 
resumed trials using video conferencing and online applications after 
some of the lockdown restrictions were removed in the summer of 
2020. India’s Supreme Court encouraged courts across the country 
to utilize online technologies to continue to hear trafficking cases 
virtually during the pandemic. 
Overall law enforcement efforts across the country, especially against 
bonded labor, remained inadequate compared to the scale of the 
problem. The law required police to file a First Information Report 
(FIR) upon receipt of information about the commission of a 
cognizable offense, such as forced labor or sex trafficking, which 
legally bound police to initiate a criminal investigation. Police did 
not always arrest suspected traffickers, file FIRs to officially register 
a complaint, or file FIRs under trafficking crimes; and officials often 
settled cases at the complaint stage. For example, in a child trafficking 
case during the reporting period, the police filed a FIR under IPC 
360 (kidnapping) instead of POCSO and IPC 370 (trafficking of 
minors), allowing the alleged trafficker to be released on bail directly 
following his arrest. In recent years, West Bengal, Jharkhand, and 
Assam state authorities allegedly ordered police to register trafficking 
cases as kidnapping or missing persons to reduce the number of 
trafficking cases in official statistics. In December 2020, the Supreme 
Court directed the states of West Bengal, Assam, and Rajasthan to 
ensure video conferencing facilities were available for children and 
trafficking witnesses to help mitigate case delays caused by the 





pandemic-related lockdown, district courts granted bail to some 
alleged traffickers without serving notification of bail hearings to 
prosecutors or victims, including child victims, in contravention 
of the POCSO Act. This resulted in prosecutors and victims being 
unable to present counter arguments in bail hearings and raised 
concerns of alleged traffickers intimidating victims. 
The lack of sufficient political will across many states to address 
bonded labor stymied efforts nationwide. NGOs previously estimated 
police did not file FIRs in at least half of bonded labor cases nationally, 
especially in Bihar and Rajasthan. NGOs stated police, at times, 
allegedly did not file cases to shield traffickers or to avoid paying 
compensation to victims. In 2019, law enforcement reported 1,155 
cases of bonded labor under the BLSA, an increase from 778 cases 
in 2018. In 2019, officials convicted 52 persons in 33 cases under 
the BLSA and acquitted 90 persons in 38 cases. These statistics were 
a sharp decrease, compared with 2018, when officials convicted 331 
persons in 198 cases under the BLSA and acquitted 189 persons 
in 142 cases. In the 2018 Crime in India Report, the government 
began including in the BLSA statistics cases that district and labor 
officials handled administratively, including through summary 
trials; therefore, because the majority of “convictions” in 2018 and 
2019 were administrative decisions, traffickers received inadequate 
sentences of fines, and authorities did not criminally investigate 
human trafficking crimes. Twenty-one of India’s 36 states and 
union territories reported not identifying any bonded labor victims 
or filing any cases under the BLSA in 2019. This was an increase 
from 17 states and territories not identifying any bonded labor 
victims or filing any cases under the BLSA in either 2017 or 2018, 
despite continued NGO and media reports of bonded labor victims 
identified in some of those states. Similar to 2018, Uttar Pradesh 
accounted for 80 percent of all cases under the BLSA, but the evidence 
did not suggest it had a disproportionately large problem, which 
called into question other states’ efforts to address bonded labor. 
Some district magistrates dissuaded bonded labor victims from 
pursuing cases against their traffickers and mediated cases in lieu 
of criminal prosecution. NGOs reported the collaboration between 
Karnataka agencies and other stakeholders resulted in the removal 
from exploitation of approximately 500 bonded laborers between 
January and June of 2020. Tamil Nadu officials conducted more 
than 30 operations to remove approximately 1,500 bonded laborers 
from exploitation between January and November of 2020. However, 
in June 2020, Tamil Nadu district officials did not charge a brick 
kiln owner with violating bonded labor laws because the district 
administration did not have the funding necessary to compensate 
victims as mandated by the BLSA, due to pandemic-related budget 
shortfalls. Police subsequently arrested the brick kiln owner on two 
other criminal charges. Additionally, Tamil Nadu police and local 
government officials removed 173 children (mostly young girls) 
from a private spinning mill. The children, ages 13-18, worked 
14-hour days with no days off. Police did not file charges under the 
Child Labor (Abolition and Regulation) Act or the BLSA and instead 
filed an FIR under IPC Sections 269 and 271 for negligence “likely 
to spread infection of disease dangerous to life,” an enforcement 
provision resulting from the pandemic. 
AHTUs, legally established by state governments and partially funded 
by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), served as the primary 
investigative force for human trafficking crimes. At the end of the 
previous reporting period, the government announced it would 
expand the number of AHTUs from 332 districts to all of India’s 
732 districts; the government did not report the outcome of this 
expansion or final number of AHTUs during the current reporting 
period. In July 2020, in response to the pandemic, the MHA advised 
all Indian states and Union Territories (UTs) to expedite setting up 
new AHTUs and to strengthen existing ones. MHA also advised the 
state governments to create a coordination mechanism among the 
different departments, conduct community awareness programs on 
missing children, increase patrols of transit points and international 
borders, and train police officers on victim-centered investigations 
and protection. MHA released 42.3 million Indian rupees (INR) 
($579,180) to Telangana to set up units in each of its 13 districts 
and 18 million INR ($246,460) to Kerala to expand resources in 
five AHTUs operating in rural police districts. Uttar Pradesh, India’s 
most populous state, reported allocating 1.6 million INR ($21,910) 
to create an additional 40 AHTUs so that all of its 75 districts had 
AHTUs that operated as separate police stations to facilitate the 
rescue and rehabilitation of trafficking victims. During the reporting 
period, Maharashtra created 36 new AHTUs. 
An NGO study reported only 27 percent of AHTUs were fully 
operational and many still only existed on paper. State governments 
and civil society nationwide agreed the majority of AHTUs currently 
active were not sufficiently funded or trained, nor solely dedicated 
to trafficking. The study concluded government funding was mostly 
spent on infrastructure development and awareness programs, with 
little devoted to trafficking investigations. Additionally, AHTUs were 
frequently regarded as less favorable assignments for police officers 
and were at times occupied by near-retirees or were assigned to 
officers as a reprisal for poor performance. However, the study also 
stated some AHTUs were effective in investigating and providing 
evidence in cases and empowering victims. Some NGOs reported 
good working relationships and effective coordination with local 
AHTUs. In March 2020, the national government disbursed 1 billion 
INR ($13.69 million) to strengthen existing AHTUs and establish 
new units along India’s borders with Bangladesh and Nepal. 
In December 2020, the government allocated an additional 1 billion 
rupees ($13.69 million) to establish “women help desks” in 10,000 
police stations across the country. Police staffed the desks and, in 
coordination with lawyers, psychologists, and NGOs, facilitated legal 
aid, counseling, shelter, rehabilitation, and other related services 
for victims of crime, including human trafficking. In the previous 
reporting period, the government expanded the mandate of the 
National Investigation Agency (NIA) to include inter-state and 
transnational trafficking cases. In October 2020, NIA filed charges 
in its first trafficking case against 12 individuals stemming from 
the discovery of a sex trafficking criminal operation in Hyderabad 
in 2019. Criminal Investigation Divisions (CID) within state-level 
police also investigated human trafficking. States were empowered 
to dedicate courts to hearing cases under the POCSO Act, including 
child sex trafficking; as of April 2019, the country had 664 POCSO 
courts. In some states, however, authorities reported the judges and 
prosecutors at POCSO courts had no training or expertise in POCSO 
crimes. Law enforcement generally did not prioritize trafficking cases 
over murder or drug crimes, which increased the length of trials and 
in some cases led to acquittals. Unofficial village caste councils have 
in the past reportedly pressured lower caste female sex trafficking 
victims not to pursue criminal cases, although no incidents were 
cited during the reporting period NGOs reported all police and 
judicial academies had human trafficking in their course curriculum. 
Media reported the government arrested allegedly complicit officials, 
but as in past years, the government did not report any prosecutions or 
convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking 
crimes. In Hyderabad, police arrested an Assistant Commissioner of 
Income Tax in May 2020 for exploiting five victims in a sex trafficking 
scheme. Police arrested a government engineer in Uttar Pradesh for 
sexually abusing more than 50 children over the span of 10 years 
and selling the images of the abuse online. In November 2020, 
police arrested a Chhattisgarh party official for involvement in a 
sex trafficking case; police also arrested four others in connection 
to the case. However, the government did not report taking action 
on allegations of official complicity in other cases. The Ministry of 
External Affairs (MEA) promoted a former consular officer who 
has an open U.S. indictment for visa fraud related to her alleged 
exploitation of an Indian domestic worker to an Ambassadorial 
position. In 2019, Tamil Nadu state authorities admitted some local 
politicians benefitted from child sex trafficking and forced begging 
rings with impunity; the government did not report investigating such 
allegations. In the previous reporting period, the Delhi Commission 
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for Women claimed police filed fraudulent criminal charges against 
the organization to impede the organization’s anti-trafficking efforts. 
Some state-owned tea estates in Assam continued to hold workers 
in bonded labor by creating recurring debt by underpaying wages 
and overcharging for daily living expenses such that 37 percent of 
workers had daily expenditures that exceeded their daily income. 
Some law enforcement reportedly received bribes from sex trafficking 
establishments and sexual services from victims in exchange for 
alerting the traffickers of forthcoming raids. 
A lack of accountability for misconduct and corruption persisted 
at various levels of government, contributing to the perception of 
widespread impunity for trafficking crimes. Caste discrimination by 
some police and administration officials impeded identification and 
investigation of such cases. NGOs across multiple states reported 
politically connected individuals, including local and state politicians 
who held workers in bonded labor in agriculture and on brick kilns, 
successfully avoided prosecution. Civil society reported a number 
of instances in which police refused to register FIRs against officials 
who were alleged perpetrators. 
During the previous reporting period, the government conducted 
one high-profile investigation of abuse at a shelter home in Bihar, 
resulting in the conviction of 19 individuals, 12 of whom were 
sentenced to life in prison for sexual assault for the sex trafficking of 
more than 44 girl residents at a government-funded shelter. Among 
those convicted were three state officials, including the chairperson of 
the Child Welfare Committee (CWC), and a former legislator. Despite 
this action in Bihar, the lack of investigations into suspected trafficking 
crimes and broader physical and sexual abuse of trafficking victims at 
government-run and government-funded shelters due to widespread 
negligence created an atmosphere of impunity for shelter employees 
to engage in trafficking. In 2018, the Supreme Court encouraged the 
National Commission for Women and state-level institutions to 
audit the status of their state shelter homes, including homes that 
care for adult and child trafficking victims. In compliance with this 
announcement, the National Commission for Protection of Child 
Rights produced a report on the 7,163 childcare institutions in India 
of which 88 percent are managed by non-governmental entities. 
The report noted 40 percent of all shelters did not have adequate 
measures in place to prevent physical or sexual abuse of children. 
In addition, staff members were not properly trained to recognize 
the signs of abuse or raise alarm to proper authorities. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained overall victim identification and 
protection efforts, but the identification and protection for bonded 
laborers remained inadequate. In 2019, the government reported 
identifying 5,145 trafficking victims and 2,505 potential trafficking 
victims, an increase compared with 3,946 trafficking victims and 
1,625 potential victims identified in 2018. In 2019, authorities 
identified 3,133 victims in labor trafficking, including 1,549 in 
bonded labor, 2,012 in sex trafficking, and did not report the type 
of trafficking of the 2,505 potential victims identified. Ninety-four 
percent of trafficking victims identified were Indian, approximately 
57 percent were adults, and 62 percent were female. Despite some 
estimates of eight million Indians in bonded labor, the Ministry 
of Labor and Employment reported to Parliament in 2019 that the 
government had only identified and released 313,687 since 1976. 
Moreover, due to lack of law enforcement efforts against traffickers, 
one NGO working in 10 states reported that more than 60 percent 
of released victims were subjected to bonded labor again following 
their release. Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh states, where 
some authorities may engage more actively against bonded labor, 
accounted for the majority of bonded labor victims identified, with 
130,249, and 964 victims identified respectively, overall accounting 
for 87 percent of the country’s total identification of bonded labor 
victims. The MHA created standard procedures for trafficking victim 
identification in 2009, but it was unclear how many states had adopted 
them. State revenue officers had the responsibility for identifying 
bonded labor victims, yet NGOs identified most cases. Poor inter-state 
coordination between state government agencies impeded trafficking 
investigations and victims’ ability to obtain services, including 
participation in civil and criminal cases in their home states. The 
Ministry of Women and Child Development (MWCD) continued to 
support some broad national child protection mechanisms, including 
a hotline for children, and a system to identify missing children 
and remove them from their exploitation or situation. During the 
reporting year, state and local officials focused resources to contain 
the spread of COVID-19, which subsequently reduced some trafficking 
“raid and rescue” operations. However, media reported railway and 
transit police increased patrolling of transportation hubs to prevent 
and intercept perpetrators and victims of human trafficking in 2020.
The government did not report how many trafficking victims it 
assisted or referred to care. The government had shelter and services 
for child and adult female trafficking victims, although the quality, 
consistency, and availability varied. Police could refer all adult 
and child trafficking victims, except bonded labor victims, to state 
judiciaries and CWCs to determine appropriate care. CWCs generally 
returned child trafficking victims to their parents, some of whom had 
subjected their children to trafficking. When CWCs did refer child 
trafficking victims to care, it placed them in privately run shelters, 
government-run juvenile justice homes (some of which housed 
child victims with children accused of crimes), or government-run 
women and children’s homes, some of which allowed routine abuse 
in previous reporting periods. While judges could reportedly refer 
bonded labor victims to care, there were no reports officials did so in 
practice. Judges could require all adult trafficking victims identified 
under the ITPA to stay in government- or NGO-run shelters for up 
to three weeks, and victims who were part of an ongoing legal case 
as a witness or victim could not leave shelters without a magistrate’s 
order. The government did not operate or fund shelters that could 
accommodate adult males. 
Government-run and -funded shelters remained insufficient, facing 
serious shortages of space, financial resources, and trained personnel. 
NGOs relied primarily on donor contributions, although some 
received government funds. The disbursal of government funding 
to NGOs was sometimes delayed for multiple years. In 2020, 
an amendment to the Foreign Contribution Regulation Act that 
prevented the sub-granting of foreign contributions from the original 
Indian NGO recipient to other NGOs came into force, preventing 
collaboration and coordination and severely affecting their activities, 
including anti-trafficking NGOs. MWCD continued to provide state 
governments with funding for NGO- and government-run shelter and 
rehabilitation through the Ujjawala program for female sex trafficking 
victims (operating 136 shelters, compared with 134 in 2019) and 
the Swadhar Greh program for women in difficult circumstances 
(operating 417 shelters, compared to 514 in 2018). The central 
government allocated 250 million INR ($3.42 million) to the Swadhar 
Greh and Ujjawala programs in the 2020-2021 budget but did not 
include separate allocations for the 2021-2022 budget. MWCD ran 
One-Stop Centers (OSCs) for female victims of all crimes, including 
sex trafficking. As of December 2020, there were 700 OSCs operating 
across India, compared with 506 in 2019. It did not report if the 
centers assisted any trafficking victims, and some NGOs previously 
reported the centers were ineffective and difficult to access. 
Media, NGOs, and authorities continued to document a lack of 
oversight and negligence in government-run, government-funded, 
and privately run shelters that sometimes resulted in abuse and 
trafficking of residents. In several cases, such homes continued to 
operate despite significant gaps in mandatory reporting and allegations 
of abuse, at times due to alleged political connections. CWCs were 
designed to routinely monitor victim shelters and provide updates 
on victims’ cases, although their efficacy varied across states. CWCs 
promoted interagency collaboration to prevent trafficking during the 
pandemic. The National Commission for the Protection of Child 
Rights’ (NCPCR) audit of 9,500 Child Care Institutions (CCIs) 





adequate measures to prevent abuse of children and one-third 
lacked registration and therefore operated with little or no oversight. 
Moreover, it reported CCIs subjected the majority of child residents, 
including trafficking victims, to corporal punishment, substandard-
food, inadequate medical and legal assistance, and did not provide 
education or skills training. In response to this audit, the government 
closed 539 CCIs between 2018 and 2019 and registered others but did 
not report whether they filed any criminal charges against the owners 
and where they referred the residents. In February 2020 the Minister 
of Women and Child Development directed senior state officials 
to inspect all CCIs and implement the required monitoring and 
evaluation, including regular review of abuse complaints. However, 
the government did not report the outcome of this directive, and 
due to the pandemic, social workers throughout the country were 
frequently unable to contact trafficking victims in shelter homes 
or conduct effective evaluations. In addition, reportedly due to the 
fear of transmission of COVID-19, some CCIs returned children to 
their families, in some cases as a result of government pressure. The 
NCPCR sent a letter to eight state governments directing them to 
reunite children with their families as a measure to halt COVID-19 
transmission. In Tamil Nadu, an NGO reported approximately 
56,000 children lived in shelter homes in March 2020 but as of 
August 2020 only 6,000 lived in shelter homes. In October 2020, 
the Supreme Court required NCPCR to provide more information 
on their directive as CWCs were the only body authorized to order 
reunification of children with their families and raised concerns the 
children may have been returned to abusive situations. 
Ujjawala and Swadhar Greh homes had similar levels of non-
registration. Due to a reported loophole in the law, if the government 
did not act on a shelter’s application in a prescribed timeframe, 
the organization was automatically licensed. Whenever a license 
application is accepted, the home must go through several inspections, 
but it was unclear whether authorities conducted these inspections 
in practice. Allegedly, some corrupt officials purposely missed the 
licensing deadline to allow inadequate but politically connected 
organizations to gain licensing. In the states that allowed audits of 
Ujjawala and Swadhar Greh homes, previous audits documented 
many homes violated minimum hygiene and safety standards, did 
not provide psycho-social support or educational opportunities, 
and operated without proper registration. Moreover, in some 
instances the shelters functioned as hostels and charged non-victim 
residents for accommodation. Due to unsafe conditions and abuse 
by caretakers, authorities reported multiple cases in which residents, 
including children, ran away from these shelters during previous 
reporting periods. MWCD did not report an update on its drafting 
of a child protection policy to prevent abuse in government-run and 
-funded shelter homes the Supreme Court had ordered it to create 
in September 2018. 
Four states had previously reported their use of child-friendly 
courtrooms or procedures, including some that allowed victims 
to testify via video conference. During the reporting year, courts 
reportedly expanded video conference capabilities due to the 
pandemic, although the scale of expansion was unknown. In February 
2021, two child trafficking victims testified via a video conference 
as a part of a measure to expedite trafficking trials and clear up a 
backlog of cases; instead of traveling 600 miles, the boys went to a 
local court 25 miles from their village. In other cases, inadequate 
implementation of victim protection measures and legal assistance 
provisions, including witness protection, led victims to refuse to 
participate in trials. Moreover, NGOs reported that judges closed 
many cases because the government did not provide adequate 
financial assistance to enable victims to participate in trials. While 
victims could obtain restitution from their traffickers in criminal 
cases, courts rarely awarded it. Judges could order compensation to 
trafficking victims through a variety of government schemes, usually 
funded by the central government and administered at the state level, 
but rarely did so. NGO analysis of historical government crime data 
showed that among 38,503 trafficking victims identified between 
2010 and 2018, judges only proactively awarded compensation to 
102 (less than one percent) although there have been some minor 
improvements in compensation in more recent years. In addition, 
state and district legal offices did not regularly inform trafficking 
victims that they were eligible to receive compensation. When they 
did payments were often delayed due to lack of state funds. However, 
during the reporting period, the District Legal Services Authority 
(DLSA) in Kolkata awarded 876,410 INR ($12,000) to a survivor of 
human trafficking, the highest compensation awarded by a DLSA in 
West Bengal. The DLSA awarded that amount based on the pending 
POCSO cases, the absence of interim compensation, the duration of 
the upcoming trial, the psychological effects of the crime, and the 
victim’s future educational pursuits. While authorities have only 
awarded 14 victims compensation in West Bengal since 2012, 11 
of those decisions were between September 2019 and March 2020 
and the amounts awarded were significantly higher than in previous 
years. Authorities issued an additional 90 compensation orders after 
March 2020, although payment was still pending at the end of the 
reporting period. Some states, as allowed in the central government’s 
2016 bonded labor scheme, controlled how victims could use this 
compensation, such as requiring them to put it into annuity schemes. 
The Kolkata High Court ruled against West Bengal’s policy of limiting 
victims to small, monthly withdrawals over 10 years. 
The central government funds a program through which district 
officials identified bonded labor victims and provided them with 
release certificates that provided access to non-monetary assistance 
and, upon conviction of their trafficker, to compensation. In 2016, the 
government amended the program to include female sex trafficking 
and child forced labor victims as recipients and mandated local 
district authorities to provide immediate monetary assistance up 
to 20,000 INR ($274) to a victim within 24 hours of identification, 
regardless of the status of the related court case. The release of the 
overall compensation amounts (between 100,000 INR [$1,370] 
and 300,000 INR [$4,110] based on the victim’s demographics) 
remained contingent upon conviction of the trafficker or conclusion of 
magisterial processes, which could take several years. The government 
did not adequately implement any stage of this program, and when 
states did implement the program, it was often due to sustained NGO 
advocacy. Some states had SOPs to address bonded labor cases. The 
Delhi government had an SOP to rescue bonded labor victims. In 
March 2020, Karnataka released a comprehensive SOP on human 
trafficking in collaboration with civil society organizations that covers 
sex trafficking, victim identification, forced child begging, bonded 
labor, and child labor. In July 2020, Tamil Nadu issued an SOP to 
address bonded labor among migrant workers. The state government 
also directed District Collectors to form vigilance committees and 
monitor the welfare of bonded laborers who had been removed 
from their exploitation. The government did not report whether 
any other states had bonded labor SOPs.
The government did not report how many release certificates it 
provided during the reporting period, compared with approximately 
2,300 provided between March 2018 and March 2019. The issuance 
of mandatory release certificates varied greatly between states, but 
in many states, officials did not issue release certificates without 
significant advocacy from high profile NGOs, which could take 
years. NGOs reported that compensation schemes were too slow in 
providing victims with funding – survivors waited years to testify 
in court to determine how much they would be awarded, and state 
authorities at times delayed payment due to limited funds. During 
the pandemic, these shortcomings were exacerbated. According to one 
NGO, state authorities rarely classified children as victims of bonded 
labor due to what appeared to be inconsistent testimony and a lack of 
identity documents or proof of enslavement; ultimately this denied 
child victims government compensation. In Tamil Nadu, by contrast, 
some NGOs reported success collaborating with the government and 
securing release certificates, although some smaller NGOs had less 
success. Authorities continued to misidentify bonded labor or treat 
it as labor exploitation, child labor, or minimum wage violations, 
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and not provide victims the mandatory 20,000 INR ($274) owed 
upon identification. Some police were unaware these protections 
applied to trafficking victims whom traffickers had trapped with 
other forms of force or coercion. During the previous reporting 
period, Arunachal Pradesh authorities refused to recognize or provide 
mandatory release certifications and compensation to bonded 
laborers identified by NGOs because it claimed it had eradicated 
bonded labor in 1998. In May 2020, the Supreme Court ordered 
the state government of Bihar to remove 187 bonded laborers from 
exploitation in a brick kiln and issue release certificates. The Bihar 
government stated it was unable to help the victims due to the influx 
of internal migrant workers returning to Bihar from other states as 
a result of the pandemic-related lockdown. The central government 
reported it had adequate funding to provide initial compensation to 
all identified bonded laborers, and the 2016 scheme required each 
state to have a permanent fund with at least 1 million INR ($13,690) 
at all times for district magistrates to use exclusively for bonded labor 
victims. However, Bihar previously claimed the central government 
had not reimbursed them for prior bonded labor compensation 
and many states did not have the established fund, which delayed 
compensation. The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) 
ordered law enforcement and district officials to provide release 
certificates to bonded labor victims. While NHRC was often effective 
in securing release certificates when NGOs or bonded labor victims 
requested its assistance, it required significant time and persistent 
follow-up from NGOs. Although the NHRC could issue orders to 
state and local officials to provide release certificates to individuals, 
there was no penalty for noncompliance. Due to a lack of proactive 
victim identification, the widespread tendency to handle bonded 
labor cases administratively in lieu of criminal prosecution, and 
stalled bonded labor prosecutions, victims infrequently received full 
compensation. In Telangana state, the government did not provide 
full compensation to any of 1,174 bonded labor victims removed 
from exploitation from 2012-2019 because it did not convict any 
traffickers under the BLSA. However, in June 2020, 12 bonded labor 
victims in Telangana received full compensation two years after they 
were removed from exploitation. While the 2016 scheme also required 
states to provide non-cash benefits, including employable skills 
training, provision of such services remained weak or nonexistent. 
Foreign victims had the same access to shelter and services as Indian 
nationals. Government policy on foreign victims dictated their return 
to their country of origin at the earliest possible time. Authorities 
detained foreign sex trafficking victims in shelters until deportation, 
and both repatriation of foreign victims seeking to return home and 
deportation of victims could take years due to bureaucratic constraints. 
In July 2020, a group of Nepali trafficking victims were stranded in 
a Manipur shelter due to a lack of clear procedures to facilitate their 
repatriation. Some officials refused to repatriate victims until they 
had provided testimony in prosecutions against their traffickers. 
The government continued to review its 2015 memorandum of 
understanding with the Government of Bangladesh on identification 
and repatriation of Bangladeshi trafficking victims. The lengthy and 
complex approval system forced some Bangladeshi victims to languish 
in Indian shelters for years before repatriation. Media reported 180 
Bangladeshi sex trafficking victims were awaiting repatriation at 
various shelters in West Bengal, many of whom have waited years 
for the conclusion of the 15-step approval process. The government 
provided some funding to NGOs to repatriate child trafficking victims 
but did not offer financial assistance for repatriation of adults. Indian 
embassies abroad provided assistance to Indian citizens identified 
as trafficking victims. MHA facilitated repatriation of Indian women 
in distress located in the Middle East, including trafficking victims, 
through the Indian Community Welfare Fund. Six Indian embassies 
abroad, primarily in the Gulf, had shelters that could temporarily 
house female migrant workers with serious indicators of forced labor. 
Suspected trafficking victims in the two embassy shelters in Oman 
previously reported the shelters did not provide adequate food, basic 
amenities, or allow the victims to contact family. 
Authorities did not always effectively utilize procedures to screen 
for trafficking among vulnerable populations and arrested, fined, 
penalized, and deported some adult and child trafficking victims for 
unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit. Penalization of 
trafficking victims was not systematic, but penalization most often 
occurred against sex trafficking victims for immigration violations 
and prostitution offenses. The government required Indians who 
received a visa from a foreign government indicating the person was 
a trafficking victim in the foreign country or was a family member 
of a victim to provide documentation of the trafficking experience 
in order to renew their passports or travel. In 2016, the government 
began to include a stamp in the passports of some recipients of the 
foreign government’s visas, for both trafficking victims and their 
eligible family members, identifying them as trafficking victims 
involved in a particular investigation or civil or criminal case; this 
practice continued in 2020 with the government including a stamped 
paper attached to the recipient’s passport. While the stamp requested 
authorities permit the visa holder to travel without hindrance, some 
NGOs familiar with this practice noted it made some victims fearful 
of reprisal and penalization and served as a deterrent to victims 
interacting with authorities. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent human trafficking, 
although efforts remained inadequate compared with the scale 
of the problem. The government’s inter-ministerial committee, 
chaired by MWCD, met to discuss trafficking-related issues during 
the reporting period. While the government reported it continued 
to rely on a 2012 national action plan to combat sex trafficking of 
women and children, it did not report its implementation efforts or 
convening any meetings to coordinate action. Since 2016, the central 
government has offered reimbursement of 450,000 INR ($6,160) to 
any district that conducted a census of bonded labor, available once 
every three years, and additional funding for evaluation studies. The 
Tamil Nadu Labor and Employment Department accepted funding 
in 2019 and during the reporting period began the creation of a 
database of bonded labor to identify the number of bonded laborers 
and the industries in which they are exploited. In an attempt to 
mitigate increased trafficking risks for vulnerable populations due 
to the pandemic, government agencies issued advisories and SOPs 
designed to combat trafficking as well as awareness campaigns to 
prevent trafficking. NCPCR released a report recommending increased 
coordination with local leaders and NGOs to identify child trafficking 
victims and increase monitoring of vulnerable populations as well 
as trafficking in transit and destination locations. The report also 
recommended that officials offer vulnerable communities assistance 
through government programs to decrease the risk of trafficking. 
NGOs welcomed the increased action from the central government but 
cautioned that implementation was uneven and significant challenges 
remained. The Ministry of Railways increased the number of child 
help desks at stations from 84 to 139 to support unaccompanied 
children who were vulnerable to traffickers. 
Anti-trafficking preventative measures varied widely by state. Some 
state governments conducted anti-trafficking awareness campaigns, 
although NGOs reported local officials, migrant workers, and 
agricultural workers often still lacked awareness of human trafficking 
and their legal rights. The governments of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu 
observed February 9, 2021, as “Anti Bonded Labor Day” to mark the 
anniversary of the formulation of the BLSA and during the reporting 
period increased public awareness campaigns about bonded labor. 
Officials and NGOs reported pandemic-related restrictions on public 
gatherings severely affected the ability of local and state governments 
to launch new awareness campaigns or continue existing ones 
during the reporting period. Several state governments suspended 
or modified labor laws to boost economic activity immediately after 
the initial pandemic related lockdown. The changes included higher 
limits of maximum work hours for certain industries, reduced social 
security payments, suspension of industrial dispute resolutions, 





advocates criticized the changes, noting the potential negative effect 
on vulnerable groups. State governments emphasized the economic 
recovery measures did not circumvent bonded labor, POSCO, or any 
other anti-trafficking law.
The government registered foreign recruitment agencies and Indian 
migrant workers through the eMigrate system. The government 
required migrant workers going to 16 specific countries to receive 
emigration clearance before departure; it did not allow emigration 
to Iraq. The government maintained its ban on females younger than 
age 30 and older than 50 from working in 17 countries, mostly Gulf 
states. The UN and civil society argued any ban on migration increased 
the likelihood of illegal migration and heightened vulnerability to 
traffickers. MEA operated five national centers and a 24/7 helpline to 
provide counseling and other resources to those considering migrant 
work. MEA’s Indian Community Welfare Fund, accessible to all Indian 
missions abroad and funded primarily via overseas consular fees, 
offered shelter, legal assistance, and repatriation for migrant workers 
in distress, as well as awareness measures and hotlines. MEA has not 
reported on the level of utilization of this fund in several years. The 
government allocated $463 million of pandemic relief measures 
for migrant workers; however, a lack of documentation and bank 
accounts for migrant workers hindered access to aid. The government 
permitted licensed foreign employment recruiters to charge migrant 
workers up to 30,000 INR ($411) for recruitment fees and costs. 
However, observers stated employers frequently charged migrant 
workers more than the maximum. For example, a Mumbai-based 
global recruitment agency charged between 185,000 ($2,530) and 
200,000 INR ($2,740) to 900 Indian nurses for jobs in Kuwait; the 
government opened an investigation but did not report taking any 
action. Other states actively cracked down on illegal recruitment. 
Odisha state, for example, arrested and filed charges against 91 
recruitment agents who fraudulently recruited bonded laborers for 
inter-state work within India. Unregistered sub-agents often operated 
online and operated widely without oversight. Every month, the 
Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs released a list of illegal agents 
reported to the ministry from the Overseas Indian Help Desk and 
sent a list of illegal agents to state governments for investigation and 
prosecution. According to latest 2019 data, the central government 
referred 769 cases against illegal agents to respective states. 
Officials acknowledged some registered and unregistered spas 
exploited females in sex trafficking and that officials lacked sufficient 
oversight of all such establishments. In some cases, law enforcement 
shut down some of the unregistered spas and initiated criminal 
investigations while in other cases, law enforcement shut down the 
spas without further action. In June 2019, the labor ministry drafted 
a national domestic worker policy to regulate placement agencies 
and allow domestic workers to formally register for worker benefits, 
including the right to minimum wage and access to the justice system; 
however, the document remains in draft form and to date has not 
been included as part of any legislation. The state of Karnataka 
outlawed caste based free labor known as bitti chakri by classifying it 
as bonded labor. A local NGO reported more than 3,000 scheduled 
caste families were working without payment, while a further 10,000 
provided unpaid labor for special events such as weddings or other 
ceremonies. In April 2019, after reports of exploitative conditions 
including indicators of trafficking in some of Tamil Nadu state’s 
7,000 garment factories and spinning mills, the NHRC ordered the 
state to inspect all establishments. The state did not take any action 
during the reporting period. Following the August 2020 removal of 
35 children from forced labor in a garment factory in Tamil Nadu, the 
Madras High Court directed police and labor inspectors to conduct 
inspections at all local garment factories. Some states had action 
plans to combat bonded labor, although the government did not 
report how many states or if they successfully implemented them. 
Some officials made efforts to reduce the demand for commercial 
sex generally by prosecuting those who purchased commercial sex 
from children. Media reported the pandemic and its subsequent 
economic insecurity has led some individuals in commercial sex, 
including sex trafficking victims, to turn to brothel owners, pimps, 
and others for loans, increasing their risk of debt bondage. A study 
by one organization reported more than 95 percent of those in 
commercial sex in India were willing to leave commercial sex but 
felt unable to do so due to debt bondage. In November 2020, the 
NHRC requested state governments register individuals in commercial 
sex as informal workers, which would entitle them to benefits and 
access to aid from the COVID-19 relief fund; however, following 
criticism the non-binding decision was reversed. Despite India being 
a destination for child sex tourism, the government did not report 
measures specifically to reduce demand for child sex tourism. The 
government did not provide information about training provided 
to its diplomatic personnel. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in India and traffickers exploit victims from India 
abroad. Internal forced labor constitutes India’s largest trafficking 
problem; traffickers use debt-based coercion (bonded labor) to compel 
men, women, and children to work in agriculture, brick kilns, rice 
mills, embroidery and textile factories, and stone quarries. Traffickers 
promise large advances to manipulate workers into accepting low-
paying jobs, where traffickers then add exorbitant interest rates; create 
new deductions for items such as lodging, health care, or wage slips; 
or fabricate the amount of debt, which they use to coerce workers 
into continuing to work for little or no pay. NGOs have assessed at 
least eight million trafficking victims in India, the majority of whom 
are bonded laborers. Intergenerational bonded labor continued, 
whereby traffickers transfer the outstanding debts of deceased workers 
to their parents, siblings, or children. Traffickers often target those 
from the most disadvantaged social strata. The increase in economic 
insecurity and unemployment due to the pandemic places substantial 
burdens on economically vulnerable communities in meeting daily 
food and shelter requirements, thereby increasing their vulnerability 
to trafficking. In 2020, traffickers offered cash advances to attract 
workers who were unemployed, thus increasing the likelihood of debt 
bondage among economically vulnerable groups. NGOs reported a 
significant increase in child trafficking due to pandemic-related loss 
of parental employment and school closures. Traffickers force entire 
families into work in brick kilns, including children younger than 
6 years old. In a 2017 study of brick kiln workers in Rajasthan state, 
researchers found more than 40 percent of seasonal workers from 
Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Bihar, and Rajasthan states owed debts 
to kiln owners that were greater than the amount workers earned 
over the entire season. In some states, the exploitative contractors 
that trap workers in bonded labor are local government officials 
or politically influential. Some traffickers severely abused bonded 
laborers, including those who asked for their rightful wages, and 
some bonded laborers died under traffickers’ control. Traffickers 
exploit adults and children, including entire families, into bonded 
labor in carpet production in Jharkhand and Uttar Pradesh states, 
and in mica mining and textiles, sometimes requiring adults to 
leave children behind as collateral when they leave the premises 
for any reason. State-owned tea estates in Assam pay workers much 
less than the state-mandated minimum wage and do not provide 
workers with pay slips to document their debts and expenditures. 
Indian law allows estates to pay workers in both cash and in-kind 
benefits, but researchers noted the quality and quantity of the food 
rations constituting part of the workers’ salaries were inadequate and 
disproportionate to the amount deducted. Thirty-seven percent of 
workers across 50 tea estates in Assam had daily expenditures that 
exceeded their daily income, making workers extremely vulnerable 
to debt-based coercion. In some cases, the “Provident Funds” or 
Sumangali scheme in which employers pay young women a lump 
sum for education or a dowry at the end of multi-year labor contracts, 
often in Tamil Nadu’s spinning mill industry, may amount to bonded 
labor, and some employers subject these women to sex trafficking. 
Traffickers exploit children as young as 8 in forced labor in agriculture 
(coconut, eucalyptus, ginger, and sugarcane); construction; domestic 
service; garment, steel, and textile industries (tanneries, bangle, and 
INDIA
288
sari factories); begging; criminality; food-processing factories (biscuits, 
bread-making, meat-packing, and pickling); floriculture; cotton; ship 
breaking; and manufacturing (wire and glass). Multiple organizations 
note physical violence against trafficking victims – in both forced 
labor and sex trafficking – is particularly prevalent in South Asia, 
including India. Some traffickers force women and girls to conceive 
and deliver babies for sale. Non-state armed groups continued to 
recruit and use children as young as 14 in direct hostilities against 
the government in Jammu and Kashmir. Maoist groups, particularly 
in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand forcibly recruited children as young 
as 12 to handle weapons, improvised explosive devices, and in some 
cases serve as human shields. Several women and girls formerly 
associated with Maoist groups reported that sexual violence, including 
practices indicative of sexual slavery, was a practice in some Maoist 
camps. Non-state Naxalite groups continued to systematically recruit 
and use child soldiers.
Traffickers exploit millions of people in commercial sex within 
India. Scheduled caste females were sometimes exploited through 
the traditional Jogini system, in which Dalit women and girls are 
ceremoniously “married” to a local temple deity but in practice 
are used as sex slaves for higher caste villagers. Traffickers target 
Indian women and girls, but also fraudulently recruit significant 
numbers of Nepali and Bangladeshi women and girls to India for 
sex trafficking. Additionally, traffickers exploit women and girls 
from Central Asian, European, and African countries in commercial 
sex, especially in Goa state. NGOs reported that internal trafficking 
victims in western India came from almost every state. In addition to 
traditional red light districts, dance bars, spas, and massage parlors, 
traffickers increasingly exploit women and children in sex trafficking 
in small hotels, vehicles, huts, and private residences. Media outlets 
report the recruitment of women and children for commercial sex 
increasingly took place through social media platforms, including 
mobile dating applications and websites. Traffickers use encrypted 
digital communication applications to conduct transactions, enabling 
them to evade law enforcement. In addition, traffickers increasingly 
utilize digital payment applications in place of cash to evade suspicion. 
India is a source for child sex tourists and a destination for child 
sex tourism. 
Traffickers kidnap and force Indian and Nepali women and girls to 
work as “orchestra dancers” in India, especially in Bihar state, where 
girls perform with dance groups until they have repaid fabricated 
debts. Traffickers exploit women and children in sex trafficking 
in religious pilgrimage centers and in tourist destinations. Some 
traffickers kidnap children from public places, including railway 
stations, entice girls with drugs, and force girls as young as 5 years 
old in sex trafficking to take hormone injections to appear older. 
Some law enforcement officers protect suspected traffickers and 
brothel owners from law enforcement efforts and take bribes from 
sex trafficking establishments and sexual services from victims. 
According to one report, police have accepted bribes to release child 
sex trafficking victims back into traffickers’ custody. Traffickers arrange 
sham marriages within India and Gulf states to subject females to sex 
trafficking. There have been isolated reports of physical and sexual 
abuse in some government-, NGO-, and privately run shelter homes, 
including of trafficking victims, and compelling shelter residents 
into forced labor and sex trafficking in previous reporting periods. 
Traffickers force many Indian migrants who willingly seek employment 
abroad into construction, domestic work, factories, and other low-
skilled sectors in many regions, especially Gulf countries and Malaysia, 
often following recruitment fraud and exorbitant recruitment fees. 
Indian female domestic workers in Gulf countries, particularly Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia, consistently report strong indicators of forced labor, 
including non-payment of wages, refusal to allow workers to leave 
upon completion of their contracts, and physical abuse. In United 
Arab Emirates, labor traffickers bring Indian workers overseas on 
tourist visas, withhold their identity documents and wages, and force 
them to work, especially in construction. Authorities have identified 
Indian forced labor victims in Armenia, Portugal, Gabon, and Zambia, 
and Indian female sex trafficking victims in Kenya. Traffickers exploit 
Rohingya, Sri Lankan Tamil, and other refugee populations in sex and 
labor trafficking. Traffickers subject some boys from Assam, Bihar, 
and Uttar Pradesh states to forced labor in Nepal. 
INDONESIA: TIER 2
The Government of Indonesia does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Indonesia remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
investigating, prosecuting, and convicting recruitment agents who 
facilitated the forced labor of Indonesians aboard Chinese-flagged 
fishing vessels, enacting implementing regulations to its 2017 
migrant protection bill that prohibited employers from charging 
placement fees to migrant workers, and suspending substantially 
more recruitment agencies for trafficking-related practices. In addition, 
the government continued efforts to repatriate Indonesian trafficking 
victims exploited abroad and civilly recover back wages. However, 
the government did not meet the minimum standards in several key 
areas. Investigations decreased for the fourth consecutive year, and 
prosecutions and convictions decreased for the third consecutive 
year. Official complicity in trafficking crimes remained a concern, 
although the government convicted two government officials for child 
trafficking offenses under its child protection laws during the reporting 
period. For the fifth consecutive year, the government decreased its 
budget allocation to the coordinating office of the national task force. 
Despite some action in individual cases of forced labor in fishing 
and of Indonesian migrant workers abroad, the government did not 
prioritize the staffing or funding for effective oversight of these sectors 
with long-standing, pervasive trafficking problems and pursued civil 
and administrative remedies in lieu of criminal action. The lack of 
robust, systematized victim identification procedures continued to 
hinder the identification of victims overall—particularly male victims. 
Coordination between the national anti-trafficking task force and its 
provincial and local-level counterparts was insufficient to translate 
central government policies into nationwide implementation. The 
2007 anti-trafficking law was inconsistent with international law by 
requiring a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute 
a child sex trafficking crime. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase efforts to vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict 
traffickers under the 2007 law, including complicit officials who 
ignore, facilitate, or engage in trafficking crimes. • Amend the 2007 
law to remove the required demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion 
to constitute child sex trafficking. • Develop, finalize, disseminate, 
and train all relevant officials, including law enforcement, foreign 
affairs, marine, and labor ministry staff, on comprehensive standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) for proactive victim identification. • 
Complete implementing regulations to enforce the 2017 law on 
migrant worker protection. • Increase resources for and proactively 
offer all victims, including male victims, comprehensive services. • 
Allow victims in government shelters freedom of movement. • Increase 
efforts to effectively monitor labor recruitment agencies, including 







conduct that contributes to the forced labor of migrant workers, 
including charging placement fees, deceptive recruitment practices, 
contract switching, and document forgery. • Institutionalize and 
regularly provide anti-trafficking training for judges, prosecutors, 
police, and social workers. • Develop and implement mandatory 
pre-departure and post-arrival orientation and training for Indonesian 
and migrant fishermen, respectively, in order to provide information 
on labor rights and safety at sea, and ensure the orientation and 
training costs are covered by employers. • Increase resources for 
the anti-trafficking task force and improve its coordination across 
ministries. • Strengthen coordination between central and provincial-
level social affairs agencies to improve implementation of victim 
protection procedures. • Finalize and implement a national action 
plan to combat trafficking. • Establish a data collection system to 
track anti-trafficking efforts at all levels of law enforcement. • Lift 
current bans on migration to encourage migration through safe, legal 
channels. • Take steps to increase awareness of trafficking trends 
and vulnerabilities among local village leaders. • Create a national 
protocol that clarifies roles for prosecuting trafficking cases outside 
victims’ home provinces.
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. The 2007 anti-
trafficking law criminalized all forms of labor trafficking and some 
forms of sex trafficking and prescribed penalties of three to 15 years’ 
imprisonment, which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect 
to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other 
serious crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent with international law, 
the 2007 law required a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion 
to constitute a child sex trafficking offense and therefore did not 
criminalize all forms of child sex trafficking. However, judicial 
officials at the national and provincial level continued to assert the 
law implicitly established that force, fraud, or coercion were not 
required to constitute child sex trafficking, and that this therefore was 
not a barrier in successfully prosecuting and obtaining convictions 
in child sex trafficking cases. 
While the Ministry of Home Affairs issued a ministerial regulation 
in April 2018 that mandated regional governments include anti-
trafficking in their policy priorities, the central government did 
not have a mechanism to enforce this mandate, and it did not 
influence all provincial governments to consistently allocate anti-
trafficking funding or implement national policies. Consequently, 
government agency coordination and data collection remained 
a challenge, and some provincial police reported their budget 
did not allow for interprovincial or international investigations. 
Officials noted ineffective coordination hindered the government’s 
ability to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers and collect 
comprehensive data on such efforts, especially when cases involved 
multiple jurisdictions. Different agencies investigated and prosecuted 
trafficking cases depending on where the case occurred: in provincial 
areas, provincial police investigated trafficking cases and referred 
them to the province’s high prosecutor; in cities, district or city 
police investigated trafficking cases and referred them to district 
prosecutors; and elsewhere, Indonesian National Police (INP) 
investigated trafficking cases and the attorney general’s office (AGO) 
prosecuted. During the reporting period, INP’s Criminal Investigative 
Division (CID) in Jakarta, responsible for investigating cases that 
cross multiple local jurisdictions, received 373 million Indonesian 
Rupiah (IDR) ($26,590) dedicated to anti-trafficking activities. 
Provincial police did not receive dedicated funding for trafficking 
cases and funded anti-trafficking investigations through their general 
crimes budget. 
The national police anti-trafficking unit did not have a mechanism 
to track investigations at all levels of government, making it difficult 
to assess enforcement trends and to determine the total number of 
investigations and resolved cases. Nevertheless, law enforcement 
reported substantially lower law enforcement efforts than in previous 
years, in part, due to pandemic health and other restrictions that 
limited their ability to investigate crimes. In 2020, police at the 
national level reported arresting 42 individuals for alleged labor or 
sex trafficking, a decrease from 132 in the previous reporting period. 
Police initiated 38 forced labor or sex trafficking investigations, a 
substantial decrease from 102 investigations initiated in the previous 
reporting period, and a continued decrease from 95 investigations in 
2018 and 123 in 2017. Police concluded and referred eight of these 
investigation dossiers to the AGO in 2020, a decrease from 26 in 
2019. The Supreme Court’s comprehensive recordkeeping mechanism 
for national court data reported 232 prosecutions for trafficking (an 
increase from 226) and 202 case convictions of 259 defendants, an 
increase from 108 defendants in 2019 (overall, a continued decrease 
from 204 convictions in 2019, 279 in 2018, and 331 in 2017). As in 
prior years, the government did not report comprehensive sentencing 
data. According to media coverage of suspected trafficking cases, 
prosecutors charged some trafficking cases under its Law on Migrant 
Workers Protection and Law on Child Protection. 
During the reporting period, as included in the statistics previously 
mentioned, INP commenced investigation into several Chinese and 
Indonesian individuals related to the forced labor of Indonesian 
fishermen aboard Chinese-flagged fishing vessels. INP arrested and 
charged at least 16 Indonesian labor recruiters under the trafficking 
law and Law on Migrant Workers Protection for various trafficking-
related crimes. Courts convicted six individuals, sentenced them to 
between one and four-and-a-half years’ imprisonment, and ordered 
them to pay restitution. Investigations or trials against 10 suspects 
remained ongoing at the close of the reporting period. Additionally, 
INP arrested and charged two Chinese nationals who were part of 
the ships’ leadership crews. The trial against one of the suspects, 
accused of torturing Indonesian fishermen, remained pending. The 
court acquitted the second official of assault and human trafficking, 
but the prosecutor appealed at the close of the reporting period. INP 
continued to investigate additional crewmembers of several Chinese-
flagged ships for the forced labor, slavery, and torture of more than 
150 Indonesian fishermen and for the death of at least two. 
Official complicity in human trafficking offenses remained 
a significant concern, despite some arrests, investigations, and 
convictions of government officials for crimes related to trafficking or 
corruption. During the reporting period, the government convicted 
two officials for trafficking in cases initiated in 2019; both officials 
were convicted under the child protection law, one receiving a 
sentence of six years and three months in prison and a fine and 
the other receiving a sentence of 12 years’ imprisonment. In 2019, 
Singaporean authorities alleged that an Indonesian labor official 
accepted bribes from migrant worker insurance companies to illegally 
authorize the companies to hire Indonesian migrant workers. While 
INP claimed it was investigating the case, the official reportedly still 
worked for the government during the reporting period. In January 
2019, provincial police arrested a legislator for allegedly sending a 
migrant worker to Jakarta, where the individual was forced to work 
for multiple employers without pay.
Civil society alleged some law enforcement officials and politicians 
organized raids on entertainment venues to extort financial kickbacks 
from adults in commercial sex, which may have included sex 
trafficking victims. Corrupt officials reportedly continued to facilitate 
the issuance of false documents, accept bribes to allow brokers to 
transport undocumented migrants across borders, protect venues 
where sex trafficking occurred, engage in witness intimidation, 
and intentionally practice weak oversight to insulate recruitment 
agencies from liability. Bribes and extortion influenced prosecution, 
conviction, and sentencing in civil and criminal cases, including 
trafficking cases. Legal aid organizations reported cases often moved 
very slowly unless a bribe was paid, and prosecutors in some cases 
sought bribes from defendants in exchange for lighter prosecution or 
dropped charges. Civil society members alleged some police refused 
to arrest traffickers who were connected to influential members of 
society, including through familial relationships with or personal 




Although some officials received trafficking training from the 
Indonesian government, international organizations, and foreign 
governments, authorities did not provide comprehensive trafficking 
training to all judicial and law enforcement authorities. Observers 
noted low awareness of trafficking crimes and relevant legislation 
among local law enforcement and judicial authorities impeded case 
detection and prosecutorial progress. As a result, authorities often 
prosecuted suspected traffickers under the Law on Migrant Workers 
Protection, which prescribed less severe penalties. Civil society 
contacts reported some civil and criminal trafficking proceedings 
were informally discontinued prior to a verdict. The Supreme Court 
included trafficking in its annual curriculum for judges; however, it 
only accommodated 20 to 30 judges per year. During the reporting 
period, the Ministry of Women Empowerment and Child Protection 
(MOWECP) held four in-person trainings for law enforcement on how 
to investigate trafficking cases using a victim-centered approach. Due 
to the pandemic, the government limited the number of participants 
at each training. The government’s anti-trafficking task force did not 
conduct any trainings on trafficking during the reporting period, as 
compared to two trainings that reached 175 officials in 2019. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained inadequate protection efforts. Officials 
did not collect comprehensive data on the number of victims 
identified. Disparate government entities sometimes reported 
their own statistics, making aggregate data incomparable to data 
reported in earlier periods and possibly double-counting victims 
as they came into contact with different government agencies. 
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) utilized procedures for 
victim identification to assist Indonesian citizens overseas, but the 
government did not have comprehensive or systematized SOPs for 
proactive victim identification or referral to rehabilitation services. 
Observers noted, however, law enforcement did not use SOPs, 
especially at the municipality and district level. Observers expressed 
concern that the lack of SOPs and the government’s anti-trafficking 
infrastructure, which was under the purview of local-level police 
units and protection agencies who focused primarily on women 
and children, hindered the identification of victims overall and of 
rural and male victims. Additionally, the government’s inadequate 
efforts to screen vulnerable groups for trafficking indicators may 
have resulted in the punishment or deportation of unidentified 
trafficking victims. Police were sometimes unresponsive when victims 
attempted to report their trafficking circumstances. After identifying 
a potential victim, provincial police sometimes approached NGO 
service providers for assistance rather than filing cases with provincial 
social service officials. 
The government primarily coordinated services for victims of abuse, 
including trafficking victims, through local integrated service centers 
for women and children (P2TP2A). There were P2TP2As in all 34 
provinces and approximately 436 districts. Provincial or district 
governments managed and funded the centers. Services included 
short-term shelter, medical care, counseling, family liaison services, 
and some vocational skills training; however, in practice, services 
varied based on local leadership and funding. Some P2TP2A facilities 
were not open for the required 24 hours, and women living in rural 
areas or districts without a P2TP2A center had difficulty receiving 
support services. Officials acknowledged the central government’s 
Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) had not adequately disseminated 
legislation passed in 2014 to clarify the roles and responsibilities 
of provincial social affairs agencies regarding victim protection, 
resulting in a lack of coordination on victim services at the local level. 
NGOs continued to play a critical role in supplementing and filling 
gaps in government services—including for male victims, whom 
local governments sometimes had to refer to NGOs for shelter. The 
Witness and Victim Protection Agency (LPSK) maintained a hotline 
and mobile application to provide information to all victims of 
crime on filing complaints and available government protection 
services; however, authorities did not provide statistics on the use of 
these mechanisms. It operated six shelters for victims and witnesses 
to crimes who are facing threats or intimidation. Victims entered 
and exited the six government shelters only upon the approval of 
a government agency; victims did not have freedom of movement 
once placed in a shelter and could not seek employment. 
MOSA and provincial social affairs agencies funded and operated 
28 trauma centers that were available to trafficking victims, the 
same as in the previous reporting period. The shelters assisted 8,702 
individuals during the reporting period, but authorities did not report 
how many were trafficking victims. Observers noted MOSA did not 
adequately coordinate with its provincial capital counterparts to 
repatriate and rehabilitate victims. MOSA also funded and staffed a 
protection shelter for women who had experienced sexual violence. 
It assisted 135 women during the reporting period, some of whom 
were trafficking victims; this is an increase from no data reported on 
the victims assisted in 2019 and 38 victims assisted at the shelter in 
2018. MOSA allocated 2.2 billion IDR ($156,830) to the shelters it 
funded during the reporting period. The government did not repot 
MOSA’s funding for shelters in previous years but noted this was a 
decrease because it diverted some of its funding towards its COVID-19 
response. The government prohibited Indonesian seafarers from 
being placed on certain foreign-flagged fishing vessels where they 
were likely to be exploited and placed repatriated victims, mostly 
male, in government shelters; however, a civil society contact noted 
further government action was necessary to fully protect Indonesian 
crew aboard foreign-flagged vessels. 
The government housed child victims of crimes in children’s homes 
funded by MOSA and provincial or district governments, and in some 
cases in partnership with local NGOs. The number of children’s 
homes remained at 14; the government did not report how many 
child trafficking victims it housed in 2020 or 2019, compared with 
11 housed in 2018. Authorities disaggregated victim protection data 
using categorizations outside of the standard definition of trafficking. 
The Commission for Protection of Children did not report whether 
it identified any child trafficking cases during the reporting period, 
compared to “40 child trafficking cases, 43 cases of child commercial 
sexual exploitation, and 57 cases of child commercial sex” in 2019. 
NGOs and past government reports estimated the number of child 
sex trafficking victims to be many thousands more. The government 
housed foreign trafficking victims identified in Indonesia in MOSA’s 
Jakarta trauma center. The government allowed an international 
organization to provide counseling and legal services at some shelters. 
The government did not provide legal alternatives to the removal 
of foreign victims to countries where they may face hardship or 
retribution.
The MFA continued to identify and protect Indonesian trafficking 
victims exploited abroad. It had an online portal and mobile 
application available through its embassies for individuals to report 
exploitation and access services. Some Indonesian consular authorities 
overseas had labor attaches that identified and referred Indonesian 
trafficking victims to care, including embassy-run shelters. The 
government allocated 43 billion IDR ($3.07 million) to the MFA 
to fund repatriation, maintenance of Indonesian shelters abroad, 
provision of legal aid, and training for its officials. The MFA received 
383 cases of migrant worker complaints in 2020 (259 in 2019, 164 in 
2018, 340 in 2017, and 478 in 2016), 290 of which related to labor 
issues. The MFA did not indicate how many of the 383 it referred 
to social services (94 referred in 2019 and 95 in 2018). The MFA 
recovered approximately 140 billion IDR ($9.98 million) in back 
wages owed to migrant workers (approximately $14 million in 2018). 
The MFA repatriated at least 104 Indonesian forced labor victims from 
Syria, including providing them with up to two months of housing 
in Syria prior to repatriation. This is comparable to previous years; 
the MFA typically repatriated up to 200 Indonesian forced labor 
victims from Syria annually. Additionally, the Indonesian embassy in 
Riyadh repatriated 32 Indonesians during one month of 2020, most 
of whom were trafficking victims. Finally, the MFA repatriated 589 
Indonesian fishermen who complained about working conditions 







The government advocated for workers to receive wages owed from 
foreign-flagged fishing vessels, including those from China. 
Police requested victims stay in government shelters until the 
completion of relevant investigations, but most victims were only 
able to stay in the trauma centers for an average of two weeks due 
to government budget constraints. Women and children reportedly 
stayed longer, although the government did not provide data on 
the average length of stay or where victims went once authorities 
released them. Once the government released a victim from care, 
it did not track the victim, including for purposes of gathering 
testimony for their traffickers’ prosecution; instead, authorities 
relied on an international organization to remain in contact with 
the victims and provide follow-up assistance, if necessary. A general 
lack of adequate rehabilitative and reintegrative care, coupled with 
low awareness among village and local leaders, increased many 
victims’ risk of re-trafficking, particularly among fishermen returning 
to their communities after experiencing forced labor at sea. The 
government’s universal health care system covered some of the medical 
needs of Indonesian victims; however, the system required identity 
documents that many Indonesian migrant workers returning from 
exploitation overseas did not possess. The Ministry of Health (MOH) 
was responsible for funding victims’ health care, which national police 
hospitals were obligated to provide free of charge. The MOH did not 
report if it trained hospital personnel to provide health services to 
victims of trafficking and violence in 2020 or 2019, compared with 
training for hospital personnel in six provinces in 2018.
In 2017, the Supreme Court issued guidelines stipulating judges 
protect female victims during legal processes by considering 
psychological trauma and allowing video testimony. However, the 
government did not report if it consistently offered such protections 
during court proceedings for female trafficking victims. Authorities 
continued to implement regulations allowing the LPSK to add 
restitution to the perpetrator’s penalties before or after conviction 
for human trafficking and other crimes. The government allocated 
79 billion IDR ($5.63 million) for the LPSK in 2021, an increase 
from 56 billion IDR ($3.99 million) allocated in 2020. In 2020, 
the LPSK provided various protection services to 314 trafficking 
victims, family members of victims, and witnesses; authorities 
did not report how many of these were trafficking victims. LPSK 
officials sought 4.96 billion IDR ($353,580) in restitution for 194 
trafficking victims and witnesses ($215,000 in restitution for 44 
victims in 2019), but courts only approved 1.26 billion IDR ($89,820) 
(approximately $87,000 in 2019). Furthermore, nearly half of the 
restitution that courts approved—598 million IDR ($42,630)—was 
never paid because Indonesian law allowed convicted traffickers to 
serve additional imprisonment in lieu of paying restitution. LPSK 
did not report the outcomes or status of the remaining cases. Further 
compounding access to recompense and justice, some recruitment 
agencies harassed, intimidated, or filed defamation lawsuits against 
victims attempting to report their abuses. Many victims originated 
from remote rural areas and lacked the financial means necessary 
to travel to, or remain in, urban areas for the long duration of trial 
proceedings. There were no reports of specific instances in which 
the government arrested, detained, fined, or otherwise punished 
trafficking victims for crimes traffickers compelled them to commit. 
However, adults in commercial sex work have been charged with 
crimes against morality and decency and can be sentenced to public 
caning under Sharia law in Aceh province.
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
government had a national anti-trafficking in persons task force, 
coordinated by MOWECP and chaired by the Ministry of Human 
Development and Culture, that led anti-trafficking efforts across 21 
ministries. It met multiple times during the reporting period and 
continued development, but did not finalize, a draft 2020-2024 anti-
trafficking national action plan. The national task force maintained 
32 provincial-level task forces, one in every province except Papua 
and West Papua, and 251 municipal and district-level task forces—a 
slight increase from 32 provincial and 242 municipal task forces 
in the previous reporting period. Observers continued to note 
insufficient funding and lack of coordination within and between 
the local task forces and the national task force. Some provincial 
task forces also suffered from a lack of understanding of trafficking 
among members, lack of procedures to guide their work, and a lack 
of coordination. Moreover, it was unclear how many were active 
or met during the reporting period. The government substantially 
decreased its budget allocation to MOWECP’s trafficking office. 
While some of the reduction was a result of the pandemic, this was 
the fourth consecutive year of decreased funding—from 20.1 billion 
IDR ($1.43 million) in 2018, to 17.3 billion IDR ($1.23 million) 
in 2019, to 6.5 billion IDR ($463,360) in 2020, and further to 4.26 
billion IDR ($303,680) in 2021. 
The 2017 Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers law mandated 
that provincial governments – instead of private companies – oversee 
the provision of pre-departure vocational training and the placement 
of workers. Article 30 stated Indonesian migrant workers “cannot be 
borne with placement costs,” and Article 72 prohibited recruiters or 
employers from passing on to the worker any placement costs that 
they had originally paid. The law also mandated the designation of 
a single agency to license recruitment agencies. During the reporting 
period, the government passed a new implementing regulation 
defining, and exempting Indonesian migrant workers from, placement 
fees. While the government began to implement the regulation, 
migrant workers continued to report payment of illegal placement 
fees. In addition, one of the new 2020 implementing regulations 
required married migrant workers to obtain permission from their 
spouse to work abroad. That requirement increased the probability 
that women would migrate through illicit channels, which increased 
vulnerability to traffickers. Prior to the 2017 law, recruitment agencies 
charged migrant workers fees based on their chosen profession and 
destination. Observers reported the government was not effective 
in protecting migrant workers from expenditures higher than the 
government-set recruitment fee, and many migrant workers still 
remitted their first year of wages to their recruiters or employers to 
repay the initial costs of recruitment and placement, which traffickers 
used to coerce and retain victims’ labor. In 2020, the Ministry of 
Manpower (MOM) temporarily suspended the licenses of five 
recruitment agencies—the same as in 2019 but still a large decrease 
from suspending 18 licenses in 2018. Notably, MOM revoked the 
licenses of 111 such agencies—a substantial increase from not revoking 
any licenses in 2019 and revoking only one in each 2018 and 2017. The 
reasons for the suspended and revoked licenses included cramped or 
unsafe accommodations in dormitories, document forgery, coercive 
or deceptive recruitment practices and contract signings, underage 
recruitment, illegal fees, and sending workers to Middle Eastern 
countries that Indonesia’s moratorium on the placement of domestic 
workers prohibited. The government did not report whether it referred 
any of the 116 companies to police for criminal investigations of 
human trafficking-related offenses. The 2017 law stated that MOM 
had the authority to terminate a recruitment agency’s license if it 
violated any of the regulations, but it did not address the use of 
unlicensed sub-agents who regularly charged migrant workers a fee 
to connect them to a recruitment agency. 
The government continued its ban on overseas placement to 21 Middle 
East and North African nations, despite noting the number of migrant 
workers circumventing the ban through the use of illegal recruiters 
continued to increase. The UN, other international organizations, 
and NGOs continued to argue any ban on migration increased the 
likelihood that workers would migrate illegally, heightening their 
risk of human trafficking. Constituting a freedom of movement 
concern that could have further exacerbated irregular migration 
through unsafe channels, the government confiscated the passports 
of any Indonesians repatriated with government assistance if they 
had violated an overseas placement ban. The government maintained 




Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions for the recruitment, placement, 
and protection of Indonesian migrant workers. It continued to 
negotiate additional MOUs with the Governments of Brunei and 
Malaysia. In its MOU with Saudi Arabia, the governments agreed 
migrant workers should not be charged placement fees. Article 31 of 
the 2017 migrant workers law stipulated the government could only 
allow a person to migrate to a destination country that had a law on 
foreign worker protection, a written agreement with the destination 
government, and a social security system or insurance to protect 
migrant workers. MOM did not report an update on its initiative to 
review its existing bilateral MOUs on migrant worker protections to 
ensure compliance; in the absence of robust monitoring schemes, and 
amid inconsistent labor laws and regulations in receiving countries, 
abuses, including forced labor, persisted. 
The government did not effectively implement its existing 
regulations over the fishing sector, which allowed forced labor 
to persist. Underscoring NGO claims of insufficient oversight, 
central government records appeared to drastically underreport the 
number of Indonesians working in the global fishing industry when 
compared against analogous records maintained by another key 
destination country’s authorities. The Ministry Marine Affairs and 
Fisheries (MMAF) and the MFA continued to deconflict roles and 
responsibilities with regard to oversight of recruitment and labor 
practices in the fishing sector. In principle, MMAF would certify the 
credentials of both fishermen and fishing vessels cleared to accept 
Indonesian workers, the Ministry of Transportation would validate 
work contracts, and MOM would oversee coordination between 
ministries. For the second consecutive year, the president did not sign 
the implementing regulations required to solidify these roles and 
responsibilities (related to Law No. 18/2017 on the Coordinating 
Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Investment's National Action 
Plan on Seafarers and Fishing Crews Protection), which hampered 
coordination efforts. Civil society groups noted many Indonesian and 
migrant fishermen were unaware of their rights and responsibilities 
and unprepared for the work in the absence of standardized, employer-
paid pre-departure and post-arrival orientation and training. During 
the reporting period, after media reports emerged of Indonesian 
forced labor on Chinese-flagged fishing vessels, the government 
instituted a ban on Indonesian fishermen working aboard Chinese-
flagged vessels, vessels operated by Chinese companies, and South 
Korean- and Taiwanese-flagged vessels operating outside of their 
Exclusive Economic Zones. One NGO, however, lamented that this 
ban would not stem forced labor on such vessels because it did not 
account for the substantial illegal recruitment of workers, and it is 
easy for a company to change the flag or ownership of the ship to 
evade the restrictions. Internally, the government established two 
Fishers Centers in 2020 to handle complaints from fishermen. The 
centers received 36 complaints of labor violations during the reporting 
period, from both Indonesian and foreign fishermen. 
The Labor Inspectorate had the authority to inspect for, and sanction, 
child labor violations in the formal sector. MOM conducted more 
than 10,000 inspections during the reporting period, including 
more than 580 for child labor, but did not identify any child labor 
violations. Low compensation for inspectors and limited capacity 
among provincial and local-level officials reportedly impeded effective 
oversight. Additionally, MOM officials acknowledged such violations 
likely existed, including forced child labor, but inspectors’ inability 
to access the informal sector hampered identification efforts. To 
reduce their vulnerability to child and forced labor, the government 
sent 94 teachers to Malaysian palm oil plantations to educate the 
children of Indonesian migrant palm oil laborers. Several ministries 
and agencies, including MOWECP, MOSA, and the Indonesian 
Migrant Worker Protection Agency (BP2MI), operated hotlines 
on a range of issues inclusive of, but not limited to, trafficking. In 
2020, BP2MI’s complaint system received 1,812 complaints from 
workers placed overseas, a drastic decrease from 9,377 complaints 
in 2019 and 4,678 in 2018. Of the complaints, BP2MI reported 89 
were related to trafficking (54 in 2019 and 36 in 2018) and 1,363 
demonstrated certain trafficking indicators (2,937 in 2019 and 1,852 
in 2018). Although BP2MI reportedly referred these cases to police 
for investigations, the government did not report whether it took 
any action on the referrals. During the reporting period, BP2MI 
partnered with religious organizations to launch the Task Force on 
Migrant Worker Illegal Placement Eradication, which seeks to end 
illicit labor recruitment. The task force identified 200 villages in six 
provinces as key source areas for non-procedural migrant workers, or 
those who go abroad outside of the formal government procedures, 
and began outlining plans for engagement. 
The government continued public awareness events on trafficking, 
including by conducting awareness-raising activities that highlighted 
the legal procedures to migrate for work and migrant workers’ rights. 
The Indonesian embassy in Kuwait launched a pocketbook for 
migrants that explained Kuwait’s migrant worker policies, including 
the right to retain one’s visa and work contract, as well as information 
on salaries, working hours, and overtime requirements. Due to 
the pandemic, the MFA did not conduct any trainings for junior 
diplomatic personnel on trafficking (100 trained in 2019 and 59 in 
2018). The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand 
for commercial sex acts. The government made efforts to reduce the 
demand for child sex tourism by arresting two foreigners who engaged 
in commercial sex acts with children and coordinating with foreign 
governments to deny entry to known sex offenders. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Indonesia and exploit victims from Indonesia 
abroad. Each of Indonesia’s 34 provinces is a source and destination 
of trafficking. The government estimates that more than two million 
of the six to eight million Indonesians working abroad—many of 
whom are women working in the domestic sector—are undocumented 
or have overstayed their visas, increasing their risk to trafficking; 
the true number of undocumented Indonesian workers is likely 
much higher. During the reporting period, nearly 200,000 of the 
documented Indonesian migrant workers returned to Indonesia 
due to the pandemic. Labor traffickers exploit many Indonesians 
through force and debt-based coercion in Asia (particularly China, 
South Korea, and Singapore) and the Middle East (in particular Saudi 
Arabia) primarily in domestic work, factories, construction, and 
manufacturing, on Malaysian oil palm plantations, and on fishing 
vessels throughout the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Indonesian women 
are exploited in forced labor in Syria. Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, 
and the Middle East host many Indonesian domestic workers who are 
unprotected under local labor laws and often experience indicators 
of trafficking, including excessive working hours, lack of formal 
contracts, and unpaid wages. Many of these workers come from 
the province of East Nusa Tenggara. NGOs estimate unscrupulous 
labor recruitment agents and sub-agents are responsible for more 
than half of Indonesian female trafficking cases overseas. To migrate 
overseas, workers often assume debt that both Indonesian and 
overseas recruitment agents exploit to coerce and retain their labor. 
Additionally, some companies withhold identity documents and use 
threats of violence to keep migrants in forced labor. Sex traffickers 
exploit Indonesian women and girls primarily in Malaysia, Taiwan, 
and the Middle East. Some for-profit universities in Taiwan aggressively 
recruit Indonesians and subsequently place them into exploitative 
labor conditions under the pretense of educational opportunities. 
These students are often unaware of the work component prior to 
arrival and reportedly experience contract switching, prohibitive 
working hours, and poor living conditions contrary to their original 
agreements. Fraudulent recruitment agencies have sent at least 100 
Indonesians to Taiwan under the guise of university scholarships 
where, upon arrival, they were forced to work at an iron foundry to 
repay a “loan” for alleged schooling fees.
In Indonesia, labor traffickers exploit women, men, and children 
in fishing, fish processing, and construction; on oil palm and other 







women and girls in forced labor in domestic service. Traffickers 
may subject children to forced criminality in the production, sale, 
and transportation of illicit drugs. Government regulations allow 
employers in certain sectors, including small and medium enterprises 
and such labor-intensive industries as textile manufacturing, an 
exemption from minimum wage requirements, thereby increasing 
the risk of workers in those sectors to debt-based coercion. More 
than 1.5 million Indonesian children between 10 and 17 years old 
work in agriculture, including on tobacco plantations, without gear 
to protect them from the sun and chemicals; working without proper 
protective gear can be an indicator of forced labor. NGOs report that 
in the city of Bima, on the island of Sumbawa, some professional 
horse racers use child jockeys, some of whom may be forced. Early 
marriage practices pushed many children—especially in poorer 
rural communities—into employment as new primary earners for 
their households, driving a high incidence of child labor migration 
through channels known for deceptive recruitment practices, debt 
bondage, and other forced labor indicators. In at least one case, an 
Indonesian lured another woman into marriage with a Chinese male 
through a “mail-order bride” program, where the woman was forced 
to work 14 hours per day at her new “husband’s” shop and plantation.
According to one international organization, up to 30 percent of 
individuals in commercial sex in Indonesia are female child sex 
trafficking victims. Sex traffickers often use debt or offers of jobs 
in restaurants, factories, or domestic service to coerce and deceive 
women and girls into exploitation in commercial sex across Indonesia, 
and notably in Batam and Jakarta. Sex traffickers use spas, hotels, 
bars, karaoke establishments, and other businesses to facilitate sex 
trafficking. Traffickers also exploit women and girls in sex trafficking 
near mining operations in Maluku, Papua, and Jambi provinces. 
Traffickers increasingly use online and social media platforms to 
recruit victims. In 2017, an NGO estimated there were 70,000 to 
80,000 child sex trafficking victims in Indonesia. Child sex tourism is 
prevalent in the Riau Islands bordering Singapore. Bali is a destination 
for Indonesians and foreign tourists engaging in child sex tourism. 
Middle Eastern tourists come to Indonesia, particularly Puncak district 
in Bogor, and pay more than $700 for a “contract marriage,” usually 
up to one week in duration, that allows them to have extramarital 
sex without violating Islamic law. The girls as young as 9 years old, 
and some of the women, that the tourists “marry” are sex trafficking 
victims. While this is a religious practice, there is tacit government 
acceptance. Indonesian women are recruited abroad for ostensibly 
legitimate employment and are exploited in sex trafficking abroad, 
including in Timor-Leste. 
Indonesians, including children, whose homes or livelihoods were 
destroyed by natural disasters in 2020 are vulnerable to trafficking; 
this is also true for four million children deemed by the government 
to be “neglected” and for approximately 16,000 homeless children 
estimated to be living in urban environments. Government failure to 
prevent companies from encroaching on indigenous communities’ 
land, sometimes in collusion with the military and local police, 
contributed to displacement that also left some ethnic minority 
groups vulnerable to trafficking. Endemic corruption among 
government officials facilitates practices that contribute to trafficking 
vulnerabilities in the travel, hospitality, and labor recruitment 
industries. Widespread social stigma and discrimination against 
members of Indonesia’s LGBTQI+ communities and persons living 
with HIV/AIDS complicated their access to formal sector employment, 
placing them at higher risk of human trafficking through unsafe 
employment in the informal sector. During the reporting period, 
nearly 350 Rohingya left Indonesian refugee camps by boat with 
human smugglers to reach Malaysia. 
Senior vessel crew on board Chinese, Korean, Vanuatuan, Taiwan, 
Thai, Malaysian, Italian, and Philippines-flagged and/or owned fishing 
vessels operating in Indonesian, Thai, Sri Lankan, Mauritian, and 
Indian waters subject Indonesian fishermen to forced labor. During 
the reporting period, several Indonesian forced labor victims aboard 
Chinese-flagged fishing vessels sent a plea for assistance over social 
media, detailing persistent exploitation that included physical violence 
and the vessel’s crew refusal to feed workers until they completed 
their daily 20-hour shifts. Authorities secured the release of 157 
Indonesian fishermen from the vessels, with strong indicators of 
forced labor, and confirmed that 12 Indonesian workers had died 
aboard the vessels between November 2019 and August 2020. Some 
trafficking victims reported the Chinese-flagged vessels had initially 
recruited them under the guise of well-paying jobs on Korean-flagged 
vessels. Traffickers recruited many fishing forced labor victims from 
Java, where they targeted poor farm workers, fraudulently recruited 
them with promises of high salaries and good working conditions, 
provided illicit travel documents, and made workers sign contracts so 
hard to break that experts refer to them as “slavery contracts.” Some 
Chinese-, Korean-, and Taiwanese-flagged vessels force Indonesian 
workers to remain on the vessel and work after the conclusion of their 
contract until the company secures replacement workers. Some of 
the traffickers promised to send the workers’ salaries directly to their 
families, but after several months at sea, many workers discovered 
the vessels had not sent any payments. 
Dozens of recruitment agencies in Burma, Indonesia, and Thailand 
lure fishermen with promises of high wages, charge fees and 
curtailment deposits to assign them fake identity and labor permit 
documents, and then send them to fish long hours in waters on vessels 
operating under complex multinational flagging and ownership 
arrangements. Some fishermen are unaware their recruitment agencies 
continue to withhold or withdraw funds from their salary for years. 
Crew on board these vessels have reported low or unpaid salaries and 
coercive tactics such as contract discrepancies, document retention, 
restricted communication, poor living and working conditions, 
threats of physical violence, and severe physical and sexual abuse. 
Boat captains and crews prohibit fishermen from leaving their vessels 
and reporting these abuses through threats of exposing their fake 
identities to the authorities, threats of blacklisting them from future 
fishing employment, and, in previous years, by detaining them on 
land in makeshift prisons. Forced to sail longer distances to adjust to 
dwindling fish stocks, some crews remain at sea for months or even 
years without returning to shore, compounding their invisibility and 
preserving abusive senior crews’ impunity. Most Indonesian fishermen 
work aboard vessels operating in Taiwan’s highly vulnerable distant 
water fleet; many are also fishing in Korea’s distant water fleets. More 
than 7,000 Indonesian fishermen per year sign in and out of foreign 
vessels at the port in Cape Town, South Africa, reportedly facing dire 
working conditions, particularly on vessels owned by citizens of 
Taiwan, Korea, and Japan. Traffickers also subject fishermen from other 
parts of Asia to forced labor on board fishing vessels in Indonesian 
waters; according to one recent study, these vessels account for nearly 
half of all migrant fishermen trafficked from Cambodia, Thailand, 
and Vietnam. In Indonesian waters and elsewhere, some senior vessel 
crew force fishermen to engage in illegal fishing, poaching, smuggling, 
and illegal entry into national territories, making them vulnerable 
to criminalization. Companies operating under the auspices of the 
Japanese government’s “Technical Intern Training Program” have 
subjected Indonesian nationals to forced labor in food processing, 
manufacturing, construction, and fishing. 
IRAN: TIER 3
The Government of Iran does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking and, even considering the impact of 
the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on the government's anti-trafficking 
capacity, is not making significant efforts to do so; therefore Iran 
remained on Tier 3. During the reporting period, there was a 
government policy or government pattern of recruiting and using child 
soldiers, as well as complicity in sex trafficking of adults and children 
with impunity. Government officials continued to perpetrate and 
condone trafficking crimes with impunity, both in Iran and overseas, 
and did not report law enforcement efforts to address the crime. 
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The government continued to force or coerce children and adults 
to fight for Iranian-led militias operating in Syria, and it continued 
to provide financial support to militias fighting in armed conflicts 
in the region that recruited and used child soldiers. In addition, the 
government failed to identify and protect trafficking victims among 
vulnerable populations and continued to treat trafficking victims as 
criminals, including child sex trafficking victims. Victims continued to 
face severe punishment, including death, for unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit, such as engaging in commercial sex and 
immigration violations. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Cease punishing trafficking victims for unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit, such as engaging in commercial sex and 
immigration violations. • Cease the forcible and otherwise illegal 
recruitment of adults and children for combat in Syria and cease 
support for armed militias that recruit and use child soldiers in Iraq, 
Syria, and Yemen. • Amend the 2004 law to bring the definition of 
trafficking in line with international law. • While respecting due 
process, investigate, prosecute, and convict sex trafficking and forced 
labor perpetrators – particularly complicit government officials – and 
sentence convicted traffickers to significant prison terms. • Institute 
nationwide procedures to proactively identify trafficking victims, 
particularly among vulnerable populations such as persons in 
commercial sex, street children, and undocumented migrants. • Offer 
specialized protection services to victims of all forms of trafficking, 
including shelter and medical, psycho-social, and legal assistance. 
• Develop partnerships with and allow for the registration of civil 
society and international organizations to combat trafficking and 
to help provide essential protection services to victims. • Increase 
transparency of anti-trafficking policies and activities. • Become a 
party to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. 
PROSECUTION
The government did not report anti-trafficking law enforcement 
efforts, and officials continued to perpetrate trafficking crimes with 
impunity, including sex trafficking of adults and children and the 
coerced recruitment and use of adults and children in armed conflict 
in the region. Iranian law did not criminalize all forms of trafficking. 
A 2004 law criminalized trafficking in persons by means of threat 
or use of force, coercion, abuse of power, or abuse of a victim’s 
position of vulnerability for purposes of prostitution, slavery, or 
forced marriage. Inconsistent with the definition of trafficking 
under international law, the law required movement to constitute a 
trafficking offense and required a demonstration of force, fraud, or 
coercion in child sex trafficking cases. The law did not encompass 
all forms of labor trafficking. The prescribed penalty under this law 
included up to 10 years’ imprisonment if the trafficking offense 
involved an adult victim and a penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment if 
the offense involved a child victim. Both penalties were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
the penalties prescribed for kidnapping. The 2002 Law to Protect 
Children and Adolescents criminalized buying, selling, and exploiting 
children; the punishments for such crimes were six months’ to one 
year imprisonment and a fine, which were neither sufficiently stringent 
nor commensurate with other serious crimes such as kidnapping. 
The labor code criminalized forced labor and debt bondage, but the 
prescribed penalty of a fine and up to one year imprisonment was 
not sufficiently stringent. Courts accorded legal testimony by women 
only half the weight accorded to the testimony by men, thereby 
restricting female trafficking victims’ access to justice. Moreover, 
female victims of sexual abuse, including sex trafficking victims, 
faced prosecution for adultery, defined as sexual relations outside 
of marriage and punishable by death. 
The government continued to conflate human trafficking and 
smuggling crimes, and efforts to address sex trafficking and forced 
labor crimes were either nonexistent or not widely publicized. The 
government did not report statistics on investigations, prosecutions, 
convictions, or sentences of traffickers. In April 2020, Iranian media 
reported the government, with the assistance of an international 
organization, arrested an Iranian national for suspected sex trafficking 
of Iranian girls in Malaysia over a three-year period. Iranian police 
reportedly extradited the alleged trafficker from Malaysia and arrested 
an unknown number of other accomplices in Iran. Influential Iranian 
officials reportedly guaranteed the safety of the alleged traffickers by 
helping them avoid earlier arrest and secured the release of some of 
the victims being detained by the Iranian police and returned them 
to the traffickers over the three-year period. The government did 
not report the status of this case at the end of the reporting period; 
however, Iranian media reported that the alleged traffickers were 
referred to the courts for prosecution. The government did not report 
providing anti-trafficking training to its officials.
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, 
or convictions of government employees complicit in human 
trafficking offenses; however, corruption and official complicity 
in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law 
enforcement action during the year. The government condoned 
or directly facilitated commercial sex involving both adults and 
children, including clear cases of sex trafficking, throughout Iran 
and in neighboring countries. Observers continued to report that 
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Iranian 
Basij Resistance Force (Basij), a paramilitary force subordinate to the 
IRGC, continued to actively recruit and use – through force or coercive 
means – migrant and refugee children and adults, as well as Iranian 
children, for combat in IRGC-led and commanded militias in Syria. 
According to a statement made by an IRGC official in October 2019, 
the IRGC may have recruited child soldiers from 3,700 student Basij 
bases in Khuzestan province, and these child soldiers were likely still 
engaged with the IRGC during the reporting period. 
PROTECTION
The government failed to identify and protect any trafficking victims. 
Official government involvement in trafficking crimes and authorities’ 
abuse of trafficking victims continued unabated. The government 
reportedly continued to punish sex and labor trafficking victims 
for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit, such as 
engaging in commercial sex and immigration violations. As in 
previous years, the government’s continued pattern of human rights 
abuses against victims of sexual abuse and persons in commercial 
sex resulted in the government severely punishing potential adult 
and child sex trafficking victims through lashings, public shaming, 
forced confessions, imprisonment, and the death penalty. The 
government also continued to detain and deport Afghan migrants, 
including children, who did not comply with Iranian officials who 
recruited them – through coercive means – to fight for Iranian militias 
abroad. Some detained migrants experienced severe physical abuse, 
including sexual abuse of young girls, while in government custody, 
which at times resulted in lack of food and water for extended periods 
of time and extortion. In 2020, the government deported 325,000 
Afghans and did not make efforts to screen for or identify trafficking 
victims among this highly vulnerable population. Furthermore, in 
November 2020, the government introduced legislation to impose 
fines and severe prison terms – up to 25 years – on undocumented 
migrants and allow security officers to open fire at vehicles suspected 
of transporting them, an approach that would harm potential 
victims among this vulnerable population and disincentivize their 
consultation with law enforcement to report trafficking crimes or seek 




them to back to camps pending deportation or to detention centers; 
between 60 to 80 percent were estimated to be foreign nationals, 
some of whom may have been trafficking victims. 
The government did not provide protection services specifically for 
trafficking victims. Iran’s state welfare system did not provide adequate 
coverage nor protection to the most vulnerable populations in the 
country, including children and persons engaged in commercial sex. 
Foreign trafficking victims were unable to access assistance from the 
welfare system. The government did not report providing support to 
or partnering with NGOs that offered limited services to populations 
vulnerable to trafficking. Furthermore, the government harassed 
some NGOs working with vulnerable populations, and it arrested 
and imprisoned some activists under national security charges or 
for “spreading propaganda against the system.” The government 
did not encourage trafficking victims to assist in the investigation 
or prosecution of traffickers and did not provide witness support 
services. The government did not provide foreign trafficking victims 
legal alternatives to their removal to countries in which they may 
face hardship or retribution. 
PREVENTION
The government failed to prevent trafficking. The government’s 
persistent lack of efforts to prevent official complicity in trafficking 
crimes further exacerbated trafficking in the country and the region. 
The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for 
commercial sex acts in Iran or child sex tourism by Iranian citizens 
traveling abroad; on the contrary, Iranian officials were reportedly 
actively involved in the promotion of commercial sex, including 
cases of sex trafficking. The government did not take measures to 
prevent the IRGC’s recruitment and use of children to fight in the 
Iranian-led and funded Fatemiyoun Brigade deployed to Syria. 
Furthermore, the government did not take action to hold accountable 
officials, including the current Minister of Education, who in previous 
reporting periods promoted the recruitment and use of children to 
fight for Iran in Iraq. 
Iran is not a party to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. The government did 
not have a national anti-trafficking coordinating body; the government 
did not report dedicating resources to address human trafficking or 
the provision of anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel. 
The government did not improve transparency on its anti-trafficking 
policies or activities, nor did it implement anti-trafficking awareness 
campaigns. Hardline elements within the regime routinely stymied 
efforts to amend relevant existing laws or introduce new measures to 
improve the government’s ability to prevent or address the country’s 
pervasive trafficking problems. Children of unregistered Afghans 
continued to have difficulty obtaining legal documentation, which 
increased this population’s vulnerability to trafficking. In June 
2020, a new nationality law entered into force that stated Iranian 
women married to foreign men were able to transmit citizenship to 
their children; this was not automatic, however, as it required the 
mother to submit an application on behalf of her children. Human 
rights activists reported concerns, that the nationality law required 
the Intelligence Ministry and the Intelligence Organization of the 
IRGC to certify that no “security problem” existed before approving 
citizenship for children born to Iranian mothers with non-Iranian 
fathers; this vaguely defined security provision could have been used 
to arbitrarily disqualify applicants if they or their parents were seen 
as critical of the government, further increasing this population’s 
vulnerability to trafficking due to lack of citizenship documentation. 
Due to the pandemic, the government required students to register 
for online schooling with their national identification number, 
which undocumented children did not have, further heightening 
their vulnerability to labor exploitation and trafficking. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Iran, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Iran abroad. The ongoing worsening of the Iranian economy, as 
well as serious and ongoing environmental degradation in Iran, 
have significantly exacerbated Iran’s human trafficking problem, 
particularly for vulnerable and marginalized communities such 
as ethnic minority groups, refugee and migrant populations, and 
women and children. Iranian and some foreign women and girls, 
as well as some men, are highly vulnerable to sex trafficking in Iran. 
Although prostitution is illegal in Iran, a local NGO estimated in 
2017 that prostitution and sex trafficking are endemic throughout 
the country, and reports estimate sex traffickers exploit children as 
young as 10 years old. The government reportedly condones and, in 
some cases, directly facilitates the commercial sexual exploitation 
and sex trafficking of adults and children throughout the country; 
Iranian police, IRGC, Basij, religious clerics, and parents of victims 
are allegedly involved in or turn a blind eye to sex trafficking crimes. 
The demand for commercial sex reportedly occurs in large urban 
centers, including the major pilgrimage sites of Qom and Mashhad; 
reportedly Iranian, Iraqi, Saudi, Bahraini, and Lebanese women in 
these locations are highly vulnerable to sex trafficking. Poverty and 
declining economic opportunities lead some Iranian women to 
willingly enter commercial sex; traffickers subsequently force or coerce 
these women to remain in commercial sex. Some Iranian women who 
seek employment to support their families, as well as young Iranian 
women and girls who run away from their homes, are vulnerable 
to sex trafficking. “Temporary” or “short-term” marriages – for the 
purpose of commercial sexual exploitation known as “sigheh” – 
lasting from one hour to one week are reportedly widespread in Iran 
and take place in so-called “chastity houses,” massage parlors, and 
private homes. These arrangements are reportedly tightly controlled, 
condoned by the state, and regarded highly by religious leaders to 
allow men to sexually exploit female and male Iranians, as well as 
Chinese, Thai, and other victims, including children. Afghan girls 
are vulnerable to forced marriage with men living in Iran, which 
frequently leads to their victimization in sex trafficking, forced labor, 
and domestic servitude. Child marriage of Iranian and some foreign 
girls is reportedly increasing in Iran and is most widespread among 
communities in lower-income areas of large cities, often with the 
consent of parents; girls in these marriages may be at risk of sex 
trafficking or domestic servitude. North Korean nationals working in 
Iran may have been forced to work by the North Korean government.
Iranian women, boys, and girls are vulnerable to sex trafficking 
abroad, including in Afghanistan, Armenia, Georgia, Iraq, the Iraqi 
Kurdistan Region (IKR), Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). In 2018, a prominent Iranian NGO reported a rise 
in the number of Iranian nationals in commercial sex in nightclubs 
in Tbilisi, Georgia, including some child sex trafficking victims; 
pimps and madams in Tbilisi reportedly confiscate victims’ passports 
and physically abuse and threaten victims. The media continued to 
report in 2018 an increase in young Iranian women in commercial 
sex in Dubai; some of these women are trafficking victims, whose 
pimps confiscate their passports and threaten them with violence or 
execution if they return to Iran. Some reports also suggest collusion 
between pimps in Dubai and Iranian police, the IRGC, and the Basij. 
Nationals from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Qatar reportedly purchase 
sex from Iranian women in commercial sex in Dubai, including 
trafficking victims. Reports suggest that Iranian women are also 
vulnerable to sex trafficking in Turkey, particularly in Turkish cities 
close to the Iranian border. According to IKR press reports in 2018, 
more than 2,000 young Iranian women and girls entered the IKR in 
2018, many of whom are victims of sex trafficking in cafes, hotels, 
and massage centers. According to a regional scholar, traffickers 
reportedly use Shiraz, Iran, as a transit point to bring ethnic Azeri girls 
from Azerbaijan to the UAE and exploit them in sex trafficking rings.
Iranian and Afghan refugee children, street children, and orphans in 
Iran are highly vulnerable to forced labor, and experts suggest child 
trafficking is increasing in Iran. A local Iranian official stated that the 
number of child laborers in streets has increased significantly due to 
the pandemic and the related economic downturn and that some of 
these children work under the supervision of profiteers and traffickers. 
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Official Iranian statistics indicate there are three million children 
working in Iran, but Iranian media suggest there are approximately 
seven million children sold, rented, or sent to work in Iran. Most of 
these children are reportedly between the ages of 10-15 years old, 
and the large majority are foreigners with no official identification 
documents. The number of children working in transport, garbage 
and waste disposal, “dumpster diving,” car washing, brick factories, 
construction, and the carpet industry reportedly continues to increase; 
these children experience abuse and withheld wages and may be 
exposed to infectious diseases, all indicators of forced labor. Young 
Afghan children, mainly boys, are forced to perform cheap labor 
and domestic work, which often involves debt-based coercion, 
restriction of movement, non-payment of wages, and physical or 
sexual abuse, all of which are trafficking indicators. Organized criminal 
groups target children for child begging rings in Iran. Criminal 
groups kidnap or purchase and force Iranian and migrant children, 
especially undocumented Afghan children, to work as beggars and 
street vendors in cities, including Tehran. These children, who may 
be as young as three years old, are routinely subjected to physical and 
sexual abuse and drug addiction. Orphaned children are vulnerable 
to criminal begging rings that maim or seriously injure the children 
to gain sympathy from those passing on the street. Poor families 
“rent” their children by the day to criminal groups that force the 
children, some as young as five years old, to beg in the street; if the 
children do not collect a specified amount of money by the end of 
the day, the groups force children to work in illegal workshops or 
exploit them in commercial sex. Reports indicate that organized 
gangs force some children, including Afghan children, to engage in 
unlawful activities, such as drug trafficking and smuggling of fuel 
and tobacco. Some Afghan children, ranging from ages 14-17, use 
smugglers to transport them from Afghanistan to Iran in search 
of work; once in Iran, smugglers turn the children over to Iranian 
employers who force them to work.
Foreign workers, Pakistani migrants, and Afghan migrants and refugees 
are highly vulnerable to forced labor and debt-related coercion in 
Iran. The UN estimates as many as three million Afghans live in 
Iran and reports there are 951,142 Afghans registered as refugees 
in Iran. In addition to registered refugees, the government hosts an 
estimated 450,000 Afghans who hold Afghan passports and Iranian 
visas and an estimated 1.5 to two million undocumented Afghans. 
Undocumented Afghans face increased vulnerability to economic 
and social hardships and exploitation, including trafficking. Afghan 
refugees and migrants frequently travel illegally through Iran en 
route to Turkey, making them ineligible to receive state assistance 
and vulnerable to abuse and exploitation. Organized trafficking 
groups subject Pakistani men and women migrants in low-skilled 
employment, such as domestic work and construction, to forced labor 
using debt-based coercion, restriction of movement, non-payment 
of wages, and physical or sexual abuse. Increasingly, employers 
seek adjustable work contracts for registered foreign workers where 
employers deny workers their benefits and coerce them to work 
overtime, increasing the workers’ vulnerability to forced labor. 
Traffickers subject Afghan migrants, including children, to forced 
labor in construction and agriculture in Iran. 
Iranian authorities continue to force and coerce Afghan migrants, 
including children, as well as some Pakistani migrants and Iranian 
children, into armed groups in the region. Several credible sources 
continue to widely report the IRGC and Basij coerce male adult 
and child Afghans residing in Iran, including boys as young as 13 
years old, to fight in the Iranian-led and funded Fatemiyoun Brigade 
deployed to Syria. Officials threaten these individuals with arrest 
and deportation to Afghanistan. The Basij also reportedly recruits 
and trains Iranian children who are deployed to Syria. Sources also 
indicate the government exploits undocumented and impoverished 
Pakistani adults living in Iran to fight for the IRGC-led Zaynabiyoun 
Brigade in Syria. According to a November 2020 media report, the 
IRGC reportedly established three centers located in Al Mayadin 
to facilitate recruitment and training of Syrian youth from Dayr az 
Zawr to fight in IRGC and affiliated militia in Syria. Established in 
2019, the largest center reportedly houses 250 children between the 
ages of 13-18 years; the children undergo three months of training 
in preparation for combat. In addition, the Iranian government 
provides funding to militias operating in Iraq and to Asa’ib Ahl al-
Haq (AAH) and Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HHN), which recruit, 
train, and use child soldiers in combat in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. 
According to an Iraq-based observer, the Iranian government also 
provided funding to the militia Abu Fadhl al-Abbas Brigades, which 
used children in combat on the front line in Fallujah, Iraq, in 2016. 
IRAQ: TIER 2
The Government of Iraq does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to 
do so. The Iraqi government demonstrated overall increasing efforts 
compared to the previous reporting period, considering the impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Iraq remained on Tier 2. These efforts included convicting more 
traffickers, including complicit officials; bolstering the capacity of the 
Ministry of Interior’s (MOI) anti-trafficking directorate with additional 
funding and staff; and increasing law enforcement training to improve 
officials’ knowledge of anti-trafficking laws. The Iraqi government 
continued to identify and refer victims to protective services, which 
for the first time included referrals to NGOs. The Kurdistan Regional 
Government (KRG) established specialized anti-trafficking police 
units in each of its governates in the autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan 
Region (IKR), and it continued to facilitate the release of Yezidis 
from ISIS captivity. However, the Iraqi government and the KRG did 
not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. Deficiencies 
in identification and referral procedures, coupled with authorities’ 
lack of understanding of trafficking, continued to prevent many 
victims from receiving appropriate protection services. Authorities 
did not proactively identify trafficking victims among vulnerable 
populations, which resulted in the continued punishment of some 
victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit, 
such as immigration and prostitution violations. The government 
also lacked adequate protection services for victims of all forms 
of trafficking. In addition, the KRG did not report prosecuting or 
convicting any traffickers during the reporting period. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Ensure trafficking victims are not punished for unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit, such as prostitution and immigration 
violations. • Prevent the recruitment and use of child soldiers by 
all armed groups, including units of the Popular Mobilization 
Forces (PMF) and independent militias, and provide appropriate 
protection services to demobilized child soldiers. • Develop and 
institute guidelines for proactive victim identification and referral 
to protection services for all relevant officials, and train officials 
on these procedures. • Allow all relevant authorities to officially 
identify potential trafficking victims and refer them to care, not solely 
investigative judges via a court order. • Ensure victim identification 
and protection measures are provided independent of the prosecution 
of a trafficker. • Significantly increase unhindered access to adequate 
protection services for victims of all forms of trafficking and their 




long-term shelter, legal aid, translation and interpretation services, 
reintegration services, employment training, and financial assistance. 
• Protect victims from re-traumatization during trial, including by 
allowing alternative means for victim and witness testimony. • Make 
significant efforts to investigate, prosecute, convict, and stringently 
sentence traffickers, including complicit government officials and staff 
and guards at government-run shelters, even when victims do not 
participate in legal proceedings against their trafficker. • Amend the 
anti-trafficking law to ensure that a demonstration of force, fraud, or 
coercion is not required to constitute a child sex trafficking offense, in 
accordance with the 2000 UN Trafficking in Persons Protocol (Palermo 
Protocol). • Finalize regulations to enable full implementation of 
the anti-trafficking law. • Establish a legal framework for NGOs to 
operate shelters for victims, and provide financial resources, facilities, 
and trained personnel to such organizations.
PROSECUTION
The Iraqi government increased law enforcement efforts. It reported 
an increase in convictions of traffickers, including complicit officials; 
increased the capacity of the MOI’s anti-human trafficking directorate; 
and expanded law enforcement training to address gaps in officials’ 
understanding of the anti-trafficking law. Additionally, the KRG 
established specialized trafficking units in each governate within the 
IKR. Iraq’s 2012 anti-trafficking law criminalized forced labor and 
some forms of sex trafficking. Inconsistent with the definition of 
trafficking under international law, the anti-trafficking law required 
a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex 
trafficking offense and therefore did not criminalize all forms of child 
sex trafficking. The anti-trafficking law prescribed penalties of up to 
15 years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to 10 million Iraqi dinar 
(IQD) ($8,790) for trafficking offenses involving adult male victims, 
and up to life imprisonment and a fine of 15 million to 25 million 
IQD ($13,180 to $21,970) if the offense involved an adult female 
or child victim. These penalties were sufficiently stringent, and with 
respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as rape. Article 399 of the penal code 
criminalized “the prostitution of a child” and provided a penalty 
of up to 10 years’ imprisonment, which was sufficiently stringent, 
although not commensurate with the penalties prescribed for rape. 
The MOI submitted a draft amendment to the 2012 anti-trafficking 
law in December 2020 that included provisions to establish a 
court specialized in combating human trafficking in each appellate 
jurisdiction, establish a legal defense fund to assist victims, require 
referral of all victims to state-run shelters instead of police stations 
for the duration of criminal proceedings, allow for issuance of 
residence visas to all trafficking victims, prohibit penalization of 
victims of any criminal charges resulting from their trafficking, and 
strengthen legal penalties for trafficking offenses to allow for seizure 
of movable and immovable property by perpetrators. At the close 
of the reporting period, the amendment remained pending review 
by Parliament. The government continued to lack implementing 
regulations for the anti-trafficking law, hindering its ability to enforce 
the law, bring traffickers to justice, and protect victims. The KRG did 
not develop the regulatory and enforcement framework required to 
fully implement the 2012 Iraqi anti-trafficking law, which the IKR’s 
regional parliament approved in 2018. 
During the reporting period, the MOI’s anti-trafficking unit arrested 
and detained 394 individuals for alleged involvement in trafficking 
crimes; the unit arrested 199 of these alleged traffickers after 
conducting 37 raids on massage parlors, coffee shops, and other 
establishments known for human trafficking activities. Of the 394 
individuals, authorities referred 35 for prosecution under the 2012 
anti-trafficking law, while it acquitted 82 and released 21 on bail; 
the remaining 256 individuals remained under investigation at 
the close of the reporting period. The government convicted and 
sentenced 127 traffickers in 18 cases under the anti-trafficking law 
and sentenced them from five to 15 years in prison. For the first time, 
the government reported the type of trafficking crimes for which 
these individuals were convicted; out of the 127 convictions, 80 
were convicted for sex trafficking, 28 for forced labor, nine for both 
sex and labor trafficking and 10 for child trafficking. In the previous 
reporting period, the government reported it detained 504 alleged 
traffickers, referred 105 to prosecution, and convicted and sentenced 
67. As in the previous reporting period, the KRG made an unknown 
number of arrests but did not report prosecuting or convicting any 
traffickers during the reporting period. 
Concerns of alleged official complicity in trafficking crimes 
remained; however, the government reported it convicted eight 
servicemen—including six MOI officers and two Iraqi military 
officers—for child sex trafficking and sentenced each official to eight 
to 10 years’ imprisonment. Some NGOs continued to report that 
government officials in key security positions protected traffickers 
from investigation and prosecution. Further, during the reporting 
period, an NGO reported allegations from trafficking victims of abuse 
by staff and guards at government-run shelters. The government did 
not report efforts to investigate or prosecute continued allegations 
that security and camp management personnel in IDP camps were 
complicit in the sexual exploitation and trafficking of women and girls, 
particularly those with ties to alleged ISIS members. However, during 
the reporting period, the government cooperated with an international 
organization and NGOs to address sexual exploitation concerns 
in IDP camps. The Iraqi government did not investigate or hold 
criminally accountable non-compliant militia units affiliated with 
the PMF that operated under the Popular Mobilization Committee 
(PMC), a component of the Iraqi security forces (ISF), including for 
child soldiering offenses. Furthermore, some foreign governments 
with large numbers of migrant workers in Iraq continued to report 
Iraqi officials sometimes forced them to pay bribes, along with 
immigration fees, to release their citizens who were trafficking victims 
from detention and to repatriate them. 
The MOI’s anti-trafficking directorate continued to report that its many 
responsibilities limited its ability to conduct trafficking investigations; 
lack of resources and weak coordination among governmental 
ministries also hindered trafficking investigations. Additionally, 
Iraqi government and KRG officials—including police officers and 
investigative judges—continued to lack a general understanding of 
trafficking and the ability to recognize trafficking indicators. Local 
NGOs reported KRG law enforcement experienced reduced working 
hours and limited salaries due to pandemic-related government 
closures and the ongoing financial crisis in the country; a lack of 
staff and resources also contributed to police units’ low capacity 
to investigate trafficking crimes. Despite a six-month nationwide 
pandemic-related lockdown that closed all government agencies 
except some law enforcement and health services, the MOI took 
steps to address some of these shortfalls during the reporting period. 
The government reported it facilitated an increased number of 
anti-trafficking trainings for MOI, Ministry of Justice (MOJ), and 
Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs (MOLSA) personnel on Iraq’s 
anti-trafficking law, best practices for investigating and prosecuting 
trafficking cases with a victim-centered approach, and victim 
identification and protection through train-the-trainer programs. 
In total, the Central Committee to Counter Trafficking (CCCT) 
conducted 18 virtual training programs for police officers and judges; 
the MOI held 27 online workshops on investigation best practices and 
conducted 27 train-the-trainer programs on victim identification and 
protection for community policing officers and counter-trafficking 
investigators, among others. Several local and international NGOs 
noted Iraqi officials demonstrated an increased understanding of 
Iraq’s anti-trafficking law during the reporting period. Following the 
MOI’s upgrade of its anti-human trafficking unit to the equivalent 
of a directorate in March 2020, the government reported it allocated 
substantial additional financial and human resources to the directorate 
during the reporting period; this included the creation of additional 
units—one that focused on professional training for all staff, run by 
specialized investigators and educators with expertise in trafficking 
crimes, and another focused on tracking potential trafficking crimes 
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perpetrated through social media, a trend that increased due to 
the pandemic. The KRG did not report providing anti-trafficking 
training for its personnel. However, during the reporting period, 
the KRG established fully operational anti-trafficking police units 
in all four governates of the IKR, as well as in the two independent 
administrations of Garmiyan and Raparin. Some NGOs reported the 
anti-trafficking unit in Erbil improved its identification of trafficking 
cases during the reporting period and often coordinated with courts 
in Erbil to move trafficking cases through the legal system. However, 
other NGOs continued to report the KRG generally underestimated 
the actual number of trafficking cases in the region and judicial actors 
lacked the necessary capacity to identify and investigate trafficking 
crimes. Local NGOs also reported KRG law enforcement lacked a 
clear reporting system for trafficking crimes and many government 
actors tasked with handling trafficking lacked specialized training 
for identifying and investigating potential cases.
PROTECTION
The government maintained mixed efforts to protect victims. Despite 
the pandemic-related closure of the Iraqi government-operated 
shelter for six months during the reporting period, the government 
continued to identify trafficking victims and refer them to shelter. 
For the first time, the government informally referred victims to 
NGOs for protection services. It also worked with an NGO to provide 
training to shelter staff for the first time; however, it continued to 
penalize trafficking victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled 
them to commit and did not establish standardized identification and 
referral procedures, rendering some potential victims unidentified 
and therefore unable to receive care. The MOI reported it identified 
58 total trafficking victims, which included five female victims of sex 
trafficking, one child trafficking victim, 14 victims of forced labor, 
and four victims of forced begging; the government did not provide 
data on the type of trafficking for the remaining 34 victims identified. 
During the previous reporting period, the MOI identified 72 total 
trafficking victims. Of the 58 identified victims in this period, the 
Iraqi government referred 18 adult female victims to the MOLSA-run 
trafficking shelter in Baghdad, three child victims to orphanages, 
and four adult female victims to health care facilities. For the first 
time, the Iraqi government reported it referred the remaining 34 
victims to NGOs to receive protection services; further, several NGOs 
reported government attitudes toward organizations running shelters 
significantly improved during the reporting period. Additionally, 
MOLSA and an NGO launched a collaborative training program for 
trafficking shelter staff for the first time, which represented a shift 
towards greater government cooperation with NGOs addressing 
trafficking. The Iraqi government did not have victim identification 
guidelines for all officials, including first responders, who came 
in contact with potential trafficking victims among vulnerable 
groups, including undocumented foreign migrants and persons in 
commercial sex. The Iraqi government also did not have a national 
victim referral mechanism, and the government continued to have 
an ad hoc referral process. Civil society organizations reported 
some Iraqi officials, including district-level police officers, did not 
proactively identify trafficking victims because officials lacked a general 
understanding of the crime. NGOs reported some police officials 
proactively identified foreign labor trafficking victims, but they did 
not adequately screen for victims among Iraqi citizens, including 
those that were internally displaced, or during investigations of 
prostitution crimes. Investigative judges were the only officials who 
could officially identify and refer a trafficking victim to protection 
services via a court order, including the government-run shelter 
in Baghdad; however, because judges required victims to testify 
in front of their perpetrators in court, many victims did not come 
forward due to fear of retaliation. Because of this requirement and 
the resulting absence of victim witnesses, judges determined in many 
cases there was insufficient evidence to officially classify a person 
as a trafficking victim, thereby denying victims’ access to protection 
services. Furthermore, the Iraqi government did not have specialized 
judges or courts that were trained or dedicated to handling trafficking 
cases; both NGOs and international organizations continued to 
report that the lack of specialized investigative judges hindered the 
official determination of trafficking victims, and some victims may 
have been unidentified and unable to receive protection services. 
An international organization reported authorities frequently held 
trafficking victims in detention facilities while an investigative 
judge determined their status as a victim; due to pandemic-related 
restrictions and the government lockdown, authorities held some 
victims for extended periods of time without the ability to receive 
protection services. 
Some officials continued to criminalize and punish trafficking 
victims. Authorities arrested, imprisoned, deported, and financially 
penalized trafficking victims in Iraq, including in the IKR, for unlawful 
acts traffickers compelled them to commit, such as prostitution 
and immigration violations and child soldiering. Foreign migrant 
workers, including foreign labor trafficking victims, faced regular 
discrimination in the criminal justice process, re-victimization, and 
retaliation from traffickers. Police at times inappropriately arrested 
and detained foreign trafficking victims, rather than the perpetrators, 
after employers and recruitment agents filed false claims of theft 
against the victim in retaliation for victims reporting allegations of 
trafficking to the police. Although employers were legally responsible 
to pay immigration fees or liabilities related to foreign workers 
under Iraq’s sponsorship system, in practice authorities penalized 
workers, including identified and unidentified trafficking victims, for 
failing to pay; additionally, an international organization reported 
officials sometimes waived residency fines, but the decision-making 
process appeared arbitrary and highly personalized. In an effort 
to address this issue, in March 2020, the Higher Judicial Council 
(HJC) advised its judges to waive all fines for trafficking victims 
who were in violation of Iraq’s residency laws. Likely as a result 
of this decision, an NGO reported a substantial reduction in the 
number of vulnerable migrant workers detained for their inability 
to pay residency fines; in 2020, authorities detained 35 vulnerable 
workers for not paying fines, compared to 300 workers detained 
in 2019. Another NGO reported that within IKR, KRG authorities 
also improved the process for waiving fines that trafficking victims 
would otherwise be subject to for working in Kurdistan without 
legal documentation; however, as this process was informal, some 
trafficking victims may not have benefitted from the change. NGOs 
continued to report the Iraqi government increasingly recognized that 
people arrested for prostitution crimes could be victims of trafficking 
and should be treated as such; however, despite these improvements, 
other NGOs reported authorities continued to charge sex trafficking 
victims on prostitution violations. During the reporting period, an 
NGO reported the KRG arrested 33 individuals for prostitution but 
failed to screen for trafficking indicators, and therefore may have 
penalized potential sex trafficking victims. In addition, Iraqi and 
KRG authorities continued to inappropriately detain and prosecute 
without legal representation children allegedly affiliated with ISIS—
some of whom were victims of forcible recruitment and use—and 
used abusive interrogation techniques and torture to gain children’s 
confessions; the Iraqi government did not report screening these 
children as potential trafficking victims or referring them to protection 
services. However, in December 2020, an NGO reported an Iraqi 
special judicial committee that adjudicated cases of children with 
alleged ISIS links appeared to comply with international human rights 
standards; the committee reviewed individual cases and ordered the 
release of 75 alleged child offenders for lack of evidence to prevent 
double jeopardy, and per provisions of Iraq’s amnesty law, during 
the reporting period.
The Iraqi government provided limited protection services to 
trafficking victims and did not operate shelters specifically for 
male trafficking victims. By law, the Iraqi government was the only 
authority permitted to provide shelter to trafficking victims; however, 
NGOs reported greater cooperation with the Iraqi government 
during the reporting period and received referrals from the MOI 
to assist trafficking victims for the first time. In 2020, the Iraqi 




to fund the government shelter; however, it still partially relied 
on donations from civil society and international organizations. 
Previously, the Iraqi government did not allocate funding in its 
budget specifically for victim protection services. MOLSA continued to 
operate a trafficking shelter in Baghdad for female trafficking victims; 
during the reporting period, 18 trafficking victims, the majority of 
whom were sex trafficking victims, utilized the shelter, an increase 
from seven victims that were assisted at the shelter in the previous 
reporting period. MOLSA—in coordination with the Ministry of 
Health (MOH)—provided victims at the shelter with psycho-social, 
trauma, and reintegration services and medical care; MOH reported it 
dedicated two doctors for trafficking victims at the shelter. NGOs and 
an international organization reported that overall services fulfilled 
victims’ basic physical needs, but a lack of resources, staffing, and 
case management training limited shelter staff’s ability to provide 
psycho-social and medical care and vocational training specifically 
for trafficking victims. However, during the reporting year, MOLSA 
reported it had developed a distinct case management system and 
clinical psychology tracks for different categories of trafficking victims; 
it also reported the MOLSA shelter began providing vocational 
training to trafficking victims in 2020. In most cases, officials did not 
allow female victims to freely enter and exit shelters because they 
were referred via a court order and officials limited victims’ ability to 
communicate with anyone outside of the shelters. An international 
organization reported foreign victims could not easily access services 
outside of the shelter while they awaited repatriation; instead, foreign 
victims often relied on their embassies for support. The embassies 
of the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Indonesia reportedly provided 
shelter for their nationals while they awaited repatriation during the 
year. Conversely, the CCCT reported it provided full support to all 
known foreign trafficking victims, and the MOI reported providing 
identical physical and mental services and legal assistance to both 
Iraqi and non-Iraqi citizen trafficking victims. During the reporting 
period, an NGO reported allegations that staff and guards at Iraqi 
government-operated shelters abused trafficking victims. To address 
this, MOLSA reported it installed a monitoring system to prevent any 
violations by shelter staff against victims during the year, in addition 
to conducting physical checks when the victims were admitted to the 
facility and discharged in order to detect and document any potential 
abuse against the shelter occupants. The Iraqi government did not 
provide specialized care for rape victims, including trafficking victims 
who were also victims of rape; due to social norms, rape victims were 
often encouraged by Iraqi government authorities or sometimes 
forced by their families to marry their rapists. The Iraqi government 
did not report providing funding or in-kind assistance to NGOs 
that provided victim care during the year; however, unlike previous 
reporting periods, NGOs reported government attitudes towards 
organizations operating trafficking shelters improved significantly 
throughout the year. During the previous reporting period, officials 
of the Council of Ministers General Secretariat (COMSEC) filed a 
lawsuit against an NGO that provided support to female trafficking 
victims in an effort to dissolve the NGO. However, the NGO won a 
final appeal on the case in February 2021.
The KRG continued to operate four shelters in the IKR for women; 
the shelters could provide services to female trafficking victims but 
rarely did so during the reporting period. Victims needed to obtain 
a court order to leave the shelters, which significantly restricted their 
movement, and shelter space was limited. The KRG did not report 
how many trafficking victims received services at these shelters 
during the reporting period. During the previous reporting period, 
the KRG gave official permission to an Erbil-based NGO to operate 
the first trafficking shelter in IKR, which could house as many as 38 
victims at one time. A local NGO reported the shelter was almost 
always at capacity, and during the reporting period, 43 trafficking 
victims received shelter services. The KRG continued to facilitate the 
release of Yezidis held captive by ISIS, most of whom were likely 
trafficking victims and reported it coordinated with NGOs and an 
international organization to provide essential psycho-social and 
protective services to these victims. The Iraqi government did not 
report efforts to provide protection services to demobilized child 
soldiers of ISIS, the PMF, or other armed groups, thus failing to 
prevent re-victimization or re-recruitment of these children. 
Neither the Iraqi government nor the KRG provided adequate 
protections to victims or witnesses to encourage their assistance in 
investigations and prosecutions of traffickers. However, the MOI 
reported 27 identified victims voluntarily assisted law enforcement 
authorities during the investigation and prosecution of their traffickers. 
The Iraqi government did not allow trafficking victims to work, 
move freely, or leave the country during trials. The MOI reported 
any foreign or Iraqi trafficking victim could file a civil lawsuit against 
a trafficker, but an NGO reported no victims filed such lawsuits in 
2020, likely due in part to authorities’ poor investigative techniques 
for trafficking cases and the overall lack of protections provided to 
victims during trial. Courts did not protect the privacy or identity of 
victims when testifying against their trafficker; during the reporting 
period, NGOs reported courts required victims to testify in front of 
their traffickers, as well as—at times—in front of an entire courtroom 
of other people waiting for their cases to be heard. Iraqi courts also 
did not provide translation and interpretation services for foreign 
trafficking victims, which delayed cases for months; in some cases, 
courts used unqualified interpreters, which harmed the credibility 
of victims’ testimonies. Labor courts in the IKR did not provide 
translation and interpretation services for foreign workers, including 
foreign labor trafficking victims, creating difficulties for victims to sue 
abusive employers. Although the Iraqi anti-trafficking law allowed 
for the government to provide special residency status benefits to 
foreign trafficking victims, the government did not report offering 
this assistance to any victims during the reporting period. The KRG 
did not offer special residency status to victims during the reporting 
period either, but it reportedly continued to refrain from deporting 
victims. The Iraqi government and the KRG provided foreign victims 
relief from deportation or offered legal alternatives to their removal 
to countries in which they may have faced hardship or retribution. 
The Iraqi government and KRG reportedly cooperated with an 
international organization to repatriate an unknown number of 
foreign trafficking victims during the reporting period.
PREVENTION
The government increased its efforts to prevent human trafficking. 
Political unrest, including mass protests, budget shortfalls, 
understaffing, a stagnant economy, and the pandemic-related 
government lockdown for six months of the reporting period limited 
the Iraqi government and KRG’s ability to coordinate anti-trafficking 
efforts and dedicate resources to combat trafficking. Nevertheless, the 
CCCT continued to meet nearly every month during the reporting 
period. The KRG’s anti-trafficking committee—established in 2016—
which was led by the Kurdistan Ministry of Interior (KMOI) and 
included 17 government ministries did not meet during the reporting 
period due to the pandemic. The Iraqi government maintained a 
national anti-trafficking action plan but acknowledged that the 
pandemic slowed its implementation. The government did not report 
whether it dedicated a specific budget to overall implementation 
of the action plan but reported an increase in staff and funding to 
the MOI’s anti-trafficking directorate, which implemented aspects 
of the plan, during the year. Additionally, the Iraqi government 
and the KRG expanded coordination in 2020; the CCCT reported 
increasing the number of KRG representatives from one to three and 
launched separate monthly meetings between MOI and the KRG’s 
MOI members of the CCCT to enhance law enforcement efforts. 
During the reporting period, the MOI’s anti-trafficking directorate 
and the CCCT conducted a nationwide awareness campaign that 
included publishing stories about trafficking on national media 
outlets and government-run radio to highlight the warning signs of the 
crime; advertised its anti-trafficking hotline and posted information 
at hospitals, markets, border crossings and security checkpoints, 
airports, police stations, and transportation hubs; and provided 
lectures to incoming students at universities throughout the country 
IRAQ
300
on trafficking indicators. As in the previous reporting period, the 
Ministry of Transportation reported it continued to work with bus 
companies and airlines to raise awareness about trafficking, and the 
Ministry of Displacement and Migration raised awareness at IDP 
camps during the reporting period. In addition, the MOI reported 
partnering with local and international NGOs to conduct an awareness 
campaign on human trafficking at government and public offices, 
airports, and border checkpoints that reached over 200,000 people 
from May 2020 to January 2021. The MOI continued to operate a 
24-hour anti-trafficking hotline; the hotline received 169 calls, which 
resulted in 35 alleged trafficking cases, 17 arrests, and 10 convictions 
during the year. During the previous reporting period, the hotline 
received 26 alleged trafficking cases, but the government did not 
report if these cases resulted in arrests or convictions. In 2020, the 
MOI also launched a public email address to receive trafficking tips. 
The KRG operated its own hotline where trafficking victims could 
seek assistance and report labor abuses, but it did not report how 
many alleged trafficking cases it received through the hotline during 
the reporting period. 
The Iraqi government and the KRG continued to cooperate with each 
other to maintain an online visa system to track migrant workers and 
their sponsoring companies to prevent employers from committing 
labor abuses; the government reported the system could automatically 
block any single individual or company from sponsoring more than 
50 foreign laborers. However, the KRG reported challenges tracking 
migrant workers hired by employers and companies that used fake or 
fraudulent registrations and others who acted as agents, sponsoring 
foreign labor visas before ultimately hiring the workers to third-
party companies for profit. The government reported it regulated 
labor recruitment and placement of foreign workers through MOI’s 
Residency Office and MOLSA, where recruitment agents licensed by 
the government sponsored workers. Under this sponsorship system, 
a worker could not change employers until completing two years 
of work with a sponsor, unless the worker had a complaint of poor 
treatment or abuse. However, even in cases where an employee had 
a legitimate complaint, NGOs and an international organization 
reported the employee was often relocated to a new employer 
and authorities rarely held the abusive employer accountable. An 
international organization also reported agencies that the government 
blacklisted changed names frequently to enable them to continue 
to operate, and in cases where an employer was punished for abuse, 
it was common for a single perpetrator to be penalized, rather than 
the entire company or agency. However, in an effort to improve the 
identification of potential trafficking cases in instances of abuse or 
labor law violations, in January 2021, the HJC allocated judges with 
greater knowledge and experience of trafficking crimes in Iraqi labor 
dispute courts. The Iraqi government did not provide anti-trafficking 
training to its diplomatic personnel. The government reported it made 
efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts by increasing 
surveillance on social clubs, hotels, massage parlors, and marriage 
offices; MOI also reported providing human trafficking training to 
police responsible for securing tourism sites. The government did 
not make efforts to reduce the demand for child sex tourism. In the 
previous reporting period, the HJC directed courts to use the anti-
terrorism law to counter some forced marriage practices, including 
fasliya and nahwa—a practice in which a family forces a woman to 
marry one of her father’s cousins—which placed women and girls at 
increased risk of trafficking. The government reported arresting three 
individuals in June 2020 for nahwa and referred them for prosecution; 
additionally, as of February 2021, the government reported courts 
had prosecuted 59 nahwa cases in 2020. 
During the reporting period, the Iraqi government announced its 
decision to begin to close all IDP camps across the country. NGO 
and media reports alleged government officials forced thousands of 
civilians, mostly women and children, out of camps with very little 
notice. NGOs and an international organization expressed concern 
that many of the camps’ residents did not have anywhere to return 
to as their homes were destroyed during the conflict with ISIS, or 
feared retaliation and violence if they returned home because of real 
or perceived affiliation with ISIS. Further, NGOs reported other camp 
residents experienced challenges obtaining civil documentation and 
security clearance to travel to other parts of the country, resulting 
in secondary displacement and exacerbating the risk of exploitation 
and trafficking in a highly vulnerable population. An international 
organization reported tens of thousands of IDP children lacked civil 
documentation, particularly those born or formally residing in areas 
under ISIS control, and could not access basic services, including 
enrolling in school.
Iraqi law prohibited voluntary recruitment of any person younger than 
age 18 into the governmental armed forces, including governmental 
paramilitary forces, militia groups, or other armed groups. There 
were no reports of child soldiers used within the Iraqi military, and 
the government reportedly provided training to military officers 
on child soldier issues. However, the Iraqi government did not 
exercise complete control over certain units of the PMF, which 
sometimes undertook operations independent of political leaders 
or military commanders. The Iraqi government’s inter-ministerial 
senior committee to monitor, evaluate, and report on children’s rights 
violations in conflict zones in Iraq continued to closely coordinate 
with an international organization during the reporting period but 
did not report on actions by the committee during the reporting 
period. The government also continued to discuss the development 
of an action plan with an international organization for the PMC 
to address the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Iraq, and traffickers exploit victims from Iraq 
abroad. The violent conflict with ISIS exacerbated the population’s 
vulnerability to trafficking, in particular women and children, 
although the government’s territorial defeat of the terrorist group, 
announced December 9, 2017, has improved conditions for Iraqi 
civilians. However, insecurity remained in many areas, including 
those liberated from ISIS rule. Since January 2014, more than five 
million Iraqis have been displaced, with approximately 1.2 million 
still displaced as of the end of 2020; about 80 percent have been 
displaced for more than three years, placing them at continued risk 
of exploitation. Many of those that are displaced are female heads of 
household vulnerable to sexual exploitation and abuse due to their 
perceived affiliation with ISIS. In addition, more than 245,000 Syrian 
refugees remained displaced in Iraq, the vast majority in the IKR. 
With the defeat of the ISIS physical caliphate, the reported incidence 
of these violations has diminished. Between 2014 and 2018, ISIS 
militants kidnapped and held captive thousands of women and 
children from a wide range of ethnic and religious groups, especially 
Yezidis, and sold them to ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria, where ISIS 
fighters subjected them to forced marriage, sexual slavery, rape, and 
domestic servitude. ISIS maintained an organized system to buy 
and sell women and girls for sexual slavery, including sales contracts 
notarized by ISIS-run courts. Media have reported ISIS sold some 
captives to wealthy individuals in Gulf countries, and reports suggested 
some Yezidi captives were moved to Syria, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. 
IKR-based civil society organizations also reported in 2018 that ISIS 
members and supporters kidnapped Yezidi children for exploitation 
in Turkey. ISIS reportedly kidnapped 120 Turkmen children in 2014; 
they have reportedly been sold multiple times for the purpose of 
sexual exploitation, and only 20 of the kidnapped children were 
rescued by the end of 2018. Throughout 2015-2019, thousands of 
women and children escaped ISIS captivity—many of whom were 
pregnant as a result of rape, forced marriage, and sex trafficking; these 
women and girls, including IDPs among this population, remain 
highly vulnerable to various forms of exploitation, including re-
trafficking. Some Yezidi women and girls reportedly reside in Iraqi 
IDP camps or Al-Hol camp in Syria where they continue to live with 
Sunni families that formerly exploited them under ISIS rule. As of 




and children—remain missing. Some reports indicate the missing 
women and girls remain with ISIS in eastern Syria and Turkey or 
have been exploited in other parts of the region, Europe, or Asia. 
Children remain vulnerable to forcible recruitment and use by 
multiple armed groups operating in Iraq, including—but not limited 
to—ISIS, the PMF, tribal forces, the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), 
and Iran-backed militias. Despite the defeat of the physical caliphate, 
ISIS continues to abduct and forcibly recruit and use children in 
combat and support roles, including as human shields, informants, 
bomb makers, executioners, and suicide bombers; some of these 
children were as young as eight years old and some were mentally 
disabled. Multiple sources report the PKK and People’s Protection 
Units (YPG) operating in the IKR and Sinjar continued to recruit and 
use children. In 2021, an unverified source reported that the PKK 
recruited dozens of children to prepare them for combat, including 
children from Kirkuk, Iraq. Local NGOs reported in 2018 that Yezidi 
militias in Sinjar recruited approximately 10 to 20 Yezidi boys. NGO 
and local government contacts confirmed that hundreds of Yezidi 
children have been recruited by the PKK-aligned Yezidi Civil Protection 
Units (YPS) and other PKK-affiliated militias. In 2018, civil society 
organizations reported the PKK recruited and trained children from 
Sinjar, Makhmour, and other locations, and sent them to bases in 
Sinjar, Turkey, and the Qandil Mountains between Iraq and Iran.
Since 2015, NGOs have reported some non-compliant, Iran-aligned 
PMF units recruit, use, and provide military training to children, 
though the incidence of these reports has declined with the defeat 
of ISIS’s territorial presence in Iraq. The number of incidents of child 
soldier recruitment and use continues to decline, according to an 
international organization in 2019. In 2018 and 2019, NGOs alleged 
that some PMF-affiliated militias, including Iranian-backed Harakat 
Hezbollah al-Nujaba (HHN) and Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), recruited 
boys younger than the age of 18 to fight in Syria and Yemen. In 2017, 
reports also indicated both the AAH and Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH) 
militias recruited and used child soldiers. Some of the forces in the 
HHN, AAH, and KH militias operated under the umbrella of the PMF, 
but they generally operate outside of the command and control of 
the Iraqi government. Civil society organizations and local contacts 
reported in 2017 that posters commemorating children who died 
while fighting for Shia militias were commonplace in Shia-majority 
areas of Baghdad and throughout southern Iraq. Most of the children 
who were celebrated for fighting allegedly fought for brigades of the 
AAH and KH militias. According to the PMF official social media 
site and posters in the street in mid-2017, the PMF offered military 
training courses to children and youth ages 15-25. In 2015 and 2016, 
multiple sources reported factions of the PMF recruited and used 
children in operations in Fallujah and other areas of the country, 
while PMF-affiliated media celebrated the service and sacrifice of 
child soldiers. Credible reporting in 2017 indicated Sunni tribal 
militias recruited boys out of IDP camps, some of whom received 
military training. In August 2016, an international NGO reported 
that Sunni tribal militias affiliated with the PMF recruited at least 
seven children from the Debaga IDP camp in northern Iraq; witness 
accounts reported that members of the ISF facilitated the recruitment 
of children from the camp. In addition, international observers 
reported the ISF used three children at a checkpoint in early 2019. 
Refugees and IDPs face heightened risk of forced labor and sex 
trafficking due to their economic and social vulnerability and lack 
of security and protections. Between 2015-2018, NGOs reported 
trafficking networks in the IKR targeted refugees and IDPs, operating 
with assistance from local officials, including judges, officials from 
the Asayish forces, and border agents. Women and girls in IDP 
camps whose family members have alleged ties to ISIS continue to 
be exposed to a complex system of potential sexual exploitation, sex 
trafficking, and abuse by armed actors residing in the camps, as well 
as security and military officials. In 2015 and 2016, NGOs reported 
some personnel from the Asayish forces facilitated the sex trafficking 
of women and girls in Syrian refugee camps in the IKR. Reports from 
2015 indicated a trafficking network exploited IDPs and some Syrian 
refugee women in sex trafficking in hotels and brothels in Baghdad, 
Basrah, and other cities in southern Iraq after agents of the network 
promised to resettle them from the IKR; the network also forced the 
women’s children to beg on the street. Criminal gangs reportedly 
force boys and girls to beg, especially IDP and refugee children 
and children with disabilities, primarily in urban areas; criminal 
gangs also force children to sell and transport drugs and weapons, 
particularly in southern Iraq.
Iraqi, Iranian, and Syrian women and girls, as well as LGBTQ+ persons 
in the IKR, are particularly vulnerable to sex trafficking. LGBTQ+ 
individuals across all ethnic and religious groups remained at risk 
of sex trafficking primarily because of cultural stigmas. According 
to IKR press reports, the collapse of Iran’s currency and economic 
slowdown spurred an influx of more than 2,000 young Iranian 
women and girls into the IKR in 2018, many of whom were victims 
of sex trafficking in cafes, hotels, and massage centers. According 
to KRG law enforcement in 2018, IKR-based taxi drivers allegedly 
facilitate the transportation of these women and girls from Iran to 
the IKR under the cover of tourism. Numerous media reports in 2018 
claim girls as young as 11 years old are observed in nightclubs and 
casinos in Baghdad as waitresses, dancers, and in commercial sex; 
some militia groups, including AAH, reportedly provided security at 
these establishments and relied on them for income. NGOs reported 
in 2018 and 2019 that male sex traffickers in the IKR use the threat 
of publicizing compromising photos of women to sexually exploit 
or force them into commercial sex. NGOs in 2016 reported cases in 
which criminal networks exploited in child sex trafficking girls who 
had run away from their families out of fear of honor killings. The 
media reported in 2018 that trafficking gangs increasingly used social 
media sites, particularly Facebook, to buy and sell women and girls for 
sex and labor exploitation. Reports from 2014-2017 suggested some 
Iraqi law enforcement officials have allegedly frequented brothels 
known for sex trafficking or accepted bribes to allow sex trafficking. 
Foreign media reports from 2018 suggested a growing trend of child 
sex trafficking of Iraqi girls ages 11-16 in Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, 
Lebanon, and the UAE. Trafficking networks also reportedly sell 
Iraqi children in neighboring countries and Europe for commercial 
sexual exploitation. Iraqi refugees in Jordan are vulnerable to labor 
trafficking in Jordan’s informal labor sector, in part due to employers 
paying them below-market wages and expecting them to work 
excessively long hours. 
Traditional practices, including fasliya – the exchange of family 
members to settle tribal disputes—and child-forced and “temporary” 
marriages also place women and girls at increased risk of trafficking 
within the country. In 2019, an international media outlet reported 
clerics operated “marriage offices” in areas outside of important 
shrines in Iraq, which advertised “temporary marriages” with girls as 
young as nine years old for the purpose of sex trafficking. Some militia 
groups, such as AAH, reportedly provided security for these “offices” 
and relied on them for income. Additionally, a local NGO disclosed 
in early 2021 that reports from local partners in southern Iraqi border 
provinces noted Saudis and Kuwaitis sought child sex during hunting 
trips in areas inhabited by Kawalyah, nomadic tribesman without 
civil documentation. Child protection organizations reported in 
2016 incidents of child marriage—which could increase a child’s 
risk of trafficking—increased among IDPs and Syrian refugees in 
the IKR, as heads of households sought ways to generate income 
and reduce the family’s economic burden. As reported in previous 
years, traffickers forced Syrian girls from refugee camps in the IKR 
into early or “temporary marriages” with Iraqi or other refugee 
men; some KRG authorities allegedly ignored, or may have accepted 
bribes to ignore such cases, including those in which girls are sold 
multiple times. An NGO reported in early 2021 that traffickers 
continued to open massage parlors in five-star hotels in Iraq as a 
cover for commercial sex and sex trafficking; some of these hotels are 
owned by state entities, which allow the traffickers to operate with 
impunity. The Iraqi government further confirmed in early 2020 that 
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massage parlors, coffee shops, bars, and nightclubs were locations 
for sex trafficking. Additionally, according to the Iraqi government, 
traffickers use social media to operate their networks and recruit 
victims, such as by advertising fake job offers. 
Some men and women from throughout Asia and Africa who 
migrate—both legally and illegally—to Iraq are subjected to forced 
labor as construction workers, security guards, cleaners, handymen, 
and domestic workers. Contacts reported in early 2020 an increase in 
trafficking victims from Ghana, Kenya, and Sierra Leone. In January 
2016, the MOLSA reported approximately 140,000 foreign workers 
lacked formal work permits; NGOs reported some employers and 
recruitment agents exploit workers’ illegal status by withholding 
salaries and subjecting workers to substandard living conditions. 
Some foreign migrants are recruited for work in other countries 
in the region but are forced, coerced, or deceived into working in 
Iraq and the IKR. In 2018, the KMOI reported 22 workers from 
the Philippines legally entered the IKR under the sponsorship of a 
labor contracting company but were subsequently forced to work in 
Baghdad. In early 2020, NGOs reported that smugglers in the IKR 
promise some sub-Saharan African workers better work opportunities 
in Baghdad, but upon arrival, traffickers exploited the workers in 
forced labor. An international organization reported in 2018 that 
if a foreign worker had a complaint of abuse about an employer, 
recruitment agents moved the worker to a different employer and 
did not report the employer to the police. Recruitment agencies 
reportedly operate clandestinely without permits and beyond the 
control of the government.
IRELAND: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Ireland does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included designating an independent 
human trafficking national rapporteur and establishing a formal 
national anti-trafficking forum composed of interagency and 
civil society stakeholders. In coordination with an international 
organization, the government launched a national anti-trafficking 
public awareness campaign. The government also increased funding 
for victim assistance, antitrafficking public awareness campaigns, 
and training. However, the government did not demonstrate overall 
increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, even 
considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-
trafficking capacity. While courts convicted one trafficker under false 
imprisonment charges, the government has not obtained a trafficking 
conviction under the anti-trafficking law since it was amended in 
2013, which weakened deterrence, contributed to impunity for 
traffickers, and undermined efforts to support victims to testify. The 
government investigated and prosecuted fewer suspected traffickers, 
did not prosecute any labor traffickers, and victim identification 
decreased for the fourth year in a row. The government continued 
to have systemic deficiencies in victim identification, referral, and 
assistance, and lacked specialized accommodation and adequate 
services for victims. Therefore Ireland remained on Tier 2 Watch List 
for the second consecutive year.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate, prosecute suspects, and convict traffickers of 
both sex and labor trafficking using the trafficking law. • Continue to 
systematically train law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges on a 
victim-centered, trauma-informed approach to law enforcement efforts 
and trials and sensitize judges to the severity of trafficking crimes. • 
Update and adopt a national anti-trafficking action plan with a clear 
timeline for implementation, responsible ministries, and resources for 
implementation. • Improve victim identification and referral and issue 
a revised referral mechanism in coordination with NGOs, offering 
formal identification, a recovery and reflection period, and services 
to all victims. • Allow formal victim identification by and referral 
from entities other than the police, including civil society, social 
workers, and healthcare professionals. • Allow all victims to access 
the national referral mechanism without requiring cooperation with 
law enforcement. • Increase efforts to identify and protect all victims, 
especially of labor trafficking and forced criminality. • Continue to 
train law enforcement and prosecutors on developing cases with 
evidence to corroborate victim testimony. • Adopt a legal provision 
to exempt victims from penalization for the unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit. • Offer specialized accommodations to 
trafficking victims that are safe, appropriate, and trauma informed. • 
Continue to enforce the amended rules for the working scheme for 
sea fishers to reduce their risk of labor trafficking. • Increase resources 
for legal assistance to trafficking victims as well as the legal services 
provided, including assistance to victims through investigations and 
court proceedings, which can be accessed at the earliest opportunity 
and prior to engaging with police. • Establish a national hotline to 
report trafficking crimes and provide victim assistance and referral. 
• Increase efforts to order restitution for victims, particularly for 
undocumented workers or victims of sex trafficking. • Continue to 
increase coordination between law enforcement and prosecutors 
through regular case conferencing and consider prosecution-assisted 
investigations on trafficking cases. • Prioritize investigating fraudulent 
labor recruitment and labor trafficking, and prosecute these crimes as 
trafficking rather than labor code violations. • Expand government 
authorities to ensure the effective regulation and monitoring of 
agencies that recruited domestic workers and au pairs. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained inadequate law enforcement efforts. 
The 2008 Human Trafficking Act, amended in 2013, criminalized sex 
trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties up to life 
imprisonment, which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect 
to sex trafficking, commensurate with punishments prescribed for 
other serious crimes, such as rape. The law broadly defined sexual 
exploitation to include the sexual abuse of children. The Criminal 
Justice (Sexual Offences) Act of 2017 criminalized the purchase of 
sexual services and prescribed more severe penalties for the purchase 
of sex from a person subjected to trafficking. In such cases, the burden 
of proof shifted to the accused, who had to prove they were unaware 
the victim was exploited in trafficking. 
The national police anti-trafficking unit reported investigating 22 
suspects in 2020 (15 for sex trafficking and seven for labor trafficking), 
compared with 39 investigations in 2019. Courts were shut down 
for 16 weeks in 2020 due to the pandemic, which postponed the 
vast majority of jury trials, a requirement for human trafficking 
cases, to 2021. Despite this, the government initiated prosecutions 
for three sex trafficking suspects (compared with five in 2019, zero 
in 2018, and three in 2017). The government did not initiate any 
prosecutions for labor trafficking in 2020. For the seventh year in 
a row, the government did not convict any traffickers under the 
anti-trafficking law, as amended in 2013, although the government 
has reported identifying 508 victims since 2013. However, in 2020, 
courts convicted one trafficker under another law after he pled 
guilty to false imprisonment; he had yet to be sentenced at the 
end of the reporting period. In its 2017 report, GRETA expressed 
concern about the inadequate criminal justice response in Ireland, 
noting the failure to convict traffickers and the absence of effective 
sentences could contribute to impunity and undermine efforts to 






The Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP) had a 
specialized team responsible for prosecuting trafficking crimes. 
However, the government did not have specialized judges or 
courts that could hear trafficking cases, and judges often had little 
understanding of trafficking crimes or familiarity with the effects 
of trauma on trafficking victims. Civil society continued to express 
concern regarding the lack of judicial training. NGOs recommended 
training for law enforcement, prosecutors, and the judiciary regarding 
the complexities of commercial sex and sex trafficking, as well as non-
punishment of trafficking victims. In February 2021, the government 
established a new specialized police unit, which focused primarily 
on vulnerable populations within the commercial sex industry and 
its links to organized crime, and included identifying trafficking 
victims as an area of priority. 
During the reporting period, the government and a government-
funded NGO trained two officials from the criminal justice police 
unit, as well as other justice department officials and members of the 
legal aid board, but the government noted it was unable to train any 
police recruits due to pandemic-related restrictions. The government 
did not report how many officials received training in total, compared 
with 1,699 officials trained in 2019. The government reported that 
coordination between law enforcement and the ODPP improved 
during the reporting period. The government did not report any 
investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government officials 
complicit in trafficking. In 2020, law enforcement cooperated in 
an international investigation with the United Kingdom (UK), 
which resulted in the identification of five trafficking victims in 
the UK and Ireland. The government continued to coordinate with 
INTERPOL, including information and intelligence sharing. In 2020, 
the government received 19 European arrest warrants for suspected 
human traffickers and arrested nine suspects from warrants issued 
by Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, and the UK. The government also 
extradited three suspects—one to France and two to the UK.
PROTECTION
The government maintained inadequate victim protection efforts. 
Authorities identified 38 trafficking victims, a small decrease compared 
with 42 in 2019; however, 2020 was the fourth consecutive year of 
decreasing victim identification and the fewest victims identified 
since 2013. Of the 38 victims, 26 were exploited in sex trafficking 
and 12 in labor trafficking (which included two victims of forced 
criminality), compared with 34 victims of sex trafficking and six 
victims of labor trafficking identified in 2019. Of the 38 victims 
identified in 2020, all were adults, 33 were female and five were male. 
Unlike 2019, when the government identified nine child trafficking 
victims, the government did not identify any children as victims 
in 2020. This may have been due to the ODPP’s 2018 decision to 
reclassify child trafficking victims as victims of sexual exploitation, 
which consequently excluded children from trafficking statistics. 
While the government increased efforts to identify victims of forced 
labor, it again did not report identifying any victims who were Irish 
nationals. However, some experts raised concerns that the number of 
victims formally identified by police did not represent the true scale 
of trafficking in Ireland, as many victims remained unidentified. An 
independent and comprehensive 2021 study found that from 2014-
2019, victim identification statistics were approximately 38 percent 
higher than the official national statistics. Since the government 
amended its atypical working scheme for sea fishers in 2019, it has 
identified zero trafficking victims in the fishing industry, compared 
to 23 victims in 2018. Some experts also continued to raise serious 
concerns and asserted that foreign national sea fishers outside of the 
European Economic Area (EEA) were at even greater risk following 
the amendment of the scheme because the government failed to 
enforce the amended rules of the scheme, no longer identified 
victims, and had begun revoking the status and associated protections 
against previously identified trafficking victims within this sector. 
A government-funded international organization repatriated five 
trafficking victims in 2020, compared to none reported for 2019 and 
15 in 2018. Although labor inspectors reported conducting 7,687 
inspections, including one joint inspection with the police in 2020, 
the government has not reported identifying any trafficking victims 
as part of these inspections since 2017. 
Experts continued to raise concerns regarding the government’s 
inability to identify trafficking victims due to shortcomings in its 
identification mechanism and limiting identification of victims solely 
to police. While the government had national formal procedures 
for victim identification, they were valid only for victims lacking 
legal residency in Ireland, namely foreign nationals from outside 
the EEA who were not asylum-seekers. The formal identification 
scheme excluded EEA-nationals, including Irish nationals, and 
asylum-seekers with pending applications. As a result, the government 
did not formally identify such persons as suspected victims of 
trafficking, with implications for their access to social welfare and 
other specialized victim services, as reported by GRETA in 2017. The 
government reported that, in practice, domestic and foreign victims 
had equal access to all state services. GRETA and NGOs, however, 
asserted EEA-national victims could be excluded from accessing 
general social welfare, housing support payments, and other state 
support until they satisfied or were granted an exemption from the 
Habitual Residence Condition, which some victims may not have 
been able to satisfy because of an inability to prove a documented 
work history. The government maintained it assessed suspected victims 
on a “reasonable grounds” basis to allow them access to support 
and services; victims that cooperated with law enforcement were 
often referred to services, but referral was not systematic throughout 
the country. A 2021 academic study concluded the government 
did not have a formal victim identification process due to a lack 
of specific criteria for “reasonable grounds” decisions. NGOs and 
lawyers asserted the national police lacked consistent standards 
when assessing victims; anti-trafficking efforts varied widely from 
urban to rural areas; and there was no consistently used formal 
referral mechanism for all police units for sex trafficking victims. 
NGOs and other front-line responders did not have a formal role 
in the identification of victims, although police could receive victim 
referrals from any source. In its 2017 report, GRETA criticized the 
exclusive police authority to identify victims, asserting it created a 
potential conflict of priorities between law enforcement efforts and 
victim assistance. A formal victim statement to police and a law 
enforcement referral were required for potential victims to access the 
national referral mechanism; victims unwilling to go to the police 
could access emergency accommodation, counseling, medical care, 
and legal services from NGOs that received government funding, but 
not through the referral mechanism. Victims who did not cooperate 
with law enforcement did not have access to statutory care or the 
sexual health screenings available to victims that did cooperate. In 
2017, the government reported plans to institute a new and revised 
referral mechanism; however, the government has not yet issued the 
revised mechanism. While experts welcomed ongoing government 
plans to develop the new mechanism, they expressed concern with 
the slow pace and lack of clarity surrounding its development. The 
government continued to have incomplete data on victims provided 
with assistance. Of the 38 victims police formally identified in 2020, 
they referred 36 to some or all of the services available to victims 
under the national referral mechanism, including medical care, 
housing, social workers, legal aid services, and various trafficking 
NGOs, but the government did not report how many victims utilized 
these services. 
The government provided €453,000 ($555,830) to NGOs for victim 
assistance, including both sex and labor trafficking, an increase 
compared with €338,450 ($415,280) in 2019. However, due to 
the pandemic, the caseworkers for trafficking victims within the 
Health Services Executive (HSE), were seconded to COVID-19 
contact tracing roles; subsequently, case management of trafficking 
victims and referral to services may have been diminished. Further, 
civil society continued to raise concerns regarding the government’s 
ongoing, chronic deficiencies providing assistance and protection 
to trafficking victims. Through the national referral mechanism, 
which was administered at government-run direct provision centers, 
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the government provided victims with voluntary access to health 
services, immigration permission, accommodation, welfare and 
rent allowance, police assistance, residence permits, repatriation, 
translation and interpretation assistance, and access to education 
for dependent children. While there were no dedicated services or 
accommodations for child trafficking victims, children were usually 
placed in children’s residential centers or in approved foster care and 
had access to social workers. In 2020, the government hired one 
psychologist for the anti-human trafficking team at the HSE that 
specialized in trauma care. However, there was no legally mandated 
psychological assistance for victims, and NGOs continued to report a 
lack of specialized services to address the physical and mental health 
needs of victims. According to experts, the lack of clear rights and legal 
protections for victims often required NGOs to use the legal system to 
ensure victims’ rights were protected, which only benefited a limited 
number of victims. Further, access to legal services was limited, as 
resources were insufficient for demand and delays in application 
processing resulted in some victims becoming undocumented, 
limiting their access to care and assistance. Services available from 
the government’s Legal Aid Board were inadequate for victims’ needs, 
as the board only provided information to potential victims referred 
by police but did not provide legal assistance or support to victims 
during investigations or trials. Only one government-funded NGO 
provided legal representation for labor trafficking victims in 2020. 
GRETA urged the government to ensure victims had early access to 
legal practitioners with specialized knowledge of trafficking who 
could represent them. 
The government provided accommodation arrangements for victims 
and potential victims through its direct provision system, which 
housed asylum-seekers, refugees, and trafficking victims in centers 
and temporary accommodation facilities across the country. Victims 
were not required to stay in the direct provision accommodation 
provided by the government, though the government did not 
offer dedicated shelters for victims of trafficking. NGOs stated 
the mixed-gender housing in the direct provision system had 
inadequate privacy, was unsuitable and potentially unsafe for 
traumatized victims, could expose them to greater exploitation, 
and undermined victim recovery. Experts also noted a lack of 
specialized services in the centers for all victims, but especially for 
female victims who had been traumatized due to psychological, 
physical, or sexual violence. Experts noted that accommodation in 
direct provision was inappropriate and unacceptable for emergency 
or long-term stays. NGOs raised concerns that the placement of 
trafficking victims in direct provision accommodation isolated 
victims from other available services and exposed them to re-
trafficking and re-traumatization. Potential victims who were in 
the asylum process remained in direct provision accommodation 
while a determination was being made in relation to their claim 
for international protection, which could continue for years. 
Accommodations in the direct provision system were particularly 
strained in 2020, due to a housing shortage, increased demand on 
the system, and decreased housing capacity to ensure compliance 
with social distancing requirements due to the pandemic. While 
the government, including a parliamentary committee, an Advisory 
Group, and Ireland’s Ombudsman, acknowledged the lack of 
adequate accommodation for several years and announced plans 
to phase out the direct provision system by 2024, officials took no 
concrete steps to do so during the reporting period. 
The government could give potential foreign trafficking victims 
temporary relief from deportation, contingent upon cooperation 
with an ongoing investigation. The government also had legal 
alternatives to removal to countries in which victims would face 
retribution or hardship. The government issued some form of 
immigration permissions, including renewals, to 81 trafficking 
victims in 2020, compared with nine in 2019 and 47 in 2018. The 
permissions were granted through a 60-day recovery and reflection 
period, a six-month temporary residence permission, or a two-year 
residence permission that allowed the holder to engage in legal 
employment. Trafficking victims could not work for the first 60 
days. NGOs reported the six-month periods acted as a barrier to 
work and that the recovery and reflection period was not uniformly 
granted to victims. The temporary protection could evolve into 
permanent residency and residency benefits were not linked to a 
conviction. To respond to the pandemic, the government allowed 
applicants for international protection to apply for work permits 
after six months, as opposed to nine months, and doubled the time 
for which permits were valid. However, the government precluded 
victims who sought asylum from obtaining six-month renewable 
residence permits, which limited their access to certain benefits, 
such as work permits. 
The government did not provide compensation to victims of 
trafficking. The law did not require prosecutors to request restitution 
for victims for the crime of trafficking, though courts could order 
restitution for victims and victims could also obtain restitution 
for lost wages through a criminal trial, a civil suit, state bodies 
dealing specifically with work-related rights, and the criminal 
injuries compensation tribunal. Some NGOs reported victims 
infrequently received payment in the past, as the court did not 
have enforcement authority and employers would frequently close 
down, transfer directorship, leave the country, or claim inability 
to pay. The Minister of Justice could decide to order restitution 
for unpaid labor of foreign trafficking victims, but the minister 
never utilized this authority. NGOs criticized the lack of viable 
avenues for victim restitution, particularly of cases that involved sex 
trafficking and undocumented workers. Victims of sex trafficking 
had no verifiable expenses or employment losses, and the labour 
relations committee was unavailable to undocumented workers, 
who could only pursue civil suits if they could prove they took all 
reasonable steps to rectify their irregular working status. The law 
protected the privacy and identity of victims in court proceedings 
and allowed victims to testify via video link at the discretion of the 
judge; however, this was not always uniformly granted, and NGOs 
were concerned that victims were not always informed of these 
protections. The government had a witness protection program 
but did not report how many trafficking victims were provided 
this service during the reporting period. 
Additionally, the government remained without a specific legal 
provision on the non-punishment of victims of trafficking and 
GRETA urged adoption of such a provision in both its 2013 and 
2017 reports. Further, in 2015, the Irish high court found a need 
for protocols or legislation to dictate what happens when a victim 
is suspected of criminal activity; however, the government took no 
action to rectify this gap and the existing trafficking law did not 
include a provision to protect victims from prosecution for crimes 
their trafficker compelled them to commit. However, in practice, 
prosecutors sought to avoid victim prosecution and utilized internal 
guidelines that instructed prosecutors to consider the public interest 
and mitigating factors, such as coercion, when deciding whether 
to charge an individual with a crime. The government reported the 
national police also collaborated with ODPP to ensure victims were 
not prosecuted, but that decision rested entirely with the ODPP and 
was not subject to scrutiny. NGOs noted the process for victims to 
seek immunity from punishment for criminal activity as a result 
of trafficking was complex and required early legal representation. 
If authorities prosecuted an individual before they were formally 
identified as a trafficking victim, their criminal record could not be 
expunged. NGOs noted that the government historically detained 
potential victims in prison for cannabis production prior to assessing 
whether they were victims of trafficking and urged the government 
to complete the identification process first. The government did 
not report how many reviews of cannabis production cases for 
possible trafficking indicators police conducted, the number of 
victims identified, or the number of cases overturned for 2019 or 
2020; compared with 70 reviews in 2018 with no victims identified 







The government increased prevention efforts. The justice ministry’s 
criminal justice policy unit functioned as the national coordinating 
body and was responsible for coordinating interagency efforts, 
raising awareness, providing funding to anti-trafficking civil society 
organizations, collecting data, and publishing an annual trafficking 
report. In 2020, the policy unit established a formal national 
anti-trafficking forum, composed of interagency and civil society 
stakeholders; the forum met twice during the reporting period and 
focused one meeting on the creation of a role that would bridge 
gaps between police and victims to improve evidence collection. 
In October 2020, the government appointed the Irish Human Rights 
and Equality Commission as the independent national rapporteur; 
it was responsible for monitoring human trafficking policy and data 
collection. It was uncertain whether the government followed its 
national antitrafficking action plan; the plan, adopted in 2016, had 
no end date, timeframe, budget allocation, or indication of agencies 
responsible for its implementation. NGOs described the national 
action plan as outdated; the new anti-trafficking committee stated 
its intention to draft an updated plan. The government continued 
extensive efforts to raise awareness of trafficking by funding and 
launching a new national human trafficking public awareness 
campaign, in partnership with an international organization, and by 
maintaining a website, updated in 2020, that provided information 
on human trafficking and encouraged the public to report possible 
cases of trafficking to authorities. In 2020, the government provided 
€137,700 ($168,960) to NGOs for anti-trafficking public awareness 
campaigns and the development of training material for front-
line officials, specifically targeting labor trafficking and vulnerable 
populations, an increase compared to 2019. The government funded 
several studies into human trafficking and the efficacy of its laws in 
2020, one of which found the government undercounted victims 
by 38 percent.
Labor recruitment and employment agencies were required to have 
a license, and passport withholding was illegal. The government 
did not report investigating or prosecuting any labor recruitment 
agencies for fraudulent labor recruitment or labor trafficking. The 
workplace relations commission (WRC) provided information on 
employment rights to approximately 52,566 callers (54,748 in 2019) 
and replied to 6,895 emails from the public in 2020. The WRC did 
not have the authority to regulate agencies that recruited au pairs, 
who were allowed to work up to 20 hours per week without the need 
for a work permit. NGOs reported employers regularly paid au pairs 
less than minimum wage and forced them to work more than the 
maximum of 20 hours of work per week, creating vulnerability to 
labor trafficking; however the government did not report any steps 
taken to address this during the reporting period. Further, an NGO 
also raised concerns regarding the lack of jurisdiction for WRC 
inspectors to address violations regarding the number of hours 
worked on fishing vessels. The WRC reported conducting 7,687 
labor inspections in 2020, 5,202 of which were unannounced—an 
increase compared with 4,800 in 2019; however, it did not report 
identifying any trafficking victims through the inspections. Of the 
171 vessels under the scope of the amended atypical working scheme, 
in 2020, the WRC conducted 31 desktop inspections and two on-
board inspections, identifying zero trafficking victims. While no 
trafficking victims were identified, WRC inspectors found 36 violations 
of employment rights or employment permits pertaining to 19 
vessels and referred three violations for prosecution. While the WRC 
prosecuted several employers for these employment-related offenses, 
it did not report law enforcement actions against any companies for 
labor trafficking in 2020. 
In an effort to address vulnerabilities created by the pandemic when 
migrant workers became unable to travel or physically apply to 
extend their immigration status, the government permitted those 
that became undocumented to access unemployment payments 
and ensured officials did not report undocumented workers to 
immigration authorities. The government prohibited convicted 
human traffickers from being selected for public contracts. The 
government made efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex 
acts by providing €96,050 ($117,850) for research and awareness 
raising projects in relation to the criminalization of the purchase 
of sex and the inherent exploitation involved, the same amount as 
in 2019. The government continued to provide funding to several 
anti-trafficking programs abroad. The government did not fund the 
operation of a dedicated trafficking national hotline but promoted 
a general crime hotline for anonymously notifying police about 
various crime incidents; police officers staffed the hotline, which 
was available for 12 hours daily. The government did not report 
the number of calls received for trafficking-related cases during the 
reporting period. The national police had a dedicated email address 
for reports of trafficking and received 33 emails in 2020, compared 
with 67 in 2019. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Ireland, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Ireland abroad. Traffickers subject Irish children to sex trafficking 
within the country. The prevalence of human trafficking in Ireland is 
likely much higher than official statistics report, and an independent 
and comprehensive 2021 study found that from 2014-2019, the 
true number of trafficking victims was approximately 38 percent 
higher than the official national statistics. Foreign trafficking victims 
identified in Ireland are from Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, and South 
America. In recent years, authorities and media have reported an 
increase in suspected victims from Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
and Romania. Traffickers exploit victims of forced labor in domestic 
work, the restaurant industry, cannabis cultivation, nail salons, food 
processing, waste management, fishing, seasonal agriculture, and car 
washing services. Undocumented workers in the fishing industry and 
domestic workers, particularly au pairs, are vulnerable to trafficking. 
Migrant workers from Egypt and the Philippines are vulnerable to 
forced labor on fishing vessels. Women from Eastern Europe who 
are forced into marriage in Ireland are at risk for sex trafficking and 
forced labor.
ISRAEL: TIER 2
The Government of Israel does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts 
to do so. These efforts included investigating, prosecuting, and 
convicting complicit officials. The government repealed the “Deposit 
Law,” thereby decreasing the vulnerability of foreign and migrants’ 
workers to trafficking and began returning funds to some workers. 
The government continued to operate shelters and other facilities 
that provided victims a wide variety of immediate and long-term care 
and rehabilitative services. However, these efforts were not serious 
and sustained compared to the efforts during the previous reporting 
period, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on 
the government’s anti-trafficking capacity. The government’s victim 
identification policies sometimes re-traumatized trafficking victims 
and delayed access to necessary care, at times for years. In addition, 
the government decreased overall efforts to investigate, prosecute, 
and convict traffickers. Government policies towards foreign workers 
increased their vulnerability to trafficking, and the government did 
not consistently investigate trafficking cases referred by NGOs. For 
the fifth consecutive year, the Police Anti-Trafficking Coordinating 
Unit (PTC), which remained the only authority to officially recognize 
victims of trafficking, remained severely understaffed, which further 
impacted the efficiency of victim identification procedures and referral 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Expedite processes to identify and refer trafficking victims to 
appropriate care without re-traumatizing victims, including those 
referred by NGOs, and ensure victim identification procedures take 
a trauma-informed approach. • Authorize more government officials, 
including throughout the country, to identify trafficking victims to 
allow for more efficient access to protection services. • Proactively 
screen irregular African migrants and foreign workers to ensure 
trafficking victims among these populations are not penalized for 
unlawful acts traffickers compel them to commit, such as immigration 
violations. • Significantly increase investigations, prosecutions, and 
convictions of labor traffickers, including potential trafficking cases 
referred by NGOs. • Sentence convicted traffickers to adequate 
penalties, which should involve significant prison terms. • Substantially 
increase anti-trafficking awareness and victim identification trainings 
for law enforcement, including police officers and prison officials, at 
regional and local levels. • Provide access to the national healthcare 
system, including shelter and medical and psycho-social treatment, for 
victims of all forms of trafficking for the duration of their presence in 
Israel. • Increase the number of labor inspectors, social workers, and 
interpreters in the agricultural, construction, and caregiving sectors, 
and provide them with training on victim identification procedures. 
• Increase enforcement of foreign worker labor rights, eliminate 
worker-paid recruitment fees for all foreign and Palestinian workers 
and ensure any recruitment fees are paid by employers. • Establish 
systems to ensure foreign and Palestinian workers have valid and fair 
labor contracts and ensure any employer-paid recruitment fees are not 
passed onto workers. • Amend the 2006 anti-trafficking law to include 
a definition of human trafficking consistent with international law. • 
Transparently share information on government anti-trafficking efforts 
with civil society. • Designate a Knesset committee or subcommittee 
to address labor trafficking.
PROSECUTION
The government decreased overall law enforcement efforts. The 2006 
anti-trafficking law criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed penalties of up to 16 years’ imprisonment for the 
trafficking of an adult and up to 20 years’ imprisonment for the 
trafficking of a child. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, 
with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent with the definition 
of trafficking under international law, the law did not establish the 
use of force, fraud, or coercion as an essential element of the crime. 
Under 376A of the Penal Law 5737-1977, holding a person’s passport 
against their will carried a penalty of three to five years’ imprisonment.
In 2020, the police initiated 11 total investigations, including one 
investigation of sex trafficking crimes, eight potential forced labor 
crimes, and two potential child sex trafficking crimes; the government 
also investigated 91 sex trafficking-related crimes but determined all 
were prostitution-related offenses. This was a decrease compared with 
18 total investigations (three adult sex trafficking, eight forced labor, 
and seven child sex trafficking investigations) in 2019. In 2020, the 
government initiated nine total prosecutions, including three for adult 
sex trafficking, one for forced labor, and five for child sex trafficking; 
this was a decrease compared with 20 total prosecutions (16 adult 
sex trafficking, two forced labor, and two child sex trafficking) in 
2019. In a case indicted in April 2020, the defendant allegedly held 
women and children in conditions of slavery in a Jerusalem cult; the 
defendant allegedly forced participants in his “women’s seminar” to 
provide involuntary domestic services and cede any wages directly to 
him. In 2020, the government convicted 12 traffickers, including nine 
for adult sex trafficking, two for forced labor, and one for child sex 
trafficking; this was a decrease compared with convicting 17 traffickers 
(13 for adult sex trafficking, none for forced labor, and four for child 
sex trafficking) in 2019. Of the 24 sentences issued during 2020, 
including cases convicted in previous reporting periods, 13 traffickers 
received sentences greater than one year imprisonment. Sentences 
ranged from a fine and five months’ community service to 5.5 years’ 
imprisonment and a 12-month suspended sentence; sentencing 
also included fines and victim compensation in some cases. The 
government coordinated with a foreign government to investigate an 
alleged child sex trafficking case involving foreign and Israeli suspects. 
Additionally, authorities opened 145 criminal investigations and filed 
94 indictments against employers of foreign workers for suspected 
violations of labor laws; courts rendered 77 sentences with sanctions 
and compensation totaling approximately 3.7 million Israeli shekels 
($1.15 million). This represented a significant decrease from 2019 
when the government opened 1,087 criminal investigations for 
suspected violations of labor laws, filed 94 indictments, and rendered 
123 sentences with sanctions and compensation totaling 6.88 million 
shekels ($2.14 million). 
The government continued to report law enforcement efforts to 
address government officials complicit in trafficking offenses during 
the reporting period. In September 2020, the government initiated 
one investigation involving a police officer who allegedly attempted 
to solicit commercial sex from a child sex trafficking victim; the 
government indicted the police officer in March 2021. In November 
2020, the government sentenced a police officer to 18 months’ 
imprisonment, a suspended sentence, and a fine for accepting a bribe 
from the owner of a brothel, where trafficking allegedly occurred, 
to allow the facility to continue to operate in a case indicted the 
previous reporting period; at the end of the reporting period, the 
State Attorney’s Office appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the 
leniency of the sentence. In January 2021, the government also filed an 
indictment against a Population and Immigration Authority (PIBA) 
official responsible for coordinating private recruitment agencies in 
the caregiving field—a sector highly vulnerable to trafficking—for 
allegedly fraudulently obtaining visas for foreign workers, accepting 
bribes, and breach of trust.
Authorities reduced the size of the PTC of the Israeli National Police 
(INP) to one officer for most of 2020 and often re-assigned the officer 
to enforce pandemic-related mitigation measures. NGOs reported the 
government was, at times, reluctant to investigate complex trafficking 
cases due to lack of resources. For example, the INP initially declined 
to investigate a potential forced labor case involving Thai agricultural 
workers; after an NGO petitioned the Supreme Court, the INP opened 
an investigation, recognized the workers as trafficking victims, and 
referred them to a trafficking shelter. At the end of 2020, the acting 
police commissioner decided to divert additional resources and 
directives to the PTC, including by adding two additional officers to 
the unit; at the end of the reporting period, the new officers had not 
yet joined the PTC. The government reported difficulties gathering 
victim and witness testimony, which was exacerbated by foreign 
victims’ wishes to return to their home country during the pandemic. 
To address this gap, the government distributed policy documents 
on early testimony in these cases to create a uniform standard. The 
government reported investigations were inhibited during the reporting 
period due to illness among investigators, mandatory quarantines, and 
other pandemic-related mitigation measures. To address challenges in 
reporting trafficking crimes during the pandemic, the INP established 
an online system to file complaints for victims hesitant to meet with 
law enforcement officials, including irregular migrant workers. As in 
previous years, the government provided extensive anti-trafficking 
training, awareness-raising workshops, and seminars, at times in 
coordination with NGOs; several trainings were held virtually in 
response to pandemic-related mitigation measures. However, the 





pandemic-related mitigation efforts, including a training for new-hire 
police officers and training for border and immigration officials. Due 
to the pandemic, the government canceled mandatory training on 
sex crimes and trafficking for judges hearing criminal cases in 2020. 
PROTECTION
The government decreased victim identification and protection efforts. 
In addition, the government’s victim identification policies actively 
re-traumatized victims and delayed access to appropriate services. 
In 2020, the government reported receiving 74 victim referrals from 
NGOs and government sources, compared with 96 referrals in 2019. 
Of the 74 referrals, the government granted official trafficking victim 
status to 69 individuals—including 53 women and 16 men—a slight 
decrease from the 73 victims identified in 2019. Of the 69 identified 
victims, 39 Israeli women and girls were victims of slavery in a cult, 
nine were victims of sex trafficking, and 20 were victims of forced 
labor. The government identified one male victim exploited in the 
Sinai prior to arriving in Israel, a decrease from three exploited victims 
identified in the Sinai the previous year. The government continued to 
circulate trafficking victim identification guidelines widely to relevant 
ministries. However, the government reported the PTC was the only 
government entity with the authority to grant individuals official 
trafficking victim status, which allowed a victim full access to protection 
services. Because the government only authorized one PTC officer 
to review victim applications throughout the country, the process 
significantly delayed for months—and in some cases, years—and at 
times inhibited victims’ access to much-needed protection services 
during those delays. NGOs reported the sole PTC officer denied victim 
identification requests because they appeared complex and only 
uncomplicated requests received approval; in 2020, the government 
approved several cases initially denied by PTC after NGOs petitioned 
the Supreme Court. NGOs reported the government’s strict evidentiary 
standard for granting official victim status, which required eyewitness 
accounts, dates, and details from the victims, prevented some victims 
referred by NGOs from receiving status and, thus appropriate care, in 
2020. In addition, due to the high burden placed on victims to recount 
and prove their victimization, including by providing witnesses to 
their accounts, NGOs reported victims were re-traumatized without 
guarantee of receiving government services; victims were also reluctant 
to contact witnesses due to stigmas associated with their exploitation. 
In May 2020, the government committed to establishing an appeal 
process within six months and to create a set of criteria for official 
victim identification in response to a Supreme Court case; at the 
end of the reporting period, the PTC had drafted both policies but 
had yet to finalize or begin implementation of them. Some NGOs 
did not submit cases of trafficking among the Eritrean and Sudanese 
irregular migrant community due to this high standard and the risk 
that the application process would re-traumatize victims but not 
result in recognition. NGOs also reported multiple cases in which 
the government significantly delayed the identification of trafficking 
victims. For example, the government granted victim status to a 
Moldovan sex trafficking victim 18 years after her exploitation; the 
recognition was ultimately too late, and she died of a drug overdose 
two months after her recognition as a trafficking victim. 
The government continued to provide a wide range of protective services 
for victims of all forms of trafficking. The government continued to 
operate a 35-bed shelter for female trafficking victims, a 35-bed shelter 
for male trafficking victims, and transitional apartments with 18 beds 
for female victims. In response to the pandemic, the government 
divided shelter residents into “bubbles” to limit transmission, and each 
shelter designated quarantine areas for isolating residents potentially 
exposed to COVID-19. Ministry of Labor, Social Affairs and Social 
Services (MLSS) also facilitated the vaccination of shelter residents 
and staff ahead of the general population to decrease chances of an 
outbreak at the shelters. Shelter residents could leave freely. These 
shelters offered one year of rehabilitation services, including job 
training, psycho-social support, medical treatment, language training, 
and legal assistance. Due to pandemic-related mitigation measures, 
some services, such as medical consultations and psycho-social care, 
took place virtually or via telephone rather than in-person during 
part of the reporting period. In 2020, the women’s shelter assisted 40 
adult victims and three children of victims; the men’s shelter assisted 
32 victims, and the transitional apartments assisted 9 women and 21 
children accompanying their mothers; in 2019, the women’s shelter 
assisted 59 adult victims and three children of victims; the men’s 
shelter assisted 33 victims, and the transitional apartments assisted 
21 men and women, including 18 children. Shelter staff adjusted 
operations to accommodate deaf and deaf-mute victims during the 
reporting period including by contracting an interpreter. The MLSS 
continued to operate the National Center for Survivors of Slavery 
and Trafficking in Persons, formerly known as the “day center,” in Tel 
Aviv for male and female trafficking victims who were waiting for a 
space at a shelter, chose not to reside at a shelter, or had completed 
one year at a shelter. The center provided psycho-social services and 
food aid, with social workers trained to identify individuals at risk of 
re-trafficking. In 2020, the center provided services to 133 male and 
106 female victims, as well as 160 children; this is compared to 2019 
when the center provided services to 230 male and female victims, as 
well as 125 children of victims. The government allocated 7.78 million 
shekels ($2.42 million) to the operation of the shelters, transitional 
apartments, and center in 2020, the same as 2019. Additionally, for 
identified trafficking victims who opted not to stay in shelters, the 
government continued to provide an official letter that protected 
them from potential arrest for immigration violations and emergency 
contact numbers for shelters and relevant ministries. The government 
continued to provide free medical treatment for one year at various 
government-funded health facilities for identified trafficking victims 
living outside of shelters.
The government continued to encourage victims to assist in the 
investigation and prosecution of their traffickers but did not require 
their participation in court cases as a condition for receiving visas and 
protective assistance; victims could opt to leave the country pending 
trial proceedings. During the reporting period, the government 
distributed new policy guidance for collecting early testimony in cases 
involving foreign victims if foreign victims requested repatriation 
before completion of their case. In March 2021, the government 
established a new procedure for managing sex crimes, including 
sex trafficking, by designating a contact person at every court to 
coordinate victims’ security during proceedings, arranging private 
waiting rooms, and enabling video testimony. The government allowed 
trafficking victims to work during the investigation and prosecution 
of their traffickers. The Legal Aid Administration (LAA) continued 
to provide free legal aid to trafficking victims; due to the pandemic, 
staff regularly consulted with victims virtually rather than in person. 
In 2020, the LAA received 76 legal aid requests to assist potential 
trafficking victims compared to 86 legal aid requests in 2019. The 
government provided all victims residing in the shelters with B1 
visas—unrestricted work visas; in 2020, the government issued 29 new 
B1 visas and 99 B1 visa extensions to trafficking victims. Following 
the conclusion of criminal proceedings, trafficking victims could 
request a rehabilitation visa for an additional year; due to delays 
caused by the pandemic, the government extended rehabilitation 
visas on an ad hoc basis. In 2020, the government issued 14 one-
year rehabilitation visas and three one-year extensions. It also issued 
eight visas to trafficking victims to return to Israel after leaving the 
country in 2020, a significant decrease compared with 34 visas of 
this kind issued in 2019. The government forfeiture fund, which used 
property and money confiscated from traffickers to assist victims, 
lacked sufficient resources to allocate new grants to victims in 2020. 
However, the National Anti-Trafficking Unit (NATU) and the fund’s 
committee ensured allocations approved in previous reporting periods 
would be fully allocated; the government transferred 83 percent of 
the approved 2019 allocations totaling 419,500 shekels ($130,560) 
to an unknown number of applicants for the provision of various 
protection services, including housing, counseling, and vocational 
training for victims, monetary compensation ordered by courts, and 
funding for NGOs. The anti-trafficking law dictated the court must 
explain its decision to abstain from awarding compensation in the 
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verdict, making compensation the default; in 2020, the government 
awarded at least 235,600 shekels ($73,330) in victim compensation 
during criminal proceedings. 
The government maintained guidelines discouraging the prosecution 
of trafficking victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to 
commit during their exploitation. However, the government did not 
systematically screen for trafficking among the irregular African migrant 
population or individuals in prostitution and, as a result, authorities 
may have penalized unidentified and some identified victims for 
immigration violations or prostitution offenses. In December 2020, 
the government announced a program to expunge the records of 
individuals convicted of prostitution-associated offenses, including 
potential sex trafficking victims; the government did not report how 
many records it expunged during the reporting period, and the program 
was only available to those not sentenced to prison terms. In April 
2020, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the “Deposit 
Law” (article 4 of the Prevention of Infiltration Law), which required 
employers to deposit a certain percentage of irregular migrants’ 
wages—including those of identified trafficking victims—into a fund 
that migrants could not access until they departed the country; the 
government could also deduct from the fund for each day a migrant 
remained in the country without a visa. Following this ruling, PIBA 
set up a website through which workers could request their deducted 
wages be returned. As of March 2021, the government had returned 
210.54 million shekels ($65.53 million) to 14,473 workers; 3,445 
workers had not yet received their deposit, and 3,202 had not yet filed 
a request. As the government began returning all withheld money to 
workers, the government opened 60 investigations into employers 
who deducted but did not deposit funds; 30 employers received fines 
and authorities launched five criminal investigations, leading to one 
indictment. In October 2020, the MLSS rejected proposals by Knesset 
members to require the government to repay money owed to workers 
or to provide workers with legal assistance to sue their employers; 
at the end of the reporting period, the government did not address 
how to return money owed to this group of workers. The government 
continued to incentivize irregular African migrants to “voluntarily” 
depart Israel to third countries in Africa, which included a paid plane 
ticket in most cases and a $3,500 stipend in some cases; however, 
NGOs and an international organization confirmed that migrants 
who arrived in a third country in Africa did not receive residency or 
employment rights upon arrival.
PREVENTION
The government maintained woefully inadequate efforts to prevent 
human trafficking and government policies towards foreign workers 
increased their vulnerability to trafficking. NATU within the Ministry 
of Justice continued to coordinate anti-trafficking efforts effectively 
among relevant ministries and NGOs during the reporting period, 
and NATU officials continued to appear regularly in the media to 
raise awareness of trafficking. The government maintained its 2019-
2024 national action plan (NAP) to combat human trafficking. 
However, for the second consecutive year, the government did not 
submit its implementation plan for the five-year NAP. Throughout 
2020, the five inter-ministerial teams, each focusing on key objectives 
outlined in the NAP, held more than 20 discussions with NGOs 
and civil society organizations; the teams were scheduled to present 
their recommendations to the Committee of Directors General for 
approval in mid-2021. One of the five inter-ministerial teams was 
tasked with conducting research on the scope and characteristics of 
trafficking in Israel; the government did not report whether future 
research products would be publicly available. The government did 
not allocate additional funds for full implementation of the NAP 
for the third consecutive year. In August 2020, the government re-
established the Knesset Subcommittee on Trafficking in Women and 
Prostitution and convened four roundtables with civil society on 
trafficking-related issues; the subcommittee was not active between 
April 2019 and August 2020 due to lack of government formation. 
While the government produced an annual report on its anti-trafficking 
efforts, the report was not publicly available; NGOs reported difficulty 
obtaining information on the government’s anti-trafficking efforts, and 
the government did not respond to most information requests. The 
government conducted various national awareness-raising campaigns 
during the reporting period, including education programs for students, 
national television commercials, radio broadcasts, and lectures for 
government officials, shelter staff, and academics.
In 2020, the MLSS, which employed 231 labor inspectors during 
routine inspections, issued 217 administrative warnings, imposed 
66 fines totaling 9.96 million shekels ($3.1 million), and filed six 
indictments for labor violations involving foreign workers; in 2019, 
the MLSS issued 415 administrative warnings, imposed 53 fines worth 
9.6 million shekels ($2.99 million), and processed four criminal 
complaints that resulted in five indictments for labor violations. 
NGOs continued to report there were not enough labor inspectors, 
especially in the construction and agricultural sectors, to sufficiently 
monitor and enforce labor laws. Additionally, NGOs reported the 
government did not effectively regulate work force companies, nor 
did it combat criminal networks that recruited foreigners for the 
construction and caregiving fields and for commercial sex. In 2020, the 
government ratified bilateral work agreements (BWA) with Sri Lanka 
and Georgia for employment of Sri Lankan and Georgian workers 
in the caregiving sector and caregiving in institutions, respectively; 
the government also signed a BWA with Nepal but did not ratify the 
agreement. The government did not implement the BWA ratified in a 
previous reporting period with the Philippines during the reporting 
period. The government maintained BWAs with six other countries 
for agricultural and construction work; in 2020, 3,646 of the 10,662 
foreign migrant workers who arrived in Israel did so through these 
agreements. Foreign workers recruited under BWAs had triplicate 
standardized labor contracts held by the worker, employer, and 
the government. While Israeli law required employers of foreign 
workers to provide detailed labor contracts in a language the worker 
understands, there was not adequate government oversight to ensure 
contracts for workers not covered by BWAs met labor standards, which 
left workers vulnerable to exploitative employment practices. NGOs 
reported foreign workers often paid exorbitant fees to recruitment 
agencies in their country of origin or the Israeli manpower agency; 
NGOs reported many foreign workers financed the fees through high 
interest rate loans from informal or illicit lenders in Israel further 
increasing workers’ vulnerability to trafficking. In 2020, the government 
adopted a policy change wherein foreign workers recruited on an 
“expert” visa could only be recruited from countries with a higher 
GDP than Israel and if their home country made adequate efforts to 
combat trafficking; NGOs reported “expert” foreign workers would 
continue to be vulnerable to trafficking because they are unable to 
change employers. 
While most foreign workers could change employers without their 
previous employers’ permission, foreign construction workers were 
limited to being able to change employers on a specified date each 
quarter and otherwise required employers’ permission to change 
employers. NGOs reported the government’s agreements with private 
Chinese employer associations required workers in the construction 
industry to pay licensed employment recruiters’ fees and costs, which 
could increase their debt and vulnerability to forced labor. An NGO 
also reported that in several cases, a Turkish company coerced migrant 
workers into signing promissory notes; in at least one case with forced 
labor indicators, the PTC did not investigate the case when reported, 
and the government only granted the victim status after the worker 
filed a petition with the Supreme Court. During the reporting period, 
the government reassigned PIBA official responsible for construction 
company oversight to assist pandemic-related mitigation measures, 
leaving workers without a means of redress. PIBA procedures for 
recruitment agencies in the caregiving sector continued to require every 
agency to hire a licensed social worker responsible for supervising 
the conditions of foreign caregivers, including home visits, and for 
informing relevant authorities about labor violations. While the 
government contended that workers’ visas were not tied to a specific 
employer, government policies restricted foreign caregivers’ ability 





geographical area, preventing them from changing employers more 
than three times, and preventing them from changing employers 
after being in Israel for 63 months. NGOs reported that more than 
68,000 foreign workers were employed under arrangements that did 
not allow them to change employers within the caregiving sector or 
dramatically limited their ability to do so. NGOs also reported that 
if a foreign caregiver abruptly left their employer, including due to 
physical or sexual violence, government policy allowed employers 
to unilaterally revoke their visa, and foreign caregivers were not 
entitled to an immigration hearing. During the reporting period, 
caregivers were mandated to remain in their employers’ homes 
during pandemic-related lockdowns; when lockdowns eased for 
others, including caregiving employers, the government restricted 
caregivers to their employers’ homes on rest days which further 
increased caregivers’ vulnerability to trafficking. In December 2020, 
PIBA adopted a new policy regarding Palestinian work permits 
in the construction sector to allow Palestinian workers to change 
employers more easily; however, NGOs reported the new policy was 
too narrowly focused on the construction sector at the expense of 
other sectors such as agriculture and the government did not take 
sufficient steps to inform Palestinian workers about the policy change 
or implement mechanisms to facilitate the job search process. Due to 
the government failing to enact a permanent policy to address refugee 
and immigration processes, asylum-seekers and migrants—including 
potential trafficking victims—have not been eligible for social benefits 
such as unemployment compensation and health insurance, which 
is tied to their work and cannot be obtained otherwise, since their 
arrival in Israel. The lack of social benefits further increased this 
population’s vulnerability to trafficking. 
PIBA, in collaboration with an NGO, continued to operate a 24-hour 
hotline to assist foreign workers who were in Israel under bilateral 
agreements. The hotline employed 13 interpreters in nine languages: 
Chinese, Thai, Bulgarian, Russian, Nepalese, Sinhalese, Romanian, 
Ukrainian, and Turkish. In 2020, the hotline received 2,874 calls; 
similar to previous years, the majority of calls were from Chinese 
construction workers (1,828 calls). There was no comparable hotline 
for the approximately 117,000 documented migrant workers who 
worked in Israel through private recruitment, nor for the approximately 
148,000 Palestinian workers in Israel and Israeli settlements in the 
West Bank. The Child Protection Bureau Hotline, which handled 
online offenses against children, reported addressing more than 
10,000 cases in 2020, an increase from 7,665 in 2019; however, the 
hotline did not report identifying any suspected cases of trafficking. 
As in previous years, the government did not maintain a separate 
hotline for potential child victims of all forms of trafficking. The 
government also maintained an emergency hotline for women and 
girls in commercial sex, which provided referrals to emergency and 
psychological assistance; the government did not report whether the 
hotline received any calls in 2020. The government made efforts to 
reduce demand for commercial sex acts by coordinating an awareness 
campaign that consumption of prostitution is illegal in Israel in 
Hebrew and Arabic and conducting operations against 24 websites 
advertising commercial sex. The government did not report efforts 
to prevent child sex tourism. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Israel. Palestinians and foreign workers, 
primarily from South and Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and 
the former Soviet Union, migrate to Israel for temporary work in 
construction, agriculture, and caregiving; traffickers exploit some of 
these workers in forced labor. As of March 2021, data from the Israeli 
government and NGOs indicated there were 265,000 legal foreign 
workers and 93,000 non-citizens present in Israel, many of whom 
without legal status, including Palestinian workers, in Israel and 
Israeli settlements in the West Bank. Due to pandemic-related travel 
restrictions, approximately 12,476 fewer foreign workers entered 
Israel in 2020 compared with 2019. Israeli and foreign employers 
exploit foreign workers, particularly Turkish, Chinese, Palestinian, 
Russian, Ukrainian, and Serbian men, in the construction sector 
where they suffer from labor rights abuses and violations and labor 
trafficking. Some employers in the construction sector illegally 
charge Palestinian workers monthly commissions and fees, and 
in many cases, employers illegally hire out Palestinian workers to 
other workplaces; these workers are vulnerable to forced labor. 
The employer-based work permit system for Palestinians—except 
those working in the construction sector—binds Palestinian workers 
to specific employers, which enables some employers to exploit 
workers in forced labor. Furthermore, as a condition of their overnight 
permits, employers retained identity documents of some of the 19,000 
Palestinian workers, effectively restricting their movement in Israel. The 
approximately 1,000 Jordanian day workers are vulnerable to forced 
labor in construction, agriculture, and other sectors, primarily in the 
resort city Eilat, due to limits on entry permits and the geographic 
isolation of Eilat. Traffickers subject some Thai men and women to 
forced labor in Israel’s agricultural sector imposing conditions of long 
working hours, no breaks or rest days, withheld passports, poor living 
conditions, and difficulty changing employers due to limitations 
on work permits. Some traffickers in the agricultural sector recruit 
agricultural students to take part in an agricultural study program on 
student visas and force them to work in the industry upon arrival, 
effectively circumventing the BWA process; observers reported the 
programs contain no academic content and students are bound by 
tuition fees—which NGOs reported were de facto recruitment fees—
up to 11,000 shekels ($3,420) effectively creating situations of debt 
bondage. Over the past two years, trafficking victims were identified 
in four of the six academic agriculture programs in Israel, including a 
group of Guatemalan and Honduran agricultural engineering students 
in 2020. Caregivers are highly vulnerable to forced labor due to their 
isolation inside private residences and their lack of protection under 
the labor law; local NGOs report that traffickers subject caregivers 
to excessive recruitment fees, fraudulent work contracts, long work 
hours, confiscation of passports, underpayment of wages, physical 
violence, sexual harassment and abuse, denial of severance pay, and 
poor housing including—in some cases—living in the same room as 
their employer. Foreign caregivers constitute the largest share of all 
legal foreign workers in the country; the vast majority of these workers 
are women. During the reporting period, NGOs reported Chinese 
and Turkish construction companies in Israel compelled Chinese 
and Turkish workers to work under the threat of debt bondage or 
coercive promissory notes. Foreign workers who entered Israel on 
“expert” visas—a visa procedure intended to facilitate the recruitment 
of highly skilled workers to fill hard-to-fill jobs—were vulnerable 
to trafficking as the manufacturing sector increasingly uses the visa 
system to recruit workers for low-wage jobs; in 2020, an estimated 
7,000 foreign workers in Israel on “expert” visas, primarily from low-
income countries, were subjected to worker-paid recruitment fees as 
high as 98,350 shekels ($30,610). Networks of workforce agencies 
recruit workers to Israel through a fraudulent asylum-claim process, 
charge workers high mediation fees, and sell them fake documents; 
these workers are vulnerable to exploitation. The government’s policy 
of refusing fast-track asylum claims has resulted in fewer claims from 
Ukrainian and Georgian applications; however, they were replaced by 
increased numbers of Russian and Moldovan workers following the 
same pattern. Some Bedouin Israeli children are reportedly vulnerable 
to forced labor, experiencing long working hours and physical violence. 
NGOs reported an increase in Palestinian children exploited in forced 
begging in the Northern District of Israel and Jerusalem during the 
reporting period. NGOs also reported large numbers of Arab children 
in Israel exploited in various forms of labor exploitation during the 
reporting due to pandemic-related school closures; NGOs cited 
concerns many of these children will not return to school due to 
their increased labor exploitation.
Eritrean and Sudanese male and female migrants and asylum-seekers 
are highly vulnerable to sex and labor trafficking in Israel. As of March 
2021, there were approximately 31,000 African migrants and asylum-
seekers in Israel, most of whom were from Eritrea or Sudan. According 
to NGOs, these migrants and asylum-seekers were increasingly 
vulnerable to trafficking due to the government’s implementation 
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of the Deposit Law that reduced net wages for this population; the 
government repealed this law in April 2020, but the government was 
not able to return all funds to workers due to fraudulent practices by 
employers. NGOs reported, due to the pandemic, nearly 80 percent 
of this population experienced some type of unemployment, further 
increasing their risk to exploitation. Economic distress among women 
in this population, especially Eritrean women, greatly increases their 
vulnerability to sex trafficking. Approximately 400 female asylum 
seekers engaged in survival sex prior to the pandemic; the government 
estimates that figure tripled during 2020. Since 2007, thousands of 
African migrants entered Israel via the Sinai Peninsula. The flow of 
these migrants arriving in Israel, peaking at more than 17,000 in 
2011, dramatically decreased to zero in 2017. Many of these migrants 
were kidnapped in the Sinai and subjected to severe abuse, including 
forced labor and sex trafficking, at the hands of criminal groups in 
the Sinai before reaching Israel. In 2020, an NGO reported that of 
the approximately 4,000 to 5,000 of these migrants still present in 
Israel, the government had only recognized approximately 400 to 500 
as trafficking victims but that the actual number was much higher.
Israeli children, Israeli Bedouin and Palestinian women and girls, 
foreign women, and transgender adults and children are vulnerable to 
sex trafficking in Israel. Traffickers use social media websites, including 
dating apps, online forums and chat rooms, and Facebook groups, to 
exploit girls in sex trafficking. In 2020, an NGO reported there were 
approximately 3,000 Israeli child sex trafficking victims in Israel. Israeli 
Bedouin and West Bank Palestinian women and girls are vulnerable 
to sex and labor trafficking after family members force them into 
marriages with older men; these women and girls experience physical 
and sexual abuse, threats of violence, and restricted movement. Russian, 
Ukrainian, Eritrean, and Ethiopian women are also vulnerable to 
sex and labor trafficking through online-facilitated forced marriages. 
NGOs report some Palestinian LGBTQI+ men and boys in Israel are 
vulnerable to abuse and sexual exploitation due to their lack of legal 
status and restrictions on work eligibility for Palestinian nationals 
in Israel. Some Israeli transgender women and girls are sexually 
exploited in commercial sex to be able to afford gender-affirming care. 
Some transgender children as young as 13 years old, many of whom 
ran away from home, come under the mentorship of transgender 
women in commercial sex; sometimes these “mentors” then exploit 
these transgender children in commercial sex. Traffickers subject 
women from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, China, 
and Ghana, as well as Eritrean women, to sex trafficking in Israel; 
some women arrive on tourist visas to work willingly in commercial 
sex—particularly in the southern coastal resort city of Eilat—but sex 
traffickers subsequently exploit them. Some traffickers reportedly 
recruit sex trafficking victims with false, fraudulent, or misleading job 
offers on the internet, sometimes through legitimate employment 
websites. During the reporting period, Israeli authorities indicted a 
suspect for allegedly holding people in conditions of slavery while 
operating a religious cult by allegedly forcing women and children 
to provide any earnings to the suspect and to perform involuntary 
domestic work; media reporting also alleged the suspect sexually 
exploited the victims.
ITALY: TIER 2
The Government of Italy does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts 
to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts 
compared to the previous reporting period, considering the impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Italy remained on Tier 2. These efforts included increasing funding for 
labor trafficking prevention and awareness campaigns compared with 
the prior year. The government also trained more law enforcement 
officials and adopted new decrees that largely revoked 2018 decrees 
affecting humanitarian protections for asylum-seekers that had 
increased vulnerability to trafficking. However, the government 
did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. The 
government reported fewer trafficking investigations and prosecutions 
compared with the prior year and reported partial sentencing data. 
The government identified and assisted fewer victims and decreased 
labor inspections. The national victim identification and referral 
mechanism was implemented unevenly throughout the country 
and was not always consistently effective. The government did not 
adopt a new national action plan, appoint a national rapporteur, 
or award restitution to any victims. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking cases and convict 
and sentence traffickers with adequate sentences. • Increase proactive 
victim identification by improving and consistently implementing 
the national identification referral mechanism across the country, 
including for Italian nationals and vulnerable populations such 
as foreign migrants, Cuban medical professionals, and children. • 
Intensify efforts to effectively screen for labor trafficking through 
increased inspections and improved training of labor inspectors to 
spot trafficking indicators and refer victim for services. • Strengthen 
interagency coordination and partnership with civil society. • Adopt 
a national action plan. • Continue to increase migrant worker 
protections by consistently enforcing strong regulations and 
oversight of labor recruitment agencies and labor brokers, including 
investigating and prosecuting for labor trafficking. • Ensure labor 
trafficking is investigated and prosecuted as a trafficking offense and 
not pursued as an administrative labor code violation or other lesser 
crime. • Consolidate data among different ministries, and make 
public a database on investigations, prosecutions, and convictions, 
including sentencing data. • Implement a licensing and accreditation 
process for massage parlors. • Continue to increase international 
cooperation with source and transit countries, especially Nigeria, 
Tunisia, and Libya, on information sharing and countering trafficking 
rings. • Improve security standards in and around reception centers 
to limit contact between traffickers and victims or potential victims. 
• Continue to strengthen international law enforcement cooperation 
to prevent and investigate child sex tourism. • Amend the law on 
the non-punishment of victims to ensure that trafficking victims 
could not be inappropriately penalized for acts traffickers compelled 
them to commit. • Appoint a national rapporteur to provide an 
independent review of government efforts. • Increase efforts to order 
restitution for victims. 
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. Article 601 of 
the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed penalties of eight to 20 years’ imprisonment, which 
increased by one third to one half if the offense involved a child 
victim. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect 
to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other 
serious offenses, such as rape. Additional penal code provisions were 
utilized to prosecute trafficking crimes. Article 600 criminalized 
placing or holding a person in conditions of slavery or servitude, 
and Article 602 criminalized the sale and purchase of slaves – both 
prescribed the same penalties as Article 601. Additionally, Article 
600-bis criminalized offenses relating to child sex trafficking and 
prescribed punishments of six to 12 years’ imprisonment and a fine 





Courts were closed for approximately four months due to the 
pandemic, which postponed criminal proceedings, and pandemic-
related restrictions limited the ability for law enforcement to pursue 
trafficking investigations. In 2020, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) 
reported investigating 254 persons under Articles 600, 601, and 
602, a decrease compared with 323 in 2019. The government also 
reported investigating 116 suspects in 2020 under Article 600-bis 
for child sex trafficking, compared with 166 suspects in 2019. The 
government reported prosecuting 106 suspects under articles 600, 
601, and 602, a significant decrease compared with 202 in 2019. In 
2020, trial and appellate courts reported convicting 175 traffickers 
under articles 600, 601, and 602, compared with 170 as originally 
reported in 2019. The government did not report comprehensive 
sentencing data for 2020, or in any prior year, but reported that 
the average sentence for convicted traffickers was 8.2 years in 2020, 
an increase compared with 6.6 years in 2019. In 2020, authorities 
extradited 36 suspects from abroad who were accused of crimes under 
Articles 600, 601, and 602, as well as other crimes such as sexual 
intercourse with children, abetting illegal immigration, illicit labor 
mediation and exploitation of prostitution; this compared with 26 
in 2019. The government also extradited 26 persons accused of the 
same crimes to foreign countries; this compared with 24 in 2019.
The government did not maintain a consolidated database on 
investigations, prosecutions, convictions, and sentencing of traffickers, 
or of their victims, a deficiency noted by the Council of Europe’s 
expert group (GRETA). Specialized anti-mafia units of prosecutors 
and judiciary police handled trafficking prosecutions. Whenever 
investigators found clear evidence of trafficking, they referred the 
case to an anti-mafia unit, which relaunched the investigation and 
consequently extended the timeframe for prosecution and trial. 
To avoid this delay, non-specialized investigators and prosecutors 
sometimes charged perpetrators with crimes other than trafficking. 
Anti-mafia units continued to prioritize investigations of criminal 
networks over individual cases, citing limits on available resources. 
Lack of a sufficient number of interpreters, especially for West 
African dialects, continued to limit law enforcement arrests and 
investigations, as well as diminish the benefits of investigators’ 
wiretapping capability. Italian prosecutors and police continued 
to cite insufficient cooperation in investigations from officials in 
source and transit countries; with many cases being transnational, 
this hindered prosecutions and convictions. 
Law enforcement agencies received training on victim identification 
and investigation of trafficking crimes within their standard 
curriculum. In 2020, the MOI provided anti-trafficking training to 
more than 1,500 law enforcement officers and, in collaboration 
with an international organization, trained 60 members of asylum 
committees and social workers on victim identification and referral, 
as well as an additional 67 caseworkers. This was a significant increase 
compared with 763 officials trained in 2019. In 2020, the government 
cooperated in an international law enforcement operation with Spain 
and Romania, which resulted in the arrest of 16 suspects and the 
identification of 13 victims. In 2020, the government continued to 
provide funding to an international organization for an anti-trafficking 
project across Africa, part of which focused on improving international 
judicial cooperation between Italy and Nigeria. Through the program, 
the government continued to support a liaison magistrate exchange 
with Nigeria, which included joint-investigations, case coordination, 
legal assistance, and information-sharing between the government 
and Nigeria. The program also organized a 2020 visit to Nigeria 
by an Italian NGO to strengthen cooperation between Italian and 
Nigerian NGOs working on human trafficking and to improve 
assistance to returning Nigerian victims. The government formalized 
a bilateral agreement with Nigeria in October 2020 on extradition, 
mutual legal assistance, and transfer of convicted persons, though 
it did not report utilizing this agreement. Trafficking networks and 
gangs continued to grow more sophisticated, organized, and violent, 
particularly Nigerian gangs linked to the Black Axe, Supreme Viking 
Confraternity, and the Eiye syndicate. The government did not report 
any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government 
employees complicit in human trafficking offenses.
PROTECTION
The government decreased protection efforts. The government ordered 
national and regional lockdowns due to the pandemic several times 
in 2020, which included home confinement and limited freedom 
of movement – this, coupled with the increased use of private 
residences for commercial sex operations, decreased victim visibility to 
authorities, exacerbated vulnerabilities for sex trafficking victims, and 
made them more difficult to detect. The pandemic also exacerbated 
vulnerabilities for labor trafficking victims through the increased 
isolation of migrant and seasonal workers, which complicated 
detection by officials and NGOs. The government identified 470 
new victims in 2020, a decrease compared with 657 in 2019. Of 
the victims identified, 310 were sex trafficking victims and 160 were 
labor trafficking victims, which included 142 victims of forced labor, 
eight victims of forced criminality, six victims of domestic service, 
and four victims of forced begging. The government also identified 
175 persons at migration centers who the government believed 
were likely to become victims of trafficking but had not yet been 
exploited. Irregular migrants and asylum-seekers continued to make 
up the majority of identified trafficking victims, with most victims 
originating in Nigeria and a smaller percentage from Pakistan and 
The Gambia. All newly identified victims were foreign nationals. 
NGOs reported that gaps in authorities’ proactive victim identification 
efforts persisted during the reporting period. The government again 
did not identify any Italian nationals as victims and very few children 
(less than one percent); experts raised concerns about this potential 
gap in victim identification. Furthermore, NGOs reported police 
forces in some provinces did not fully cooperate with civil society 
organizations focused on undocumented migrants, due to a lack of 
understanding or mutual distrust, which subsequently limited the 
ability of local authorities to identify victims among this population. 
The government cooperated with NGOs and international 
organizations to provide shelter and services to victims. In 2020, the 
government allotted €24 million ($29.45 million) to 21 trafficking 
victim assistance programs implemented by NGOs across the country, 
the same as in 2019. NGOs reported high but inconsistent quality 
standards of assistance programs across regions. NGOs reported that 
the Department of Equal Opportunity (DEO), which coordinated 
protection efforts, was not sufficiently funded or staffed to consistently 
monitor assistance programs nationally. In 2020, the DEO reported 
government-supported NGOs assisted 757 trafficking victims and 745 
potential victims, compared with 1,877 trafficking victims assisted in 
2019. The government also assisted 390 persons at migration centers 
whom the government believed were likely to become victims of 
trafficking but had not yet been exploited. Statistics pertaining to 
the number of victims assisted by the government included victims 
assisted for the first time in 2020 and ongoing assistance to victims 
identified in prior years. The DEO reported that in 2020 it performed 
fewer evaluations of potential victims and admitted fewer victims to 
protection services than in 2019 due, in large part, to the pandemic’s 
impact and the national lockdowns. While the government had a 
formal referral mechanism, it was implemented unevenly during the 
reporting period. NGOs and the DEO recognized inconsistencies 
in the efficiency and effectiveness of the current referral process 
between regions and found that quality standards were lower in 
the south. Insufficient availability of interpretation services for 
lesser-known African dialects, with victims coming from as many 
as 15 different language groups, remained a significant challenge. 
Trustworthy interpreters were also difficult to secure, as reportedly 
many interpreters came from the same communities as the accused 
traffickers. 
According to NGOs and pro bono lawyers, many victims applied for 
asylum upon arrival rather than protection as a trafficking victim, 
either through pressure from their trafficker or believing that 
asylum status afforded greater freedoms, more immediate access 
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to employment and services, and long-term residency. During the 
reporting period, regional committees continued to utilize national 
guidelines for asylum-seekers to adjudicate asylum applications to 
identify trafficking victims among applicants; however, inconsistencies 
in implementation persisted throughout the reporting period. 
Furthermore, asylum hearings for potential trafficking victims 
significantly declined in 2020 due to pandemic-related restrictions, 
though the government adapted by holding some hearings on 
virtual platforms. The overall decrease in hearings may have left 
some trafficking victims unidentified during the reporting period. 
To address prior identification inconsistencies, in January 2021, the 
MOI, in collaboration with an international organization, published 
updated comprehensive victim identification guidelines for asylum 
committees. Further, the National Commission on Asylum signed 
an information sharing agreement with the anti-mafia directorate 
to facilitate the prosecution of traffickers.
To reduce the number of refugees and migrants from Libya, Italy 
continued training operations with and assistance to the Libyan 
Coast Guard, as did other EU member states. However, many NGOs 
criticized this coordinated effort because it often resulted in the 
occupants of vessels identified in the Libyan search and rescue 
area being returned to Libyan shores; NGOs and international 
organizations cited severe security and human rights conditions 
inside Libya and Libyan detention centers and a heightened risk of 
trafficking for migrants forced to remain in Libya. For four months 
in 2020, the pandemic prompted the government to temporarily 
close its ports to NGO humanitarian ships carrying refugees and 
migrants from Libyan search and rescue waters, which temporarily 
prevented them from docking at Italian ports. NGOs coordinated 
with law enforcement and immigration officials at both the arrival 
points and the longer-term reception centers. The government 
observed standard UNHCR procedures to screen for trafficking victims 
among all asylum-seekers, although NGOs asserted authorities did 
not properly identify many of the victims on arrival, potentially 
leaving some trafficking victims unidentified within the system and 
classified instead as asylum-seekers or undocumented immigrants 
subject to deportation. NGOs continued to stress the need for longer 
time periods for screening of refugees and migrants at arrival ports 
to more accurately ascertain victim status, but they acknowledged 
conditions were not conducive to a stay there beyond one or two days. 
In October 2020, the government adopted new decrees that largely 
revoked 2018 decrees affecting humanitarian protections, which had 
increased vulnerability to trafficking. The new decrees increased the 
availability of humanitarian protections for asylum-seekers who could 
face persecution if returned to their country of origin and introduced 
new services to facilitate reintegration of asylum-seekers. In May 2020, 
the government also adopted a decree allowing for the regularization 
of workers informally employed in the agricultural, fishing, home 
care, and domestic-work sectors. In 2020, 31,000 informal workers 
in agriculture and 177,000 in homecare requested work permits 
based on the new decree; of the permits the government reviewed, 
it accepted the vast majority. The law allowed for an initial three to 
six months of government assistance to all trafficking victims. After 
initial assistance, foreign victims were eligible to obtain temporary 
residency and work permits and had a path to permanent residency; 
additionally, foreign victims were eligible for six months of shelter 
benefits, renewable for an additional six months, if the victim obtained 
a job or enrolled in a training program. To adjust to pandemic-
related restrictions on movement imposed by the government, the 
government extended the expiration dates of residence permits for 
asylum-seekers by several months in 2020. The government granted 
at least 108 residence permits in 2020, compared with 155 in 2019 
and 270 in 2018 to trafficking victims. In 2020, 26,551 migrants 
submitted asylum applications compared with 31,136 in 2019; 
adding to an already existing backlog of nearly 140,000 applications. 
Of the applications the government processed, it granted asylum 
status or subsidiary protections in approximately one fourth of the 
applications. In some cases, the government housed victims and 
potential victims with irregular migrants, and such housing lacked 
adequate security against traffickers inside and outside the centers 
seeking to recruit victims or remove those already under their control. 
In January 2020, the Ministry of Interior published specific guidelines 
for identifying and referring child victims mostly within the asylum 
system. While the government had a victim identification and referral 
mechanism for some forms of child trafficking, it remained without 
a separate national mechanism that included all forms of trafficking. 
In its 2019 report, GRETA recommended establishing a separate 
national referral mechanism specifically for the specialized needs 
of children. Children represented five percent of victims receiving 
assistance. NGOs estimated there were several thousand children in 
Italy who were victims of sex trafficking in 2020. Many unaccompanied 
Nigerian child victims misrepresented their age to gain placement in 
an adult reception center, giving them greater freedom to leave the 
center unnoticed with their trafficker. NGOs, however, welcomed 
increased scrutiny by authorities of these age-claims, and authorities 
more often sent victims into child protection if unable to confirm 
adult age-status. Foreign child victims automatically received a 
residence permit until age 18 and accommodations in a general 
children’s center or a designated center for trafficking victims who 
were also asylum-seekers. Children received counseling and were 
enrolled in public schools with the support of mentors. 
Italian criminal law lacked a provision specifically prohibiting 
punishment of trafficking victims for unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit, but during the reporting period there were 
no reports of judges convicting trafficking victims forced to commit 
such crimes, and cooperation between NGOs and police to prevent 
victim penalization remained strong. Current law required proof of 
exploitation in a criminal action against the perpetrator, which left 
victims and potential victims at risk of prosecution and conviction 
when a court did not first convict the perpetrators. The government 
did not require victims to cooperate with law enforcement to obtain 
assistance and a residence permit, although NGOs and international 
organizations reported authorities did not consistently implement 
this policy and sometimes gave preference to those who cooperated. 
The government reported it often had difficulty prosecuting trafficking 
cases because victims were often unwilling to cooperate with law 
enforcement, and in a March 2021 document, NGOs urged the 
government to adopt a victim-centered approach. The government 
had a witness protection program but did not report whether any 
trafficking victims were able to access this protection during the 
reporting period; experts noted that increased utilization of witness 
protection programs could increase the willingness of victims to 
cooperate with law enforcement proceedings. The government offered 
a single payment of €1,500 ($1,840) to victims for compensation, 
although GRETA and NGOs noted the application procedure was 
overly complex, the amount insufficient, and very few victims ever 
received compensation. The government did not report granting 
compensation to any victims during the reporting period. GRETA 
further recommended the government increase the use of existing 
legal remedies to provide restitution to victims and more proactively 
seize assets and pursue forfeiture against perpetrators. The government 
did not award restitution from criminal cases or damages from civil 
suits to any trafficking victims during the reporting period. 
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. The DEO, as coordinator 
of the interagency steering committee on trafficking, was responsible for 
drafting the national anti-trafficking action plan, coordinating programs 
for prevention and victim assistance, and submitting a biannual 
anti-trafficking report. The government remained without a national 
rapporteur to provide independent analysis of government efforts to 
combat human trafficking; in a March 2021 document submitted to 
the government, several NGOs urged the government to establish such 
a body. The interagency steering committee continued to meet virtually 
and work on updating the 2016-2018 national action plan; however, 
the government did not adopt a new plan during the reporting period. 





and partnership with civil society and adopt a victim-centered approach. 
During the reporting period, the inter-ministerial working group 
on labor exploitation, which focused on the agricultural sector and 
illicit labor brokers and aimed to prevent exploitation and offer legal 
alternatives to illegal employment, continued to meet, expanded its 
membership to include representatives from the south, and established 
a subgroup on victim protection and assistance. In 2020, the working 
group successfully obtained €95 million ($116.56 million) in funding 
for its previously proposed national three-year plan, from 2020-2022, 
to combat labor exploitation in agriculture, which included several 
programs that ranged from victim protection and reintegration services 
to awareness raising and training. As part of its three-year plan, the 
government continued to contribute trained cultural mediators to 
communicate and raise awareness among refugees, migrants, and 
victims. In 2020, mediators conducted outreach to 3,600 workers in 
migrant communities on labor exploitation and available protections. 
Under the plan, the government also funded local awareness campaigns 
on labor exploitation, including trafficking, but did not report any 
national-level awareness campaigns on sex trafficking. In 2020, the 
labor ministry released a cell phone application in five languages, to 
connect agricultural workers with potential employers with the goal 
of increasing transparency and reducing the need for illicit labor 
brokers and subsequently decreasing the risk of exploitation. In 
2020, the government provided €250,000 ($306,750) to a program 
in Niger to raise awareness and strengthen judicial cooperation on 
human trafficking and other crimes. The government also contributed 
€1 million ($1.23 million) for a trafficking awareness campaign in 
Nigeria in 2020. 
The law required businesses to submit reports on their actions to 
minimize the risk of forced labor and prohibited the purchase of 
products made with forced labor. Part of the government’s three-
year plan included creating ethical agricultural supply chains, 
with a particular focus on the harvesting of tomatoes. In 2020, the 
government continued efforts to investigate labor brokers for illicit 
labor mediation by arresting 67 suspects, prosecuting 271 suspects, 
and convicting 109 criminals; compared with arresting 113 suspects, 
prosecuting 313 suspects, and convicting 131 criminals in 2019. 
While illicit labor mediation does not meet the threshold for labor 
trafficking, law enforcement efforts in this sector helped reduce the 
demand for forced labor. In 2020, the government reported inspecting 
83,421 sites, including 5,372 agricultural sites, and identified 
17,788 unregistered workers. This represented a significant decrease 
compared with the inspection of 128,376 sites in 2019, including 
5,950 agricultural sites, and the identification of more than 41,000 
unregistered workers. Unions expressed concern that the pandemic 
hampered labor inspections, which decreased by nearly half in the 
harvesting season from 2019 to 2020. Furthermore, fraudulent labor 
recruitment and passport retention remained concerns during the 
reporting period. Experts estimated that in 2020, as many as 180,000 
agricultural workers, especially seasonal workers, were at risk of labor 
trafficking in Italy. Employers in the agricultural sector sometimes 
submitted falsified forms pertaining to their workers, which impeded 
labor inspections and the potential identification of trafficking 
victims. Although illegal, employers or labor recruiters sometimes 
charged a placement fee to employees, which increased their risk 
of trafficking. The government had a licensing and accreditation 
system for labor brokers and labor recruitment agencies. There was 
a lack of regulation, including a licensing or accreditation system, 
and oversight on massage parlors, which remained places of high 
concern for sex trafficking. The government did not report the extent 
to which it screened or identified potential trafficking cases during 
its inspections. The government did not effectively regulate labor 
recruitment agencies or illicit labor brokers during the reporting 
period. While authorities seized several farms and arrested many 
suspects for crimes that could potentially reach the threshold for 
labor trafficking, the government did not report investigating or 
prosecuting any agencies or companies for labor trafficking, including 
for fraudulent labor recruitment, but instead arrested suspects for 
other related crimes. GRETA recommended the government intensify 
efforts to more effectively screen for trafficking victims through 
increased labor inspections, expanded training of inspectors, and 
in monitoring of recruitment practices including in agriculture, 
domestic labor, hospitality and food service. 
The DEO continued to operate its 24-hour hotline for victims of 
human trafficking, which reported receiving more calls in 2020 (5,510 
calls), compared with 2019 (3,711 calls), but fewer relevant calls. Of 
the relevant calls, 73 percent pertained to sexual exploitation, 25 
percent pertained to labor exploitation, and two percent pertained to 
forced begging. The national government did not coordinate efforts 
to reduce the demand for commercial sex, although some local 
governments imposed fines on purchasers. The government made 
efforts to reduce the demand for participation in international sex 
tourism by its citizens through the initiation of two investigations 
into child sex tourism in 2020.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
foreign, and to a lesser degree domestic, victims in Italy. Victims 
originate primarily from Nigeria and other African countries, China, 
Pakistan, Romania, Bulgaria, and include ethnic Roma. The pandemic 
exacerbates vulnerabilities for trafficking victims, including through 
increasing isolation of migrant and seasonal workers as well as sex 
trafficking victims, which complicates their identification by officials 
and NGOs. In 2020, sex traffickers left thousands of Nigerian women 
and children trafficking survivors destitute and without basic needs, 
such as food, during the national lockdowns; many anti-trafficking 
NGOs raised concerns that travel restrictions and limited social 
and public services make it more difficult for trafficking victims to 
escape and return home. Traffickers, often part of Chinese criminal 
networks, systematically exploit Chinese women in sex trafficking 
in apartments, beauty centers, clubs, and massage parlors, as well as 
labor trafficking in a variety of Chinese owned businesses. Massage 
parlors are sometimes used as fronts for the purchase of commercial 
sex, raising concerns about sex trafficking. Of an estimated 40,000 
to 45,000 individuals involved in commercial sex on the streets, 
NGOs reported approximately 60 percent (or 24,000 to 27,000) are 
trafficking victims or at risk of trafficking and between five and eight 
percent are children (or approximately 2,000 to 3,200 of 40,000). 
The majority of sex trafficking victims are from Nigeria, although 
more recently their numbers have decreased. The government and 
civil society maintain that Nigerian women and unaccompanied 
children remain extremely vulnerable to trafficking because of the 
continued operation of organized Nigerian trafficking networks. 
Several Nigerian trafficking networks have expanded operations 
across Italy and reportedly receive protection from Italian crime 
syndicates. International organizations estimated up to 75 percent 
of the Nigerian women and unaccompanied children who arrived 
in 2018 were trafficking victims. Traffickers subject Nigerian women 
and girls to sex trafficking through debt-based coercion and voodoo 
rituals. Authorities report traffickers encourage Nigerian victims to 
claim asylum to obtain legal residency and facilitate their continued 
exploitation. Traffickers sometimes exploit migrant women in sex 
trafficking in and around migration centers. The Government of 
France reports receiving Nigerian victims who were exploited in 
trafficking while awaiting legal residency in Italy. Italian citizens will 
sometimes engage in child sex tourism abroad. Traffickers frequently 
target unaccompanied children, who are especially vulnerable to 
trafficking; children are exploited in child sex trafficking, forced to 
commit crimes or beg, and forced to work in shops, bars, restaurants, 
and bakeries. Ethnic Roma children are at risk for trafficking, including 
forced begging and child sex trafficking. Unlike the downward trend in 
prior years, authorities state the number of seaborne unaccompanied 
children increased in 2020 to 4,631 identified, compared with 1,680 
in 2019, 3,534 in 2018, and 15,731 in 2017. 
Labor traffickers operate in agriculture, predominantly in southern 
Italy, construction, household labor, hospitality, and restaurants. 
Traffickers use fraudulent recruitment, passport retention, and 
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debt-based coercion to control trafficking victims; traffickers also 
extort payments from the victim’s family in the source country. 
Cuban medical professionals working in Italy during the pandemic 
may have been forced to work by the Cuban government. Italy has 
an estimated 1.5 million unregistered workers and 3.7 million 
irregular workers who are at risk for labor trafficking. Specifically for 
the agricultural sector, experts estimated that as many as 180,000 
workers, particularly seasonal workers, are at risk for forced labor 
in Italy. Employers in the agricultural sector will sometimes submit 
falsified forms pertaining to their workers, which impedes labor 
inspections and the potential identification of trafficking victims. 
Italy has approximately 517,000 irregular migrants in 2020, many 
of whom are at risk for trafficking. Italy received 34,154 irregular 
arrivals by sea in 2020, a significant increase compared with 11,471 
in 2019, many through Libya, where victims reported experiencing 
extortion, torture, and rape by militias or traffickers while awaiting 
passage to Italy. In 2017, government officials, including intelligence 
officials, met with a notorious alleged human trafficker to discuss 
controls on refugee and migrant flows from Libya, where the alleged 
trafficker requested funds from Italian authorities to manage the 
reception of migrants in Libya. Irregular migrants that arrived by 
sea mostly originate from Tunisia and Bangladesh. In 2019, of the 
roughly 31,000 persons requesting asylum, authorities estimate up to 
30 percent were at risk for sex trafficking or forced labor while waiting 
for adjudication of their petitions. Traffickers target migrant centers 
to recruit and later exploit asylum-seekers, sometimes claiming to be 
family members to gain access to the centers. Asylum-seekers may 
legally work beginning two months after filing their applications, 
although many seek illegal employment immediately in informal 
sectors, increasing their risk for trafficking. Many also attempt passage 
to other European countries; under the European Commission’s 
Dublin Regulation, countries have six months to repatriate victims to 
the EU country of their arrival but must accept their asylum claim if 
they fail to transfer them in due time. This regulation likely increased 
the number of asylum-seekers or trafficking victims forced to remain 
in Italy or return to Italy from another country.  
JAMAICA: TIER 2
The Government of Jamaica does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Jamaica remained on Tier 2. These efforts included achieving a 
trafficking conviction that resulted in a significant prison term and 
restitution paid to the victim; adopting a national referral mechanism 
(NRM) to standardize procedures for victim identification and referral 
to services across government entities and the public; and publishing 
its second annual report on trafficking in persons in Jamaica. However, 
the government did not meet the minimum standards in several 
key areas. The government identified and assisted fewer victims, 
and it significantly reduced funding for trafficking victim protection 
services. Although the government provided some training for law 
enforcement and criminal justice officials, these efforts were ad hoc, 
and the government did not provide consistent, standardized anti-
trafficking training for officials. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Adopt, fully implement, and train officials—including local police, 
Center for the Investigation of Sexual Offences and Child Abuse 
(CISOCA) investigators, social workers, and justices of the peace—on 
government-wide SOPs to guide proactive identification of suspected 
trafficking victims and referral to services, including screening for 
indicators of trafficking among vulnerable groups. • Increase efforts 
to provide more victims, whether identified in Jamaica or repatriated 
from abroad, with comprehensive services, including legal, medical, 
psycho-social, shelter, case management, educational/vocational, and 
reintegration assistance, for the full length of any legal proceedings. 
• Amend the anti-trafficking law to prescribe penalties for sex 
trafficking that are commensurate with penalties for other grave crimes, 
including by removing sentencing provisions that allow fines in lieu of 
imprisonment and increasing the available maximum imprisonment 
term. • Allow adult victims greater independence to make informed 
choices about their own security needs and do not impose restriction of 
movement on adult victims while in the government’s care. • Provide 
all victims with the necessary long-term protection and reintegration 
assistance to safely transition to living outside shelters. • Strengthen 
the role of government or NGO service providers when conducting 
victim interviews, formally identifying victims, and assessing victims’ 
needs. • Allow authorities and the public to refer all potential victims 
directly to government or NGO service providers, and make victims 
eligible to receive formal identification and trafficking-related services 
without police referral. • Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and 
convict traffickers, including officials who are complicit in human 
trafficking and foreign tourists or Jamaicans who purchase commercial 
sex acts from child trafficking victims. • Increase funding and human 
resources to ministries, departments, and agencies responsible for 
trafficking victim protection services. • Allocate sufficient resources 
to the Office of the National Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons 
(ONRTIP) to conduct an independent assessment of the government’s 
victim identification efforts, including systematic implementation 
of the screening tools and NRM. • Strengthen and institutionalize 
training on human trafficking and victim-centered procedures for 
police, prosecutors, and judges and assign cases to trained personnel.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained limited law enforcement efforts. The 
government criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking through 
its Trafficking in Persons (Prevention, Suppression, and Punishment) 
Act, which prescribed penalties of up to 20 years’ imprisonment, a 
fine, or both for offenses involving an adult victim, and up to 30 
years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both for those involving a child victim. 
These penalties were sufficiently stringent; however, with respect to 
sex trafficking, by allowing for a fine in lieu of imprisonment and 
prescribing a lower maximum imprisonment term, these penalties 
were not commensurate with those for other serious crimes, such 
as rape. 
Officials investigated 42 potential sex trafficking cases and one 
labor trafficking case, compared with 41 potential sex trafficking 
cases and two labor trafficking cases investigated in the previous 
reporting period. During the reporting period, the government 
initiated three new sex trafficking prosecutions, a decrease from five 
sex trafficking prosecutions and two labor trafficking prosecutions 
initiated during the previous reporting period, and it continued 19 
previously initiated prosecutions. The government convicted one sex 
trafficker from a 2016 case and sentenced him to nine years and five 
months’ imprisonment for trafficking and 12 months’ imprisonment 
for living off the earnings of prostitution, to be served concurrently; 
courts also required the trafficker to pay 250,000 Jamaican dollars 
($1,670) restitution to the victim. During the previous reporting 
period, the government also convicted one trafficker. From the cases 
investigated for trafficking, the government ultimately prosecuted 
five suspects for separate crimes. The slow pace at which cases moved 
through the courts hampered efforts to hold traffickers criminally 






were no investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government 
employees complicit in trafficking offenses, but reports indicated 
that some police officers were complicit in sex trafficking.
The government maintained a specialized police unit with island-wide 
jurisdiction to investigate human trafficking and vice crimes, as well 
as a team of prosecutors specialized in human rights, intellectual 
property, and sexual offenses. Police adapted investigation methods 
in response to the pandemic, such as conducting witness interviews 
via telephone; authorities reported these methods posed limitations 
to evidence collection efforts. Police reportedly screened for victims 
of trafficking during raids on venues where commercial sex occurred, 
although these operations were not effective in identifying victims. 
The government reported pandemic-related diversion of funds and 
restrictions on gatherings limited its training of law enforcement 
officers. The government conducted six virtual training sessions 
attended by 250 police officers on topics related to human trafficking 
and migrant smuggling; in comparison, 721 police attended training 
or other information sessions on human trafficking in the previous 
year. The government provided facilitators for donor-funded training 
on human trafficking for 25 prosecutors. Some individual judges 
had specialized trafficking experience, but there was no mechanism 
to assign trafficking cases to these judges. The government’s training 
efforts for law enforcement and criminal justice officials continued 
to be ad hoc and largely dependent on foreign donors, rather than 
sustained year to year through consistent government delivery 
mechanisms. The government reported international police 
cooperation with the Cayman Islands.
PROTECTION
The government maintained efforts to protect victims. The government 
formally identified eight trafficking victims, all through calls to a 
government hotline. In comparison, police formally identified ten 
victims during the previous reporting period. Identified victims 
included seven girls and one young woman, and all were Jamaican 
citizens exploited in sex trafficking. The government reported referring 
three victims to government-run shelters but did not specify the types 
of shelter, their length of stay, or lodging for the remaining victims. 
During the previous reporting period, the government referred six 
victims to accommodations, including government shelters and 
temporary private lodging, where they remained between three months 
and one year. The government reported providing all eight victims 
with care and services that may have included food, clothing, medical 
care, counseling, psycho-social support, legal assistance, training and 
educational support, or employment assistance, but it did not provide 
additional details on the scope or duration of services provided. The 
government spent approximately 2 million Jamaican dollars ($13,330) 
on protection and assistance to victims, a significant decrease from 7 
million Jamaican dollars ($46,670) spent in the previous reporting 
period. Local experts reported the government likely provided shelter 
or other services to some child trafficking victims it did not formally 
identify and classified as victims of other crimes.
The government’s National Children’s Registry (NCR) operated a 
hotline for reporting cases of child abuse, including human trafficking, 
that was available seven days a week but not overnight. The NCR 
hotline received 23 calls about suspected trafficking cases. Hotline 
officials referred all cases to the specialized police unit for investigation, 
and police identified eight victims as a result of these calls. 
The government had several written guidelines to assist healthcare 
workers, labor officials, diplomats, hotline officials, and officers in the 
Jamaica Constabulary Force’s (JCF) anti-trafficking and vice crimes 
unit in proactively identifying potential trafficking victims. However, 
these guidelines were not comprehensive, and local experts could 
not verify how consistently they were applied. With support from an 
NGO, several government agencies participated in the development 
of ministry-specific screening tools to guide officials in assessing 
behavioral, situational, health, and other factors to identify potential 
child trafficking victims among vulnerable groups, and a NRM to 
standardize procedures for victim referral and management of care. 
The National Task Force Against Trafficking in Persons (NATFATIP) 
and several individual government agencies endorsed the screening 
tools and national referral mechanism during the reporting period 
but did not begin standardized implementation. The Victim Services 
Division (VSD) began implementing the screening tool during its 
intake assessments of children. The government required all reports 
of suspected trafficking to go through the JCF’s anti-trafficking and 
vice crimes unit, and victims were not eligible to receive formal 
identification or trafficking-specific services without police referral. JCF, 
NATFATIP, and in the case of child victims, the Child Protection and 
Family Services Agency (CPFSA), worked in consultation to arrange 
accommodation and other services to formally identified victims 
on a case-by-case basis. The government conducted virtual and in-
person sessions to train immigration officials, medical professionals, 
and labor inspectors on procedures for identifying and referring 
trafficking victims. Nonetheless, many front-line responders had 
limited understanding of trafficking crimes, and the government 
identified and assisted a small number of victims. According to press 
reports, the government contracted approximately 450 Cuban medical 
professionals during the year. Authorities did not acknowledge their 
presence or provide information on measures taken to screen Cuban 
medical workers for trafficking indicators, despite ongoing concerns 
the Government of Cuba may have compelled some of them to work. 
NATFATIP operated a shelter exclusively for trafficking victims, which 
could accommodate 12 female victims, and arranged private lodging 
for some victims, including men; in addition, authorities could place 
child victims in CPFSA facilities or female victims in NGO-operated 
shelters that were not exclusive to trafficking victims. The government 
reported adult victims had the option of residing in the government’s 
specialized shelter or in private accommodation; in practice, however, 
authorities limited some victims’ options based on an independent 
police assessment of the victim’s security risks. Authorities placed 
victims deemed to be at high risk in private accommodations, guarded 
by police, and they were unable to move freely. The government 
closely monitored and sometimes restricted victims’ movement while 
residing in the specialized shelter. These high security measures may 
have re-traumatized some victims. CPFSA had a protocol for providing 
services to child trafficking victims under the agency’s care, and the 
government had victim management guidelines for facilities that 
provided care to victims of trafficking in Jamaica. The government 
provided few long-term services to support victims’ reintegration, 
prevent re-exploitation, or sustain protection throughout the duration 
of lengthy court cases. The government continued to fund training for 
a Haitian woman who has been a resident of the NATFATIP shelter 
since 2013, but authorities did not take steps to assist her in safely 
transitioning to long-term independence outside the shelter. 
Foreign victims were able to access the same services as Jamaican 
victims. The government did not have a formal policy to provide 
residency to foreign victims who faced hardship or retribution upon 
return to their home countries, but authorities could provide this 
assistance to victims on a case-by-case basis. No victims received 
residency during the reporting period. The government continued 
to provide lodging, medical services, food, and clothing to an Indian 
victim identified during the previous reporting period before he 
returned to India. 
VSD offered court orientation sessions for victims participating in the 
judicial process, including children, and officers from VSD or CPFSA 
accompanied victims testifying in court. The government provided 
legal assistance, security, transportation, and lodging to two victims 
who testified in court during the reporting period. In certain instances, 
justice officials permitted victims to provide testimony through video or 
written statements. However, the government did not allocate adequate 
human or financial resources to provide victims with sustained support 
during legal processes, and authorities did not always employ victim-
centered procedures. Years-long court cases, re-traumatization during 
the criminal justice process, and fear of reprisal further disincentivized 




Jamaica’s anti-trafficking law directed the court to order restitution 
to victims, and prosecutors increased efforts to ensure judges 
implemented this provision appropriately. The court ordered one 
convicted sex trafficker to pay 250,000 Jamaican dollars ($1,670) to 
the victim. Jamaican law protected trafficking victims from prosecution 
for immigration or prostitution-related offenses traffickers compelled 
them to commit, but it did not provide immunity for other unlawful 
acts traffickers may have compelled victims to commit. Due to 
inadequate screening for indicators of potential trafficking among 
vulnerable populations, including children apprehended for gang-
related criminal activity, authorities may have penalized some victims.
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. NATFATIP, 
which included representatives from relevant government institutions 
and select NGOs, met monthly to coordinate implementation of the 
2018-2021 national action plan. With support from an international 
organization, the government drafted its first national policy to combat 
trafficking in persons 2018-2030, though the cabinet did not approve it 
during the reporting period. ONRTIP provided independent oversight 
of the government’s anti-trafficking efforts and published its second 
annual report on trafficking in persons in Jamaica in April 2020, but 
it reported insufficient access to data and information from relevant 
stakeholders in a timely manner. 
The government initially allocated 11 million Jamaican dollars 
($73,330) to the NATFATIP secretariat—a significant decrease from 
27 million Jamaican dollars ($180,000) allocated during the previous 
fiscal year—although this was later reduced to 7 million Jamaican 
dollars ($46,670) due to pandemic-related budget cuts. Ministries 
also funded anti-trafficking activities from their respective budgets. 
NATFATIP continued to maintain a database to collect information 
on traffickers and victims and worked with an NGO to improve this 
system; however, ONRTIP reported shortcomings in data entry and 
data sharing across ministries with this system. The government did 
not use information from the database to support development of 
its policy and programming. Centralized decision-making hindered 
interagency cooperation and individual ministries, departments, and 
agencies did not allocate sufficient resources to effectively combat 
trafficking. 
Pandemic-related restrictions limited the government’s ability to 
conduct in-person awareness-raising events, but officials utilized virtual 
platforms to hold numerous information sessions targeting children 
and young adults, community leaders, and front-line government 
personnel. The government also conducted awareness campaigns 
on the risks of trafficking for the public through radio, television, 
and print media. 
The Employment Agencies Regulation Act set guidelines for the 
licensing of employment agencies and prohibited charging some 
workers recruitment fees, but this only applied to participants in 
overseas programs in which host governments had prohibited such 
fees. Separate laws prohibited fraudulent recruitment practices 
such as contract switching; however, the government did not report 
enforcement efforts against fraudulent recruitment practices, unlawful 
recruitment fees, or unlicensed employment agencies during the year. 
Authorities reported difficulties in identifying and sanctioning illegally 
operating employment agencies, particularly those operating online. 
The labor ministry conducted pre-departure orientation sessions for 
migrant workers in the hotel and agricultural sectors in the United 
States and Canada; these sessions included information on types of 
human trafficking, identifying and avoiding potential risks, and who 
to contact for assistance. Pandemic-related travel restrictions limited 
the scope of overseas work programs, but the government continued 
to hold sessions for smaller groups. The government maintained 
liaison officers in the United States and Canada to protect the interests 
of overseas workers but did not report whether these officials made 
efforts to prevent trafficking. The government advised overseas workers 
to remain at their workplace, not accept visitors, and refrain from 
visiting relatives and friends as pandemic-mitigation measures, though, 
these practices may have increased some workers’ vulnerability to 
exploitation or limited their ability to access assistance. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of foreign tourists for the purchase of commercial sex acts 
from child trafficking victims. The government conducted awareness-
raising activities on the criminal penalties for purchasing commercial 
sex acts to deter potential buyers and held information sessions on 
human trafficking within the tourism sector with industry stakeholders. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Jamaica, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Jamaica abroad. Sex trafficking of Jamaican women and children, 
including boys, reportedly occurs on streets and in nightclubs, bars, 
massage parlors, hotels, and private homes, including in resort towns. 
Local observers believe sex trafficking operations have become more 
clandestine as a result of the pandemic. Traffickers increasingly 
use social media platforms and false job offers to recruit victims. 
Communities vulnerable to sex trafficking and forced labor include 
young women and children from poor households, child victims 
of sexual abuse, homeless LGBTQI+ youth, residents of Jamaica’s 
poverty-stricken areas effectively controlled by criminal “dons,” 
migrant workers, and workers in the informal sector, particularly on 
family farms and in markets and shops. Traffickers subject children 
and adults to forced begging and women and children to domestic 
servitude. Girls, sometimes coerced by family members, are subjected 
to sex trafficking by men who provide monetary or material payment 
to the girls or their families in exchange for sex acts; local observers 
report this form of child sex trafficking may be widespread in some 
communities. Children from rural Jamaica, and possibly from other 
Caribbean countries, who are sent to live with more affluent family 
members or acquaintances sometimes become exploited in forced 
labor in private households, markets, or shops. Gang members may 
exploit children in forced begging or in forced criminal activity, 
including as lookouts, armed gunmen, or couriers of weapons and 
drugs; there were reports that criminal organizations exploited children 
in forced criminal activity in lotto-scamming. Pandemic mitigation 
measures exacerbated existing trafficking risks and increased the 
number of individuals vulnerable to trafficking, particularly among 
children who were not able to leave their homes or attend school 
for much of the year and economically vulnerable households 
that relied on income from international tourism. Many children 
are reported missing in Jamaica; traffickers exploit some of these 
children in forced labor or sex trafficking. Traffickers have exploited 
Jamaican citizens in sex trafficking and forced labor abroad, including 
in other Caribbean countries, Canada, the United States, and the 
United Kingdom. Jamaican women have reported being charged high 
recruitment fees, being misled about their terms of employment, and 
compelled through threats to continue working in the United States’ 
hospitality industry. Traffickers exploit foreign nationals, including 
migrants from South and East Asia, in forced labor and sex trafficking 
in Jamaica. There have been reports of forced labor of foreign nationals 
aboard foreign-flagged fishing vessels operating in Jamaican waters. 
Among the approximately 450 Cuban medical professionals the 
government contracted, some may have been forced to work by the 
Cuban government. NGOs and other local observers report child sex 
tourism is a problem in Jamaica’s resort areas. Some police allegedly 
facilitated or participated in sex trafficking.
JAPAN: TIER 2
The Government of Japan does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts 
to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts 





of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Japan remained on Tier 2. These efforts included investigating, 
prosecuting, and convicting some traffickers; identifying some 
trafficking victims; and continuing to implement public awareness 
campaigns. However, the government did not meet the minimum 
standards in several key areas. Authorities continued to prosecute 
and convict traffickers under laws carrying lesser penalties and 
delivering suspended sentences in lieu of incarceration in nearly all 
cases, while some traffickers received only fines. These sentences for 
convicted traffickers were not sufficiently stringent to deter the crime. 
The failure to sentence the large majority of traffickers to terms of 
imprisonment significantly weakened deterrence, undercut efforts 
to hold traffickers accountable, and did not adequately address the 
nature of the crime. Government officials, including law enforcement, 
did not systematically address child sex trafficking crimes, allowing 
traffickers to operate with impunity. Foreign-based and domestic 
traffickers continued to abuse the government-operated Technical 
Intern Training Program (TITP) to exploit foreign workers. Despite 
persistent reports of forced labor among labor migrants working 
in Japan under its auspices, authorities again did not proactively 
identify a single trafficking case or victim in the TITP. Within TITP, 
the government’s memoranda of cooperation with sending countries 
have been ineffective in preventing foreign-based labor recruitment 
agencies from charging excessive fees, a key driver of debt-based 
coercion among TITP participants, and the government did not hold 
recruiters and employers accountable for abusive labor practices and 
forced labor crimes. Interagency stakeholders continued to rely on 
disparate, ineffective identification and referral procedures, which 
did not cover all forms of trafficking, thereby preventing authorities 
from properly screening vulnerable populations for trafficking and 
protecting victims of all forms of trafficking. Law enforcement 
bodies continued to identify hundreds of children exploited in 
the commercial sex industry without formally designating them 
as victims of trafficking in most cases, hindering their access to 
protection services and judicial recourse. In addition to insufficient 
victim identification practices, the government did not provide 
specific services dedicated to victims of all forms of trafficking. 
Continued lack of political will to address all forms of trafficking 
crimes and identify and protect trafficking victims, especially victims 
of forced labor and child and adult sex trafficking, contributed to 
the government’s overall lack of progress. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate and prosecute sex and labor trafficking cases, 
and hold convicted traffickers accountable by imposing strong 
sentences. • Amend anti-trafficking laws to remove sentencing 
provisions that allow fines in lieu of imprisonment and increase the 
penalties for trafficking crimes to include a maximum of no less than 
four years’ imprisonment. • Develop, systematize, and implement 
standard interagency procedures for the identification of, and referral 
to protective services for, victims of forced labor among migrant 
workers, including those in Japan under the auspices of the TITP 
and other visa-conferring statuses, and among those in immigration 
detention. • Enhance victim screening to ensure victims—including 
children exploited in commercial sex without third party facilitation, 
migrant workers under the TITP, and migrant workers entering Japan 
under the new regimes, including the Specified Skilled Worker Visa—
are properly identified and referred to services, and not detained or 
forcibly deported for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to 
commit. • Increase efforts to identify male victims of sex trafficking 
and forced labor. • Increase resources to provide specialized care 
and assistance to trafficking victims, including designated shelters 
for trafficking victims, and ensure these services are also available 
to both foreign and male victims. • Increase implementation of the 
TITP reform law’s oversight and enforcement measures, including by 
training Organization for Technical Intern Training (OTIT) personnel 
and immigration officials on victim identification, improving OTIT 
coordination with NGOs, reviewing all contracts prior to approval of 
TITP work plans, increasing employer inspections, and terminating 
contracts with foreign recruitment agencies charging excessive 
worker-paid commissions or fees. • Establish formal channels 
allowing all foreign workers to change employment and industries 
if desired. • Enact legislation banning employers from retaining all 
foreign workers’ passports or other personal documents. • Reduce 
migrant workers’ vulnerability to debt-based coercion by amending 
relevant policies to eliminate the imposition of all worker-paid 
recruitment and service fees. • Increase enforcement of bans on 
“punishment” agreements, passport withholding, and other practices 
by organizations and employers that contribute to forced labor. • 
Aggressively investigate, prosecute, convict, and punish Japanese 
citizens who engage in child sex tourism overseas.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained inadequate law enforcement efforts. 
Japan did not have a comprehensive anti-trafficking statute that 
included definitions in line with international law. It criminalized sex 
trafficking and labor trafficking offenses through disparate penal code 
laws pertaining to prostitution of adults and children, child welfare, 
immigration, and employment standards. Article 7 of the Prostitution 
Prevention Law criminalized inducing others into prostitution and 
prescribed penalties of up to three years’ imprisonment or a fine of 
up to 100,000 Japanese yen ($970) if fraudulent or coercive means 
were used, and up to three years’ imprisonment and a fine of up to 
100,000 yen ($970) if force or threats were used. Article 8 of the same 
law increased penalties to up to five years’ imprisonment and a fine 
of up to 200,000 yen ($1,940) if the defendant received, entered 
into a contract to receive, or demanded compensation for crimes 
committed under Article 7. The “Act on Regulation and Punishment 
of Activities Relating to Child Prostitution and Pornography and 
the Protection of Children” criminalized engaging in, acting as an 
intermediary for, and soliciting the commercial sexual exploitation 
of a child and prescribed penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment, 
a fine, or both. The act also criminalized the purchase or sale of 
children for the purpose of exploiting them through prostitution or 
the production of child pornography, and it prescribed a maximum 
penalty of 10 years’ imprisonment. The government also prosecuted 
trafficking-related offenses using the Child Welfare Act, which 
broadly criminalized transporting or harboring children for the 
purpose of causing them to commit an obscene or harmful act and 
prescribed penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment, or a fine of up 
to 3 million yen ($29,100), or both. The Employment Security Act 
(ESA) and the Labor Standards Act (LSA) both criminalized forced 
labor and prescribed penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment or a 
fine not exceeding 3 million yen ($29,100). However, the Ministry of 
Health, Labor and Welfare (MHLW) reported the definition of “forced 
labor” under the LSA was narrower than the definition of human 
trafficking under international law and—in practice—rare cases 
charged as “forced labor” under the LSA were not treated as human 
trafficking crimes. Inconsistent with the definition of trafficking 
under international law, the LSA did not include exploitation as an 
essential element of the crime. As in the previous reporting period, 
many prosecutors reportedly avoided using the ESA and LSA due 
to a perception that the relatively high penalties were more likely 
to trigger appellate processes that would decrease their overall 
conviction rates and negatively affect their professional standing. 
When penalties allowed for fines in lieu of imprisonment for sex 
trafficking, they were not commensurate with penalties prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as rape. Civil society organizations 
reported that reliance on these overlapping statutes continued to 
hinder the government’s ability to identify and prosecute trafficking 
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crimes, especially for cases involving forced labor with elements of 
psychological coercion. The government did not have any laws that 
prohibited employers, recruiters, or labor agents from confiscating 
either Japanese or foreign workers’ passports, travel, or other identity 
documents, except for TITP participants, for whom passport or 
residential identification confiscation was prohibited. However, the 
government did not report if it enforced this law or penalized any 
employers or agencies for withholding TITP participants’ documents 
during the reporting period. Japanese law—enacted in 2017—
contained a provision that criminalized bribery of witnesses, which 
would allow authorities additional grounds to pursue obstruction 
of justice charges against some traffickers. However, for the third 
consecutive year, the government did not report to what extent it 
implemented this for trafficking cases. 
From January 2020 to December 2020, the government investigated 
40 cases of sex trafficking involving 48 suspected perpetrators and 15 
cases of labor trafficking involving 10 suspected perpetrators; of the 
58 total suspects, the police arrested 57 and referred the remaining 
suspect—a child—to a prosecutor to be handled in family court. 
This compared with the government’s investigation and arrest of 
39 suspected perpetrators of trafficking in 2019. In 2020, courts 
initiated the prosecution of a total of 50 alleged traffickers, 42 for 
sex trafficking and eight for labor trafficking. Of the 50 perpetrators, 
15 were pending trial at the end of the reporting period, and two 
were sent to family court. The government convicted 50 perpetrators 
during the reporting period, including cases that were initiated in 
previous reporting periods. Out of the 50 convicted, courts sentenced 
36 traffickers to prison terms of eight months’ to 13 years’; however, 
courts fully suspended 26 of these sentences, resulting in the traffickers 
serving no prison time. Ten traffickers received a sentence to serve 
imprisonment; courts sentenced 14 of the 50 traffickers to financial 
penalties only, with fines ranging from 50,000 yen ($485) to 800,000 
yen ($7,760). The 50 perpetrators were convicted under a range of laws 
pertaining to the prostitution of adults and children, child welfare, 
immigration, and employment standards, including—but not limited 
to—the Child Welfare Act and the Act on Regulation and Punishment 
of Acts Relating to Child Prostitution and Child Pornography and the 
Protection of Children. In comparison, in 2019, courts prosecuted 
32 alleged traffickers and secured 22 convictions under various laws, 
with only three of those convicted serving prison time that ranged 
from 10 months’ to two and a half years’. The government did not 
report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government 
employees complicit in human trafficking crimes. 
Despite the known prevalence of forced labor indicators within 
the TITP program, the government did not investigate, prosecute, 
or convict any individuals for involvement in the forced labor of 
TITP participants; the government’s reluctance to identify suspected 
traffickers within this program allowed exploitative employers 
to operate with impunity. The Labour Standard Bureau within 
MHLW provisionally reported conducting 8,124 inspections of TITP 
workplaces in 2020 (9,454 inspections in 2019) and investigating 
5,766 employers of TITP participants for violations of labor standards 
laws and regulations. As a result, the Labour Standard Bureau referred 
36 cases to prosecutors for investigation in 2020, compared with 
33 referred for investigation in 2019. However, the government did 
not report whether any of the referrals were for labor trafficking 
crimes. Service provision NGOs reported repeated attempts to draw 
attention to specific allegations of forced labor occurring within 
TITP worksites, but the government did not proactively investigate 
the majority of these allegations for potential trafficking crimes 
and did not identify any cases of forced labor within the program. 
The government reported it revoked TITP plans from an unknown 
number of implementing organizations as an administrative penalty 
for allegations of abuse or assault against TITP participants; the 
government, however, did not initiate criminal investigations of these 
incidences of alleged trafficking. Despite Japanese law prohibiting the 
confiscation of passports and travel documents of TITP participants, 
the government did not initiate any investigations of employers that 
allegedly violated this law. NGOs reported courts set prohibitively 
high evidentiary standards for forced labor cases involving foreign 
victims, including overreliance on physical indicators of abuse in 
lieu of evidence supporting psychological coercion, thereby stymying 
appropriate law enforcement action. 
The government reported it did not investigate or prosecute cases 
involving child commercial sexual exploitation under trafficking 
statutes because, in practice, authorities did not formally identify 
children in commercial sexual exploitation as sex trafficking 
victims unless a third-party facilitated the commercial sex acts. The 
government reported more than 600 instances of “child prostitution” 
involving more than 500 perpetrators, but the government did not 
investigate these cases for potential trafficking crimes—including 
whether or not they involved a third-party facilitator—and it failed to 
identify the vast majority of the 379 children involved in these cases 
as trafficking victims. In previous years, authorities also processed 
hundreds of such cases involving children in commercial sexual 
exploitation without formally identifying them as trafficking crimes 
(784 cases in 2019; more than 700 cases in 2018; 956 cases in 2017). 
Experts noted the lack of efforts by law enforcement to treat child 
sex trafficking cases appropriately was permissive of and perpetuated 
the continued commission of the crime; it continued to minimize 
the prevalence of the crime; and it resulted in weak—if any—efforts 
to hold traffickers accountable and protect victims. 
For the third consecutive year, the government did not report law 
enforcement action taken against child sex trafficking in Joshi kosei or 
“JK” businesses—dating services connecting adult men with underage 
high school girls—and in coerced pornography operations. Eight 
major prefectures maintained ordinances banning “JK” businesses, 
prohibiting girls younger than 18 from working in “compensated 
dating services,” or requiring “JK” business owners to register their 
employee rosters with local public safety commissions. Like the 
previous reporting period, authorities did not report how many such 
operations they identified or shuttered for violating the terms of the 
ordinances (unreported in 2019; 137 identified and none closed in 
2018), nor did they report arresting any individuals alleged to have 
been engaged in criminal activities surrounding the “JK” business 
(unreported in 2019; 69 arrested in 2018). Some authorities were 
reportedly unaware of the crime or unsure how to prosecute it, often 
citing prohibitively high evidentiary standards. 
In April 2020, the National Police Agency (NPA) issued a circular 
to prefectural police nationwide which directed them to identify 
trafficking cases and coordinate with other relevant agencies; however, 
the circular did not provide additional guidance or procedures that 
would assist police in identifying such cases. During the reporting 
period, the government provided anti-trafficking trainings to various 
ministries, including OTIT and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA); 
the government postponed or canceled some trainings, including 
those conducted by an international organization. Contacts continued 
to report an acute need for additional training to address the lack 
of awareness among key law enforcement officials and judicial 
stakeholders. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained insufficient efforts to protect victims, 
including by consistently failing to formally identify victims of 
trafficking within the TITP and among children in commercial sexual 
exploitation. Lack of standardized guidelines, poor coordination 
among ministries, and misunderstanding of sex and labor trafficking 
crimes among all relevant agencies contributed to the government’s 
inadequate efforts to identify and protect victims. The government 
did not have nationwide standard operating procedures or guidelines 
for officials to identify victims, even for victims that reported a crime 
themselves, which thereby impeded their access to care. Interagency 
stakeholders followed disparate, insufficient victim identification 
procedures, which did not incorporate all forms of trafficking, 





Several ministries continued to operate hotlines that could identify 
potential trafficking cases, including MHLW, the immigration bureau, 
and NPA, but none of these hotlines identified any victims during 
the reporting period. Due to the limited scope of laws prohibiting 
commercial sex, widespread victimization of children and adults took 
place within a legalized but largely unregulated range of “delivery 
health service” commercial sex acts in urban entertainment centers.
In 2020, authorities identified 25 sex trafficking victims and 13 labor 
trafficking victims; this included seven Filipina victims who were 
forced to work as “hostesses” at bars and whom the government 
identified as victims of labor trafficking. This represented a decrease 
compared with 47 total trafficking victims identified in 2019, which 
included 12 women and girls forced to work as “hostesses.” The 
government has never identified a forced labor victim within 
the TITP since its inception in 2017 nor during the tenure of its 
predecessor organization founded in 1993, despite substantial 
evidence of trafficking indicators. The government reported 8,000 
TITP participants disappeared from their jobs in 2020, some of 
whom likely fled because of exploitative or abusive conditions and 
were likely unidentified trafficking victims. Authorities continued to 
arrest and deport TITP participants who escaped forced labor and 
other abusive conditions in their contracted agencies; some labor 
contracts featured illegal automatic repatriation clauses for interns 
who became pregnant or contracted illnesses while working in Japan. 
During the reporting period, some TITP participants lost their jobs 
because of pandemic-related business closures, which caused them to 
find a new employer to pay off their outstanding debts to the sending 
organization; however, authorities arrested some TITIP participants 
for illegally changing jobs without screening them for trafficking. 
Although the law ostensibly protected victims from deportation 
from Japan, authorities’ inadequate screening of vulnerable groups 
led to the arrest and detention of some victims due to immigration 
violations or other unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to 
commit. The government did not report national statistics on forcible 
TITP deportations in 2020, and—like in the previous year—it did 
not provide data on the number of screening interviews immigration 
authorities conducted of TITP participants departing Japan prior to the 
end of their contracts nor on the number of successful interventions 
in unjust employer-initiated deportations. Furthermore, civil society 
groups noted the government did not have a procedure for screening 
foreign nationals—including TITP participants—in immigration 
detention for possible trafficking indicators. 
Contrary to definitional standards under the 2000 UN TIP Protocol, 
authorities did not identify children as victims of sex trafficking unless 
a third party mediated the commercial sex acts, preventing hundreds 
of children from formal designation. The government also reported it 
did not treat cases of children in commercial sex as child sex trafficking 
cases because—contrary to definitional standards under the 2000 
UN TIP Protocol—it required the perpetrator to exercise “control 
over the victim.” Some provincial law enforcement officials noted 
in the previous reporting period that Japan’s unusually low age of 
consent, 13, further complicated efforts to formally identify children 
exploited in commercial sex as trafficking victims. The government 
identified only 18 trafficking victims among the 379 children involved 
in the more than 600 cases of “child prostitution”—a form of sex 
trafficking—reported by the police in 2020. The government reported 
approximately 200 incidents of male victims of child pornography and 
“child prostitution” yet failed to identify any male child sex trafficking 
victims. Therefore, the government did not provide essential victim 
protection services to any of the children involved in the hundreds of 
incidents of child sexual and commercial sexual exploitation during 
the reporting period, nor did it refer them to NGOs for assistance. 
Police continued to treat some potential child sex trafficking victims, 
including LGBTQI+ children, as delinquents and counseled them on 
their behavior instead of screening them for trafficking, investigating 
their cases, or referring them to specialized services. 
The government allocated more than 3.5 million yen (approximately 
$33,950) for sheltering trafficking victims in fiscal year 2020, the 
same amount allocated in fiscal year 2019. Despite this funding—as 
in prior years—the government failed to provide adequate protection 
services, such as trafficking-specific shelters, psycho-social care, 
and legal aid, to trafficking victims including Japanese and foreign 
trafficking victims. Government-run protection options focused on 
victims of other crimes, and relevant staff were not equipped to 
provide the specific services required to accommodate victims of all 
forms of trafficking. The availability and quality of government-run 
services that could be provided to victims varied widely according 
to prefecture-level officials’ ad-hoc experience with trafficking cases. 
The government continued to operate “one-stop assistance centers” 
in each prefecture for victims of sexual abuse, including some 
forms of sex trafficking, but the government did not report if any 
trafficking victims received services at these centers during the 
reporting period. The government also continued to fund Women’s 
Consultation Offices (WCOs) and Child Guidance Centers, both of 
which could provide shelter for trafficking victims alongside victims of 
domestic violence and other crimes. WCO shelters provided food and 
other basic needs—including COVID-19 preventive face masks and 
disinfectant—psychological care, and coverage of medical expenses 
to victims, who were free to leave the facilities if accompanied by 
WCO personnel. However, some NGOs continued to allege the 
physical conditions and services in these facilities were poor, overly 
restrictive, and insufficient to provide the specialized care required 
for trafficking victims. Authorities reported eight trafficking victims 
received assistance in WCO shelters in 2020, a gradual decrease from 
11 in 2019 and 16 in 2018. The government reported 18 victims 
“self-identified” to authorities during the reporting period, but it 
did not report providing or referring these victims to protection 
services. Civil service providers reported that if a trafficking victim 
sought assistance from a provider, it could not assist a victim until the 
government formally identified the victim as such, which significantly 
delayed essential services given to victims. In addition, international 
organizations and NGOs reported most foreign trafficking victims 
had limited or no access to other government-provided social services 
from which legal resident victims could benefit. For example, while 
Immigration Services Agency granted resident status to one foreign 
trafficking victim and “special permission to remain in Japan” to 
seven foreign victims in 2020, it did not report if it provided or 
referred these victims to essential care. The government relied on 
and expected foreign embassies to provide protection services to 
their nationals who were exploited in Japan. NGOs also highlighted 
a lack of government-provided language interpretation services as a 
particular challenge to the protection of foreign victims. Temporary, 
long-term, and permanent residence benefits were available to foreign 
victims who feared the repercussions of returning to their countries of 
origin, but the government did not report how many—if any—victims 
received these benefits during the reporting period. The government 
continued to fund a program through an international organization 
to provide counseling, temporary refuge, social reintegration, and 
repatriation services to trafficking victims; the government’s budget 
for this program was 11,000,000 yen ($106,715), a decrease from 
15,000,000 yen ($145,520) in the previous reporting period. Through 
this program, five foreign victims received repatriation assistance (14 
in 2019; five in 2018; seven in 2017). 
Victims had the right to file civil suits to seek compensation from their 
traffickers, but the government did not report cases in which victims 
did so during the reporting period. Moreover, the owners of abusive 
supervising organizations and subsidiary businesses employing TITP 
participants frequently filed for bankruptcy or falsified administrative 
changes in order to shield themselves from civil or criminal liability, 
enabling forced labor to continue throughout the program with 
impunity. Some employers pressured TITP participants to leave 
their labor unions to reduce their chances of seeking recompense 
for labor abuses committed against them. Receipt of compensation 
awards was therefore nearly impossible in practice. For the third 
consecutive year, authorities did not report any instances of court-
ordered restitution for victims during the reporting period. In previous 
years, civil society organizations reported some victims of coerced 
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pornography chose not to participate in court proceedings against 
their traffickers due to fear that doing so would create stigma-based 
challenges to their reintegration.
PREVENTION
The government maintained insufficient efforts to prevent trafficking, 
including by continuing to demonstrate a lack of political will 
to adequately do so among highly vulnerable migrant worker 
populations. Although the government maintained a national-level 
interagency coordinating body, the lack of centralized leadership 
contributed to ineffective coordination among relevant ministries 
to combat trafficking. The government continued to base its anti-
trafficking efforts on an outdated 2014 national anti-trafficking action 
plan (NAP). In accordance with the NAP, the government met twice 
in 2020 with civil society organizations to review the government’s 
measures to combat trafficking, but it did not report if any tangible 
results came from these meetings. It produced its sixth annual report 
on government actions to combat trafficking and tracked measures 
against the stated goals of its 2014 NAP. Authorities continued to 
raise awareness on trafficking by disseminating information online—
including on the NPA’s public website—and through radio programs, 
posters, and brochures, as well as through leaflets distributed to 
NGOs, immigration and labor offices, and diplomatic missions in 
Japan and abroad. In response to an increase in Vietnamese workers 
in Japan, during the reporting period, NPA included information 
in Vietnamese in its anti-trafficking leaflets. NPA also produced 
an online anti-trafficking presentation for the airline industry that 
aired in December 2020. The NPA—in cooperation with a foreign 
government and international organizations—distributed posters 
in airports to raise awareness about sexual exploitation, including 
commercial sexual exploitation of children and the production of 
child pornography. The government did not make significant efforts to 
reduce the demand for commercial sex acts, and many of its awareness-
raising content on the “JK” business was targeted toward victims, 
rather than the demand source. The government had extraterritorial 
jurisdiction to prosecute Japanese nationals who engaged in child 
sexual exploitation abroad, but—unlike in the previous reporting 
period—it did not report investigating or prosecuting any cases of 
child sex tourism under this jurisdiction in 2020. 
The government continued to implement the 2016 Act on Proper 
Technical Intern Training and Protection of Technical Intern Trainees 
(TITP reform law). The TITP reform law mandated the MHLW approve 
work plans outlining living conditions, working hours, and other 
factors developed jointly by incoming TITP participants and their 
employers; from November 2020 through mid-January 2021, the 
government allowed the entry of 55,754 TITP participants. However, 
authorities did not fully implement oversight procedures to ensure 
unity among sending and receiving organizations’ contracts nor among 
these contracts and the participants’ work plans, resulting in discrepant 
language that left many participants vulnerable to labor abuses, 
including forced labor. According to the government’s provisional 
data, in 2020, OTIT reported conducting on-site inspections of 15,318 
TITP implementing organizations and 2,983 supervising organizations. 
Authorities did not report revoking any MHLW-approved work plans 
for labor violations in 2019, compared with eight revocations in 2018; 
some observers expressed these work plans lacked enforceability due 
to the high number of TITP employers and participants relative to 
the small number of inspectors. In February 2021, MHLW issued 
instructions to each regional labor standards inspection office to report 
potential trafficking cases to MHLW for further review; as of the end 
of the reporting period, it did not report if any offices reported such 
cases. Civil society groups continued to express concern the OTIT 
was too understaffed to adequately investigate allegations of abuse, 
including forced labor, within such a large program—particularly 
as the number of participants continued to grow. Some participants 
reported the OTIT and the MHLW were unresponsive to their request 
for mediation when their employers suddenly changed or terminated 
their contracts. Immigration officials issued orientation pamphlets with 
hotlines and contact information to all incoming TITP participants. 
The government maintained memoranda of cooperation (MOC) 
pertaining to the TITP with Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, Cambodia, 
India, Indonesia, Laos, Mongolia, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam as sending countries of TITP 
participants. MOCs remained the Japanese government’s primary 
tool to regulate recruitment practices, but they remained largely 
ineffective because the government failed to hold the governments 
of the sending countries accountable for abusive labor practices and 
forced labor crimes by recruiters and sending organizations. The MOCs 
affirmed the government would accept TITP trainees only from state-
approved organizations that would not charge participants “excessive 
fees” known to place workers in high debt. However, some sending 
organizations in these countries circumvented the fee restrictions 
and secured their respective governments’ approval by charging 
high “commissions” in lieu of fees; trainees from these countries 
therefore remained at risk for debt bondage once in Japan. This 
was especially true for Vietnamese participants, who constituted the 
highest proportion of TITP trainees. Some Japanese TITP employers 
forced participants to remit portions of their salaries into mandatory 
savings accounts as a means to prevent their abscondment and retain 
their labor. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ), MOFA, and MHLW could 
request that sending countries investigate allegations of recruitment fee 
violations, but the decision to penalize or ban sending organizations 
for the practice was at the discretion of sending country authorities. 
MOJ, MOFA, and MHLW reported to sending countries misconduct 
by 79 sending organizations for investigation during the reporting 
period. 
The government continued to implement its “Special Skilled Worker” 
visa program—established in 2018—that allowed 15,663 foreign 
workers to enter Japan in 2020 and fill positions in construction, 
shipbuilding, nursing care, and 10 other sectors with known labor 
shortages over a five-year period. Although there were no reported 
cases of forced labor within this system in 2020, observers continued 
to express concern that it would engender the same vulnerabilities 
to labor abuses, including forced labor, as those inherent to the TITP 
and that the government’s oversight measures were similarly lacking. 
The program reportedly permitted qualifying individuals already 
participating in the TITP to switch their visas to the newly created 
categories, allowing them to extend their stay in Japan and change 
jobs within the same sector. Japanese law also enabled for-profit 
employment agencies and individuals to become “registered support 
organizations”—with no licensing requirements—to liaise between 
labor recruitment brokerages and employers for a fee. Observers 
reported these service fees could create additional risks for debt-based 
coercion among migrant workers entering under the auspices of the 
regime. Under this program, the government maintained MOCs with 
13 governments that provided a framework for information-sharing 
to eliminate malicious brokers and recruitment agencies. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers subject Japanese 
and foreign men and women to forced labor and sex trafficking, 
and they subject Japanese children to sex trafficking. Traffickers 
also transport victims from elsewhere in the region through Japan 
before exploiting them in onward destinations, including East Asia 
and North America. Traffickers subject male and female migrant 
workers, mainly from Asia, to conditions of forced labor, including 
at companies participating in Japanese government-run programs, 
such as TITP. The government identified five Japanese male victims in 
2020. In one of the instances, traffickers forced a male victim to work 
at a restaurant at a low wage for long hours after physically assaulting 
the victim on a daily basis. Japan’s fast-growing foreign student 
population is also at risk for trafficking in the unskilled labor sector 
due to abusive and often deceptive work-study contract provisions. 
Men, women, and children from Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South 
Asia, Latin America, and Africa travel to Japan for employment or 
fraudulent marriage and are subjected to sex trafficking. Traffickers 
use fraudulent marriages between foreign women and Japanese men 





clubs, brothels, and massage parlors. Traffickers keep victims in forced 
labor or forced commercial sex using debt-based coercion, threats of 
violence or deportation, blackmail, confiscation of passports and other 
documents, and other psychologically coercive methods. Employers 
require many migrant workers to pay fees for living expenses, medical 
care, and other necessities, leaving them vulnerable to debt-based 
coercion. Brothel operators sometimes arbitrarily impose “fines” on 
victims for alleged misbehavior, thereby extending their indebtedness 
as a coercive measure.
Traffickers also subject Japanese citizens and foreign nationals—
particularly runaway teenage girls and boys—to sex trafficking. 
Enjo kosai or “compensated dating” services and variants of the “JK” 
business, often with ties to organized crime, continue to facilitate 
the sex trafficking of Japanese boys and girls; underage youth from 
China, South Korea, Laos, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam 
are also reportedly exploited in these establishments. The pandemic 
caused a surge in unemployment and domestic violence, which 
increased the risk of some Japanese women and girls—especially 
runaway children—to enter into “compensated dating;” NGOs 
reported that traffickers increasingly use social media sites to contact 
women and girls for this purpose. “JK” bar owners may subject some 
underage boys and girls, including LGBTQI+ youth, to forced labor 
as hostesses and club promoters. Highly organized commercial sex 
networks target vulnerable Japanese women and girls—in many 
instances those living in poverty or with cognitive disabilities—in 
public spaces such as subways, popular youth hangouts, schools, 
and online, and subject them to sex trafficking in commercial sex 
establishments, small musical performance venues, retail spaces, 
and reflexology centers, often through debt-based coercion. Some 
groups posing as model and actor placement agencies use fraudulent 
recruitment techniques to coerce Japanese men, women, boys, and 
girls into signing vague contracts and then threaten them with legal 
action or the release of compromising photographs to force them 
to participate in pornographic films. Some transgender youth seek 
employment in unregulated urban entertainment districts as a 
means of financing their gender-affirming care and are subsequently 
exploited in commercial sex and possibly forced labor. Private 
Japanese immigration brokers help Japanese-Filipino children and 
their Filipina mothers move to Japan and acquire citizenship for a 
significant fee, which the mothers often incur large debts to pay; 
upon arrival, some of these women and their children are subjected 
to sex trafficking to pay off the debts. Organized crime syndicates 
posing as immigration brokers also lure these families to Japan with 
deceptive job offers, and then subject the women to forced labor 
and sex trafficking in the nightlife industry. Japanese men remain a 
source of demand for child sex tourism in other countries in Asia.
Cases of forced labor continue within the TITP, a government-run 
program originally designed to foster basic technical skills among 
foreign workers that has effectively become a guest-worker program. 
TITP participants from Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, Cambodia, China, 
India, Indonesia, Laos, Mongolia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam pay sending organizations 
in their home countries thousands of dollars in excessive worker-
paid fees, deposits, or vague “commissions”—despite bilateral 
agreements between sending countries and Japan aimed at curbing 
the practice—to secure jobs in fishing, food processing, shellfish 
cultivation, ship building, construction, textile production, and 
manufacturing of electronic components, automobiles, and other 
large machinery. TITP employers place many participants in jobs that 
do not teach or develop technical skills, contrary to the program’s 
stated intent; others place participants in jobs that do not match the 
duties they agreed upon beforehand. Some of these workers experience 
restricted freedom of movement and communication, confiscation 
of passports and other personal and legal documentation, threats of 
deportation or harm to their families, physical violence, poor living 
conditions, wage garnishing, and other conditions indicative of 
forced labor. Some sending organizations require participants to sign 
“punishment agreements” charging thousands of dollars in penalties 
if they fail to comply with their labor contracts. Participants who 
leave their contracted TITP jobs fall out of immigration status, after 
which some are reportedly subjected to sex trafficking and forced 
labor. Some foreign workers within the Specified Skilled Worker 
visa program—including former TITP participants—may be at risk 
for trafficking. An NGO noted more than 90 percent of the migrant 
workers in Japan under the auspices of this visa regime were former 
TITP interns in vulnerable sectors prior to 2019.
JORDAN: TIER 2
The Government of Jordan does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking 
capacity; therefore Jordan was upgraded to Tier 2. These efforts 
included referring more domestic servitude cases for prosecution, 
establishing case management procedures to improve coordination 
between investigators and prosecutors, and identifying more victims. 
Parliament approved amendments to the 2009 anti-trafficking law 
and the government also maintained a trafficking shelter that offered 
a wide range of comprehensive services. The government launched a 
campaign to remove vulnerable children, including forced begging 
victims, from the streets of Amman. However, the government did not 
meet the minimum standards in several key areas. The government 
shelter received fewer referrals of victims; NGOs reported issues 
referring victims to the shelter during the height of pandemic-related 
lockdowns, when all movement and public facilities were restricted. 
Authorities continued to arrest, detain, and deport some victims 
for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit, such as 
immigration violations and fleeing abusive employers. Jordan’s 
sponsorship system, which placed a significant amount of power 
in the hands of employers of foreign workers, continued to create 
vulnerabilities for the exploitation of migrant workers and remained 
a significant impediment to authorities identifying and protecting 
trafficking victims.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase efforts to prosecute, convict, and punish sex trafficking 
and forced labor offenses with significant prison terms. • Increase 
efforts to proactively screen for and identify trafficking victims 
among vulnerable populations, such as detained foreign migrants, 
domestic workers, workers in the agricultural sector, refugees, street 
children, and persons in commercial sex. • Ensure victims are not 
inappropriately punished for unlawful acts traffickers compelled 
them to commit, such as immigration or prostitution violations or 
escaping from an abusive employer. • Fully approve and implement 
all provisions of the new anti-trafficking law to ensure penalties for 
sex trafficking crimes are commensurate with those prescribed for 
other serious crimes. • Train law enforcement officers, judges, prison 
officials, and labor inspectors throughout the country to screen 
for, identify, and refer to protection services trafficking victims. • 
Investigate and punish individuals for withholding workers’ passports 
under Jordan’s passport law. • Cooperate regularly with NGOs to 
identify and refer victims to protection services. • Allocate adequate 
funding for operation of the government’s trafficking shelter, and 




• Issue and fully implement labor regulations governing work in the 
agricultural sector and increase labor inspections in this sector. • 
Reform the sponsorship system by extending labor law protections to 
all workers in Jordan, including domestic workers, and allow workers 
to freely change employers. • Regulate and investigate fraudulent 
labor and recruitment practices.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained weak law enforcement efforts but made 
efforts to address structural issues in its law enforcement response to 
trafficking. The 2009 Law on the Prevention of Trafficking in Human 
Beings criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking. The law 
prescribed penalties of a minimum of six months’ imprisonment, 
a fine of 1,000 to 5,000 dinars ($1,410 to $7,060), or both, for 
trafficking offenses involving an adult victim. These penalties were 
sufficiently stringent. However, by allowing for a fine in lieu of 
imprisonment, the penalties prescribed for sex trafficking were 
not commensurate with the penalties prescribed for other serious 
crimes, such as kidnapping. The law prescribed penalties of up to 10 
years’ imprisonment and a fine of 5,000 to 20,000 dinars ($7,060 
to $28,250) for trafficking offenses involving a child victim. These 
penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, 
commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as 
kidnapping. Jordan’s passport law criminalized the withholding of 
passports by an employer, carrying penalties of six months’ to three 
years’ imprisonment and fines. In March 2021, Parliament approved 
amendments to the 2009 anti-trafficking law submitted in 2019; at 
the end of the reporting period, the amendments were pending the 
King’s signature and publication in the official gazette. The pending 
amendments would enhance sentences for trafficking offenses, allow 
prosecutors to seek restitution in trafficking cases, formalize the use 
of specialized prosecutors and judges, and establish a donations-
based victims’ compensation fund.
The Public Security Directorate (PSD) and Ministry of Labor (MOL) 
joint counter-trafficking unit (CTU)—the national focal point leading 
anti-trafficking investigations—continued to investigate potential 
trafficking crimes. In 2020, the CTU reported authorities investigated 
206 potential trafficking cases, similar to 205 investigations of 
potential trafficking crimes in 2019. Of the 206 potential cases, 
CTU determined 22 cases involving 36 suspects met the criteria to 
be classified as trafficking cases and referred these to prosecutors. 
These 22 cases included 20 suspected domestic servitude cases 
and two sex trafficking cases. In addition, CTU identified an organ 
trafficking case involving four suspects and referred it to prosecutors. 
The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) reported it initiated the prosecution 
of 13 trafficking cases involving 22 defendants; the other 10 cases 
investigated by CTU and referred for prosecution remained pending 
charges and under investigation by the office of the public prosecutor 
at the end of the reporting period. In addition, the MOJ prosecuted 
and convicted an unreported number of defendants for trafficking 
crimes under other laws such as passport withholding. The MOJ 
reported six trafficking judgements were completed in 2020, with 
a 100 percent conviction rate, resulting in 12 traffickers convicted 
under the 2009 anti-trafficking law. Of the 12 convictions, eight 
traffickers received sentences greater than one-years’ imprisonment. 
Penalties ranged from three months’ to five years’ imprisonment; 
three convicted traffickers also received fines. The 22 prosecutions 
initiated demonstrate a slight increase from 18 prosecutions in 2019. 
The 12 convictions in 2020 was similar to 11 convictions secured 
in 2019. Legal experts continued to report that judges were hesitant 
to convict perpetrators for human trafficking, preferring to pursue 
other charges such as labor violations that carried lesser penalties 
than the anti-trafficking law due to the complexity of trafficking 
cases, lack of judicial experience and expertise on trafficking, and 
the cultural acceptance of some forms of trafficking such as forced 
labor in domestic work. NGOs and foreign embassy representatives 
continued to report the government preferred to settle potential cases 
of domestic servitude through mediation, rather than referring them 
for criminal prosecution; however, CTU officers reported mediation 
was only used in administrative labor violations, not when indicators 
of trafficking violations were present. The government did not report 
any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government 
officials complicit in trafficking offenses during the reporting period.
Jordan’s overcrowded and underfunded judicial system continued 
to lack a sufficient number of trained judges and prosecutors who 
could specialize in trafficking cases. However, beginning in 2018, 
the MOJ began assigning specialized prosecutors and judges to 
criminal cases, including trafficking; pending amendments to the 
2009 anti-trafficking law would require the Judicial Council to 
name specialized prosecutors and judges to every court to handle 
trafficking cases. Officials reported poor communication between 
CTU investigators and prosecutors contributed to weak prosecution 
of trafficking cases; in September 2020, the CTU implemented a 
new case management procedure to allow CTU investigators to 
follow trafficking investigations through prosecution to improve the 
classification of trafficking cases. The government rotated specialized 
investigators out of the CTU into other assignments every two 
years or less, which hindered the work of the unit. In 2020, the 
CTU reported conducting 10 training workshops for officials, in 
coordination with NGOs and international organizations; due 
to the pandemic, the government had to postpone 11 planned 
workshops. In addition, the CTU conducted 31 lectures and six 
seminars targeting law enforcement, judges, public prosecutors, 
and relevant ministries in different areas of Jordan on identifying 
trafficking victims, victim protection issues, and other topics; CTU 
officials reported 560 officials attended these lectures. The MOL 
partnered with civil society organizations to strengthen the capacity 
of labor inspectors to identify labor trafficking cases. 
PROTECTION
The government identified more trafficking victims but provided 
services to fewer trafficking victims, and authorities continued to 
punish victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to 
commit. In 2020, the government identified 25 trafficking victims, 
which represented an increase from the nine identified victims in 
2019. The government continued to utilize formal written procedures 
to proactively identify trafficking victims, and it continued to receive 
referrals of potential victims from NGOs, international organizations, 
and police stations across the country. Although the CTU was 
headquartered in Amman, it used specialized liaison officers in 
police stations across the country to identify trafficking victims outside 
of the capital. During the reporting period, the CTU established 
additional liaison officers in Syrian refugee camps. In October 
2020, the Ministry of Social Development’s (MOSD) anti-vagrancy 
department launched a campaign to remove vulnerable children, 
including forced begging victims, from the streets of Amman. Joint 
patrols by teams of MOSD social workers, PSD investigators, and 
female police officers screened children for trafficking indicators and 
referred potential trafficking victims to MOSD juvenile assistance 
centers to receive medical assistance and social services including 
family reintegration efforts.
The government continued to utilize a national victim referral 
mechanism (NRM) to refer identified victims to care, including 
shelters run by an NGO and MOSD, and cases to the CTU for 
investigation. Labor inspectors, regular police officers outside of the 
CTU, and detention center officials lacked the specialized training 
to proactively identify and refer victims to protection services; the 
government reviewed, updated, and trained relevant ministry officials 
on the updated NRM standard operating procedures during the 
reporting period. MOSD continued to operate and fund the Dar 
Karama shelter dedicated to protecting trafficking victims, which 
provided psycho-social care, medical treatment, legal assistance, 
vocational training, and specialized services for children. It also 
continued to offer computer classes, a book club, and religious 
services for both Muslim and Christian shelter residents. The shelter’s 
staff included lawyers and specialists in psychology, social work, 





conditional upon a victim’s cooperation with law enforcement or 
judicial authorities. Victims could freely and willingly leave the shelter 
and were allowed to stay at the shelter for as long as two months; 
victims’ stay in the shelter could be extended through a process 
requiring MOSD approval. The shelter had the capacity to serve a 
total of 40 victims, both Jordanian citizens and foreign nationals, 
with space for 27 women, three children, and 10 men. The shelter 
had a separate wing and entrance for male victims, and it was the 
only shelter in the country available to men; however, the MOSD did 
not report any male victims received services at the shelter during 
the reporting period. In 2020, the shelter served a total of 14 victims, 
which represented a decrease from the 35 victims it served in 2019. 
The government referred the other 11 identified victims to an NGO 
shelter. Of the 14 victims assisted by the Dar Karama shelter, 12 
were adult women and two were girls; 10 were forced labor victims 
and two were sex trafficking victims. Three victims assisted in the 
shelter were Jordanian and the rest were from Bangladesh, Uganda, 
Indonesia, and Tunisia. Shelter staff continued to cooperate with 
the embassies of Bangladesh, Philippines, and Sri Lanka to provide 
assistance to their nationals during the reporting period. Although 
the Dar Karama shelter remained open during the pandemic, NGOs 
reported issues contacting shelter staff and referring victims during the 
height of pandemic-related lockdowns in April 2020. The government 
encouraged victims to assist in the investigation and prosecution 
of their traffickers; female officers accompanied female victims to 
court and officials assigned all victims a lawyer throughout judicial 
proceedings to ensure protection of their rights. Foreign victims also 
had the option to provide a deposition prior to being repatriated. 
However, victims were not able to file civil suits against their traffickers 
for compensation. The government provided foreign victims with 
legal alternatives to their removal to countries where they faced 
retribution or hardship.
Authorities continued to punish some foreign trafficking victims 
for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit—such as 
immigration violations—including fines, arrest, detention, and 
deportation if found without valid residence documents. Jordan’s 
sponsorship system continued to prevent foreign workers from 
switching employers (without a letter of release from their sponsor) 
or receiving adequate access to legal recourse in response to abuse. 
Migrant workers, including potential trafficking victims, who left 
their place of employment prior to fulfilling their work contract, were 
considered illegal residents and subjected to fines and detention for 
their irregular presence in the country; loss of legal status created 
greater vulnerabilities to trafficking. Furthermore, bureaucratic 
and financial barriers and detention prevented some victims from 
repatriation, even if a worker left an employer because it was an 
exploitative situation. Some foreign workers remained in Jordanian 
detention due to pending criminal charges against them or their 
inability to pay overstay penalties or plane fare home. NGOs reported 
foreign labor trafficking victims were less likely to report abuses to the 
authorities because of fear of deportation or detention. Trafficking 
victims who opted to remain in Jordan for work were required to pay 
their overstay and lapsed labor permit fines before applying for a new 
work permit, which was a significant financial burden for victims. 
During the reporting period, legal experts reported authorities arrested 
domestic workers – some of whom might have been trafficking victims 
– for not having travel documents. However, due to the pandemic, 
the MOL waived most fines for migrant workers with expired work 
or residence permits to allow migrant workers to depart Jordan. In 
May 2020, the government launched an online platform to assist 
migrant workers seeking to return to their home countries due to the 
pandemic. In addition, foreign embassies reported they negotiated 
with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to release their citizens 
from detention for repatriation. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. The government’s 
full inter-ministerial anti trafficking committee did not meet 
during the reporting period due to pandemic-related restrictions 
on gatherings. However, the inter-ministerial committee held three 
technical committee meetings and several informal meetings chaired 
by the Minister of Justice. The government continued to implement 
its 2019-2022 national anti-trafficking strategy in partnership with 
NGOs and international organizations. The government continued 
to raise awareness about trafficking crimes throughout the country, 
including by distributing anti trafficking information to all foreign 
migrant workers entering Jordan and at inspected work sites. For 
example, the CTU coordinated with border guards to place awareness 
stickers, which included the government’s anti-trafficking hotline, 
in the passports of all foreign workers entering the country. In 
addition, the CTU distributed brochures about workers’ rights along 
with food, sanitizer, and masks as part of its COVID-19 mitigation 
efforts. An NGO continued to report government-led awareness 
campaigns contributed to an increase in victim referrals from the 
general public. The MOL and CTU continued to operate a hotline to 
receive complaints of labor violations and potential trafficking crimes; 
the hotline offered interpretation services in some source-country 
languages. However, due to overall budget shortfalls, the government 
remained unable to consistently maintain interpreters of some Asian 
languages at the hotline, which led to difficulties identifying potential 
trafficking victims and referring them to protection services. Jordan 
maintained several bilateral labor agreements with other countries, 
some of which created greater vulnerabilities to trafficking. For 
example, a labor agreement between the Jordanian and Egyptian 
governments specified that an Egyptian national cannot leave 
Jordan without permission from his or her employer, even if the 
employer was convicted of trafficking crimes. Similarly, though the 
Ugandan government signed a labor agreement with Jordan, there 
was no Ugandan embassy or diplomatic representation in Jordan 
for Ugandan nationals, including potential trafficking victims, to 
seek assistance. In January 2021, authorities deported a Bangladeshi 
journalist allegedly in relation to an article published in April 2020 
critical of conditions for Bangladeshi workers in Jordan. However, 
NGOs reported a bilateral labor agreement between the Jordanian 
and Philippine governments strengthened protections and led to 
improved working conditions for Filipino migrant workers.
The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for 
commercial sex acts or child sex tourism. The MOL continued to 
implement regulations that required labor recruitment companies to 
maintain insurance policies for workers, which provided repatriation 
costs, health care, and death benefits. The government also continued 
to cooperate with an international organization to eliminate 
recruitment fees for workers in Jordan’s garment sector, where some 
workers were vulnerable to trafficking. In 2020, the government 
continued to take measures to reduce the vulnerability of Syrian 
refugees to trafficking. The government continued to formalize access 
to the labor market for 192,000 Syrians from host communities and 
refugee camps, which helped to reduce this population’s vulnerability 
to forced labor. The government continued to issue a flexible work 
permit to Syrians in the construction and agriculture sectors; the 
permit legalized the status of the workers in these sectors and 
allowed Syrians to work for multiple employers in these sectors in a 
12-month period. More than 28,000 work permits for Syrian refugees 
remained active in 2020. Due to pandemic mitigation measures such 
as movement restrictions, the government issued 23,258 work permits 
to Syrian refugees as of September 2020 compared to 47,766 issued 
in 2019. The Ministry of Education also continued to allow Syrian 
refugee children access to public education, with more than 136,000 
refugee students enrolled in schools in the 2019-2020 school year. 
The government did not report specific anti-trafficking training for 
its diplomatic personnel. The MFA continued to report its finance 
department directly paid locally hired domestic staff of Jordanian 
diplomats posted abroad, in accordance with labor laws and wage 
rates in the host country. The Jordanian Armed Forces continued 
to provide specific anti-trafficking training to peacekeepers before 





As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Jordan, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Jordan abroad. Trafficking victims in Jordan are primarily from South 
and Southeast Asia, East Africa, Egypt, and Syria. In 2018, an NGO 
reported a large increase in Ugandan trafficking victims following 
the implementation of a 2016 bilateral labor agreement between 
the Ugandan and Jordanian governments. Jordan relies on foreign 
migrant workers – many of whom are undocumented – in several 
sectors, including construction, agriculture, textiles, and domestic 
work; according to an NGO in 2018, workers in these sectors are the 
most vulnerable to trafficking because of informal work agreements 
and frequently changing employers. In 2020, officials estimated 
the total number of foreign workers in Jordan could be as high as 
1.5 million. The MOL reported issuing 246,646 work permits for 
foreign workers in 2020 and 425,220 in 2019; officials from foreign 
embassies report many foreign workers are irregular and working 
without a visa, residency, or work permit. Jordan’s visa sponsorship 
system increases foreign workers’ vulnerability to trafficking by 
preventing them from switching employers without the initial 
employer’s consent. Because work permits are linked to a specific 
employer, when a worker quits one job before securing another, the 
worker loses legal status increasing vulnerability to trafficking. Some 
recruitment agencies fraudulently recruit victims from labor-source 
countries to Jordan, using false promises of money or other benefits. 
Forced labor victims in Jordan experience withheld or non-payment 
of wages, confiscation of identity documents, restricted freedom 
of movement, unsafe living conditions, long hours without rest, 
isolation, and verbal and physical abuse. For example, adults from 
South and East Asia migrate to work in factories in Jordan’s garment 
industry, some of whom experience withholding of passports, 
restricted movement, and unsafe living conditions. Traffickers exploit 
some migrant workers from Egypt—the largest source of foreign labor 
in Jordan—in forced labor specifically in the construction, service, 
and agricultural sectors. In 2017, the government estimated there 
were 82,643 foreign female domestic workers in Jordan, primarily 
from South and Southeast Asia and East Africa, who are highly 
vulnerable to forced labor. Some out-of-status domestic workers 
from Bangladesh, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka have 
been reportedly exploited in sex trafficking while looking for an 
employer or after fleeing their previous employers.
Refugees from Iraq, the West Bank and Gaza, Syria, and other 
countries are highly vulnerable to trafficking in Jordan, especially 
women and children working illegally or informally. Jordan is host 
to approximately 753,282 UNHCR-registered refugees from more 
than 55 countries, including 664,414 Syrians and 66,760 Iraqis. 
Non-Syrian and non-Palestinian refugees are vulnerable to labor 
exploitation due to the Jordanian government’s restrictions on 
their ability to work in most formal employment sectors. In 2019, 
Iraqi refugees reported they are vulnerable to exploitation in the 
informal sector because employers pay them below-market wages 
and expect them to work excessively long hours. NGOs continue to 
observe an increase in child labor and potential forced child labor 
among Syrian refugee children working alongside their families in 
the agricultural and service industries, as well as peddling goods and 
begging. There have been reported cases of Syrian refugee women 
and girls sold into forced marriages in Jordan. Refugee boys and 
young men, in particular, often work illegally and informally in the 
Jordanian economy, which puts them at risk of trafficking.
Some Jordanian and Syrian girls are forced to drop out of compulsory 
school to perform domestic service in their families’ homes; some 
of these girls are vulnerable to trafficking. Jordanian boys employed 
within the country in the service industry, agricultural sector, and 
as mechanics, street vendors and beggars may be victims of forced 
labor. NGOs and an international organization reported in 2018 
an estimated 3,000 children begging in the streets in Jordan, some 
of whom are highly vulnerable to trafficking. Traffickers exploit 
Lebanese, North African, and Eastern European women in sex 
trafficking who have migrated to Jordan to work in restaurants and 
nightclubs; some Jordanian women working in nightclubs may also 
be exploited in sex trafficking. As reported by an NGO in 2016, some 
Egyptian women are exploited in forced begging or sex trafficking 
by their Jordanian husbands.
KAZAKHSTAN: TIER 2
The Government of Kazakhstan does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so.  The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Kazakhstan was upgraded to Tier 2.  These efforts included 
investigating more trafficking cases and identifying more victims of 
sex trafficking and forced labor than the previous year; increasing 
the number of trafficking convictions for the first time in five years; 
and, achieving the first convictions for forced labor crimes in three 
years.  In conjunction with an international organization, the 
government also established pilot taskforces to improve proactive 
victim identification; conducted training activities for an increased 
number of officials; expanded the length of NGO service provider 
contracts with local governments; and granted deportation relief 
for migrant workers stranded in Kazakhstan during the pandemic. 
However, the government did not meet the minimum standards in 
several key areas.  Civil society and government interlocutors reported 
that legislative insufficiencies continued to hinder effective anti-
trafficking enforcement and victim identification.  Foreign victims 
continued to face obstacles in accessing protection services absent 
initiation of criminal cases against their traffickers.  Authorities at 
times harassed and imposed spurious penalties on members of 
civil society, including anti-trafficking organizations and activists 
attempting to raise awareness of forced labor and other abuses 
against ethnic Kazakhs in Xinjiang, China.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Amend trafficking laws to align the definition of trafficking with 
international standards and train law enforcement officers and labor 
inspectors on their application, particularly in the detection of cases 
involving psychological coercion and other less overt trafficking 
indicators. • Approve and implement policies allowing formal 
recognition of foreign nationals as trafficking victims and their referral 
to robust protection services irrespective of whether criminal cases 
have been initiated against their traffickers. • Vigorously investigate, 
prosecute, and convict suspected trafficking cases, including allegedly 
complicit government officials, police officers, and labor traffickers. 
• Significantly increase efforts to identify trafficking victims among 
vulnerable populations and refer these victims for assistance, with an 
emphasis on foreign forced labor victims, LGBTQI+ individuals, and 
Kazakhstani women and children repatriated from armed conflict 
zones in Iraq and Syria. •  Ensure victims are aware of their right to 
seek compensation, and train attorneys and law enforcement officials 
on how to assist them in the process. • Provide systemic, specialized 
training to all labor inspectors to identify victims of forced labor 
and report potential trafficking cases to the police. • Establish and 
implement a centralized anti-trafficking data collection system. • 







Continue to provide legal alternatives to deportation, especially when 
foreign trafficking victims may face hardship, abuse, or re-trafficking 
in their countries of origin. • Continue to display anti-trafficking 
awareness materials at border-crossings and checkpoints.
PROSECUTION
The government increased anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. 
Articles 128, 134, 135, 308, 125(3b), and 126(3b) of the penal 
code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking.  However, 
inconsistent with the definition of trafficking under international 
law, the law did not include force, fraud, or coercion as an essential 
element of the crime, but rather considered them an aggravating 
circumstance.  NGO observers and government officials alike noted 
this was particularly illustrative in Article 128 (Trafficking in Persons) 
and Article 135 (Trafficking in Minors), which criminalized the 
purchase or sale of persons under certain circumstances; its lack of 
specificity reportedly prevented authorities from properly investigating 
or prosecuting some cases involving psychological coercion or other 
more complex trafficking indicators.  The law, as amended in 2019, 
prescribed penalties of four to seven years’ imprisonment for adult 
trafficking and five to nine years’ imprisonment for child trafficking, 
an increase from three to five years’ imprisonment and five to seven 
years’ imprisonment for the respective crimes; the penalties could 
be increased to up to 18 years’ imprisonment under aggravated 
circumstances.  These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with 
respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for 
other serious crimes, such as rape.  For those accused of trafficking, 
the 2019 amendments also rescinded provisions of the criminal code 
that allowed defendants to pay monetary compensation to victims 
in exchange for having the criminal cases withdrawn.  Kazakhstani 
officials reportedly began consulting with international organizations 
and foreign governments on the creation of standalone trafficking 
legislation; this process was ongoing at the end of the reporting period. 
Police newly investigated 72 trafficking cases in 2020—an increase 
compared with 45 in 2019—and continued 23 investigations initiated 
in the previous reporting period.  Police also initiated an investigation 
into a transnational trafficking organization under criminal code 
articles related to organized crime; the Ministry of Internal Affairs 
(MVD) and finance ministry authorities used digital forensics to 
identify eight individuals suspected of arranging the trafficking of 
Kazakhstani women into Bahrain.  The case was ongoing at the end 
of the reporting period.  The government prosecuted 45 human 
trafficking cases in 2020, compared with 67 cases in 2019, and it 
convicted 11 sex traffickers, compared with eight in 2019, 17 in 2018, 
29 in 2017, and 45 in 2016—the first annual increase in five years. 
Sentencing was more stringent than the previous reporting period; of 
the 11 traffickers convicted in 2020, nine received sentences ranging 
from 6.6 to 17 years’ imprisonment, with the remainder sentenced to 
four years and three years, respectively (compared with six sentences 
ranging from five to 10 years’ imprisonment, one conditional sentence 
of three years’ served outside of prison, and one partially suspended 
sentence resulting in 6.8 years’ imprisonment in 2019).  Three of the 
traffickers were sentenced for labor trafficking crimes, marking the first 
time in three years the government achieved forced labor convictions. 
As in previous years, many of the trafficking cases were the result 
of three multi-day special anti-trafficking police operations, called 
“Stop Trafficking,” in which the police located and closed brothels, 
arrested pimps, and registered adults engaged in commercial sex. 
The government also reported pursuing unspecified accountability 
for nearly 500 individuals for subjecting their employees to forced 
labor, but authorities did not provide information on whether any 
of these cases were related to the aforementioned convictions, or 
whether relevant charges and penalties were criminal or administrative 
in nature.  NGOs continued to report investigators closed or decided 
not to open some criminal cases due to a perceived lack of evidence, 
despite the available testimony of trafficking victims and that they 
continued to focus on investigating cases involving sex trafficking to 
the exclusion of those involving forced labor.  Following a presidential 
directive to improve anti-trafficking investigations and prosecutions, 
the government initiated an internal research process to assess the 
quality of 250 trafficking investigations closed or suspended over the 
previous five-year period; the study reportedly found a significant 
“latency of cases” generated by victims’ fear of reprisals from their 
traffickers throughout the criminal justice process.  As a result of 
this research, the Prosecutors General Office (PGO) identified and 
formally reopened 35 cases that had been improperly closed; these 
remained under investigation at year’s end.  In previous years, NGOs 
reported traffickers bribed low-ranking police officials to avoid charges 
and alleged that some police officers facilitated forced labor or sex 
trafficking crimes.  Unlike the previous year, there were no convictions 
of government officials for trafficking-related offenses in 2020.
The government continued to train police, prosecutors, and judges on 
the identification, investigation, and prosecution of trafficking crimes, 
and it funded police and other officials’ participation in international 
anti-trafficking conferences; these activities were mostly conducted 
online due to the pandemic.  In 2020, the MVD’s Trafficking in 
Persons Training Center trained 168 police officers (167 in 2019) on 
investigative techniques.  The PGO, in partnership with the Supreme 
Court, MVD, and MLSP, trained 90 police officers, 90 prosecutors, 
36 judges, and 36 labor inspectors from around the country on the 
identification and prosecution of labor trafficking cases (compared 
with 44 prosecutors trained in 2019).  The PGO also trained attorneys 
on provision of legal assistance to victims and created a video 
training module on human trafficking for new law enforcement and 
transferring police officers.  Unlike in previous years, these trainings 
were primarily government funded.  During the reporting period, 
the government also formally amended the position descriptions 
of labor inspectors to include responsibility for the identification of 
victims and subsequent notification to law enforcement, addressing 
a key recommendation from international observers.  However, 
authorities did not report if labor inspectors’ new mandate resulted 
in the increased referral of cases to law enforcement.  Kazakhstani 
law enforcement continued to cooperate with foreign governments 
on the investigation of trafficking crimes.  In 2020, police arrested 
five Uzbekistani individuals and extradited a sixth at the request 
of their government in response to sex trafficking and forced labor 
allegations; they also submitted formal requests for assistance with 
the investigation of trafficking cases involving Kazakhstani victims 
in Russia and Bahrain, respectively (compared with ten international 
cases and five extraditions in 2019).
PROTECTION
The government increased protection efforts.  Law enforcement 
units dedicated to migration and trafficking issues operated under 
standard guidelines for the identification of victims among vulnerable 
populations, including undocumented migrant communities 
and individuals in commercial sex.  Separate referral procedures 
were outlined under the 2015 Special Social Services Standards, 
which instructed law enforcement agencies on how to coordinate 
with NGOs to connect victims with protection services.  Police 
also maintained a formal referral mechanism for victims initially 
arrested or detained during police operations.  Although some 
international organizations encountered fewer foreign victims as a 
result of decreased movement across international borders during 
the pandemic, Kazakhstani authorities increased victim identification 
among both domestic and foreign nationals during the reporting 
period.  The government identified 88 trafficking victims, compared 
with 40 in 2019.  Of these, 71 were Kazakhstani citizens—all women 
and girls, including 51 exploited in sex trafficking in Bahrain and 16 
exploited in sex trafficking domestically.  The remaining four, whose 
genders and ages were unknown, were exploited in forced labor 
within Kazakhstan, along with 17 Uzbekistani nationals (compared 
with two Uzbekistani victims and one Russian victim identified in 
2019).  As in the previous year, the government identified most 
sex trafficking victims during three anti-trafficking special police 
operations intended to locate and close brothels, arrest pimps, 
and register women engaged in commercial sex.  Comprehensive 
statistics on NGO victim identification were unavailable in 2020; 
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however, reports indicate NGOs continued to provide shelter, legal 
assistance, and other services to hundreds of victims—many more than 
formally identified by the authorities (compared with 76 victims—21 
Kazakhstanis and 55 foreign nationals—assisted by NGOs in 2019). 
Law enforcement referred six victims to protection services provided 
by an international organization (12 in 2019), foreign embassies 
referred one, and NGOs referred four; as in previous years, most 
victims self-reported, including through hotlines.  The government 
funded an NGO-operated trafficking hotline that received 1,341 
phone calls in 2020, 21 of which were referred to anti-trafficking 
police units (compared with 1,834 calls culminating in 12 referrals 
in 2019).  Unlike the previous year, two of these calls involving a 
total of seven victims resulted in confirmed trafficking investigations 
(none in 2020); however, both cases were ultimately closed per the 
victims’ request.  In cases where law enforcement identified foreign 
victims, victims often refused to cooperate.  According to experts, 
foreign victims frequently reported their exploitation to local police 
upon return to their home country, where they felt safer.
In conjunction with an international organization, the government 
established three pilot interagency taskforces comprising police 
officers, prosecutors, labor inspectors, and civil society representatives 
to share best practices on victim identification with local authorities 
and collect data on potential cases throughout the country.  In a 
decision lauded by civil society, the government then included the 
activities of these mobile taskforces within its new national action 
plan (NAP).  NGOs continued to report effective victim referral and 
police cooperation with regional anti-trafficking units, which were 
composed of one or two police officers.  Law enforcement units 
mandated to address migration or trafficking issues had a formal 
system to identify trafficking victims among at-risk persons, such as 
undocumented migrants or individuals in commercial sex; although 
the government improved efforts to identify foreign victims and 
expanded the mandate of the labor inspectorate to require monitoring 
for trafficking indicators, officials’ efforts to identify foreign victims 
and victims of labor trafficking remained inadequate.
During the reporting period, authorities issued a policy extending the 
length of NGO service providers’ local government contracts from 
one to three years to reduce administrative burdens on organizations 
providing essential services to trafficking victims.  However, 
government pressure on civil society at times impeded the work of 
anti-trafficking NGOs; authorities imposed politically-motivated 
administrative fines and closure orders on several organizations 
providing shelter services in 2020.  Following widespread expression 
of concern among international donors, the government rescinded 
all relevant charges.  The authorities continued to allocate funding 
for NGO-run shelter operations.  Nine anti-trafficking NGOs across 
nine provinces applied for and received government grants totally 
69.4 million Kazakhstani tenge (KZT) ($164,740) to support shelter 
activities in 2020 (a slight decrease compared with eight total shelters 
receiving 76.2 million KZT, or $180,880, in 2019).  However, the 
government significantly increased its 2021 funding allocation to 
148.9 million KZT ($353,460) with the intention of expanding 
shelter support to eight additional provinces.  Existing NGO-operated 
trafficking shelters offered legal, psychological, and medical assistance 
and were accessible to all Kazakhstani trafficking victims.  The 
government encouraged victims—including foreigners—to participate 
in investigations and prosecutions by providing witness protection 
during court proceedings, access to pre-trial shelter services, and basic 
provisions such as food, clothing, and medical and legal assistance. 
These and other protection services were not conditional upon 
Kazakhstani victims’ cooperation with law enforcement, but foreign 
victims could not access these services unless a criminal case had 
been initiated against their traffickers.  To address this insufficiency, 
provisions of Kazakhstan’s new NAP committed to Social Code 
amendments that would extend protection services to foreign victims 
irrespective of the initiation of criminal cases; these amendments 
remained under consideration at the end of the reporting period, but 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials reportedly utilized other channels 
to secure permission to provide protection services to an unspecified 
number of foreign victims in the interim.  Some NGO observers 
noted existing shelter space would not be sufficient to accommodate 
an increase in the referral of foreign victims to protection services 
that could result from this change.  During the reporting period, the 
government promulgated a law on compensation originally adopted 
in 2017 that increased the amount to which trafficking victims were 
entitled; however, no such cases were subsequently filed.  Many 
victims and their attorneys continued to be unaware of the right 
to seek compensation, and high legal fees continued to dissuade 
some victims from doing so.  The government could provide pro 
bono attorneys to trafficking victims, although statistics on provision 
of legal services were unavailable during the reporting period, and 
NGOs reported these attorneys were often inexperienced.
Unlike in previous years, the government did not report data on 
provision of legal protection to foreign trafficking victims in 2020 
(compared with one victim in 2019) nor on the suspension of 
deportation screenings or temporary residency granted for trafficking 
victims during criminal investigations.  However, in 2020 the 
government eliminated the imposition of penalties on foreign 
nationals leaving the country after their visas, registration cards, 
or work or residence permits expired, and it provided expansive 
deportation relief to thousands of migrant workers stranded in 
Kazakhstan due to the pandemic, addressing a common risk factor 
for immigrations status-based coercion.  NGOs reported foreign 
victims sometimes experienced problems in accessing local medical 
care due to a lack of health insurance, residence permits, or financial 
strain generated by loss of employment during the pandemic.  With 
the exception of four notable asylum cases involving ethnic Kazakhs 
fleeing persecution in Xinjiang, the government generally did not 
offer legal alternatives to foreign victims’ removal to countries 
where they would face retribution or hardship and, according to 
local law, victims were required to be deported after expiration of 
their temporary residency rights.  Although Kazakhstan’s new NAP 
included provisions outlining a reflection period in lieu of statutory 
deportation, this plan had not come into effect by the end of the 
reporting period.  NGOs continued to report a shortage of lawyers 
authorized to participate in administrative deportation cases.
The government at times penalized foreign nationals fleeing 
exploitation abroad, including from China, for illegally entering 
Kazakhstan; these immigration violations were not automatically 
expunged in cases where such individuals were granted asylum, and 
they precluded future eligibility for Kazakhstani citizenship.  This 
reportedly had the potential to disincentivize some victims from 
accessing asylum and protection services.  Civil society contacts 
continued to report some foreign trafficking victims, including ethnic 
Kazakh survivors of Xinjiang detention camps and Turkmen victims 
in southern Kazakhstan, were hesitant to report their abuses to local 
authorities due to distrust of law enforcement, perceived corruption, 
and fear of punitive deportation or other punishment.  Authorities at 
times committed politically-motivated harassment against activists 
attempting to raise awareness and advocate for the human rights 
of ethnic Kazakhs subjected to forced labor in Xinjiang.  However, 
Kazakhstani authorities refused to comply with China’s extradition 
requests of ethnic Kazakhs fleeing persecution and instead granted 
asylum to at least four such individuals during the reporting period. 
Although there were no other reports of authorities punishing victims 
for any unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit in 2020, 
enduring insufficiencies in victim identification procedures placed 
some unidentified foreign victims—especially those exploited in 
forced labor—at risk of penalization.
In continuation of large-scale repatriation efforts conducted in 2019, in 
February 2021, the government repatriated and provided rehabilitation 
services to at least seven Kazakhstani children, including potential 
trafficking victims, who had been living in Syria with male relatives 
participating in armed conflict.  The group also included four men 
and one woman, but some or all of these adults may have been jailed 







in 2019.  Specific information on rehabilitative services for these 
individuals was unavailable in 2020.  However, in previous years, 
adults repatriated from Iraq and Syria were housed in government-run 
rehabilitation centers, where they also benefitted from medical and 
psychosocial care, and children were generally housed with family 
members while receiving state-funded rehabilitation and reintegration 
services.  Kazakhstani authorities reportedly also worked to repatriate 
Kazakhstani nationals subjected to arbitrary detention in facilities 
known to perpetrate forced labor in Xinjiang, China, but additional 
information on these cases was unavailable.  
PREVENTION
The government increased overall prevention efforts.  The Interagency 
Trafficking in Persons Working Group, led by the MVD, held two 
virtual sessions in 2020 to assess the implementation of the 2017-
2020 anti-trafficking NAP and to finalize a comprehensive draft 
2021-2023 NAP, which the government approved in February 2021. 
Apart from some incidents of politically-motivated interference in 
the operation of some anti-trafficking NGOs, civil society observers 
noted improved political will, more proactive efforts, and enhanced 
coordination with NGOs on the part of the interagency working 
group and its subsidiary regional and local commissions.  The 
government continued to fund anti-trafficking information and 
education campaigns targeting potential trafficking victims, including 
children.  The Ministry of Information and Communication funded 
radio and television programs, as well as the publication of newspaper 
articles and web-publications, designed to raise public awareness and 
prevent the crime.  Kazakhstan’s border authorities instituted the 
24-hour display of a video created jointly by the MVD and a foreign 
donor to educate travelers on forced labor vulnerabilities, reporting 
channels, and ways victims can seek assistance at key transit hubs 
and border crossings.  The government continued to advertise an 
NGO-operated anti-trafficking hotline and, in conjunction with an 
international donor, trained its operators on victim identification 
and service provision.  It also created and distributed thousands of 
pandemic facemasks printed with the hotline number to increase 
awareness of its availability.  Authorities at times harassed, surveilled, 
censored, criminally prosecuted, and curtailed the freedom of 
expression and assembly of activists attempting to raise awareness 
on widespread abuses, including forced labor, perpetrated against 
ethnic Kazakhs in detention camps in Xinjiang.
In 2020, labor inspectors under the Ministry of Health and Social 
Protection conducted 3,982 inspections to identify labor violations; 
although this was a marked decrease from 6,681 inspections in 2019—
likely as a result of pandemic-related business closures—inspectors 
still identified more than 6,000 violations (unreported in 2019). 
These violations predominantly dealt with wage irregularities, contract 
violations, and labor without proper employment agreements—all of 
which were common labor trafficking indicators.  Inspectors issued 
2,290 administrative citations and imposed 1,086 fines totaling 
174.3 million KZT ($413,750) (compared with 2,651 recruiters 
and employers receiving administrative unspecified fines in 2019). 
Despite the prevalence of forced labor indicators detected, and 
although the labor inspectorate’s mandate was changed in 2020 to 
include trafficking identification and referral to law enforcement, 
the government did not report if any of these inspections led to 
the opening of criminal cases.  The number of labor inspectors 
employed under the MLSP increased from 260 to 274 during the 
reporting period.  This increase fell short of a commitment to double 
inspectorate staff in 2020, due in part to pandemic-related challenges; 
the inspectorate therefore remained inadequate to effectively enforce 
labor regulations across the country.  In previous years, migrant 
workers reported using unofficial third-party intermediaries to 
find employment and meet Kazakhstani migration registration 
requirements; these intermediaries often circumvented the law could 
facilitate the trafficking of foreign victims with relative impunity due 
to their unofficial status.  Authorities did not provide information 
on enhanced regulation of or enforcement within these networks 
during the reporting period.  In 2020, Kazakhstan entered into a new 
agreement with Uzbekistan to strengthen regulation and oversight 
of labor migration flows and enhance migrant worker protections. 
The government also improved online informational resources 
for migrants.  The government did not make efforts to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex acts.  In 2020, the government reported 
providing anti-trafficking training to 120 peacekeepers prior to 
their international deployment, thereby fulfilling a 2020 TIP report 
recommendation.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Kazakhstan, and traffickers exploit victims 
from Kazakhstan abroad.  Domestically, the relative economic 
prosperity in the government capital Nur-Sultan, the financial 
capital Almaty, and the western oil cities Aktau and Atyrau attract 
large numbers of rural Kazakhstanis, some of whom traffickers 
lure through fraudulent offers of employment and then exploit in 
sex trafficking and forced labor in agriculture, construction, and 
other sectors.  Traffickers force some children to beg and may also 
coerce adults and children into criminal behavior.  Some members 
of Kazakhstan’s LGBTQI+ communities are at risk of police abuse, 
extortion, and coercion into informant roles; LGBTQI+ individuals, 
particularly transgender persons required to undergo invasive and 
bureaucratic processes for gender-affirming care, are vulnerable to 
trafficking amid widespread social stigma and discrimination that 
often jeopardizes their employment status or prospects in the formal 
sector and complicates their access to justice.  Domestic violence may 
also drive many Kazakhstani trafficking victims to seek and accept 
unsafe employment opportunities on which traffickers prey; this 
vulnerability has reportedly increased as a result of state-ordered 
residential quarantines amid the pandemic.
Women and girls from neighboring East Asian, Central Asian, 
and Eastern European countries, as well as from rural areas in 
Kazakhstan, are exploited in sex trafficking in Kazakhstan; in most 
cases, traffickers target young girls and women, luring them with 
promises of employment as waitresses, models, or nannies in large 
cities.  Traffickers increasingly exploit Central Asian citizens, in 
particular Uzbekistani men and women, in forced labor in domestic 
service, construction, bazaars, and agriculture in Kazakhstan.  Many 
migrant workers among the one million Uzbekistanis subjected to 
Russia’s 2014 re-entry ban have subsequently sought temporary 
work and residence in Kazakhstan, where traffickers prey on them. 
Thousands of undocumented Uzbekistani migrants transit into 
Kazakhstan each day via informal border crossings for seasonal labor 
in construction, agriculture, retail, hospitality, and commercial sex; 
these individuals are particularly vulnerable to trafficking by virtue 
of their irregular immigration status, as are their accompanying 
children, who often do not attend school despite their eligibility to 
do so.  These and other migrant populations have suffered additional 
vulnerabilities to trafficking as a result of pandemic-related business 
closures and financial constraints preventing them from accessing 
affordable medical care.  NGOs have reported an increase in traffickers’ 
use of debt-based coercion in the exploitation of migrants in recent 
years.  Traffickers capitalize on tough law enforcement policies to 
coerce migrants to remain in exploitative situations and leverage 
these policies to threaten victims with punishment and deportation 
if they notify authorities, fostering distrust in law enforcement.  
Traffickers coerce or force Kazakhstani men and women into labor 
mostly in Russia, but also in Bahrain, Brazil, the Republic of Korea, 
Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.  Sex traffickers exploit 
Kazakhstani women and girls in the Middle East, Europe, East Asia, 
and the United States.  Chinese authorities arbitrarily detain some 
Kazakhstani citizens visiting family in Xinjiang, China and subject 
them to forced labor; their children, subsequently unaccompanied, are 
also at elevated risk of trafficking at home in Kazakhstan.  Organized 
crime groups and small trafficking rings with recruiters in Kazakhstan 
operate in conjunction with brothel operators in Kazakhstan and 
abroad.  Some Kazakhstani men travel to Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan 
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to fight alongside or seek employment within armed groups and 
are subsequently subjected to forced labor in cooking, cleaning, 
and portering.  Kazakhstani women and children traveling with 
these men are also vulnerable to sex trafficking and forced labor on 
arrival; many are reportedly placed alongside other Central Asian 
family members in makeshift camp communities, where their 
travel and identity documentation is confiscated and their freedom 
of movement is restricted.  Many of these women report having 
lost their husbands to armed conflict, after which their economic 
hardships and confinement in the camps make them vulnerable to 
coercive local marriages that may feature corollary sex trafficking or 
forced labor indicators.
KENYA: TIER 2
The Government of Kenya does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts 
to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts 
compared to the previous reporting period, considering the impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Kenya remained on Tier 2. These efforts included increasing the 
number of investigations and prosecutions of trafficking crimes; 
convicting more traffickers; increasing personnel dedicated to 
specialized anti-trafficking police units; and launching a new hotline 
to report trafficking crimes. However, the government did not meet 
the minimum standards in several key areas. The government 
identified significantly fewer trafficking victims, and protection 
services for identified victims, particularly adults, remained limited 
and inconsistent in quality. Despite sustained concerns of official 
complicity in trafficking crimes, which hindered both law enforcement 
efforts and victim identification during the reporting period, the 
government did not report any law enforcement action against 
allegedly complicit officials. The government often tried trafficking 
cases as immigration or labor law violations rather than crimes 
under the anti-trafficking law, which resulted in suspected traffickers 
receiving less stringent sentences. Additionally, because of the lack 
of screening among migrants, authorities reportedly detained and 
deported potential trafficking victims for suspected violation of 
immigration laws. Observers reported the Counter Trafficking in 
Persons Secretariat remained without sufficient staffing or funding, 
hindering overall progress on anti-trafficking efforts. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase efforts to vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict 
traffickers, including complicit officials, and sentence convicted 
traffickers to adequate penalties, which should involve significant 
prison terms. • Ensure protection services are available for all victims, 
including adult victims and foreign nationals. • Fully implement the 
national referral mechanism and encourage law enforcement officials 
to formally refer trafficking victims for assistance. • Systematically 
and proactively identify trafficking victims by screening vulnerable 
populations, such as refugees, asylum-seekers, individuals in 
commercial sex, and all foreign workers, including Ethiopians, 
Ugandans, Cuban medical professionals, and North Koreans, for 
trafficking indicators and refer all victims to appropriate services. • 
Increase protective services for victims participating in the criminal 
justice process to prevent re-traumatization. • Establish a shelter 
dedicated for trafficking victims to receive specialized care or provide 
funding or in-kind resources to NGO-run shelters. • Increase data 
collection and data sharing among relevant agencies to synthesize 
and analyze nationwide law enforcement and victim protection 
data related to trafficking crimes. • Amend the anti-trafficking 
law to remove sentencing provisions that allow fines in lieu of 
imprisonment for sex trafficking offenses. • Develop, adopt, and 
implement an updated national action plan to combat trafficking. 
• Expand training to all levels of the government, specifically to law 
enforcement personnel and local authorities in rural and coastal 
regions, on identifying, investigating, and managing trafficking 
cases. • Continue to regulate and oversee overseas recruitment 
agencies and train inspectors to report potential violations to the 
appropriate officials.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts but did not take 
adequate steps to address official complicity in trafficking crimes, 
which remained pervasive. The Counter-Trafficking in Persons 
Act of 2010 criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and 
prescribed penalties of 30 years’ to life imprisonment, a fine of not 
less than 30 million Kenyan shillings ($274,980), or both. These 
penalties were sufficiently stringent. However, by allowing for a fine 
in lieu of imprisonment for sex trafficking, these penalties were not 
commensurate with those for other serious crimes, such as rape. 
Sections 14 and 15 of the Sexual Offenses Act of 2006 criminalized 
the facilitation of child sex tourism and “child prostitution” and 
prescribed punishment of no less than 10 years’ imprisonment and 
a fine of 2 million shillings ($18,330). 
The government’s overall data collection and reporting on anti-
trafficking law enforcement efforts remained weak; additionally, 
the government provided some data that fell outside of the current 
reporting period without a mechanism to disaggregate. In 2020, 
the government reported initiating investigations of 18 trafficking 
cases, including at least four child sex trafficking cases, one child 
labor trafficking case, and one adult labor trafficking case, compared 
with six trafficking investigations initiated in 2019. The government 
reported that five trafficking investigations from previous years 
remained ongoing; however, the government did not provide an 
update on these cases. The government reported arresting 11 alleged 
traffickers in 2020, a decrease from at least 42 arrests in 2019. Arrests 
included a German national involved in child sex tourism and six 
Kenyan nationals for exploiting Ethiopian victims in forced labor; 
other arrests included charges of child sex trafficking and child labor 
trafficking, but the government did not provide further information 
on these cases. The government reported prosecuting 46 individuals 
under the 2010 anti-trafficking law between July 2019 and June 2020, 
compared with at least 22 individuals prosecuted in 2019; however, 
some of the prosecution data provided fell outside of the current 
reporting period. Prosecutions of at least three defendants from prior 
years remained ongoing at the end of the reporting period. At the end 
of the previous reporting period, at least 38 prosecutions remained 
ongoing; however, the government did not report updates on these 
cases. Courts convicted at least six traffickers under the 2010 anti-
trafficking law—two for child forced begging, two for sex trafficking, 
one for child trafficking, and one for an unspecified trafficking 
crime; this compared with at least three convictions in 2019. Courts 
sentenced convicted traffickers to varying degrees of punishment but 
did not provide sentencing data for all convictions; in one case, a 
judge issued a ruling of a fine of 400,000 shillings ($3,670) or four 
years’ imprisonment, while another court sentenced a trafficker to 
65 years’ imprisonment. Courts acquitted two suspected traffickers 
during the reporting period for unspecified reasons. In response to the 
pandemic, courts nationwide operated virtually from March 2020 to 
June 2020; gradual re-openings began in June 2020, but operations 
remained limited due to differing protocols among various courts. 
While anti-trafficking specific law enforcement units continued to 
operate throughout the pandemic, the government reported that 
pandemic-related restrictions, such as office closures, national curfew, 





law enforcement actions. In addition to pandemic-related challenges, 
officials also reported that law enforcement action under the 2010 
anti-trafficking law remained minimal for various reasons, including: 
limited police awareness about evidence collection and its use in 
proving a trafficking crime; corruption; the increased challenges 
of pursuing a trafficking prosecution instead of treating incidents 
as immigration violations; and the complexity of proving all the 
elements of trafficking. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking 
offenses; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking 
crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement 
action during the year. In late 2018 and early 2019, media and NGOs 
reported an investigation of a cabinet-level official who reportedly 
signed special sports and cultural work permits for women to dance in 
a mujra club notorious for exploitative practices; authorities removed 
the official from office after the allegations surfaced, but the status 
of investigations into the official’s conduct remained unreported 
for the third consecutive reporting period. Police officers continued 
to accept bribes to warn traffickers of impending operations and 
investigations, particularly along the coast, and officials reported 
perpetrators sometimes escaped conviction by bribing magistrates 
and court officials or intimidating or paying witnesses to make 
false statements. During the reporting period, observers alleged 
that criminal syndicates colluded with various law enforcement and 
immigration departments to transport trafficking victims in Kenya. 
Traffickers continued to easily obtain fraudulent identity documents 
from complicit officials, particularly at border checkpoints. Due 
to pandemic-related travel restrictions and border closures, the 
government did not report efforts to prevent corruption on the 
border unlike in the previous reporting period.
The government continued to enhance the investigative capacity 
of the Directorate of Criminal Investigation’s (DCI) Anti-Human 
Trafficking and Child Protection Unit (AHTCPU) by increasing 
its personnel from 33 to 37 officers—27 in Nairobi and 10 in 
Mombasa—and planning to open a third office in Kisumu. The 
DCI’s Transnational Organization Crime Unit (TOCU), mandated 
to investigate adult trafficking cases, had 32 officers—25 in Nairobi 
and 7 in Mombasa. During the reporting period, the government 
continued to collaborate with the Government of Uganda on a case 
identified during the previous reporting period and began working 
with the Government of Tanzania and the Government of Burundi 
on forced labor cases; however, observers reported the government 
continued inadequate efforts to pursue international trafficking cases 
involving Kenyan victims in foreign countries. In 2020, NGOs and 
international organizations provided regular trainings to several 
hundred prosecutorial and judicial officials, border guards, police 
officers, and immigration agents on how to detect and respond 
to trafficking crimes in their respective capacities; the government 
provided varying degrees of logistical support for these training 
endeavors. 
PROTECTION
The government decreased victim protection efforts. The government 
reported identifying 383 victims of trafficking—51 adult males, 
176 adult females, 104 boys, and 52 girls—a significant decrease 
compared with identifying 853 victims in 2019. Of the 227 adult 
victims identified, 150 were Kenyans exploited in or in transit 
to Middle East countries, including Iraq, or India. Other adult 
victims included Kenyans and foreign nationals, primarily from 
Ethiopia, Uganda, and Burundi, exploited within the country. In 
2019, TOCU proactively identified 144 trafficking victims during 
raids of commercial sex establishments; however, the government 
did not report taking such actions during the reporting period. NGOs 
reported identifying at least 363 victims during the reporting period. 
The government maintained a national referral mechanism (NRM) 
that outlined guidelines for victim identification and referral to 
services and reported regularly screening returnees from Gulf states; 
however, the government did not fully implement the NRM, and 
local authorities continued to bypass the NRM and directly contact 
NGOs to provide victim assistance. 
The government reported partnering with various NGOs to offer 
routine assistance to 134 victims (77 adults and 57 children), 
including medical care, psycho-social counseling, reintegration 
support, and legal assistance; however, NGOs reported that, in some 
cases, the government acted too slowly or not at all, necessitating 
action solely by NGOs. The government referred 112 victims (37 
adults and 75 children) to shelter services, compared with 78 victims 
referred to shelter in 2019. The government did not operate any 
trafficking-specific shelters and continued to rely on NGOs to provide 
this service during the reporting period. The government continued 
to operate five child protection centers throughout the country, but 
it did not report if these centers housed trafficking victims during 
the reporting period. Protection services for adult victims remained 
scarce, and NGOs reported that the government’s overall victim 
assistance remained limited and inconsistent in quality. NGOs and 
government officials in coastal regions partnered to provide trauma 
counseling, medical services, shelter, and reintegration support for 
trafficking victims returning from Somalia—some of whom left or fled 
al-Shabaab—and Gulf states; however, victim care remained scarce 
in coastal regions due to a lack of training and resources. In response 
to the pandemic, some NGO shelters and government-run centers 
acted as quarantine or testing centers or had limited capacity due to 
social distancing measures; the government reported this decreased 
its ability to refer all victims to care. The government also reported 
pandemic-related measures, such as travel restrictions, mandatory 
quarantine and testing, social distancing, and curfews, decreased 
the ability for the government to provide in-person care. However, 
NGOs expressed concern over long-standing protection gaps made 
worse by the pandemic, inhibiting the government from providing 
appropriate care to victims during the reporting period. Despite 
reliance on civil society organizations to provide victim services, the 
government did not report providing financial or in-kind support to 
such organizations. Officials noted that overall funding to combat 
trafficking remained inadequate, alleging that officers sometimes 
used their personal funds to provide support to victims. During the 
2020-2021 fiscal year, the National Treasury allocated 20 million 
Kenyan shillings ($183,320) to the National Assistance Trust Fund 
for Assisting Victims of Trafficking, the same amount as the previous 
fiscal year. The government reported dispersing 1.8 million Kenyan 
shillings ($16,500) from the fund to screen 314 Kenyan migrant 
workers repatriated from the Middle East; the government also used 
the fund to provide counseling and other protection services to at 
least 80 victims identified through the screening process. While 
courts ordered payments to victims from the fund for the first time 
in December 2019, stakeholders reported the government did not 
utilize the fund to provide direct payments to victims during the 
reporting period. 
To address the exploitation of Kenyan nationals abroad, the Ministry 
of Labor and Social Protection (MOL) continued to employ labor 
attachés in Kenyan diplomatic missions in Qatar, United Arab 
Emirates (UAE), and Saudi Arabia. Reportedly, the attachés advocated 
for Kenyan workers’ rights with host governments, screened workers 
for trafficking indicators, resolved workplace disputes, provided 
identity documents, and partnered with licensed employment 
agencies to find legitimate work opportunities for Kenyans; the 
government reported the attachés coordinated with the MOL, National 
Employment Authority (NEA), and Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
assist in victim identification and repatriation during the reporting 
period. In 2020, media reported that numerous Kenyan women 
employed as domestic workers in Lebanon may have been victims 
of trafficking; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reportedly sent a fact-
finding mission to investigate the allegations, but the government did 
report any findings or specific actions taken. In 2020, NGOs assisted 
the government to repatriate Kenyan trafficking victims exploited 
in Bahrain, Tanzania, Saudi Arabia, and Uganda. The government 
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provided foreign victims of trafficking with similar protective services 
as Kenyan nationals, particularly immediate needs like shelter and 
counseling; however, authorities did not provide longer-term shelter 
or residency benefits to foreign victims. Senior officials reported that 
authorities often quickly returned trafficking victims to their countries 
of origin due to the limited availability of shelters and other services. 
The law allowed officials to grant permission for foreign trafficking 
victims to remain indefinitely in Kenya if they would face hardship 
or retribution upon repatriation; the government did not report 
using this provision during the reporting period. NGOs reported 
the government sometimes placed victims in refugee camps, where 
their freedom of movement was restricted. Authorities sometimes 
obtained protective custodial orders for victims from courts to 
formalize protection service provisions pending repatriation. In 
2020, the government reported assisting in the repatriation of at 
least 113 foreign victims, compared with 142 repatriations in 2019.
The government maintained a Witness Protection Agency that offered 
protection to victims participating in investigations and prosecutions, 
and the government did not report providing this support to trafficking 
victims during the reporting period. Additionally, contrary to previous 
reporting, the government did not have formal procedures to 
encourage victims’ voluntary participations in investigations and 
prosecutions. Some courtrooms had facilities or equipment that 
allowed victims to provide testimony via video, one-way glass, or 
written statements; however, these services were not available in all 
courtrooms. Foreign victims had the ability to leave the country, 
seek employment, and move freely within the country pending trial 
proceedings after they testified. Even though victims’ benefits were 
not linked to law enforcement participation or whether the trafficker 
was convicted, officials noted the lack of victim services as a barrier to 
court cases and due to frequent repatriation or deportation, victims 
often could not serve as witnesses. Under the Employment Act and 
the 2010 anti-trafficking law, trafficking victims could file civil suits 
against traffickers for damages; however, the government did not 
report any civil suits filed in 2020.
Authorities reportedly penalized victims for unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit. NGOs across Kenya continued to report 
that potential victims within vulnerable groups, particularly adults 
in commercial sex, were sometimes charged with commercial sex 
crimes or labor violations. In recent years, authorities punished 
foreign national trafficking victims for violating immigration laws, 
often detaining or deporting them without screening for trafficking 
indicators; however, immigration officials reported enhancing 
coordination between national officials and local authorities to 
protect potential trafficking victim from penalization. NGOs reported 
witnesses appeared to have been intimidated, disappeared, or did not 
appear in court for fear of re-victimization. In 2020, an independent 
institution reported that authorities detained more than a third of 
migrants for being in the country without proper documentation; 
under this approach, officials sometimes detained potential trafficking 
victims without proper screening or provision of assistance. The 
same report alleged the government regularly held potential victims 
awaiting repatriation in detention. Officials and NGOs reported 
the government often placed adult trafficking victims in prisons 
or detention centers due to the lack of shelters available for adult 
victims; authorities sometimes placed child victims in centers for 
juvenile offenders until officials found a shelter or safe house with 
space available. In August 2019, an NGO sued the government for 
failing to meet its international and national obligations to protect 
victims of human trafficking; the case remained ongoing at the end 
of the reporting period. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
Counter Trafficking in Persons Secretariat (CTiP Secretariat), the 
operational arm of the Counter Trafficking in Persons Advisory 
Committee, continued to spearhead government efforts to combat 
trafficking. The CTiP Secretariat reportedly had dedicated funding 
in the national budget, but the government did not provide the 
total amount of anti-trafficking funding allocated for the fiscal year. 
Civil society and other stakeholders reported the CTiP Secretariat 
engaged them more regularly than in prior reporting periods, when 
the Secretariat primarily engaged stakeholders through standing 
quarterly meetings; however, observers noted that the CTiP Secretariat 
did not have sufficient staffing or funding, hindering progress on 
new anti-trafficking efforts and publication of required reporting 
on government efforts. The National Coordination Mechanism 
on Migration (NCM), chaired by the Department of Immigration, 
maintained responsibility for managing national coordination on 
migration issues, including addressing allegations of forced labor of 
Kenyans abroad, and held quarterly meetings to discuss migration, 
trafficking, and smuggling matters. While the CTiP Secretariat and 
NCM regularly coordinated, some stakeholders reported the two 
groups had overlapping mandates, which created confusion and 
discrepancies on which mechanisms were most effective. Officials 
continued to operate under the 2013-2017 national action plan 
(NAP), although it formally expired in 2018. In 2019, the government, 
in partnership with international organizations and civil society, 
drafted a 2019-2022 NAP; however, in 2020, observers reported the 
government found unspecified deficiencies in the draft NAP and 
planned to make amendments to the draft before finalizing the 
plan. The government continued to implement the National Plan 
of Action Against Sexual Exploitation of Children 2018-2022, which 
included efforts to prevent child sex trafficking. The government, in 
partnership with civil society organizations, continued to conduct 
various awareness-raising campaigns, primarily online in light of 
the pandemic, emphasizing the prevention of online child sexual 
exploitation, resources to report child trafficking, and emerging trends 
as a result of the pandemic. The government, in partnership with an 
NGO, continued to operate a 24-hour hotline to report child abuse 
and exploitation, including child trafficking; in 2020, the government 
reported identifying at least 16 cases of suspected child trafficking 
through the hotline, compared with 11 cases identified in 2019. In 
December 2020, the DCI launched a new call center for the public 
to report crimes, including human trafficking; authorities reported 
identifying one potential trafficking case through the hotline during 
the reporting period, while two other potential trafficking crimes 
remained under investigation.
The NEA continued to regulate labor migration and other labor-related 
matters, including labor trafficking, during the reporting period; 
however, officials noted a lack of leadership, uneven regulation 
enforcement, and corruption hindered NEA operations. As in previous 
years, the NEA published on its website a list of accredited and vetted 
recruitment agencies that successfully obtained proper licensing. The 
NEA had 320 registered private employment agencies, an increase 
compared with 284 during the previous reporting period; the NEA 
continued to prohibit hundreds of agencies from recruiting in Kenya. 
The NEA maintained a security bond intended to cover airfare for 
Kenyan migrant workers, including potential trafficking victims, in 
need of repatriation due exploitative situations. The government 
did not report approving any such requests during the reporting 
period, despite observers alleging the number of victims in precarious 
employment situations overseas increased during the pandemic. As 
in previous years, NEA utilized an e-platform for recruitment and 
placement of Kenyans migrating to Saudi Arabia to promote a safe 
migration process; however, observers continued to report that Kenyan 
officials negotiated a pay rate lower than the Saudi Arabian minimum 
wage, making Kenyan migrant workers vulnerable to trafficking. The 
government required migrant workers to attend a pre-departure 
training course that included information on human trafficking 
and migrant rights; it also included specific homecare management 
training for domestic workers. However, some prospective domestic 
workers reported there were not sufficient slots in training schools 
to meet training demands during the reporting period. Observers 
continued to report that foreign employers held migrant workers’ 
salaries until the completion of their contract period to coerce them 
to stay longer, and in some cases, employers sold migrant workers to 





NGOs reported recruitment agencies bribed labor officials to bypass 
required procedures, including allowing recruitment agents to sign 
the contract on the worker’s behalf when the worker did not appear 
in person. Although the government made efforts to vet recruitment 
agencies, numerous illegal and unregistered agencies remained 
in operation. The government did not make efforts to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex or child sex tourism.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Kenya, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Kenya abroad. Traffickers exploit children through forced labor in 
domestic service, agriculture, fishing, cattle herding, street vending, and 
begging. Traffickers exploit women and children in commercial sex, 
often facilitated by family members in informal settings, throughout 
Kenya, including in sex tourism in Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kisumu. 
In 2020, an international NGO reported there are between 35,000 
and 40,000 victims of commercial sex, including child sex tourism, in 
Kenya, of which approximately 19,000 are children; most perpetrators 
are Kenyan and, to a lesser extent, foreign tourists. Workers in khat 
cultivation areas and near gold mines in western Kenya, truck drivers 
along major highways, and fishermen on Lake Victoria also exploit 
children in sex trafficking. NGOs report that IDPs, particularly those 
who live close to a major highway or local trading center, are more 
vulnerable to trafficking than persons in settled communities. During 
the pandemic, school closures from March 2020 to January 2021, 
family economic challenges, curfews, and travel restrictions left 
children more vulnerable to trafficking, particularly online sexual 
exploitation and forced labor in domestic work and forced begging. 
Observers reported that measures to mitigate the pandemic resulted 
in the confinement of some victims of sex trafficking, particularly 
women and children, to the same location as their trafficker, which 
exacerbated their exploitation. Employment agencies, both legal and 
fraudulent, recruit Kenyans to work in the Middle East (particularly 
Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, and 
Oman), Central and Southeast Asia, Europe, Northern Africa, and 
North America, where, at times, traffickers exploit them in massage 
parlors, brothels, domestic servitude, or manual labor; Kenyans who 
voluntarily migrate in search of employment opportunities are also 
vulnerable to exploitative conditions. NGOs reported that economic 
loss due to the pandemic, coupled with border closures, increased the 
number of Kenyans migrating via irregular routes; these populations 
were particularly vulnerable to trafficking. Criminals involved in 
terrorist networks lure and recruit Kenyan adults and children to join 
non-state armed groups, primarily al-Shabaab, in Somalia, sometimes 
with fraudulent promises of lucrative employment.
Kenya hosts more than 500,000 refugees and asylum-seekers, primarily 
located in Kakuma Refugee Camp, Kalobeyei Integrated Settlement, 
and Dadaab Refugee Complex. Refugees are generally required to live 
within the camps with restricted movement and limited access to 
education and livelihood opportunities, increasing their vulnerability 
to labor and sex trafficking; children and LGBTQI+ persons in refugee 
camps are especially vulnerable. Nairobi-based labor recruiters 
maintain networks in Uganda and Ethiopia that recruit Burundian, 
Ethiopian, Rwandan, and Ugandan workers through fraudulent 
offers of employment in the Middle East and Asia. Kenya continues 
to serve as a transit point for migrants seeking work in South Africa, 
leaving these populations vulnerable to exploitation; traffickers exploit 
transient Ethiopians in forced labor and Burundian and Rwandan 
women in domestic servitude. Ugandan and Nigerian traffickers 
exploit Kenyan women in sex trafficking in Thailand. Authorities 
reported business owners and employers exploited Ugandan girls 
in sex trafficking and forced labor, specifically in Nairobi’s Eastleigh 
neighborhood. Traffickers exploit children from neighboring East 
African countries in forced labor and sex trafficking in Kenya. Cuban 
medical professionals and North Korean nationals working in Kenya 
may have been forced to work by the Cuban and North Korean 
governments, respectively. Recruiters use debt-based coercion to force 
Nepali, Indian, and Pakistani women to work in mujra dance clubs 
in Nairobi and Mombasa, where traffickers force them to pay off 
debts by engaging in commercial sex. Traffickers have increasingly 
exploited Somali women and girls in sex trafficking in brothels 
in Nairobi and Mombasa. Increasingly, traffickers bring children 
and individuals with physical disabilities from Tanzania and other 
neighboring countries to exploit them in forced begging; traffickers 
often coerce foreign victims to serve as facilitators to further such 
trafficking schemes. 
KOREA, DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S  
REPUBLIC OF: TIER 3
The Government of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK 
or North Korea) does not fully meet the minimum standards for the 
elimination of trafficking and, even considering the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity, is not 
making significant efforts to do so; therefore North Korea remained 
on Tier 3. During the reporting period there was a government 
policy or pattern of forced labor in mass mobilizations of adults and 
children, in prison camps as part of an established system of political 
repression, in labor training centers, and through its imposition of 
forced labor conditions on DPRK overseas workers. Reports indicate 
the government utilized the COVID-19 pandemic to increase the 
number of political prisoners, thereby expanding its existing capacity 
to subject North Koreans to forced labor. The government used 
proceeds from state-sponsored forced labor to fund government 
functions, as well as other illicit activity. The government did not 
demonstrate any efforts to address human trafficking. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
End the use of state-sponsored forced labor, including among 
North Korean workers abroad and in prison camps used as a source 
of revenue and tool of political repression. • End the practice of 
summary executions and other harsh punishments, including forced 
labor, for victims who are forcibly returned from other countries. • 
Eliminate coercion tactics used to monitor and limit the movements 
and communications of workers overseas. • Cease the garnishing of 
wages of overseas workers for the purposes of furthering forced labor. 
• Provide assistance to victims exploited in the DPRK and to North 
Korean victims returned from abroad. • Criminalize sex trafficking 
and labor trafficking. • Investigate and prosecute trafficking cases 
and convict traffickers in accordance with the rule of law. • Increase 
transparency by allowing international human rights monitors to 
evaluate living and working conditions of workers, both domestically 
and abroad. • Forge partnerships with international organizations 
and NGOs to combat human trafficking. • Allow North Koreans 
to choose their form of work and leave their employment at will. • 
Accede to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol.
PROSECUTION
The government did not report any law enforcement efforts. It is 
unclear whether North Korean laws criminalized sex trafficking 
or labor trafficking. Fair trials did not occur in the DPRK, and the 
government did not explain what provisions of law, if any, were 
used to prosecute trafficking offenses. The government did not 








prosecutions, or convictions of traffickers, including government 
employees complicit in forced labor or other trafficking crimes. Media 
reported the government publicly executed six persons, including 
four party officials (without conducting fair trials) for their alleged 
involvement in the facilitation of commercial sex acts with female 
college students. Reports suggested some of the women were forced 
to engage in commercial sex; however, there was no indication 
authorities adequately investigated the situation as sex trafficking. 
Further, authorities reportedly sent more than 50 students alleged 
to have engaged in commercial sex acts, some of whom were likely 
trafficking victims, to labor camps where they were subjected to three 
to six months’ forced labor.
PROTECTION
The government did not report any protection efforts. Government 
authorities did not report identifying any victims or providing 
protective services, nor did they permit NGOs to provide these 
services. Authorities penalized victims for unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit. Authorities treated returning victims 
as criminals for crossing the border. The government sent North 
Koreans, including potential trafficking victims, forcibly returned 
by Chinese authorities to detention and interrogation centers, 
where the government subjected them to forced labor, torture, 
forced abortions, and sexual abuse by prison guards; in some cases, 
authorities potentially sent them on to prison camps. North Korean 
defectors previously reported instances of the government executing 
trafficking victims forcibly returned from China. 
PREVENTION
The government did not report any efforts to prevent trafficking. 
Government oppression in the DPRK prompted many North Koreans 
to flee the country in ways that heightened their risk of trafficking 
in destination countries. The government made no efforts to raise 
awareness of human trafficking. The government did not make efforts 
to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts, nor did it provide 
anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel. The DPRK is 
not a party to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers—including 
government officials—exploit North Koreans in the DPRK and 
abroad. Within North Korea, women and children are exploited in 
sex trafficking. Female college students unable to pay fees charged to 
them by universities to meet demands set by the government were 
vulnerable to sex trafficking. Forced labor is part of an established 
system of political repression and a pillar of the economic system in 
North Korea. The government subjects its nationals to forced labor in 
North Korean prison and labor camps, through mass mobilizations, 
and in overseas work. The law criminalizes defection, and individuals, 
including children, who cross the border for the purpose of defecting 
or seeking asylum in a third country are subject to a minimum of 
five years of “labor correction.” In “serious” cases, the government 
subjects asylum seekers to indefinite terms of imprisonment and 
forced labor, confiscation of property, or death. 
The DPRK holds an estimated 80,000 to 120,000 persons in political 
prison camps and an undetermined number of persons in other forms 
of detention facilities, including re-education through labor camps. 
In many cases, these prisoners have not been charged with a crime 
or prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced in a fair judicial hearing. In 
prison camps, all prisoners, including children, are subject to forced 
labor, including in logging, mining, manufacturing, or farming for 
long hours under harsh conditions. In many cases, the government 
also detains all family members if one member is accused or arrested. 
Reports noted authorities subjected children to forced labor for up 
to 12 hours per day, did not allow them to leave the camps, and 
offered them limited access to education. The government subjects 
prisoners to unhygienic living conditions, beatings, torture, rape, a 
lack of medical care, and insufficient food. Many prisoners do not 
survive. Reporting indicates the government utilized the COVID-19 
pandemic to increase the number of political prisoners, thereby 
expanding its existing capacity to subject North Koreans to forced 
labor. Authorities allegedly treated individuals who did not wear face 
masks or who were found to violate quarantine rules as criminals 
guilty of political crimes and sent them to political prison camps 
where they were subjected to a minimum of three months’ forced 
labor. In 2020, the government reportedly created new, and expanded 
existing, political prison camps to accommodate the resulting 
increased prison populations; there were reports of further plans to 
expand the political prison camp system. 
The North Korean government operates regional, local, and sub-
district level labor camps and forces detainees to work for short periods 
doing hard labor while receiving little food and being subjected to 
abuse, including regular beatings. Authorities reportedly send people 
to these camps if they are suspected of engaging in simple trading 
schemes or are unemployed; North Koreans who were not officially 
registered as being employed for longer than 15 days were at risk of 
being sent to labor camps for a minimum of six months. 
Officials forcibly mobilize adults and school children to work in 
various sectors, including in factories, agriculture, logging, mining, 
infrastructure work, information technology (IT), and construction. 
An NGO reported the government withholds food rations or imposes 
taxes against adults who do not participate in these forms of forced 
labor. There were reports that in 2020 government officials required 
all women in the area of Hyesan to work daily on construction and 
other projects; those physically unable to work had to pay a fine, 
and security forces arrested evaders. The law requires all citizens 
of working age to work and “strictly observe labor discipline and 
working hours.” There are numerous reports that some farms and 
factories do not pay wages or provide food to their workers. According 
to reports from an NGO, during the implementation of short-term 
economic plans, factories and farms increase workers’ hours and ask 
workers for contributions of grain and money to purchase supplies for 
renovations and repairs. By law, failure to meet economic plan goals 
may result in two years of “labor correction.” In 2019, workers were 
reportedly required to work at enterprises to which the government 
assigned them, and then the enterprises failed to compensate or 
undercompensated them for their work. 
Schools receive compensation from the government for labor 
conducted by children, and officials occasionally sent schoolchildren 
to work in factories or fields for short periods to complete special 
projects such as snow removal on major roads or meeting production 
goals. Schools also require students under the minimum working 
age to work to raise funds for faculty salaries and maintenance costs 
for school facilities. In addition, school principals and teachers 
exploit students for personal gain by forcing them to work on 
farms or construction sites. Children aged 16 and 17 are enrolled in 
military-style youth construction brigades for 10-year periods and are 
subjected to long working hours and hazardous work. Authorities also 
sometimes subject children to mass mobilizations in agriculture away 
from their families, with excessive daily working hours, sometimes 
for periods of a month at a time. Children living in orphanages 
are often subjected to forced labor instead of attending school. 
The effects of such forced labor on children and students included 
physical and psychological injuries, malnutrition, exhaustion, and 
growth deficiencies. 
North Korean workers sent by the government to work abroad, 
including through bilateral agreements with foreign businesses or 
governments, also face conditions of forced labor. Credible reports 
show many North Koreans working overseas are subjected to working 
excessive hours, sometimes in hazardous temperatures, with restricted 
pay for up to three years at a time. They reportedly work on average 
between 12 and 16 hours a day, and sometimes up to 20 hours per 
day, and are allowed only one or two rest days per month. North 
Koreans work in a range of industries overseas, including but not 






















IT services, logging, medical, pharmaceuticals, restaurant, seafood 
processing, textiles, and shipbuilding. NGOs report the government 
manages these workers as a matter of state policy and that they were 
under constant and close surveillance by government security agents. 
Workers often reside in shared dormitories and have very limited 
freedom of movement. These workers face threats of government 
reprisals against them or their relatives in the DPRK if they attempt 
to escape or complain to outside parties. Workers’ salaries are 
appropriated and often deposited into accounts controlled by the 
North Korean government, which justifies its retention of most of the 
money by claiming various “voluntary” contributions to government 
endeavors. Workers receive only a fraction of the money paid to 
the North Korean government for their work and face punishment 
if they fail to meet production or work targets. According to NGO 
reports, the North Korean government withholds 70-90 percent of 
wages from overseas workers, which generates an annual revenue to 
the North Korean government of hundreds of millions of dollars. 
Wages of some North Korean workers employed abroad reportedly are 
withheld until the workers return home, increasing their vulnerability 
to coercion and exploitation by authorities. 
In 2017, UN Security Council resolutions prohibited UN Member 
States from issuing new or renewed work authorizations to DPRK 
overseas workers and required States to repatriate North Korean 
nationals earning income overseas, subject to limited exceptions, 
including for refugees and asylum seekers, no later than December 
22, 2019. The vast majority of North Koreans employed outside the 
DPRK are located in Russia and China. Workers were also reportedly 
employed in a number of additional countries and regions in 
2020, including Abkhazia (Russia-occupied region of Georgia), 
Angola, Cambodia, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Niger, Oman, Qatar, Republic of the Congo, 
Senegal, South Sudan, Thailand, Uganda, and Vietnam. Some of these 
countries may have removed most or all of these workers during 
the year. However, reports suggested a number of countries either 
have not taken action or have resumed issuing work authorizations 
or other documentation, allowing these individuals to continue 
working, in violation of UN Security Council resolutions. There 
are an estimated 20,000-80,000 North Koreans working in China, 
primarily in restaurants and factories. The Government of Russia 
reportedly issued nearly 27,000 tourist and study visas to North 
Koreans in 2019, more than five times as many as it did during the 
previous year, strongly suggesting that these visas are being used 
inappropriately for workers; media reports highlight Russian court 
cases alleging that DPRK nationals on student visas were instead in 
Russia for the purpose of employment. In addition, official Russian 
statistics showed that nearly 3,000 tourist and study visas were issued 
to North Koreans in 2020. There were reports that the DPRK planned 
to send as many as 10,000 workers to Russia beginning in March 
2021, where they will work for as long as three years. 
North Koreans seeking to leave the DPRK due to the government’s 
egregious human rights violations are vulnerable to sex and labor 
trafficking in neighboring China. Many of the North Korean refugees 
and asylum-seekers living irregularly in China are particularly 
vulnerable to traffickers who lure, drug, detain, or kidnap some 
North Korean women upon their arrival. Traffickers also operate 
networks spanning from China into North Korea to recruit North 
Korean women and girls to smuggle into China. For example, in 
border towns traffickers approach women with false promises of 
profitable employment that would enable them to pay broker fees 
associated with being smuggled to China. These women are subjected 
to physical abuse and sexual exploitation by their traffickers, forced 
into commercial sex in brothels or through internet sex sites, or 
compelled to work as hostesses in nightclubs or karaoke bars. 
Traffickers also sell North Korean women to Chinese men for forced 
marriages, whereby they are subsequently forced into commercial sex, 
domestic service, agricultural, or other types of work. These victims 
often lack identification documents and bear children with Chinese 
men, which further hinders their ability to escape. As many as 30,000 
children born in China to North Korean women and Chinese men 
have not been registered upon birth, rendering them stateless and 
vulnerable to possible exploitation. If found by Chinese authorities, 
trafficking victims are often forcibly returned to the DPRK, where 
they are subject to harsh punishment, including forced labor in 
labor camps, torture, forced abortions, or death. In 2020, however, 
North Korean authorities refused to accept more than 200 defectors 
detained by Chinese authorities due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF: TIER 1
The Government of the Republic of Korea (ROK or South Korea) 
fully meets the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. 
The government continued to demonstrate serious and sustained 
efforts during the reporting period, considering the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore South 
Korea remained on Tier 1. These efforts included prosecuting more 
offenders for trafficking-related crimes, identifying and providing 
services to 11 victims of labor trafficking, and drafting guidelines 
aimed at increasing protections for migrant fishermen. In March 
2021, the National Assembly adopted the Prevention of Trafficking 
in Persons, Etc. and Victim Protection Act, which will go into effect in 
2023 and included a definition of “trafficking in persons, etc…” that 
aligned more closely with the international definition of trafficking 
and will require the government to make future anti-trafficking 
efforts. Although the government meets the minimum standards, 
officials did not consistently utilize victim identification guidelines 
and the government did not track the number of trafficking victims 
identified by authorities. Courts sentenced the majority of offenders 
convicted for trafficking crimes to less than a year imprisonment, 
fines, or suspended sentences. Government officials penalized foreign 
sex trafficking victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to 
commit and often deported victims without providing them adequate 
services or investigating their traffickers. Numerous NGOs stated that 
due to the absence of penalty provisions, it was unlikely the new law 
passed in March would improve efforts to bring traffickers to justice. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Ensure police, immigration, labor, and social welfare officials 
consistently use victim identification guidelines to increase 
identification of victims of labor and sex trafficking. • Proactively 
screen for victims among vulnerable populations, including 
individuals in commercial sex, fishermen, and migrant workers. 
• Criminalize all forms of trafficking in persons, in line with the 
definition of trafficking under the 2000 UN TIP Protocol, and that 
prescribes penalties that are sufficiently stringent and, with respect 
to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other 
grave crimes. • Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict 
traffickers, particularly for labor trafficking, including for those who 
use forced labor on South Korean-flagged fishing vessels. • Cease the 
penalization of victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them 
to commit, including by improving coordination between police 
and immigration in cases involving foreign victims. • Punish the 
majority of convicted traffickers to significant prison terms exceeding 
one year. • Provide trauma-informed training to law enforcement 
to ensure they use victim-centered approaches in investigations and 
victim protection. • Establish and implement formal procedures for 
police, immigration, labor, and social welfare officials to refer both 





to train law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judicial officials, and 
social service providers to better understand “trafficking” as defined 
by international law. • Take steps to increase and enforce protections 
for migrant fishermen, including by reducing the amount of time 
high-risk vessels are able to legally remain at sea without returning 
to port, and develop a more consistent and effective system for 
inspecting the labor conditions of fishing vessels. • Improve the 
quality of specialized services provided to trafficking victims, especially 
male, child, foreign, and disabled victims. • Establish a system to 
collect trafficking law enforcement and victim protection data that 
distinguishes trafficking from other crimes such as commercial 
sex. • Increase interagency coordination on efforts to combat both 
sex and labor trafficking. • Prohibit the confiscation of workers’ 
identity documents, including passports, and take steps to enforce 
this prohibition and punish violators. • Take steps to eliminate 
recruitment and/or placement fees charged to workers by labor 
recruiters in the ROK and workers’ home countries and ensure any 
recruitment fees are paid by employers.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts, but continued 
to make inadequate efforts to prosecute labor traffickers, especially in 
the fishing industry. Various articles under Chapter 31 of the Criminal 
Act, when read together, criminalized sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to 15 years’ imprisonment 
for trafficking crimes, which were sufficiently stringent and, with 
respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for 
other serious crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent with the definition 
of trafficking under international law, Article 289 (“trafficking 
in persons”) limited the definition of trafficking to require the 
buying or selling of another for exploitation and did not include a 
demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion as an essential element of 
the crime. However, Articles 288 (“kidnapping, abduction, etc. for 
the purpose of indecent acts, etc.”) and 292 (“receiving, harboring, 
etc. of person kidnapped, abducted, trafficked or transported”) could 
apply to trafficking offenses not covered under Article 289. Similarly, 
Article 12 of the Act on the Protection of Children and Juveniles 
Against Sexual Abuse incorrectly defined child sex trafficking to require 
transnational movement of the victim. However, various other articles 
under the law could be applied to child sex trafficking offenses that 
did not involve such movement. The absence of a criminal offense 
that defined trafficking consistent with international law resulted 
in varying understanding of the crime among law enforcement and 
prosecutors. Government officials frequently believed trafficking 
required the buying and selling of a person, and conflated trafficking 
with related crimes such as commercial sex, kidnapping, domestic 
violence, and other forms of sexual abuse. In March 2021, the 
government adopted the Prevention of Trafficking in Persons, Etc. 
and Victim Protection Act, which will come into effect in January 
2023. While the law included a definition of “trafficking in persons, 
etc…” which aligned more closely with the international definition 
of trafficking, it did not include penalty provisions. The government 
stated penalty provisions were unnecessary because officials could 
prosecute traffickers under various statutes in the existing legal 
framework and that a new criminal statute could harm existing efforts 
to prosecute traffickers. However, numerous NGOs and anti-trafficking 
experts noted the government has not effectively used the existing 
legal framework to prosecute traffickers and many traffickers often 
go unpunished; therefore, it is unclear that this new law will result 
in increased trafficking prosecutions and convictions.
While the government maintained general statistics on victims 
and offenders across all subsections of the criminal code, it did 
not adequately distinguish trafficking cases from related crimes 
such as commercial sex and kidnapping. This made it difficult to 
determine which law enforcement actions reported by the government 
involved human trafficking as defined by international law. In 
2020, the government did not report the number of trafficking 
cases investigated in 2020 (13 in 2019) but reported it indicted 133 
suspects (90 in 2019) and convicted 59 traffickers (77 in 2019) for 
crimes related to trafficking. The government reported sentencing 
28 traffickers to at least one year imprisonment (30 in 2019). While 
a greater percentage of traffickers were sentenced to at least one year 
of imprisonment than in 2019, the majority of those convicted 
for trafficking-related crimes were sentenced to less than one year 
imprisonment, suspended terms of imprisonment, or fines. This 
weakened deterrence and undercut the government’s overall anti-
trafficking efforts. In one high-profile case, a court sentenced one 
offender to 40 years’ imprisonment for leading an organization 
that forced more than 100 women and girls to create videos of sex 
acts and images that were uploaded to and sold on an online chat 
room; several accomplices were also sentenced to significant prison 
terms. Observers reported the government’s failure to sentence the 
majority of traffickers to significant terms of imprisonment resulted 
in impunity for traffickers in ROK and some instances of previously 
convicted offenders resuming trafficking activities.
The government did not report any criminal investigations or 
prosecutions of South Korean men who, according to anecdotal 
reports prior to the pandemic, engaged in child sex tourism abroad. 
While the government reported investigating four cases of labor 
trafficking involving Korean victims with intellectual disabilities in 
2020, it did not identify any cases of labor trafficking on Korean-
flagged fishing vessels, despite ongoing reports that forced labor 
of migrant fishermen remained widespread in Korea’s distant and 
coastal water fishing fleets. NGO experts reported the government 
did not implement adequate or frequent inspections of fishing 
vessels, which resulted in minimal regulation and impunity for boat 
captains and others who exploited migrant workers, including in 
forced labor. The government’s efforts to investigate trafficking in the 
fishing industry were also ineffective due to its interview methods 
of workers, which often involved preannounced visits and were 
conducted in locations such as the offices of labor unions where 
fishermen were not comfortable speaking openly. Article 167(3) 
of the Seafarer’s Act prohibited forced labor on fishing vessels, but 
the government has reportedly never used this provision to convict 
trafficking on Korean-flagged vessels. The government also did not 
report prosecuting any cases involving the exploitation of migrant 
workers in forced labor in other industries, despite widespread 
reports from NGOs that this continued to occur. NGOs working 
with labor trafficking victims reported that immigration officials and 
labor inspectors continued to lack an understanding of the crime, 
which resulted in officials treating potential labor trafficking cases 
as administrative labor violations. 
The Korean National Police Agency (KNPA) included anti-trafficking 
education in five police trainings in 2020, included modules on 
identifying victims of sex trafficking in its police academy training, 
and reported that all police station employees received training on 
the prevention of sex trafficking once per year. As in previous years, 
trainings for law enforcement did not specifically address labor 
trafficking, and some officials reportedly demonstrated a lack of 
understanding of the crime, particularly in cases involving debt-based 
coercion. Some NGOs noted trainings for law enforcement were not 
effective at improving anti-trafficking efforts. Police, prosecutors, 
and government-provided interpreters did not use trauma-informed 
practices when interviewing victims, which inhibited their ability 
to effectively collect evidence and testimony from victims to pursue 
charges against their traffickers. Law enforcement did not proactively 
investigate trafficking cases and declined to pursue charges in some 
suspected trafficking cases for unclear reasons, sometimes due to a 
lack of understanding of tactics used by traffickers. In previous years 
some NGOs expressed concern that the government often did not 
prosecute cases involving debt-based coercion due to a perceived lack 
of jurisdiction over recruitment that generally originated in a victim’s 
home country. The lack of an option to provide foreign trafficking 
victims with long-term or permanent residency discouraged victims 
from participating as witnesses in investigations of their traffickers. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 












crimes; however, there were anecdotal reports of corruption and 
official complicity in trafficking crimes. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained efforts to protect sex trafficking victims 
but made inadequate efforts to protect labor trafficking victims and 
prevent the penalization of foreign victims. Officials continued to 
be unable to track or provide the number of trafficking victims 
identified or referred to services, thereby making some aspects of 
their overall protection efforts unclear. The government continued 
to distribute victim identification guidelines created by the National 
Human Rights Center of Korea (NHRCK) to police, prosecutors, and 
coast guard officials but the government lacked formal procedures 
to refer victims to care. MOGEF also continued to distribute the 
Guidelines for the Identification of Sex Trafficking Victims to some 
officials. Nonetheless, law enforcement often did not take steps to 
proactively identify victims, failed to identify many victims, and many 
officials did not adequately implement identification procedures. 
One NGO reported that despite the existence of the NHRCK and 
MOGEF screening tools, immigration and other law enforcement 
officials did not use them in practice. Labor inspectors did not utilize 
victim identification guidelines during inspections. KNPA continued 
to train investigators on the NHRCK guidelines. MOGEF provided 
training to 262 of its staff working in facilities that support victims 
of sex trafficking in 2020. The Ministry of Employment and Labor 
(MOEL) conducted annual trainings for labor inspectors on labor 
laws, including the prohibition of forced labor. 
MOGEF conducted outreach in “red-light districts” to assist individuals 
in commercial sex but did not report how many trafficking victims it 
identified through these efforts. Law enforcement referred individuals 
in commercial sex to support facilities operated or funded by MOGEF 
but did not identify how many were victims of sex trafficking. MOGEF 
provided services to 6,743 individuals in its support facilities in 2020, 
compared to 6,924 in 2019. The government reported providing 
services to four South Koreans, including three with intellectual 
disabilities, identified as victims of labor trafficking. However, 
despite ongoing concerns that migrant workers are exploited in labor 
trafficking in various industries, the government reported identifying 
only seven migrant workers exploited in labor trafficking during the 
reporting period. The government did not assist in the repatriation 
of any Korean victims exploited abroad during the reporting period. 
KNPA operated teams that were responsible for guiding all crime 
victims, which could include trafficking victims, from the initial point 
of contact with law enforcement to protection and support systems. 
However, the government did not have a formal referral process to 
guide officials in referring trafficking victims to services. Police did 
not consistently use a victim-centered approach in investigations, and 
instead used practices such as subjecting victims to lengthy interviews 
immediately after their identification resulting in re-traumatization. 
Officers were sometimes unaware of the rights of trafficking victims, 
and asked NGOs for information on government laws and policies 
related to trafficking. A Thai NGO working with Thai sex trafficking 
victims exploited in South Korea expressed concern about the 
quality of care the victims had received from the government in the 
ROK before they were repatriated to Thailand. In addition, when 
exploited workers contacted government hotlines or migrant support 
centers, some officials reportedly did not take steps to screen cases 
for potential indicators of trafficking or refer victims to services, and 
instead often encouraged workers to remedy their situation through 
their employer. As part of a new education program created in 2020, 
MOEL trained 35 officers in charge of issuing employment permits to 
migrant workers in identifying human trafficking cases. The Ministry 
of Justice (MOJ) reported it continued to implement regulations 
established in January 2020 that require entertainer visa holders to 
complete a sex trafficking identification questionnaire when renewing 
their visa status. However, NGOs continued to note concerns that 
this measure required victims to self-identify, that victims’ well-
founded fears of penalization and deportation made it unlikely they 
would reveal their exploitation through such questionnaires, and 
that the government did not establish corresponding guidelines for 
immigration officials on what steps they should take if a visa holder 
reported any indicators of trafficking. 
MOGEF supported 96 facilities that provided services to victims 
of crime. These facilities were available to assist trafficking victims 
through counseling services, shelter, education, and rehabilitation 
support; however, the government did not report providing services 
designed specifically for trafficking victims. While these facilities 
primarily served female victims, the government made some services, 
such as counseling, medical, and legal assistance, available to male 
victims. Nonetheless, NGOs continued to report that the quality of 
victim care was insufficient, particularly for male, disabled, foreign, 
and child victims, and also that assistance was inconsistently provided 
to foreign victims. In addition, the government did not provide 
undocumented victims some services unless they cooperated with law 
enforcement in the investigation of their traffickers. An amendment 
to the Act on the Protection of Children and Youth against Sexual 
Offenses adopted in May 2020 defined children under the age of 19 
in commercial sex as victims who should be provided counseling, 
medical assistance, legal support, and other assistance. Victims 
could file civil suits to receive compensation; the government did 
not report whether any victims received such compensation. The 
government issued G-1 visas to foreign victims of crimes, which 
allowed victims to stay and work in South Korea for up to one year 
while cooperating in investigations and prosecutions; because the 
government did not track identified victims, it was unable to provide 
the number, if any, of trafficking victims it issued G-1 visas. MOJ 
also reported foreign victims of sexual violence and trafficking were 
exempt from immigration penalties for remaining in the country 
beyond the permitted period of stay; five victims benefited from this 
provision during the reporting period, although it is unclear how 
many of these were victims of trafficking. Despite these benefits, the 
government did not provide legal alternatives to foreign victims’ 
removal to countries in which they face retribution or hardship and 
authorities frequently detained or deported foreign victims. 
NGOs also continued to report that some government officials’ 
lack of understanding of all forms of trafficking resulted in the 
misidentification and penalization of some victims for unlawful acts 
traffickers compelled them to commit. The government detained 
some foreign sex trafficking victims during investigations against their 
traffickers and deported them after investigations were completed. In 
addition, police arrested foreign sex trafficking victims, including at 
least one child during the reporting period, did not screen them for 
trafficking, and instead interrogated and penalized them for unlawful 
acts traffickers compelled them to commit. KNPA, MOJ, and the 
Ministry of Oceans and Fisheries (MOF) acknowledged some such 
instances of deportation of foreign trafficking victims, including some 
who self-reported, and attributed it to a breakdown in communication 
between investigators and immigration authorities. KNPA reported 
it had a policy to not inform immigration officials of the illegal 
status of victims who self-reported their exploitation to authorities; 
however, this policy was not extended to victims who did not self-
identify or were not accompanied by legal counsel or other service 
providers. The lack of a comprehensive policy across ministries to 
protect foreign trafficking victims from arbitrary deportation may have 
disincentivized KNPA from communicating with immigration to the 
detriment of information-sharing on trafficking trends and ensuring 
KNPA thoroughly investigated cases. Some police also reportedly 
believed KNPA policy required the detention and deportation of 
undocumented foreign victims whom traffickers had forced to 
commit unlawful acts; according to one NGO, police reported they 
were required to refer victims to immigration authorities within 48 
hours. During raids against entertainment establishments, where 
sex trafficking was common, police did not investigate trafficking, 
did not use guidelines to screen for trafficking victims, and often 






The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
government continued to coordinate efforts to prevent sex trafficking. 
An interagency taskforce established in March 2020 drafted the Act on 
the Prevention of Trafficking, etc. and Victim Protection and solicited 
feedback from civil society groups; the National Assembly adopted 
the legislation in March 2021. The legislation, which will not go into 
effect until 2023, will require the creation of a national anti-trafficking 
policy coordinator council, national action plans every five years, 
and 18 trafficking victim protection centers, among other initiatives. 
However, anti-trafficking NGOs widely criticized the legislation for 
its lack of penalty provisions for human trafficking and the usage of 
the term “human trafficking, etc.” which they stated is unlikely to 
address ongoing misunderstandings of the crime among government 
officials. The government continued efforts to raise awareness of sex 
trafficking through public broadcasting programs and ad campaigns 
on social media. However, while the coast guard issued press releases 
on its efforts to identify human rights violations against seafarers 
and persons with disabilities working in the fishing industry, the 
government did not make sufficient efforts to raise awareness of 
labor trafficking. Some NGOs reported an absence of effective or 
widespread anti-trafficking education campaigns, which contributed 
to low levels of awareness of human trafficking among the public. 
MOGEF continued to distribute trafficking awareness leaflets to 
Korean diplomatic missions abroad and anti-trafficking organizations 
in countries where Koreans were vulnerable to trafficking. To reduce 
the demand for commercial sex acts, officials provided schools, 
government agencies, and other public organizations with anti-
commercial sex and trafficking education programs, and it publicized 
the illegality of child sex tourism in airports. The government did 
not operate a hotline specifically for reporting potential trafficking 
crimes, but MOGEF continued to operate hotlines in 13 languages that 
were accessible to trafficking victims. MOF operated two call centers 
to provide counseling for migrant seafarers. The hotlines provide 
counseling and interpreting services in Indonesian, Vietnamese, 
Chinese, and Burmese languages. In 2020, the two call centers made 
31 and two referrals, respectively. 
NGOs continued to report traffickers exploited migrant workers 
through the government’s Employment Permit System (EPS). MOEL 
provided pre- and post-arrival education on labor and occupational 
safety, health laws, and sexual abuse to migrants working under 
EPS, and provided training to 2,356 ROK employers of foreign 
workers on the same subjects. MOEL provided interpretation, medical 
treatment, and counseling services to migrant workers through 
44 support centers that were partially funded by the government. 
NGOs expressed concern that the government did not adequately 
investigate unscrupulous recruitment agencies. The government’s 
restrictions on the ability of migrant workers employed under EPS to 
change employers increased their vulnerability to exploitation. The 
government asserted it permitted workers who reported exploitation 
or labor violations to MOEL to change their employers while MOEL 
investigated their claims. According to NGOs, however, MOEL 
reportedly did not adequately investigate workers’ claims and instead 
workers spent months attempting to prove their exploitation to MOEL 
before receiving permission to change their place of employment. 
In addition, employers who exploited their workers often only 
received small fines or suspended sentences. During the reporting 
period, MOEL established a training program for officials in charge 
of issuing employment permits to migrant workers; it trained 35 
officials on human trafficking definitions and indicators through 
this program. MOEL extended the employment period of some 
migrants who worked in agriculture, the fishing sector, and in other 
industries under EPS and who were unable to leave the ROK due to 
travel restrictions related to the pandemic. 
Traffickers capitalized on gaps in Korean labor laws to exploit foreign 
fishermen in forced labor. The Seafarers Act exempted migrant 
workers from the legal working and rest hours, overtime pay, and paid 
holidays prescribed for Korean fishermen. The Seafarer’s Act stated 
that the Minister of Oceans and Fisheries can set the minimum wage 
of seafarers (including fishermen), and while the Labor Standards 
Act applied to all seafarers and prohibited discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality, the annual Ministerial Notification on the 
Minimum Wage of Seafarers only set a minimum wage for Korean 
crewmembers. This allowed employment and fisheries associations, 
as well as the National Distant Water Fisheries Trade Union, to 
ultimately decide the minimum wage of migrant fishermen. These 
wages were not made public, but one NGO reported the minimum 
wage for migrant fishermen was ten times less than the minimum 
wage of Korean fishermen and that migrant workers often did not 
receive holiday or overtime pay. Furthermore, the government did not 
mandate fishing vessels return to ports for routine labor inspections. 
NGOs reported that unless they required maintenance, vessels were 
able to avoid returning to port and that many vessels remained at 
sea for more than a year at a time. The law also did not prohibit 
exploitative wage deductions or prohibit worker-charged recruitment 
fees, which enabled traffickers to use debt-based coercion to exploit 
migrant fishermen, as well as workers in other industries. To address 
some of these gaps, the government worked with employers and 
labor unions to develop and release two sets of guidelines and 
measures for protecting migrant fishermen in June and December 
2020. These guidelines aimed to improve the transparency of wage 
payments, improve regulation of recruitment agencies in sending 
countries, guarantee rest hours, introduce a standard labor contract, 
and ensure the provision of potable drinking water. However, NGO 
experts reported these newly announced measures would not be 
permanent or codified in law, and noted they did not include measures 
to ensure workers had access to their identify documents or ban 
the confiscation of passports. In addition as part of these measures, 
MOF announced that it would allow the National Federation of 
Fisheries Cooperatives (NFFC), which NGOs reported was not a 
government agency, to regulate the migrant worker recruitment 
process. NGOs expressed concern that this would not improve 
exploitative recruitment practices as similar arrangements with NFFC 
had been made in the past and unscrupulous practices continued. In 
addition, they noted the following gaps in the announced measures: 
a standard labor contract was already required by the Seafarers 
Act but not adequately enforced by the government; the planned 
measures with regards to minimum wages of migrant fishermen 
would still violate the Labor Standards Act ban on discrimination 
based on nationality; the measures allowed for flexible provision 
of rest hours which could still result in workers receiving minimal 
consecutive rest hours; the measures did not clearly define what would 
constitute a recruitment fee, (which the measures stated would be 
paid by the ship-owning company) thereby allowing workers to be 
charged recruitment costs under other terminology; and the measures 
allowed vessels to remain at sea for a maximum of 15 consecutive 
months. Furthermore, the government did not clearly explain how 
it would enforce these measures, especially when it did not require 
routine inspections. 
The Korean Coast Guard and MOF conducted surveys of working 
conditions for fishermen and other marine workers in May and 
June 2020, which resulted in 103 arrests of ship owners, captains, 
fish farm operators, and others in 2020. MOEL inspected 7,137 
workplaces and 493 residential facilities for migrant workers to 
ensure their suitable living conditions. Nonetheless, NGOs reported 
some migrant workers continued to live in inadequate conditions 
which likely exacerbated the exploitation of those in forced labor 
conditions. MOEL often provided employers advance notice of when 
inspections would take place, allowing unscrupulous employers to 
hide indicators of trafficking and coach victims for interviews ahead 
of inspections. MOGEF revised regulations related to the marriage 
brokerage business to prohibit international marriage advertisements 
that commercialize sex acts. Local governments encouraged and 
provided financial assistance to South Korean farmers to pursue 
marriages to foreign women through brokers; some of these women 













As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in South Korea, and traffickers exploit victims from 
South Korea abroad. Traffickers exploit South Korean women and 
children, including children who run away from home and victims of 
domestic violence, in commercial sex including in bars, nightclubs, and 
other entertainment establishments, or through internet-advertised 
escort services. Traffickers increasingly utilized smartphone and chat 
applications to recruit and coerce victims to engage in commercial sex 
acts and to facilitate trafficking by communicating with purchasers 
of commercial sex. Chat room operators recruit Korean women and 
children, including child sex trafficking victims, and threaten them 
with the release of compromising photographs to coerce them to 
participate in the production of pornographic materials. Traffickers 
exploit South Korean women overseas, including in the United States, 
in sex trafficking in massage parlors, salons, bars, and restaurants, or 
through internet-advertised escort services, often through debt-based 
coercion. Traffickers subject men and women primarily from China, 
Thailand, Russia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Indonesia, Morocco, 
and other countries in Asia, the Middle East, and South America, 
to forced labor and sex trafficking in South Korea. Traffickers force 
victims who owe debts to entertainment establishment owners or 
loan sharks into commercial sex. Sex traffickers exploit some foreign 
women on E6-2 entertainment visas—many from the Philippines 
and Thailand—in bars and clubs, including “foreigners only” bars 
near ports and U.S. military bases. However, many of the clubs that 
catered to U.S. military personnel remained closed since early 2020 
due to the pandemic. Job brokers, unscrupulous recruitment agencies, 
and managers or owners of bars and clubs recruit foreign women 
under false promises of jobs as singers or performers but instead 
coerce victims to work excessive hours selling juice and alcohol, and 
to engage in commercial sex acts in clubs. Recruiters and owners of 
massage parlors fraudulently recruit women for work as professional 
masseuses in Korea, but force them to engage in commercial sex acts, 
sometimes through passport confiscation, physical violence, and 
threats of deportation or violence. Some victims are not provided an 
adequate number of days off, face harassment, verbal and physical 
abuse, and are paid less than the minimum wage or have their 
wages withheld to discourage them from leaving Korea or seeking 
new employment. Some bar managers reportedly confiscate victims’ 
passports or alien registration cards and restrict their ability to go 
outside their workplace. Women from the Philippines and other 
countries in Asia enter Korea on tourist visas after receiving false 
promises of short-term work in factories or other industries but 
then have their passports confiscated by traffickers who force them 
to work in clubs and engage in commercial sex acts; however, this 
likely occurred less frequently during the reporting period due to 
pandemic-related restrictions on the issuance of visas. Some women 
from China, Vietnam, Thailand, the Philippines, and Cambodia, 
who are recruited for marriages to South Korean men through 
international marriage brokers, are vulnerable to sex trafficking and 
forced labor after their arrival. Some South Korean men reportedly 
engage in child sex tourism in other Asian countries; however, this 
likely occurred less frequently during the reporting period due to the 
pandemic. Travel restrictions and quarantine requirements related 
to the pandemic prevented traffickers from recruiting some foreign 
trafficking victims during the reporting period; this resulted in the 
increased exploitation of migrant women who were already in Korea. 
As the entertainment industry experienced a loss of business, some 
traffickers also used increased levels of violence and other forms of 
exploitation to force victims into commercial sex. Some brokers also 
force Korean women who worked in clubs prior to the pandemic 
into commercial sex.
Traffickers have forced some physically or intellectually disabled 
South Korean men to work on fishing vessels, and fish, salt, and cattle 
farms. Unscrupulous labor recruiters contribute to the forced labor 
of migrant workers, especially those from Vietnam, the Philippines, 
Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Mongolia through debt-based 
coercion by charging workers excessive fees, sometimes leading to 
thousands of dollars in debt. Approximately 200,000 migrant workers 
employed under the government’s Employment Permit System work 
in fishing, agriculture, livestock, restaurants, and manufacturing. 
Undocumented workers are also employed in these sectors, though 
there are no official statistics on their numbers. Some workers, both 
documented and undocumented, face conditions indicative of forced 
labor. Many migrant workers in the agriculture sector are forced to 
live in inadequate housing, sometime in greenhouses, shipping 
containers, or dormitories. South Korea is a transit point for Southeast 
Asian fishermen subjected to forced labor on fishing ships bound 
for Fiji and other ports in the Pacific. There are ongoing reports of 
widespread abuse, including forced labor, of migrant workers in the 
Korean fishing fleet, one of the world’s largest distant water fishing 
fleets. Recruiters, boat owners, captains, and job brokers often use 
debt-based coercion to exploit migrant fisherman in forced labor 
on Korean-flagged or -owned vessels. Reports estimate that nearly 
4,000 migrant workers, mainly from Indonesia, are employed on 
these vessels. Korean distant water vishing vessels frequently use 
at-sea trans-shipment of catches and can often stay at sea for a year 
or longer without visiting a port, limiting the ability of workers to 
report exploitation to authorities or to safely leave their exploitation. 
According to one study, Korean longline fishing vessels spend the 
longest amount of time at sea, travel the furthest distances, and have 
the longest daily fishing hours when compared with the world’s 25 
largest longline fishing fleets. Recruitment agencies and job brokers 
often charge fishermen excessive recruitment fees, sometimes as much 
as $13,000 for Indonesian and Vietnamese fisherman working on 
vessels in coastal waters, increasing their vulnerability to debt-based 
coercion. Migrant fishermen on distant water vessels often have the 
first three months of their wages withheld to serve as a “deposit” 
that they are unable to receive back until the completion of their 
contract. These workers are often then forced to work excessive 
hours, up to 20 hours per day, with limited rest hours or days off, 
face physical and verbal abuse by boat captains, salary deductions, 
are not provided adequate food and water, and are forced to live 
and work in unsanitary conditions. It is common for recruitment 
agencies, captains, and skippers, to retain coastal and distant water 
fishermen’s passports to prevent them from leaving their employment.
Anecdotal reports indicated government officials were occasionally 
complicit in trafficking and related crimes. Traffickers reportedly 
utilized partnerships with some law enforcement authorities to 
threaten victims with penalization and deportation. In one reported 
instance, an employer received information from corrupt police and 
immigration officials ahead of raids or immigration checks. NGOs 
reported some government employees, including police, sexually 
exploited children and solicited individuals in commercial sex, some 
of whom may have been sex trafficking victims. 
KOSOVO: TIER 2
The Government of Kosovo does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Kosovo remained on Tier 2. These efforts included adopting 
new standard operating procedures (SOPs) to increase the efficiency 
of prosecutions and designating a trafficking point of contact in all 
seven basic prosecution offices. The government increased resources 
for victim protection, including funds to NGO-run and state-run 
anti-trafficking shelters. However, the government did not meet the 
minimum standards in several key areas. The government convicted 
fewer traffickers, and judges continued to impose insufficient 
sentences on convicted traffickers. First responders lacked guidance 
on how to handle and proactively identify victims of forced begging, 
especially children. Due to the pandemic, the National Agency Against 
KOSOVO
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Trafficking in Persons (NAATIP) did not regularly hold meetings, 
and the government did not adopt the 2020-2024 Anti-trafficking 
National Strategy and Action Plan.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, including 
complicit officials, and sentence convicted traffickers to prison terms 
consistent with prescribed penalties. • Develop written guidance and 
enhance efforts to identify and assist children exploited in forced 
begging. • Adopt, resource, and implement the 2020-2024 Anti-
trafficking National Strategy and Action Plan. • Designate trained 
prosecutors and judges in every region to handle trafficking cases. • 
Continue providing advanced training to judges, prosecutors, and 
law enforcement on trafficking investigations and prosecutions. • 
Further reduce the judiciary’s backlog of cases, including trafficking 
cases. • Work with local authorities to strengthen victim protection 
throughout Kosovo, but particularly in the northern municipalities. • 
Increase government support for comprehensive vocational training 
and reintegration services for victims. • Standardize data collection 
and create a database that disaggregates statistics for trafficking and 
trafficking-related prosecutions and convictions. • Provide hotline 
operators training on handling trafficking cases. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Article 165 of 
the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed punishments of five to 12 years’ imprisonment 
and a fine for offenses involving adult victims and five to 15 years’ 
imprisonment and a fine for offenses involving child victims. These 
punishments were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other serious 
crimes, such as rape. In November 2018, the government revised the 
criminal code, which went into force in April 2019, and reclassified 
all forced prostitution offenses as trafficking and increased the 
minimum punishment for child trafficking from three years to five 
years’ imprisonment. Police, prosecutors, and courts maintained 
different methods for counting cases, resulting in inconsistent 
statistics across databases. Police initiated 62 new trafficking cases 
(43 cases in 2019) and arrested 10 additional suspects for “utilizing 
sexual services from a trafficking victim” (nine in 2019). Authorities 
prosecuted 20 new cases involving 32 suspects (43 new cases involving 
80 suspects in 2019). Courts convicted three traffickers (eight in 
2019) and convicted one perpetrator who “utilized sexual services 
from a trafficking victim” (five in 2019). Judges continued to issue 
sentences below the minimum penalty of five years’ imprisonment. 
One convicted trafficker received a two-year suspended sentence; one 
trafficker received six months’ imprisonment and a fine of €5,000 
($6,130); and one received three years’ imprisonment and a fine of 
€500 ($610). The perpetrator convicted for “utilizing sexual services 
from a trafficking victim” received one year imprisonment. Courts 
slightly reduced the overall backlog of trafficking cases; 68 cases 
remained open from previous years, compared with 74 in 2019.
The Trafficking in Human Beings Directorate (THBD) within the 
Kosovo Police (KP) investigated all trafficking cases through its eight 
regional units, and it also maintained a unit in the predominantly 
ethnic Serb northern municipalities. The Chief State Prosecutor’s 
Office (CSPO) continued to designate a special coordinator for 
trafficking to monitor cases, provide guidance, and participate in 
the task force. The government adopted new SOPs to increase the 
efficiency of prosecution efforts and designated a trafficking point 
of contact in all seven basic prosecution offices. THBD cooperated 
with the Labor Inspectorate to conduct 77 joint inspections of 
bars, nightclubs, restaurants, and massage parlors (171 in 2019). 
Separately, THBD also conducted joint operations with the Ministry 
of Trade and Industry, Tax Administration, and Labor Inspectorate to 
screen 59 coffee bars, nine massage parlors, four private houses, and 
three hotels, which led to the closure of 39 premises (78 in 2019). 
Observers reported the lack of trafficking training and experience 
among most prosecutors and judges resulted in weak sentences or 
cases that were instead charged as a lesser crime, especially cases 
involving emotional control or psychological coercion of a victim. 
Additionally, KP and border police required further guidance on when 
to classify forced begging of children by their parents as trafficking, 
instead of as parental neglect or abuse.
CSPO trained judges and prosecutors, and the KP Training 
Department, in cooperation with international organizations, held 26 
training events (48 in 2019). The Justice Academy trained prosecutors, 
judges, and victim advocates on trafficking issues. The government 
exchanged information with foreign governments on 18 trafficking 
cases (30 in 2019) and cooperated with Albania, Germany, North 
Macedonia, and Moldova on investigations. THBD, CSPO, and the 
KP Inspectorate cooperated to investigate government employees 
potentially complicit in trafficking offenses but did not report any 
new cases. Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes 
remained a concern, inhibiting law enforcement action during the 
year. In 2016, prosecutors indicted two police officers on separate 
cases of suspected abuse of an official position and sexual exploitation 
of trafficking victims. In 2019, Pristina Basic Court acquitted one 
of the officers.
PROTECTION
The government maintained victim protection efforts. The government 
identified 17 trafficking victims (26 in 2019). Of these, seven were 
exploited in sex trafficking and 10 in forced labor (20 were exploited 
in sex trafficking, three in forced labor, two in “slavery and servitude,” 
and one in domestic servitude through forced marriage in 2019). 
Fifteen of the victims were children (the same number as in 2019); 
there were seven female and 10 male victims (23 females and 
three males in 2019); all victims were from Kosovo (21 were from 
Kosovo, two from Serbia, two from Montenegro, and one from 
Albania in 2019). First responders used standard indicators to 
screen vulnerable populations; however, observers reported a lack 
of guidance and proactive identification efforts for victims of forced 
begging, especially children. A multi-disciplinary national referral 
mechanism (NRM) provided SOPs for identifying and referring 
victims to services. The NRM required an investigator from the THBD 
and a victim’s advocate from the Victim’s Assistance and Advocacy 
Office to convene and assess the victim as low, medium, or high 
risk of danger and coordinate victim care and placement; the NRM 
also required a social worker for child victims to participate in the 
assessment. NGOs continued to report the NRM functioned well 
and highlighted good cooperation among actors. 
The government licensed and partially funded two NGO-run shelters 
to provide services to victims, along with the state-run Interim Security 
Facility (ISF). ISF temporarily accommodated victims assessed as 
high-risk, such as victims with their trafficker still at large, victims 
testifying in court proceedings, or victims awaiting repatriation. 
Authorities required victims to have a police escort outside of the ISF 
while court proceedings were ongoing and required an approval from 
a prosecutor and the KP for high-risk victims to permanently leave 
the ISF. The facility had the capacity to shelter 40 individuals with 
separate rooms for females, males, and families, and victims stayed 
for an average of 90 days before transferring to an NGO-run shelter. In 
2020, ISF accommodated nine victims (27 victims in 2019). The three 
shelters provided legal assistance, medical and psychological services, 
counseling, education, recreational services, and rehabilitative support. 





to victims immediately after arrival, to ensure COVID-positive victims 
received medical attention and safety precautions. The Center for Social 
Welfare (CSW) also provided services to child victims but, due to the 
pandemic, CSW reduced work hours and the number of working social 
workers resulting in fewer referred cases and challenges in offering 
24-hour guardianship. Civil society reported good quality of care for 
victims, but reintegration programs had limited success due to a lack 
of resources and high overall unemployment.
The government allocated €205,000 ($251,530) for victim protection, 
an increase from €172,960 ($212,220) in 2019. This included an 
increase in funds for NGO-run shelters after years of inadequate 
funding and bureaucratic delays; NGO-run shelters received €105,000 
($128,830), compared with €67,000 ($82,210) in 2019 and €70,680 
($86,720) in 2018. ISF received €100,000 ($122,700), compared 
with €80,000 ($98,160) in 2019 and 2018. The Pristina municipal 
government also provided €13,000 ($15,950) to one of the NGO-run 
shelters, compared with €7,100 ($8,710) in 2019. NGO-run shelters 
reported government funding in 2020 was satisfactory. There were no 
reports the government penalized victims for crimes their traffickers 
compelled them to commit; however, due to a lack of consistent 
identification procedures for forced begging, some children may 
have remained unidentified within the law enforcement system. 
The law entitled foreign victims to a 90-day reflection period in 
which victims can recover before deciding whether to cooperate 
with law enforcement. Authorities afforded foreign victims the same 
rights and services as domestic victims, and the law entitled foreign 
victims to a temporary residence permit for at least six months; no 
foreign victims requested a permit in 2020 (same as in 2019). The 
government assisted in repatriating three victims (two in 2019). All 
17 victims participated in investigations by providing statements to 
THBD, prosecutors, and pre-trial judges (26 in 2019). The government 
reported suspected traffickers were not present when victims provided 
statements and foreign victims could return to their countries of 
origin after testifying without waiting for the conclusion of the 
trial. The law allowed compensation from the state if victims could 
not get restitution from their traffickers; one victim received €3,000 
($3,680) for mental health damages from the compensation fund 
(one child victim received €2,000 ($2,450) in 2019).
PREVENTION
The government decreased efforts to prevent trafficking, particularly 
due to the pandemic. NAATIP, composed of representatives from 
eight government ministries, the judiciary, municipal offices, victim 
advocates, NGOs, and international observers, coordinated interagency 
efforts and produced quarterly reports but did not regularly hold 
meetings due to the pandemic. In 2019, the government, in 
consultation with civil society, drafted the Anti-trafficking National 
Strategy and Action Plan 2020-2024; however, its approval remained 
pending, in part due to delays caused by the pandemic. While 
civil society reported NAATIP was less active, it highlighted strong 
cooperation with NAATIP and the national coordinator, including 
responsiveness to recommendations and concerns. The government 
organized an annual month-long awareness campaign and produced 
a video on child begging, but few events took place due to pandemic 
mitigation efforts. Separately, the government distributed leaflets on 
health services to trafficking victims, and THBD distributed leaflets at 
border points and held lectures and roundtables on anti-trafficking 
efforts. The Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare maintained a 
legal framework for the registration and licensing of private sector 
employers, including foreign employment agencies. The government-
operated hotline for victims of domestic violence and other crimes 
received 650 calls (831 in 2019), including six potential trafficking 
cases (nine in 2019). Observers reported operators needed training 
to respond properly to trafficking-related calls. The government 
aired a public service announcement to reduce the demand for 
commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Kosovo, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Kosovo abroad. Criminal networks exploited victims in sex trafficking 
internally. Many sex trafficking victims in Kosovo are girls, although 
traffickers also force women from Albania, Moldova, Montenegro, 
Romania, Serbia, and other European countries into sex trafficking. 
Women and girls are exploited in sex trafficking in private homes 
and apartments, nightclubs, and massage parlors. Children from 
Kosovo, Albania, and other neighboring countries are forced to 
beg within the country. Traffickers subject Kosovo citizens to sex 
trafficking and forced labor throughout Europe. Marginalized Roma, 
Ashkali, and Egyptian communities are vulnerable to forced begging 
and sex trafficking. LGBTQI+ persons, migrants, asylum seekers, and 
refugees also experience a higher risk to trafficking. 
KUWAIT: TIER 2
The Government of Kuwait does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking 
capacity; therefore Kuwait remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
continuing to utilize its specialized trafficking unit to investigate 
potential trafficking crimes and increase prosecutions and convictions 
under the anti-trafficking law, including taking legal action against 
complicit officials. It provided shelter and protection services to 
victims of trafficking, executed new policies to protect workers 
vulnerable to trafficking, and launched an employment accreditation 
system in collaboration with two international organizations to 
protect vulnerable workers through the labor recruitment process. 
However, the government did not meet the minimum standards in 
several key areas. Some officials continued to routinely use arbitration 
and administrative penalties to resolve grievances filed by domestic 
and other migrant workers instead of investigating such cases as 
human trafficking crimes; protracted litigation and subsequent 
appeals processes led most victims to decline to file court cases. The 
government did not regularly use standard procedures for proactively 
identifying victims and referring them for protection services, and 
it continued to detain, prosecute, and deport trafficking victims, 
including those fleeing forced labor.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Continue to increase law enforcement efforts to investigate, prosecute, 
and convict traffickers, including Kuwaiti citizens and allegedly 
complicit officials, under the 2013 anti-trafficking law rather than 
treating potential forced labor cases as administrative violations. 
• Proactively screen for trafficking indicators among vulnerable 
populations including those in government shelters, during migrant 
roundups, and during amnesty periods to ensure victims are not 
wrongfully penalized or deported for unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit. • Institute reforms to the sponsorship-
based employment system, including by allowing all workers to 
change employers without necessitated employer approval, ceasing 
prosecution of workers who flee their employment, ensuring no 
recruitment fees are transferred to workers, and increasing oversight 
of recruitment agencies and companies. • In adherence to Kuwaiti 




who illegally confiscate migrant workers’ passports. • Strengthen 
efforts to punish potential forced labor crimes criminally instead of 
administratively and refer instances of trafficking indicators, such 
as complaints of non-payment of wages, passport confiscation, and 
restriction of movement, for investigation as potential trafficking 
crimes. • Institute trainings for all relevant officials on mechanisms 
to proactively identify and refer to protection services all victims 
of human trafficking and routinely employ these procedures. • 
Continue to strengthen enforcement of the domestic labor law 
to ensure domestic workers’ rights are protected. • Commence 
construction on a shelter to accommodate male victims. • Given 
significant concerns about forced labor indicators in Cuban Medical 
Missions and experienced by Chinese nationals on projects managed 
by state-owned enterprises, screen Cuban medical professionals 
and Chinese nationals and refer them to appropriate services. • 
Continue to convene the official governmental committee and 
strengthen implementation of the national anti-trafficking strategy. • 
Expand efforts to raise anti-trafficking awareness, particularly among 
vulnerable populations, including migrant workers.
PROSECUTION
The government increased law enforcement efforts. The 2013 anti-
trafficking law criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and 
prescribed penalties of up to 15 years’ imprisonment for offenses 
involving an adult male victim and up to life imprisonment for 
those involving an adult female or child victim. These penalties were 
sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate 
with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. In April 
2019, the Constitutional Court annulled an article from the 2013 
anti-trafficking law that required judges to issue a verdict in trafficking 
cases, arguing the stipulation undermined judicial independence and 
precluded judges from exercising discretion. As a result, judges retained 
broad discretion to defer and delay issuance of verdicts in trafficking 
cases, as they did in other cases. The Public Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) 
and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) continued to require all cases of 
buying and trading of fraudulent visas, withholding of salaries and 
passports in excess of three months, or forcing individuals into jobs 
different from those contractually agreed upon be prosecuted under 
the anti-trafficking law rather than the labor law. 
The government’s specialized trafficking unit investigated 46 potential 
trafficking cases during the reporting year, compared with 51 in the 
previous reporting period. It received 42 referrals from the PPO, two 
from INTERPOL and two from the Public Authority for Manpower 
(PAM). In 2020, officials prosecuted 35 cases involving 109 suspects, 
up from 27 cases in 2019. The government issued verdicts in 16 cases 
involving 41 defendants; of those 41, the government convicted 28 
traffickers and acquitted 13 defendants. All convicted traffickers 
received sentences from three to seven years’ imprisonment. In the 
previous reporting period, the government convicted an unknown 
number of defendants in seven cases and acquitted an unspecified 
number in one case. The remaining 11 cases were pending at the close 
of the reporting period compared to five pending prosecutions the 
year prior. The government did not report disaggregated information 
on convictions for forced labor versus sex trafficking crimes. In April 
2020, the PPO prosecuted six defendants for human trafficking; 
the Criminal Court convicted and sentenced these six traffickers to 
penalties ranging from two years to life imprisonment with hard 
labor and 3,000 Kuwaiti dinar (KD) ($9,870) in fines. In a case 
stemming from the previous reporting period, in January 2021 the 
Criminal Court sentenced a Kuwaiti sponsor to death for the torture 
and murder of her Filipina domestic worker employee; the sponsor’s 
husband was sentenced to four years’ imprisonment for attempting 
to cover up the murder. 
Some government officials allegedly sold work visas to illegal recruiters 
or even directly to migrant workers, potentially facilitating trafficking. 
During the reporting period, the government charged multiple Kuwaiti 
officials with trafficking-related crimes in two separate high-profile 
cases related to visa trading and bribery. In the first case, the court 
sentenced a MOI police colonel and his Egyptian partners to three 
years’ imprisonment with hard labor for illegally facilitating the entry 
of hundreds of workers into Kuwait. The MOI colonel reportedly 
operated a front company for which approximately 1,200 migrant 
laborers did not have valid residence permits and were vulnerable 
to trafficking. In the second case, courts sentenced a member of the 
Bangladeshi parliament (MP) to four years in prison and a fine of 
1.9 million KD ($6.25 million) for bribing Kuwaiti officials to issue 
work visas. This allowed the MP’s company to bring in thousands 
of workers on fake or expired government contracts, making them 
vulnerable to labor trafficking; victims paid up to 3,000 KD ($9,870) 
each in exchange for visas, only to find they had no job after arriving 
in Kuwait. Courts also convicted several Kuwaiti officials, including a 
senior ruling family member and former MOI Assistant Undersecretary 
and a top official in PAM. 
Generally, Kuwaiti authorities did not routinely categorize or 
investigate labor violations as potential trafficking and typically 
treated such cases as administrative infractions. In April 2020, the 
Minister of the Interior announced the formation of an interagency 
task force to investigate employers and recruiting companies that 
use deceptive techniques to lure migrant workers to Kuwait through 
unenforceable contracts, fraudulent visas, and nonexistent positions, 
leaving these workers highly vulnerable to trafficking; however, the 
government did not report on the actions of the task force during the 
reporting period. Nonetheless, officials commonly used arbitration, 
which resulted in monetary compensation and repayment of back-
wages to victims, administrative fines, and closure of recruitment 
firms to resolve such cases. If a settlement could not be agreed 
upon, officials referred the case to the labor courts. If the complaint 
involved a severe abuse, such as assault or domestic worker abuse, 
authorities transferred the case directly to the PPO. Some domestic 
worker abuse cases were not prosecuted due to lack of evidence or 
witnesses. As a result, only severe cases of domestic worker abuse—
usually involving significant bodily injury or death—were prosecuted 
as violations of other criminal laws. Although the withholding of 
workers’ passports was prohibited under Kuwaiti law, this practice 
remained commonplace among sponsors and employers of foreign 
workers. During the reporting period, PAM received 1,122 complaints 
of confiscated passports, of which 304 complaints were referred to 
the labor courts; the government did not report how many employers 
PAM ordered to return employees’ identification documents or if 
it referred any of these complaints for criminal investigation. The 
Domestic Workers Employment Department (DWED) arranged six 
internal training programs on general trafficking topics for 47 of 
its staff members, and 76 PAM and DWED employees participated 
in trainings organized by international organizations. Due to the 
pandemic, MOI’s Anti-Human Trafficking Department did not 
conduct any trainings during the reporting period.
PROTECTION
The government maintained efforts to protect trafficking victims. The 
government reported it identified 103 trafficking victims during the 
reporting period; it did not report the number of victims identified in 
the previous reporting period. All identified victims received assistance 
at the government-run migrant worker shelter. In total, the government 
reported it assisted 461 vulnerable female workers at the government 
shelter, compared to 2,183 during the previous reporting period. 
The majority of those admitted to the shelter were potential victims 
of forced labor and had fled poor working conditions, including 
excessive hours and delayed payment of wages, or desired to return 
to their respective countries of origin. The government referred one 
of these residents not previously identified as a trafficking victim 
to the MOI’s anti-trafficking unit for further investigation. The 
DWED referred 185 vulnerable domestic workers to the shelter and 
provided repatriation assistance for 519 workers in total; the entity 
also recouped approximately 18,920 KD ($62,240) in unpaid wages 
for this vulnerable group. The Permanent National Committee for 
the Implementation of the National Strategy for the Prevention of 






adopted in 2018, to identify and prevent cases of trafficking; the 
mechanism contained six stages ranging from proactive identification 
of victims to their safe repatriation. The mechanism also aimed to 
improve intragovernmental coordination and expedite criminal 
charges in forced labor cases. Although the government reported that 
front-line officials and investigators continued to follow prescribed 
procedures regarding victim identification and used the NRM to refer 
abused workers and possible trafficking victims to the shelter, it did 
not report the extent to which it was employed. Representatives of 
labor-source countries reported that in some cases MOI or shelter 
staff turned away workers who were potential trafficking victims. 
During the year, the government-run shelter received referrals from 
embassies, NGOs, international organizations, churches, private 
citizens, and other migrant workers. The shelter served as a one-stop 
facility, providing medical and psychological care, food, rehabilitation 
support, and access to officials from various ministries to facilitate 
legal and repatriation assistance. The shelter employed a screening 
process to identify and categorize types of abuse and determine 
whether a resident was a victim of trafficking; during the reporting 
period, the government reported that one potential trafficking victim 
was identified through this screening process and was subsequently 
referred to MOI’s anti-trafficking unit for further investigation. 
Residents at the shelter had access to cell phones and legal assistance, 
as well as freedom of movement. Shelter management used a shift 
system wherein supervisors, medical staff, and investigators were on 
duty 24 hours per day. During the reporting period, the government 
reported that land had been identified for a second shelter for female 
residents of the current shelter; however, the government had not yet 
commenced construction on this new facility, planned since 2018, 
at the close of the reporting period. In April 2020, the Minister of 
Economic Affairs and Social Affairs announced that companies 
referred to the PPO on charges of visa trading would be required 
to cover all costs associated with sheltering and repatriating their 
registered employees; however, the government did not report if this 
announcement was implemented or if any companies referred to 
the PPO paid for shelter and repatriation costs of their employees 
during the reporting period. 
The government provided an annual budget of 100,370 KD ($330,160) 
for domestic worker shelter operations and protection programs for 
trafficking victims, a significant decrease compared to 2 million 
KD ($6.58 million) during the previous year. Embassies of the 
Philippines, India, and Sri Lanka maintained their own domestic 
worker shelters and worked closely with the Kuwaiti government to 
seek compensation and legal redress for their nationals subjected 
to exploitative working conditions in the country. However, during 
the reporting period, embassy workers allegedly “recycled workers” 
from their shelters by providing the worker new employment through 
illegal channels and receiving kickbacks, which rendered an unknown 
number of workers vulnerable to trafficking or re-trafficking. In 
cooperation with international organizations and foreign embassies, 
the government could assist victims in retrieving documentation and 
funding for repatriation. In the case of administrative deportation 
for vulnerable migrant workers, officials provided airline tickets 
and worked to recoup associated costs from the accused employers. 
The government allowed victims residing in its shelter to either 
change sponsors or be repatriated to their country of origin once 
their residency status was resolved or pending the resolution of 
a legal case or unpaid bills, without respective sponsor approval. 
Also, once the shelter admitted a victim, employers could not press 
“absconding” charges. The government did not report deporting 
those who faced retaliation or retribution in their respective home 
countries. Rather, the government allowed all trafficking victims to 
change employers and maintain residency in Kuwait or otherwise 
be resettled to a third country at the victims’ request; however, most 
shelter residents chose to be repatriated to their home country. During 
the reporting period, the government repatriated 617 shelter residents 
to their respective countries of origin and, in cooperation with two 
international organizations, provided repatriation, reintegration 
support, and transition assistance to more than 21 vulnerable 
domestic workers from nations without diplomatic representation 
in Kuwait who needed to procure travel documentation. In March 
2020, the MOI established the “Leave Safely” amnesty campaign to 
repatriate residency violators, either from residing in Kuwait illegally 
or becoming illegal after job loss due to the pandemic. The program 
granted violators amnesty through April 30, waived all penalties and 
fees, and provided violators free tickets back to their home countries, 
as well as the ability to return to Kuwait at a later time without being 
blacklisted (as a worker would be if they were deported for residing 
illegally in Kuwait). To facilitate the amnesty program, MOI set up 
repatriation centers in two neighborhoods where a large number of 
migrant workers resided. However, the government did not report 
screening for trafficking indicators among those participating in the 
amnesty program, and some potential victims may have remained 
unidentified. In July 2020, the MOI announced it would not deport 
an estimated 15,000 residency violators who were illegally present 
in Kuwait from January to February 2020 due to the closure of 
government ministries at the onset of the pandemic. The government 
granted these individuals temporary residency through August 
31, ensuring they maintained their legal status to mitigate further 
vulnerability. In December 2020, MOI announced a second amnesty 
for the remaining 150,000 residency violators in Kuwait through 
March 2, 2021; however, unlike the first amnesty period, violators 
were required to pay the necessary fines to legalize their stay or pay 
for their repatriation flights, without being subject to a blacklist.
Authorities continued to arrest, detain, and administratively deport 
some workers who fled their sponsors without permission. The risk 
of penalization, coupled with protracted litigation processes and 
exorbitantly high legal fees, discouraged workers from appealing 
to police or other authorities for protection and adequate legal 
redress for their exploitation. In addition, it was not uncommon 
for sponsors to file counter-grievances against their employees, 
including trafficking victims who reported abuse. This sometimes 
resulted in administrative deportation or detention of the employees 
and victims. Within worker communities, there existed a persistent 
fear that confiding in authorities would result in deportation, 
imprisonment, or return to the employer in question. In July 2020, 
PAM announced it would prevent business owners and companies 
from filing absconding charges against employees forced to stay 
home due to the pandemic lockdowns. PAM noted that it had 
received dozens of absconding reports from employers who used 
them to avoid their legal obligations to pay wages and provide food 
and accommodation to their employees. The government reported 
public prosecutors willingly tried cases on victims’ behalf using 
their oral and written statements; however, it lacked privacy laws to 
protect victims against potential retribution and often was unable to 
provide adequate care for victims throughout the duration of legal 
proceedings. Media reported the government directed settlements 
in response to individual civil suits against employers, but the 
government did not report the amount in civil damages paid out 
during the year. The government did not report how many victims 
received restitution.
PREVENTION
The government increased efforts to prevent human trafficking, 
although it did not take any new steps to reform the problematic 
sponsorship system. The Permanent National Committee for the 
Implementation of the National Strategy for the Prevention of 
Trafficking, established in 2018, convened three times during the 
reporting period; the Committee included the MOI’s Anti-Trafficking 
Department and Residency Affairs Division, PAM, and the PPO. The 
government reported that agencies tasked with combating trafficking, 
including those on the Committee, continued to operate during the 
pandemic, although their operations were limited by social distancing 
measures. In September 2020, PAM announced a collaborative 
program with the Supreme Council for Planning and Development 
and two international organizations, entitled “Tamkeen,” which 
included the creation of an International Recruitment Integrity 




employees, and recruiters to promote ethical recruitment. The 
government reported that Tamkeen was working to digitize PAM’s 
labor files in order to make the files trackable with the aim of 
eliminating the gaps in records of employment that allowed employers 
to circumvent the labor law previously; PAM officially launched the 
program in January 2021. In April 2020, the Council of Ministers 
instructed the Minister of Interior to form a working group with all 
stakeholder agencies to gather information and take legal actions 
necessary to counter visa trading, a significant indicator of trafficking. 
Additionally, MOI investigators questioned 1,600 residency violators 
that had signed up for the amnesty program and uncovered 28 “fake 
companies”; MOI referred the companies to the PPO for criminal 
proceedings. The government, in collaboration with an international 
organization, financially supported and conducted public awareness 
campaigns at shopping malls and the international airport to raise 
awareness of trafficking and warn against using illegal domestic 
labor recruitment companies. Various officials also took part in 
anti-trafficking awareness messaging on local television, radio, and 
social media platforms. The government continued to disseminate 
pamphlets to educate migrant workers on their rights, which were 
published in multiple languages and disseminated in airports, 
embassies, and labor-recruitment agencies. Authorities continued 
to employ the services of the government’s Mobile Labor Disputes 
Office to help workers in remote areas of the country file complaints 
against employers for labor law violations. The mobile unit was 
run by an emergency team of investigators, inspectors, interpreters, 
lawyers, and volunteers. Officials also advertised to migrant laborers 
online services that allowed workers and employers to dock and track 
workplace issues electronically, receive alerts if an employer filed an 
absconding charge, notify the respective source country embassy, and 
challenge legal settlements incurred. PAM maintained a hotline to 
receive general workplace grievances and potential trafficking cases, 
while DWED had an email address for the same purpose. Although 
both hotlines remained operational during the pandemic, neither 
entity reported how many trafficking-specific calls they received 
during the reporting period. 
The domestic labor law (Law 68/15) guaranteed domestic workers 
one day off per week, a maximum 12-hour workday, minimum 
wages paid per month, paid annual leave, and access to file formal 
grievances at the MOI, among other protections. The 2016 bylaws 
regulated implementation of this law. Amendments to the ministerial 
resolution of the 2010 labor law, passed in 2016, increased penalties 
for non-payment of wages, made mandatory documentation of 
all paid wages, and required prison time and fines for employers 
and government officials who failed to adhere to provisions of this 
law. Authorities continued to apply the amended provisions of the 
domestic labor law by building a monetary reserve to adjudicate 
cases of labor law violations to pay unpaid wages and cover the costs 
of repatriation. For issuance or renewal of a license for a domestic 
labor recruitment firm, it enforced the rule that single offices must 
submit financial deposits of 40,000 KD ($131,580) with a two-year 
validity and larger companies to present a letter of guarantee worth 
100,000 KD ($328,950). During the previous reporting period, PAM 
formed specialized administrative and oversight teams within the 
DWED aimed at safeguarding the rights of domestic workers. The 
teams were composed of 34 employees to manage arbitration of 
workplace disputes, inspection of premises, and licensing of firms.
The DWED continued to investigate domestic worker recruitment 
agencies to ensure compliance with the 2015 domestic labor law. 
In addition, it initiated investigations based on grievances filed 
by domestic workers, employers, and embassies of labor-source 
countries. The government arbitrated such grievances either through 
extrajudicial proceedings or through the labor courts. The DWED 
also reported it could refer suspected trafficking cases to the MOI for 
further investigation but did not report doing so during the reporting 
period. DWED officials received 2,634 work-related complaints, 
amicably resolved 867 in extrajudicial proceedings, referred 1,625 to 
the labor courts, and the others remained pending. With lockdowns 
and social distancing measures due the pandemic, the DWED 
conducted 10 inspections of domestic worker recruitment firms—
which identified six fake recruitment offices. The recruitment offices 
were subsequently shut down, and the owners were referred to MOI’s 
General Investigation Department. DWED consequently suspended 
37 recruitment firms for three to six months for violation of the 
domestic labor law, compared to 52 suspensions the previous year; 
officials did not report referring any of these for criminal investigation 
or prosecution. Separately, PAM received 10,498 official grievances 
from foreign laborers, the most common of which included pay 
discrepancies, denied requests to transfer employers after the required 
two years with an initial sponsor, and disputes regarding overtime 
pay issuances. Authorities reported resolving 90 percent of grievances 
in favor of the employees, to include transference of employer or 
receipt of unpaid wages; it referred the remaining 2,693 unresolved 
cases via arbitration to the labor courts. At the close of the reporting 
period, the outcomes for a majority these cases were unknown, but 
PAM reported referring two cases to MOI’s anti-trafficking unit for 
criminal investigation. In 2020, PAM conducted and/or participated 
in more than 15,475 inspections to ensure labor and residency laws 
were fully implemented by employers; these inspections resulted 
in roughly 1,100 citations and fines against violating companies. 
Additionally, PAM identified hundreds of companies that engaged 
in fraudulent practices by sponsoring workers yet failing to provide 
legitimate employment. Accordingly, PAM officials referred 915 
companies to MOI’s investigative department, permanently revoked 
files of 71 companies, and temporarily suspended files of more than 
3,400 companies in contravention of local labor laws. As of November 
2020, PAM had transferred around 417 company case files to the 
PPO over involvement in human trafficking since the onset of the 
pandemic; however, the government did not report the outcome 
of these referrals. Additionally, in the same month, PAM reported 
that it had formed crisis and emergency teams in addition to the 
existing inspection teams to monitor the conditions of expatriate 
workers during the pandemic. Under Kuwaiti law, a blocked file 
precludes companies from transferring workers to other employers, 
hiring new employees, and renewing their licenses to operate. In 
December 2020, PAM announced that it would no longer conceal 
the types of violations and crimes by companies found guilty of 
trafficking by removing obscure codes for 10,000 companies’ files 
and replacing the codes with clear information on their violations 
and crimes, such as violating workers’ rights, failure to pay salaries, 
and visa trading. The government reported that this information 
would eventually become accessible to the public via a website to 
enable greater transparency and hold companies that previously 
were in violation accountable for past crimes.
In adherence to the domestic labor law, the government’s centralized 
recruitment company, Al Durra, worked to reduce recruitment costs, 
curb illegal recruitment fees, provide greater oversight of recruiting 
practices, hire male domestic workers, and secure labor agreements for 
female employees. However, in 2019, Al Durra stopped working with 
expatriate employers after complaints suggested the mechanism was 
established to help Kuwaitis and was subsequently made available for 
Kuwaiti citizens only. The most common nationalities hired previously 
through Al Durra included those from the Philippines, India, Sri 
Lanka, and Burkina Faso. Kuwait maintained its agreement with the 
Philippine government to regulate the recruitment and employment 
of Filipino domestic workers in Kuwait to better safeguard their legal 
protections. The Commerce Ministry capped at 890 KD ($2,930) the 
ceiling for mandatory recruitment fees employers pay to agencies 
to recruit domestic employees; in actuality, a portion of these fees 
were transferred to the domestic employees. The government made 
efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts by continuing 
to enforce the law that makes prostitution illegal and by carrying out 
raids on suspected sex rings and massage parlors allegedly engaged 
in commercial sex practices. The government provided annual anti-







As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit foreign 
victims in Kuwait. Men and women migrate primarily from South and 
Southeast Asia, Egypt, and other countries in the Middle East to work 
predominantly in the domestic service, construction, hospitality, and 
sanitation sectors, and the vast majority arrive voluntarily. Unskilled 
laborers and female domestic workers are especially vulnerable to 
forced labor, as they often have limited access to assistance outside 
their worksite or employer’s home, and in some cases, due to the 
absence of diplomatic representation in Kuwait. In October 2018, 
Kuwait and India signed an agreement on broader protections for 
domestic workers that resulted in the end of India’s 2014 ban on 
Indian female domestic workers. However, as conditions for many 
remain perilous, numerous labor-source countries, including Bhutan, 
Burundi, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Indonesia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, continue to 
restrict their female nationals from domestic employment in Kuwait. 
The Kuwaiti government has continued its recruitment of domestic 
employees from African labor-source countries, and many workers 
continue to defy the respective bans by transiting through third 
countries before arrival in Kuwait.
Upon arrival, some sponsors subject migrants to forced labor, and 
to a much lesser extent sex trafficking, through the following illegal 
measures: non-payment of wages, protracted working hours contrary 
to contractual agreements, deprivation of food, substandard housing, 
threats or harassment, physical or sexual abuse, and restrictions on 
movement, such as confinement to the workplace and passport 
confiscation. Although unlawful, passport withholding by employers 
is ubiquitous in Kuwait. Furthermore, many migrant workers pay 
exorbitant fees to recruiting agents in their countries of origin and/
or are coerced into paying labor broker fees in Kuwait, which, 
according to Kuwaiti law should be paid by the employer, thereby 
plausibly rendering workers vulnerable to forced labor, including 
debt bondage. Visa trading continues to be a common manifestation 
of trafficking in Kuwait, and illicit visa trading markets increasingly 
expanded into social media during the reporting period. In some 
cases, officials do not provide workers copies of their contracts, or 
the contracts are not written in a language they can read. Some illegal 
labor recruiting companies facilitate trafficking through the use of 
deceptive techniques to bring in migrant workers on the basis of 
unenforceable contracts, fraudulent visas, and nonexistent positions. 
Some officials allegedly take bribes or overtly sell work permits to 
illegal labor recruiting companies or directly to migrant workers. Civil 
society groups, press outlets, and members of parliament called for 
the government to increase its efforts to protect victims and punish 
traders and their enablers. Chinese nationals working in Kuwait 
may have been forced to work on projects managed by state-owned 
enterprises, and Cuban nationals working in Kuwait may have been 
forced to work by the Cuban government.
Kuwait’s sponsorship law, which ties a migrant worker’s legal residency 
and valid immigration status to their employer, restricts workers’ 
movements and penalizes them for leaving abusive workplaces. 
Domestic workers are particularly vulnerable to forced labor inside 
private homes, as dominant cultural attitudes—particularly regarding 
the sanctity of the private household—sometimes enabled the 
exploitation of foreign workers. Many workers report experiencing 
work conditions substantially different from those described in the 
contract. In addition, sources report runaway domestic workers are 
sometimes exploited in sex trafficking by agents or criminals, who 
utilize their illegal status to ensure workers will not report illegal 
activity to authorities. Due to the pandemic, many migrant workers 
were dismissed from employment and trapped in Kuwait due to travel 
restrictions and expensive flights without any means of support, 
rendering them illegal and heightening their risk to trafficking. 
Others faced increased risk of abuse by employers as curfews and 
neighborhood lockdowns left them confined to their employer’s 
homes. The current reporting period saw an increase in press reports 
where employers physically prevented their domestic workers from 
leaving the country or transferring to another employer due to 
shortages in the labor market caused by airport closures in Kuwait 
for several months. The use of fraudulently obtained visas and fake 
work permits remains common. The current reporting period saw 
fewer sit-ins and protests by employees who had been sub-contracted 
to work for Kuwaiti ministries for companies, compared to previous 
years, likely due to the pandemic’s related mitigation efforts including 
curfews and neighborhood lockdowns.
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC: TIER 2
The Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (or Kyrgyzstan) does not fully 
meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but 
is making significant efforts to do so. The government demonstrated 
overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, 
considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-
trafficking capacity; therefore Kyrgyzstan was upgraded to Tier 2. 
These efforts included initiating investigations into potential cases 
of official complicity; reassessing hundreds of previously dismissed 
cases for trafficking indicators, leading to the reinstatement of several 
investigations; repatriating dozens of vulnerable Kyrgyzstani children 
from potentially exploitative circumstances in armed conflict zones in 
Iraq and Syria; and, with support from an international organization, 
developing and disseminating anti-trafficking training materials for 
police and prosecutors. However, the government did not meet the 
minimum standards in several key areas. For the third consecutive 
year, the government did not prosecute or secure convictions in 
any cases that featured genuine trafficking elements according 
to international law. Authorities relied heavily on international 
organizations for victim identification and service provision. Following 
political unrest, the central government disbanded the national 
anti-trafficking coordinating body, preventing the completion and 
approval of urgently needed standard operating procedures (SOPs) 
for implementation of the national referral mechanism (NRM). 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Respecting due process, investigate and, when sufficient evidence 
exists, criminally prosecute, convict, sentence, and incarcerate persons 
complicit in human trafficking, including government officials, and 
ensure convicted traffickers serve proportionate and dissuasive prison 
sentences. • Finalize, approve, train officials on, and implement SOPs 
for the NRM. • Increase efforts to proactively identify trafficking 
victims, particularly among such vulnerable groups as individuals in 
commercial sex, LGBTQI+ individuals, women and girls subjected to 
traditional forced marriage practices, Kyrgyzstani migrant workers, 
and Chinese nationals working in Chinese government-affiliated 
construction projects within Kyrgyzstan, as well as within increasingly 
vulnerable internet recruitment channels. • Redesignate a specific 
government body to coordinate inter-ministerial antitrafficking 
efforts. • Increase trafficking-specific training for law enforcement, 
including by contributing to the efforts of international organizations 
to train police, prosecutors, and judges. • Ensure identified trafficking 
victims are exempt from punishment for unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit. • Continue to collaborate with, and 
provide financial or in-kind support to, civil society organizations 
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assisting victims. • Implement child-sensitive investigation and 
prosecution procedures for cases in which children may be human 
trafficking victims. • Establish and implement a comprehensive anti-
trafficking data collection system for use by law enforcement and 
inter-ministerial coordinative bodies. • Eliminate the imposition of 
all employee-paid recruitment fees on Kyrgyzstani migrant workers.
PROSECUTION
The government modestly increased law enforcement efforts in some 
areas but, for the third consecutive year, did not prosecute or convict 
any traffickers. Articles 171 and 173 of the criminal code criminalized 
sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of 
two and a half to five years’ imprisonment, which were sufficiently 
stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with those 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as kidnapping. Prosecutors 
could also charge traffickers using Article 260 for engaging a person 
in prostitution through the use of force or the threat of force or 
fraud, which was punishable by a fine or imprisonment of three to 
five years’ if the victim was an adult, five to 10 years’ imprisonment 
if the victim was 14-17 years old, and 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment 
if the victim was younger than 14 years old. Investigators frequently 
downgraded trafficking crimes to lesser charges to ease investigation 
and prosecution, which lead to lesser penalties. 
Key government agencies and law enforcement bodies were required 
to work remotely for seven months during the reporting period as a 
pandemic mitigation measure; this, coupled with periods of severe 
political instability and subsequent turnover of stakeholder ministry 
leadership, significantly impacted investigative and prosecutorial 
efforts. During the calendar year, the government initiated 40 
trafficking investigations—24 for sex trafficking under Article 171 
and 16 for labor trafficking under 173—compared with one and 
seven, respectively, in 2019. This significant increase was due in part 
to the government’s efforts to formally reexamine more than 300 
previously dismissed cases involving potential trafficking elements. 
Of these cases, the prosecutor general’s office (PGO) referred 26 to the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) for reinvestigation; ten such cases 
related to “sexual exploitation” subsequently moved to new pre-trial 
proceedings under Article 166 (involvement into prostitution) and 
Article 171. Two cases related to “labor exploitation” were reopened 
for investigation under unspecified statutes. Seven of the 26 referred 
cases were formally terminated, and the remainder were ongoing 
at the end of the reporting period. Authorities also continued to 
investigate seven cases initiated in the previous reporting period. 
Many criminal cases were suspended due to pandemic-related delays 
in court proceedings and the redirection of limited law enforcement 
resources to pandemic mitigation activities; for much of the reporting 
period, police, attorneys, prosecutors, and judges had significantly 
reduced capacity to conduct enforcement and judicial work. As in 
prior years, courts continued to investigate trafficking cases under 
lesser statutes, and some prosecutions initiated under Articles 171 
and 173 featured elements that were inconsistent with the definitions 
of trafficking as established in international law, such as the sale of 
infants. Authorities reported prosecuting three fraudulent adoption 
cases under trafficking statutes but, for the third consecutive year, did 
not prosecute or secure convictions in any sex trafficking or forced 
labor cases that were consistent with international law. Unlike in 
previous years, the government did not provide information on 
how many such cases culminated in convictions (compared with 
11 suspects convicted of fraudulent adoption in 2019). 
Kyrgyzstan’s NRM, promulgated in 2019, allowed civil society and 
international organizations to file criminal complaints on behalf of 
victims; however, the government did not report if this provision was 
implemented during the reporting period. In previous years, victim 
advocates reported a general lack of proactive investigation, particularly 
of cases in which the victims did not self-report specific complaints. 
Courts may have improperly dismissed some trafficking cases on the 
basis of insufficient evidence, including several cases of child sex 
trafficking. Civil society continued to report the need for systemic 
training for law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges, particularly 
on how to identify victims, work with them as witnesses, and gather 
evidence outside of victim testimony. During the reporting period, 
the government collaborated with an international organization to 
develop and disseminate educational materials on anti-trafficking 
case methodology for law enforcement and judicial authorities in the 
southern region. The government, in conjunction with international 
donors and civil society partners, continued to conduct and participate 
in training sessions on improving international anti-trafficking 
cooperation, investigative and prosecutorial best practices, and 
provision of legal assistance to victims; these trainings proceeded 
in virtual format as a result of the pandemic. Authorities did not 
provide data on the total number of officials participating in these 
training events (compared with 1,119 MVD officials in 2019), but 
at least 30 prosecutors and investigators benefited from joint PGO 
and MVD training courses. Unlike the previous year, the government 
provided information on international investigations; authorities 
reportedly cooperated with the Government of Italy on a case 
involving a Kyrgyzstani suspect who may also have been a victim 
of forced criminality. In previous years, corruption and official 
complicity presented significant obstacles to anti-trafficking law 
enforcement, with law enforcement officials and judges accepting 
bribes to drop cases and, at times, warning suspects prior to raids. 
Traffickers were reportedly also able to avoid punishment by offering 
victims payment to drop cases in prior years. The judicial system 
continued to feature widespread corruption; during the reporting 
period, the government began investigating two law enforcement 
officials for potentially facilitating an unspecified trafficking crime; 
the investigations were in process at year’s end. The government did 
not report any prosecutions or convictions of government employees 
complicit in trafficking crimes. 
PROTECTION
The government modestly increased efforts to protect victims. The 
government reported proactively identifying or participating in the 
identification of victims, but authorities did not disaggregate such 
cases from the 111 victims identified by an international organization, 
compared with two forced labor victims reportedly identified by 
the government in 2019. NGOs reported identifying and providing 
services to an additional 82 victims. According to civil society 
groups, the government referred at least six forced labor victims, 
all Uzbekistani nationals, to NGO shelter services (compared with 
two forced labor victims identified and referred in 2019 and none 
in 2018). International organizations and NGOs did not provide 
information on victims’ genders, ages, nationalities, or types of 
trafficking in which they were exploited, compared with 60 exploited 
in forced labor and 12 in sex trafficking; one Uzbekistani national; 
one child; and 40 men and 32 women in 2019. 
The government formally promulgated the NRM in 2019, but 
the pandemic and political unrest significantly constrained its 
implementation during the reporting period. The NRM established 
formal policies on victim identification, assistance referral, provision 
of social services, and protection of victims’ personal data, and did not 
require victims to participate in a criminal case to receive assistance. 
It also included provisions that addressed the treatment and proper 
provision of assistance to children. However, SOPs to guide the NRM’s 
implementation—particularly at the oblast and local levels—remained 
incomplete amid a large-scale government restructure that disbanded 
the national anti-trafficking coordinating body. Civil society reported 
the NRM lacked specific measures outlining assistance for foreign 
victims and did not feature language explaining how NGOs could 
appeal in instances when the government failed to properly identify 
victims. Authorities did not proactively implement NRM provisions 
guiding victim identification among vulnerable communities. The 
government reportedly granted Chinese companies permission to 
circumvent pandemic-related border closures and enter the country 
to engage Chinese nationals in construction projects; authorities 
did not take steps to monitor these crews for the forced labor 










government trained law enforcement officials on the new NRM 
during the reporting period, but NGOs continued to ascribe the 
government’s insufficient victim identification to enduring capacity 
constraints. Absent sufficiently systematized procedures, some police 
demonstrated ad hoc efforts to screen and refer potential victims 
identified in enforcement operations, but they did not provide 
relevant data. The government continued to grant limited financial 
and in-kind support to two NGO-run shelters that provided services 
for trafficking victims, including foreign nationals, but the activities 
of these shelters were heavily constrained by the pandemic. During 
the reporting period, authorities opened a crisis center in Bishkek 
for women and girls subjected to domestic violence that could also 
accommodate trafficking victims; data on assistance provided at this 
facility and the two trafficking-specific shelters were unavailable in 
2020 (compared with nine Kyrgyzstani victims assisted in 2019). 
The government did not have a policy to provide longer-term shelter 
or residency options for foreign victims. In previous years, consular 
officials assisted trafficking victims with provision of no-cost travel 
documents for transit through migration and passport control, as 
well as with financial support, including the procurement of airline 
tickets for their repatriation; such information was unavailable in 
2020, in part due to pandemic-related border closures and travel 
restrictions. Authorities did not report providing any consular or 
repatriation assistance to Kyrgyzstani victims identified abroad. The 
government did not provide statistics on the repatriation of foreign 
victims in 2020, compared with one foreign victim repatriated 
in 2019 and 29 in 2018. The government took steps to repatriate 
dozens of highly vulnerable children born to Kyrgyzstani nationals 
who had traveled alongside relatives to armed conflict zones in 
Iraq and Syria; however, observers noted authorities at times did 
not demonstrate sufficient political will to repatriate adult ethnic 
Uzbek Kyrgyzstani nationals, some of whom reportedly experienced 
conditions indicative of sex trafficking or forced labor, from refugee 
camps in these and other conflict areas. 
Victims remained highly vulnerable to pressure from traffickers to 
withdraw their complaints or settle cases informally; MVD’s witness 
protection unit reported assisting trafficking victims but provided 
no additional details. Article 31 of the criminal code adopted in 
2019 allowed for investigative judges to receive victim testimony 
outside of court, or electronically over video calls; however, there 
was no evidence that victims benefitted from this provision in 
2020, despite an increase in the use of remote technologies for 
judicial processes during the pandemic. Government-provided 
attorneys reportedly lacked knowledge on handling trafficking cases. 
Observers noted insufficient legal representation for child victims. 
The government did not maintain or implement child-sensitive 
procedures for the investigation or prosecution of cases involving child 
victims. While the law provided the opportunity to seize traffickers’ 
assets and compensate victims, authorities did not report granting 
such restitution during the reporting period. There were no reports 
that officials fined, detained, or penalized trafficking victims for 
unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit; however, absent 
systematized screening procedures as part of law enforcement raids 
on commercial sex establishments, it is possible the government 
punished some unidentified victims through arrest or deportation.
PREVENTION
The government demonstrated uneven efforts to prevent trafficking. 
The State Migration Service (SMS), which formerly led the anti-
trafficking interagency working group and served as the national 
prevention coordinating body, was disbanded in March 2021 as part 
of a government restructuring campaign. The government reported 
that relevant anti-trafficking responsibilities would be transferred 
back to individual line ministries until a new coordinating body 
could be established, but this remained pending at the end of the 
reporting period. Although authorities did not report how many 
times the working group convened in 2020 prior to the abolishment 
of the SMS (twice in 2019), the working group did convene virtually 
during the pandemic to continue discussing implementation of 
the current national action plan (NAP) and preparations for the 
new NAP for 2021-2024, which remained in draft at the end of 
the reporting period. In 2019, the SMS established an additional 
interagency focus group of all relevant entities, including local state, 
non-state, and international actors to accelerate implementation of 
the NRM and improve law enforcement investigations of trafficking 
cases. Although it met twice in 2020, the operating status of this 
entity was unclear amid the pandemic, political instability, and 
inter-ministerial restructuring, as was that of the parliament’s anti-
trafficking task force, which acted as the group’s oversight body. 
Anti-trafficking coordination councils at the local level, composed of 
regional government representatives, NGOs, and local civic groups, 
continued to meet and were tasked with implementing the NRM, 
although the pandemic often significantly obstructed this work. 
The government cooperated with international organizations and 
continued to conduct awareness campaigns that reached thousands 
of people throughout the country. The government lacked a uniform 
system of collecting trafficking data, which, in conjunction with 
pandemic-related coordination challenges, continued to hinder 
effective self-evaluation. According to some civil society groups, 
the government increased the politically-motivated harassment of 
labor union activists while pursuing legislative amendments that 
would further restrict freedom of association among groups seeking 
to improve labor rights. 
As with other prevention activities, the status of government-led 
awareness-raising, pre-departure orientation, and service provision for 
Kyrgyzstan’s migrant workers was unclear following the dismantling of 
the SMS. Some of its activities began to slow prior to the government 
restructure amid a decline in labor migration stemming from 
pandemic-related border closures and travel restrictions. Despite 
these changes, the government, with the support of an international 
organization, continued to operate an employment center in Bishkek 
that provided an unknown number of individuals with information 
on employment services, vacancy advertisements, and licensed foreign 
labor recruitment agencies; it also offered pre-departure orientation—
which included trafficking prevention—for jobseekers to ensure safer 
migration and employment. The government maintained two publicly 
available databases of private employment agencies; one contained 
information on “government licensed” agencies, and the other a 
list of agencies about which the government received complaints. 
The government did not provide updates to the status of legislative 
amendments introduced in 2019 aiming to strengthen protection 
for migrant worker recruitment. By law, recruitment agencies could 
charge a maximum pre-departure fee of 1,000 Kyrgyzstani soms ($12) 
to Kyrgyzstani migrant workers seeking employment overseas. The 
government maintained a hotline for reporting domestic violence 
and general abuses against children, but none of the 129,000 calls 
received in 2020 led to the positive identification of any trafficking 
cases. The government also continued to provide a national toll-
free telephone line and office space to an NGO-run hotline that 
provided legal advice and assistance regarding working abroad, but 
authorities did not report information on calls received or relevant 
investigations initiated through this hotline (compared with two 
victims identified and no investigations initiated in 2019). The 
government continued to provide support for a mobile phone 
application that connected Kyrgyzstani migrants with information 
on workers’ rights and contact telephone numbers, including anti-
trafficking hotlines and local Kyrgyzstani embassies; additionally, the 
SMS maintained satellite offices in Russia, which continued to be the 
primary destination country for Kyrgyzstani labor migrants. During 
the pandemic, the government also worked with international donors 
to create online awareness materials and hold consultations on the 
risks of irregular migration for thousands of prospective Kyrgyzstani 
migrant workers. Unlike the previous year, the government reported 
providing some anti-trafficking guidance for its diplomatic personnel. 
The government did not report making efforts to reduce the demand 




As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Kyrgyzstan, and they exploit victims from 
Kyrgyzstan abroad. Adult male labor migrants working abroad are 
reportedly at the highest risk of trafficking. Kyrgyzstani men, women, 
and children are exploited in forced labor in Russia and Kazakhstan, 
and to a lesser extent in Turkey and Ukraine, Georgia and other 
European countries, as well as within Kyrgyzstan—specifically in 
agriculture, construction, textiles, domestic service, and childcare. 
As a result of a Russian labor migrant re-entry ban, thousands of 
Kyrgyzstani migrants are unable to return legally to Russia for work. 
Kyrgyzstani families on the Russian re-entry blacklist often send their 
children to work in Russia, where they are vulnerable to trafficking. 
Fearing this blacklist, some unemployed Kyrgyzstani migrant workers 
likely remain in Russia under irregular immigration status rather than 
returning home; traffickers may then be able to leverage threats of 
deportation as a coercive tool to secure and retain their forced labor 
or to compel them into sex trafficking. 
Observers note a pronounced increase in the use of online recruitment 
channels by trafficking syndicates during the pandemic. Sex traffickers 
exploit Kyrgyzstani women and girls abroad, reportedly in India, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, South Korea, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), and within the country. Women and underage teenaged girls 
from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan may be exploited in sex trafficking; the 
southern region of Kyrgyzstan is increasingly becoming a destination 
area for Uzbekistani and Tajikistani citizens who are exploited by 
sex and labor traffickers. Some men and women from Uzbekistan, 
Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan transit the country as they migrate to 
Russia and Kazakhstan, the UAE, and Turkey, where they may be 
exploited in sex and labor trafficking. Chinese nationals employed at 
Chinese government-affiliated construction projects within Kyrgyzstan 
may be vulnerable to forced labor. 
Within Kyrgyzstan, the practice of “bride kidnapping” by Kyrgyzstani 
men continues to place women and girls at risk of forced marriage 
that may subsequently lead to sex trafficking and forced labor. 
Unaccompanied children who engage in begging and children 
engaged in domestic work—often in the homes of extended family 
members—are vulnerable to traffickers. Some Kyrgyzstani children 
are vulnerable to forced labor in animal husbandry. Widespread 
unemployment and economic hardship among Kyrgyzstani migrant 
workers in Russia following the pandemic-related closure of businesses 
and work sites have led to a significant drop in earned income and 
remittance transfers, leaving these migrant workers and their families 
in Kyrgyzstan more vulnerable to trafficking. Some members of 
Kyrgyzstan’s LGBTQI+ communities may be more vulnerable to 
trafficking; pervasive social stigma and reports of police brutality 
against LGBTQI+ individuals attempting to report crimes may 
also dissuade LGBTQI+ trafficking victims from accessing justice. 
International organizations and NGOs report some Kyrgyzstani 
men and boys who travel to Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan to fight 
alongside or seek employment within armed groups—including 
some who are recruited with false promises of job offers in Turkey 
or elsewhere—are subsequently compelled to remain against their 
will, are subjected to forced labor in cooking, cleaning, and portering 
and combatant roles, and/or are forced to suffer sexual slavery. 
Kyrgyzstani women and children traveling with these individuals, 
at times under deception, are also vulnerable to sex trafficking and 
forced labor on arrival; some are reportedly placed alongside other 
Central Asian family members in makeshift camp communities, 
where their travel and identity documentation is confiscated and 
their freedom of movement is restricted. Some of these women 
report having lost their husbands to armed conflict, after which 
their economic hardships and confinement in the camps make them 
vulnerable to coercive local marriages that may subsequently lead 
to sex trafficking or forced labor.
LAOS: TIER 2
The Government of Laos does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts 
to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts 
compared to the previous reporting period, considering the impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Laos remained on Tier 2. These efforts included investigating, 
prosecuting, and convicting traffickers, approving national victim 
protection and referral guidelines, identifying and referring victims 
to protection services, maintaining a national anti-trafficking budget, 
improving cooperation with civil society, and implementing measures 
to protect the rights of Lao migrant workers abroad—including those 
seeking employment in domestic work. However, the government did 
not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. Authorities 
inconsistently utilized victim identification and screening procedures 
throughout the country. Police therefore penalized some unidentified 
sex trafficking victims for prostitution violations—unlawful acts their 
traffickers forced them to commit. The government continued to 
inadequately identify Lao and foreign victims of trafficking within 
Laos, despite acknowledgment by Lao authorities and NGOs of 
the increased risk of trafficking in special economic zones (SEZs), 
agricultural plantations, and large-scale infrastructure projects. 
Furthermore, law enforcement authorities did not adequately address 
or investigate suspected perpetrators of sex trafficking in at-risk 
sectors. Victim protection services remained insufficient for male 
victims of trafficking. 
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Continue to increase efforts to disseminate, implement, and train 
police and border officials on the national victim protection and 
referral guidelines, with a focus on vulnerable groups, and proactively 
screen for trafficking indicators among vulnerable groups, including—
but not limited to—Lao and foreign workers on large infrastructure, 
mining, and agricultural projects and returning from work overseas, 
and Lao and foreign women and girls in domestic commercial sex. • 
Train members of the central and provincial COVID-19 Task Forces, 
especially personnel involved in processing returning migrants, on 
victim identification and screening measures and victim referral 
procedures. • Proactively screen for and identify trafficking victims 
among women and girls discovered during police raids of nightclubs, 
karaoke bars, and other establishments that facilitate commercial 
sex. • Strengthen efforts to secure, formalize, and monitor border 
crossings in remote and mountainous areas commonly used by Lao 
labor migrants returning from abroad, and proactively screen for 
trafficking indicators among them. • Further train law enforcement 
officials at the national and local level on the Lao Penal Code to 
improve their ability to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers 
–including complicit officials and child sex tourists. • Increase 
trafficking investigations, prosecutions, and convictions. • Continue 
to collaborate with civil society to update and extend the national 
action plan beyond 2021, taking into account changing trends and 
trafficking vulnerabilities. • Further increase government efforts and 
resources dedicated to service provision and assistance programs 
for victims and expand these services for male victims. • Eliminate 
the requirement that victims formally request restitution to receive 
compensation from their traffickers. • Further reduce barriers to 
formal labor migration to reduce vulnerability of migrant workers, 
to include taking steps to eliminate employee-paid recruitment fees. 











• Continue to strengthen efforts at diplomatic missions overseas 
to identify and assist Lao victims of sex and labor trafficking. • 
Improve transparency and coordination by collecting information 
on government anti-trafficking activities, including case details and 
financial allocations, and share this information among all sectors 
and levels of government and with nongovernmental stakeholders. 
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. Article 215 of 
the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and 
prescribed increased penalties of five to 15 years’ imprisonment and 
a fine of 10 million to 100 million Lao kip ($1,080 to $10,780); 
if the offense involved a child victim, the fine range increased to 
100 million to 500 million Lao kip ($10,780 to $53,880). These 
penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, 
commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, 
such as rape. The Anti-Trafficking Department (ATD) within the 
Ministry of Public Security reported it initiated the investigation of 
21 potential cases of trafficking involving 43 suspected perpetrators 
from January to December 2020 (32 cases in 2019). Of these 21 cases, 
police completed the investigation of and referred to the People’s 
Prosecutor 10 cases involving 20 suspected traffickers in 2020 (14 
cases involving 25 suspected traffickers in 2019). Seven of the 10 cases 
involved fraudulent marriage—which may have involved corollary 
sex or labor trafficking indicators, but the government did not report 
these details—one involved labor trafficking, and two involved 
“trafficking,” but the government did not provide additional details 
of those cases. Additionally, two trafficking cases involving three 
suspected perpetrators initiated in 2019 remained pending with the 
People’s Prosecutor during the reporting period. Of the 12 cases, the 
People’s Prosecutor reported that there was not sufficient information 
to pursue three of the cases and it sent two back to the police for 
further investigation. The government secured convictions of 11 
traffickers in five cases in 2020 (three involving child sex trafficking 
and two involving forced marriage, although the government did 
not provide details on the forced marriage cases to confirm that 
sex or labor trafficking indicators were present), compared with 18 
traffickers convicted in 12 cases in 2019 (10 sex trafficking and two 
labor trafficking). Courts sentenced traffickers to between five and 
15 years’ imprisonment and fines under article 215 of the penal 
code. Police at the central, provincial, and district levels reported 
during police raids of entertainment venues, nightclubs, and karaoke 
bars, they were reluctant to make arrests of “first offenders” among 
those facilitating or purchasing commercial sex, including potential 
perpetrators of sex trafficking and child sex trafficking. Furthermore, 
the government did not report investigating potential perpetrators of 
sex trafficking within known establishments facilitating commercial 
sex in the Golden Triangle SEZ in Bokeo province, even though the SEZ 
was a part of the Ministry of Public Security’s jurisdiction during the 
reporting period. The government did not report any investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of officials for complicity in trafficking 
or trafficking-adjacent crimes during the year.
Authorities provided anti-trafficking trainings for law enforcement 
officials during the reporting period, including train-the-trainer 
sessions for the police; 129 police officials received trainings, which 
included 42 capital police officials and 51 police officials from six 
provinces. The government cooperated with China, Thailand, and 
Vietnam pursuant to existing bilateral agreements on information 
sharing, case investigation and prosecution, and victim repatriation. 
During the reporting period, the police cooperated with the Chinese 
police in an investigation involving an alleged Chinese sex trafficker 
who exploited two Lao girls. The government also continued to 
cooperate with the Chinese government on a case that it initiated in 
March 2020, which involved two suspected traffickers and six Chinese 
trafficking victims exploited in the Golden Triangle SEZ; per the 
bilateral agreement, in May 2020, the Lao government transferred the 
victims and alleged traffickers to Chinese authorities. Several provinces 
and districts maintained signed memorandums of understanding 
(MOUs) with Thai officials to promote cooperation. During the 
reporting period, the government received 57 Lao trafficking victims, 
which included 17 children, from the Thai government. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained victim protection efforts. The government 
continued to identify and refer trafficking victims to protection 
services; however, its lack of consistent identification and referral 
practices throughout the country remained an obstacle to combating 
trafficking during the reporting period. The central ATD was the sole 
authority able to formally identify trafficking victims. In practice, 
provincial police, immigration police, village-level authorities, the 
government-funded Lao Women’s Union (LWU), and NGOs could 
also screen for and identify victims and refer them to the ATD for 
formal identification. ATD and other police and border officials, 
including those stationed near or in at-risk communities, continued 
to use a victim identification manual; the LWU and Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA) also used this manual during the reporting 
period. Nevertheless, authorities did not proactively screen for and 
identify trafficking victims in foreign-owned rubber and banana 
plantations, SEZs, Laos-China railway construction sites, and garment 
factories—all locations that presented some indicators of trafficking. 
Officials reported that a lack of resources and personnel hindered 
efforts to proactively screen for and identify victims in these sectors. 
According to media reports during the reporting period, police at the 
central, provincial, and district levels were aware of establishments 
facilitating commercial sex in at least one SEZ, but police did not 
report screening for or identifying any adult or child sex trafficking 
victims in these establishments. Central and provincial level police 
officers reported that during raids of establishments facilitating 
commercial sex, failure to proactively screen for trafficking may 
have resulted in the arrest of some adult sex trafficking victims for 
prostitution violations; some child sex trafficking victims may have 
also been arrested due to officers’ inability to effectively determine 
their age. As of the beginning of the reporting period, the government’s 
National Task Force for COVID-19—a multi-sector committee led by 
the Ministry of Health (MOH)—assumed responsibility for screening 
all Lao migrants who returned to the country and oversaw COVID-19 
quarantine centers; however, due to the large volume of nationals 
returning to the country, the task force focused primarily on health 
examinations for returnees and did not consistently screen this 
vulnerable population for trafficking. For example, MOH reported 
the task force facilitated the return of and quarantined more than 
300 Lao migrant workers who returned from Malaysia—many of 
whom worked in the fishing industry—but it did not report if it 
screened this vulnerable population for trafficking. NGOs reported 
the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare (MLSW) screened for 
trafficking indicators among some nationals returning through 
formal checkpoints, but the government did not effectively screen 
for trafficking among those returning illegally at informal border 
crossings. Overseas, Lao diplomatic officials were responsible for 
identifying victims and reporting cases to the ATD or MOFA; however, 
the government did not report if these officials continued to employ 
victim identification measures during the reporting period. Notably, 
in April 2020, the government approved national victim protection 
and referral guidelines—which were developed in consultation 
with civil society—to establish uniform, protective procedures for 
referring victims to services with the opportunity to seek justice. 
Although the pandemic delayed the government’s efforts to officially 
disseminate the guidelines to relevant authorities for a few months, 
the LWU—which was tasked with compiling the guidelines—began 
to disseminate them during the reporting period. LWU also reported 
that authorities demonstrated implementing the guidelines through 
its efforts to assist in the return of Lao victims from Thailand and 
China during the reporting period. The government did not report if it 
funded the repatriation of foreign victims during the reporting period. 
The government identified 21 victims of sex trafficking and 39 victims 
of labor trafficking; 66 victims of fraudulent marriage, which may have 
included corollary sex or labor trafficking indicators; and 16 victims 
of other forms of exploitation. All identified victims were citizens of 
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Laos and the majority of these victims were exploited abroad, mostly 
in China and Thailand. The government did not report identifying 
any foreign trafficking victims during the reporting period. The ATD 
did not report if it counted or tracked victims who declined official 
assistance. The government referred all 60 identified victims of sex and 
labor trafficking, as well as the 82 victims of fraudulent marriage and 
other forms of exploitation, to the LWU for services, which operated 
the government’s single shelter for trafficking victims. In comparison, 
in 2019, the government did not report a comprehensive number 
of identified victims but reported the LWU provided services to 39 
identified victims. The 2016 anti-trafficking law entitled victims to 
shelter, legal counseling, medical services, education or vocational 
training, and financial assistance for reintegration, regardless of sex 
or nationality; however, in practice, the government did not provide 
sufficient services for male victims. The provision of shelter or other 
protective services were not contingent upon victims’ cooperation 
with law enforcement or testimony in court. The Supreme People’s 
Court reported that it continued to allow victims to testify behind 
a curtain to protect their privacy and ensure their safety, but it did 
not report how many victims testified against traffickers during the 
reporting period. The LWU and the MLSW were responsible for 
providing reintegration services for trafficking victims but relied 
heavily on NGOs to provide such assistance. The government reported 
that victims may request civil compensation and that this civil 
procedure can be combined with a criminal trial; the courts ordered 
nine defendants convicted in 2020 to pay compensation to their 
victims (four victims in total), with 78 million LAK. The government 
did not report providing legal alternatives to the removal of foreign 
victims to countries where they may face hardship or retribution. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. The government 
reported its budget for anti-trafficking activities remained the same 
as the previous reporting period, which was 300 million Lao kip 
($32,330) provided to each ministry. Some agencies, especially service 
providers, reported they had incurred extra expenses in 2020 due 
to the high volume of returning migrant workers; the government 
provided extra funds to the MOH for anti-trafficking activities, in 
part to assist in the unusually high number of victims returning from 
Thailand. The ministerial level National Steering Committee on 
Anti-Human Trafficking and the working-level National Secretariat 
on Anti-Human Trafficking continued to meet regularly and led 
Laos’ anti-trafficking response. The Prime Minister’s 2018 decree on 
the creation of multi-sectoral anti-trafficking steering committees 
at the provincial and district levels to implement the 2016 anti-
trafficking law and national action plan remained a priority; all 18 
provinces and districts maintained committees. Coordination with 
civil society organizations continued to improve throughout the 
reporting period through joint formal consultations, sharing of best 
practices, and partnerships at national and sub-national levels. The 
government implemented its 2016-2020 national action plan and 
continued to consult with civil society organizations—for a new 
plan covering 2021-2025. The government’s annual progress report 
on implementation of the existing plan was not publicly available.
The government continued to conduct a range of anti-trafficking 
education and outreach efforts through public posters, radio 
segments, and television, including a nationally broadcast weekly 
television program on trafficking issues. In December 2020, the 
government conducted awareness-raising on child sex tourism for 
50-60 representatives from local anti-trafficking committees, tourism 
businesses, restaurants, and hoteliers in Champasak and Salavan 
provinces, then held similar activities in Vientiane Capital and 
Savannakhet in March and April 2021, respectively. The government 
also reportedly provided an anti-trafficking training to tourist-focused 
businesses during the reporting period. The ATD continued to operate 
a trafficking hotline, which received an average of 15 calls per month, 
but observers reported it was not fully staffed by an officer who could 
answer or address calls. The LWU also operated a hotline for domestic 
and gender-based violence and human trafficking, which served as the 
de facto national trafficking hotline; the hotline received 60-100 calls 
a day, but the government did not report how many trafficking cases 
or victim referrals it received from the hotline. Observers reported 
that staff at both hotlines did not always provide effective assistance 
or follow-up, and public awareness of these hotlines was limited. 
Regulations for Lao workers migrating abroad were designed to prevent 
trafficking but in some cases may have exacerbated vulnerability to 
it. In May 2020, the Prime Minister issued Decree No.245 on the 
placement of Lao workers abroad, intended to protect the rights and 
interests of both workers and recruitment agencies; it also eliminated 
the ban on domestic work, which previously created the risk that 
some workers would migrate through informal channels and increase 
their vulnerability to unscrupulous agents and traffickers. During the 
reporting period, MLSW conducted skills training and job placement 
services for Lao workers, in an effort to discourage returned migrants 
from illegally seeking employment abroad. MLSW continued to 
oversee 24 recruitment agencies authorized to recruit for jobs abroad, 
although most of these agencies were closed during the reporting 
period. These agencies acted as gatekeepers to the formal migration 
process in Laos, and Lao law allowed these agencies to charge workers 
various recruitment fees. A 2002 MOU on employment cooperation 
with the Government of Thailand remained active and provided for a 
formal labor migration process, but it was costly to workers (requiring 
forced savings for repatriation and payment of other fees), complex, 
and time-consuming. As a result, the MOU process did not dissuade 
migrants from utilizing irregular migration schemes, though it led to 
higher wages and fewer hours of work. A 2020 study conducted by an 
international organization reported that while the bilateral process 
did not always prevent Thai employers from exploiting workers, 
the process offered victims with assistance in both Thailand and 
Laos. A 2018 study by an international organization found formal 
recruitment centers passed on fees to workers; many workers did not 
understand the contracts they signed with the recruitment centers; 
and some Thai employers withheld workers’ passports—all of which 
increased workers’ vulnerability to trafficking. The MLSW continued 
to employ a labor attaché in Thailand who could register employment 
grievances of Lao workers in the country, but the government did 
not report if the attaché received anti-trafficking training or if the 
attaché formally identified any trafficking victims in Thailand during 
the reporting period. The government scheduled standard anti-
trafficking trainings for its diplomatic personnel in 2020, but they 
were delayed due to COVID-19 restrictions; however, MOFA and LWU 
held a training session for consular officers on victim identification 
and referral in February 2021. Government capacity to register births 
and issue family books and other civil documents, particularly in 
remote areas of the country, remained limited and contributed to 
vulnerability; however, the government began to modernize civil 
registration systems in March 2021. The government did not make 
efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
domestic and foreign victims in Laos, and traffickers exploit victims 
from Laos abroad. Laos is primarily a source country for human 
trafficking, particularly to Thailand and China, as well as Vietnam 
and Malaysia. Traffickers exploit a large number of Lao women and 
girls in Thailand in commercial sex and forced labor in domestic 
service, factories, or agriculture, and in some cases exploit those sold 
as brides in China in sex trafficking or domestic servitude. Traffickers 
exploit Lao men and boys in forced labor in Thailand’s fishing, 
construction, and agricultural industries. Lao trafficking victims, 
especially from the southern region of the country, are often migrants 
seeking opportunities abroad whom traffickers exploit in labor or 
sex trafficking in destination countries. Some victims migrate with 
the assistance of legal or illegal brokers charging fees, while others 
move independently through Laos’ 101 official border crossings 
using valid travel documents. Many of these border crossings are 
managed by provincial or district level immigration authorities with 





easier transit points for traffickers to facilitate the movement of Lao 
victims into neighboring countries. Foreign traffickers increasingly 
collaborate with local Lao middlemen to facilitate trafficking. In 2020, 
the pandemic had an impact on the vulnerability of Lao nationals 
returning from abroad. In March 2020, thousands of Lao migrants 
formally and informally working in Thailand and other countries, 
including Malaysia and China, began to return to Laos, which led 
to widespread unemployment within the country and increased 
economic hardship for families dependent on foreign remittances. 
These conditions placed Lao workers in potentially exploitative 
situations as they sought low paying jobs in Laos or illegally migrated 
for work abroad. Police observed that the closure of the Laos-Thai 
border has created a local demand for commercial sex; local officials 
speculate that the lack of access to work in Thailand coupled with 
economic hardship could lead to an increase in individuals engaging 
in commercial sex, increasing their vulnerability to sex trafficking. 
Traffickers in rural communities often lure Lao women and girls 
with false promises of legitimate work opportunities or promises 
of marriage—typically through the use of marriage brokers—to 
nationals in neighboring countries, primarily China, and then subject 
them to sex or labor trafficking. Children from poor, rural areas are 
especially vulnerable. Students often have little incentive to continue 
their education, especially given the legal work age of 14 and the 
lure of higher wages abroad. With no oversight by local authorities, 
foreign and Lao workers at or near foreign-owned or foreign-operated 
agricultural plantations—including banana and rubber plantations—
railway construction sites, and SEZ are extremely vulnerable to forced 
labor and sex trafficking. A study conducted by an international 
organization in 2019 reported the presence of women and children 
in commercial sex near Chinese-financed railway construction sites. 
There are reports that the Boten Economic Zone near the border 
with China houses a flourishing commercial sex industry. Other 
reports indicate that Burmese nationals working as manual laborers 
or involved in commercial sex near the Lao portion of the Golden 
Triangle—the geographic area marked by the intersection of the Lao, 
Burmese, and Thai borders—may be victims of trafficking; a media 
report from February 2021 indicated the presence of Lao, Chinese, 
Burmese, Thai, and Vietnamese nationals in commercial sex in the 
Golden Triangle SEZ, some of whom may be trafficking victims. 
Traffickers also exploit Vietnamese, Chinese, and Lao women and 
children in sex trafficking in larger Lao cities and in close proximity to 
national borders, casinos, and SEZs—reportedly to meet the demand 
of Asian tourists and migrant workers. NGOs estimated in 2018 that 
13,000 individuals in Laos are in commercial sex in established 
businesses and are potentially vulnerable to sex trafficking, with as 
many as three times that figure operating independently throughout 
the country. Reports indicate child sex tourists from the United 
Kingdom, Australia, and the United States have traveled to Laos for 
the purpose of exploiting child sex trafficking victims. 
LATVIA: TIER 2
The Government of Latvia does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do 
so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts compared 
to the previous reporting period while considering the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Latvia remained on Tier 2. These efforts included investigating more 
trafficking cases; seizing significantly more assets from suspected 
traffickers; and identifying and referring more trafficking victims. 
Furthermore, the government amended the labor law to protect the 
rights of employees posted abroad and hold employers liable for the 
employee’s terms of employment and working conditions. However, 
the government did not meet the minimum standards in several key 
areas. Courts convicted one trafficker and issued a suspended sentence 
with no prison time—thereby denying the serious nature of the crime. 
Officials struggled to identify child trafficking victims even though 
children in state orphanages remained vulnerable to sex trafficking. 
Many judges and prosecutors lacked a sufficient understanding of all 
forms of trafficking and how to apply anti-trafficking laws.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Investigate, prosecute, and convict trafficking cases under the 
trafficking statute (Section 154-1 of the criminal law) rather than for 
lesser crimes and issue significant sentences, involving imprisonment 
of at least one year, to convicted traffickers. • Proactively identify 
trafficking victims, including children induced into commercial sex 
and victims of sex trafficking in Latvia’s legal commercial sex industry, 
and provide relevant training to authorities. • Develop and implement 
a national referral mechanism to include guidance on identification, 
referral, and information exchange among stakeholders. • Expand 
efforts to educate officials involved in judicial proceedings, particularly 
prosecutors and judges, to understand all forms of trafficking and 
apply anti-trafficking laws. • Increase anti-trafficking training for law 
enforcement officials on working with victims, evidence collection, 
and understanding psychological coercion. • Train authorities from 
agencies tasked primarily with non-trafficking issues to identify 
trafficking cases for investigation and refer victims for assistance. 
• Regulate and monitor recruitment agencies for labor trafficking 
indicators and hold fraudulent agencies civilly or criminally liable. 
• Approve and implement a national action plan (NAP) for 2021.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Sections 154-
1 and 154-2 of Latvia’s criminal code criminalized sex trafficking 
and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to eight years’ 
imprisonment for offenses involving adult victims and between three 
and 12 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving child victims. 
These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other serious 
crimes, such as rape. Judges and prosecutors had the power to reclassify 
cases from Section 154-1 to lesser crimes. Prosecutors could charge 
trafficking crimes under Section 164, which criminalized exploiting 
vulnerability or using deceit to involve individuals in commercial 
sex with prescribed penalties as lenient as community service or a 
fine. Additionally, law enforcement officials reportedly were more 
likely to investigate and charge suspected traffickers for crimes other 
than trafficking, such as pimping and transfer for sexual exploitation. 
Authorities used Section 165-1, which prohibited the transfer of 
individuals for the purpose of sexual exploitation, to prevent potential 
cases of trafficking by charging perpetrators who attempted to recruit 
individuals for sexual exploitation schemes abroad.
The State Police’s anti-trafficking unit, comprising 18 officers and 
specializing in investigating trafficking, brokered marriages, and 
related crimes, investigated seven new cases (one sex trafficking and 
six labor trafficking) under Section 154-1, an increase from three 
in 2019. Authorities prosecuted two traffickers (one sex trafficking 
and one labor trafficking) under Section 154-1 (three in 2019), and 
courts convicted one trafficker (three in 2019). The convicted trafficker 
received a suspended sentence with no jail time, whereas in 2019 the 
convicted traffickers received prison sentences of five years and two 
months each. Under Section 165-1, authorities investigated one new 
case, prosecuted one defendant, and convicted zero traffickers. By 
comparison, in 2019, authorities investigated one case, prosecuted 
four defendants, and convicted two traffickers, who received prison 
sentences of six years and six months. In 2020, the anti-trafficking 
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police unit seized approximately €1.7 million ($2.1 million) in 
assets from suspected traffickers, a significant increase from €463,000 
($568,000) in 2019. The majority of the assets seized pertained 
to a labor trafficking case in a cookie factory involving Indian 
and Uzbek workers. The prosecutor general’s office reviewed one 
judicial assistance request in a trafficking case from Germany and 
submitted one to Morocco. A specialized prosecution office reviewed, 
monitored, and managed all Riga District Court trafficking-related 
cases pertaining to Section 154-1. The government did not report 
any new investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government 
employees complicit in human trafficking offenses.
Perennial issues within the judicial system, such as lengthy trials and 
lenient sentences, which often resulted in no jail time for convicted 
traffickers, remained the government’s greatest deficiency—providing 
limited deterrence, contributing to the underreporting of trafficking 
crimes, and undermining defendants’ rights to a fair trial within a 
reasonable time. For instance, a 2014 case involving two Riga police 
officers charged with facilitating pimping remained in court at the 
end of the reporting period. Reports persisted that police, prosecutors, 
and judges lacked an understanding of trafficking. Experts noted 
the need for more training for authorities, particularly on applying 
anti-trafficking laws, working with victims, evidence collection, and 
understanding psychological coercion. The government addressed 
knowledge gaps during the reporting period by training prosecutors 
and consular employees on aspects of labor trafficking; judges 
on prevention measures; border guards on victim identification; 
and police on the different types of trafficking and recruitment 
methods. Experts noted, though, that a lack of interest in training 
among law enforcement officials often led to poor attendance at 
international and local seminars. To improve law enforcement’s 
response to trafficking, the government committed to a project with 
an Estonian university and international organizations to enhance 
law enforcement cooperation and training on trafficking.
PROTECTION
The government increased efforts to protect victims. In 2020, 
authorities identified 47 trafficking victims (37 labor trafficking, 10 
sex trafficking), an increase from 39 in 2019. Police, immigration, 
and social services utilized written procedures for identifying victims. 
Authorities referred victims to the assistance program based on 
decisions by either law enforcement or an NGO-led panel of experts. 
Experts reported most government agencies lacked either the practical 
experience or willingness to identify victims and noted agencies tasked 
primarily with non-trafficking issues rarely referred trafficking cases 
for investigation or victims for assistance. Additionally, experts raised 
concerns that the lack of a centralized referral mechanism hindered 
coordination among stakeholders and the facilitation of care for all 
potential victims. Subsequently, in August 2020, the prime minister 
directed the development of a national referral mechanism to include 
guidance on identification, referral, and information exchange. 
Identifying child trafficking victims domestically remained a challenge; 
authorities identified two children in 2020 (one in 2019) even though 
government officials cited orphanages as vulnerable and noted an 
increase in potential trafficking cases involving children in recent years. 
Observers maintained the crime remained underreported and stated 
further education of staff at institutions, such as orphanages, could 
lead to increased identification of child trafficking victims. In 2019, the 
Office of the Ombudsman, in conjunction with an NGO, monitored 
sexual abuse in orphanages and boarding schools to identify the risks 
of sex trafficking in the sector but, due to the pandemic, ceased the 
study during 2020. Nevertheless, the ombudsman maintained children 
of municipal and private social care providers were most vulnerable 
to trafficking risks. Child protection conducted 76 inspections of 
possible children’s rights violations (eight at orphanages), but none 
resulted in a trafficking case.
The government continued to contract two NGOs to assist victims in 
the state-funded, NGO-run assistance program, allocating €201,000 
($247,000), a notable increase from €135,000 ($166,000) in 2019. 
The program offered victims medical and psychological assistance, 
legal representation, housing, and reintegration services. While shelters 
were available to trafficking victims, with the growing number of labor 
trafficking victims, NGOs reported the need for specialized shelters. 
The assistance program certified more victims in 2020 (44 compared 
with 35 in 2019) due to the increase in identified labor trafficking 
victims. Thirty-one of the victims certified were foreign nationals (28 
in 2019), continuing the swing from 2018 when all certified victims 
were Latvian nationals. Experts attributed the shift to an increase in 
domestic labor trafficking of guest workers from India, Tajikistan, and 
Uzbekistan in the Latvian agriculture and construction industries. 
Latvian law allowed foreign victims to receive residence permits and 
a 30-day reflection period to consider claiming formal status as a 
trafficking victim. In 2020, the government granted a 30-day reflection 
period to eight victims and issued 17 temporary residence permits. 
Experts expressed concern about human trafficking in Latvia’s legal 
commercial sex industry and the potential penalization of victims, 
noting law enforcement’s focus on fining potential victims who were 
not in compliance with regulations or other criminal statutes, rather 
than on identifying victims. Government regulations on assistance 
to trafficking victims limited state-funded rehabilitation services 
to six months, although victims whose cases went to trial received 
assistance, mostly legal counselling, for the duration of the legal 
proceedings. In 2020, 22 victims cooperated with law enforcement, 
a significant increase from four in 2019; 20 were victims of labor 
trafficking. Two trafficking victims received compensation from the 
State Agency for Judicial Assistance, which administered the victims’ 
compensation program (three in 2019). During the reporting period, 
the government amended the Law on Social Services and Social 
Assistance to prohibit trafficking victims from losing their social 
allowances once they received court-ordered compensation. In 
2020, one trafficking victim received partial court-ordered restitution 
from their traffickers (two in 2019). One trafficking victim received 
state-funded voluntary repatriation and other services through the 
state assistance program.
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. Although the 
government’s NAP expired during the reporting period, a new NAP 
was pending review and approval. Several ministries published 
quarterly and annual reports on trafficking, including a survey on the 
scope and social backgrounds of identified victims. The ministries of 
interior and foreign affairs conducted a joint awareness campaign, 
informing the public about the different forms of trafficking, risks 
and repercussions associated with trafficking, and opportunities for 
assistance. Other government agencies also contributed to a number 
of public awareness campaigns, including on safe travel and labor 
exploitation. In accordance with European Parliament directives, the 
government amended its labor law, obligating employers to regulate 
working conditions for employees posted abroad. The government 
also amended the law to penalize employers for not providing a 
written contract and minimum wage to employees. With the rise 
of third country nationals arriving in Latvia for employment, the 
government amended labor regulations on recruitment agencies, 
requiring agencies to provide job-related information to employees 
in a language they understand. Based on regional research examining 
labor trafficking cases, particularly cases combining economic crime 
and illicit financial flows, the government developed guidelines for 
authorities to use in identifying cases. Latvia led a regional project to 
support stakeholders in combating and disrupting labor trafficking 
by analyzing and consolidating information, improving assistance 
to victims, and increasing prosecution of traffickers. In 2020, the 
state monitored the activities of licensed employment agencies, but 
did not report any canceled licenses for agencies in violation, the 
same as in 2019. The government did not make efforts to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex acts. The State Police participated in an 
international project aiming to combat sexual exploitation among 
children by addressing trafficking risks, victim vulnerability, and 
cooperation with law enforcement. A special police unit focused on 





protection maintained a helpline for child victims of abuse, including 
trafficking. The government maintained emergency helplines that 
received 74 calls on potential trafficking situations.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Latvia, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Latvia abroad. Traffickers exploit Latvian women and girls in sex 
trafficking in Latvia, other parts of Europe, and the United States. 
Latvian women recruited for brokered marriages in Western Europe 
are vulnerable to sex trafficking, domestic servitude, and forced labor. 
Traffickers target single women with limited education, children 
from disadvantaged families, students, unemployed adults, and 
people with mental disabilities by word-of-mouth and through 
social media. Latvian men and women are exploited in forced labor, 
mainly in other parts of Europe. The government reports a decrease 
in international trafficking, which it attributes to underreporting. 
Government officials report an increase in domestic labor trafficking 
of guest workers, particularly men, from India, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, 
and Ukraine, most of whom arrive in Latvia legally with Schengen 
or student visas and mainly work in the agriculture, construction, 
food, and hospitality industries. The State Labor Inspectorate reports 
increasing numbers of illegal workers in the transportation industry, 
including taxi drivers from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan who receive 
work contracts from Polish recruitment agencies, at risk to trafficking. 
Illegal migrants from Vietnam, Pakistan, Algeria, and Russia, some 
of whom may be or may become trafficking victims, transit Latvia 
en route to Western Europe. Observers reported children in state 
orphanages are particularly vulnerable to sex trafficking, although 
there have been no documented sex trafficking cases of children 
living in state institutions.
LEBANON: TIER 2
The Government of Lebanon does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Lebanon remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
temporarily waiving requirements for employer approval to allow 
migrant workers to change employers, extending migrant workers’ 
residencies through June 2021 in response to the pandemic, amending 
reporting processes to prevent automatic penalization of migrant 
workers leaving abusive employers, and increasing investigations. 
However, the government did not meet the minimum standards 
in several key areas. The government did not initiate any new 
prosecutions or convict any sex or labor traffickers. The government 
did not approve the labor law amendment extending legal protections 
to all foreign workers or approve the draft standardized contract 
for migrant workers. The government did not implement formal 
victim identification and referral procedures, which resulted in the 
potential for some victims to face arrest, detention, or deportation 
for unlawful acts their traffickers compelled them to commit. 
Lebanon’s sponsorship system continued to create vulnerabilities 
for the exploitation of migrant workers and remained a significant 
impediment to authorities identifying and protecting trafficking 
victims.
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Develop and implement government-approved procedures for officials 
to identify trafficking victims among vulnerable populations, such as 
illegal or detained migrants, women holding artiste visas, domestic 
workers, and Syrian refugees, for referral to protection services. 
• Increase efforts to ensure trafficking victims are not arrested, 
detained, or deported for unlawful acts their traffickers compelled 
them to commit, such as immigration or prostitution violations. 
• Enact the labor law amendment extending legal protections to 
all foreign workers, including domestic workers and artiste visa 
holders, and approve the draft standardized contract for migrant 
workers as submitted to the State Shura Council. • Strengthen and 
expand efforts to reform the sponsorship system to ensure all foreign 
workers, including domestic workers and artiste visa holders, are 
not bound to abusive employers, and allow workers full freedom 
of movement, including by permanently waiving previous employer 
approval requirements for workers to change employers. • Increase 
prosecutions and convictions of perpetrators of all forms of trafficking 
under the anti-trafficking law and investigate for potential trafficking 
crimes employers and recruitment agents who withhold workers’ 
passports, travel documents, or wages. • Increase efforts to train judges, 
prosecutors, law enforcement officials, and diplomatic personnel 
about the crime of trafficking and application of the anti-trafficking 
law. • Screen all detained domestic workers in detention centers for 
trafficking indicators and refer victims to care. • Take concrete steps 
to improve oversight of artiste visas, a program that contributes to 
the vulnerability of women to sex trafficking. • Ensure the judiciary 
coordinates with the Directorate of General Security (DGS) to 
consistently apply the anti-trafficking law by granting temporary 
residency permits for trafficking victims and allowing victims to 
work. • Continue to work in partnership with NGOs to screen , 
identify, and provide protection services, including witness support 
during criminal proceedings, for all victims. • Increase efforts to raise 
public awareness of trafficking, including exploitation of migrant 
domestic workers. • Formally establish the victim assistance fund. 
•Adopt and implement the draft national anti-trafficking action plan. 
• Improve the judiciary’s capacity to collect, compile, and track data 
and outcomes of trafficking cases from all courts.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained uneven law enforcement efforts. The 2011 
anti-trafficking law criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed penalties of five to seven years’ imprisonment and 
fines if the offense involved an adult victim, and 10 to 12 years’ 
imprisonment and fines for those involving a child victim. These 
penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, 
commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such 
as rape. The government did not have a law that prohibited or 
penalized confiscation of workers’ passports or travel documents 
by employers or labor agents. 
During the reporting period, the Internal Security Forces (ISF) 
investigated 12 cases, confirmed by the judiciary as instances of 
human trafficking, involving 77 suspects—67 men and 10 women—
for sex trafficking; the 12 cases involved 38 sex trafficking victims. 
Additionally, DGS investigated 206 cases of suspected trafficking 
involving migrant domestic workers and adult nightclub workers 
holding artiste visas. DGS reported it determined 128 of the 206 
cases met the criteria for trafficking cases; some of the cases involved 
multiple violations. DGS investigations resulted in the following 
outcomes: referral to judicial or law enforcement authorities for 
further investigation, payment of back wages to workers, repatriation 
of migrant workers, and denying or restricting employers and sponsors 
from hiring migrant workers, including domestic workers. The 218 
total investigations in 2020 represented an increase from the 191 
investigations initiated during the previous reporting period. The 
government reported one prosecution continued from a previous 
reporting period but did not report initiating any new prosecutions 
or convicting any sex or labor traffickers during the reporting period. 










This was a decrease in prosecutions and convictions in comparison 
to the previous reporting period, during which the government 
prosecuted 46 alleged traffickers and convicted and sentenced 22 
traffickers. The government did not report investigations, prosecutions, 
or convictions of government officials complicit in human trafficking 
offenses during the reporting period.
Due to pandemic mitigation measures, the government assigned all ISF 
units, including the anti-trafficking unit, to lockdown enforcement for 
at least a week at a time at multiple points in the reporting period; the 
units could not complete regular duties while so assigned. In addition, 
the government either closed courts or significantly reduced their 
operating capacity due to pandemic-related mitigation measures; all 
but emergency trials were suspended, and the government prioritized 
completing investigations that would allow the release of pre-trial 
detainees to reduce overcrowding in prisons. The government reported 
pandemic-related lockdowns and mitigation measures hindered 
investigators’ ability to collect evidence and victim testimonies. The 
ISF anti-trafficking unit remained understaffed and underfunded with 
only 22 officers covering all of Lebanon and no field offices outside 
of Beirut; this continued to limit the ISF’s work and ability to recruit 
and train new officers for the unit. Additionally, government officials 
and NGOs continued to report some judges lacked understanding of 
the anti-trafficking law and knowledge of best practices for handling 
trafficking cases. Officials generally sought to resolve trafficking cases 
involving foreign workers through mediation between the employer 
and worker, rather than referring them for criminal prosecution. 
Government officials continued to report security forces were reluctant 
to arrest parents for subjecting their children to trafficking, usually 
in forced begging, due to a lack of social services available should 
the child be removed from the family. The ISF, DGS, and Ministry 
of Justice (MOJ) continued to occasionally include specialized anti-
trafficking training as a part of their curriculum for personnel. The 
government also continued to encourage officials to participate in 
anti-trafficking trainings provided by NGOs, though the pandemic 
forced the postponement of many trainings.
PROTECTION
The government increased victim identification and protection 
efforts, although the government remained dependent on NGOs 
to provide most victim services. The government did not formally 
adopt draft procedures for the identification and referral of victims 
to NGO services; in practice, officials continued to identify and refer 
trafficking victims to care on an ad hoc basis. In November 2020, 
the government convened international organizations and NGOs 
via virtual fora to develop a plan to finalize adoption of the draft 
victim identification procedures. While the government established 
steps towards adoption, it did not finalize a timeline due to the 
caretaker status of the government. During the reporting period, 
the Ministry of Social Affairs (MOSA) requested an international 
organization’s assistance to develop a digital tool to better identify 
trafficking victims among vulnerable populations, including migrant 
workers. The government identified at least 156 trafficking victims 
and referred all of them to NGO protection services during the 
reporting period. The number of victims identified and referred 
to services in 2020 represented a substantial increase from the 63 
victims the government identified in 2019. The government reported 
a DGS-operated hotline received 211 calls but did not report if it 
identified any victims through hotline calls or referred any cases for 
investigation. Through the Ministry of Labor’s (MOL) complaints 
office and 24-hour hotline, it received 300 complaints but did not 
report further details.
The government did not directly provide protection services to 
trafficking victims but continued to work in partnership with NGOs 
to provide essential victim services. Government officials noted the 
pandemic limited NGOs’ ability to assist victims due to movement 
restrictions and social distancing measures that reduced the number 
of new victims entering shelters and made service provision difficult. 
NGO-run victim care facilities in Lebanon were dedicated only to 
female and child trafficking victims; there were no services available 
or government resources dedicated to male trafficking victims, even 
though trafficking of men in the construction sector reportedly 
continued. An NGO reported referring male victims to their embassy 
or consulate for accommodation during the reporting period. Pursuant 
to a longstanding memorandum of understanding, renewed during 
the reporting period, between the government and an NGO, DGS 
referred female victims to an NGO-run safe house and provided 
security for the location; the government did not allow victims to 
work while receiving assistance at the safe house. In response to 
pandemic-related mitigation measures, the NGO updated the safe 
house to include single-occupant rooms for quarantine purposes. In 
2020, the safe house assisted 145 trafficking victims. Victim services 
were not time-limited or conditional upon victims’ cooperation with 
law enforcement. MOSA also continued to coordinate and fund the 
provision of protection services to child trafficking victims through 
contractual agreements with NGOs. Foreign embassies that provided 
shelter to nationals when NGO shelters were full reported providing 
accommodation to an increased number of their nationals, including 
domestic servitude victims, due to the economic crisis; for example, 
the Philippines embassy regularly housed 140 migrant domestic 
workers in a space meant for 30. DGS expanded a December 2019 
amnesty program through June 2021 to waive most overstay fines 
and provided plane tickets for an unspecified number of migrant 
workers, including potential trafficking victims; although the program 
still required out-of-status migrants to pay one year’s worth of 
fees—between 300,000 lira ($200) and 400,000 lira ($270)—DGS 
waived all fees when NGOs or foreign embassies requested. For the 
second consecutive year, MOSA coordinated with an international 
organization to provide technical support for the development of 
an implementation decree to create a victim assistance fund; the 
decree remained in draft form at the end of the reporting period. 
In September 2020, the caretaker Minister of Labor attempted to 
introduce an amendment to the draft labor law extending legal 
protections to foreign and domestic workers; however, the State 
Shura Council determined a minister in caretaker status could not 
submit an amendment to a law. 
The government continued to arrest, detain, and/or deport unidentified 
victims for unlawful acts their traffickers compelled them to commit, 
such as domestic workers who fled abusive employers, out-of-status 
or irregular migrant workers, women holding artiste visas, and persons 
in commercial sex. NGOs reported some foreign victims, including 
migrant domestic workers, sometimes refused to file complaints or 
retracted testimony due to fear of reprisal or deportation. Under the 
sponsorship system, foreign workers—including foreign trafficking 
victims—who left their place of employment without permission 
from their employer forfeited their legal status, thereby increasing 
the risk of arrest, detention, and deportation. In February 2021, DGS 
adopted new administrative procedures for employers to inform 
DGS about domestic workers that have left the workplace; the new 
procedures replaced previously used employer complaint systems 
that automatically launched prosecutions of migrant workers who 
left their workplace. In addition, DGS prohibited the use of certain 
language in official reports implying domestic workers violated 
employment conditions such as “fled” or “ran away,” replacing 
them with the phrasing “left the workplace.” Authorities could 
subject foreign workers without valid residence and work permits 
to detention for one to two months—or longer in some instances—
followed by deportation; due to the pandemic, authorities did not 
exercise this authority during the reporting period. Furthermore, 
authorities could immediately deport women holding artiste visas 
upon arrest for prostitution violations; however, DGS reported it 
did not deport any artiste visa holders during the reporting period 
and voluntarily repatriated 53 artiste visa holders, five of which were 
repatriated following trafficking investigations. During the reporting 
period, DGS extended all residency permits for all migrant workers 
until June 2021 to mitigate increased vulnerabilities resulting from 
the pandemic. DGS continued to operate a 750-person detention 






violating the terms of their work contracts or visas. For the last 
several years, DGS allowed an NGO to operate a permanent office 
inside the detention center that allowed staff unhindered access to 
detainees to provide medical and psycho-social services. However, 
due to a decrease in government funding to the NGO over the past 
two reporting periods, the NGO was unable to continue providing 
health services to detainees—including trafficking victims—and was 
only able to provide social and legal services. DGS also continued 
to permit the NGO to interview detainees to identify trafficking 
victims among the detention center population, although interviews 
were limited due to pandemic-related mitigation measures; NGOs 
identified 16 trafficking victims in the detention center during the 
reporting period, compared with 49 victims the NGO identified in 
2019. In response to the pandemic, DGS announced only detainees 
with pending judicial action would be held at the detention center 
and other detainees would be released with the option of temporary 
residency or repatriation assistance. DGS reported that as of September 
2020, DGS had released and repatriated 600 of the 700 detainees that 
had been at the center at the start of the reporting period. The NGO 
continued to report high levels of professionalism, sensitivity, and 
awareness among DGS officials and investigators, which allowed the 
NGO to more effectively identify victims among detainees.
Victims could file civil suits to obtain compensation; the government 
did not report whether courts awarded compensation to victims 
through civil suits during the reporting period. Investigative judges 
could exclude the identity of a victim from official reports if there 
was a concern that providing information about the crime could 
result in a threat to the life or safety of the victim or their family; 
the government did not report whether this provision was used 
during the reporting period. In addition, victims could provide 
testimony via video or written statement, but the government did 
not report whether this was used during the reporting period. Victims 
were also allowed to reside in Lebanon during an investigation 
of a trafficking case upon a judge’s decision, but the government 
did not report that any judges issued such a decision during the 
reporting period. NGOs continued to report foreign victims preferred 
quick administrative settlements followed by repatriation rather 
than long criminal prosecutions because of the lack of protection 
services or resettlement options during the criminal proceedings. An 
international organization reported pandemic-related lockdowns and 
airport closures further encouraged victims to return home rather 
than remaining in Lebanon under severe lockdown measures and 
poor economic conditions. Therefore, authorities faced challenges 
pursuing potential cases of trafficking when victims chose voluntary 
repatriation rather than facing an often-lengthy trial process because 
they were not present in the country to testify against their traffickers. 
The government did not provide temporary or permanent residency 
status or other relief from deportation for foreign trafficking victims 
who faced retribution or hardship in the countries to which they 
would be deported.
PREVENTION
The government maintained weak efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
national anti-trafficking commission under the National Human 
Rights Committee continued to coordinate anti-trafficking efforts 
during the reporting period. The government did not adopt its 2013 
draft national anti-trafficking action plan, but relevant ministries 
continued to implement portions of the plan. The government, at 
times in coordination with NGOs and international organizations, 
conducted public awareness campaigns during the reporting period. 
The MOJ also planned a conference with international organizations 
and NGOs to mark World Day Against Trafficking in Persons in July 
2020, but the government canceled the conference due to pandemic-
related restrictions. DGS and the MOL continued to operate hotlines 
to receive reports of abuse and migrant worker complaints, including 
suspected trafficking crimes. The MOL hotline received 300 calls, and 
the DGS hotline received 211 calls during the reporting period. The 
government did not report whether the government identified any 
victims or initiated any investigations as a result of these calls. DGS 
continued a program to inform artiste visa holders about restrictions 
and obligations of their visa status upon arrival to Beirut International 
Airport. Under the program, if the visa holder objected to the visa’s 
terms, they were free to return to their home country. DGS reported 
that seven women who entered the country on an artiste visa chose 
to return immediately to their home countries without continuing 
to their place of employment during the reporting period. Under a 
directive from DGS, airport officers continued to return passports 
directly to foreign domestic workers upon their arrival in Lebanon, 
but NGOs reported that many employers ultimately confiscated 
workers’ passports in private.
The government continued coordinating a working group with an 
international organization focused on reforming the sponsorship 
system established in the previous reporting period. In September 
2020, the caretaker Minister of Labor approved a draft standardized 
work contract for migrant domestic workers drafted in the previous 
reporting period as part of the working group’s efforts. However, in 
October 2020, the State Shura Council suspended the use of the 
new standardized contract following a legal challenge by a trade 
organization representing recruitment agencies. The standardized 
contract remained suspended at the end of the reporting period. MOL 
finalized standardized operating procedures begun in the previous 
reporting period to refer migrant workers to services that call the 
MOL’s complaint hotline. Because many domestic workers became 
unemployed due to the economic crisis, DGS waived requirements 
for notarized employer approval for workers to change employers 
during the reporting period; the government did not report for how 
long these requirements would be waived. A 2015 ministerial decree 
prohibited recruitment agencies from requesting or receiving any 
worker-paid recruitment fees, but the government acknowledged 
there were numerous unregistered recruitment agencies operating 
illegally which may have charged migrant workers recruitment 
fees. In 2020, the MOL closed six recruitment agencies for labor 
violations or complaints of mistreating migrant domestic workers. The 
MOL also maintained a list of an unknown number of recruitment 
agencies that had committed fraudulent recruitment practices. The 
government, however, did not report prosecuting any recruitment 
or employment agencies for potential trafficking crimes during the 
reporting period. The government did not take steps to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex acts or address child sex tourism by 
Lebanese nationals abroad. The government did not provide anti-
trafficking training for its diplomatic personnel.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Lebanon, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Lebanon abroad. Women and girls from South and Southeast Asia 
and an increasing number from East and West Africa are subjected 
to domestic servitude in Lebanon. According to an international 
organization, there were 250,000 migrant domestic workers in 
Lebanon in 2019. Lebanese government officials and NGOs report 
most employers withhold their domestic workers’ passports, and 
some employers also withhold workers’ wages, force them to work 
excessive hours without rest days, restrict their freedom of movement, 
and physically or sexually abuse them. NGOs report that such abuse 
of domestic workers is typically underreported. Many migrant 
workers arrive in Lebanon through legal employment agencies but 
are subsequently exploited or abused by their employers, and some 
employment agencies recruit workers through fraudulent or false job 
offers. The prolonged economic crisis exacerbated by the pandemic 
prompted approximately 30,000 migrant workers to leave Lebanon 
in 2020. New migrant worker arrivals in Lebanon dropped as much 
as 75 percent in 2020, compared with 2019, according to media 
estimates; an international organization reported only 9,409 migrant 
domestic workers were recruited in 2020, compared with 33,075 
recruited in 2019. NGOs reported employers dropped domestic 
workers off at their embassies during the reporting period because 
they were unable to continue paying salaries, and an international 




decreased from 151,121 in 2019 to 109,672 in 2020. In 2020, an 
international organization reported an increase in cases of victims 
exploited by nationals of their own country of origin, particularly 
among migrant workers. Traffickers among the same nationality 
coerce migrant workers that have been fired or abandoned by their 
Lebanese employer into domestic servitude or sex trafficking. In 
2020, NGOs reported demand for domestic workers already in 
Lebanon increased due to pandemic-related travel restrictions and 
the economic crisis. NGOs reported the combined impact of the 
economic crisis, pandemic restrictions, and the August 2020 port 
explosion in Beirut increased vulnerability of Lebanese nationals 
to trafficking. NGOs and international organizations reported an 
increase in exploitation of Lebanese adults by Lebanese nationals—
particularly in industries such as custodial services—and similar to 
migrant workers previously filling the same jobs, these Lebanese 
workers were subjected to abuses, such as nonpayment of wages, 
poor working conditions, and excessive hours. 
Women, primarily from Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Morocco, 
and Tunisia, legally enter Lebanon to work as dancers in nightclubs 
through Lebanon’s artiste visa program. An artiste visas is valid for 
three months and can be renewed once. The terms of the artiste 
visa prohibit foreign women working in these nightclubs to leave 
the hotel where they reside, except to work in the nightclubs that 
sponsor them, and nightclub owners withhold the women’s passports 
and wages and control their movement. Traffickers also exploit 
these women through physical and sexual abuse and domestic 
servitude. The government and NGOs reported the number of 
migrant domestic workers and artiste visa holders entering Lebanon 
was significantly lower in 2020; the government reported 3,376 
artiste visa holders entered Lebanon in 2019, compared with 774 in 
2020. The government reported 29 out of 42 adult nightclubs closed 
permanently during the reporting period due to the economic crisis 
and pandemic-mitigation shutdowns, after which artiste visa holders 
either returned to their home country or stayed in Lebanon if they 
found work at a different nightclub. 
Adults and children among the estimated 1.5 million Syrian refugees 
in Lebanon are at high risk of sex trafficking and forced labor. 
Restrictions on Syrians’ ability to work legally in Lebanon and 
the enforcement of visa and residence permit laws increase this 
population’s vulnerability to trafficking. Syrians are commonly 
involved in the exploitation of other Syrians in Lebanon, particularly 
targeting refugees fleeing the conflict. For example, Syrian traffickers 
hold Syrian refugee adults and children in bonded labor to pay for 
food, shelter, and the cost of transit to Lebanon, and they contract 
out groups of refugees to work in the agricultural sector in the Bekaa 
Valley. Similarly, an international organization reports evidence of 
bonded labor within refugee communities, where child labor is 
used in exchange for living in informal tented settlements. Child 
labor and forced child labor among the Syrian refugee population 
continues to increase, particularly in agriculture, construction, and 
street vending and begging. These children are at high risk for labor 
trafficking, especially on the streets of main urban areas such as 
Beirut and Tripoli, as well as in the agricultural sectors of Bekaa and 
Akkar. For example, in 2019, international organizations reported 
the presence of children working in illegal cannabis farms in the 
North Bekaa region. Furthermore, NGOs report that some Syrian 
refugee children are forced or coerced to conduct criminal activity. 
Syrian refugee LGBTQI+ persons, women, girls, and some men are 
highly vulnerable to sex trafficking. Many women and girls who were 
recruited from Syria with false promises of work were subjected to 
commercial sexual exploitation in which they experienced mental, 
physical, and sexual abuse and forced abortions. Family members 
or powerful local families forced some Syrian refugee women and 
girls into commercial sex acts or early marriage to ease economic 
hardships; these women and girls are highly vulnerable to trafficking. 
Lebanese nationals fleeing the economic crisis reportedly joined 
Syrian refugees to migrate irregularly from north Lebanon to Cyprus 
and Turkey, and an international organization reported organized 
trafficking networks fraudulently offered Lebanese nationals false or 
misleading job opportunities. Syrians and Lebanese nationals traveling 
through these channels were vulnerable to sex trafficking in Turkey.
LESOTHO: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Lesotho does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government made key achievements during the 
reporting period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 
on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Lesotho was upgraded 
to Tier 2 Watch List. These achievements included convicting the 
first trafficker in four years and sentencing him to imprisonment; 
enacting a new anti-trafficking law that closed key legislative gaps, 
including criminalizing all forms of sex trafficking and prescribing 
penalties commensurate with the penalties for other serious crimes; 
commencing criminal investigations into multiple government 
officials allegedly complicit in human trafficking offenses; devoting, 
for the first time, modest funding for victim protection; and passing 
a 2021-2026 anti-trafficking national action plan. Despite these 
achievements, the government did not meet several key minimum 
standards. Law enforcement efforts remained insufficient compared 
to the problem, in part due to the lack of training and experience 
necessary to conduct complex multi-jurisdictional investigations. 
The government did not investigate several credible allegations 
of trafficking of its citizens in South Africa, nor did it investigate 
credible allegations of abuse of trafficking victims by South African 
and Lesotho police officers. Victim identification efforts were weak, 
and the government continued to rely on one NGO to provide all 
victim shelter and care with nascent government funding. For the 
fifth consecutive year, the government did not finalize standard 
operating procedures on victim identification or the national referral 
mechanism, and for the 10th consecutive year, did not allocate 
funding for the Victims of Trafficking Trust Fund. Law enforcement 
and front-line responders continued to lack regular anti-trafficking 
training, which at times resulted in law enforcement re-traumatizing 
potential victims. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers 
through independent and fair trials, including officials complicit 
in trafficking crimes. • Adequately fund the police trafficking and 
smuggling unit and establish a focal point in all 10 districts of 
Lesotho to ensure effective responsiveness to all potential trafficking 
cases. • Increase oversight of labor recruitment agencies licensed 
in Lesotho to mitigate fraudulent recruitment for mining work in 
South Africa. • Adequately fund shelter and protective services for 
victims. • Allocate funds for the Victims of Trafficking Trust Fund 
and implement procedures for administering the funds. • Finalize 
and implement guidelines for proactive victim identification and 
standard operating procedures for referring identified victims to 
care, in line with the anti-trafficking act regulations. • Allocate 
funding to support operation of the anti-trafficking taskforce and 
implementation of the 2021-2026 national action plan. • Provide 
trafficking-specific training to police investigators, prosecutors, 
judges, and social service personnel. • Fix jurisdictional issues that 
prevent magistrate courts from issuing the maximum penalty for 
trafficking crimes. • Increase efforts to systematically collect and 






• Develop effective professional relationships with South Africa and 
other judiciaries and law enforcement agencies throughout Southern 
Africa to increase information sharing, and bilateral and regional 
coordination on trafficking investigations.
PROSECUTION
The government increased anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts, 
although serious allegations of official complicity in trafficking 
remained unaddressed. Lesotho law criminalized sex trafficking and 
labor trafficking. The 2011 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act criminalized 
all forms of labor trafficking and some forms of sex trafficking but 
until 2021 remained inconsistent with international law, as the act 
required a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a 
child sex trafficking offense, and therefore did not criminalize all forms 
of child sex trafficking. The anti-trafficking act prescribed penalties 
of up to 25 years’ imprisonment or a fine of 1 million maloti (LSL) 
($68,150) for the trafficking of adults and up to life imprisonment 
or a fine of 2 million LSL($136,300) for the trafficking of children. 
These penalties were sufficiently stringent, but, with respect to sex 
trafficking, by allowing for a fine in lieu of imprisonment, the penalties 
in the anti-trafficking act were not commensurate with penalties 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. 
However, in January 2021, the government enacted the Anti-Trafficking 
in Persons Amendment Act of 2021, which amended the definition 
of trafficking to criminalize all forms of sex trafficking and removed 
the option of a fine in lieu of imprisonment for trafficking offenses. 
Because the 2021 Amendment removed the option for a fine in lieu 
of imprisonment, these penalties were commensurate with penalties 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Section 77 of the 
Children’s Protection and Welfare Act (CPWA) criminalized child 
sex trafficking offenses without requiring the use of force, fraud, or 
coercion. However, the CPWA prescribed penalties of a fine not to 
exceed 30,000 LSL ($2,040) or 30 months’ imprisonment, or both; 
these penalties were not sufficiently stringent nor commensurate 
with other grave crimes, such as rape.
The government initiated four trafficking investigations, continued 
three from previous reporting periods, prosecuted four cases, and 
convicted one trafficker—an increase from zero new investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions in the previous reporting period. Two 
of the new investigations involved Basotho girls allegedly exploited 
in trafficking in South Africa. In the first case, the victim’s uncle 
allegedly abducted her and transported her to South Africa for sex 
trafficking. In the second case, an alleged trafficker recruited a girl 
for domestic work in South Africa, smuggled her across the border, 
and withheld her wages, purportedly to repay travel expenses. Of the 
four prosecutions, all of which came from investigations initiated in 
previous reporting periods, one case involved adult forced labor and 
three involved adult sex trafficking. The government convicted its first 
trafficker in four years. The forced labor prosecution led to conviction 
of the perpetrator and a sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment; the 
sex trafficking prosecutions remained ongoing at the close of the 
reporting period. For the sixth consecutive year, the government did 
not address a jurisdictional issue impeding efforts to hold traffickers 
accountable. Namely, the magistrate courts, which are the court of 
first instance for trafficking cases, lacked authority to impose the 
maximum penalties allowed in trafficking crimes.
Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained 
significant concerns and continued to inhibit law enforcement 
action. In a change from previous reporting periods, the government 
reported two investigations into officials allegedly complicit in 
human trafficking-related offenses, both of which were ongoing at 
the close of the reporting period. In one case, a senior Ministry of 
Home Affairs official, responsible for the anti-trafficking portfolio, 
allegedly assisted third-country nationals from South Asia with 
illegal entry into South Africa via Lesotho by removing all records 
of their entry into Lesotho. This allowed the travelers to circumvent 
South African entrance requirements. The government investigated 
the case as a trafficking offense but was unable to establish elements 
of human trafficking that would allow for prosecution for human 
trafficking. Police placed the official on administrative leave pending 
the outcome of the investigation. The government did not make 
efforts to address other, repeated allegations of complicity. The 
government was aware of alleged trafficking of Basotho women 
to South Africa for commercial sex. For the third consecutive year, 
the government’s efforts to form a liaison relationship with South 
African officials to investigate these allegations and to target those 
allegedly involved in these schemes did not yield tangible results. 
In the previous reporting period, officials deported a Nigerian labor 
trafficking victim; for the second consecutive year, the government 
did not take any action against his alleged trafficker, whose identity 
was known and who operated his business in Maseru with impunity. 
There were continued allegations of complicity in trafficking among 
law enforcement officers at the Maseru Bridge border crossing. 
The Lesotho Mounted Police Service’s (LMPS) Child and Gender 
Protection Unit (CGPU) led anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts 
until October 2020, when the government established the Trafficking 
in Persons and Migrant Control Unit within the LMPS, which assumed 
responsibility for all trafficking-related investigations. The trafficking 
and smuggling unit had dedicated investigators and received some 
administrative support. Like the CGPU, however, it lacked a dedicated 
budget, and members did not receive training on trafficking in 2020. 
The government did not have trafficking-specific courts, although 
three magistrate judges had special training to hear human trafficking 
cases. Many front-line officials incorrectly believed trafficking to be 
a movement-based crime and did not screen for trafficking among 
vulnerable groups, including migrant workers. In addition, many 
conflated gender-based violence and trafficking, and some police 
officers exhibited extreme insensitivity towards child victims of sexual 
abuse, including potential trafficking victims. Observers noted that 
reporting potential trafficking cases to the police made child victims 
more vulnerable to exploitation. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained victim identification and protection 
efforts. The government did not finalize standard operating procedures 
for victim identification or the national referral mechanism for the 
fifth consecutive year. The government identified two child trafficking 
victims, the same number identified in the previous reporting period. 
The government did not directly assist the trafficking victims but 
informally referred them to an NGO for care. The NGO had an 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the government to 
provide emergency shelter to female and child victims of trafficking, 
sexual assault, and domestic violence, as well as some medical 
care, counseling, job skills training, and legal assistance. For the 
first time, the government paid for the shelter’s utilities, including 
reimbursements for prior years’ utilities, totaling 147,000 LSL 
($10,020). It did not provide any other financial or in-kind support 
for trafficking victim care. While trafficking victims had a choice 
of whether to enter the NGO shelter, it was the only residential 
assistance available. Neither the government nor the NGO offered 
independent living options. At the shelter, victims had freedom of 
movement and could terminate their residency at will. There were 
no shelters equipped to provide protective services for male victims. 
In previous years, government social workers often did not respond 
to requests to certify victims or respond to potential cases. The 
CGPU and trafficking and smuggling unit, which also had the lead 
for trafficking victim identification, had limited capacity to respond 
to potential trafficking cases in Lesotho’s 10 districts because they 
operated from Maseru. They could only provide guidance to other 
police units that were less capable of responding to trafficking cases. 
For the tenth consecutive year, the government did not allocate 
funding for the Victims of Trafficking Trust Fund, which it had 
established to ensure consistent provision of protective services and 
to provide compensation for victims. While Lesotho law provided 
restitution in trafficking cases, no judges ordered it during the 
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reporting period. The anti-trafficking act and its implementing 
regulations prohibited the prosecution of victims for unlawful acts 
traffickers compelled them to commit, allowed foreign victims to 
elect permanent residency as a legal alternative to their removal, 
and encouraged victims to assist in the investigation of traffickers; 
however, the government did not implement these provisions during 
the reporting period. For foreign victims, provision of care beyond 
a 60-day reflection period was dependent on their cooperation 
with law enforcement; authorities repatriated victims who did not 
cooperate with law enforcement after the reflection period. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs was responsible for coordinating with the 
victim’s home country for the issuance of travel documents within 60 
days of victim identification if the victim no longer had their travel 
documents in their possession. In practice, and during the reporting 
period, the government did not facilitate or fund the repatriation of 
its nationals exploited in trafficking abroad. 
PREVENTION
The government increased anti-trafficking prevention efforts. The 
multi-sectoral committee (MSC), led by the Ministry of Home Affairs 
and charged with leading anti-trafficking legal and policy efforts, 
met four times during the year. This was an increase from sporadic 
meetings in previous years. Despite more frequent meetings, MSC 
still had systemic deficiencies that impeded its efficacy. For example, 
it lacked formal processes, including administrative procedures, to 
determine action items and track progress against national anti-
trafficking goals; coordination among members; and consistent 
participation from some high-level officials. In past years, senior 
government officials did not support the MSC and some even 
appeared to impede its activities. Despite the creation of the cabinet-
level sub-committee on human trafficking, it was not clear that the 
issues surrounding the functioning of the MSC had been resolved. 
Moreover, the MSC did not invite NGOs to participate in its meetings, 
which reduced the transparency and efficacy of its efforts. MSC made 
progress in some of these areas during the reporting period. 
To address the lack of high-level participation in anti-trafficking 
efforts, the Prime Minister created a cabinet-level sub-committee 
for trafficking composed of six ministers. Together, the MSC and 
cabinet sub-committee drafted new anti-trafficking legislation, 
established the trafficking and smuggling unit within the LMPS, and 
drafted and enacted a new national action plan, which had been 
pending since 2018. The 2021-2026 national action plan, which 
incorporated feedback from NGOs and international organizations, 
provided a roadmap for anti-trafficking efforts that delineated 
responsibilities among ministries. However, the government did not 
allocate any funding to MSC or for implementation of the plan. A 
foreign government began funding an international organization to 
update MSC’s standard operating procedures for increased efficiency. 
As in past years, the government reported participating in some 
radio public awareness events led by NGOs. With support from an 
international organization, the government contributed information 
to a centralized anti-trafficking database that collected national data 
on criminal cases and victims identified and shared it with countries 
in the region. Labor inspectors conducted 70 inspections in 2020, 
primarily in textile factories; the inspectors did not identify any cases 
of forced labor. An NGO conducted, and the government provided 
material support for, a trafficking victim identification training for 35 
labor inspectors, seven journalists, and NGO partners. In addition, 
the government reportedly began an assessment of child labor and 
child trafficking and allocated 2 million LSL ($136,300) to continue 
it; it did not share any results from the initial assessment. The cabinet 
approved a new labor migration policy focused on recruitment 
malpractice. The government made efforts to implement it during 
the reporting period by adding trafficking indicators to migrant 
labor inspectors’ screening questions, including among migrants 
departing for South Africa. The government had an agreement with 
the Government of South Africa that aimed to increase protections 
for Basotho employed in South Africa, including in domestic work. 
The agreement authorized the issuance of long-term work permits, 
required signed employment contracts, and allowed Basotho to register 
for unemployment insurance in South Africa; despite this agreement, 
Basotho remained vulnerable to trafficking. The government did not 
make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
domestic and foreign victims in Lesotho, and traffickers exploit 
victims from Lesotho abroad. Traffickers increasingly used social 
media to find and lure victims into forced labor and sex trafficking. 
Traffickers entice victims from rural areas, including the large orphan 
population, into urban areas or South Africa with false promises 
of legitimate employment. In Lesotho, traffickers exploit Basotho 
children in domestic servitude and animal herding; traffickers 
also exploit children, especially orphans who migrate to urban 
areas, in sex trafficking. Young girls, especially orphans, regularly 
engaged in domestic work in exchange for room and board; such 
informal, imbalanced, and private arrangements render these children 
vulnerable to forced labor and abuse from employers. There were 
anecdotal reports that “workshop masters” force children to produce 
and sell arts and crafts in market vending. There were reports of 
rampant sexual harassment in Taiwanese, mainland Chinese, and 
South Asian-owned textile factories in Lesotho, including widespread 
reports that managers and supervisors coerced female workers into 
sexual relationships in exchange for maintaining employment, 
achieving better working conditions, and avoiding further sexual 
harassment. There were also reports that women employed on 
construction sites were sexually harassed by their local and South 
African employers. 
Basotho women and girls seeking work voluntarily migrate to South 
Africa, where traffickers detain some in prison-like conditions and 
exploit others in sex trafficking. Traffickers exploit some Basotho 
men who migrate voluntarily, although illegally and often without 
identity documents, to South Africa for work in agriculture and 
mining in forced labor; many work for weeks or months before 
their employers turn them over to South African authorities for 
deportation on immigration violations to avoid paying them. 
Traffickers connected to organized crime syndicates operating in 
South Africa are alleged to exploit and sometimes kill Basotho men 
in derelict mines. Traffickers also compel Basotho into committing 
crimes in South Africa, including theft, drug trafficking, and smuggling 
under threat of violence or through forced drug use. Due to pandemic-
related border closures, many Basotho crossed illegally into South 
Africa in search of employment, including a higher percentage of 
females; migrants lacking formal legal status are more vulnerable 
to traffickers. Foreign nationals, including Chinese and Nigerians, 
subject their compatriots to sex trafficking in Lesotho. The Chinese 
and Cuban governments may have forced their respective citizens to 
work in Lesotho, including medical teams from each country sent 
to combat the pandemic.
LIBERIA: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Liberia does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so.  These efforts included opening a new shelter for 
child trafficking victims, initiating an investigation into a high-profile 
labor trafficking case in cooperation with foreign governments, and 
allocating funding to NGOs to conduct awareness raising campaigns. 
However, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, even considering 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity. 
The government identified fewer victims, initiated fewer investigations, 
prosecuted fewer defendants, and did not convict any traffickers. 






understanding of trafficking to effectively investigate and prosecute 
trafficking crimes.  Shelter services for victims remained insufficient, 
and the government did not support NGOs providing care to victims. 
Therefore, Liberia was downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking cases, including 
internal trafficking cases and officials accused of complicity. • Train 
law enforcement and judicial officials on identifying, investigating, 
and prosecuting trafficking cases under the 2005 anti-trafficking law. 
• Amend the 2005 anti-trafficking law to remove the requirement of 
force, fraud, or coercion in child sex trafficking cases. • Amend the 
2005 anti-trafficking law to prescribe penalties for adult trafficking 
that are sufficiently stringent and commensurate with the penalties for 
other grave crimes. • Expand victim services—particularly for victims 
outside the capital, males, and victims requiring long-term care. • 
Increase financial or in-kind support to NGOs that support trafficking 
victims. • Train law enforcement, labor inspectors, immigration 
officials, and social workers on standard victim identification 
procedures and the national referral mechanism. • Allocate financial 
and in-kind resources, as feasible, to the anti-trafficking task force. 
• Increase labor inspections in the informal sector and mining 
regions to improve identification of trafficking cases, including child 
forced labor. • Increase efforts to raise public awareness of human 
trafficking, including internal trafficking. • Screen foreign workers, 
including Cuban medical workers and Chinese nationals working 
for Chinese-owned enterprises, for forced labor indicators and refer 
identified forced labor victims to appropriate services.
PROSECUTION
The government decreased anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. 
The 2005 Act to Ban Trafficking in Persons criminalized some forms 
of sex trafficking and all forms of labor trafficking and prescribed 
minimum sentences of one year imprisonment for adult trafficking 
and six years’ imprisonment for child trafficking, but it did not 
include maximum sentences.  The prescribed penalties for trafficking 
of children were sufficiently stringent but those prescribed for 
trafficking of adults were not.  The penalties for child sex trafficking 
were commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, 
such as kidnapping, but those prescribed for adult sex trafficking 
were not.  Inconsistent with international law, the law required a 
demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex 
trafficking offense, and therefore did not criminalize all forms of 
child sex trafficking.
The government investigated seven cases and initiated prosecutions 
of two defendants, a decrease compared with 18 case investigations 
and prosecutions of four defendants in the previous reporting period. 
Courts did not convict any traffickers, compared with one conviction 
during the previous reporting period.  Authorities investigated a case 
involving a Liberian national who allegedly recruited and exploited 15 
adults and children from Sierra Leone, Mali, Guinea, and Cote d’Ivoire 
in forced labor; the trafficker posed as a labor recruiter on an online 
platform and exploited the victims in street vending upon their arrival 
in Liberia.  Authorities cooperated with the governments of Sierra 
Leone, Mali, Guinea, and Cote d’Ivoire on the case.  The defendant was 
charged with human trafficking and awaited prosecution at the end 
of the reporting period.  In January 2021, the government extended 
authority to Ministry of Labor (MOL) lawyers to prosecute trafficking 
and child labor cases, in addition to the Ministry of Justice (MOJ); the 
MOL subsequently prosecuted one trafficking case during the reporting 
period.  Authorities arrested and charged an Indian national with 
human trafficking; the perpetrator allegedly fraudulently recruited 
an Indian man for work in Liberia and exploited him in domestic 
servitude.  However, the MOL dropped the trafficking charges, and 
the perpetrator paid a fine.  Authorities apprehended and extradited 
one alleged trafficker to Sierra Leone during the reporting period. 
Officials continued to lack an understanding of internal trafficking, 
and some continued to view forms of trafficking, especially forced 
labor of children in domestic servitude, as a community practice 
rather than a crime.  Prosecutors may have pursued other charges, 
including rape and child endangerment, in lieu of sex trafficking or 
child forced labor due to a lack of understanding of human trafficking. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government officials complicit in human trafficking 
offenses; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking 
crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement 
action during the year.  During the previous reporting period, 
the government reported initiating investigations of an unknown 
number of cases of official complicity but did not report whether 
it continued the investigations.  Observers previously reported law 
enforcement occasionally accepted bribes from suspected traffickers 
to end investigations, and some government employees may have 
been directly complicit in child trafficking, including for domestic 
servitude and street vending.
The Women and Children Protection Section (WACPS) of the 
Liberian National Police (LNP) bore primary responsibility for 
investigating trafficking cases.  The Liberian Immigration Service 
(LIS) and Transnational Crimes Unit also investigated transnational 
trafficking cases.  The LIS Anti-Human Trafficking and Migrant 
Smuggling Unit, comprising 14 officers, stationed at least one officer 
at each of Liberia’s five major ports of entry and other minor ports of 
entry.  The government did not provide the LNP with dedicated anti-
trafficking funding or in-kind support, and it lacked basic resources 
and equipment to fully respond to and investigate allegations 
of trafficking, especially outside the capital.  Courts operated at 
reduced capacity and processed fewer cases due to pandemic-related 
restrictions.  The pandemic also reduced law enforcement’s capacity 
to conduct investigations; authorities reassigned law enforcement 
officers to enforce public health measures, diminishing police 
presence at stations, depots, and border posts.  
The government coordinated with an international organization to 
develop a legal handbook on human trafficking for prosecutors and 
judges; authorities also continued to use a training curriculum on 
trafficking and case management for judicial and law enforcement 
officials developed in a previous reporting period.  Although pandemic-
related restrictions halted training for much of the reporting period, 
the government provided some support to the same international 
organization to train 223 law enforcement officials from LNP, LIS, 
Liberia Drug Enforcement Agency, and labor inspectors on conducting 
trafficking investigations and identifying victims.  Nonetheless, officials 
and NGOs reported many labor inspectors, police, prosecutors, and 
judges remained unable to identify trafficking and lacked sufficient 
resources, impeding trafficking investigations and prosecutions.  
PROTECTION
The government maintained insufficient efforts to identify and 
protect trafficking victims.  The government identified 29 trafficking 
victims in 2020, compared with identifying seven trafficking victims 
and 60 potential trafficking victims during the previous reporting 
period.  Of the 29 victims, authorities identified 11 victims from 
Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, and Sierra Leone as part of a fraudulent 
recruitment investigation; the government provided shelter and 
basic necessities to the 11 victims but could not account for all of 
the victims’ whereabouts at the end of the reporting period.  The 
government did not report how many, if any, of the remaining 18 
identified victims it referred to shelter services.  The government had 
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standard operating procedures and a national referral mechanism 
(NRM) to identify trafficking victims and refer them to care.  However, 
law enforcement, immigration, and social services personnel lacked 
training on such procedures and, at times, misidentified trafficking 
victims as victims of other crimes.  The government did not report 
training officials on the NRM, in part due to pandemic-related 
gathering restrictions, compared with holding three trainings during 
the previous reporting period.
Police and community members generally referred trafficking victims 
to the Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Protection (MOGCSP). 
The anti-trafficking task force working group, which included the 
MOGCSP, was responsible for coordinating victim care.  During 
the reporting period, the MOL opened a shelter for child labor 
and child trafficking victims; the shelter could accommodate eight 
victims at a time, with emergency space for five additional victims. 
The government also operated the Liberia Children Village for child 
victims of neglect and abuse, which could provide short-term shelter 
to child trafficking victims.  The MOGCSP operated shelters in Lofa 
and Nimba for gender-based violence victims that female trafficking 
victims could access; the shelters provided long-term care and social 
services.  Additionally, the MOGSCP operated several transit centers 
that provided medical services and short-term accommodation.  Each 
transit center should have had at least one social worker, one nurse 
trained in sexual- and gender-based violence cases, and one police 
officer on staff; however, resources allocated to each center varied. 
Most of the transit centers operated only during the daytime and 
did not provide short-term accommodations.  Twelve LNP WACPS 
facilities could provide short-term accommodations to child victims 
of crime, and occasionally adult victims, but lacked basic amenities; 
an international organization renovated six of the centers during 
the reporting period.  Two MOGCSP social workers continued to 
work within the WACPS to assist women and children, including 
trafficking victims, and visit police precincts to coordinate cases. 
Resource constraints limited services for trafficking victims.  The 
government relied heavily on NGOs and private shelters when 
government shelters were unavailable but did not report providing 
financial or in-kind assistance to those shelters.  Shelter and services 
were available to both domestic and foreign victims.  No shelter 
was available for adult male victims, although some MOGCSP and 
private shelters could accommodate young boys.  Adult victims were 
only allowed to leave the shelters at will on an ad hoc basis.  Shelters 
sometimes could not protect victims’ identities, and victims could 
usually stay only three to six months due to capacity limitations. 
MOGSCP could arrange foster care for victims requiring longer-term 
care.  The government did not report if the MOGSCP continued 
collaborating with NGOs through regular meetings of the Child 
Protection Network during the reporting period.  The government 
coordinated with the Government of Sierra Leone to repatriate three 
Sierra Leonean potential trafficking victims, and the government 
repatriated one Indian national trafficking victim.  
The government did not systematically encourage victims to participate 
in investigations and prosecutions of their traffickers but at times 
provided victim-witnesses support to offset the costs of participating 
in a trial; during the reporting period, the government provided some 
funding for transportation and lodging to assist victims’ participation 
in prosecutions.  The anti-trafficking law allowed victims to obtain 
restitution, but courts did not issue restitution in any cases during the 
reporting period.  Victims could file civil suits against their traffickers; 
no victims filed civil suits during the reporting period, largely due 
to lack of awareness of this option.  The government did not have a 
formal policy that provided alternatives to removal to countries in 
which victims would face retribution or hardship but could offer 
alternatives, including temporary residency, on a case-by-case basis. 
There were no reports the government detained or otherwise penalized 
trafficking victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to 
commit; however, due to a lack of training, insufficient resources, 
and inconsistent application of victim identification procedures, 
authorities may have detained unidentified victims.
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent human trafficking. 
The MOL coordinated the government’s anti-trafficking efforts and 
co-chaired the anti-trafficking task force with the MOJ.  The task force 
also included representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ministry of Health, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and MOGCSP; 
it continued to meet regularly during the reporting period.  The 
government allocated $50,000 to the task force in the 2020-2021 
budget, the same amount allocated in the 2019-2020 budget; the 
government did not report how much of the funding it disbursed 
during the reporting period, compared with disbursing $25,000 
during the previous reporting period.  The government allocated 
$5,000 to five local NGOs conducting awareness raising campaigns 
on trafficking and child labor in five of Liberia’s 15 counties.  The 
government continued implementing the 2019-2024 action plan to 
combat trafficking in persons, although pandemic-related gathering 
restrictions limited its ability to conduct activities during the reporting 
period.  In July 2020, the government organized public awareness 
activities around World Day against Trafficking in Persons with 
participation of high-level officials, community members, and 
the media.  In collaboration with NGOs, the MOL continued to 
operate an anti-trafficking hotline during business hours and hired 
an additional staff member to manage the calls.  The government 
received 346 credible calls during the reporting period but did not 
report initiating any investigations or identifying any victims as a 
result.  Despite conducting over 1,000 labor inspections in 2020, labor 
inspectors did not report identifying any child labor or trafficking 
victims.  During the previous reporting period, LNP visited popular 
beaches and entertainment centers in Monrovia known to have high 
instances of child sex trafficking, spoke with community groups, 
and distributed fliers to sensitize citizens on child protection issues; 
the government continued these activities on a limited basis during 
the reporting period due to the pandemic’s impact on tourism and 
strained law enforcement resources.  The government did not make 
efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.  The government 
did not provide anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Liberia, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Liberia abroad.  Trafficking within the country is more prevalent than 
transnational trafficking, and the majority of victims are children. 
Traffickers recruit and exploit most victims within the country’s 
borders in domestic servitude, forced begging, sex trafficking, or 
forced labor in street vending, gold and alluvial diamond mines, 
and on small-scale rubber plantations.  Traffickers typically operate 
independently and are commonly family members who promise 
poorer relatives a better life for their children or promise young 
women a better life for themselves, take the children or women 
to urban areas, and subsequently exploit them in forced labor in 
street vending, domestic service, or sex trafficking.  Traffickers are 
also often well-respected community members who exploit the 
“foster care” system common across West Africa.  While Liberian law 
requires parents to register children within 14 days of birth, only 
about 30 percent of births are registered.  Although the government 
has expanded birth registration accessibility, continued lack of birth 
registration and identity documents increase individuals’ vulnerability 
to trafficking.  Traffickers exploit orphaned children in street vending 
and child sex trafficking.  Some parents encourage their daughters’ 
exploitation in commercial sex to supplement family income.  Liberian 
nationals and—to a lesser extent—foreigners exploit children in sex 
trafficking in Monrovia.  Traffickers allegedly compel children to sell 
illicit drugs.  Cuban medical professionals working in Liberia may 
have been forced to work by the Cuban government, and Chinese 
nationals working in Liberia may have been forced to work, including 
by Chinese-owned enterprises.  Officials identified potential Chinese 
and Malaysian forced labor victims in the construction sector during 
the previous reporting period.  In the past, officials documented 






Leonean traffickers operate in Liberia.  During the reporting period, 
Liberian authorities identified a suspected trafficker and trafficking 
victim from India.  Traffickers exploited a small number of Liberian 
men, women, and children in other West African countries, including 
Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. 
During the previous reporting period, Thai authorities identified 
a Liberian trafficking victim in Thailand.  In the past, traffickers 
exploited Tunisian and Moroccan women in sex trafficking in Liberia 
and Liberian women in forced labor in Lebanon and Finland.
LITHUANIA: TIER 1
The Government of Lithuania fully meets the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued to 
demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting period 
while considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on 
its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Lithuania remained on Tier 1. 
These efforts included prosecuting and convicting more traffickers; 
allocating more funds to NGOs for victim assistance; and approving 
a new national action plan (NAP). Furthermore, the government 
adopted a non-punishment provision for labor trafficking victims 
and a law entitling all victims access to assistance. In addition, child 
protective services trained child rights specialists on identifying child 
victims. Although the government meets the minimum standards, 
authorities investigated fewer cases and identified the lowest number 
of victims since 2013. Shortcomings in victim protection during the 
investigation and trial process continued to hamper law enforcement 
efforts, and concerns persisted that relevant agencies lacked the 
knowledge to recognize indicators of child trafficking. Additionally, 
authorities inconsistently implemented victim identification and 
referral mechanisms throughout the country, especially in rural areas.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Proactively identify victims, particularly children, and provide training 
for authorities and child protective services officials. • Implement 
formal victim identification and referral mechanisms for victim 
assistance throughout the country, especially in rural areas. • Increase 
efforts to vigorously investigate and prosecute sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking cases and convict traffickers. • Expand efforts to protect 
victims from threats and re-victimization during the investigation 
and trial of trafficking cases, including by developing clear procedures 
on how to protect victims. • Train investigators and prosecutors on 
building trafficking cases, including collecting evidence to corroborate 
victim testimony. • Provide specialized services to child victims in 
foster care homes and mixed-use shelters. • Ensure victims have access 
to appropriate mental health professionals during the interrogation 
process. • Develop a more comprehensive data collection system that 
disaggregates data, including by type of trafficking.
PROSECUTION
The government increased law enforcement efforts. Articles 147 
and 157 of the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking and prescribed penalties ranging from two to 12 years’ 
imprisonment, which were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other serious 
crimes, such as rape. Five specialized prosecutors led the investigation 
and prosecution of trafficking cases in country. Authorities investigated 
eight trafficking cases (one sex trafficking, six labor trafficking, and 
one child trafficking), compared with 13 in 2019. The government 
initiated prosecutions of 40 suspected traffickers, a substantial increase 
from 24 in 2019, and convicted 16 traffickers, compared with 12 in 
2019. Of the 16 convicted traffickers, 12 received prison sentences 
with terms ranging from one to eight years. Government officials 
reported that collecting adequate evidence remained a problem in 
prosecuting trafficking cases, particularly since trafficking activity 
recently shifted online to methods that did not include physical 
coercion. As a result of the pandemic, remote court hearings became 
the main litigation tool, which according to law enforcement posed 
challenges. In addition, the pandemic compounded the already 
existing difficulties associated with communication and cooperation 
between law enforcement officials in Lithuania and other countries. 
Nonetheless, the government collaborated with foreign counterparts 
in 21 international trafficking investigations (42 in 2019), including 
a joint investigation with authorities from Spain and the United 
Kingdom (UK) on a labor trafficking case, which involved eight 
Lithuanian victims and resulted in two arrests. The general prosecutor’s 
office received no extradition requests, the same as in 2019, and 
issued six European arrest orders in trafficking cases, compared with 
three in 2019. The government did not report any investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in 
trafficking offenses. The general prosecutor’s office organized a virtual 
training on protecting refugees from trafficking for 14 prosecutors 
and 28 border officials; 34 border officials received anti-trafficking 
training from the State Border Guards Service. The National Court 
Administration organized anti-trafficking training modules for judges. 
Additionally, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) hosted a national seminar 
on preventing trafficking and assisting victims; more than 250 law 
enforcement officers, municipal employees, psychologists, social 
workers, diplomats, lawyers, and judges participated.
PROTECTION
The government maintained protection efforts. Authorities identified 
24 victims, the lowest number of identified victims since 2013 
(36 in 2019); however, amid reports indicating foreign workers 
were at high risk to exploitation, authorities identified 11 foreign 
victims in 2020, an increase from six in 2019. As in previous years, 
experts raised concerns that the data collected across government 
agencies and civil society was inconsistent and did not provide a 
comprehensive picture of the trafficking situation. While authorities 
implemented formal victim identification and referral mechanisms 
for victim assistance, observers reported authorities in some parts 
of the country underutilized both and lacked the skills to identify 
victims. Additionally, observers reported the mechanisms lacked best 
practices for how to interview victims, especially children, and as a 
result, victims were often questioned several times, placing them 
under additional stress. 
In accordance with European Parliament directives, the government 
passed a law entitling all crime victims, including trafficking victims, 
access to assistance, including counseling, regardless of whether 
victims sought assistance from law enforcement. The government 
allocated €245,000 ($301,000) to NGOs for victim assistance, an 
increase from €190,000 ($233,000) in 2019. Government-funded 
NGOs supported 208 trafficking victims, including the 24 identified 
victims and at-risk individuals, compared with 224 in 2019. A formal 
mechanism existed between police and NGOs to refer victims to NGO 
facilities; however, NGOs alleged authorities did not refer all victims 
to care facilities. Facilities provided short- or long-term assistance, 
such as health care, psychological and social counseling, and shelter, 
to trafficking victims. Authorities placed Lithuanian female trafficking 
victims in municipal and NGO-facilitated shelters for victims of 
domestic violence and had the option to place foreign victims at 
a refugee reception center in Rukla. Five crisis centers provided 
assistance to male victims, including finding accommodations. 
Authorities placed child victims in foster care homes or mixed-use 
shelters, as there were no shelters specifically for child trafficking 
victims. Experts raised concerns about inadequate protection and 
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assistance measures for child victims. According to observers, child 
protective services struggled to identify child victims and refer them 
to care, especially in rural areas. In 2020, authorities identified one 
child victim, compared with four in 2019. Child protective services 
organized a training on identifying child victims for 63 child rights 
specialists with plans to expand the training to more specialists. 
Child sexual abuse victims, including trafficking victims, could 
seek assistance in the government-operated national support center 
in Vilnius. Municipalities continued to finance and implement 
reforms to the institutional child care system with the goal to move 
all children from institutions to families. As part of the reforms, 
municipalities converted large institutions into community houses, 
which accommodated up to eight children. In 2020, 567 children 
lived in community homes, and 1,200 children remained in state 
care homes. The minister of social affairs and labor signed a decree 
prohibiting the placement of new children into care at orphanages 
as of January 1, 2020. Foreign trafficking victims had the same access 
to care as Lithuanian victims. Legislation allowed foreign victims a 
30-day reflection period to decide whether to cooperate with law 
enforcement; foreign victims cooperating with law enforcement 
could receive temporary residency.
During the reporting period, the government passed amendments to 
the anti-trafficking law, which included a non-punishment provision 
establishing that labor trafficking victims not be penalized for 
committing offenses related to forced labor and services. While the 
government encouraged victims to cooperate in investigations and 
prosecutions, the absence of a clear policy on how victims would 
be adequately protected and law enforcement’s shortcomings in this 
area contributed to victims’ reluctance to assist in cases. In particular, 
traffickers sometimes threatened victims as they were entering or 
exiting the courtroom, and victims lacked access to mental health 
professionals during or after their interviews by law enforcement. 
Although the government provided legal representation to victims, 
observers reported attorneys had little experience with trafficking 
issues; as a result, NGOs often hired private attorneys for victims. 
There were no state-run victim compensation programs, but victims 
could apply to the court for financial compensation from their 
trafficker. In 2020, 20 victims applied for compensation, and courts 
ordered payment of €29,000 ($35,600) in non-material damage and 
€5,340 ($6,550) in material damage.
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. The government 
approved a new NAP for 2020-2022 and allocated approximately 
€375,000 ($460,000) for implementation. The NAP focused on 
strengthening interagency coordination; improving prevention work; 
strengthening the pre-trial investigations process; and improving 
assistance to trafficking victims. The government developed the NAP 
in consultation with multiple national and local agencies and NGOs. 
The government participated in a range of awareness-raising activities, 
including developing a smart phone application to teach children 
about trafficking and staging trafficking-themed live performances 
and videos. The police advertised and managed an email account 
that the public could use to report potential trafficking situations and 
solicit advice. During the reporting period, the government launched 
a 24-hour national hotline available in multiple languages to assist 
trafficking victims via NGOs, and it reported that NGOs assisted 
208 victims. The government made efforts to reduce the demand 
for commercial sex acts by fining five individuals for buying sexual 
services (16 in 2019).
A specialized trafficking police officer served as an attaché in the 
Lithuanian embassy in the UK to assist in international investigations 
involving Lithuanian citizens in the UK and Ireland. In Spain, the 
MOI funded a project focused on preventing labor exploitation 
of the Lithuanian community, which included more than 28,000 
Lithuanians. In cooperation with Poland and Sweden, the MOI 
conducted a study aimed at identifying recruitment methods and 
tools used by employment agencies to recruit Lithuanians to work 
under exploitative conditions. The State Labor Inspectorate trained 
52 new inspectors on identifying labor trafficking cases and launched 
a special group of inspectors to manage forced labor cases. The 
inspectorate and police inspected construction sites, hotels, and 
restaurants to ensure employers were complying with the law regarding 
third country nationals and reported 29 illegally hired individuals 
as potential labor trafficking victims.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Lithuania, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Lithuania abroad. Law enforcement reports most trafficking cases 
involve Lithuanian trafficking networks that prey on Lithuanian 
victims. As a result of the pandemic, traffickers have shifted recruitment 
methods from in-person to online settings, mainly through social 
media, hindering authorities’ ability to locate victims and identify 
traffickers. Traffickers exploit Lithuanian men and boys in criminal 
activities, such as shoplifting, and Lithuanian women and children 
in commercial sex in Scandinavia and Western Europe, particularly 
Spain and the UK. They also continue to exploit women and girls 
in sex trafficking within the country. NGOs report the majority of 
trafficking cases occur within Lithuania. Many trafficking victims have 
some degree of mental disability, psychological problems, and/or 
alcohol or drug addiction. Authorities report women are recruited 
for brokered marriages abroad; these women are vulnerable to sex 
trafficking, domestic servitude, and forced labor. Reports indicate the 
exploitation of foreign workers from Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus. 
Foreign workers are at risk of labor trafficking as long-haul truck 
drivers, builders, ship hull assemblers, and welders. The 1,200 
children institutionalized in approximately 49 child care institutions 
are vulnerable to trafficking.
LUXEMBOURG: TIER 1
The Government of Luxembourg fully meets the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued to 
demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting 
period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its 
anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Luxembourg remained on Tier 
1. These efforts included increased funding for NGOs to ensure 
more robust access to services for victims and the establishment 
of the country’s first crime victim hotline. The government also 
increased cooperation between labor inspectors and police to identify 
labor trafficking through joint operations and increased efforts to 
collaborate with international law enforcement partners to investigate 
trafficking cases. Although the government meets the minimum 
standards, the number of convictions declined, and courts continued 
to issue lenient sentences to convicted traffickers, creating potential 
safety problems for trafficking victims, weakening deterrence, and 
undercutting nationwide efforts to fight trafficking. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Sentence traffickers to significant prison terms and ensure convicted 
traffickers serve those sentences in practice. • Develop safeguards 
for victims to protect them against traffickers freed on suspended 
sentences. • Revise the trafficking law to clarify that force, fraud, or 
coercion are core elements of the crime of trafficking of adults rather 








of the crime and the impact on victims and ensure convictions 
result in significant sentences. • Increase efforts to identify labor 
trafficking victims, by raising the number of labor inspectors in the 
field and granting them the power to proactively identify victims 
and increase efforts to prosecute and convict labor traffickers. • 
Promote a victim-centered approach in child victim identification 
procedures. • Increase staffing of the victim protection and fugitive 
research unit. • Include measurable outcomes in the national action 
plan to assess its progress. • Coordinate trafficking data collection 
and fund, maintain, and conduct trafficking research to create an 
evidence base for future policy decisions. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Luxembourg 
criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking through Articles 
382-1 and 382-2 of the criminal code and prescribed penalties of 
three to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine for trafficking offenses 
involving adult victims and 10 to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine 
for offenses involving child victims. These penalties were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent 
with the definition of trafficking under international law, the law 
established the use of force, fraud, or coercion as aggravating factors 
rather than essential elements of the crime.
In 2020, the government initiated 11 investigations, compared with 
nine investigations in 2019. Of these cases, four were forced labor 
and one was sex trafficking; six cases were determined to not involve 
trafficking. The government initiated four prosecutions (two in 
2019) and convicted one perpetrator for sex trafficking in 2020 (two 
convictions in 2019). Courts issued weak sentences for trafficking 
convictions, a perennial problem that undercut efforts to hold 
traffickers accountable and protect victims. The government partially 
suspended the convicted trafficker’s 18-month prison sentence in a 
case involving the exploitation of four victims. In 2019, the courts fully 
suspended the two convicted traffickers’ sentences. Law enforcement 
officials continued to report the law hindered investigators’ ability 
to search private homes suspected of being used for commercial 
sex and illicit activities; authorities noted commercial sex activities 
moved increasingly to private homes and online platforms during 
the pandemic. The police organized crime unit responsible for 
investigating trafficking comprised 13 investigators. The police 
maintained a two-person victim protection and fugitive research unit 
to ensure separation between victim assistance and investigations; 
however, an official noted that the unit did not have sufficient 
personnel to cover the potential absence of one of its officers. The 
government’s national institute of public administration canceled 
all anti-trafficking training for prosecutors, judges, law enforcement 
and immigration officials due to the pandemic. However, all 109 
new police recruits received anti-trafficking training per mandated 
curriculum. Police and investigators continued to participate in an 
ongoing labor trafficking investigation with Belgium involving five 
suspects in five companies and an ongoing sex trafficking investigation 
with Germany involving six suspects. Labor inspectors and police 
coordinated with French labor inspectors to inspect a construction 
site, which led to the identification of four victims from Portugal, 
who were living in France but forced to work in Luxembourg. The 
government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government officials complicit in trafficking offenses.
PROTECTION
The government increased efforts to protect victims. Authorities 
identified seven trafficking victims (six forced labor victims and 
one sex trafficking victim), compared with nine in 2019 and 14 
in 2018. All were foreign citizens, including five men and two 
women; four of the victims were from Portugal. Police presumed an 
additional three foreign national labor trafficking victims; however, 
the potential victims declined to participate in an investigation and 
did not request or accept assistance services. The police had the sole 
authority to officially identify a victim and refer them to government 
assistance. Although NGOs continued to report the labor inspectorate 
was understaffed and the government’s ratio of field inspectors to 
workers was less than half of the ILO’s recommendation for highly 
industrialized countries, observers credited labor inspectors with 
increased recruitment and inspection efforts during the reporting 
period. However, labor inspectors did not have clear victim 
identification protocols and were not authorized to identify victims 
under Luxembourg law but could refer victims to the police; during the 
reporting period the labor inspectorate increased its cooperation with 
police including through joint investigations. A joint investigation in 
September and October 2020 led to the identification of four labor 
trafficking victims. Due to the pandemic, the government did not 
train labor inspectors during the reporting period. 
Government-funded victim services included housing, psychological 
support, medical, legal, and financial assistance. The government 
utilized a national mechanism for victim referral and provided 
€461,500 ($566,260) in 2020 to the two NGOs responsible for 
coordinating trafficking victim care, an increase from the 2019 
amount of €359,420 ($441,010). The two government-funded NGOs 
provided shelter to 16 trafficking victims during the reporting period. 
In January 2021, the two NGOs increased their operating hours to a 
maximum combined total of 100 hours per week from 60 hours per 
week; the two NGOs also combined resources during the reporting 
period, to include operating a joint office space and creating a single 
contact number. These measures facilitated better access to care for 
victims, although the limited operating hours continued to cause 
delays in victim assistance and hindered proactive operations. When 
the government identified victims outside operational hours, police 
could directly refer adult female and child victims to shelters; adult 
male victims could be housed temporarily in hotels until longer-term 
housing could be identified. Adult male victims could receive the 
same access to long-term accommodation and other victim services 
as adult female and child victims. Victims could leave the shelters 
unchaperoned and at will during opening hours of their respective 
shelter. The government also provided €8.4 million ($10.31 million) 
to assistance centers that provided shelter and assistance to victims 
of crime, including trafficking victims, compared with €7.5 million 
($9.2 million) in 2019. The government further provided €96,960 
($118,970) to an NGO responsible for providing shelter to male 
trafficking victims. In an effort to mitigate the spread of the pandemic, 
the government funded the temporary housing of victims in hotel 
rooms before transferring them to shelters. 
The government had legal alternatives to removal to countries in 
which victims would face retribution or hardship and provided 
relief from deportation for medical reasons. Victims were entitled 
to a 90-day reflection period to decide whether they wanted to 
testify, during which EU citizens could work. Upon expiration of 
the reflection period, the government could issue a foreign victim 
either temporary or permanent residency status if the victim chose to 
cooperate with law enforcement, during which time all victims could 
work. The government assessed on a case-by-case basis the residency 
status of victims who did not cooperate with law enforcement. Victim 
assistance was not contingent on cooperating with an investigation. 
Victims who declined to cooperate with police did not benefit from 
a temporary authorization to stay but otherwise received the full 
range of assistance. During the pandemic, the government extended 
residence permits for all migrant workers. Immigration officials used 
a questionnaire to proactively screen asylum-seekers for trafficking 
indicators; the government did not detect potential trafficking victims 
amongst asylum-seekers in 2020. The government continued working 
with the Netherlands and Belgium to strengthen their joint efforts in 
combating trafficking, particularly to protect non-EU victims exploited 
in a territory other than that of the country where they seek help and 
assistance. Moreover, the three governments published an updated 
brochure to raise awareness amongst the public and potential victims 
about anti-trafficking legislation and referral and assistance programs 





passed legislation to guarantee legal aid, regardless of nationality 
or residency status, to all persons recognized as victims who have 
insufficient resources and choose to pursue civil action. Victims could 
participate in a witness protection program to ensure their security 
before, during, and after a trial. Victims could claim compensation from 
the government and file civil suits against traffickers. The government 
did not grant compensation during the reporting period; in 2019, 
courts granted €2,000 ($2,450) to a victim in a civil suit. 
PREVENTION
The government modestly increased prevention efforts. The 
government’s inter-ministerial trafficking committee, chaired by the 
Ministry of Justice met three times in 2020 (five in 2019), to coordinate 
anti-trafficking efforts and national action plan implementation. 
Some observers noted the government fragmented responsibilities 
between numerous ministries with little centralized communication, 
however, the government reported no issues. For example, three 
separate ministries coordinated funding for male, female, and child 
shelters. GRETA reported the national action plan, endorsed in 2016, 
was vague, lacked a timeframe on meeting objectives, and did not 
allocate any resources. The Consultative Commission on Human Rights 
continued to serve as the independent rapporteur. In April 2020, the 
government launched the country’s first hotline for victims of crime, 
including trafficking victims; however, the hotline did not receive 
any calls leading to the detection of trafficking victims. In 2020, the 
government budgeted €15,000 ($18,400) to fund awareness activities 
compared with the same amounts in 2019 and 2018. The government 
continued its multi-faceted awareness campaign in coordination 
with the EU by printing and distributing brochures on victim rights 
and support services and renting and using advertisement space at 
tramway stops in one city. A government-funded NGO developed 
a toolkit for high school students to raise awareness about decent 
work conditions; the NGO tested the program in one school, but 
the pandemic postponed the project. The independent rapporteur 
reported the need to coordinate data collection across stakeholders. 
Government-funded NGOs carried out anti-trafficking projects in a 
range of countries in Asia, Africa, and South America. The government 
made efforts to reduce the demand for participation in international sex 
tourism by continuing to fund an NGO for local awareness campaigns 
focused on the prevention of child sex tourism. The government 
encouraged, but did not require, diplomats to attend anti-trafficking 
training. Labor laws allowed for recruitment fees but criminalized 
excessive amounts. The government continued its commitments 
under the 2020-2022 national action plan on implementing the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which sought to 
prevent forced labor in private sector supply chains. The government 
did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts 
but criminalized soliciting a sex trafficking victim. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit foreign 
victims in Luxembourg. Traffickers exploit victims from Europe, Africa, 
Asia, and South America in sex trafficking operations in cabarets, 
private apartments, and on the street. Increasingly, traffickers engage 
in forced labor crimes, sometimes involving Chinese, Pakistani, or 
eastern or southern European men, women, and children in various 
sectors, including restaurants and construction. Traffickers transport 
Romani children from neighboring countries for forced begging 
in Luxembourg. Groups vulnerable to traffickers’ illicit schemes 
include migrant workers in domestic work, catering, construction, 
and begging, as well as unaccompanied foreign children and people 
in Luxembourg’s legal and illegal commercial sex industry. 
MACAU: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of the Macau Special Administrative Region of 
the People’s Republic of China does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included training numerous police, 
customs, and social welfare officials; increasing funding for 
governmental anti-trafficking efforts; holding labor rights seminars for 
migrant workers vulnerable to exploitation; and enacting legislation 
to deter practices among employment agencies that contribute to 
debt-based coercion. However, the government did not demonstrate 
overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, 
even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-
trafficking capacity. Authorities did not identify or provide assistance 
to any victims for the second consecutive year, and the government 
did not initiate any trafficking investigations or prosecutions or 
convict any traffickers. The government has never identified a victim 
of forced labor. Therefore Macau remained on Tier 2 Watch List for 
the second consecutive year. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Significantly increase proactive victim identification, especially 
among vulnerable populations such as migrant workers and persons 
in commercial sex. • Significantly increase efforts to investigate, 
prosecute, and convict sex and labor traffickers, including those 
operating in casinos and other entertainment establishments, and 
sentence those convicted to significant prison terms. • Develop, 
approve, and implement an updated anti-trafficking action plan. • 
Ensure victims are referred to and receive protective services. • Provide 
training on the use of the trafficking law to prosecutors and judges, 
ensuring an understanding that a victim’s initial consent is not seen 
as evidence that trafficking did not occur. • Increase efforts to screen 
for and identify labor trafficking and male victims, including by 
decreasing the reliance on self-identification tools and improving 
victim-centered screening practices. • Amend the labor law to include 
protections for foreign domestic workers. • Take steps to eliminate 
recruitment or placement fees charged to workers by employment 
agencies in Macau and in their countries of origin, including by 
ensuing any recruitment fees are paid by employers and coordinating 
with migrant workers’ countries of origin. 
PROSECUTION 
The government maintained anti-trafficking law enforcement 
efforts. Law 6/2008 amended the penal code and criminalized sex 
trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of three 
to 20 years’ imprisonment, depending on the age of the victim. 
These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other serious 
crimes, such as rape. Authorities did not initiate any investigations or 
prosecute or convict any traffickers in 2020, compared with one sex 
trafficking investigation, zero prosecutions, and three sex trafficking 
convictions in 2019. Officials reportedly believed a victims’ initial 
consent or “voluntary association” with a trafficker was sufficient 
evidence to prove a trafficking crime did not occur, which sometimes 
led to trafficking cases being pursued under other crimes. In previous 
years, the government reported victims were often unwilling to 
participate as witnesses in cases against their traffickers, which also 
affected the success of trafficking prosecutions. After an October 
2019 media report documenting the prevalence of sex trafficking in 
nightclubs and casinos, authorities initiated an investigation into 
the allegations; however, the government did not report any progress 
in their investigation during the reporting period. As a result of a 
judicial assistance request, authorities investigated a report from a 





trafficking crime in Macau, but they did not identify any evidence of 
trafficking. The government trained more than 1,700 police officers, 
labor department employees, social workers, and immigration 
officials, and it continued to include a trafficking component in 
mandated training for new police and customs recruits. Authorities 
did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of 
officials complicit in trafficking offenses.
PROTECTION
The government maintained weak protection efforts, and for the 
second consecutive year, authorities did not identify or provide services 
to any victims. The government has never identified labor trafficking 
victims in Macau. Authorities had formal victim identification 
procedures, an operational referral process, and standardized screening 
questionnaires that could guide law enforcement, immigration, and 
social services personnel to screen individuals vulnerable to trafficking, 
including persons in commercial sex and migrant workers. Officials 
distributed questionnaires to suspected undocumented workers to 
promote self-identification but did not identify any victims of forced 
labor through these efforts; it was unclear if these questionnaires 
were an effective tool for victim identification due to their reliance 
on victims to self-identify. In previous reporting periods, officials 
referred child victims to a government-funded NGO that offered 
shelter, counseling, and economic and medical assistance. In 2020, 
the government modified its victim referral process to refer child 
victims to two separate government-funded NGOs, which were 
designated to assist victims’ depending on their country of origin; 
however, authorities did not report referring victims to either shelter 
during the reporting period. The social welfare bureau designated 
shelters for adult female and male trafficking victims and made 
medical care, financial assistance, counseling, legal assistance, and 
other services available for identified victims, but it did not report 
providing these services to any adult victims during the reporting 
period. The law permitted victims to seek compensation through 
civil courts or to obtain restitution in criminal proceedings. The 
government allocated approximately 1.74 million patacas ($217,770) 
for victim protection services, compared with 1.72 million patacas 
($215,270) allocated in 2019. In addition, the government reserved 
a budget of 39,600 patacas ($4,960) under an agreement with an 
international organization for repatriation assistance, but it did not 
assist any victims through the agreement during the reporting period. 
The government operated and publicized a trafficking hotline, as 
well as a hotline for reporting labor exploitation, for the public and 
potential victims to seek assistance; nonetheless, the government 
did not report identifying any victims through these hotlines. There 
were no reports the government penalized victims for crimes their 
traffickers compelled them to commit; however, due to a lack of 
sufficient screenings, some potential victims may have remained 
unidentified within the law enforcement system. The approval of 
a standard operating procedure for ensuring safe repatriation of 
mainland Chinese child sex trafficking victims was delayed due to 
the pandemic. The law permitted migrant victims to remain in Macau 
temporarily and seek employment while authorities pursued cases 
against their traffickers. In cases in which a victim faced retribution 
or hardship in their home country, authorities reported a policy 
that provided permanent residency on the basis of “well-founded 
humanitarian reasons,” although no victims benefited from this policy. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
interagency Human Trafficking Deterrent Measures Concern 
Committee, led by the security bureau, coordinated Macau’s anti-
trafficking efforts. Macau did not experience resource limitations 
as a result of the pandemic and therefore did not divert anti-
trafficking resources during the reporting period. The government 
allocated 3.44 million patacas ($430,540) to the committee for 
anti-trafficking activities in 2020, compared with 3.24 million patacas 
($405,510) allocated in 2019. The government disseminated television 
commercials, radio broadcasts, online videos, and pamphlets and 
posters in several different languages to raise awareness of trafficking. 
The Labor Affairs Bureau (LAB) distributed a leaflet in three languages 
covering the prevention of forced labor in offices of the immigration 
department. The labor department held labor rights seminars for the 
hotel and construction industries, and it co-hosted seminars with 
an NGO and a foreign consulate for migrant workers. In addition, 
the government held awareness seminars for potential workers in 
the mainland Chinese city Zhuhai, which borders Macau. Standard 
labor laws did not apply to domestic workers, and while there was 
a required minimum income threshold for employers to be able to 
sustain at least a 3,000 patacas ($375) monthly wage, there was no 
minimum wage for foreign domestic workers, a situation which may 
have increased their vulnerability to trafficking. During the reporting 
period, the government amended the law regulating the hiring of 
migrant workers to ban migrants from seeking employment in Macau 
while under a tourist visa. While some observers expected this change 
to reduce recruitment practices that led to worker exploitation, others 
noted it may increase costs for migrant workers to come to Macau and 
thereby increase their risk of facing debt-based coercion. Separately, 
the legislative assembly passed legislation that became effective in 
March 2021 and established new regulations for employment agencies, 
such as limiting the amount of fees agencies could charge migrant 
workers to 50 percent of the first months’ salary and prohibiting 
the withholding of workers’ identity documents or other personal 
belongings. Violations of the law were subject to a fine of 20,000 
to 50,000 pacatas ($2,500-$6,260) and license revocation. The 
labor department held three orientation meetings covering the new 
legislation with employment agency operators. LAB adjudicated 1,519 
labor dispute cases and conducted inspections at 72 construction sites 
and 209 employment agencies for labor violations. The government 
did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts 
or provide anti-trafficking training to its personnel posted overseas.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit foreign 
victims in Macau. Traffickers recruit victims, primarily from mainland 
China, Russia, and Southeast Asia, using false advertisements for jobs, 
such as singing and modeling or work in casinos. Adult and child 
victims are compelled into commercial sex in massage parlors, illegal 
brothels, nightclubs, entertainment establishments in casinos, hotels, 
and private homes, where they are closely monitored, threatened 
with violence, forced to work long hours, and sometimes have their 
identity documents confiscated. Casinos and other entertainment 
establishments reportedly allow staff to partner with criminal networks 
to allow illegal commercial sex activities within their establishments, 
which likely facilitated sex trafficking. The government’s pandemic-
related mitigation efforts, including travel and quarantine restrictions, 
disrupted Macau’s tourism industry; as a result, illegal activities 
in casinos, including commercial sex, declined in 2020. Migrant 
construction and domestic workers, primarily from mainland China, 
Indonesia, and Philippines, may be vulnerable to forced labor in Macau. 
Some employment agencies overcharge workers recruitment fees of 
approximately two to three months’ salary and withhold workers’ 
passports, potentially leading to debt-based coercion. Some brokers 
bring migrant workers to Macau to renew work visas for other countries 
while restricting their movement and withholding their passports.
MADAGASCAR: TIER 2 
The Government of Madagascar does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering 
the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Madagascar remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
increasing investigations and prosecutions of suspected trafficking 




one-stop centers to provide assistance to victims of child sexual 
exploitation, including child sex trafficking; and establishing a 
second specialized center for gender-based violence victims, including 
trafficking victims. For the first time in recent years, the government 
reported taking law enforcement action in trafficking cases involving 
child sex tourism. However, the government did not meet the 
minimum standards in several key areas. Despite continued reports of 
alleged complicity, the government did not hold any complicit officials 
accountable and did not investigate reports of officials facilitating child 
sex trafficking or the dismissal of trafficking cases. The government 
remained without official standard operating procedures (SOPs) to 
proactively identify trafficking victims and refer them to care, and 
it did not identify any foreign victims of trafficking. Overall efforts 
to address internal trafficking crimes, including domestic servitude, 
forced begging, and child sex trafficking, remained inadequate.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking offenses, including 
complicit officials and perpetrators of internal trafficking crimes, 
and adequately sentence convicted traffickers. • Systematically and 
proactively identify trafficking victims by screening for trafficking 
indicators among vulnerable populations, including child laborers, 
women exploited in commercial sex, migrant workers, and Chinese 
nationals working on Chinese government-funded infrastructure 
projects. • Refer all identified trafficking victims to appropriate 
protection services, including victims of internal trafficking, such 
as domestic servitude, forced begging, child sex trafficking, migrant 
workers, and Chinese nationals working on Chinese government-
funded infrastructure projects. • Institutionalize the training of 
front-line officials on case investigation and the use of SOPs for 
the identification and referral of victims to appropriate services. • 
Finalize, adopt, and provide appropriate funding to implement an 
anti-trafficking national action plan. • Amend the 2014 anti-trafficking 
law to ensure that the penalties prescribed for adult sex trafficking are 
commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such 
as rape and/or kidnapping. • Improve coordination between law 
enforcement and prosecutors/investigating judges, including regular 
case conferencing and conducting prosecution-led investigations. 
• Establish and implement strong regulations and oversight of 
recruitment companies, and enhance enforcement, including by 
investigating and prosecuting those involved in fraudulent labor 
recruitment. • Increase migrant worker protections by prohibiting 
recruitment fees charged to migrant workers and requiring minimum 
salaries, pre-departure training, a mutually enforceable standard 
contract, a complaints mechanism for returning workers, and a public 
blacklist of abusive employers. • Improve the national identification 
system, including a database and anti-fraud features, to prevent child 
sex trafficking based on issuance of fraudulent documentation. • 
Increase use by all relevant agencies of the national centralized 
anti-trafficking database to streamline data collection, including the 
number of victims identified, cases investigated and prosecuted, and 
convictions. • Conduct community-level sensitization campaigns to 
raise public awareness of all forms of trafficking, including child sex 
trafficking and internal trafficking.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. 
Law No.2014-040 criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed penalties ranging from two to five years’ imprisonment 
and a fine of one million to 10 million Malagasy ariary (MGA) ($260 
to $2,610) for offenses involving an adult victim, and five to 10 years’ 
imprisonment and a fine of two million to 20 million MGA ($520 
to $5,230) for those involving a child victim. These penalties were 
sufficiently stringent. For offenses involving children, with respect 
to sex trafficking, these penalties were commensurate with those 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape; however, offenses 
involving adult sex trafficking were not commensurate with those 
prescribed for other serious crimes.
The government reported investigating 24 potential trafficking cases 
involving at least 30 suspects, compared with 16 investigations 
involving at least 16 suspects in the previous reporting period. 
The government arrested at least 20 suspected traffickers; many 
remained in pretrial detention at the end of the reporting period, 
while the government temporarily released some of the suspects. The 
government reported prosecuting eight trafficking cases, involving at 
least eight suspected traffickers, compared with the prosecution of 
seven alleged traffickers in one case in 2019. The government reported 
referring all other investigated cases for prosecution but did not 
report initiating prosecutions or provide updates on ongoing cases. 
The Anti-Corruption Court (PAC) of Antananarivo, whose mandate 
included trafficking cases that were transnational or involved criminal 
networks or fraudulent documents, convicted two traffickers charged 
with fraudulently inducing Malagasy women to travel to China for 
the purpose of exploitation, compared with six convictions in 2019 
and zero convictions in 2018 and 2017. The PAC sentenced both 
traffickers to six years’ imprisonment. A second branch of the PAC 
began operations in Mahajanga in October 2020. For the first time in 
recent years, the government reported investigating and prosecuting 
suspects involved in child sex trafficking, including child sex tourism. 
In Toliara, authorities prosecuted and convicted a foreign tourist who 
engaged in child sex trafficking and was charged with child sexual 
exploitation. The Court of First Instance convicted the tourist of 
pedophilia and sentenced him to five years’ imprisonment and a fine 
of 10 million MGA ($2,610); however, the perpetrator appealed his 
sentence, claiming poor health conditions, and courts subsequently 
released him and suspended the judgement. The government did 
not report the outcome of the other six reported prosecutions. 
Overall, efforts to investigate and prosecute internal trafficking 
crimes, including domestic servitude, forced begging, and child 
sex trafficking, remained inadequate compared to the scale of the 
problem, and officials continued to frequently conflate trafficking and 
smuggling. Since May 2020, the National Office to Combat Human 
Trafficking (BNLTEH) has maintained a national database for the 
collection of trafficking-related information; however, not all relevant 
ministries regularly contributed to the database, causing national 
law enforcement statistics to remain difficult to obtain and verify. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government officials complicit in trafficking offenses; 
however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes 
remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action 
during the year. Furthermore, procedures stating that a government 
official cannot be arrested without authorization from the official’s 
supervisor impeded holding complicit officials accountable for 
trafficking crimes. Observers reported some government officials 
continued to help Malagasy nationals obtain fraudulent travel 
documentation to circumvent a 2013 travel ban to certain Middle 
Eastern countries where traffickers have exploited Malagasy laborers. 
Observers also alleged that a network of government officials 
continued to produce false identity documents used to facilitate 
child sex trafficking, especially in coastal areas like Nosy Be; however, 
the government did not report initiating an investigation into these 
continued allegations. Judges released accused sex offenders, some 
of whom may have been traffickers and often were foreign citizens, 
allegedly at the request of senior government officials.
In partnership with an NGO, the government trained nine law 
enforcement officials, gendarmes, and judges in Toamasina and 








110 officials trained in 2019 and 264 in 2018. Despite training efforts, 
the government did not institutionalize anti-trafficking training, and 
some police, immigration officers, prosecutors, and judges continued 
to lack a clear understanding of trafficking, which hampered law 
enforcement and victim identification efforts. Coordination and 
information sharing between the public prosecutor’s office and 
police were inadequate and continued to hinder case progression. In 
December 2019, the government, in partnership with an international 
organization, approved an interagency agreement between the justice 
system, the national police, and the national gendarmerie to establish 
a protocol for effective coordination on trafficking cases; however, the 
different agencies had not signed the agreement and did not report 
cases of its implementation for the second consecutive reporting 
period. Due to lengthy judicial processes and a lack of implementation 
for victim protections in criminal proceedings, victims and families 
often chose to settle conflicts, including trafficking crimes, through 
informal family mediations at the local level. Victims were often 
reluctant to file charges due to fear of reprisals. 
PROTECTION
The government increased victim protection efforts. Due to a lack 
of coordinated data collection at the national level, the government 
did not report comprehensive data. The government reported 
identifying at least 175 victims of trafficking during the reporting 
period, compared with at least 111 victims identified in the previous 
reporting period. Of the identified victims reported, 172 were female, 
three were male; 171 were adults, four were children; and all victims 
were Malagasy nationals. The government provided various forms of 
assistance, including medical services, psychosocial counseling, and 
financial support, to at least 117 trafficking victims, compared with at 
least 103 victims assisted last reporting period. In addition to victims 
identified by the government, NGOs and international organizations 
reported identifying and assisting at least 973 potential victims, 
providing them with protective services, including medical care, 
social reintegration assistance, and school support. The government, 
with the support of international organizations, repatriated 305 
Malagasy women, including potential victims of trafficking, from 
the Middle East—176 from Kuwait, 75 from Saudi Arabia, and 54 
from Lebanon—where they had been laboring in domestic work 
and potentially exploited in domestic servitude, compared with 68 
victims repatriated from Kuwait in the previous reporting period. 
The government and international organizations reported all of the 
women became stranded abroad due to pandemic-related business 
closures, travel restrictions, and border closures.
The government remained without official SOPs to proactively 
identify trafficking victims and refer them to care; instead, there 
were disparate SOPs across different ministries. An international 
organization reported training law enforcement officials and service 
providers on a victim identification and referral manual; however, 
the manual did not include methods to proactively screen vulnerable 
groups to identify potential trafficking victims. The manual included 
a list of assistance organizations to which victims should be referred 
for care. The government did not distribute the manual, and officials 
used it only minimally outside of Antananarivo. The Central Unit 
of Specialized Investigation and Fight Against Documentary Fraud 
within the National Police reportedly developed a victim identification 
questionnaire for use during investigations; however, the government 
did not report implementing the tool during the reporting period. 
The Ministry of Population (MOP), in collaboration with an 
international organization, continued to coordinate more than 
700 child protection networks across the country to protect children 
from various forms of abuse and exploitation, as well as to ensure 
access to medical and psychological services for victims of crime, 
including trafficking. Due to lack of resources, only about 600 
child protection networks provided basic assistance through public 
hospitals and health units, and most of the networks referred the 
victims to international organizations and NGOs for additional 
assistance; however, this was an increase compared with only 
400 operating in the previous reporting period. Through referral 
from the child protection networks, an international organization 
assisted 876 children (487 girls and 389 boys), including victims 
of sexual exploitation and the worst forms of child labor, both 
including child trafficking. The Mitsinjo Center, a government-owned, 
trafficking-specific temporary shelter for repatriated adult victims, 
assisted one potential victim during the reporting period. Since 
the intended recipients of shelter at the center had to quarantine 
after travel during the pandemic, repatriated women, including 
potential trafficking victims, received shelter at a hotel paid for by 
international organizations. The government reported the center 
was instead used as emergency shelter for victims of other types of 
violence for most of the reporting period. Six government hospitals 
had “one-stop” victim support centers that offered assistance to 
child victims of various abuses, including sex trafficking; the one-
stop support centers—located in Antananarivo, Mahajanga, Nosy 
Be, Toamasina, Tolagnaro, and Toliara—offered victims medical 
assistance, psychological support, and access to police and social 
workers. The government reported assisting 1,304 children (including 
14 boys) at these facilities; however, the government did not report 
the number of identified trafficking victims assisted. The government 
opened and operated two new one-stop centers in Tolagnaro and 
Toliara during the reporting period. The MOP, in partnership with 
an international organization, continued to operate a foster care 
program for exploited children in Nosy Be; the government did 
not provide statistics on the number of available foster families 
or beneficiaries for the second consecutive reporting period. The 
government continued to operate and fund the Manjary Soa Center 
in Antananarivo, which received 30 children who had been removed 
from situations of forced labor and sex trafficking. This center provided 
vocational training or reintegration into the public school system 
and allowed victims to stay at the center for a whole school year. 
The city of Antananarivo continued to manage an emergency center 
for child victims of crime, including domestic servitude and forced 
begging victims, who were frequently referred by the Morals and 
Protection of Minors Police Service; the city, in partnership with an 
international organization, provided food, lodging, psychological 
and medical aid, and educational services. In November 2020, the 
government, in partnership with an international organization, 
established a second specialized center for gender-based violence 
victims, including trafficking victims, in Antananarivo; the MOP 
provided training to staff at the new shelter on trafficking victim 
identification. These centers provided free psychological support, 
medical care, and legal assistance; the government did not report the 
number of trafficking victims assisted during the reporting period.
The 2014 anti-trafficking law required authorities to consider legal 
alternatives for foreign trafficking victims who believe they may face 
hardship or retribution if returned to their country of origin, but 
the government did not report providing this protection to victims 
during the reporting period. There were occasional reports that the 
government arrested or punished trafficking victims for unlawful 
acts traffickers compelled them to commit; police would sometimes 
arrest girls for prostitution without screening or identification as 
trafficking victims and would sometimes temporarily keep potential 
transnational labor trafficking victims in police stations due to a lack 
of alternative accommodations. Observers reported employers often 
sued former child domestic workers to avoid paying accumulated 
unpaid salaries in cases where victims may have reported their abuse; 
however, the government did not report investigating these incidents. 
To prevent retaliation from suspected traffickers, trafficking trials 
could be held in private or by camera for the sake of the victim or 
witness confidentiality and privacy; however, the government did 
not report doing so during the reporting period. While the 2014 
anti-trafficking law entitled victims to restitution, for the seventh 
consecutive year, the government did not implement this provision.
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. BNLTEH, 




national anti-trafficking efforts. During the reporting period, the 
government dedicated additional resources to BNLTEH, increasing 
the total staff from six to 15 civil servants. The 2020 federal budget 
legislation provided a dedicated budget of 410 million MGA 
($107,200) for anti-trafficking programs led by BNLTEH; however, 
the government did not disburse any funding to BNLTEH during the 
year, attributing the decision to the strain on the national budget 
during the pandemic. The lack of funding led to the cancellation of 
most of BNLTEH’s planned activities. The government did not have 
an anti-trafficking national action plan (NAP); BNLTEH finalized an 
updated draft NAP, which was awaiting approval by the prime minister 
at the end of the reporting period. The government maintained 
efforts to conduct public awareness campaigns during the reporting 
period. BNLTEH, in partnership with an international organization, 
launched an online campaign focused on the increased risks of human 
trafficking in the context of socio-economic challenges during the 
pandemic. BNLTEH also disseminated four series of posters to raise 
awareness among relevant government ministries. Despite decreased 
air travel due to the pandemic, BNLTEH continued to broadcast a 
video on the risks of dangerous migration and human trafficking 
in Ivato International Airport. BNLTEH maintained a hotline to 
report human trafficking and dedicated staff to receive incoming 
calls; however, calling the hotline was not free of charge, and its 
publicization was limited. In partnership with an international 
organization, the MOP continued to operate a national toll-free 
hotline to report child abuse. The government reported identifying 
37 cases of child exploitation—including at least 23 cases of forced 
labor in domestic servitude and at least three cases of child sex 
trafficking—from the hotline during the reporting period, compared 
with 27 cases in the previous reporting period. 
A 2013 ban on migrant worker travel to Middle Eastern countries 
the government considered high-risk remained in place; however, 
illicit recruitment agencies circumvented the ban by sending workers 
through Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, and Seychelles. In 
an attempt to address this issue and identify agencies involved in 
fraudulent recruitment, the government continued its suspension 
of all existing accreditations for placement agencies and, thus, its 
prohibition of recruitment of workers for employment abroad. These 
prohibitions on migrant workers continued to leave Malagasy with 
no legal means to travel abroad for work and therefore without 
access to protection mechanisms available through authorized 
travel, subsequently increasing their vulnerability to trafficking and 
blackmail. The Ministry of Labor, Employment, Civil Service, and 
Social Laws (MOL) continued to oversee the process of migrant 
workers traveling to non-Gulf countries by requiring contract approval 
by the relevant Malagasy embassy. The MOL and Ministry of Youth, 
in partnership with an international organization, established 
fair recruitment focus groups in the Analamanaga, Diana, and 
Sava regions; these groups met regularly to assess employment 
opportunities abroad, identify alternatives to professional migration, 
and raise awareness on the risks of illegal work migration.
The government increased efforts to reduce the demand for 
commercial sex acts, including child sex tourism. Local officials 
in Toliara, a destination for child sex tourism, increased efforts to 
investigate child sex tourism suspects, including those purchasing sex 
from children. The Ministry of Tourism (MOT), in partnership with 
international organizations, continued to monitor the commitment 
of the approximately 1,000 tourism operators in 12 regions who had 
previously acceded to the tourism code of conduct against commercial 
child sexual exploitation and sex tourism. The MOT reported that it 
continued to conduct an unknown number of routine compliance 
inspections; however, the government did not report the number 
of inspections conducted during the reporting period, if any hotel 
operators were found in violation of the code, or if steps were 
taken to rectify noncompliance. The MOT conducted an unknown 
number of hotel compliance inspections to remind hotels of their 
obligation to display posters in their reception areas publicizing the 
prohibition of commercial child sexual exploitation; the government 
also maintained such billboards at airports as a warning for tourists. 
The MOT, in partnership with NGOs and an international donor, 
continued to disseminate pamphlets to tourists to remind them that 
child sex trafficking was illegal and provide steps on how to report 
a trafficking crime. The government did not provide anti-trafficking 
training to diplomats.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Madagascar, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Madagascar abroad. Traffickers exploit Malagasy children, mostly from 
rural and coastal regions and from impoverished families in urban 
areas, in child sex trafficking and forced labor in domestic service, 
mining, fishing, and agriculture across the country. The prevalence 
of child forced begging continues to increase in Antananarivo; 
reports indicate that traffickers force children, including those with 
disabilities, to work for long hours and in dangerous conditions, 
frequently at the behest of their parents. Most child sex trafficking 
occurs in tourist destinations, urban cities, vanilla-growing regions, 
and around formal and informal mining sites with the involvement 
and encouragement of family members; however, tourist operators, 
hotels, taxi drivers, massage centers, and local adults in commercial 
sex also facilitate this crime. Traffickers continue to exploit girls as 
young as 13 years old in child sex tourism in Nosy Be and other coastal 
areas, increasingly in Toliara. Malagasy men exploit the majority of 
child sex trafficking victims. Although tourist arrivals declined in 
2020, historically most foreign sex tourists in Madagascar are French 
and Italian nationals, and, to a lesser extent, other Westerners and 
Comorians. In coastal areas like Nosy Be, Toliara, Mahajanga, and 
Toamasina, parents encourage girls as young as 15 years old to become 
financially independent by engaging in commercial sex with foreign 
tourists; traffickers use this cultural norm as an opportunity to exploit 
girls in child sex trafficking. Traffickers fraudulently recruit some 
children for work in Antananarivo and Mahajanga as waitresses and 
masseuses before exploiting them in child sex trafficking. Traffickers 
continue to abuse traditional practices of arranged marriage, bride 
purchase, and girl markets to exploit girls in child sex trafficking. 
Government officials are reportedly complicit in providing falsified 
national identity cards to traffickers that facilitate child sex trafficking 
in Madagascar and forced labor in domestic service of Malagasy 
women abroad. During the pandemic, sex traffickers increasingly 
exploited women and children online; in some cases, traffickers lured 
women from rural provinces to Antananarivo with the promise of 
employment but then forced them to perform online sex acts for 
foreign customers. Previous reports indicated child sex trafficking 
of boys was becoming more prevalent. Forced labor persisted in the 
context of dinas, which were informal arrangements for payment 
or in response to wrongdoing and a way of resolving conflicts or 
paying debt.
Many Malagasy women are employed as domestic workers in China, 
Lebanon, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, and media sources report that 
informal placement agencies are still attempting to circumvent a 2013 
ban against sending workers to the Middle East by routing them via 
Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, and Seychelles using legitimate 
tourist visas to avoid declaring travelers as migrant workers. Traffickers 
acting as agents in labor recruitment agencies send Malagasy women 
to China with falsified identity cards, where they are exploited in 
forced labor in agriculture or domestic servitude. Traffickers and 
employers may exploit Malagasy men in forced labor in the services 
and construction industries in the Middle East and in domestic service 
in China. Suspending accreditation of placement agencies has led 
to employers and traffickers increasingly targeting migrant workers 
for blackmail or solicitation of bribes. Reports indicate traffickers 
and employers exploit Malagasy workers in Gulf States using various 
forms of abuse, such as physical violence, salary withholding, and 
confiscation of passports. Chinese nationals working in Madagascar, 
particularly in construction, may have been forced to work, including 









The Government of Malawi does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Malawi remained on Tier 2. These efforts included initiating 
more trafficking investigations and prosecutions; identifying more 
trafficking victims; developing standard operating procedures (SOPs) 
and an implementation plan to identify victims within refugee 
camps and refer them to appropriate care; and establishing four 
new district-level anti-trafficking coordination committees. The 
government formally recognized and provided official licensing 
certificates to four trafficking-specific shelters—the first in the 
country—initiating the process for the four shelters to become 
operational. However, the government did not meet the minimum 
standards in several key areas. Government efforts to address sex 
trafficking were inadequate compared to the scale of the problem; 
the government did not report investigating any sex trafficking crimes 
or identifying any sex trafficking victims during the year. Due to the 
lack of shelters and other protections, police often detained victims 
during the investigation process and did not take adequate measures 
to prevent the re-traumatization of victims participating in criminal 
proceedings. Credible reports of official complicity continued to 
impede the government’s efforts to carry out anti-trafficking law 
enforcement efforts and proactively identify trafficking victims. 
The U.S. Department of State suspended the A-3 visa sponsorship 
privileges afforded to Malawi bilateral mission members as a result 
of an unpaid default judgment rendered against a now former 
Malawian diplomat by a federal district court in 2016 for trafficking. 
For the third consecutive year, the former diplomat failed to pay the 
outstanding judgment.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Using the established standard operating procedures and national 
referral mechanism, systematically and proactively identify trafficking 
victims by screening for trafficking indicators among vulnerable 
populations, including individuals involved in commercial sex, 
refugees, and foreign workers, and refer all victims to appropriate 
services. • Vigorously investigate and prosecute sex and labor 
trafficking crimes and sentence convicted traffickers to adequate 
penalties under the 2015 anti-trafficking law, including complicit 
government officials. • Collaborate with NGOs and international 
organizations to increase the government’s capacity to provide 
shelter and protective services to more trafficking victims. • Increase 
protective services for victims participating in the criminal justice 
process to prevent re-traumatization, including establishing child-
friendly interviewing spaces and ensuring victims receive basic needs. 
• Expand the collection of law enforcement and victim protection 
data for trafficking cases, specifically the number of victims referred 
and provided protective services, and compile data from all districts. 
• Disperse funds allocated to the Anti-Trafficking Fund to provide 
care to victims and to expand training for law enforcement and 
protection officers on investigating trafficking crimes, identifying 
trafficking victims, and providing adequate protection services. • 
Train labor inspectors to identify potential forced labor victims during 
routine inspections and to report potential trafficking violations to 
appropriate officials. • Develop and institutionalize a mandatory 
pre-departure anti-trafficking training for all Malawian diplomats. 
• Increase awareness and monitoring of trafficking crimes, as well 
as efforts to identify traffickers and victims at border crossings and 
internal police checkpoints.
PROSECUTION
The government slightly increased anti-trafficking law enforcement 
efforts. The 2015 Trafficking in Persons Act criminalized sex trafficking 
and labor trafficking, and prescribed punishments of up to 14 
years’ imprisonment for offenses involving an adult victim and 
up to 21 years’ imprisonment for those involving a child victim. 
These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with punishments prescribed for other 
serious crimes, such as kidnapping. 
In 2020, the Malawi Police Service (MPS) reported anti-trafficking law 
enforcement data from five of Malawi’s 34 district-level police stations, 
compared with data from 11 district-level police stations during the 
previous reporting period. The government reported investigating 
44 trafficking cases and arresting 54 suspected traffickers, compared 
with reporting 48 arrests in an unspecified number of investigations 
during the previous reporting period. Of these 44 cases, 35 involved 
forced labor; the government did not report the types of trafficking 
in the remaining nine cases and did not report investigating any sex 
trafficking crimes during the reporting period. The government noted 
that the majority of alleged traffickers were Malawian nationals, 
while others were foreign nationals from Zambia, Mozambique, 
Pakistan, and China. Four investigations remained ongoing at the 
end of the reporting period. The government initiated prosecutions 
of 33 cases involving 39 suspected traffickers, compared with 30 
alleged traffickers prosecuted in 2019. The government reported 
convicting 29 traffickers, compared with 30 convictions during the 
prior reporting period. Ten prosecutions remained ongoing at the 
end of the reporting period. Courts sentenced convicted traffickers 
to prison terms ranging from one to five years’ imprisonment. The 
government reported 13 traffickers received suspended sentences; 
four did not serve any prison time. Courts acquitted two alleged 
traffickers for unspecified reasons. The government reported that 
pandemic-related restrictions, such as travel limitations and spread 
of the virus among law enforcement officials, may have inhibited 
or slowed some efforts, particularly investigations, during the year. 
During the reporting period, the government, in partnership with 
an international organization, trained 247 police and social welfare 
officers on trafficking, compared with at least 153 officials trained 
on investigations, victim identification, and data collection in the 
previous reporting period. The MPS retained anti-trafficking training 
in its curricula for the Limbe, Mtakata, and Mlangeni Police Training 
Schools and Zomba Police College; however, the government did 
not report the number of recruits trained. The government noted 
pandemic-related restrictions and widespread infection among 
officials negatively affected training opportunities during the reporting 
period. Despite previous trainings, police reported a continued lack 
of financial resources and coordination with neighboring countries 
to conduct timely cross-border investigations; pandemic-related 
border closures and travel restrictions further affected transnational 
anti-trafficking efforts during the year. 
Widespread corruption, coupled with a lack of capacity and resources, 
led to limited documentation and poor data collection on trafficking 
cases. The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, 
or convictions of government employees complicit in human 
trafficking offenses; however, corruption and official complicity 
in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law 
enforcement action during the year. In recent years, law enforcement 
officers regularly failed to screen individuals engaged in commercial 
sex for trafficking indicators and were allegedly complicit in sex 
trafficking crimes by arresting and charging girls and women in 
commercial sex if they did not provide free sexual services to the 





discern the age of individuals in commercial sex or investigate such 
cases as child sex trafficking crimes, despite indications of children 
being involved. During the reporting period, officials suspended 
12 police officers in Mzuzu for reportedly assisting traffickers; the 
government did not provide further details on these allegations 
or report criminally investigating these cases. In April 2019, the 
Department of State suspended for two years the A-3 visa sponsorship 
privileges afforded to Malawi bilateral mission members as a result 
of an unpaid final judgment against a former Malawian diplomat for 
approximately $1.1 million rendered by a federal district court in a 
civil human trafficking case involving a domestic worker who sued 
her former employer, the former Malawian diplomat, for trafficking. 
The former diplomat left the United States in 2012. During the 
reporting period, the former diplomat and the domestic worker 
reportedly discussed settlement but were unable to reach agreement. 
For the third consecutive year, the government did not report taking 
any further action to hold the diplomat accountable. 
PROTECTION
The government increased efforts to identify trafficking victims, 
while efforts to provide services to victims remained weak. The 
government identified 199 trafficking victims, a significant increase 
compared with 140 victims identified in the previous reporting 
period. The government reported traffickers exploited 144 of these 
identified victims in forced labor; it did not provide details on the 
type of trafficking the other 55 victims experienced. The government 
did not report identifying any sex trafficking victims during the 
reporting period. Of the 199 victims identified, 57 were children; 
however, government reports did not distinguish between child 
trafficking victims and the children of trafficking victims in its records. 
Consequently, some of the child victims reported in 2020 may have 
been the dependents of identified adult victims. The government 
continued to use the SOPs and national referral mechanism for victim 
identification and assistance launched during the previous reporting 
period; however, observers noted government officials continued to 
lack an understanding of trafficking, hindering proactive identification 
and referral efforts. During the reporting period, the government, 
in partnership with international organizations and foreign donors, 
developed and finalized SOPs for victim identification and referral, 
as well as a case reporting form, to increase protection efforts in the 
Dzaleka Refugee Camp. 
During the reporting period, the government formally recognized and 
provided official licensing certificates to the first trafficking-specific 
shelters—in Limbe, Lilongwe, Mchinji, and Zomba—initiating the 
process for the four shelters to become operational and support 
identified victims of trafficking. The government, in partnership with 
NGOs, had already identified facilities to house these shelters and 
assigned protection officers from the Ministry of Gender to oversee the 
shelters once operational. The government referred at least 96 victims 
to NGO-run protection services, where they received counseling, 
medical care, food, and livelihood training, as appropriate; however, 
observers reported that government efforts to provide protection 
services to trafficking victims remained minimal. The government 
operated one center in Lilongwe that provided counseling and 
specialized care for vulnerable children, which could include child 
trafficking victims; however, the government did not provide specific 
numbers of trafficking victims who benefited from these services 
during the reporting period. Some of the approximately 300 police 
sub-stations at the village-level housed victim support units (VSUs) 
to respond to gender-based violence and trafficking crimes; however, 
the VSUs lacked capacity to respond adequately, and the quality of 
services varied throughout the country. The government and civil 
society reported pandemic-related preventative measures, such as 
limitations on gatherings, travel restrictions, border closures, and 
curfews, limited victim care during the reporting period.
Despite the government’s reliance on civil society organizations to 
provide care to trafficking victims, it did not report providing financial 
or in-kind support to such organizations during the reporting period. 
In 2020, the government allocated 150 million Malawian kwacha 
($182,930) to the anti-trafficking fund, the same amount allocated 
in 2019 and 2018; the government utilized the fund for various 
activities during the reporting period, including support for victim 
repatriation and capacity building for protection service providers. 
A significant lack of resources, capacity, and anti-trafficking training 
among police and social welfare officers led to ad hoc assistance, a 
lack of victim-centered approaches, and potential re-traumatization 
of victims. Observers reported police often transported victims, 
particularly children, and suspected traffickers in the same vehicle, 
resulting in potential intimidation and further traumatization of 
victims. Officials occasionally placed victims in detention, due to 
a lack of shelter space; in some cases, victims reportedly ran away 
from detention after officials failed to provide them basic needs, 
such as food. The 2015 anti-trafficking law allowed courts to provide 
immunity to victims for crimes their trafficker compelled them 
to commit, including potential immigration violations; however, 
previous reports alleged foreign victims faced deportation unless they 
challenged their immigration status in court. Malawian law did not 
allow for foreign victims to receive regularization of immigration 
status and temporary residency. 
PREVENTION
The government slightly increased efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
National Coordination Committee Against Trafficking in Persons, led 
by the Ministry of Homeland Security and charged with overseeing 
national anti-trafficking efforts, met once during the reporting period, 
compared with quarterly meetings in prior years. The government 
established four new district coordination committees against 
trafficking in persons in Dedza, Karonga, Mangochi, and Mzimba 
and began developing district-level action plans for each committee; 
this expanded the total number of district coordination committees 
to six, including in Mchinji and Phalombe. Members of the informal 
Malawi Network Against Child Trafficking, comprising government 
officials, religious leaders, NGOs, and international stakeholders, 
also continued to meet. The government continued to implement 
its 2017-2022 anti-trafficking national action plan, including by 
establishing new district coordination committees, training police 
and social welfare officials, and conducting awareness campaigns. 
During the reporting period, the government developed and finalized 
an implementation plan to increase anti-trafficking efforts within 
the Dzaleka Refugee Camp. The government reported conducting 
fewer awareness campaigns compared with the previous reporting 
period, citing pandemic-related restrictions on in-person gatherings; 
however, the government conducted some national and community-
level radio campaigns to raise awareness of trafficking crimes. The 
government did not operate a hotline to report trafficking crimes or 
provide services to victims; however, it partnered with an NGO-run 
hotline to assist victims and track trafficking crimes. The government 
and NGO registered 82 potential trafficking crimes – 65 involving 
children and 17 involving adults – through the hotline during the 
reporting period. With support from an international organization, 
the government contributed information on trafficking cases identified 
during the reporting period to a national centralized anti-trafficking 
data collection and reporting tool. The Ministry of Labor carried 
out an unknown number of inspections, primarily in response to 
complaints of forced or exploitative labor on large commercial farms; 
however, the government did not report identifying any trafficking 
victims or further investigating potential trafficking violations found 
during these inspections. The government did not make efforts to 
reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. Due to pandemic-related 
restrictions on travel and gatherings, the government did not provide 
anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel, compared with 
one training during the previous reporting period. However, the 
government reported developing an anti-trafficking training program 
for diplomats during the reporting period.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 






Malawi abroad. Traffickers exploit most Malawian victims within 
the country, generally lured from the southern part of the country 
to the central and northern regions for forced labor in agriculture 
(predominantly the tobacco industry), goat and cattle herding, and 
brickmaking. Many cases of child labor external to the family involve 
fraudulent recruitment and physical or sexual abuse, indicative of 
forced labor. Traffickers — primarily facilitators, family members, or 
brothel owners —  lure children in rural areas by offering employment 
opportunities, clothing, or lodging, for which they are sometimes 
charged exorbitant fees, resulting in sex trafficking. Traffickers exploit 
teenage boys in forced labor on farms and girls in sex trafficking or 
other forms of sexual exploitation in nightclubs or bars. As a result 
of restaurant and bar closures during the pandemic, observers 
report that private homes, especially in Lilongwe and Blantyre, have 
started operating as illegal brothels and bars; operators of these 
establishments exploit girls in sex trafficking. Traffickers exploit 
children in forced labor in begging, domestic servitude, small 
businesses, and potentially in the fishing industry; in past years, 
some children were coerced to commit crimes. During the pandemic, 
school closures from March to October 2020 and January to February 
2021 increased children’s vulnerability to exploitation, including sex 
trafficking and forced labor in agriculture. Adult tenant farmers are 
at risk for exploitation, as they incur debts to landowners and may 
not receive payment during poor harvests. Traffickers exploit adults 
and children from Mozambique, Zambia, the Great Lakes region, 
and the Horn of Africa in labor and sex trafficking. In response to the 
pandemic, traffickers began using unmonitored and irregular border 
crossings to facilitate transnational trafficking, avoiding traditional 
border crossings requiring COVID-19 test certificates; observers also 
report traffickers’ increasing use of smaller, less obvious transportation 
methods, such as bicycles and motorbikes, versus trucks or buses to 
transport potential trafficking victims.
Malawi hosts more than 49,000 refugees and asylum-seekers, primarily 
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, 
Ethiopia, and Somalia, in Dzaleka Refugee Camp. Traffickers exploit 
men in forced labor and women and girls in sex trafficking both 
inside and via the camp. Criminal networks facilitate sex trafficking 
and forced labor, primarily in farming and domestic servitude, of 
refugees in Malawi or the transportation of refugees and vulnerable 
migrants for the purpose of sexual exploitation to other countries 
in Southern Africa. Malawian victims of sex and labor trafficking 
have been identified in Kenya, Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania, 
and Zambia, as well as in Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Some 
girls recruited for domestic service are instead forced to marry and 
are subsequently exploited in sex trafficking by their “husbands.” 
Fraudulent employment agencies lure women and girls to Gulf states, 
where traffickers exploit them in sex and labor trafficking.
MALAYSIA: TIER 3
The Government of Malaysia does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making 
significant efforts to do so, even considering the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Malaysia was downgraded to Tier 3. Despite the lack of significant 
efforts, the government took some steps to address trafficking. The 
government prosecuted and convicted some traffickers, adopted 
victim identification standard operating procedures (SOPs), continued 
to identify and provide some protection services to trafficking 
victims, and publicly released the results of a survey it funded on 
the prevalence of forced and child labor in the palm oil sector. 
However, the government continued to conflate human trafficking 
and migrant smuggling crimes and did not adequately address or 
criminally pursue credible allegations from multiple sources alleging 
labor trafficking, including in the rubber manufacturing industry and 
palm oil sector, with the government owning 33 percent of the third 
largest palm oil company in the world. The government continued 
to rely on victims to “self-identify” and did not implement SOPs to 
proactively identify victims during law enforcement raids or among 
vulnerable populations with whom authorities came in contact; 
thus, authorities continued to inappropriately penalize victims for 
immigration and prostitution violations. Insufficient interagency 
coordination and inadequate victim services, which discouraged 
foreign victims from remaining in Malaysia to participate in criminal 
proceedings, continued to hinder successful law enforcement efforts 
to prosecute traffickers. Despite ongoing concerns that corruption 
facilitated trafficking, the government arrested and investigated, but 
did not prosecute or convict, officials who were allegedly complicit 
in trafficking-related crimes.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase efforts to identify trafficking victims among vulnerable 
populations, including household workers and palm oil plantation 
workers • Increase efforts to prosecute and convict more trafficking 
cases—as distinct from migrant smuggling—including those involving 
complicit officials and forced labor crimes. • Make public the results 
of investigations involving corrupt officials to increase transparency 
and deterrence and hold officials criminally accountable when they 
violate the law. • Increase law enforcement capacity to investigate 
and prosecute trafficking cases, including by improving interagency 
coordination. • Improve case management and communication with 
trafficking victims, including through an expanded Victim Assistance 
Specialist program. • Expand labor protections for domestic workers 
and investigate allegations of domestic worker abuse. • Take steps 
to eliminate recruitment or placement fees charged to workers 
by recruiters and ensure recruitment fees are paid by employers. 
• Expand efforts to inform migrant workers of their rights and 
Malaysian labor laws, including their rights to maintain access 
to their passports at any time, as well as opportunities for legal 
remedies to exploitation. • Create a system for access to timely and 
accurate interpretation in victims’ primary languages available to law 
enforcement, the court system, and shelters. • Continue to expand 
cooperation with NGOs, including through financial or in-kind 
support to NGOs to provide some victim rehabilitation services. 
• Effectively enforce the law prohibiting employers from retaining 
passports without employees’ consent, including by increasing 
resources for labor inspectors, and include language explicitly stating 
passports will remain in the employee’s possession in model contracts 
and future bilateral memoranda of understanding with labor source 
countries. • Increase the number of trafficking victims who obtain 
approval for freedom of movement from shelters, expand freedom 
of movement to include unchaperoned movement, and increase 
victims’ access to communication with people outside shelter facilities, 
including through telephone calls. • Train relevant officials, including 
labor inspectors and immigration officials, on SOPs for victim 
identification that include information on trafficking indicators. • 
Reduce prosecution delays, including by providing improved guidance 
to prosecutors on pursuing trafficking charges, and increase judicial 
familiarity with the full range of trafficking crimes, particularly forced 
labor. • Increase efforts to identify trafficking victims among Chinese 
workers on Chinese-government affiliated infrastructure projects.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. The 2007 
Anti-Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants (ATIPSOM) 
Act—amended in 2010 and 2015—criminalized labor trafficking 




years’ imprisonment and a fine, which were sufficiently stringent 
and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those 
prescribed for other serious offenses, such as rape. From April 2020 
to March 2021, law enforcement authorities conducted 118 total 
human trafficking investigations and – of these cases – referred 52 
suspected sex trafficking cases and 57 suspected labor trafficking 
cases to the Attorney General for prosecution. The Attorney General’s 
Chamber initiated the prosecution of 79 alleged traffickers. The courts 
convicted 25 human traffickers and migrant smugglers, but it did 
not disaggregate the data, nor did it provide case details; perpetrators 
were charged and convicted under a range of laws, including the 
ATIPSOM Act, Immigration Act, and the Penal Code. This data 
compared with 277 investigations (80 of which involved forced 
labor), 20 prosecutions, and 20 convictions during the previous 
reporting period. The government did not report efforts to coordinate 
with foreign law enforcement to investigate or prosecute trafficking 
cases. The government continued to conflate human trafficking and 
migrant smuggling, which impeded anti-trafficking law enforcement 
and victim identification efforts. 
The Royal Malaysia Police continued to serve as the lead enforcement 
agency under ATIPSOM and assigned 248 officers to its specialized 
anti-trafficking unit. The Labor Department similarly had a 
specialized trafficking enforcement team with 24 officers. Although 
the government continued to operate an interagency anti-trafficking 
law enforcement task force, coordination among agencies remained 
insufficient. For example, police, immigration, and customs officials 
often failed to collaborate when an investigation fell under the 
purview of two or more units or departments. The pandemic further 
restricted criminal justice operations, including those related to 
human trafficking cases, as courts intermittently closed, and trials 
were delayed throughout the reporting period. Law enforcement did 
not proactively investigate potential trafficking crimes, including those 
that NGOs reported, and sometimes referred potential victims for 
immigration violations, rather than investigating their traffickers. This 
subsequently resulted in increased unwillingness among civil society 
to report trafficking cases to officials. The government sometimes 
pursued cases of forced labor as disparate labor law violations instead 
of criminal cases of human trafficking or failed to investigate them 
at all. The government convicted 26 individuals for withholding the 
passports of employees under the Passport Act of 1966, but it did not 
report sentencing details for those convicted nor did it prosecute or 
convict these individuals for potential trafficking crimes. 
The government did not adequately address or criminally pursue 
credible allegations of labor trafficking in the rubber manufacturing 
and palm oil sectors made by international media, NGOs, and foreign 
governments. During the reporting period, the Labor Department 
initiated 57 investigations against employers in the rubber-product 
manufacturing sector to confirm compliance with housing laws, 
but it did not investigate these allegations as potential trafficking 
crimes. In December 2020, the government filed 19 charges against 
a disposable glove manufacturing company under the Worker’s 
Minimum Standards of Housing and Amenities Act (Act 226) for 
inhumane living conditions in migrant workers’ dormitories. The 
government also filed 30 charges against another rubber glove 
manufacturer following a series of raids where labor inspectors 
discovered more than 200 foreign workers living in inhumane 
and unsanitary conditions. However, the government did not 
report investigating or prosecuting these companies for human 
trafficking crimes despite credible evidence of debt-based coercion. 
The government did not initiate investigations of two Malaysian 
companies in the palm oil sector for forced labor allegations that 
occurred during the reporting period. Furthermore, the government 
did not report if it investigated a formal complaint filed in August 
2019 detailing allegations of forced labor at a Malaysian palm oil 
company’s plantation which was partially owned by the government. 
The government also did not report investigating or prosecuting, as 
trafficking crimes, allegations from 2018 that several rubber-product 
manufacturers exploited migrant workers, including through methods 
indicative of forced labor. 
Corruption and official complicity facilitated trafficking and impeded 
anti-trafficking efforts. In April 2020, the government charged a police 
inspector with eight counts of rape and human trafficking for the 
sexual exploitation of two Mongolian women after he arrested them; 
the case was pending trial at the end of the reporting period. Between 
May and October 2020, the government arrested 41 law enforcement 
personnel, including police, armed forces, and immigration officials, 
for collusion with human trafficking syndicates; the investigations 
were ongoing at the end of the reporting period. In 2019, the 
government charged the former deputy prime minister, who also 
served as minister of home affairs, with 40 counts of corruption 
for allegations of receiving kickbacks in visa issuance contracts for 
foreign workers. Although his trial was scheduled for October 2020, 
it was postponed due to pandemic-related restrictions; the case was 
pending at the end of the reporting period. The government did not 
report convicting any complicit officials for trafficking crimes during 
the reporting period. 
The attorney general’s chambers increased the number of trafficking-
specialist deputy public prosecutors from 69 to 73 during the reporting 
period. The government continued to operate its special trafficking 
court in Selangor, but it did not implement plans to expand special 
trafficking courts around the country. The government continued to 
conduct or support at least 52 anti-trafficking trainings, including 
hosting virtual trainings—in collaboration with an international 
organization—for law enforcement personnel and labor inspectors on 
victim identification SOPs. Nonetheless, officials did not consistently 
understand the definition of trafficking. Prosecutors often interpreted 
the definition of trafficking under ATIPSOM to require the physical 
restraint of a victim to pursue trafficking charges, which meant 
prosecutors did not pursue many potential trafficking cases under 
trafficking charges—especially in cases where coercion was a primary 
element used by traffickers. A 2014 directive required prosecutors 
to meet with victims at least two weeks prior to the start of a trial 
to prepare victims to record their statements and to help them 
understand the judicial process. Prosecutors reported they engaged 
with victims; however, limited availability of interpretation services 
made effective communication difficult. In addition, NGOs reported 
some prosecutors did not meet with victims before trial as required 
by the directive and sometimes only met a victim on the first day 
of a trial. Law enforcement agencies overwhelmingly cited language 
barriers with potential victims as an ongoing challenge in their work. 
While the government sometimes worked with foreign embassies or 
NGOs to interpret conversations, it did not have an institutionalized 
way to ensure timely and accurate communication with potential 
trafficking victims who did not speak Bahasa Malaysia or English. 
Furthermore, the absence of shelters in northern Malaysia hindered 
the ability of those prosecutors to meet with victims who were 
relocated to Kuala Lumpur for services. Some foreign victims reported 
a reluctance to stay in Malaysia to participate in prosecutions due 
to fears of extended shelter stays, unappealing shelter conditions, 
and intimidation from traffickers; some victims further reported 
authorities treated them like criminals, including taking victims 
to court in handcuffs for their trafficker’s trial. Although the law 
permitted victims to testify remotely, authorities generally expected 
victims to remain in-country pending trial proceedings. 
PROTECTION
The government demonstrated mixed protection efforts. From April 
2020 to March 2021, the government identified and confirmed 119 
trafficking victims among 487 potential victims. Of the confirmed 
victims, 72 were adult women and 47 were men or children. This 
data compared with the 82 confirmed victims identified and granted 
full protection orders among the 2,229 potential victims during 
the previous reporting period. In April 2020, the anti-trafficking 
council (MAPO) formally adopted victim identification SOPs, which 







the government did not report systematically implementing these 
SOPs; thus, authorities continued to punish potential trafficking 
victims with arrest, detention, and deportation for immigration or 
prostitution violations. The government continued to focus most 
of its identification efforts on the use of large-scale police raids 
of suspected commercial sex establishments; NGOs reported that 
some police units continued to conduct these raids during the 
reporting period. The government also conducted raids during the 
reporting period on factories suspected of having forced labor, the 
more prevalent trafficking problem in Malaysia. The government 
did not place adequate attention on the identification of victims 
of forced labor. Officials reported the government’s identification 
of labor trafficking victims often relied on reports of abuse from 
embassies representing foreign workers or from workers’ complaints 
of non-payment of wages and other violations, rather than proactive 
screening efforts. Despite adopting victim identification SOPs, 
NGOs reported police and immigration officers inconsistently 
applied victim identification procedures during large-scale operations 
to detect undocumented migrants, which ultimately prevented 
some foreign victims from being identified as victims and receiving 
protection services. Law enforcement authorities relied on victims 
to “self-identify” subsequent to a police raid, rather than proactively 
identifying victims using standardized procedures or victim-centered 
screening methods. Furthermore, the government did not partner 
with NGOs to help screen for trafficking during such raids or among 
vulnerable populations. The government did not adequately screen 
asylum-seekers and refugees for indicators of trafficking. Officials’ 
interpretation that ATIPSOM required a trafficking victim to be 
subjected to physical restraint, prevented the government from 
identifying some victims and issuing protection orders to many 
suspected victims of trafficking. NGOs relayed that authorities often 
treated potential victims identified during police or immigration 
raids like criminals; this treatment and the raid-environment were 
not conducive to victims speaking candidly to law enforcement 
and consequently contributed to the government’s insufficient 
identification of victims. In January 2021, the government announced 
a state of emergency and extended power to the armed forces to 
arrest undocumented migrants—a population highly vulnerable to 
trafficking—at the border. NGOs reported the government’s focus on 
illegal immigration during the reporting period resulted in local law 
enforcement personnel treating potential trafficking victims as illegal 
migrants and failing to investigate perpetrators for trafficking crimes. 
ATIPSOM required that the government place victims who were 
granted a court-ordered 21-day interim protection order (for potential 
trafficking victims) or a subsequent 90-day protection order (for 
certified trafficking victims) at a “place of refuge,” designated by 
the Minister of Home Affairs. During the reporting period, the 
government granted all 119 certified victims with full protection 
orders and housed them in government-operated shelters where 
they had access to food, medical care, social, religious, and income-
generating activities, and security. The Ministry of Women, Family, 
and Community Development continued to fund eight shelters 
for trafficking victims: five government-operated and three NGO-
operated. While the law permitted victims who were Malaysian 
citizens or permanent residents to be placed in the care of family 
members or a guardian, as opposed to a government shelter or 
other designated place of refuge, foreign victims were required to 
remain in government shelters for the duration of their protection 
orders. The government typically renewed protection orders for 
certified victims until the completion of the trial associated with 
their case; this resulted in some victims remaining in the shelters 
for up to six months. NGOs reported investigative authorities did 
not allow sufficient time to appropriately interview potential victims 
in shelters in order to certify them as victims and grant 90-day 
protection orders, which prevented some victims from obtaining 
protection services. Undocumented foreign trafficking victims had a 
considerably lower chance of obtaining protection orders compared 
with foreign victims who had valid immigration papers. During the 
21-day protection order, immigration authorities could offer special 
immigration passes to victims of labor trafficking that would allow 
them the right to work. Although the government did not require 
victims to participate in prosecutions to access special immigration 
passes, NGOs reported the government required victims seeking these 
benefits to make an initial deposition in court. While the government 
reportedly maintained a streamlined process to issue immigration 
passes, which required a security risk assessment, medical screening, 
and mental health evaluation by the end of victims’ 21-day interim 
protection order, no victims had requested an immigration pass 
nor were any issued during the reporting period. The government 
continued to lack enough qualified mental health counselors to 
conduct the required psycho-social evaluation during the appointed 
21-day timeframe. In comparison, the government issued 45 special 
immigration passes to victims during the previous reporting period. 
Furthermore, victims were not permitted to leave shelters unless 
immigration authorities granted them a freedom of movement pass; 
however, the government was less likely to approve these passes for 
female victims of sex trafficking. Although the government reported 
freedom of movement passes allowed victims to leave the shelters 
unchaperoned, in practice, a victim’s freedom of movement outside 
of shelters remained restricted to chaperoned trips. NGOs reported 
these shelter conditions resulted in victims feeling as though they 
were detained. Of the 119 confirmed victims, the government issued 
66 freedom of movement passes, compared with 45 passes for 
82 confirmed victims during the previous reporting period. The 
government issued a work visa to one victim during the reporting 
period, compared with one in the previous reporting period; the 
victim later declined the visa and requested repatriation.
NGOs reported medical screening was inadequate for victims upon 
arrival to government shelters, and shelters lacked full access to 
reproductive health and dental services. Shelters did not have medical 
staff on site, and accessing medical care required shelter staff to 
coordinate transportation and a chaperone. Shelter staff limited 
victims’ communication, including with family members in their 
home countries, and the government did not permit victims to 
possess personal phones in shelters. Despite placing translated 
shelter rules and regulations in five languages in some government 
shelters, language barriers continued to impact the government’s 
victim services. The lack of available and adequate interpretation 
services prevented some victims from understanding shelter rules 
and their rights during the judicial process, contributing to stress 
and reluctance to participate in prosecutions. As in past years, many 
identified victims preferred to return immediately to their home 
countries. The government worked with foreign diplomatic missions 
to fund and provide repatriation assistance for victims to return to 
their home countries. The government continued to give monthly 
allowance payments of 127 Malaysian ringgit (RM) ($32) to victims 
for incidental expenditures. The government did not always disburse 
the funds on a monthly basis; some victims received the allowance as 
a lump sum when they repatriated home. The government allocated 
750,600 RM ($186,720) to three shelters operated by local NGOs that 
could assist potential and certified victims, a decrease compared with 
its allocation of 1 million RM ($248,760) to two shelters in 2019. 
NGOs provided some victim services, including medical care and 
counseling, without government-allocated funding; however, NGOs 
continued to express difficulty maintaining adequate resources and 
staffing levels to provide consistent services for victims. 
The government extended a victim assistance specialist program until 
March 2023; under the program, two appointed specialists provided 
services to trafficking victims from the time authorities identified 
them, through the judicial process, and during their repatriation to 
their home country. The specialists under this program worked with 
and provided assistance to 15 victims during the reporting period—a 
significant decrease from more than 100 victims they assisted during 
the previous reporting period. For victims who participated in court 
proceedings, the government instructed prosecutors to request 
restitution in each case; during the reporting period, prosecutors 




secured 86,236 RM ($21,450), compared with 124,410 RM ($30,950). 
The government did not provide legal alternatives to the removal 
of foreign victims to countries where they may face hardship or 
retribution. ATIPSOM required that foreign victims without legal 
residence in Malaysia be referred to immigration authorities for 
repatriation upon the revocation of their protection order.
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
Ministry of Home Affairs led the MAPO council, which included 
five enforcement bodies, other government entities, and three 
NGOs. It continued to meet on a quarterly basis and coordinated 
interagency anti-trafficking efforts to implement the government’s 
2021-2025 national action plan. In 2020, the government allocated 
4 million RM ($995,020) to operate the MAPO secretariat, the 
same amount allocated during the previous reporting period. The 
government created 11 television and 10 radio anti-trafficking 
programs and broadcasted more than 3,000 anti-trafficking public 
service announcements on television stations and more than 55,000 
announcements on national radio networks, compared with 27,667 
radio broadcasts in 2019; it also created 22 anti-trafficking billboards, 
issued more than 5,000 mobile trafficking awareness announcements, 
and continued to distribute brochures raising trafficking awareness 
in multiple languages during the reporting period. The government 
also allocated 12,048 RM ($3,000) to a local NGO to implement 
anti-trafficking awareness campaigns. Labor officials continued to 
provide banners and other signage at the Kuala Lumpur International 
Airport in holding lounges for newly arrived migrant workers in a 
range of languages to help educate foreign workers about their rights 
in Malaysia. The government hosted three public sessions for more 
than 700 foreign workers in the palm oil industry about their legal 
rights and for employers on indicators of forced labor. The government 
continued to operate an anti-trafficking hotline, established in 2018; 
however, it was attached to a general government hotline staffed by 
operators who were not trained to work on human trafficking cases. 
The hotline reportedly received 22 calls during the reporting period, 
which resulted in the initiation of 22 law enforcement investigations 
and the identification of seven potential trafficking victims.
The government continued to enforce its ban of Malaysia-based 
outsourcing companies, which previously often used practices 
that perpetuated debt-based coercion among migrant workers. The 
government’s Private Employment Agency Act (PEAA) required all 
private recruitment agencies to secure a license with the Ministry of 
Human Resources to recruit foreign workers, including domestic 
workers. The PEAA capped employee-paid recruitment placement 
fees at 25 percent of the first month’s salary for Malaysian workers 
employed within or outside of Malaysia and one month’s salary 
for non-citizens employed within Malaysia. The law did not define 
what comprised a “placement fee” and enforcement of this rule 
was lacking; the majority of migrant workers in Malaysia paid 
much higher fees to recruitment agents, including in their home 
country, which contributed to the workers’ vulnerability to debt-
based coercion. The government also mandated employers pay the 
foreign worker levy, a one-time cost paid to the government for 
any non-Malaysian the company hired, instead of forcing workers 
to bear the cost. The government did not report investigating any 
employment agencies for violating the PEAA during the current or 
previous reporting period. The government continued to use an 
online application system – launched during the previous reporting 
period – for employers to renew their workers’ temporary work 
permits without using a broker. During the reporting period, the 
government convicted six immigration officers, suspended five officers 
from their duties, and investigated 28 officers for involvement in 
providing fraudulent passport stamps to allow foreign workers and 
undocumented immigrants to stay in Malaysia. 
Employment law continued to exclude domestic workers from a 
number of protections, including maximum working hours and the 
country’s minimum wage. Civil society observed a lack of adequate 
efforts to inform migrant workers of their rights and Malaysian labor 
regulations. The government reported it employed 94 labor inspectors 
who focused on human trafficking for the entire country, 65 of which 
were assigned to Sabah where a large number of Malaysia’s palm oil 
plantations were located; 24 inspectors were assigned to peninsular 
Malaysia and five assigned to Sarawak. During the reporting period, 
the government publicly released the results of a survey it funded 
from June 2018-January 2019 on the prevalence of forced and child 
labor in the palm oil sector. The study revealed that eight out of 
every 1,000 palm oil plantation workers were in situations of forced 
labor, with the prevalence rate considerably higher in Sarawak than 
in Peninsular Malaysia and Sabah. The lack of adequate resources, 
including for additional labor inspectors, hindered the government’s 
efforts to adequately identify labor trafficking and enforce the 
prohibition on employer-perpetrated passport retention, which 
remained widespread. Labor courts resolved 10,465 labor disputes 
and ordered employers to provide workers back wages amounting 
to 18.06 RM ($4.49 million) and levied fines against employers who 
violated labor laws of 499,570 RM ($124,270). The government did 
not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex.
Malaysian birth registration policies have left more than 500,000 
individuals, including children, stateless and therefore unable to access 
some government services, including legal employment, increasing 
their vulnerability to trafficking. In December 2020, the government 
announced a one-year time period for stateless individuals to apply 
for citizenship, with significantly reduced wait times for application 
approvals; however, stateless persons continued to face extraordinary 
hurdles that prevented them from submitting applications. The law 
did not permit the government to grant stateless persons asylum 
or refugee status, which left more than 178,000 refugee-status-
seekers and asylum-seekers in Malaysia, including more than 97,000 
Rohingya, unable to obtain legal employment, which increased 
their vulnerability to exploitation. Furthermore, while some refugee 
community schools operated in Malaysia, the law did not permit 
stateless and refugee children to attend public schools. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Malaysia, and to a lesser extent, traffickers 
exploit victims from Malaysia abroad. The overwhelming majority 
of victims are among the estimated two million documented and an 
even greater number of undocumented migrant workers in Malaysia. 
Foreign workers constitute more than 30 percent of the Malaysian 
workforce and typically migrate voluntarily—often through irregular 
channels—from Bangladesh, Burma, Cambodia, China, India, 
Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam. 
Refugees, asylum-seekers, and stateless individuals who lacked the 
ability to obtain legal employment in Malaysia are also vulnerable 
to sex and labor trafficking. Employers, employment agents, and 
illegal sub-agents exploit some migrants in labor trafficking primarily 
through debt-based coercion when workers are unable to pay the 
fees for recruitment and associated travel. Some agents in labor 
source countries impose onerous fees on workers before they arrive 
in Malaysia, and Malaysian agents administer additional fees after 
arrival—in some cases leading to forced labor through debt-based 
coercion. Large organized crime syndicates are responsible for some 
instances of trafficking. Employers utilize practices indicative of forced 
labor, such as restrictions on movement, violating contracts, wage 
fraud, assault, threats of deportation, the imposition of significant 
debts, and passport retention—which remained widespread—to 
exploit some migrant workers in labor trafficking on oil palm and 
agricultural plantations; at construction sites; in the electronics, 
garment, and rubber-product industries; and in homes as domestic 
workers. Malaysian law allows employers to hold workers’ passports 
with the workers’ permission, but it is difficult to determine if 
workers have freely given permission, and some employers retain 
the passports to prevent workers from changing jobs. A 2018 NGO 
report documented multiple indicators of forced labor associated 







practices such as threats, violence, lack of clarity of employment terms 
and conditions, dependency on the employer, lack of protection 
by police, debt bondage, high recruitment fees, and involuntary 
overtime. Traffickers use large smuggling debts incurred by refugees 
to subject them to debt-based coercion. North Koreans working 
in Malaysia may have been forced to work by the North Korean 
government. Chinese nationals working for Chinese government-
affiliated construction projects in Malaysia are vulnerable to forced 
labor. In 2017, hundreds of Chinese nationals working for one of 
the largest Chinese investment projects in Malaysia in the state of 
Johor reported exploitative work conditions, including paying high 
recruitment fees charged by recruitment agents in China, never 
receiving work visas, and receiving delayed or lower wages than 
promised. 
Traffickers recruit some young foreign women and girls—mainly from 
Southeast Asia, although also recently from Nigeria—ostensibly for 
legal work in Malaysian restaurants, hotels, and beauty salons, or 
for brokered marriages, but instead compel them into commercial 
sex. Traffickers use fraudulent recruitment practices to lure Rohingya 
women and girls out of refugee camps in Bangladesh to Malaysia, 
where they are coerced to engage in commercial sex. Traffickers 
also exploit some men and children, including Malaysians, into 
commercial sex. The Malaysian government reported in 2020 that 
children are vulnerable to online sexual exploitation, including some 
instances of child sex trafficking. Traffickers exploit Malaysian orphans 
and children from refugee communities in forced begging. Traffickers 
increasingly exploit Malaysian women and children in forced labor. 
Stateless children in Sabah were especially at risk of forced labor in 
palm oil production, service industries, and in forced begging. Media 
report young male and female Malaysians pay recruitment fees for 
promised high-paying jobs, but traffickers transfer them to Cambodia 
and exploit them and authorities arrest them for immigration 
violations. In order to circumvent the Indonesian government’s ban 
on Indonesian migration to 21 countries, some Indonesian workers 
transit Malaysia legally en route to Middle Eastern countries, where 
traffickers exploit some in forced labor.
Official complicity continues to undermine anti-trafficking efforts. 
Ongoing corruption related to processes for foreign nationals to 
work in Malaysia increases the cost of migration and consequently 
increases migrant workers’ vulnerability to trafficking through debt-
based coercion. Corrupt immigration officials facilitate trafficking 
by accepting bribes from brokers and smugglers at border crossings, 
including at airports. Some government officials profit from bribes and 
direct involvement in extortion from and exploitation of migrants.
MALDIVES: TIER 2
The Government of Maldives does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Maldives was upgraded to Tier 2. These efforts included 
opening two investigations into cases allegedly involving government 
officials in trafficking or trafficking-related corruption; establishing 
the Office of Anti-Human Trafficking (ATO) headed by a Director 
in the Ministry of Defense (MOD); dedicating funding for the office 
and the national action plan (NAP) in the official budget for the first 
time; passing amendments to the Prevention of Human Trafficking 
Act (PHTA) to bring the definition of human trafficking in line 
with the 2000 UN TIP Protocol through all necessary parliamentary 
committees in preparation for a final vote; completing construction 
of a trafficking victims shelter; elevating the human trafficking unit in 
the Maldives Police Service (MPS) to an anti trafficking department; 
holding its first ever social media awareness campaign on International 
Migrant’s Day to raise awareness on human trafficking; and drafting 
several standard operating procedures (SOPs) for victim identification, 
shelter operations, and referral to victim services. However, the 
government did not meet the minimum standards in several key 
areas. Despite continued reports of trafficking indicators among 
migrant workers, including non payment of wages and passport 
retention, the government identified only two victims during the 
reporting period. The government arrested some possible victims 
without screening them for trafficking indicators and at the close 
of the reporting period they remained in detention, despite NGOs 
calling for their identification as victims and subsequent release. 
The government did not hold employers or recruitment agencies 
accountable, by filing any charges against them despite sustained 
reports of labor violations. The government continued to erroneously 
consider trafficking as a crime only involving migrant workers and 
failed to properly investigate or charge cases involving Maldivian 
nationals. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Respecting due process, significantly increase investigations, 
prosecutions, and convictions for all forms of trafficking, including 
official complicity in trafficking-related crimes. • Significantly increase 
oversight of labor recruitment agencies and employers and refer 
trafficking indicators, such as non-payment of wages and passport 
retention, to police for criminal investigation. • Amend the Prevention 
of Human Trafficking Act (PHTA) to bring the definition of human 
trafficking in line with the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. • Significantly 
increase efforts to identify victims, and formally adopt and train 
officials on SOPs for proactive trafficking victim identification and 
referral to services. • Increase training for front-line officials on 
differentiating sex trafficking from sexual abuse, and train immigration 
officials and social service providers to identify and refer suspected 
trafficking cases to police. • Increase training for law enforcement and 
judges on investigation of trafficking crimes and application of the 
anti-trafficking law. • Allocate resources for proactive monitoring of 
resorts and guest homes for labor violations and child exploitation. 
• Open a trafficking victim shelter, establish consistent protection 
services, including psycho-social support, and provide interpretation 
for foreign victims. • Finalize, adopt, implement, and train officials 
on the SOPs for shelter operations and victim services. • Continue 
to increase public awareness of human trafficking—especially among 
migrant workers—through widespread media campaigns. • Re-
establish regular anti-trafficking training for diplomats.
PROSECUTION
The government increased anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts; it 
reported investigations into corrupt and allegedly complicit officials, 
but decreased overall trafficking investigations, prosecutions, and 
convictions. The PHTA criminalized some, but not all, forms of sex 
trafficking and labor trafficking. Inconsistent with the definition of 
trafficking under international law, the PHTA required transportation 
of a victim in order to constitute a trafficking offense. The law 
criminalized child sex trafficking but did not make clear if forced 
prostitution of adults was considered a form of trafficking. Article 
16 criminalized debt bondage without reference to transportation. 
The PHTA prescribed penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment for 
trafficking offenses involving an adult victim and up to 15 years’ 
imprisonment for those involving a child victim; these penalties were 
sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate 




government finalized amendments to the PHTA to bring it in line 
with the Palermo Protocol. These amendments passed all necessary 
parliamentary committees and was pending a final vote before the 
entire parliament at the end of the reporting period. 
The government investigated two trafficking cases involving seven 
individuals but did not initiate any new prosecutions or convict 
any traffickers during the reporting period. This compared with 
investigating two trafficking cases and 27 potential labor trafficking 
cases, prosecuting one case, and convicting two traffickers during 
the previous reporting period. The fall in numbers was due in large 
part to the government’s need to reallocate a significant amount 
of financial and human resources away from nearly all aspects of 
its operations to focus on the pandemic. While MPS continued to 
investigate 27 recruitment agencies from the previous reporting 
period, it reported that it did not identify any trafficking victims 
from the cases. The Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) continued 
to prosecute four cases from previous reporting periods. Two 
prosecutions—one possible labor trafficking case from 2016 and 
one possible sex trafficking case from 2017—ended in acquittals 
for the alleged traffickers due to insufficient evidence, although the 
PGO appealed the acquittal in the 2017 case to the Maldives High 
Court, which remained ongoing at the end of the reporting period. 
The Ministry of Gender, Family, and Social Services (MOGFSS) 
did not identify any child sex trafficking cases during the reporting 
period. MPS reported investigating 291 incidents of child commercial 
sexual exploitation in 2020, and sending PGO 115 of these cases for 
prosecution; however, it did not report identifying any of these cases 
as trafficking. The government ordered a national lockdown, during 
which all government offices were closed, from April through July 
2020. Following the end of the lockdown, courts remained closed 
to in-person sessions for the remainder of the reporting period. 
Additionally, the government diverted police officers from their 
regular duties to enforce the lockdown and move migrant workers 
from their typical congested living quarters to government provided 
shelter. To adapt to pandemic-related restrictions, MPS introduced 
special investigative guidelines that included virtual meetings with 
witnesses and established an online portal for MPS to submit cases 
to PGO electronically. Courts also began to hold limited virtual trial 
hearings. As the new procedures required implementation of new 
technological solutions, the government reported the lockdown 
affected the ability of law enforcement to report and investigate cases 
and delayed the prosecution of all criminal cases.
The government took steps to investigate select reports of trafficking-
related corruption, though corruption and official complicity in 
trafficking crimes remained significant concerns. The government did 
not report any prosecutions or convictions of government employees 
complicit in human trafficking crimes. In July 2020, MPS announced 
an investigation into a local construction company of which a member 
of parliament was managing director, following a violent protest 
staged by approximately 200 foreign migrant worker employees who 
had not received salaries, some for more than six months. MPS referred 
the case to the PGO in December 2020. Previously, the Controller 
of Immigration alleged the former government had illegally issued 
quotas relating to the number of migrant workers allowed, which in 
turn facilitated fraudulent recruitment and human trafficking, and 
the Minister of Economic Development (MED) similarly alleged in 
public remarks that Maldivian recruiters bribed senior officials in 
exchange for larger quotas to bring in more migrant workers. During 
the reporting period, MPS and the Anti-Corruption Commission 
(ACC) investigated two former and two current immigration officials 
over alleged complicity in the case. The investigation was ongoing at 
the end of the reporting period. Civil society alleged labor inspectors 
accepted bribes to not report labor violations. Private employers 
held foreign employees’ passports. Observers assessed that some 
traffickers operated with impunity due to connections with influential 
Maldivians. Observers reported some officials warned businesses in 
advance of planned raids to investigate labor violations.
During the reporting period, the MPS-Human Trafficking Unit (MPS-
HTU) was elevated to create a department solely dedicated to the 
investigation of trafficking cases. MPS designed the department with 
additional staff and two units – one focused on the investigation of 
cases and one focused on training and awareness-raising programs. 
However, pandemic-related challenges and broader restructuring 
within the MPS delayed the hiring of additional staff and the creation 
of these units. Immigration continued to implement a mandatory 
trafficking training for new recruits, and MPS-HTU reported all 
of its current officers had previously received trafficking-specific 
training. Despite these trainings, officials continued to conflate 
human trafficking with smuggling, and government efforts focused 
primarily on transnational labor trafficking to the possible detriment 
of sex trafficking. Government officials acknowledged the need for 
increased training on identifying and investigating trafficking cases, 
especially among MED, MPS, and Labor Relations Authority (LRA) 
personnel. Some officials stated the country’s trafficking problem 
involved primarily Bangladeshi migrant workers and therefore the 
trafficking problem had diminished following the return home of the 
majority of the workers due to the pandemic. Civil society reported 
law enforcement and judges’ lack of awareness and training on the 
PHTA likely contributed to the dearth of successful prosecutions. 
MPS, in partnership with an international organization, maintained 
a trafficking case management system that allowed potential victims 
to submit cases to the police online; however, it was only available 
in English, which limited its utility. Authorities recognized the lack 
of cooperation with source-country governments as an obstacle to 
investigating cases with foreign victims or perpetrators; they made some 
efforts to work with other governments during the reporting period. 
The absence of dedicated foreign language interpreters for victims 
and witnesses among law enforcement and social service providers 
continued to hamper law enforcement and victim protection efforts.
PROTECTION
The government made mixed protection efforts; it identified fewer 
trafficking victims and may have arrested and detained unidentified 
victims but worked to draft long-stalled SOPs on victim identification, 
protection, and reintegration and shelter operation and victim 
services. Due to the pandemic, the government reported a temporary 
suspension of proactive victim identification screening procedures. 
Officials identified two Bangladeshi labor trafficking victims—
compared with one sex trafficking victim and five potential labor 
trafficking victims in the previous reporting period. The two identified 
victims were part of more than 200 expatriate workers at a resort 
who protested their employer's failure to pay six months of salary. 
NGOs reported concerns that the government was unable to identify 
any additional migrant workers who participated in the protest as 
trafficking victims, arguing that there was sufficient cause to classify 
them as victims given their employer had confiscated their passports, 
they had not received salaries for an extended period of time, and 
most of them did not have a valid work visa. The MOGFSS did not 
identify any child trafficking victims, compared with identification of 
six child sex trafficking victims and 15 potential child labor trafficking 
victims the previous reporting period. The government did not have 
standard procedures to identify trafficking victims or refer them to 
care. It did not formally adopt the SOPs for victim identification, 
protection, and referral that the National Anti-Human Trafficking 
Steering Committee (NAHTSC) had finalized in 2016. Although MPS 
had disseminated the SOPs to its officers in the past, government 
agencies did not uniformly employ them. During the reporting period, 
the NAHTSC drafted victim support and shelter guidelines, which 
established key principles on which officials created two overarching 
sets of SOPs on victim identification, protection, and reintegration; 
and on shelter operations and provision of victim services. The 
guidelines also outlined a formal referral system. At the end of the 
reporting period, the NAHTSC solicited stakeholder comments but 
had yet to finalize, adopt, and publish the SOPs. While all agencies 
could screen for trafficking, only MPS-HTU could officially declare 
an individual a trafficking victim. MPS and social service providers 







trafficking and sexual abuse, especially in cases of children; this made 
the true number of sex trafficking victims unknown. 
The government completed construction of a shelter for trafficking 
victims, but was waiting to open the shelter following the finalization, 
adoption, and publishing of the victim support and shelter guidelines, 
which remained pending at the end of the reporting period. An NGO 
working with the government on the establishment of the shelter stated 
that the main challenges to finalizing these guidelines were pandemic-
related restrictions and the human and financial resource constraints 
prompted by the government’s pandemic response. Victims were 
entitled to services, including counseling, interpretation, and police 
protection; however, in practice, the government did not always provide 
these services. From July through their repatriation to Bangladesh in 
December 2020, the government provided the two identified victims 
shelter at a local guesthouse, food, medical services, and psycho-social 
support. Article 32 of the PHTA provided a 90-day reflection period 
during which victims could receive services while deciding whether to 
assist authorities in a criminal case. PGO could only provide a victim 
support officer to trafficking victims if their cases went to prosecution. 
The judiciary could provide protections for child trafficking victims 
who participated in trials against their alleged traffickers. 
MED continued its re-registration and regularization program initiated 
in September 2019, which aimed to legalize undocumented foreign 
migrant workers and repatriate both documented and undocumented 
workers wishing to return to their home country. MED completed 
the registration of more than 41,000 migrant workers as of February 
2021 and between March 2020 and February 2021, the government 
repatriated more than 16,000 (8,775 undocumented and 8,000 
documented) foreign migrant workers. NGOs reported concerns the 
government did not screen any of these workers for human trafficking 
indicators. The government reported limited screening took place due 
to resource constraints and the large increase in repatriation requests 
due to the pandemic. There were reports the government penalized 
potential labor and sex trafficking victims. NGOs reported MPS arrested 
19 of the approximately 200 foreign migrant workers who participated 
in the protest at a resort construction site and began to investigate 
them on suspicion of property damage. NGOs called for the workers 
to be identified as trafficking victims and released from custody. MPS 
reported they screened the workers for signs of trafficking but did not 
identify them as victims. At the end of the reporting period, the 19 
workers remained in immigration detention awaiting deportation 
or criminal charges. While the government screened for physical 
confinement before arresting foreign women in commercial sex, it did 
not adequately screen for fraud or coercion. Foreign trafficking victims 
could receive a special visa allowing them to remain in Maldives and 
work during the investigation and prosecution, which both identified 
victims received. The PHTA permitted the deportation of identified 
victims who had voluntarily entered Maldives illegally. 
PREVENTION
The government increased anti-trafficking prevention efforts. The 
NAHTSC, composed of senior government officials, remained the 
lead interagency body responsible for coordinating the government’s 
efforts to combat human trafficking. The NAHTSC focused on five 
key areas of the Anti-Human Trafficking National Action Plan 
during the reporting period to adapt to reduced resources due to 
the government’s focus on fighting the pandemic. This included 
drafting an amendment to the Anti-Human Trafficking Act to align 
the definition of human trafficking with the 2000 UN TIP Protocol; 
the establishment of the trafficking shelter; establishment of an 
Office of Anti-Human Trafficking (ATO); completing a draft of the 
victim support and shelter guidelines; and conducting an awareness 
campaign. In July 2019, the government transferred the trafficking 
portfolio from MED to the Ministry of Defense (MOD). In August 
2020, the president created a new director of anti-human trafficking 
position within MOD to serve as the chair of the NAHTSC and 
in December 2020, the government announced that the director 
would also lead the new ATO. ATO’s mandate was to coordinate the 
implementation of the 2020-2022 NAP. In February 2021, the new 
director reported that MOD had allocated office space for the ATO 
and had hired two staff, one for policy and outreach and the other 
for administration and budget. The 2021 State Budget allocated 1.99 
million Maldivian rufiyaa ($129,050) to fund the work of the ATO 
and the implementation of the NAP, despite a significant decline 
in government revenue. This was the first time the government 
allocated funds specifically for the NAP under a State Budget. The 
NAHTSC delayed a baseline study to collect data throughout the 
country’s atolls to inform anti-trafficking priorities for 2021, due to 
pandemic-related travel restrictions. During the reporting period, the 
government re-assigned the dedicated trafficking hotline from MED’s 
portfolio to MOD. MOD attempted to incorporate the hotline into 
an existing call center operated by Immigration; however, the hotline 
became inoperable, due to both logistical challenges and resource 
constraints related to the pandemic. The hotline did not receive any 
calls prior to its transfer to MOD. Civil society reported the lack of 
Bengali speaking hotline operators could have been a barrier to 
the large number of suspected Bangladeshi trafficking victims. Due 
to the pandemic, authorities provided visa relief to foreigners by 
allowing those who wished to stay in Maldives the opportunity to 
extend their visas without any fine or penalties. 
In September 2019 the government created a special task force 
distinct from the NAHTSC to address migrant workers’ issues, 
including human trafficking and illegal employment. During the 
reporting period Immigration revised its expatriate regulations and 
developed a new quota issuance policy for visas, creating a ceiling 
on the maximum number of foreign workers (100,000) that can 
enter Maldives from any single country and including provisions for 
prioritizing Maldivians for employment. The quota was intended 
to limit the number of migrant workers coming from any one 
country and to help the government better track the migrants. The 
policy outlined procedures for worker recruitment and employers 
providing accommodation for workers, among other policies related 
to recruitment. In February 2021, the foreign minister signed a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Bangladesh on human 
resource placement. The government also proposed an additional 
MOU regarding Bangladeshi migrant workers in the Maldives, but 
for the third year a draft MOU on human trafficking between the 
Maldivian and Bangladeshi governments awaited finalization by 
Maldivian officials at the end of the reporting period. 
LRA had the authority to inspect all worksites, including private 
homes, and it carried out approximately 70 inspections in 2020, 
compared with 200 in 2019. The government reported pandemic-
related travel restrictions delayed inspections during the year. LRA 
did not report any cases of forced child labor or child commercial 
sexual exploitation during the reporting period. LRA lacked the 
resources, staff, and training necessary to fulfill its mandate. LRA 
generally received numerous complaints of non-payment of wages 
and mediated such claims with the employer. If an employer did not 
agree to mediation, LRA could file a civil case in the labor tribunal 
to impose a fine. Officials and civil society, however, reported the 
government did not enforce settlements adjudicated by the tribunal, 
so employers often refused to pay fines without repercussions. Neither 
LRA nor the tribunal referred labor violations to police for criminal 
investigation. LRA could request to MED that it blacklist foreign 
recruitment agencies with repeated or serious labor violations. MED 
did not always implement LRA’s recommendations, and despite 
repeated recommendations from LRA to blacklist certain agencies, 
those agencies continued to operate. Immigration also inspected 
establishments that employed migrant workers and issued warnings 
to six establishments for lack of proper documentation, including 
invalid work visas. It did not report any further action against the 
establishments. LRA continued to use an online portal for island 
councils to report the number of individuals, including migrant 
workers, on each island, but some councils did not push businesses 
to register their employees with the portal because they did not want 




Civil society reported a continued lack of significant efforts to raise 
awareness of trafficking among the most vulnerable groups. Due to 
the pandemic, the NAHTSC canceled a media campaign to mark the 
World Day Against Trafficking in Persons in July 2020 and instead 
conducted an online public awareness campaign in December 
for International Migrant Day. The government issued campaign 
material targeting Maldivians and migrant workers through social 
media platforms in Bangla, Hindi, Sinhala, English, and Dhivehi. 
The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for 
commercial sex acts or for child sex tourism. While anecdotal reports 
suggest that there have been cases of children being exploited for 
commercial sex acts or child sex tourism, there were no confirmed 
cases during the reporting period. The government previously reported 
increased concerns that traffickers could use resorts and guesthouses 
to facilitate child sex tourism, in part because no government agency 
had the authority or resources to monitor these establishments for 
such crimes. The government did not report any anti-trafficking 
training for diplomats during the reporting period. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Maldives, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Maldives abroad. Traffickers subject an unknown number of the 
approximately 169,000 documented and 65,000 undocumented 
foreign workers in Maldives—primarily Bangladeshi and Indian 
men in the construction and service sectors—to practices indicative 
of forced labor, including fraudulent recruitment, confiscation of 
identity and travel documents, withholding or non-payment of wages, 
and debt-based coercion. Migrant workers pay approximately $2,500 
to $4,000 in recruitment fees to work in Maldives, contributing 
to their risk of debt-based coercion upon arrival. In recent years, 
officials reported an increasing number of Bangladeshi workers 
fraudulently obtained 12-month work visas while only possessing 
the requirements for three month visas. In addition to Bangladeshis 
and Indians, some workers from Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Nepal 
reportedly experience recruitment fraud before arriving in Maldives. 
Recruitment agents in source countries collude with employers and 
agents in Maldives to facilitate fraudulent recruitment and forced 
labor of migrant workers. Civil society reported labor traffickers 
target Bangladeshi children who enter the country on work visas 
and falsified passports. Police reported an increase in Bangladeshi 
nationals living in Maldives who pose as labor agents and fraudulently 
recruit migrant workers from Bangladesh, facilitate their travel to 
Maldives, and abandon them upon arrival without documentation, 
rendering them vulnerable to traffickers. South Asian women may be 
victims of forced labor in domestic service in Maldives. Traffickers 
may have targeted migrant workers on fishing and cargo boats in 
Maldivian waters for forced labor. Traffickers use Maldivian children in 
forced criminality, including the transportation of drugs for criminal 
gangs. Sex traffickers exploit women and girls from Maldives and 
other South Asian countries and—to a lesser extent—women from 
Africa, Asia, and Eastern Europe in Maldives. Some impoverished 
parents act as traffickers, allowing sex traffickers to exploit their 
children in exchange for financial assistance. Some traffickers bring 
women from South Asia into Maldives under the guise of tourism 
and force them into commercial sex. Specifically, police reported an 
increase in traffickers bringing Bangladeshi women into Maldives on 
tourist visas and exploiting them in commercial sex. Some employers 
transport Maldivian children to the capital from other islands for 
domestic work, where employers sexually abuse some and others 
are vulnerable to labor traffickers. Traffickers may have exploited 
Maldivian women in sex trafficking in Sri Lanka. Traffickers have 
exploited Maldivian children in child sex tourism. 
MALI: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Mali does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts 
to do so. These efforts included training judges, prosecutors, and 
law enforcement officials on trafficking and conducting awareness 
raising activities. Given the military’s past recruitment and use of 
children between the ages of 9 and 14, the government issued an edict 
banning children from military camps and designated a child soldier 
focal point to coordinate with international organizations when 
allegations of child soldiering arise. It partnered with an international 
organization to identify children used by armed groups, including 
potential trafficking victims, and referred most of those children to 
international organizations for care as part of its continued efforts 
under its Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) 
plan with the UN. However, the government did not demonstrate 
overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, 
even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its 
anti-trafficking capacity. Substantial personnel turnover related 
to the August 2020 coup d’état and subsequent formation of the 
transition government hindered Mali’s ability to maintain consistent 
anti-trafficking efforts and accurately report on those efforts for this 
reporting period. Officials prosecuted hereditary slavery cases as 
misdemeanor offenses and continued sentencing traffickers with 
penalties inconsistent with the law. The government continued 
providing support to and collaborating with the Imghad Tuareg 
and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA), a non-governmental armed 
group led by a Malian general that recruited and used children. The 
government did not investigate any suspects, including government 
officials, for child soldiering crimes or make significant efforts to 
prevent armed groups from recruiting and using children. Law 
enforcement continued to lack resources and understanding of 
human trafficking, which impeded law enforcement efforts. Shelter 
and services for victims, especially male victims, remained insufficient 
and primarily restricted to Bamako. Therefore Mali remained on Tier 
2 Watch List for the second consecutive year.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Cease support to armed groups that unlawfully recruit and use 
children, enforce measures banning children from military bases, 
and hold any individuals or complicit officials criminally accountable 
for child soldiering offenses, including using children in support 
roles. • As part of the peace process, engage with non-governmental 
armed groups to cease recruitment and use of children. • Amend the 
2012 anti-trafficking law to ensure that it can be used to effectively 
investigate and prosecute trafficking offenses involving hereditary 
slavery, and sentence convicted slaveholders to significant prison terms. 
• Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and sentence convicted traffickers, 
including complicit officials, to prison terms in line with the 2012 anti-
trafficking law. • Expand and strengthen implementation of programs 
for the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of former 
child combatants that address specific needs of child ex-combatants, 
including psycho-social care, family reintegration, education, and 
vocational training, and release any children inappropriately detained. 
• Allocate dedicated budgets, resources, and personnel to the anti-
trafficking committee and institutionalize monthly committee 
meetings to improve operationalization of anti-trafficking policies 
and inter-ministerial coordination. • Screen vulnerable populations, 
including children associated with armed groups, individuals in 
commercial sex, and communities with a history of hereditary slavery, 
for trafficking indicators and refer them to appropriate services. • 
Develop standard operating procedures to identify victims, and 
train criminal justice officials and social service providers on the 





centered investigation techniques and trauma-sensitive approaches 
when interviewing victims. • Regularly train judges and prosecutors 
on the 2012 anti-trafficking law and standardize continuing education 
trainings. • Provide financial and in-kind support to NGOs that 
identify and assist trafficking victims. • Adopt a new national plan 
of action and allocate resources to its implementation.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained inadequate law enforcement efforts. 
Law 2012-023 Relating to the Combat against Trafficking in Persons 
and Similar Practices, as amended, criminalized sex trafficking and 
labor trafficking. The law prescribed penalties of five to 10 years’ 
imprisonment for trafficking offenses, except forced begging for 
which it prescribed lesser penalties of two to five years’ imprisonment 
and a fine of 500,000 to 2 million West African CFA francs (FCFA) 
($945-$3,780). These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with 
respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those for other serious 
crimes, such as rape. Government officials and NGOs reported that 
the law did not precisely define hereditary slavery and therefore 
could not be effectively implemented to prosecute trafficking cases 
involving hereditary slavery. During the previous reporting period, 
the government, in collaboration with an international organization, 
drafted legislation revising the anti-trafficking law to explicitly define 
hereditary slavery as a form of human trafficking; the legislation 
remained pending before the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) at the end 
of the reporting period. 
The government continued to lack a centralized data collection 
mechanism and did not systematically report law enforcement 
actions, making comprehensive statistics difficult to obtain. The 
government reported investigating at least 59 cases, including 17 
new case investigations, compared with investigating 75 cases, 
including 40 new case investigations, during the previous reporting 
period. The government prosecuted at least 78 defendants, including 
22 defendants under the 2012 trafficking law and 56 defendants 
under discrimination and related penal code statutes for hereditary 
slavery. The courts convicted 40 traffickers, including 31 slaveholders 
under penal code provisions and nine traffickers under the 2012 
trafficking law, and dismissed cases against 25 alleged slaveholders. 
This was compared to prosecutions of 67 defendants and convictions 
of 13 traffickers, including two slaveholders, during the previous 
reporting period. Prosecutors charged most hereditary slavery cases 
as misdemeanor offenses under discrimination, destruction of 
crops, or burglary statutes, which prescribed significantly lower 
penalties than those available under the trafficking law. Of the 31 
slaveholders convicted, 25 defendants received a fully suspended 
prison sentence and a fine and six received a sentence of one year’s 
imprisonment. The government convicted nine Nigerian nationals 
of sex trafficking and sentenced them to between 18 months’ and 
five years’ imprisonment. The court sentenced only two traffickers 
to penalties as prescribed in the anti-trafficking law. The Brigade 
de Moeurs was the primary law enforcement agency investigating 
sex trafficking and cases involving children, and the Specialized 
Judiciary Brigade and Specialized Investigative Brigade investigated 
and prosecuted transnational trafficking. The Migrant Smuggling and 
Trafficking Brigade, created in October 2019 with the assistance of a 
foreign donor, investigated illicit migration and migrant smuggling, 
including potential trafficking cases. These units were not dedicated 
to human trafficking, lacked adequate resources and training, and 
could not access portions of the country due to insecurity. 
During the reporting period, the government, in partnership with 
an international organization, trained 100 judges, prosecutors, and 
law enforcement officials on investigating trafficking and smuggling; 
this included training 25 magistrates in August 2020 and 30 law 
enforcement officials in November 2020. Another international 
organization trained 59 law enforcement officials on identifying 
and interviewing victims, with limited government support. Despite 
these efforts, continued lack of awareness of the 2012 anti-trafficking 
law and frequent turnover and transfers of officials stymied law 
enforcement action. Additionally, law enforcement’s system-wide 
lack of funding and resources, including vehicles and equipment to 
investigate crimes, impeded anti-trafficking efforts. The government 
had limited or no judicial presence in much of Mali, primarily in 
the north and center of the country, due to continuing security 
challenges. Insufficient funding and judicial staffing levels limited 
regular sessions of the Court of Assizes—which heard all serious 
criminal felony cases, including trafficking—and caused significant 
judicial delays. Insecurity limited court sessions outside of the capital, 
and pandemic restrictions on gatherings and court hearings further 
exacerbated judicial delays.
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government officials complicit in human trafficking, 
including hereditary slavery or child soldiering offenses; however, 
corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained 
significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action during the 
year. Observers alleged government officials interfered in hereditary 
slavery cases, and at times threatened community members, in an 
effort to have charges dismissed. A foreign government alleged 
Malian law enforcement returned three trafficking victims to their 
traffickers in exchange for bribes during the reporting period, and 
law enforcement officers allegedly coerced victims to pay bribes to 
avoid fines or obtain fraudulent identity documents. There were no 
reports Malian armed forces (FAMa) recruited and used children in 
combat or support roles during the reporting period. The Ministry of 
Defense (MoD) issued an edict banning children from all deployed 
military camps in October 2020. The MoD also designated a child 
soldier focal point to coordinate with international organizations 
when allegations of child soldiering arise. However, in the previous 
reporting period, observers verified for the first time since 2014 that 
FAMa recruited and used 47 children between the ages of 9 and 14 
years old in support roles in Gao region as couriers and domestic help; 
FAMa released all 47 children to their families and an international 
organization for care by March 2020. International observers reported 
non-governmental armed groups—such as GATIA, led by a Malian 
general—continued recruiting and using child soldiers during the 
reporting period. During the reporting period, an international 
organization reported FAMa personnel sexually exploited girls in 
exchange for food and other goods in 2019. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained efforts to identify and protect trafficking 
victims. Government officials and NGO partners identified 73 sex 
trafficking victims, including 65 Nigerians, six Malians, and two Sierra 
Leoneans during the reporting period. Officials also identified and 
screened 115 potential trafficking victims; this compared with 64 
trafficking victims and 106 potential victims identified during the 
previous reporting period. The government and NGOs provided care 
to all potential and identified victims. Additionally, an international 
organization identified at least 230 children associated with armed 
groups in the first half of 2020 alone, a significant increase compared 
to 215 children in 2019; authorities referred most of the children 
for care, while 15 remained in detention. The government did not 
have standard victim identification procedures.
The government did not have a formal referral mechanism but 
worked closely with the Fodé and Yeguine Network for Action 
(RAFY), a national network composed of NGOs, international 
organizations, and government ministries, including the Ministry 
for the Advancement of Women, Children, and the Family (MFFE), 
to refer identified trafficking victims to service providers. Officials 
reported the network did not adequately function during the reporting 
period due to poor coordination between members. With some 
government support, RAFY assisted 63 identified trafficking victims 
and 115 potential trafficking victims by providing shelter, referring 
victims to NGOs for services, or assisting with repatriations during the 
reporting period. An international organization assisted an additional 
106 trafficking victims and 10 babies born while in the organization’s 




Sierra Leoneans, and four Guineans. The government relied on NGOs 
to provide the majority of services, funded by private and international 
donors. NGOs operated transit centers for adult and child victims of 
crime, including one specialized shelter for female adult trafficking 
victims in Bamako. The government distributed pandemic prevention 
kits including food and sanitary supplies, valued at nearly 40 million 
FCFA ($75,610), to NGOs managing 10 transit centers. Services 
varied by location but generally included short-term shelter, food, 
counseling, vocational training, repatriation, and reintegration 
assistance. MFFE had general care facilities that could accommodate 
trafficking victims but did not report whether the facilities assisted 
any victims during the reporting period. Shelters and services for 
victims outside the capital remained limited, especially in the north. 
Foreign and domestic victims received the same services. While some 
facilities offered specialized services for female victims, there were 
no such services for male victims. An international organization 
assessed victim services remained inadequate during the reporting 
period. Pandemic mitigation measures to allow for social distancing 
reduced already insufficient shelter capacity; additionally, border 
closures required victims of trafficking remain at shelters for long 
periods of time. In collaboration with international organizations, 
the government assisted in repatriating at least 33 Malians exploited 
in Algeria, Cote d’Ivoire, and Senegal by providing travel documents 
and reintegration assistance. The Nigerian consulate in Bamako 
coordinated with an international organization to assist approximately 
200 Nigerians in 2020 with shelter, basic services, and repatriation. 
The government did not offer legal alternatives to removal to countries 
in which victims would face retribution or hardship; however, most 
identified victims were ECOWAS nationals who did not require special 
status to remain in Mali. The government did not have formal policies 
to encourage victims to participate in trials against their traffickers. In 
addition, sources reported authorities employed trauma-insensitive 
methods to rush victims to provide statements for fear that victims 
would be unavailable or unwilling to provide future statements 
once they entered NGO and international organization shelters. 
Victims could file civil suits against their traffickers; however, no 
victims reportedly used this provision during the reporting period 
and many victims were unaware of the option. There were no reports 
the government detained or otherwise penalized trafficking victims 
for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit; however, 
due to a lack of formal identification procedures, authorities may 
have detained some victims. Authorities continued following the 
government’s 2013 inter-ministerial protocol requiring them to 
direct former child soldiers to rehabilitation centers, and observers 
reported officials had a better understanding of the protocol. However, 
the government continued to inappropriately detain some children 
associated with armed groups. Under a DDR agreement with an 
international organization, the government and international 
organization partners identified 230 children used by non-state 
armed groups, including potential trafficking victims, in the first 
half of 2020 and referred most of those children to international 
organizations for care. However, observers reported authorities 
inappropriately detained some children for alleged affiliation with 
non-state armed groups; at the end of the reporting period, at least 
15 children remained in custody, representing a slight decrease from 
prior reporting periods. An international organization reported 
concerns the government held some children, including potential 
trafficking victims, with adults in military detention centers, which 
increased their vulnerability to further exploitation.
PREVENTION
The government maintained weak efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
government continued implementing the 2018-2022 National Plan of 
Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons during the reporting period. 
The national anti-trafficking committee met four times during the 
reporting period, compared to meeting three times during the previous 
reporting period. However, the lack of coordination and ownership 
for activities in the action plan among committee members impeded 
its effectiveness. The government lacked dedicated staff to work on 
trafficking, including the role of chairman of the anti-trafficking 
committee, which severely impeded the government’s efforts to 
consistently coordinate anti-trafficking activities. The government 
allocated 220 million FCFA ($415,880) for anti-trafficking efforts, an 
increase from 200 million FCFA ($378,070) allocated the previous 
year. In December 2020, the government conducted awareness 
raising sessions on child forced begging for community leaders and 
Quranic teachers in coordination with civil society organizations. The 
MOJ also trained community stakeholders, including community 
leaders and traditional leaders, on trafficking in persons, especially 
issues related to forced labor and sex trafficking, around artisanal 
gold mines in four regions. An action plan to cease recruitment and 
use of children drafted in the previous reporting period by the UN 
and non-governmental armed groups, including GATIA, remained 
pending signature from the leadership of each armed group. The 
police operated a hotline for crimes against women and children, 
although it did not report receiving any trafficking calls during the 
reporting period. The government did not make efforts to address 
fraudulent recruitment of Malians abroad. Labor inspectors lacked 
sufficient capacity or resources to regulate the informal sector, 
where most cases of forced labor occurred. In November 2020, the 
government adopted a decree implementing the 2019 mining law, 
which prohibited child labor and child trafficking in traditional gold 
mines and quarries. The government did not make efforts to reduce 
the demand for commercial sex acts. The government did not provide 
anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Mali, and traffickers exploit victims from Mali 
abroad. Some families sell their children into domestic servitude or 
forced labor in gold mines. Internal trafficking is more prevalent than 
transnational trafficking. Labor traffickers exploit boys from Mali, 
Guinea, and Burkina Faso in agriculture—especially rice, cotton, 
dry cereal, and corn cultivation—artisanal gold mines, domestic 
work, transportation, begging, and the informal commercial sector. 
Corrupt Quranic teachers coerce and force Malian boys to beg or 
perform agricultural work in neighboring countries, including 
Senegal, Guinea, and Cote d’Ivoire. Slaveholders subject some 
members of Mali’s black Tuareg community to slavery practices 
rooted in traditional relationships of hereditary servitude. An NGO 
noted hereditary slavery practices in Mali differ from surrounding 
countries, as communities – rather than individuals or families – 
exploit victims of slavery. Traffickers exploit men and boys, primarily 
of Songhai ethnicity, in a long-standing practice of debt bondage in 
the salt mines of Taoudeni in northern Mali. NGO reports indicate 
traffickers exploit Malian children in forced labor on cotton and 
cocoa farms in Cote d’Ivoire. Malian women and girls are victims of 
sex trafficking in Gabon, Libya, Lebanon, and Tunisia and domestic 
servitude in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia. Traffickers recruit 
women and girls from other West African countries, particularly 
Nigeria and Benin, with promises of jobs as nurses or waitresses in 
Bamako, but instead exploit them in sex trafficking throughout Mali, 
especially in small mining communities. In January 2019, Nigerian 
authorities estimated more than 20,000 Nigerian girls are victims of 
sex trafficking in Mali, although this data has not been corroborated. 
An NGO reported sex trafficking of girls in Mali has steadily increased 
since 2005. Traffickers compel women and girls into sex trafficking 
and forced labor in domestic work, agricultural labor, and support 
roles in artisanal gold mines. Reports allege corruption and complicity 
among local police and gendarmes in Farako may have facilitated 
forced labor and sex trafficking in mining communities. Africans 
transiting Mali to Europe, primarily via Algeria and Libya and less so 
via Mauritania, are vulnerable to trafficking, and Nigerian traffickers 
exploit Nigerian women in sex trafficking in Mali en route to Europe. 
An international organization repatriated 147 Malians from Algeria 
and 1,305 Malians from Libya in 2019, compared to more than 1,430 
Malians from Libya in 2017; while some returnees were identified 
as trafficking victims in 2017, the international organization did not 





During the reporting period, the government did not exercise control 
over the majority of its territory and lost ground it had previously 
regained. Justice officials had no or an extremely limited presence 
in much of Mali, particularly in the northern and central regions, 
limiting the government’s ability to administer justice, provide victim 
services, and gather data. Since early 2012, rebel and Islamic extremist 
groups have occupied parts of northern Mali. Terrorist organizations 
and armed groups continue to recruit and use children, mostly boys, 
in combat, requiring children to carry weapons, staff checkpoints, 
guard prisoners, and conduct patrols; some used boys for running 
errands and spying. Some of these groups use girls in combat, support 
roles, and for sexual exploitation, including sexual slavery through 
forced marriages to members of these militias. During the reporting 
period, authorities identified at least one girl held in sexual slavery by 
armed groups. The armed groups purportedly coerce some families 
to sell their children to the groups or compel communities into 
giving up teenage boys to the groups for “community protection.” An 
international organization reported traffickers fraudulently recruited 
some children for education in Quranic schools but forced them 
to fight with armed groups. Some families reportedly insert their 
children into the ranks of armed groups because parents believe 
they will benefit from DDR assistance. According to an international 
organization, insecurity, the pandemic, and deteriorating economic 
conditions are leading to a rise in child trafficking, forced labor, and 
forced recruitment by armed groups in Mali. International observers 
reported artisanal gold mines controlled by armed groups remain 
a concern for trafficking, child labor, and child soldiering. In the 
past, a Malian armed group forcibly recruited Malian refugees in 
Mauritania to be child soldiers in Mali. 
Malian security forces sometimes cooperated with non-government 
armed groups which recruited and used children, sometimes through 
force, fraud, or coercion. The government provided in-kind support to 
and collaborated with GATIA, a non-governmental armed group led by 
a Malian general that used and recruited children during the reporting 
period. Malian security forces allegedly cooperated with other non-
government armed groups that recruited and used children during 
the reporting period. In October 2020, the government appointed 
members of armed groups to cabinet positions; it is unclear to what 
extent, if any, these individuals remain engaged in the armed groups. 
In September 2020, the government launched the Menaka without 
Weapons initiative, an operation carried out by Malian defense 
and security forces, Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA) 
and GATIA patrols with the support of MINUSMA and Operation 
Barkhane, to secure the town of Menaka. An international organization 
reported armed groups, including GATIA, were taking steps to 
complete a UN Action Plan that would bring them into compliance 
with international child protection laws, but the agreement had not 
been signed by the end of the reporting period; CMA signed a UN 
Action Plan in 2017, but continues to recruit and use children. During 
the reporting period, one international organization reported CMA 
used children younger than the age of 18 to manage checkpoints at 
gold mines under its control. During the previous reporting period, 
FAMa recruited and used at least 47 children between the ages of 9 and 
14 years old in support roles in Gao region as couriers and domestic 
help. During the reporting period, an international organization 
reported FAMa personnel committed acts of conflict-related sexual 
violence, including child sex trafficking. In 2016, an international 
organization investigated GATIA officials, Malian Defense and Security 
Forces officers, and civilians for conflict-related sexual violence, 
including sex trafficking and sexual slavery. 
MALTA: TIER 2
The Government of Malta does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts 
to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts 
compared to the previous reporting period, considering the impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Malta remained on Tier 2. These efforts included investigating and 
prosecuting more suspected traffickers and continuing to maintain 
convictions with significant sentences. The government also trained 
more officials, increased funding for victim assistance and prevention 
efforts, and adopted an anti-trafficking national action plan. However, 
the government did not meet the minimum standards in several 
key areas. The government identified the fewest victims since 2016 
and continued to lack coordination among ministries. It did not 
effectively enforce labor recruitment regulations or monitor massage 
parlors where there was a higher incidence of trafficking indicators. 
The government also continued to delay the resolution of a 2004 
case of a former police officer allegedly complicit in trafficking and 
did not report any new investigations of other officials or additional 
efforts to prevent complicity.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Increase efforts to vigorously and expeditiously investigate and 
prosecute trafficking offenses. • Increase efforts to convict traffickers, 
including complicit officials, and sentence convicted traffickers to 
significant prison terms. • Ensure relevant staff and officials proactively 
identify trafficking victims, including Maltese nationals, among 
vulnerable populations, particularly children, migrant workers, 
and individuals in commercial sex. • Improve effective leadership 
and prioritization of human trafficking, as well as streamline 
anti-trafficking coordination and communication efforts among 
ministries. Increase migrant worker protections by implementing 
strong regulations and oversight of recruitment companies that 
are consistently enforced, including prosecuting for fraudulent 
labor recruitment. • Implement license controls for massage 
parlors, including oversight and screening for trafficking victims. 
• Increase collaboration between police and other stakeholders 
during investigations to decrease the length of investigations and 
prosecutions, and enhance the likelihood of successful convictions. • 
Institutionalize victim-centered and trauma-informed anti-trafficking 
training for front-line officials, police officers, prosecutors, and judges. 
• Adopt a national victim identification mechanism available to all 
entities involved in victim identification.
PROSECUTION
The government increased law enforcement efforts. Article 248A-G of 
the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking, 
and it prescribed penalties of six to 12 years’ imprisonment. These 
penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, 
commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such 
as rape. The government did not have specialized anti-trafficking 
prosecutors or courts. In 2020, the police vice squad, which was 
responsible for trafficking and other crimes, initiated 16 investigations 
– eight for sex trafficking and eight for labor trafficking. This was a 
significant increase compared with five investigations in 2019 and 
10 investigations in 2018. The government reported initiating new 
prosecutions of two suspected sex traffickers in 2020; this compared 
with zero in 2019 and 10 in 2018. Prosecutions of 16 suspects 
from prior reporting periods, most of whom were released on bail, 
remained ongoing. The government convicted three traffickers for 
sex trafficking in 2020, the same number as in 2019. Of the convicted 
traffickers, two were female Chinese nationals, sentenced to five 
and seven years’ imprisonment, respectively, and one was a Maltese 




three convictions with significant prison sentences in 2019. Courts 
re-sentenced two traffickers from an overturned court decision from 
2019; while the courts upheld the original conviction, they lowered the 
traffickers’ sentences from 12 to nine years’ imprisonment. Perennial 
issues with rule of law, corruption, slow court proceedings, and an 
understaffed police force continued to hamper prosecutions and 
convictions. While there were no new investigations or prosecutions 
of government employees complicit in trafficking offenses, an 
investigation initiated in 2004 of a former police officer, who allegedly 
acted as an accomplice to a convicted sex trafficker through the 
falsification of visa documents and the procurement of a victim, 
remained ongoing during the reporting period. After a court hearing 
for the former police officer, originally scheduled for April 2019, was 
deferred, there was no further action taken; if guilty of complicity 
in trafficking, the prolonged court proceedings and lack of a court 
judgment contributed to impunity for the officer and inhibited 
justice for victims. The government significantly increased training 
to officials during the reporting period by providing anti-trafficking 
training, including on victim identification and referral, to 108 
new police recruits. The government also provided anti-trafficking 
training to 163 police officers and 153 border authorities including 
civilian border control officers, officials from the Armed Forces of 
Malta, and Malta Customs officers. Additionally, the government 
reported training four police officers in understanding child sexual 
exploitation and 35 front-line officials on trafficking indicators and 
available services for victims. Unlike prior years, the government 
did not report cooperating in any joint international trafficking 
investigations or extraditing any trafficking suspects. 
PROTECTION 
The government minimally decreased protection efforts. Police and 
social workers identified six trafficking victims in 2020 (compared 
with 11 in 2019, 24 in 2018, 30 in 2017, and 35 in 2016). While the 
government’s identification of victims steadily decreased over several 
years, NGOs noted that pandemic-related restrictions in 2020 may 
have made it more difficult for the government to identify trafficking 
victims. Of the victims identified, five were victims of labor trafficking, 
including two victims of domestic servitude and three Maltese child 
victims of forced criminality, and one was a combination of both sex 
and labor trafficking. The foreign trafficking victims were all from 
the Philippines, and all six victims were female. Police continued to 
utilize standard operating procedures to systematically refer victims to 
Agenzjja Appogg, a government office within the national Foundation 
for Social Welfare Services (FSWS) that provided national assistance 
to trafficking victims; police referred all three victims they identified 
to Agenzjja Appogg. The other three victims were referred to care by 
an NGO, through self-referral, or by Agenzjja Appogg itself. There 
was no victim identification screening mechanism, though Agenzjja 
Appogg began drafting this tool during the reporting period. FSWS 
continued to coordinate effectively with the police, legal aid, and 
health services to provide quality care to victims. Government officials 
continued to work closely and collaboratively with NGOs during 
the reporting period. The national welfare agency continued to 
operate a 24-hour hotline for individuals in need of social services, 
including potential trafficking victims. Services to victims continued 
uninterrupted in 2020, though some services switched to a virtual 
platform due to pandemic-related restrictions. The government had 
dedicated services available to both foreign and domestic trafficking 
victims and once victims were referred to care, specialized social 
workers at FSWS assessed the long-term needs of each trafficking 
victim; assistance included shelter, food, psychological counseling, 
interpreters, and medical and legal aid appointments, as well as 
assistance with obtaining legal status and job searches. At least one 
trafficking victim received shelter in safe housing in 2020. Victims 
could receive protection services regardless of their agreement to 
cooperate with law enforcement but could only receive residence 
permits if they cooperated. While there was no time limit for victims 
to access some services, such as services from social workers, their 
stay in a shelter or safe housing could not exceed 180 days, with 
some exceptions. Victims had freedom of movement in government 
shelters, and both men and women had access to two shelters. 
Per a May 2020 memorandum of understanding, the government 
cooperated with the Government of Libya to reduce the number 
of irregular migrants entering Malta from Libya and reportedly 
prevented at least 7,000 irregular migrants from arriving at Maltese 
ports. NGOs criticized this coordinated effort, however, because 
it often resulted in the occupants of vessels rescued in the Libyan 
search and rescue area being returned to Libyan shores; NGOs cited 
severe security and human rights conditions inside Libya and Libyan 
detention centers and a heightened risk of trafficking for irregular 
migrants forced to remain in Libya. Despite government efforts 
to the contrary, approximately 2,300 irregular migrants arrived in 
Malta in 2020, a decrease compared to 3,100 in 2019, and were 
placed in one of four government-run detention centers. Though 
trained officials systematically screened for trafficking indicators, 
they did not report identifying any trafficking victims at detention 
centers; NGOs and officials had limited access to detention centers 
due to the pandemic, which may have resulted in some trafficking 
victims remaining unidentified within the law enforcement system. 
However, insufficient resources at migrant detention centers might 
have affected the quality of victim screening. During the reporting 
period, police continued to screen for sex trafficking indicators 
among individuals in commercial sex. In 2020, the government spent 
€120,088 ($147,350) on victim care, including salaries for social 
workers and safe housing for victims; this amount was an increase 
compared with €83,400 ($102,340) in 2019. 
The government encouraged but did not require victims to assist 
in the investigation and prosecution of their alleged traffickers. The 
government provided victims with protective support, including 
the option to testify via video and accompaniment by a social 
worker, although courts did not consistently offer these protections. 
The government had a witness protection program but did not 
report whether any victims utilized this service during the reporting 
period. The law provided victims a two-month reflection period 
to recover and contemplate cooperation with law enforcement, 
but the government did not report whether it provided this to any 
victims during the reporting period. Foreign victims who decided 
to assist police in prosecuting trafficking cases were entitled to a 
renewable six-month temporary residence permit free of charge, 
police protection, legal assistance, and the right to obtain flexible 
work permits; the government reported granting a residence permit 
to at least one trafficking victim during the reporting period. The 
government could grant refugee status to victims as an alternative to 
removal to countries where they may face hardship or persecution, 
but it did not report providing this status to any victims during the 
reporting period. The government could grant compensation to 
victims from state funding; however, the government did not report 
issuing compensation to any victims during the reporting period. 
Additionally, prosecutors could file for restitution from traffickers in 
criminal cases; however, the government did not award restitution 
to any victims during the reporting period. Victims could also file a 
civil suit to receive damages, for which the government could provide 
free legal assistance, but the government did not report any victims 
receiving damages during the reporting period.
PREVENTION 
The government maintained modest prevention efforts. In 2020, the 
Human Rights Directorate (HRD) assumed responsibilities for anti-
trafficking efforts; the government maintained its inter-ministerial 
anti-trafficking monitoring committee, which was responsible for 
implementing the national action plan, coordinating data collection, 
functioning as the national rapporteur, and reviewing policy and 
practice. The government reported that the committee met at least 
once during the reporting period and worked to coordinate law 
enforcement trainings. The government also had an anti-trafficking 
stakeholder task force, which included civil society, but during the 





efforts the task force undertook. While the government adopted a 
new anti-trafficking national action plan for 2020-2023, the plan did 
not include any specific actions to be taken by relevant ministries 
or benchmarks. Authorities and NGOs continued to report a lack 
of effective leadership, corruption allegations, and insufficient 
prioritization of human trafficking, as well as a need to streamline 
anti-trafficking coordination and communication efforts among 
ministries, which hindered progress. The government allotted HRD 
€300,000 ($368,100) in 2020 for anti-trafficking efforts, including 
efforts to improve coordination among relevant ministries. The 
government maintained its anti-trafficking training budget at €16,000 
($19,630) in 2020, the same as in 2019. Compared with 2019, 
the government decreased efforts on public awareness campaigns, 
though pandemic-related complications may have hindered efforts. 
The government held an awareness-raising conference attended 
by 128 participants and continued a public awareness campaign 
that focused on reducing the occurrence of trafficking by educating 
the public on the use of goods and services provided by victims of 
exploitation, including trafficking victims. The government used social 
media, magazines, merchandise, and a beauty contest to promote 
the public awareness campaign. The government continued to use 
its anti-human trafficking website, available in six languages, to 
disseminate information on indicators and examples of victim profiles 
and experiences. The Employment Agencies Act (EIRA) regulated 
labor recruiters and required recruiters to have a license. The EIRA 
did not allow workers to be charged recruitment fees, but this still 
sometimes occurred. The national employment authority conducted 
2,668 routine inspections of employers in 2020 (3,920 in 2019) but 
did not report identifying any trafficking victims or investigating or 
prosecuting fraudulent labor recruiters. Fraudulent labor recruitment 
remained a significant concern during the reporting period; traffickers 
would sometimes replace the originally signed contract with a less 
favorable one upon arrival or force victims to perform a different 
job than what was agreed upon. NGOs continued to report a lack of 
oversight and regulation on the licensing of massage parlors, which 
had a higher likelihood of indicators of sex trafficking. Traffickers 
would sometimes confiscate the passports of victims upon arrival. 
The government did not have any bilateral labor agreements with 
source countries. The government did not make efforts to reduce 
the demand for commercial sex acts. The government did not 
provide anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel during 
the reporting period. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Malta. Sex traffickers exploit foreign and 
domestic women and children, and labor traffickers exploit foreign 
men and women. Labor trafficking victims originate from China, 
Eastern Europe, Central America, and Southeast Asia, with increasing 
numbers from the Philippines. Women from Southeast Asia working 
as domestic workers, Chinese nationals working in massage parlors, 
and women from Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and Ukraine 
working in nightclubs represent populations vulnerable to trafficking. 
The approximately 9,000 refugees and 4,000 asylum seekers residing 
in Malta are vulnerable to trafficking in the country’s informal labor 
market, including within the construction, hospitality, and domestic 
work sectors. Cooperation with the Government of Libya prevents 
thousands of irregular migrants and refugees from arriving at Maltese 
ports; however, occupants of vessels rescued in the Libyan search and 
rescue area are returned to Libya, where NGOs cite severe security 
and human rights conditions and a heightened risk of trafficking 
for irregular migrants. Fraudulent labor recruitment continues to 
occur; traffickers replace the originally signed contract with a less 
favorable one upon arrival in Malta or force victims to perform a 
completely different job than what was agreed upon. Traffickers often 
confiscate the passports of victims upon arrival. Co-nationals and 
Maltese citizens frequently work together to exploit trafficking victims. 
MARSHALL ISLANDS: TIER 2 
WATCH LIST
The Government of the Marshall Islands does not fully meet the 
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making 
significant efforts to do so. These efforts included finalizing its national 
action plan; continuing an investigation into a government official; 
hiring an additional social worker; and continuing to fund some 
protection services available to victims, if identified. However, the 
government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared 
to the previous reporting period, even considering the impact of 
the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity. 
For the third consecutive year, the government did not identify any 
trafficking victims and continued to not utilize proactive procedures 
to identify trafficking victims. The government did not conduct 
trafficking awareness campaigns and the National Task Force on 
Human Trafficking (NTHT) was reportedly not as active as in previous 
years. The government has not convicted any traffickers since 2011. 
Because the government has devoted sufficient resources to a written 
plan that, if implemented, would constitute significant efforts to meet 
the minimums standards, Marshall Islands was granted a waiver per 
the Trafficking Victims Protection Act from an otherwise required 
downgrade to Tier 3. Therefore Marshall Islands remained on Tier 
2 Watch List for the third consecutive year. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Increase efforts to vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict 
traffickers, including complicit officials, and sentence traffickers to 
adequate penalties, which should involve significant prison terms. • 
Disseminate and employ proactive procedures to identify trafficking 
victims among all vulnerable groups, such as women in commercial 
sex and foreign fishermen, and train officials on their use. • Train 
law enforcement and prosecution officials to implement the anti-
trafficking laws. • Strengthen efforts to administer and fund protective 
services for victims in cooperation with NGOs and international 
organizations and ensure potential victims are proactively offered 
services while their case is investigated. • Finalize and implement 
the revised national action plan. • Develop and conduct public anti-
trafficking education and awareness-raising campaigns. • Undertake 
research to study human trafficking in the country. • Accede to the 
2000 UN TIP Protocol.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained minimal law enforcement efforts. The 
Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons Act of 2017 criminalized sex 
trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to 15 
years’ imprisonment, a fine of up to $10,000, or both if the victim was 
an adult, and up to 20 years’ imprisonment, a fine of up to $15,000, or 
both if the victim was under age 18. These penalties were sufficiently 
stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with other 
serious crimes, such as rape. The government reported opening a 
sex trafficking investigation involving one potential victim and one 
alleged perpetrator; the investigation was closed at the end of the 
reporting period due to the alleged victim’s assertion that no crime 
was committed. The government reported three investigations into 
child sex trafficking initiated in prior reporting periods had concluded; 





one case was dismissed due to insufficient evidence, and one case 
was dismissed due to the alleged victim’s assertion that no crime 
was committed. The government reported the conclusion of a sex 
trafficking prosecution initiated in 2019. The prosecution stemmed 
from a case identified during a prior reporting period, when local 
media uncovered alleged child sex trafficking of Marshallese girls at 
a brothel near the capitol building and alleged police inaction until 
after the newspaper published the story. The government charged 
a Chinese national with promoting commercial sex and child sex 
trafficking in the case; however, the individual fled the country prior 
to prosecution, and the case was closed. Separately, authorities 
conducted a raid on a suspected brothel and found it was not in 
operation; however, authorities did report a current investigation 
into a different suspected brothel. The government has not convicted 
any traffickers since 2011.
In the previous reporting period, the government stated it was 
investigating and had removed the Director of Immigration because 
of allegations of trafficking complicity; the investigation remained 
ongoing at the end of the reporting period. The government did 
not report any other investigations into official complicity or 
any prosecutions or convictions of allegedly complicit officials. 
Marshallese law enforcement officials cooperated with a foreign 
government on an ongoing international trafficking case. The 
NTHT reported conducting a one-day training workshop focused 
on trafficking investigations, victim services, and international 
obligations; an unspecified number of law enforcement, immigration, 
and labor officials attended the training. Stakeholders identified 
a need for a dedicated role in law enforcement focused primarily 
on anti-trafficking efforts, and the government acknowledged a 
lack of technical capacity for law enforcement on investigative and 
surveillance techniques and for prosecutors on case management 
and court filing procedures. Additionally, the government noted 
the absence of sufficient institutionalized law enforcement training, 
recruitment of officers, law enforcement facilities, and funding as 
obstacles to combating trafficking.
PROTECTION 
The government maintained minimal efforts to protect victims. 
While the government had standard operating procedures for the 
identification of victims, the government did not report employing 
such procedures. The government identified one potential sex 
trafficking victim during the reporting period, compared with 
identifying zero potential trafficking victims during the previous 
reporting period. However, the government later closed its 
investigation and determined the potential victim was not a victim 
of a crime when the alleged victim herself asserted so. The government, 
in partnership with nongovernmental, faith-based, and international 
organizations, could provide protective services to victims; but, it 
did not report providing any services during the reporting period. 
An NGO assisted the potential sex trafficking victim during the 
reporting period before the investigation was closed. Government-
provided services could include counseling, legal assistance, testing 
for sexually transmitted diseases, and accessible services for victims 
with disabilities. The government maintained a memorandum of 
understanding with an NGO to assign female victims between ages 
14 and 18 to survivor support services and place them in a network 
of approved safe houses. The Ministry of Internal Affairs continued to 
assume supervision of all other child victims and hired an additional 
social worker, increasing the number to three social workers, whose 
duties included coordinating assistance to trafficking victims, among 
others. NGOs were able to provide shelter for adult victims, and 
the victims were able to leave safe houses or shelters unchaperoned 
unless it was determined that doing so might put them in danger; 
the government did not report any victims receiving this assistance 
during the reporting period. The government reported providing 
$100,000 of funding to an NGO to provide free legal advice and 
support to victims, including trafficking victims, the same amount 
provided in the previous reporting period for such services. The 
government did not provide long-term alternatives to removal to 
countries where victims may face hardship or retribution.
PREVENTION 
The government decreased efforts to prevent trafficking. The NTHT 
encompassed a wide array of government, NGO, and international 
organization members and, while it continued to lead the 
government’s anti-trafficking efforts, it was reportedly not as active as 
in prior years. In March 2021, the government finalized and approved 
an updated national action plan for 2021; implementation was 
ongoing at the end of the reporting period. Unlike in prior years, the 
government did not conduct awareness campaigns. The government 
reported conducting immigration and labor inspections during the 
reporting period. Authorities charged employers with 22 fines for 
illegal employment and visa violations and opened one investigation 
for passport withholding; the employee initiated a civil lawsuit against 
the employer, and the investigation was ongoing at the end of the 
reporting period. The government continued to take measures to 
prevent the commercial sexual exploitation of vulnerable populations 
by prohibiting unauthorized visitors on board licensed foreign 
fishing vessels docked in Majuro; unlike prior reporting periods, the 
government did not issue immigration day passes for crewmembers 
due to pandemic restrictions. In the previous reporting period, the 
government created a digital registry system to track the movement 
of passengers from the country’s main ports increasing oversight of 
individuals entering and exiting the country. The government did 
not have an anti-trafficking hotline. The government did not take 
steps to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The Marshall 
Islands is not a party to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Marshall Islands, and traffickers exploit 
Marshallese victims abroad. Traffickers exploit Marshallese women 
and girls, and may also exploit East Asian women and girls, in 
sex trafficking in the Marshall Islands; some of these women and 
girls have also been confined and subjected to forced childbearing 
as part of international fraudulent adoption schemes. Hotel and 
bar staff and family members recruit and transport women and 
girls and exploit them in sex trafficking with foreign construction 
workers and crewmembers of foreign fishing and transshipping 
vessels that dock in Majuro. Observers report commercial sexual 
activity involving foreign fishermen has increasingly moved from 
fishing vessels to local bars and hotels. Traffickers also exploit some 
of these foreign fishermen in conditions indicative of forced labor 
on ships in Marshallese waters. Traffickers compel foreign women, 
most of whom are long-term residents of the Marshall Islands, into 
commercial sex in establishments frequented by crewmembers of 
Chinese and other foreign fishing vessels; some traffickers recruit 
Chinese women with the promise of other work and, after paying 
large recruitment fees, they force them into commercial sex. Some 
wealthier or more powerful family members use traditional cultural 
practices to exploit impoverished Marshallese from outer islands to 
serve as indentured labor on their property. Limited reports indicate 
some Marshallese searching for work in the United States experience 
indicators of trafficking, such as passport confiscation, excessive work 
hours, and fraudulent recruitment. Some Marshallese children are 
transported to the United States, where they are subjected to situations 
of sexual abuse with indicators of sex trafficking. 
MAURITANIA: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania does not fully 
meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is 
making significant efforts to do so. These efforts included convicting 








funding to the anti-slavery courts. The government enacted a new 
anti-trafficking law that increased penalties, extended legal protections 
for victims, and included hereditary slavery as a form of trafficking 
in persons. The government also enacted a new law allowing NGOs, 
including anti-slavery NGOs, to operate more freely following a 
simplified registration process. However, the government did not 
demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared to the previous 
reporting period, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity. Government agencies 
charged with combating trafficking and hereditary slavery continued 
to lack resources, training, and personnel, and reports of officials 
refusing to investigate or prosecute perpetrators persisted. The 
government did not identify any potential victims of trafficking or 
hereditary slavery. Therefore Mauritania remained on Tier 2 Watch 
List for the second consecutive year.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Direct law enforcement to investigate all allegations of slavery and 
trafficking and hold government officials accountable for failure to 
investigate alleged hereditary slavery offenses and for interference in 
ongoing investigations. • Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, 
and convict traffickers and slaveholders with appropriate prison terms 
in accordance with the 2015 anti-slavery and 2020 anti-trafficking 
laws, and ensure all human trafficking cases tried under the 2020 
anti-trafficking law are automatically referred to the anti-slavery 
courts. • Ensure each of the anti-slavery courts is adequately funded 
and staffed with a dedicated prosecutor (procureur), judge of inquiry, 
and trial judge. • Significantly increase training for law enforcement, 
prosecutors, and judicial officials on both the 2015 anti-slavery 
and 2020 anti-trafficking laws. • Develop standard procedures 
to identify and refer trafficking and hereditary slavery victims to 
care, and train authorities on the procedures’ implementation. • 
Implement measures to support trafficking and hereditary slavery 
victims during investigations, including providing easier access to 
legal assistance and protection from intimidation and threats from 
their alleged traffickers. • Partner with NGOs to provide shelter and 
services to all trafficking victims, including adults. • Proactively screen 
for trafficking indicators among vulnerable populations, including 
irregular migrants, sexual abuse victims, women in commercial 
sex, and child beggars. • Cease detaining, deporting, or otherwise 
penalizing potential trafficking victims. • Investigate and prosecute 
individuals accused of fraudulently recruiting Mauritanians abroad 
for exploitation in forced labor and sex trafficking. • Implement the 
anti-trafficking national action plan to address all forms of trafficking, 
including hereditary slavery and forced labor, with input from civil 
society and all relevant ministries in the government. • Continue to 
enhance dialogue with civil society working on anti-slavery issues 
and, with input from civil society, develop and implement a plan 
to continue providing assistance to former slaves and members of 
traditional slave castes to allow them the opportunity to leave their 
communities of enslavement. • Increase public awareness campaigns 
against trafficking, including hereditary slavery and child forced 
begging in mahadras.
PROSECUTION
The government moderately increased anti-trafficking law enforcement 
efforts. During the reporting period, the government enacted the 
2020 Law on the Prevention and Punishment of Trafficking in 
Persons, which criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed penalties of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment and a 
fine of 250,000 to 500,000 Mauritanian ouguiya (MRU) ($6,760-
$13,510). These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect 
to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other 
serious crimes, such as rape. The 2015 anti-slavery law criminalized 
hereditary slavery and prescribed sufficiently stringent penalties of 
five to 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 250,000 to 500,000 
MRU ($6,760-$13,510). 
As in previous years, the government did not report comprehensive 
law enforcement data. Although courts were shut down nationwide 
for over six months of the reporting period due to the pandemic, the 
government initiated prosecutions against four alleged traffickers and 
convicted three traffickers; the government did not initiate any new 
investigations. This compared with one investigation, prosecution 
of three alleged traffickers, and conviction of five traffickers during 
the previous reporting period. The Nouadhibou anti-slavery court 
convicted three traffickers in three hereditary slavery cases that 
had been pending since 2013, 2014, and 2015; one defendant was 
acquitted for lack of evidence. All three convicted traffickers were 
sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 500,000 MRU 
($13,510), the maximum fine possible under the law, as victim 
compensation. One of the convicted traffickers is serving his sentence. 
Authorities issued arrest warrants for the remaining two convicted 
traffickers. A total of five cases remained pending before the three 
anti-slavery courts: one before the Nema court and four before the 
Nouakchott court. The government did not report initiating any new 
investigations into fraudulent recruitment. 
Three regional anti-slavery courts had exclusive jurisdiction over 
slavery cases; however, the courts lacked the staff, funding, and 
resources to investigate and prosecute hereditary slavery crimes 
throughout their regions. In practice, authorities did not automatically 
refer slavery cases to the anti-slavery courts. The three courts received 
a total of 1.8 million MRU ($48,650) during the reporting period, a 
significant increase from a total of 900,000 MRU ($24,320) during 
the previous reporting period. While the appointed judges received 
specialized training on the 2015 anti-slavery law, they were not 
trained in its enforcement or the unique challenges of investigating 
hereditary slavery cases, including preventing slaveholders from 
intimidating victims to withdraw their cases. An international 
organization reported the government did not adequately disseminate 
information or train judges, police, social services personnel, or NGO 
stakeholders on the new 2020 anti-trafficking law. Moreover, while 
other topical courts had specialized prosecutors, the anti-slavery 
courts did not have such specialized prosecutors. During the annual 
meeting of the government’s judicial council in December 2020, the 
government opted not to rotate any of the existing anti-slavery court 
judges for the second year in a row. Officials reported the judicial 
council reassigned five advisors from the anti-slavery courts who were 
routinely impeding and slowing the courts’ work. Officials reported 
no hereditary slavery cases remained with local courts.
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking 
and hereditary slavery offenses; however, corruption and official 
complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, 
inhibiting law enforcement action during the year. Some police, 
prosecutors, and investigative judges reportedly refused to investigate 
and try cases of hereditary slavery or to acknowledge hereditary slavery 
continued to occur. The government at times relied on lesser statutes 
to punish potential slavery offenses due to a lack of adequate training 
for government officials and a lack of political will to prosecute 
such offenses. NGOs reported some local authorities encouraged 
victims and their families to resolve trafficking and hereditary 
slavery cases through social mediation rather than through the 
criminal justice system. Although prosecutors had a legal obligation 
to transfer slavery cases to the anti-slavery courts, some prosecutors 
encouraged victims to withdraw their complaints in exchange for a 
small amount of financial compensation. Corrupt marabouts (Quranic 
teachers) suspected of exploiting talibés (Quranic students) in forced 




prosecutors to drop cases. The government, in partnership with an 
international organization and foreign donor, trained police and 
gendarmerie academy instructors on human rights issues, including 
human trafficking. However, law enforcement officials continued 
to lack understanding of human trafficking and hereditary slavery. 
Due to the pandemic, the government reassigned several police 
and gendarmerie units that previously monitored the border and 
worked with vulnerable populations. Although not explicitly reported 
as human trafficking, there were five open cases of alleged sexual 
exploitation with trafficking indicators by Mauritanian peacekeepers 
deployed to the UN peacekeeping mission in the Central African 
Republic (CAR); this includes two cases reported in 2020, one in 
2019, one in 2018, and one in 2017. The government had not yet 
provided the accountability measures taken, if any, for all five open 
cases at the end of the reporting period. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained insufficient efforts to identify and protect 
trafficking victims. The government did not report identifying any 
trafficking victims for the third consecutive year. An NGO reported 
identifying and providing care to 1,130 vulnerable children, including 
potential trafficking victims, and 1,064 adult victims in 2020. Of 
the 1,064 adult victims, 646 were victims of forced labor and 418 
were victims of sex trafficking, although this may have included 
victims of sexual violence. The government did not have formal 
measures to identify trafficking victims or refer them to care, but the 
Ministry of Social Affairs (MASEF) continued using existing referral 
procedures for child victims of crime. In a previous reporting period, 
an international organization produced a manual for border agents 
that included victim identification guidance; however, the border 
agents did not consistently use the manual during the reporting 
period. NGOs noted government-employed social workers lacked 
training to identify trafficking victims, including in domestic work 
and commercial sex, and did not know where to refer identified 
victims for care. 
MASEF managed seven centers nationwide for the short-term 
protection and social integration of vulnerable children, including 
potential trafficking victims, with financial support from an NGO; one 
of the centers in Nouakchott provided overnight care for child victims 
of crime. Child victims with disabilities were referred to MASEF’s 
Training and Social Promotion Center for Handicapped Children. 
The centers supported 120 vulnerable children, including potential 
trafficking victims, compared with 350 children during the previous 
reporting period. The centers could accommodate both domestic 
and foreign child victims. After short-term care, MASEF generally 
referred victims to NGOs for long-term care. In previous reporting 
periods, MASEF centers offered daytime services to vulnerable families, 
including psycho-social, food, and vocational assistance; however, due 
to the pandemic, MASEF suspended these services. NGOs continued 
to provide the majority of protective services to trafficking victims, 
including shelter, medical, legal, social, and educational assistance, 
without government financial or in-kind support. There was limited 
psychological support for trafficking victims. The government operated 
one day center in Nouadhibou for adult female victims of sexual 
violence, including potential trafficking victims, and placed them 
with host families at night; the center also accommodated migrant 
and refugee women and girls. However, shelter and services for adult 
victims remained severely inadequate, rendering them vulnerable to 
re-trafficking. During the reporting period, the Mauritanian embassy 
in Saudi Arabia repatriated one female trafficking victim exploited 
in domestic servitude. 
The government did not have a formal policy to encourage victims 
to assist in investigations and prosecutions against their alleged 
traffickers, nor did it report providing any services to protect them 
from threats or intimidation from their traffickers in doing so, 
including legal assistance, witness protection, or confidentiality 
protocols. NGOs reported the government often brought victims 
and accused traffickers together when interviewing, which placed 
enormous pressure on victims to change their testimony. The 2015 
anti-slavery law provided for comprehensive legal assistance for 
victims of hereditary slavery and the creation of support centers in 
each province. In 2021, the government established legal aid offices 
in all regions and allocated 10 million MRU ($270,270); however, 
they were not yet operational by the end of the reporting period. The 
government allocated an additional 3.6 million MRU ($97,300) in the 
2021 budget for legal assistance to victims of human trafficking but 
did not report on victims receiving such support during the reporting 
period. The law allowed victims to obtain restitution, although 
the complex and opaque legal system made such efforts extremely 
difficult; the Nouadhibou anti-slavery court awarded 500,000 MRU 
($13,510) in restitution to four victims. The government did not 
report whether the restitution was paid. Victims could also file civil 
suits against their traffickers, although victims lacked awareness of 
this option; according to an NGO, victims filed two civil suits against 
their traffickers but have not yet received compensation. Mauritanian 
law allowed potential victims to file for asylum or refugee status; 
the government did not report granting trafficking victims asylum 
or refugee status, although an international organization registered 
more than 4,000 refugees and asylum seekers eligible for these 
protections, including potential trafficking victims. The 2020 anti-
trafficking law included provisions to protect trafficking victims from 
legal proceedings related to unlawful acts their traffickers compelled 
them to commit; however, victims of domestic servitude and sex 
trafficking remained vulnerable to penalization and imprisonment 
under fornication and adultery charges. Law enforcement officials 
jailed women suspected of engaging in commercial sex and held 
irregular migrants in detention until their refugee status was resolved 
without screening for trafficking. Under a 2003 agreement with 
Spain, Mauritania received deported migrants, including its citizens 
and third-country nationals presumed to have transited Mauritania 
en route to Spain. According to international organizations, the 
government processed and transported the migrants to the Senegal 
and Mali borders within hours of arriving in Nouadhibou without 
systematically screening for trafficking or allowing international 
organizations to offer protective services.
PREVENTION
The government increased efforts to prevent human trafficking. 
In November 2020, the government created a human rights inter-
ministerial committee responsible for implementing the national 
action plan (NAP) to combat trafficking in persons. The prime 
minister’s office coordinated the inter-ministerial committee, 
comprised of the Commissariat, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of 
Interior, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of 
Health, Ministry of Education, MASEF, Ministry of Public Function, 
and Ministry of Foreign Affairs; the committee met once during 
the reporting period. The government allocated 5.4 million MRU 
($145,950) to implement the NAP, although officials acknowledged 
this amount was inadequate for full implementation. The government 
increased awareness-raising efforts during the reporting period. It 
organized, in collaboration with an NGO, a series of workshops 
to sensitize government authorities, local and international NGOs, 
and citizens in Nema and surrounding villages on the new anti-
trafficking law. The National Commission for Human Rights led an 
awareness campaign through the eastern region of the country to 
sensitize the public on the new anti-trafficking law; the commission 
also conducted awareness campaigns to promote the anti-trafficking 
law and NAP targeting administrative, security, and judicial officials 
in Nouakchott, Zouerat, Atar, Rosso, Kaedi, and Selibaby. Through a 
grant program that provided more than 10 million MRU ($270,270) 
to NGOs, including organizations combating human trafficking, 
the government supported an NGO conducting workshops on the 
new anti-trafficking law targeting civil society, law enforcement, and 
government officials. 
During the reporting period, the Ministry of Islamic Affairs and 
Original Education granted 1.2 million MRU ($32,430) to 995 








students; the government conducted quarterly visits to some, but 
not all, mahadras that received assistance to verify they met certain 
standards, including not subjecting students to forced begging. 
The ministry continued implementing a program, which began 
in 2016, to modernize mahadras in poor areas to reduce students’ 
vulnerability to forced begging by creating and financially supporting 
150 new mahadras, creating four new regional institutes in Bourat, 
Boghé, Sélibabi and Kiffa, and providing scholarships to students. 
The ministry partnered with imams to provide literacy classes that 
addressed child rights issues, including child labor and child trafficking, 
for over 3,000 people. In previous reporting periods, the Agency for 
National Solidarity and the Fight against Exclusion (Taazour) provided 
education, economic opportunity, and health services to vulnerable 
communities, including communities traditionally subjected to 
hereditary slavery. The government allocated 4 billion MRU ($108.1 
million) over five years to Taazour in fiscal year 2020. Taazour provided 
direct cash assistance to more than 200,000 impoverished families 
in the largest cash transfer program in Mauritania’s history during 
the reporting period. The Ministry of Youth launched a job creation 
program targeting vulnerable young people, largely from communities 
affected by hereditary slavery. For the second consecutive year, there 
were no reports the government harassed or prevented anti-slavery 
activists from operating in Mauritania during the reporting period. 
In February 2021, the government enacted the Law on Associations 
(“NGO Law”), allowing all NGOs, including anti-slavery NGOs, to 
legally operate in the country following a simplified registration 
process. Some critics reported the law contained administrative barriers 
that may burden smaller NGOs and permitted the government to retain 
the authority to suspend NGOs engaged in activities that threaten 
the country’s morals. During the reporting period, the government 
provided financial support to an NGO to create a hotline for victims of 
crime, including trafficking; the hotline received over 6,300 calls, with 
operators speaking four local languages and French. The government 
made efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts by 
arresting and convicting buyers of commercial sex; however, officials 
also arrested potential trafficking victims during these operations. 
The Ministry of Labor trained 15 labor inspectors to monitor the 
labor market for violations, including child trafficking. However, 
the government struggled to regulate the large informal sector; it 
did not implement efforts to prevent abuse and screen for trafficking 
in this sector. Despite reports of labor abuses, including potential 
indicators of trafficking, the government rarely inspected fishing 
vessels, processing plants, and boat factories. In 2017, the government 
signed a memorandum of understanding with Saudi Arabia to increase 
protections for prospective domestic workers; according to NGOs, 
the government did not report on the effectiveness of the agreement 
to prevent trafficking. The government continued working with an 
international organization to study the scope of forced labor in 
Mauritania; the government did not release the report during the 
reporting period. The government continued partnering with an 
international organization to issue identification cards to Malian 
refugees—as well as birth certificates to Malian refugee children 
born in Mauritania— in Mbera camp to reduce vulnerability to 
trafficking. An international organization reported some hospitals 
refused migrants birth registrations; as a result, the government 
cooperated with the international organization to raise awareness and 
combat misconceptions related to birth registrations among hospital 
personnel. The government did not provide anti-trafficking training 
to its diplomatic personnel; however, all Mauritanian diplomats 
received internal anti-trafficking policy guidelines prior to their 
departure. The government did not provide anti-trafficking training to 
its troops prior to their deployment as peacekeepers; however, troops 
received pre-deployment briefings on human rights. Although not 
explicitly reported as human trafficking, there were five open cases of 
alleged sexual exploitation with trafficking indicators by Mauritanian 
peacekeepers deployed to the UN peacekeeping mission in CAR.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Mauritania, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Mauritania abroad. Adults and children from traditional slave castes in 
the Haratine (Black Moor) and Afro-Mauritanian (Halpulaar, Soninke, 
and Wolof) communities are subjected to hereditary slavery practices 
rooted in ancestral master-slave relationships, where they are often 
forced to work without pay as cattle herders and domestic servants. 
Although reliable data on forced labor and hereditary slavery do not 
exist, local and international experts state hereditary slavery continues 
to affect a small, but not insignificant, portion of the country’s 
population in both rural and urban settings. Many former slaves 
and their descendants remain in dependent relationships with the 
family of their former slaveholders due in part to cultural traditions 
as well as a lack of skills and alternate economic opportunities. Some 
former slaves reportedly continue to work for their former masters 
or others under exploitative conditions to retain access to land 
they had traditionally farmed. Corrupt marabouts force boys from 
Mauritania and other West African countries who study at mahadras 
to beg for food and money; boys from low-income families in the 
Halpulaar community and, increasingly, children with disabilities 
are particularly vulnerable. According to a 2018 survey, more than 
50 percent of Mauritanian children under the age of five lack birth 
certificates. It is especially difficult for children of Haratine and Afro-
Mauritanian descent to obtain birth certificates. Because secondary 
schools require birth certificates for enrollment, many children as 
young as age 12 cannot access education, increasing their vulnerability 
to trafficking. Fraudulent recruiters promise Mauritanian women and 
girls—especially those from the traditional slave castes and Afro-
Mauritanian communities—shelter and education, but force them 
into domestic servitude, especially in larger cities such as Nouakchott, 
Nouadhibou, and Rosso. Children of Haratine and Afro-Mauritanian 
descent working in the fisheries sector are vulnerable to forced labor. 
An NGO reported traffickers coerce women and children to smuggle 
illicit drugs. West African women and girls, especially Senegalese and 
Ivoirians, are vulnerable to domestic servitude and sex trafficking in 
Mauritania. Traffickers also exploit Senegalese children in fishing 
and drug production. Refugees in Nouadhibou reportedly engage in 
commercial sex due to their dire financial situations, increasing their 
vulnerability to sex trafficking. Mauritanian, Nigerian, and Senegalese 
traffickers in the port city of Nouadhibou exploited Sub-Saharan 
African migrants transiting Mauritania en route to Morocco and Europe 
in forced labor and sex trafficking. Foreign agencies and Mauritanian 
intermediaries fraudulently recruit Mauritanian women for nursing 
and teaching jobs abroad and subsequently exploit them in domestic 
servitude and sex trafficking in the Gulf, including Saudi Arabia. Men 
from Middle Eastern and North African countries use legally contracted 
temporary marriages to sexually exploit Mauritanian girls and young 
women. Mauritanian women and girls from poor families enter these 
forced marriages, facilitated by brokers and travel agencies in both 
Mauritania and in the Middle East promising substantial payment, 
and are exploited as sex slaves and in sex trafficking in Saudi Arabia 
and other Gulf countries. Cuban nationals working in Mauritania 
on medical missions may have been forced to work by the Cuban 
government; the Mauritanian government ended its agreement with 
the Cuban government, and the doctors left the country in February 
2021. In 2016, an international organization identified and removed 
from a refugee camp in southeastern Mauritania 16 Malian child 
soldiers aged 15-17 associated with Malian rebel groups; some of the 
victims had been recruited in Mali, and others allegedly had been 
recruited from the camp in Mauritania.
MAURITIUS: TIER 2
The Government of Mauritius does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 




therefore Mauritius remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
identifying more trafficking victims; providing protective services to 
all identified child victims; and conducting nationwide campaigns to 
raise awareness of trafficking. The government also increased efforts 
to screen vulnerable populations, including migrants traveling alone 
and victims of crimes, for trafficking indicators and initiated two 
investigations involving adult sex trafficking of foreign nationals; 
in previous years, the government regularly deported potential 
victims without screening for trafficking indicators. However, the 
government did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. 
The government continued to lack standard operating procedures 
to identify and refer adult victims to comprehensive protection 
services and did not designate a leading agency to address adult sex 
trafficking, hindering overall coordination and provision of adequate 
protection services to adult victims. The absence of a victim care 
policy for adult trafficking victims led to ad hoc assistance, a lack 
of victim-centered approaches, and potential re-traumatization of 
victims, such as the government denying foreign victims’ request for 
repatriation and requiring them to remain in the country until it 
completed ongoing investigations. The Inter-Ministerial Committee 
on Trafficking in Persons remained inactive for the second consecutive 
year, and the government did not adopt a national action plan for 
the seventh consecutive year, hampering government-wide efforts 
to combat trafficking.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously increase efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking 
offenses, and sentence convicted traffickers penalties as prescribed 
by the 2009 anti-trafficking law. • Improve comprehensive protection 
services for adult trafficking victims by developing and implementing 
standardized procedures for proactive victim identification and referral 
to protective services—especially among vulnerable populations, 
including individuals in commercial sex and migrant workers, such 
as Bangladeshi, Indian, and North Korean workers—and by ensuring 
provision of adequate assistance once identified regardless of their 
immigration status or willingness to participate in investigations and 
court proceedings of their traffickers. • Finalize, adopt, and allocate 
funding to implement the national action plan to combat trafficking. 
• Implement and consistently enforce strong regulations and oversight 
of labor recruitment companies, including eliminating recruitment fees 
charged to migrant workers and holding fraudulent labor recruiters 
criminally accountable. • Strengthen the partnership between police 
and prosecutors to more efficiently and effectively prosecute trafficking 
cases, including training on strong evidence gathering and victim-
centered investigations. • Implement a witness protection program to 
increase protection for victims participating in criminal proceedings 
and prevent re-traumatization, including receiving victims’ consent 
to willingly participate in law enforcement procedures. • Vigilantly 
monitor employers of migrant workers to identify indicators of 
trafficking and investigate potential trafficking situations. • Increase 
anti-trafficking coordination efforts among government agencies to 
prioritize the inter-ministerial committee’s role in driving national 
efforts and designate a lead agency responsible for the protection 
of adult sex trafficking victims. • Provide specific anti-trafficking 
training to law enforcement officials, labor inspectors, social workers, 
prosecutors, and magistrates to improve case investigation and victim 
identification and referral to appropriate care. • Utilize the national 
centralized anti-trafficking data collection and reporting tool.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. 
The Combating of Trafficking in Persons Act of 2009 criminalized 
sex trafficking and labor trafficking of adults and children and 
prescribed penalties of up to 15 years’ imprisonment. In addition, 
the amended Child Protection Act of 2005 criminalized child sex 
and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to 30 years’ 
imprisonment. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with 
respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other 
serious crimes, such as rape. The 2009 anti-trafficking law prohibited 
the recruitment of workers by using fraudulent or deceptive offers; 
however, the law did not extend to foreign recruiters who operated 
outside Mauritius.
In 2020, the government reported initiating four investigations into 
11 suspects, compared with six investigations into nine suspects in 
2019. Specifically, authorities conducted two adult sex trafficking 
investigations, one child sex trafficking investigation and one child 
labor trafficking investigation. All four investigations remained 
ongoing at the end of the reporting period. The government initiated 
two new prosecutions in 2020, compared with one new prosecution 
in 2019 and 15 prosecutions in 2018. The government reported 
convicting one trafficker, compared with two convictions in 2019. 
This conviction was of a Mauritian adult female involved in a 2014 
child sex trafficking case; courts initially sentenced the trafficker to 18 
months’ imprisonment but later reduced the sentence to 240 hours 
of community service, a common occurrence for first-time offenders 
of many crimes. The government did not provide updates on cases 
ongoing from previous reporting periods. The government did not 
report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government 
officials complicit in human trafficking. In response to the pandemic, 
the government issued stay-at-home orders from March 2020 to 
June 2020 and from March 2021 to May 2021; during this time, all 
police officers, including those mandated to investigate trafficking 
crimes, were assigned to oversee pandemic-related guidelines and 
procedures, such as mask wearing, curfews, social distancing, and 
mandatory quarantines. The government also pulled officers from 
their regular duties to assist in contact tracing, transporting individuals 
to hospitals, and providing security at quarantine locations. Due to 
pandemic-related restrictions on social gatherings, courts were closed 
for a portion of the reporting period, which exacerbated previous 
case backlogs prior to the pandemic. With training and support 
from an international organization, the government had access to 
a national centralized anti-trafficking data collection and reporting 
tool; although it was operationalized in 2019, government use of the 
tool remained limited in 2020.
The Mauritius Police Force (MPF) maintained an ad hoc internal 
coordination committee to combat trafficking, as well as a “human 
rights desk,” which employed two police officers trained on trafficking 
crimes that served as a resource for other police units. In 2020, the 
Mauritius Police Training School provided anti-trafficking courses to 
309 new law enforcement officers, compared with 400 officers trained 
in 2019. The police school also reported training 66 mid-level officers 
on trafficking during the reporting period. Despite these training efforts, 
some law enforcement officers continued to lack an understanding of 
the anti-trafficking law. Similar to previous years, proper investigations, 
including collection of evidence and adequate witness testimony, 
remained difficult for law enforcement to conduct, often leading 
to lengthy and poor investigations and prosecutions. While law 
enforcement and prosecutors reported continued case conferencing, 
coordination required further improvement; additionally, the judicial 
process continued to be prohibitively long—frequently many years—
which at times dissuaded victims from seeking legal redress through 
civil suits.
PROTECTION
The government increased efforts to identify trafficking victims, 
while protection services remained inadequate, especially for adult 







victims, compared with six victims identified in 2019. The 18 victims 
included 15 adult female Malagasy victims and one adult female 
Mauritian victim of sex trafficking, one Mauritian girl exploited in 
sex trafficking, and one Mauritian boy exploited in forced labor. The 
government did not report identifying any adult victims of labor 
trafficking during the reporting period, despite migrant workers’ 
continued vulnerability to trafficking. The government continued to 
lack standard identification and referral procedures for adult trafficking 
victims; however, the Ministry of Gender Equality, Child Development, 
and Family Welfare (MWFWCD’s) Child Development Unit (CDU) 
systematically employed standard referral procedures after identifying 
child trafficking victims. The government provided medical assistance 
and counseling to the two child victims and short-term shelter to one 
child victim. The absence of a victim care policy for adult trafficking 
victims led to ad hoc assistance, a lack of victim-centered approaches, 
and potential re-traumatization of victims. The government referred 
all 16 adult victims to NGO-run shelters for women in distress, victims 
of domestic violence, or adults involved in commercial sex with drug 
addictions, where the NGOs provided shelter, medical assistance, and 
psychosocial services. The government did not allow some victims 
to leave the NGO shelters unchaperoned or seek work opportunities 
due to ongoing investigations. Additionally, the government did 
not initially approve the Malagasy victims’ request for repatriation, 
requiring them to participate in investigations before returning 
home; police requested a court to require the victims to stay in the 
country while their cases were under investigation, which the court 
approved. The government reported supporting the repatriation of 
one trafficking victim, the same number as the previous reporting 
period. A program existed to repatriate Mauritian citizens in distress 
abroad, but the government has never reported any cases of repatriated 
Mauritian human trafficking victims.
The government determined that its first shelter for adult trafficking 
victims, established in 2019, would only accommodate male victims; 
however, it did not identify any adult male victims during the reporting 
period and did not provide services to any other victims at the shelter, 
although it was reportedly operational. The government continued to 
operate a shelter for female child sex trafficking victims that could host 
up to 32 children. Officials reported providing services to 34 children at 
the shelter during the reporting period, compared with an unreported 
number for the last four years. Child victims could leave the shelter to 
attend school and received medical and psychological assistance. The 
government allocated 11 million Mauritian rupees ($278,130) to the 
shelter in 2020; it did not report providing funding to shelters in 2019. 
There were no reports the government inappropriately detained or 
penalized trafficking victims for crimes traffickers compelled them to 
commit, and the government reportedly began screening all victims of 
crime for trafficking indicators during the reporting period; however, 
due to a lack of identification measures and gaps in understanding of 
human trafficking among some law enforcement officers, authorities 
may have penalized some unidentified adult victims of sex trafficking 
and forced labor. In previous years, immigration officials often refused 
entry to single, Malagasy women traveling alone with small amounts 
of money and attempting to enter the country on tourist visas on the 
suspicion they were coming to Mauritius to engage in commercial sex.
The 2009 anti-trafficking law provided victims limited legal alternatives 
to removal to countries in which they would face hardship. The law 
authorized the Minister of Home Affairs to allow a foreign trafficking 
victim to remain in the country for up to 42 days before deportation 
and to issue a temporary residence permit if the victim agreed to 
cooperate with the investigation and prosecution of the trafficking 
case. The law also separately allowed the Minister of Home Affairs 
to extend the trafficking victim’s permit on humanitarian grounds, 
but the government did not report providing these services during 
the reporting period. The government lacked formal policies and 
procedures to provide protective services for and encourage trafficking 
victims’ participation in investigations and prosecutions. There was no 
witness protection program for victims, but authorities kept victims’ 
identities confidential during court proceedings. Courts allowed 
victims to provide testimony via video or written statement, and if a 
victim was a witness in a court case against a former employer, they 
could obtain employment, move freely within the country, or leave 
the country pending trial proceedings; however, the government did 
not report providing these protective measures during the reporting 
period. The anti-trafficking law allowed the courts to award a victim 
up to 500,000 Mauritian rupees ($12,640) in restitution from the 
convicted trafficker; however, courts did not award restitution to 
victims during the reporting period. The law also allowed victims to 
file civil suits against their alleged traffickers for compensation for 
damages exceeding the amount of restitution awarded during criminal 
proceedings; however, civil suits could be prohibitively expensive and 
lengthy, and no victims filed such suits.
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The Prime 
Minister’s Office led government anti-trafficking efforts. The Inter-
Ministerial Committee on Trafficking in Persons, chaired by the 
attorney general’s office and designed to coordinate interagency 
policies to combat trafficking, remained inactive since 2019, hampering 
government-wide efforts to combat trafficking. The National Steering 
Committee on Trafficking in Persons, a working-level technical 
committee under the high-level inter-ministerial committee, was 
designated to drive daily operations on anti-trafficking efforts 
and met twice during the reporting period, compared with being 
inactive the prior reporting period. The MWFWCD, including the 
National Children’s Council and the CDU, led government efforts 
to combat child trafficking; there continued to be confusion within 
the government on which department was responsible for addressing 
adult sex trafficking. The government has not had a national action 
plan since 2013, which continued to hinder progress among various 
agencies mandated to work on anti-trafficking efforts. The MWFWCD 
continued to operate a 24-hour hotline to report child and sexual 
abuse cases, but it did not report call data related to trafficking during 
the reporting period. Police and the MWFWCD continued to conduct 
awareness-raising campaigns targeting elementary and high school 
students, parents, teachers, senior citizens, and tourism stakeholders 
through seminars, posters, and radio and television talk shows. The 
CPU reported conducting 345 awareness programs in schools and 
community centers for approximately 27,000 people, compared with 
14,000 individuals reached in 2019. 
In partnership with foreign governments, the government continued 
to produce and distribute migrant worker rights brochures, translated 
into seven languages, to all foreign workers upon arrival to Mauritius. 
In response to the pandemic, the government closed the country’s 
borders from March to June 2020 and from March to May 2021; 
during these lockdowns, the Ministry of Labor (MOL) extended the 
work visas of migrant workers who had reached the end of their 
stay and allowed migrant workers employed by companies that 
permanently closed to transition to other jobs. The MOL conducted 
15,368 individual sessions to sensitize migrant workers of their rights, 
including producing relevant documents in the native language of 
the migrant workers, an increase compared with conducting 1,198 
sessions in 2019. The MOL’s Special Migrant Workers Unit, responsible 
for monitoring and protecting all migrant workers and conducting 
routine inspections of their employment sites, responded to 375 
complaints from migrant workers, compared with 457 in the previous 
reporting period; however, the MOL did not report identifying any 
trafficking victims during these inspections or reporting any potential 
violations for further investigation. Although the MOL was required 
to approve all employment contracts before migrant workers entered 
the country, some migrant workers reportedly continued to enter 
the country with contracts that were incomplete or had not been 
translated into languages the workers could read. The government 
did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Mauritius. Peers, significant others, family 




exploit girls from across the country in child sex trafficking. Taxi 
drivers transport child sex traffickers to their victims with whom 
they engage in commercial sex acts; taxi drivers also transport victims 
to traffickers. Traffickers exploit girls from poor neighborhoods, an 
especially vulnerable population, in sex trafficking. Increasingly, 
guesthouse owners exploit Malagasy women, recruited under false 
pretenses of employment or tourism, in sex trafficking. Traffickers 
may also exploit children in sex trafficking on Rodrigues Island, an 
autonomous territory of Mauritius. An international organization 
reported that Russian traffickers or other criminal networks in Mauritius 
may recruit Ukrainian women to move to Mauritius, under the 
guise of a marriage agency, then subsequently exploit them in sex 
trafficking. Traffickers exploit Malagasy women who transit Mauritius 
in forced labor, primarily in domestic servitude, and sex trafficking 
in the Middle East. Mauritius’ manufacturing and construction 
sectors employ approximately 45,000 foreign migrant workers from 
Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, China, and Madagascar, some 
of whom traffickers subject to forced labor. North Korean nationals 
working in Mauritius may have been forced to work by the North 
Korean government. Employers operating small- and medium-sized 
businesses employ migrant workers, primarily from Bangladesh, 
who have been recruited through private recruitment intermediaries, 
usually former migrant workers now operating as recruiting agents 
in their country of origin; labor trafficking cases are more common 
in these enterprises than in larger businesses, which recruit directly 
without the use of intermediaries. Despite Mauritian law prohibiting 
the practice, employers routinely retain migrant workers’ passports 
to prevent them from changing jobs, enhancing the vulnerability 
to forced labor.
MEXICO: TIER 2
The Government of Mexico does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Mexico remained on Tier 2. These efforts included convicting 
more traffickers; providing funding to three NGOs that operate 
trafficking shelters; and increasing efforts of the Secretariat of Finance’s 
Financial Intelligence Unit (UIF) to collect intelligence in support of 
trafficking investigations and prosecutions. The government arrested 
two current or former public officials for suspected complicity in 
two trafficking cases authorities failed to address for numerous years. 
However, the government did not meet the minimum standards in 
several key areas. The government did not prosecute or convict any 
public officials for complicity in trafficking crimes; took limited 
action to investigate and prosecute forced labor crimes; and failed to 
allocate funds to a legally-required victim assistance fund. Authorities 
did not consistently employ a victim-centered approach and overall 
services for victims were inadequate. Fraudulent recruitment practices 
continued to be widespread, but the government did not take steps 
to hold recruiters or labor agents accountable. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Develop, implement, and fund a national strategic action plan on 
victim services, in consultation with international organizations and 
NGOs, to include shelters, comprehensive services, and reintegration 
support for all victims, including men and boys, LGBTQI+ individuals, 
and indigenous persons. • Develop and implement standardized 
procedures for front-line officials to proactively identify victims among 
vulnerable groups in Mexico and overseas—including individuals 
in commercial sex, children apprehended for illicit gang-related 
activities, Cuban medical professionals, and migrants, including 
migrant workers—and refer them to service providers for assistance. 
• Increase efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes, 
including forced labor and those involving complicit officials, at 
both the federal and state levels. • Increase and institutionalize 
anti-trafficking training for police, prosecutors, judges, immigration 
authorities, and service providers, with a focus on applying trauma-
informed, victim-centered procedures. • Provide improved security to 
victims and witnesses testifying against traffickers and ensure victims 
are not unlawfully detained, coerced into testifying, or otherwise re-
traumatized. • Allocate funds to a legally required victim assistance 
fund to cover restitution payments convicted traffickers are unable to 
pay and develop a mechanism to ensure victims receive court-ordered 
payments. • Strengthen the labor law to adequately criminalize and 
establish stringent penalties for recruitment practices that facilitate 
trafficking, and increase enforcement to punish employers and 
labor recruiters for violations. • Enact anti-trafficking legislation and 
establish specialized anti-trafficking prosecution units in all states. 
• Enact, implement, and allocate sufficient resources toward a new 
national action plan that is coordinated across federal, state, and 
local authorities. • Conduct culturally relevant awareness campaigns 
in local languages targeted for rural and indigenous communities. 
• Strengthen data collection efforts. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts; while authorities 
obtained more convictions, the government did not provide complete 
data on prosecution efforts. The 2012 anti-trafficking law criminalized 
sex trafficking and labor trafficking, prescribing penalties of five 
to 30 years’ imprisonment and fines for sex trafficking offenses 
and five to 20 years’ imprisonment and fines for labor trafficking; 
these penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other serious 
crimes, such as rape. The law defined trafficking broadly to include 
illegal adoption without the purpose of exploitation. Federal officials 
had jurisdiction over all international trafficking cases, all cases that 
took place on federally administered territory involving organized 
crime, and all cases involving allegations against government officials. 
States investigated other internal trafficking cases. Twenty-eight 
states had enacted trafficking laws. The 2012 law obligated states 
to have a dedicated human trafficking prosecutor; 30 of 32 states 
had established specialized anti-trafficking prosecutors or units. 
Local experts reported prosecutors sometimes charged suspects 
with crimes they believed were easier to prove, such as homicide or 
kidnapping, particularly in states where prosecutors’ offices were 
underfunded. The 2019 Asset Forfeiture Law allowed authorities to 
seize a trafficker’s assets. 
Authorities initiated 55 federal investigations and 550 state 
investigations in 2020, compared with 133 federal investigations 
and at least 545 state investigations in 2019, and 112 federal and 
304 state investigations in 2018. State-level investigations included 
332 suspected sex trafficking cases, 12 suspected forced labor cases, 
and 206 cases in which the type of exploitation was not specified. 
Federal authorities initiated prosecution of 40 suspected traffickers 
and continued 35 prosecutions opened in previous years for a total 
of 75 federal prosecutions in 2020, approximately half as many as 
in 2019. The government reported state-level prosecutions in 14 
states for a total of 51 cases. In comparison, authorities prosecuted 
at least 522 individuals in federal and state cases in 2019 and at least 
510 in 2018. In response to the pandemic, federal and state courts 
suspended all legal proceedings between March and May 2020. 
Prosecutors reported temporary closures of government offices and 
the judicial system hampered efforts to investigate new cases and 






halted requests for information, intergovernmental collaboration, 
and other routine investigative activities. Authorities convicted 59 
traffickers in federal and state cases in 2020, compared with 29 
traffickers convicted in 2019 and 60 convicted in 2018. Federal 
authorities convicted 13 sex traffickers while state authorities convicted 
40 sex traffickers, four labor traffickers, and two traffickers whose type 
of exploitation was not specified. In June 2020, the State of Mexico 
issued the government’s first trafficking conviction through a virtual 
platform. The government issued sentences for convicted traffickers 
ranging from three years’ to 195 years’ imprisonment, and the average 
term of imprisonment was 21 years. UIF investigated suspicious 
financial transactions and its intelligence led to the issuance of 
arrest warrants for suspected traffickers in several states; in one case, 
UIF froze bank accounts belonging to seven suspects in a child sex 
trafficking network and police issued five arrest warrants for suspects 
in this case. In 2020, UIF received 230 reports of suspicious financial 
transactions allegedly related to human trafficking, primarily from 
Jalisco, Tabasco, Quintana Roo, the State of Mexico, and Mexico City. 
In July 2020, UIF signed a cooperation agreement with the NGO 
operating the national anti-trafficking hotline to collect data from 
calls that could be used to trace illicit financial activity potentially 
linked to trafficking crimes.
Mexican authorities continued law enforcement cooperation with 
the United States, including the apprehension and extradition to the 
United States of a trafficking suspect, prosecution training that led 
to successful convictions in three states, and ongoing information 
assistance on three transnational trafficking cases. The government also 
extradited one trafficking suspect to Spain and began arrangements 
with the governments of Argentina and Peru to extradite one suspect 
to each country. 
State-level specialized prosecution units, whose capacity levels, 
staffing, and funding varied widely, had the primary responsibility 
for enforcing anti-trafficking laws throughout the country. Prosecutor 
offices in rural and indigenous communities were particularly 
understaffed and lacked sufficient resources to effectively prosecute 
trafficking crimes. Coordination across state and federal levels 
continued to be slow. Authorities from the four states of Mexico City, 
State of Mexico, Baja California, and Nuevo Leon conducted more 
than half of all investigations in 2020, while authorities in Campeche 
and Colima did not investigate any suspected cases. The government 
identified the states of Veracruz, Tlaxcala, and Guerrero as having high 
trafficking prevalence, but authorities in these states did not convict 
any traffickers in 2020. Local experts cited insufficient funding for 
prosecutors in these states led them to charge suspects with crimes 
they believed easier to prove. State-level authorities in Tlaxcala signed 
an agreement with UIF to enhance collaboration in combating 
trafficking and corruption and formalized a partnership with U.S. 
law enforcement to provide assistance in apprehending trafficking 
suspects. Authorities reported pandemic mitigation efforts, including 
temporary closures of bars and hotels, impeded investigations and 
evidence collection in possible sex trafficking cases occurring in these 
venues. A public university conducted a 30-hour training course on 
gender-sensitive victim interview techniques for 30 employees of the 
federal prosecutor’s office, and several federal agencies conducted 
anti-trafficking training sessions for law enforcement or criminal 
justice officials during the year. 
Trafficking-related corruption remained a concern. Some government 
officials colluded with traffickers or participated in trafficking crimes. 
In September 2020, the government established a hotline and 
website open to the public for the anonymous reporting of suspected 
corruption involving public officials, but it did not report receiving 
any trafficking-related tips. In November 2020, the National Human 
Rights Commission (CNDH) received six claims of trafficking-related 
human rights abuses by public officials. As a result, CNDH opened 
new investigations into two claims and ultimately referred one to the 
Attorney General’s Office for criminal investigation. CNDH added two 
claims to ongoing investigations and dismissed the other two for lack 
of sufficient information. In February 2021, authorities arrested the 
former governor of Puebla for ordering the 2005 torture and illegal 
arrest of a journalist who exposed the official’s alleged involvement 
in a child sex trafficking ring. In March 2021, in a case first exposed by 
a journalist in 2014, authorities issued arrest warrants for five current 
or former employees of a national political party—one of whom 
was a state representative—for allegedly running a sex trafficking 
operation with party resources. Authorities apprehended one suspect 
and UIF froze financial accounts linked to the alleged ringleader 
and 43 others allegedly involved in money laundering, corruption, 
or human trafficking crimes related to this case; remaining suspects 
were not apprehended during the reporting period. The government 
did not provide updates on investigations of four immigration 
officials alleged to have received payments for facilitating the entry 
and residency of foreign trafficking victims in Mexico in a previous 
reporting period. Unlike last year, the government did not prosecute 
or convict any officials for complicity in trafficking crimes. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained protection efforts, identifying more 
victims; however, it did not provide adequate services to victims. 
The government reported identifying 673 victims in 2020, compared 
with 658 victims in 2019 and 706 victims in 2018. An NGO that 
operated the national trafficking hotline reported receiving 1,931 
trafficking-related calls—originating from throughout the country—
and identifying 245 victims from these calls; 45 investigations resulted 
from calls to the hotline. These victims included 196 women and 
girls, 39 men and boys, and 10 with gender unspecified; and 140 
Mexican citizens, 49 foreigners, and 56 with nationality unspecified. 
The NGO reported identifying more male victims than the previous 
year, the majority of whom were exploited in forced labor. Hotline 
staff referred 181 victims to government and NGO service providers for 
medical, psychological, and legal assistance and 64 for psychological 
and legal counseling. This organization trained 600 police officers in 
Mexico City to respond to referrals from the hotline. The government 
identified and assisted 313 Mexican victims of human trafficking 
exploited abroad during the first half of 2020, including 301 in the 
United States, and 12 in other countries. Among these victims were 
33 men, 39 women, 155 boys, and 86 girls. The government did not 
provide data on victims identified abroad during the second half of 
2020. In comparison, authorities identified and assisted 933 victims 
abroad in 2019 and 860 in 2018. 
Immigration officials implemented a formal screening, identification, 
and care protocol to identify and refer potential trafficking victims 
during initial immigration verification and regularization. In January 
2021, authorities agreed to modify this protocol to require screening 
among migrants in detention centers and requested assistance from an 
international organization in drafting updated guidance; authorities 
did not complete these revisions by the close of the reporting period. 
Consular officials followed a protocol for identifying and providing 
assistance to Mexican victims abroad, and some other agencies 
followed informal victim referral procedures. Labor inspectors had a 
protocol for identifying suspected forced labor victims during routine 
inspections of formally-registered businesses and farms, but local 
observers reported a lack of coordination with other secretariats to 
facilitate criminal investigations and victim assistance. Across the 
government, victim referral from first responders was largely ad hoc 
and procedures varied from state to state, with most shelters relying 
on prosecutors to identify and refer victims. Most government officials 
lacked standardized procedures to proactively identify potential 
victims of trafficking within vulnerable groups and systematically 
refer them to service providers. NGOs reported authorities at all 
levels of government lacked sufficient understanding of trafficking 
laws and failed to effectively identify and refer potential victims. 
Federal and state agencies generally offered victims emergency 
assistance, such as medical care, food, and housing in temporary or 
transitional homes, and other services, such as psychological, and 
legal services, often in partnership with NGOs. However, victim 




regions; and were particularly inadequate for male victims, forced 
labor victims, and victims in rural areas. Shelters at both the state 
and local levels typically housed victims only for the duration of a 
criminal trial and long-term reintegration services were very limited, 
leaving victims highly vulnerable to re-exploitation. 
The government did not provide complete data for victims receiving 
services. As of October 2020, 82 adult and child victims resided in 
specialized government and NGO trafficking shelters across the 
country. The Special Prosecutor for Violence Against Women and 
Trafficking in Persons (FEVIMTRA) continued to operate a high-
security shelter in Mexico City that could accommodate 50 female 
victims and their children for up to three months while victims 
participated in legal processes; the shelter served 11 trafficking 
victims during the year. NGOs expressed concerns that the high-
security measures, including victims’ inability to leave the shelter 
unaccompanied, may have re-traumatized some victims. The states 
of Mexico, Chiapas, and Mexico City continued operating six 
government-funded trafficking shelters. In total, seven states had 
specialized government or NGO shelters for trafficking victims, 
and four states had agreements in place that allowed them to refer 
trafficking victims to shelters in another state. The government and 
NGOs operated additional shelters that served other populations 
and could accept trafficking victims but did not provide specialized 
services. There were no government or NGO trafficking shelters 
available for male victims older than 13, and 12 states lacked any 
shelters that accepted trafficking victims. NGOs operated the majority 
of shelters that served trafficking victims. Most shelters offered 
medical, psychological, and legal assistance for victims, but the level 
of care and quality of services varied widely. Government centers 
for crime victims provided some trafficking victims with emergency 
services, as did state-level prosecutorial, social service, and human 
rights offices. Many NGOs altered or limited their operations in 
response to severe funding cuts from donors during the pandemic. 
Some newly identified child victims were placed into facilities 
already operating at capacity due to organizations’ lack of funds. 
The National Institute of Social Development launched a program to 
provide funding to women’s shelters; in 2020, three NGOs operating 
trafficking shelters submitted requests for funding and received 
approximately 11.3 million pesos (565,000) through this program. 
FEVIMTRA coordinated with local embassies to provide legal, 
administrative, and consular assistance to victims from Brazil, 
Colombia, Honduras, Paraguay, and Venezuela and repatriated six 
victims to their home countries. The government did not report 
providing temporary immigration relief through humanitarian visas 
to any victims in 2020; in comparison, the government provided 
visas to 60 victims of human trafficking in 2019. Humanitarian visas 
enabled foreign trafficking victims to legally remain and work in 
the country up to one year and could be extended; this benefit was 
not dependent on a victims’ willingness to participate in a criminal 
trial. Government officials and NGOs acknowledged barriers to 
victims receiving humanitarian visas, including authorities’ failure 
to identify eligible foreign trafficking victims, insufficient efforts to 
make victims aware of the process for obtaining such relief, and the 
lengthy wait times for processing requests. 
The law provided victims with protection from punishment for 
unlawful acts their traffickers compelled them to commit. However, 
due to a lack of formal identification procedures, including among 
children apprehended for gang-related criminal activity or migrants 
in detention facilities, authorities may have detained or jailed some 
unidentified victims for crimes their traffickers compelled them to 
commit. NGOs reported authorities sometimes unlawfully detained 
victims on trafficking charges and some officials utilized shelters as 
detention facilities for victims until their cases were completed. In 
January 2021, CNDH issued a recommendation to the government 
to provide compensation to a sex trafficking victim following its 
determination that authorities violated the victim’s human rights 
by detaining her in a migrant detention center in 2018 and failing 
to properly provide assistance. 
The anti-trafficking law stipulated authorities must apply the principle 
of “maximum protection” to victims and witnesses, including 
protecting individuals’ identities and providing name and residence 
changes to victims affected by organized crime. Nonetheless, 
identifying information sometimes became publicly available in 
high-profile cases, and many victims feared identifying themselves 
or testifying against traffickers in court under the accusatorial system. 
NGOs reported officials often re-traumatized victims through a lack 
of sensitivity and the lack of adequate protection for victims during 
criminal proceedings. Experts expressed concern that prosecutors 
coerced some victims to testify during judicial proceedings. Authorities’ 
failure to employ victim-centered procedures, combined with an 
overall lack of specialized services and security, disincentivized 
victims from filing complaints or participating in investigations and 
prosecutions. Women, indigenous persons, LGBTQI+ individuals, 
and migrants experienced discrimination within the judicial system 
that limited their access to justice. 
The Secretariat of the Interior (SEGOB) had a unit responsible for 
supporting access to justice and compensation for victims of federal 
crimes, but the government did not provide it with sufficient funding 
and trained personnel, limiting its ability to provide this support 
to trafficking victims. A public university conducted training on 
providing assistance to trafficking victims for 35 employees in this 
unit. The national anti-trafficking law required judges in criminal 
cases at both the state and federal levels to order traffickers to pay 
restitution to victims and required the government to create a fund 
to cover restitution payments perpetrators could not pay. However, 
the government did not create this fund, and no victims received 
restitution despite judges ordering these payments in all cases that 
resulted in convictions at both state and federal levels. The government 
anti-trafficking commission continued funding an international 
organization to develop a national information system to track 
the number of victims identified, referred, and assisted across the 
country, but the pandemic delayed the system’s implementation. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. The anti-trafficking 
commission, led by SEGOB, coordinated efforts among government 
agencies and civil society organizations. Local experts reported the 
commission was effective in promoting participation of stakeholders 
from academia, NGOs, and international organizations, and it 
encouraged transparency at its regular meetings and in its five 
permanent working groups. The government lacked a national anti-
trafficking action plan for a second year, following the previous plan’s 
expiration in 2018. In December 2020, the government launched 
its National Program for Human Rights 2020-2024, which included 
a chapter on prosecution, protection, and prevention efforts to 
combat trafficking. In November 2020, following the murders of 
two children who may have been victims of forced criminality, 
authorities in Mexico City launched a multisectoral strategy to 
provide opportunities and support for vulnerable children, aimed 
at preventing their exploitation in criminal activity. 
The government conducted a variety of anti-trafficking training 
and awareness programs for government officials and members 
of the public. CNDH adapted its public outreach efforts to digital 
platforms in response to the pandemic, allowing it to reach a greater 
number of participants than the previous year; these events, which 
focused on strengthening government-civil society cooperation in 
preventing and responding to trafficking, reached more than 20,000 
individuals, including government officials, teachers, and parents. 
The Secretariat of Welfare conducted seminars, presentations, plays, 
and film showings to raise awareness of trafficking through both 
virtual and in-person events, and it trained 1,066 public officials 
on trafficking prevention and victim protection. A public university 
held four interactive conferences on combating trafficking attended 
by 70,000 members of the public. Nonetheless, awareness and 
understanding of trafficking, particularly forced labor, remained low 






reached high-risk groups such as children, rural and indigenous 
communities, and non-Spanish speakers. 
The government did not allocate sufficient resources or personnel 
to the Secretariat of Labor and Social Welfare to effectively enforce 
labor laws. Furthermore, labor inspectors had a limited mandate for 
conducting oversight of working conditions in informal businesses 
and farms—which employed more than half of Mexican workers—
and a 24-hour advance notice requirement for routine inspections 
hampered their effectiveness when they did occur. Authorities 
conducted very few inspections in major farming states where 
abuses allegedly were rife, investigated few complaints, and did 
not report successful prosecutions for the crimes. The labor law 
lacked provisions criminalizing fraudulent recruitment and contract 
practices that made many workers vulnerable to trafficking. The law 
prohibited recruiters and labor agents from charging fees to workers 
and employers from passing agency fees to workers in the form of 
wage deductions; however, the law did not establish penalties for 
these practices and recruiters and employers continued to commit 
them with impunity. Civil contract law covered some fraudulent 
recruitment practices, but there was no evidence the government used 
these or other statues to hold recruiters or employers accountable. 
The government continued implementation of a pilot program to 
enroll domestic workers in the government’s social security system, 
requiring the worker’s employer to formalize their status through a 
contract. Between April 2019 and November 2020, 27,600 domestic 
workers enrolled in the pilot program, a significant increase from 
3,800 domestic workers enrolled in social security prior to the 
launch of this initiative. However, the government estimated this 
program should have reached approximately 2.4 million individuals 
working informally in this sector, and the vast majority of these 
workers remained in informal status without access to social security 
or other legal protections. In the previous reporting period, the 
Mexican legislature ratified a trade agreement that requires the parties 
to prohibit the importation of goods produced by forced labor; 
the agreement entered into force in July 2020. The government’s 
anti-trafficking commission, with support from international 
organizations, established a working group to advance government 
compliance with these obligations but did not report any outcomes 
during the reporting period. 
The Secretariat of Tourism organized 10 virtual conferences for 560 
public officials on preventing and responding to trafficking and 
conducted awareness training for 4,150 employees of businesses that 
were party to a public-private code of conduct on the protection of 
children in the tourism sector. NGOs reported the government’s lack 
of follow-up and enforcement efforts limited the effectiveness of the 
code of conduct. The government did not investigate or prosecute any 
suspected child sex tourists. The government made efforts to reduce 
the demand for commercial sex acts by prosecuting and convicting 
individuals who purchased commercial sex acts from children.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Mexico, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Mexico abroad. Groups considered most at risk for trafficking in 
Mexico include unaccompanied children, indigenous persons, 
persons with mental and physical disabilities, asylum seekers and 
migrants, IDPs, LGBTQI+ individuals, informal sector workers, and 
children in gang-controlled territories. Traffickers recruit and exploit 
Mexican women and children, and to a lesser extent men, in sex 
trafficking in Mexico and the United States through false promises 
of employment, deceptive romantic relationships, or extortion. The 
majority of trafficking cases occur among family, intimate partners, 
acquaintances on social media, or through employment-related traps. 
Transgender persons are particularly vulnerable to sex trafficking. 
Traffickers increasingly use the internet, particularly social media, 
to target and recruit potential victims. Traffickers exploit Mexican 
adults and children in forced labor in agriculture, domestic service, 
child care, manufacturing, mining, food processing, construction, 
tourism, begging, and street vending in Mexico and the United 
States. Traffickers commonly exploit day laborers and their children 
in forced labor in Mexico’s agricultural sector; these individuals 
migrate from the poorest states to the agricultural regions to harvest 
vegetables, coffee, sugar, and tobacco; receive little or no pay, health 
care, or time off; may live in substandard housing; receive insufficient 
food; and in the case of children, are denied education. Recruitment 
agencies frequently employ deceptive recruitment practices and charge 
unlawful fees to hire agricultural workers in Mexico and the United 
States; many workers are compelled into forced labor through debt 
bondage, threats of violence, and non-payment of wages. NGOs 
estimated traffickers increasingly exploited individuals in forced 
labor in Mexico. The vast majority of foreign victims of forced labor 
and sex trafficking in Mexico are from Central and South America, 
particularly El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Venezuela—with 
Venezuelan victims increasing in recent years; traffickers exploited 
some of these victims along Mexico’s southern border. NGOs and 
the media report victims from the Caribbean, Eastern Europe, Asia, 
and Africa have also been identified in Mexico, some en route to 
the United States. Among the 1,285 Cuban medical professionals 
the government contracted to assist during the pandemic, some may 
have been forced to work by the Cuban government. 
Organized criminal groups profit from sex trafficking and force 
Mexican and foreign adults and children to engage in illicit activities, 
including as assassins, lookouts, and in the production, transportation, 
and sale of drugs. Experts expressed particular concern over the forced 
recruitment of indigenous children by organized criminal groups, who 
use torture and credible threats of murder to exploit these children in 
forced criminality. Criminal groups exploit thousands of children in 
Mexico to serve as lookouts, carry out attacks on authorities and rival 
groups, or work in poppy fields. Observers also expressed concern 
over recruitment of recently deported Mexican nationals and foreign 
migrants by organized criminal groups for the purpose of forced 
criminality. Increasingly, organized crime groups—both large and 
small—participate in trafficking of migrants, who are highly vulnerable 
to exploitation due to their transient nature, frequent reliance on 
smugglers, and fear of reporting abuses to authorities. Observers, 
including Mexican legislators, noted links between violence against 
women and girls and between women’s disappearances, murders, and 
trafficking by organized criminal groups. Observers reported potential 
trafficking cases in substance abuse rehabilitation centers, women’s 
shelters, and government institutions for people with disabilities, 
including by organized criminal groups and facility employees. 
Trafficking-related corruption remains a concern. Some government 
officials collude with traffickers or participate in trafficking crimes. 
Corrupt officials reportedly participate in sex trafficking, including 
running sex trafficking operations. Some immigration officials 
allegedly accept payment from traffickers to facilitate the irregular 
entry of foreign trafficking victims into Mexico. 
NGOs reported child sex tourism remains a problem and continues 
to expand, especially in tourist areas and in northern border cities. 
Parents are sometimes complicit in exploiting their children in child 
sex tourism, and homeless children are believed to be at high risk. 
Many child sex tourists are from the United States, Canada, and 
Western Europe; Mexicans also purchase sex from child trafficking 
victims. Authorities reported a decrease in the use of the financial 
system by traffickers in 2020, likely due to pandemic-related 
restrictions on movement that made it difficult for the more profitable 
international sex trafficking networks to operate. Authorities reported 
trafficking networks increasingly used cryptocurrencies to launder 
proceeds from their crimes. The pandemic caused economic hardship, 
food insecurity, and mandated confinement that exacerbated many 
individuals’ existing vulnerabilities to trafficking and increased the 
number of individuals vulnerable to exploitation, particularly among 
migrants. Some workers accepted loans from their employers that 
left them highly vulnerable to debt bondage. There were reports that 
traffickers in Tlaxcala took sex trafficking victims to individuals’ homes 





STATES OF: TIER 2
The Government of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) does 
not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of 
trafficking but is making significant efforts to do so. The government 
demonstrated overall increasing efforts compared to the previous 
reporting period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore FSM remained on Tier 
2. These efforts included securing a facility for its second trafficking 
victim shelter, increasing trafficking awareness activities for the public, 
and continuing to identify victims and convict traffickers. However, 
the government did not meet the minimum standards in several key 
areas. The government remained without comprehensive standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) for proactive victim identification and 
referral to protection services. Courts continued to issue lenient 
sentences to convicted traffickers, creating potential safety problems 
for trafficking victims, weakening deterrence, and undercutting 
nationwide efforts to fight trafficking. Overall protection services 
and training for law enforcement and judicial officials continued 
to be insufficient. Unlike the previous year, the government did not 
report allocating funding to victim services. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, and 
sentence convicted traffickers to significant prison terms. • Finalize, 
disseminate, and train officials on procedures for the proactive 
identification and referral of trafficking victims to rehabilitation 
services. • Increase resources for protection services for trafficking 
victims. • Screen for trafficking indicators among vulnerable 
groups, including individuals in commercial sex. • Increase and 
institutionalize anti-trafficking training for police, prosecutors, and 
judges, including on how to implement a victim-centered approach. 
• Provide legal alternatives to the removal of foreign trafficking 
victims to countries where they may face hardship or retribution. 
• Strengthen efforts to implement the national action plan (NAP) 
and state-level plans, including through staffing a governmental 
anti-trafficking secretariat. • Monitor foreign labor recruitment for 
trafficking indicators, including the coercive use of debt. • Strengthen 
efforts to conduct anti-trafficking awareness campaigns targeted to 
traditional leaders, health care professionals, and the public, including 
those citizens of FSM who might migrate for work overseas.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. The national 
anti-trafficking law criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed penalties of up to 15 years’ imprisonment, a fine of 
$5,000-$25,000, or both for offenses involving adult victims, and up 
to 30 years’ imprisonment, a fine of between $5,000-$50,000, or both 
for offenses involving child victims. These penalties were sufficiently 
stringent and, with regards to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
penalties for other serious crimes, such as rape. Each of Micronesia’s 
four states had its own laws that criminalized trafficking crimes; 
however, Pohnpei and Chuuk States did not explicitly prohibit 
adult sex trafficking. Cases prosecuted at the state level may be heard 
subsequently at the national level, under national anti-trafficking 
law, depending on which court hears a case. 
The government did not report any new trafficking investigations, 
compared with one in 2019, and prosecuted four alleged traffickers, 
compared with eight in 2019. Courts convicted four traffickers during 
the reporting period, compared with six in 2019. Courts sentenced 
one trafficker to three months’ imprisonment and a $100 fine, one 
to 12 months’ imprisonment and a $250 fine, one to seven years’ 
imprisonment and seven years’ probation, and one to 10 years’ 
imprisonment (served only on the weekends during the 10 years) 
and a $5,000 fine. Lenient sentences of a year or less or those that 
were not served on consecutive days created potential safety problems 
for trafficking victims and weakened deterrence. The government 
continued to prosecute a child sex trafficking case involving one child 
victim and three alleged traffickers during the reporting period. In 
the previous reporting period, the acting attorney general of Yap was 
murdered, and some media reports stated the motive, which remained 
unclear, may have been related to her prosecution work, including 
on human trafficking. The government charged two perpetrators 
with 19 counts ranging from murder and manslaughter to firearms 
possession; the trial was ongoing at the end of the reporting period. 
Law enforcement officials cooperated with a foreign government on 
an ongoing international trafficking case.
During a prior reporting period, the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
assigned a full-time assistant attorney general to prosecute all human 
trafficking cases and hired four investigators who specialized in human 
trafficking. The placement of the investigators changed during the 
reporting period; one was placed at the national government, one in 
Chuuk, one in Pohnpei, and one in Kosrae compared to two in Chuuk 
and two in Kosrae in prior reporting periods. In September 2020, 
the government funded its second annual three-day anti-trafficking 
conference that included victim-centered approach training for 
law enforcement officials and service providers from the national 
and Pohnpei State governments; FSM and foreign government 
officials, international organizations, and civil society stakeholders 
conducted the training. Unlike in prior years, the government 
did not report providing DOJ with funding for investigations and 
awareness activities. DOJ continued to provide state and national 
level anti-trafficking training for law enforcement, judges, lawyers, 
health providers, faith-based organizations, and youth and women’s 
groups. Despite these trainings, judges overall continued to lack 
specialized training and, consequently, some judges lacked sensitivity 
to trafficking issues and the trauma victims experienced at times, 
resulting in judges sentencing traffickers to penalties that were 
disproportionately low to the severity of the crime. The government’s 
police academy training for new cadets included mandatory training 
on investigating trafficking cases and how to interview potential 
victims. Observers stated police still required additional training on sex 
trafficking and sophisticated investigation techniques. Police did not 
frequently investigate or charge traffickers who facilitate rather than 
impose exploitation, such as hotel owners, taxi drivers, and family 
members. The insular nature of the small island communities at times 
protected traffickers and impeded investigations. The government 
did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of 
government officials complicit in trafficking crimes.
PROTECTION
The government demonstrated mixed efforts to protect victims. In the 
previous reporting period, the government finalized and approved 
SOPs for victim assistance and referral to state law enforcement; 
however, the government remained without comprehensive SOPs 
to proactively identify trafficking victims and refer them to services. 
In addition, the current SOPs did not contain measures to screen 
for trafficking indicators among LGBTQI+ individuals, who were 
disproportionately vulnerable to trafficking. The government identified 
four victims during the reporting period, compared with five victims 
who self-identified as victims to the government during the previous 
reporting period. The government reported providing food, clothing, 
medical services, psychological evaluation, counseling services, and 
academic and social reintegration support, in partnership with an 



















compared with the government providing limited protection services 
to four victims during the previous reporting period. Authorities 
may have penalized unidentified victims through law enforcement 
actions against them, such as deportation, due to insufficient 
identification efforts
An international organization facilitated a port security project that 
included a component on gender based violence and trafficking 
victim identification and protection procedures; DOJ helped facilitate 
the project and is the lead agency for implementing victim-centered 
processes. In January 2021, DOJ, with assistance from an international 
organization, finalized a needs assessment and action plan for the 
implementation of the project. The government identified and 
secured a building to serve as its second shelter, available to trafficking 
victims, in Pohnpei; its first shelter, available to all victims of crimes, 
in Chuuk continued to provide services throughout the reporting 
period. The government did not report providing funding to victim 
services, a decrease from $120,000 in 2019; additionally, unlike in 
prior reporting periods, the government did not report providing 
any funding for a trafficking victim psychologist and the trafficking 
hotline. Despite this, the trafficking hotline continued to operate 24 
hours a day in English and local languages, and while it received calls 
during the reporting period, none of the calls resulted in trafficking 
investigations. Since 2018, the government has not reported if the 
DOJ national anti-human trafficking coordinator and three assistant 
state coordinators continued to provide support to victims through 
the trial and for several years after the disposition of the victim’s case. 
Courts ordered convicted traffickers to pay restitution to one victim 
during the reporting period. The government did not provide legal 
alternatives to the removal of foreign trafficking victims to countries 
where they may face hardship or retribution. 
PREVENTION
The government modestly increased efforts to prevent trafficking. 
DOJ coordinated the government’s anti-trafficking efforts. During the 
previous reporting period, an executive order created the Division of 
Anti-Human Trafficking within the DOJ; the division was tasked with 
conducting public awareness campaigns, developing anti-trafficking 
training programs, providing victim protection services, and assisting 
in investigations. Each of the four states had an anti trafficking task 
force composed of members of state and national law enforcement, 
the legal community, medical and mental health professionals, 
immigration officials, and women’s empowerment and faith-based 
groups; only Chuuk’s task force was active during the reporting 
period. The government reported it continued to implement its 2014 
NAP and three of the four states had action plans linked to the NAP. 
DOJ conducted a series of awareness activities, both in-person and 
virtual, throughout the four states for a variety of groups including 
government officials, school stakeholders, and church members. Public 
awareness campaigns included radio question and answer programs, 
installation of anti-trafficking billboards and banners in communities, 
a walk organized in conjunction with a trafficking awareness program, 
community distribution of anti-trafficking bumper stickers and t-shirts, 
and a trafficking awareness text message sent to more than 20,000 
cell phone subscribers throughout the FSM. The government did not 
report any efforts to monitor foreign labor recruitment or provide 
information on safe migration and human trafficking indicators to 
Micronesian nationals leaving to work in other countries. While the 
government continued to report conducting awareness campaigns 
focused on destigmatizing individuals in commercial sex and closing 
known brothels, it did not report efforts to reduce the demand for 
commercial sex. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in the FSM, and traffickers exploit victims from 
FSM abroad. Sex traffickers exploit Micronesian women and girls 
through commercial sex with the crewmembers of docked Asian 
fishing vessels, crewmembers on vessels in FSM territorial waters, or 
with foreign construction workers. Some family members exploit 
Micronesian girls in sex trafficking. There are reports of children 
exploited in commercial sex facilitated by taxi drivers. Local authorities 
claim many sex trafficking cases are unreported due to social stigma 
and victims’ fear of possible repercussions in their home communities. 
LGBTQI+ individuals are disproportionately vulnerable to trafficking. 
Foreign and domestic employers in FSM exploit low-skilled foreign 
migrant workers in forced labor, including in restaurants. Foreign 
migrants from Southeast Asian countries report working in conditions 
indicative of human trafficking on Asian fishing vessels in FSM or 
its territorial waters. Traffickers recruit FSM women and men with 
promises of well-paying jobs in the United States and its territories 
but upon their arrival they are subsequently forced into commercial 
sex, domestic servitude, or forced labor. 
MOLDOVA: TIER 2
The Government of Moldova does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Moldova remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
prosecuting more suspected traffickers, developing a new national 
referral mechanism (NRM), opening a center for male trafficking 
victims, and commencing construction of a center for child victims 
and witnesses of crime, including trafficking. The Prosecutors General 
Office (PGO) approved guidelines for identifying, investigating, 
and prosecuting child exploitation cases involving information and 
communication technologies, and the Superior Counsel of Magistrates 
extended the mandates of trafficking-specialized judges from one 
year to five years, increasing judges’ experience and understanding of 
trafficking and creating a more victim-centered judicial environment. 
Additionally, the government passed an amendment to include 
trafficking victims as beneficiaries of state-guaranteed legal aid and to 
return responsibility to the State Labor Inspectorate (SLI) to conduct 
labor inspections as well as regulate employment agencies, recruiters, 
and unlicensed labor agents. However, the government did not meet 
the minimum standards in several key areas. Authorities investigated 
fewer trafficking cases, convicted fewer traffickers, and identified fewer 
trafficking victims. Corruption, particularly in law enforcement and 
the judiciary, impeded prosecutions and influenced the outcomes of 
cases, including cases against complicit officials. The government did 
not report investigating or prosecuting any complicit officials involved 
in trafficking crimes, despite a long history of alleged complicity by 
government employees. Traffickers continued to intimidate victims, 
and authorities provided uneven levels of protection during court 
proceedings. Protection and assistance for child victims remained 
inadequate, and authorities charged children with unlawful acts 
traffickers compelled them to commit. Finally, the lack of long-term 
reintegration support left victims susceptible to re-victimization.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, including 
complicit officials. • Implement measures to address corruption in 
the judicial sector and law enforcement community, including taking 
steps to shield trafficking investigators and prosecutors from external 
influence and internal corruption. • Proactively identify trafficking 





indicators among vulnerable populations and citizens returning to 
Moldova, and refer victims to care facilities for assistance. • Ensure 
trafficking victims, including children, are not inappropriately 
penalized for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit. • 
Exempt all victims from the requirement of in-person confrontations 
with their accused traffickers before an investigation can begin and 
ensure all child victims receive special protection measures during 
trials. • Ensure consistent use of laws and regulations designed to 
protect victims during trial and prosecute perpetrators of witness 
tampering and intimidation to the full extent of the law. • Empower 
authorities to conduct onsite unannounced labor inspections and 
announced inspections regardless of whether authorities receive 
written complaints. • Amend the law to allow authorities to inspect 
facilities when they have suspicions or visual evidence of businesses’ 
involvement in child labor, including forced child labor. • Adopt 
and implement the new NRM. • Increase efforts to identify and 
investigate online sex trafficking and child exploitation. • Train 
police, judges, and prosecutors on a victim-centered approach to 
investigations and prosecutions. • Formalize government oversight 
of private employment agencies, including monitoring for and 
penalizing any recruitment fees charged to applicants. • Develop 
and implement a national action plan for 2021.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Articles 
165 and 206 of the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and 
labor trafficking. The law prescribed penalties of six to 12 years’ 
imprisonment for trafficking offenses involving an adult victim and 
10 to 12 years’ imprisonment for those involving a child victim. 
These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with those for other serious crimes, such 
as rape. Article 168 of the criminal code also criminalized forced 
labor and imposed penalties of up to three years’ imprisonment.
The pandemic severely impeded anti-trafficking efforts, challenging 
police, prosecutors, judges, government coordinating bodies, social 
workers, and civil society organizations. The government implemented 
movement-restriction lockdowns and other social distancing measures 
that limited the activity of all elements of law enforcement. At various 
points throughout the year, state employees, including police and 
prosecutors, worked remotely or on limited schedules. In March 2020, 
the government closed courts and did not reopen them until June 
2020; while closed, courts did not have the capacity to conduct trials 
or hearings online, delaying all proceedings. When trials resumed, 
the need to maintain social distancing reduced the caseload of many 
courts, creating a significant backlog. According to prosecutors, the 
closure of courts affected negatively and significantly the progress 
of all criminal cases, including trafficking cases. Consequently, in 
2020, authorities conducted 65 investigations (35 sex trafficking, 
30 labor trafficking), compared with 153 in 2019 and 223 in 2018. 
The government initiated 96 prosecutions (60 sex trafficking, 36 
labor trafficking), a slight increase from 90 in 2019 and 83 in 
2018. Courts convicted 32 traffickers (22 sex trafficking, 10 labor 
trafficking), compared with 63 in 2019 and 59 in 2018. The majority 
of convicted traffickers received prison sentences ranging from 
seven years to 16 years. Additionally, a district court convicted one 
trafficker for knowingly patronizing or soliciting a trafficking victim 
for commercial sex acts and issued a suspended sentence. During the 
reporting period, authorities cooperated with foreign counterparts 
on trafficking investigations. In one case, Moldovan, Romanian, 
and French authorities set up a joint investigation team to pursue 
a labor trafficking case involving Moldovan nationals in France. 
Authorities arrested 38 traffickers (seven in Moldova); seized 19 
vehicles, weapons, phones, and approximately €100,000 ($122,700) 
in cash; and froze 11 bank accounts. The investigation began in 2018 
when French authorities intercepted a van transporting Moldovan 
migrants, who were carrying counterfeit Romanian documents. 
The transnational trafficking ring, set up by a Romanian national 
living in France, smuggled at least 40 Moldovan citizens to France 
to exploit them in the construction sector. The illegal profits from 
the trafficking scheme totaled nearly €14 million ($17.18 million).
Perennial problems, including high turnover within the police 
and prosecutor’s office, corruption in law enforcement and the 
judiciary, and lengthy trials, undermined government efforts. In 
2020, the government appointed a new commander who had no 
background in trafficking investigations to the Center for Combating 
Trafficking in Persons (CCTIP), the lead anti-trafficking investigative 
and police agency, and reduced the role of the deputy commander. 
Furthermore, CCTIP and the Organized Crime Prosecution Office 
(PCCOCS) continued to suffer from high turnover of experienced staff, 
limiting the agencies’ ability to investigate complex cases, including 
transnational criminal organizations or complicit government 
employees. In 2020, a labor trafficking case involving a border 
police officer from the previous reporting period remained under 
investigation. Apart from that case and despite a long history of 
alleged complicity by government employees, the government did not 
report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government 
employees complicit in human trafficking crimes. Furthermore, 
corruption in the judicial system remained an acute impediment 
to bringing traffickers to justice with prosecutors, members of the 
judiciary, and members of law enforcement implicated in corrupt 
practices. Courts frequently reversed convictions on appeal, sometimes 
without explanation or on weak grounds. Judges tended to re-qualify 
cases from trafficking crimes to crimes with lesser penalties, such as 
pimping, and issue varying sentences to different traffickers for the 
same crimes committed under the same circumstances. Observers 
noted prosecutors sent trafficking cases to court without sufficient 
evidence collection and withheld case files from lawyers representing 
victims. Moreover, lengthy trials impeded justice and often led to the 
acquittal of traffickers. Since final verdicts could take years, and by 
law, authorities could only detain suspects for 12 months, authorities 
released suspected traffickers before trials concluded, enabling them 
to flee the country or retaliate against witnesses.
Prosecutors at every level, from the PGO to regional territorial 
prosecution offices, were responsible for prosecuting trafficking 
crimes. The PGO maintained a unit with specialized prosecutors, who 
coordinated anti-trafficking prosecution policies and supervised the 
work of regional territorial prosecutors when working on trafficking 
cases. The PGO expanded its mandate to investigate child sexual 
exploitation cases involving information and communication 
technologies and approved guidelines for identifying, investigating, 
and prosecuting such cases. Additionally, the PGO worked with an 
international organization to develop a methodology for recovering 
criminal assets and best practices in conducting parallel financial 
investigations. In 2020, prosecutors seized approximately 21 million 
Moldovan lei ($1.23 million) in property, including money, real 
estate, and movable assets, from traffickers, a significant increase from 
1.55 million lei ($90,750) in 2019. PCCOCS also had a specialized 
unit for prosecuting trafficking cases initiated by CCTIP as well 
as cases involving criminal organizations. However, prosecutors 
assigned to PCCOCS lacked experience handling trafficking cases, 
and PCCOCS did not require them to meet any specific qualifications 
for investigating and prosecuting trafficking crimes. The Chisinau 
Prosecutor’s Office maintained an Anti-Trafficking Bureau and 
conducted the prosecution of trafficking cases from Chisinau 
municipality; at the district level, specialized prosecutors conducted 
the prosecution of trafficking cases. Within the judiciary, there 
were specialized judges trained specifically to handle trafficking 
cases. In 2020, the Superior Counsel of Magistrates extended the 
mandates of trafficking-specialized judges from one year to five 
years, increasing these judges’ experience and understanding of 
trafficking and creating a judicial environment more sensitive to 
the needs of victims. In 2020, the government provided more than 
354 law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges; and judiciary 
staff specialized training on investigating, prosecuting, and trying 
trafficking cases. An additional 225 specialists from the Ministry 







received training on identifying and assisting victims of trafficking. 
The National Institute of Justice partnered with an NGO to organize 
two training courses on identifying, investigating, and prosecuting 
crimes committed against children using information technology, 
attended by 28 judges and prosecutors and 36 judicial clerks and 
prosecutors’ assistants. Overall, the government’s ability to fund key 
law enforcement and social protection institutes remained limited. 
As a result, the government relied heavily on donor funding to train 
police, border guards, prosecutors, and judges.
PROTECTION
The government maintained victim protection efforts. According 
to authorities, pandemic-related challenges, including authorities’ 
prioritization of screening for signs of the virus over trafficking 
indicators—particularly between February and April 2020 when a 
wave of Moldovans returned home from Western Europe—severely 
inhibited identification of trafficking victims. Consequently, in 2020 
the government identified 138 trafficking victims (44 sex trafficking, 
94 labor trafficking), a significant decrease from 341 in 2019 and 
364 in 2018. Of the 139 identified victims, 23 were children (20 sex 
trafficking, three labor trafficking), a decrease from 109 in 2019 and 
the lowest number of reported identified child victims since 2011. 
The National Referral Strategy (NRS) governed identification and 
referral procedures but expired in 2016. Thus, in cooperation with 
civil society, the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Social Protection 
developed a new NRM to be implemented in 2021. During the 
reporting period, authorities utilized the current NRS, which observers 
reported lacked policy guidance and hindered efficient identification 
and referral. Under the terms of the NRS, teams of local officials and 
NGOs in all regions of Moldova coordinated victim identification 
and assistance. While the law permitted the local teams to identify 
victims, in practice, victims required law enforcement confirmation 
of identification to access state-funded assistance. Similar to the 
previous reporting period, a limited number of identified victims 
received assistance—51 in 2020, compared with 71 in 2019 and 110 
in 2018. In 2020, law enforcement referred nearly 50 percent of 
victims who received assistance to shelters or NGOs, a rise from 30 
percent in 2019, indicating increased cooperation with civil society.
The government provided short-term shelters and limited financial 
assistance for reintegration, including housing and living allowances. 
Adult victims received assistance in seven government-funded 
centers and shelters across the country, offering medical, legal, 
and psychological assistance, regardless of their cooperation with 
law enforcement. During the reporting period. the government, in 
collaboration with an international organization, opened the first 
center to support male trafficking victims with specialized services, 
including social and rehabilitation services and accommodation for 
up to 10 men. Civil society psychologists and attorneys remained 
the most qualified to assist victims, especially in the regions outside 
of the capital where government social workers frequently lacked 
trafficking-specific training. Observers reported long-term assistance 
for victims, particularly long-term reintegration support such as 
education, counseling, and job-placement, remained a challenge, 
leaving victims at risk of re-victimization. Observers also reported 
overall inadequate resources, including insufficient funding, hampered 
government efforts. In 2020, the government allocated approximately 
12.7 million lei ($743,560) for victim assistance, compared with 
11 million lei ($644,030) in 2019. The government often relied on 
NGOs and international organizations to supplement government 
funding. In contrast to previous years, the government financed 
transportation and escorts for repatriated victims; the government 
also helped repatriated victims access social support services and 
facilitated identity documents for unaccompanied children. In 2020, 
the Ministry of Health, Labor and Social Protection facilitated the 
repatriation of eight adult victims from France and Portugal using 
funds from the state budget. Foreign victims received the same access 
to care as citizens; however, refugees and asylum-seekers received 
assistance in specialized centers under the Migration and Asylum 
Bureau. Observers noted a lack of adequate and immediate social 
support, including, shelter, medical care, and counseling, for foreign 
victims before determination of their legal status. Moldovan law 
permitted foreign victims a 30-day reflection period, during which they 
could receive assistance and protection while determining whether 
to cooperate with law enforcement. Foreign victims who chose 
to cooperate with law enforcement received temporary residency. 
Victims in Transnistria could not access or benefit from Moldovan 
services or legal protections.
There were two referral mechanisms to support child victims: the 
NRS and the Inter-sectorial Collaboration Mechanism for the 
Protection of Children. The latter enabled social services to refer 
children presumed to be at risk of violence, neglect, exploitation, 
or trafficking to law enforcement. Additionally, the Ministry of 
Education, Culture, and Research established a mechanism for 
identifying and reporting child abuse, including trafficking, in state 
institutions. Nonetheless, reports persisted of management in state 
institutions participating in the exploitation of children. The Center 
for Assistance and Protection of Victims of Human Trafficking (CAP) 
assisted child trafficking victims. CAP offered legal, social, and 
psychological assistance, as well as accommodation to child victims. 
In 2020, CAP assisted 10 child victims in the shelter in Chisinau. 
The CAP shelter in Chisinau remained the only facility for child 
victims and provided limited social services for 30 days followed 
by placement into permanent housing and continued counseling 
and assistance. Authorities also placed child victims in foster care, 
orphanages, state residential schools, group homes, or other types of 
temporary residential facilities due to the lack of dedicated facilities. 
However, in 2020, the government began construction of one of 
three new regional centers for integrated assistance for child victims 
and witnesses of crime, including trafficking, designed to provide 
specialized medical, psychological, and social care and allow for 
forensic medical examinations and interviews with trained specialists 
in a safe environment. The government envisioned the first center, 
located in Balti, to serve children from 12 cities and districts across 
northern Moldova and operate under the management of the National 
Center for Prevention of Child Abuse. The government projected the 
remaining two centers in Chisinau and Cahul to serve the center 
and southern part of the country. Civil society reported the lack of 
services for resocialization and reintegration for child victims of 
sexual exploitation put them at a higher risk for institutionalization 
and further trauma. The government financed a 24-hour, NGO-run 
hotline for children, which provided psychological counseling and 
information to parents and children experiencing exploitation.
Overall, the government did not adequately protect victims 
participating in investigations and prosecutions. Law enforcement 
seldom fully informed victims of their rights, and victims did not 
understand court proceedings. The law required adult victims to 
confront their alleged traffickers in person, putting victims at risk for 
re-traumatization and likely deterring victims from reporting crimes. 
In cases involving child victims ages 14 to 18, judges permitted 
traffickers to be present during child interviews and often refused to 
apply special interviewing measures, such as conducting interviews 
in specially equipped rooms and with a psychologist present. Judges 
frequently disregarded laws and regulations designed to protect 
victims during trial proceedings thereby violating victims’ rights and 
allowing traffickers to intimidate some victims in the courtroom such 
that the victims felt pressured to change their testimony. Authorities 
could fine or imprison victims for making false statements if they 
changed their testimony, whether unintentionally due to the trauma 
experienced or deliberately due to bribes or intimidation. In 2020, 
law enforcement opened one investigation for threatening murder 
or grave bodily harm related to witness intimidation and 14 criminal 
investigations for inducing false statements in trafficking cases. In the 
former case, authorities arrested and imprisoned the suspects. A 2020 
amendment to the law on state-guaranteed legal aid added trafficking 
victims to the list of eligible beneficiaries, granting them access to free 
legal assistance without providing proof of indigence; two victims 





continued to rely mostly on NGOs for legal assistance, and NGOs 
relied on donors to fund the services. The State Guaranteed Legal 
Aid Council, in partnership with an international organization, 
developed a trafficking guide with recommendations for legal aid 
lawyers on how to better assist victims. The law allowed victims to 
file for compensation but only if prosecutors filed charges against 
traffickers or cases ended in convictions. In 2020, victims filed 73 civil 
suits. The criminal code exempted trafficking victims from criminal 
liability for committing offenses because of their exploitation. 
However, when authorities classified cases under related statutes, 
such as the article criminalizing forced labor, victims were no longer 
exempt from criminal liability. Similarly, when authorities reclassified 
sex trafficking cases to pimping cases, victims were no longer exempt 
from punishment and could be charged with commercial sex offenses. 
According to an NGO, the government charged five children from 2018 
to 2020 with unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit.
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. The government 
continued to implement the 2018-2020 national action plan (NAP) 
as part of the 2018-2023 national strategy. While the government 
allocated financial and human resources to the NAP, in practice it 
was heavily dependent on assistance from international partners 
for many of its training and support activities. During the reporting 
period, government action on the plan’s objectives stalled; only some 
of the objectives were partially completed, and frequent staff turnover 
at key investigative and prosecution institutions undermined some 
of the plan’s goals. In consultation with civil society, the Permanent 
Secretariat of the National Committee on Combatting Trafficking 
started drafting the 2021-2023 NAP. The Permanent Secretariat 
oversaw the coordination, monitoring, and evaluation of all anti-
trafficking policies. Each municipality and Gagauzia—a Turkic-
speaking autonomous territorial region—maintained a Territorial 
Commission for Combatting Trafficking to coordinate efforts at the 
local level. The commissions composed of local elected officials, 
local law enforcement, prosecutors, and social service providers. In 
collaboration with civil society and international organizations, the 
government executed several awareness campaigns, mostly funded 
by donor assistance, including one on the sexual and commercial 
exploitation of children in vocational schools. However, in 2020 the 
government conducted a series of low-cost awareness raising activities 
funded by the state, including creating a video promoting available 
resources for potential victims. The government funded and operated 
several trafficking hotlines available in Romanian and Russian and 
referred 18 calls to law enforcement for investigation, three of which 
led to prosecutions. The PGO, in coordination with an NGO, created 
a “Guide on Combatting Sexual Abuse and Exploitation of Children 
via Information Technologies” to address the rise in vulnerability 
among children who spent significant amounts of time online as a 
result of the pandemic. The government made efforts to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex acts by developing, in collaboration 
with an NGO, the methodology for a behavioral analysis study of 
convicted child sex offenders.
In 2020, Parliament approved amendments returning responsibility 
to the SLI to conduct occupational safety and health inspections and 
regulate employment agencies, recruiters, and unlicensed labor agents. 
Experts noted this was an important first step toward ensuring the 
functional integrity of the SLI and conforming with international 
labor standards. However, SLI noted limited authority to penalize 
companies for labor law violations and insufficient financial and 
human resources to conduct inspections. Furthermore, due to 
the pandemic, from March to June 2020 the government put a 
moratorium on inspections and related regulatory activities. When 
the moratorium expired, SLI labor inspectors resumed work, though 
in a limited capacity and mostly remotely, conducting inspections 
from their offices. The law limited unannounced labor inspections, 
which were the country’s main mechanism to identify child labor, 
including forced child labor, and permitted authorities to conduct 
onsite inspections provided they received written complaints and 
gave businesses five days’ notice, giving traffickers opportunity to 
evade detection. During inspections, authorities could only focus 
on the alleged violation outlined in the complaint, even if they 
identified other egregious violations, such as forced child labor. 
The law prohibited authorities from inspecting facilities, even when 
they had suspicions or visual evidence of businesses’ involvement in 
child labor, including forced child labor. Due to these restrictions, 
government and NGO sources reported the child labor violations 
identified by the government did not reflect the scale of the country’s 
problem. In 2020, the government removed four children from 
potential child labor situations, and the SLI did not identify any 
cases of forced labor, debt bondage, or slavery. Moreover, there 
was no mechanism to conduct labor inspections, including for 
child labor and forced child labor, in Transnistria. The government 
reported conducting 305 unannounced labor inspections in 2020. 
Private employers could only be inspected upon referrals from law-
enforcement bodies or complaints received from private citizens. 
A report based on a national information campaign on the risks 
of labor trafficking noted law enforcement was slow to investigate 
private employment agencies.
Observers noted the general lax oversight and control of private 
recruitment agencies, particularly those offering foreign job 
opportunities, as a key trafficking vulnerability. The amendments 
to the law allowing SLI to regulate private recruitment agencies 
included requiring recruiters to provide transparent, legally binding 
contracts for prospective workers. Agencies in violation of the law 
faced criminal charges for trafficking, among other penalties. The 
National Agency for Employment provided information on the 
benefits of a registered employment contract between employees and 
employers and the risks of illegal employment abroad. The agency 
also conducted information sessions on safe migration. Moldovan 
law prohibited agencies from charging recruitment fees or taxes 
to job seekers. During the reporting period, Moldova established 
bilateral work agreements with Israel and Bulgaria to allow Moldovan 
workers to be recruited under a government-sponsored framework 
to perform migrant labor in those two countries, protect workers’ 
rights, and prevent exploitation. Moldova’s public procurement law 
banned government agencies from contracting with any person or 
company convicted of trafficking crimes or child labor violations 
in the previous five years. In 2020, the Ministry of Finance issued 
updated guidance on public tenders that included a mechanism to 
exclude any economic agent involved in trafficking or child labor. The 
criminal laws against trafficking included penalties for individuals 
or companies profiting from trafficking.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Moldova, and traffickers exploit victims 
from Moldova abroad. Traffickers typically recruit victims through 
personal contacts but, due to the pandemic, increasingly use the 
internet and social media. Most victims are from rural areas and 
have low levels of education. Traffickers exploit Moldovan victims 
in sex trafficking and labor trafficking within Moldova and in other 
parts of Europe, particularly Russia. Victims of sex trafficking are 
overwhelmingly women and girls. Traffickers operating in Romania 
and Moldova exploit Moldovan women and girls through Romania 
with fraudulent passports in trafficking operations across Europe. 
Children are exploited in online child pornography, which experts 
note is used as a grooming method for sex trafficking. Cases involving 
child victims were mostly sex trafficking cases occurring in Chisinau. 
Traffickers exploit children, some as young as 10, in commercial sex 
and child labor, mostly in agriculture, construction, service, and 
industrial sectors. Children living on the street or in orphanages 
or abandoned by parents migrating abroad remain vulnerable to 
exploitation. Observers express concern that corrupt management in 
state institutions exploit children in domestic services or on farms. 
Labor trafficking remains the most prevalent form of exploitation 
among adult male victims. Labor migrants remain at risk of trafficking, 







The undocumented or stateless population, including the Roma 
community, within Moldova are at risk of exploitation, primarily in 
the agricultural sector. The breakaway region of Transnistria remains 
a predominate source for sex trafficking victims. Women from the 
Gagauzia Autonomous Territory are vulnerable to sex trafficking in 
Turkey. Official complicity in trafficking continues to be a significant 
problem in Moldova.
MONGOLIA: TIER 2
The Government of Mongolia does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Mongolia remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
investigating, prosecuting, and convicting significantly more 
traffickers, including in relation to alleged forced labor crimes; 
improving coordination among ministries and with key international 
and NGO stakeholders; and repatriating more victims than the 
previous reporting period. However, the government did not meet 
the minimum standards in several key areas. For at least the ninth 
consecutive year, the government did not formally identify any male 
victims. Police continued to penalize some child sex trafficking victims 
under commercial sex offenses, rather than formally identifying 
and referring them to protection services. Law enforcement officers 
found guilty of facilitating trafficking crimes received administrative 
sanctions, rather than facing criminal charges for their complicity. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking offenses—
including those allegedly committed or facilitated by law enforcement 
officials, and in partnership with law enforcement counterparts in 
common destination countries—using Articles 12.3 and 13.1 of the 
criminal code, rather than under alternative administrative or criminal 
provisions that prescribe significantly lower penalties. • Increase 
efforts to detect, investigate, prosecute, and secure convictions for 
forced labor crimes. • Amend relevant laws to ensure victims’ access 
to protection services regardless of whether officials initiate formal 
criminal proceedings against their alleged traffickers. • Systematize 
and fully implement formal procedures to guide government officials, 
including police, immigration, and labor authorities, in victim 
identification and referral to protective services—especially among 
men and boys; foreign workers; domestic and foreign nationals 
transiting major border crossing areas; domestic coal transport 
workers exploited or abused by Chinese employers; women and 
children living in mining communities; and LGBTQI+ persons. • 
Strengthen inter-ministerial coordination to combat trafficking and 
protect its victims. • Amend Articles 16.1 and 16.4 of the criminal 
code to increase prescribed penalties such that they are in line with 
penalties for other child trafficking crimes. • Cease all penalization of 
child sex trafficking victims. • Amend relevant legislation to explicitly 
prohibit employers, recruiters, and labor agents from charging workers 
recruitment fees, confiscating their identity or travel documentation, 
switching their contracts without consent, and withholding their 
wages as a means of coerced retention. • Allocate additional resources 
for, and increase efforts to train officials on, implementation of anti-
trafficking provisions of the criminal code, especially among rural 
prosecutors’ offices. • Allocate increased funding to support and 
expand both government and NGO-run shelters and other forms 
of tailored victim assistance and protection, including for male 
victims and children. • Expand the availability of assistance funds 
to all Mongolian victims identified abroad, regardless of what type 
of trafficking crime they suffer. • Strengthen efforts to monitor the 
working conditions of foreign laborers employed in Mongolia and 
screen them for labor trafficking indicators, including by increasing 
funding, resources, and training for labor inspectors and allowing 
them to conduct unannounced inspections. 
PROSECUTION
The government increased law enforcement efforts. Article 13.1 of 
the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking; it 
prescribed penalties of two to eight years’ imprisonment for offenses 
involving an adult victim, and five to 12 years’ imprisonment for 
those involving a child victim. These penalties were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. Article 12.3 of 
the criminal code criminalized sexual exploitation offenses, including 
some forms of sex trafficking; penalties ranged from two to eight 
years’ imprisonment for trafficking offenses involving individuals 
older than the age of 14, and 12 to 20 years’ imprisonment for 
those involving children younger than the age of 14. As in prior 
years, authorities sometimes prosecuted trafficking crimes under 
statutes carrying lesser penalties. Articles 16.1 and 16.4 criminalized 
“inducing a child to the committing of a crime” and “forcing a 
child into begging,” respectively; they both prescribed penalties of 
a travel ban for one to five years or one to five years’ imprisonment. 
In previous years, some prosecutors reportedly charged child forced 
begging cases as misdemeanors, rather than as criminal offenses. 
Observers noted complex case initiation and referral procedures, 
coupled with restrictions on contact between anti-trafficking police 
and prosecutors, at times hindered investigations and prosecutions. 
The government frequently redirected law enforcement resources 
and personnel to contain the pandemic, at times interrupting certain 
anti-trafficking efforts. Despite this change, arrests, investigations, 
and judicial proceedings continued. During the reporting period, the 
government initiated 36 sex trafficking investigations involving at least 
49 alleged perpetrators (compared with 10 investigations involving 24 
alleged perpetrators in 2019). Eleven of these investigations resulted 
from police raids on saunas, massage parlors, hotels, karaoke bars, 
and other venues suspected of facilitating commercial sex, as well 
as from police monitoring of sex solicitation on social media. The 
National Police Agency (NPA) maintained an anti-trafficking unit, 
which conducted eight of these investigations (compared with 10 
in 2019). Sixteen investigations of alleged sex trafficking crimes 
initiated in the previous reporting period were ongoing. Unlike in 
2019, authorities initiated a new investigation into a case of alleged 
forced labor during the reporting period; the case involved three 
Burmese nationals reportedly coerced to work without pay through 
threats of deportation. Three forced labor investigations initiated 
prior to 2019 and one investigation into a possible case of forced 
child begging initiated in 2019 remained in process at the end of the 
reporting period. As in previous years, authorities did not initiate 
any new prosecutions of alleged forced labor crimes; however, they 
newly prosecuted a total of 21 defendants for alleged sex trafficking 
crimes, including four defendants under Article 12.3 and 17 under 
Article 13.1 (compared to three and six, respectively, in 2019). 
Proceedings against 40 defendants whose prosecutions began in 2019 
were ongoing at the end of the reporting period. Courts convicted 18 
individuals under anti-trafficking articles in 2020—17 under Article 
13.1 and one under Article 12.3—compared to a total of 12 in 2019; 
courts did not secure any convictions of labor traffickers (compared 
with three in 2019). Courts also convicted two individuals under 
Article 12.6 (“organizing prostitution”); authorities did not provide 
sufficient detail to ascertain whether these cases featured trafficking 
elements according to international definitional standards. Unlike 






under Articles 16.1 or 16.4. The government did not report full 
sentencing data, but officials reported courts sentenced 17 traffickers 
to prison terms ranging from five to 26 years’ imprisonment under 
Article 13.1 and one trafficker to seven years’ imprisonment under 
Article 12.3—a significant increase from 12 traffickers convicted 
and sentenced to prison terms ranging from five to eight years in 
2019. The government did not provide information on restitution 
payments to victims as part of sentencing (compared with 798,400 
Mongolian tugriks (MNT), or $280, to at least one victim in 2019). 
Due to the misconception among many government officials that 
traffickers only exploit women and girls, authorities rarely used 
Articles 13.1 or 12.3 to prosecute cases in which traffickers targeted 
male victims and instead used provisions with less stringent penalties. 
The government continued organizing, facilitating, and providing 
funding and in-kind support for specialized training courses for law 
enforcement officers and social workers on trafficking. However, law 
enforcement authorities noted judiciary officials’ general unfamiliarity 
with trafficking-specific provisions of the criminal code continued 
to lead to lesser charges in some cases. Contacts described an acute 
need for additional training, resources, and dedicated personnel 
to properly handle trafficking cases. Mongolia maintained mutual 
legal assistance agreements with China, Thailand, and Malaysia. 
Law enforcement authorities continued to share information and 
cooperate on an ad hoc basis with anti-trafficking counterparts in 
the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region of China. 
In September, a police officer aided the owner of a massage parlor in 
abusing and coercing the continued labor of three Burmese nationals 
through threats of deportation; in response, the NPA issued an 
administrative sanction barring the police officer from promotions 
or transfers for one year but did not seek criminal liability for the 
officer’s complicity in forced labor. As in prior years, authorities did 
not report any criminal investigations, prosecutions, or convictions 
of government employees complicit in trafficking offenses.
PROTECTION
The government increased efforts to protect victims. Mongolia 
maintained a National Anti-Trafficking Program (2017-2021) and 
work plan aimed at improving prevention and protection efforts; 
the government continued to operate on a budget of 509 million 
MNT ($178,610) allocated in 2019 to implement this program 
(709 million MNT ($248,790) in 2018 and no funding in 2017). 
However, the government redirected portions of this budget to 
respond to the pandemic. In previous years, this budget allocation 
allowed border authorities to use immigration software to screen for 
trafficking indicators among hundreds of Mongolian children traveling 
internationally with and without their parents or legal guardians; 
as pandemic mitigation closures largely prevented the crossing of 
international borders during the reporting period, no victims were 
identified or prevented from leaving the country using this software 
in 2020 (compared with 105 interdictions in 2019 and none in 2018). 
The government also allocated 30 million MNT ($10,530) to fund 
the primary service provider NGO’s activities in shelter provision, 
psycho-social and medical care, and legal assistance. In October, 
Mongolia’s cabinet approved a resolution to increase the 2021 budget 
for child welfare by 2.5 billion MNT ($877,260) and to more than 
triple the number of child protection officers working nationwide.
NGOs continued to provide the vast majority of Mongolia’s limited 
victim services, in some cases with government assistance. Two 
shelters run by an NGO were the main victim service providers in 
the country; only one could accommodate male victims, and neither 
was accessible to persons with disabilities. The government ran at 
least two shelters that housed trafficking victims alongside victims 
of domestic violence and other forms of abuse; only one shelter 
was designated solely for trafficking victims, and contacts reported 
child sex trafficking victims experienced further sexual abuse within 
two of these shelters due to poor oversight and lack of specialized 
care. NPA investigators reported using a trafficking risk assessment 
checklist containing 11 questions to identify victims; however, use 
of this checklist was sporadic, and the process did not include 
screening of vulnerable groups. In practice, NGOs indicated victim 
identification and referral procedures were vague, not sufficiently 
systematic, and often depended largely on the awareness and initiative 
of individual officers. 
Authorities did not maintain complete statistical records on victim 
identification or service provision. Redirection of human and 
financial resources to the pandemic response at times negatively 
affected the capacity of front-line officers to identify victims of 
trafficking, particularly among child victims of forced labor. Neither 
the government nor the primary service provider NGO identified 
any male victims during the reporting period, despite continued 
NGO reports of the prevalence of trafficking among men and boys. 
However, unlike the previous year, the government collaborated 
with an NGO on the identification of foreign victims of forced 
labor. According to available data, police identified 40 female 
trafficking victims, including 24 girls – a decrease from 20 girls and 
48 adult women identified in 2019 (20 total victims identified in 
2018). Observers ascribed this decrease to the closure of businesses 
traditionally associated with commercial sex as a public health 
measure during the pandemic, which complicated law enforcement 
detection of some trafficking crimes. Authorities referred as many as 
41 Mongolian victims to NGO shelter services during the reporting 
period—a significant increase from five referrals in 2019—although 
some of these may have originated from other NGOs or victims’ 
personal relationships. Police separately referred three potential 
child victims to government shelter services. With funding from the 
government, the primary service provider NGO reported assisting 
46 potential victims, including 43 Mongolians and three Burmese 
nationals (compared with 34 Mongolian sex trafficking victims 
in 2019). Immigration authorities granted the Burmese nationals 
temporary residency status until they were ready to repatriate. The 
NGO also provided 24 victims with pro-bono legal assistance during 
the reporting period (compared with 11 in 2019). The same NGO 
in turn formally supplied information on 13 cases involving 39 of 
the victims to the NPA for criminal investigations into the relevant 
suspects (compared with 12 cases involving 20 victims in 2019). 
The NPA’s Victim and Witness Protection Department reportedly 
staffed psychologists who were equipped to handle domestic violence 
cases, but they did not provide information on services provided to 
trafficking victims in 2020 (no services rendered in 2019). In previous 
years, NGOs conducted screenings for at-risk women and girls at a 
key border crossing with China, at times advising some of them not 
to travel and providing them with information on available assistance 
options. Amid comprehensive border closures and travel bans during 
the pandemic, much of this work was suspended. 
Article 8.1 of the criminal procedural code included language that 
reportedly denied trafficking victims’ access to protective services 
until prosecutors had initiated cases against their alleged traffickers, 
thereby obstructing access to protective services for some victims. In 
practice, some officials claimed victims were able to access protection 
services regardless of whether relevant prosecutions had begun. In 
an effort to address this ambiguity in 2018, the Ministry of Justice 
and Home Affairs (MOJHA) created a working group and instituted 
an intra-governmental comment period to consider amendments to 
the Law on Victim and Witness Protection. However, for the second 
consecutive year, authorities did not report on the outcome, status, or 
projected timeframe of that review process. Some trafficking victims 
may have experienced delays in or denials of access to protection 
services while awaiting the results of mandatory COVID-19 screening 
procedures. Article 15 of the anti-trafficking law stipulated victims were 
entitled to compensation for damages wrought by their traffickers, 
but officials and non-governmental observers agreed inconsistencies 
between the criminal code and the civil code made this provision 
impossible to fully implement. Mongolia’s Immigration Agency, the 
General Authority for Border Protection (GABP), and the Consular 
Department within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) shared 








victims abroad. The latter maintained a fund to assist Mongolian 
victims, but it was only available in cases involving organized 
crime syndicates or “grave harm” – a distinction that was unclear in 
application. In 2020, authorities partnered with NGOs to repatriate 
15 Mongolian victims from Malaysia, compared with one each from 
China, Kyrgyzstan, and the Philippines in 2019. 
Mongolia’s Law on Petty Offenses, which allowed authorities to 
detain anyone apprehended on suspicion of commercial sex crimes 
for seven to 30 days, reportedly continued to place some victims 
at risk of penalization for unlawful acts their traffickers compelled 
them to commit. Following a series of raids conducted during the 
reporting period, authorities fined two girls under prostitution 
provisions of the Law on Petty Offenses (compared with none in 
2019). Contacts also noted some victims were hesitant to self-report 
or testify due to fear that they may face prosecution for such crimes. 
Mongolian law did not provide legal alternatives to the removal of 
foreign victims to countries in which they could face retribution or 
hardship. The Immigration Agency did not provide comprehensive 
deportation statistics for 2020 (compared with more than 1,500 
foreign nationals deported to 26 countries in 2019), but the volume 
was likely significantly lower given pandemic-related travel restrictions 
and border closures. The adequacy of screening procedures was 
difficult to gauge amid limited deportations in 2020, but screening 
procedures in previous years were neither universally implemented 
nor sufficient to detect all forms of trafficking. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. Authorities 
postponed or curtailed some elements of anti-trafficking training, 
funding, and general interagency coordination as a result of the 
pandemic. The government also redirected over half of funding 
previously allocated for the National Anti-Trafficking Program (2017-
2021) and corresponding work plan to pandemic prevention activities. 
Under the management of a National Sub-Council, the program 
aimed to provide technical guidance on trafficking prevention and 
coordinate interagency efforts to implement relevant legislation; some 
contacts continued to express concern over insufficient interagency 
coordination, but the government sought expertise and resources 
from international donors and NGOs in an attempt to address this 
shortcoming. In conjunction with international organizations, the 
government conducted three trafficking-related research programs 
during the reporting period—an assessment on Mongolia’s anti-
trafficking legislation, an analysis of risk factors among trafficking 
victims in Mongolia, and a study on child victimization through 
social media channels—but it did not provide information on the 
outcome of these studies or their utilization. In 2019 the Family, 
Child, and Youth Development Agency began assembling a large 
database containing information on at-risk populations, and it worked 
with an international organization to establish multidisciplinary 
committees focusing on at-risk children’s rights and protections 
at the district and provincial capital levels; however, authorities 
did not provide information on the status of this work in 2020. 
A portion of government funding for the primary service provider 
NGO supported the maintenance of a hotline system; although 
five potential victims were identified through the hotline, the calls 
did not result in trafficking investigations (compared with one sex 
trafficking investigation in 2019). Officials continued to disseminate 
a daily trafficking-themed public service announcement (PSA) on 
social media and television. In partnership with the Government 
of South Korea, the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection (MLSP) 
continued to produce materials raising awareness on trafficking. 
Mongolian officials also participated in international training sessions 
on sex trafficking prevention under a four-year agreement with the 
Government of South Korea. 
The MLSP’s General Agency for Labor and Social Welfare had the 
authority to monitor labor agreements for foreign nationals working 
in Mongolia, as well as those for Mongolians working in countries 
that had bilateral work agreements with Mongolia. The government 
maintained such agreements with South Korea, Czech Republic, and 
Japan; observers noted these agreements were not always sufficiently 
implemented to prevent labor abuses, including trafficking. The 
General Authority for Specialized Investigation (GASI) had the 
authority to inspect labor contracts, monitor compliance with the 
law for all workers in Mongolia, and conduct inspections of working 
conditions in Mongolian formal sector establishments. In prior years, 
officials and NGOs noted funding and resources for the inspectors 
were too low to provide comprehensive oversight, and the government 
did not report statistics on, or the outcomes of, these inspections. 
Moreover, GASI was required to give employers five days’ advance 
notification before conducting an inspection in most cases, raising 
concerns that employers may have been able to conceal violations 
in the interim. In 2019 authorities reportedly began a formal process 
to consider amendments outlining unannounced inspections, but 
the process did not culminate in the introduction or passage of any 
such amendments for the second consecutive year. Officials stated 
redirection of human and financial resources in response to the 
pandemic constrained inspection activities. Observers noted the 
government did not take adequate measures to monitor or protect the 
labor rights of Mongolian truckers facing a range of vulnerabilities—
including wage garnishing, arbitrary fines, injuries, and substandard 
living and working conditions—stemming from prolonged customs 
delays on the Chinese border and abusive policies set by attendant 
Chinese employers. For the second consecutive year, and despite the 
marked increase in reported commission of commercial sex at private 
residences and other nontraditional sex-on-site establishments during 
the pandemic, the government did not report taking measures to 
reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. Contrary to international 
standards, the government did not explicitly prohibit employers, 
recruiters, and labor agents from charging workers recruitment fees, 
confiscating their identity or travel documentation, switching their 
contracts without consent, or withholding their wages as a means 
of coerced retention. To improve regulation of recruitment practices 
according to international standards, the government collaborated 
with an international organization to draft revised labor legislation; 
the draft remained in process at the end of the reporting period. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Mongolia, and they exploit victims from 
Mongolia abroad. Traffickers may also use Mongolia as a transit 
point to exploit foreign individuals in sex trafficking and forced 
labor in Russia and China. Traffickers exploit Mongolian men, 
women, and children in forced labor in China, India, Kazakhstan, 
Norway, Sweden, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, and in sex 
trafficking in Belgium, Cambodia, China, Germany, Hong Kong, 
Japan, Macau, Malaysia, Philippines, South Korea, Sweden, Turkey, 
and the United States, as well as in Mongolia. Traffickers sometimes 
use drugs, fraudulent social networking, online job opportunities, 
or English language programs to lure Mongolian victims into sex 
trafficking. Most sex trafficking of Mongolian victims from rural and 
poor economic areas occurs in Ulaanbaatar, provincial centers, and 
border areas. A recent civil society survey found domestic violence 
drives the vast majority of Mongolian trafficking victims to seek 
and accept unsafe employment opportunities on which traffickers 
prey; this vulnerability has reportedly increased as a result of state-
ordered residential quarantines amid the pandemic. During periods 
of pandemic-related business closures, clandestine sex trafficking in 
private residences is reportedly increasing, including through the use 
of blackmail on social media as a coercive method. Traffickers exploit 
women and girls in sex trafficking in Mongolian massage parlors, 
illegal brothels, hotels, bars, and karaoke clubs, sometimes through 
the permissive facilitation of local police. LGBTQI+ individuals 
are vulnerable to trafficking amid widespread discrimination that 
often jeopardizes their employment status and complicates their 
access to justice. Transgender women in particular are at higher 
risk of sex trafficking due to pervasive social stigma barring them 
from employment in the formal sector. Mongolian communities 






especially women and informal sector workers- are more vulnerable 
to sex trafficking and forced labor. Tourists from Japan and South 
Korea reportedly engaged in child sex tourism in Mongolia in prior 
years; some civil society groups believe this practice persists.
The ongoing development of the mining industry in southern 
Mongolia continues to drive growing internal and international 
migration, intensifying trafficking vulnerabilities – especially along 
the China-Mongolia border. Truck drivers transporting coal across 
the Chinese border in Omnogovi Province are often more vulnerable 
to labor traffickers due to an arrangement under which employers 
confiscate their passports as collateral for their vehicles. These 
drivers often wait in truck lines with minimal sleep, heating, or 
access to basic needs for weeks or months at a time until they receive 
permission to cross and make deliveries in China, where Chinese 
employers and customers impose wage deductions for the delays; 
this loss of income reportedly makes them further vulnerable to 
labor exploitation. The families of coal transporters who are delayed 
at the border, who are injured, or who die as a result of the poor 
working conditions may also be vulnerable to sex trafficking due to 
ensuing economic hardships. Traffickers exploit women and girls 
in sex trafficking in these border crossing truck lines, along the coal 
transport roads connecting mining sites to the Chinese border, at 
nightlife establishments in mining towns, and at entertainment sites 
across the border in Inner Mongolia. Mining workers sometimes 
leave their children at home alone while on extended shift rotations, 
during which time the children are at elevated risk of sex trafficking. 
Sex trafficking and child forced labor also occur in connection with 
artisanal mining.
Traffickers force some children to beg, steal, or work in other informal 
sectors of the economy, such as horseracing, herding and animal 
husbandry, scavenging in garbage dumpsites, and construction. Some 
families are complicit in exploiting children in sex trafficking and 
forced labor. In previous years, traffickers have forced Mongolian girls 
to work as contortionists—often under contractual agreements signed 
by their parents—primarily in Mongolia and Turkey, and to a lesser 
extent in Hong Kong and Singapore. Mongolian boys are at high risk 
of forced labor and sex trafficking under visa regimes that enable 
them to work indefinitely as horse jockeys and circus performers 
across the Chinese border, provided they return with a chaperone 
once a month; this frequent facilitated transit also makes them more 
vulnerable to trafficking. Traffickers compel women and girls to work 
in domestic service and engage in commercial sex acts after entering 
into commercially brokered marriages with men from China and, 
to a lesser extent, Korea. Mongolians stranded abroad as a result of 
pandemic-related travel restrictions may have been at elevated risk 
of sex trafficking and forced labor due to immigration statuses that 
prevent them from seeking employment in host countries’ formal 
sector economies. Chinese companies hire Mongolian men and 
boys to work at agricultural operations for compensation far below 
minimum wage and under ambiguous immigration status, placing 
them at high risk of trafficking. Some micro-lending institutions in 
China reportedly retain Mongolians’ passports as a form of collateral, 
leaving them vulnerable to immigration status-related coercion.
Chinese workers employed in Mongolia are vulnerable to trafficking 
as contract laborers in construction, manufacturing, agriculture, 
forestry, fishing, hunting, wholesale and retail trade, automobile 
maintenance, and mining. Some of them experience contract switching 
when they enter the country, making them especially vulnerable to 
coercion due to resultant immigration violations. Some Russian 
and Ukrainian women entering Mongolia through Chinese border 
crossings for short visits under visa-free regimes may be sex trafficking 
victims. Observers report corruption among some Mongolian officials 
facilitates sex trafficking in illicit establishments and impedes the 
government’s anti-trafficking efforts.
MONTENEGRO: TIER 2 
The Government of Montenegro does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Montenegro remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
indicting more defendants and identifying more victims. The 
government adopted standard operating procedures (SOPs) for 
the Team for Formal Identification of Trafficking Victims (TFITV), 
which assessed and officially recognized potential victims, and 
added a psychologist from an NGO to the TFITV. The government 
increased resources to the anti-trafficking shelter (the shelter) and 
established a coordinating body to monitor the implementation of 
the national anti-trafficking strategy for 2019-2024. However, the 
government did not meet the minimum standards in several key 
areas. The government investigated fewer suspects and convicted fewer 
traffickers. Police refused to refer a victim to support services due to 
pandemic mitigation measures and required the victim to quarantine 
for 28 days, during which the victim faced domestic violence. The 
government did not appoint a new national coordinator, and the 
shelter’s staff lacked experience in victim assistance, particularly 
victim confidentiality; the shelter often published photos of victims 
on social media with censored faces but identifiable characteristics, 
such as clothes and location.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers under Article 
444 of the criminal code. • Establish victim confidentiality and privacy 
measures at the shelter and ensure the shelter adheres to high victim 
protection standards, including sustainably spending resources. • 
Establish and implement procedures to identify and refer victims 
safely and quickly, while adhering to pandemic mitigation measures. • 
Provide advanced training to judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement 
on trafficking investigations and prosecutions, including collecting 
evidence on subtle forms of coercion or the use of specialized 
investigative techniques. • Increase proactive screening of potential 
victims, especially for individuals in commercial sex, migrants, 
seasonal workers, and children engaged in begging. • Increase access 
to justice and victim-witness protection for victims, including access to 
experienced attorneys and protection from intimidation and threats. 
• Incentivize and encourage victim participation in investigations 
and prosecutions in a victim-centered manner. • Integrate Romani 
groups into decision-making processes regarding victim protection. 
• Create and finance an accessible compensation fund and inform 
victims of their right to compensation during legal proceedings. • 
Regulate and monitor labor recruitment agencies. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Article 444 of 
the criminal code criminalized labor trafficking and sex trafficking 
and prescribed penalties ranging from one to 10 years’ imprisonment, 
which were sufficiently stringent and commensurate with those 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Law enforcement 
investigated four cases (seven in 2019). The government indicted 
five defendants (two in 2019) and continued to prosecute five 








one trafficker (two in 2019) and acquitted two individuals. Judges 
sentenced the trafficker to 10 years’ imprisonment for forced begging 
(one trafficker received 17 years’ imprisonment and the other 14 
years’ imprisonment for sex trafficking in 2019). 
The government maintained a multi-disciplinary task force to 
proactively investigate trafficking. The Department of the Suppression 
of Criminal Offenses of Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling 
(DSCOTPS) within the Police Directorate (PD) conducted proactive 
investigations. Law enforcement conducted raids on bars, nightclubs, 
commercial sex sites, escort agencies, and businesses suspected of 
illegal employment practices, but these raids did not result in any 
trafficking investigations in 2019 or 2020. In previous years, authorities 
investigated and prosecuted possible sex trafficking cases under 
other offenses, such as brokering in prostitution (Article 210). Basic 
State Prosecutor’s Offices (BSPO) stopped some potential trafficking 
investigations when they secured enough evidence to prosecute 
under Article 210 and did not investigate for more subtle forms of 
coercion or seek additional evidence through specialized investigative 
techniques; however, the government changed case referral procedures 
in 2019 by requiring the Higher State Prosecutor’s Office (HSPO) 
to initially review all trafficking-related cases and refer cases not 
deemed as trafficking to BSPO. The government did not report any 
investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees 
complicit in trafficking. The government maintained institutionalized 
training programs for police, prosecutors, and judges on various anti-
trafficking issues. The government continued an ongoing trafficking 
investigation with Taiwan authorities, including legal assistance and 
extradition of a suspect to Taiwan. 
PROTECTION
The government increased victim protection efforts. The government 
identified 48 official victims (39 official victims in 2019). Of these, 
46 were victims of forced labor, including seven victims of forced 
begging, and two were victims of sex trafficking (all were victims 
of forced labor in 2019); 17 were females and 31 were males (12 
females and 27 males in 2019); and seven were children (none in 
2019). First responders carried out the preliminary identification of 
possible victims and then contacted police who formally recognized 
the individuals as potential victims. Police officers proactively 
screened foreign nationals and individuals in commercial sex for 
indicators of trafficking. In previous years, observers reported that 
the low number of identified victims reflected inadequate victim 
identification procedures. The government established TFITV to 
assess and officially recognize potential victims and coordinate 
victim care and placement, and it drafted new SOPs for identifying 
and referring victims to services in 2019, including eliminating the 
requirement for victims to cooperate with law enforcement in order 
to receive services. TFITV comprises a doctor, a psychologist from 
the Women’s Rights Center, police, a social worker from the Center 
for Social Work, and a representative from the Office for the Fight 
against Trafficking in Persons (TIP office). In October 2020, the 
government adopted the SOPs and added a psychologist from an 
NGO to TFITV after civil society organizations voiced their interest 
in participating in the victim identification process; TFITV met 19 
times and conducted nine field missions. The government provided 
training on victim identification and assistance to police, labor 
inspectors, health workers, social workers, and members of TFITV. 
However, observers reported an NGO worker identified a potential 
foreign victim in March 2020, but police refused to initiate the 
referral process without an approval from a health and sanitation 
inspector and threatened the victim and NGO worker with charges 
for not complying with pandemic mitigation measures. A health 
and sanitation inspector subsequently required the potential foreign 
victim and NGO worker to quarantine for 28 days, during which 
the potential foreign victim faced domestic violence. An NGO-run 
shelter housed the potential foreign victim in April 2020, and after 
persistent advocacy, DSCOTPS started an investigation and transferred 
the victim to the shelter in June 2020. 
In 2019, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) transferred funding 
responsibilities for victim protection to the Ministry of Finance and 
Social Welfare (MFSW), which subsequently defunded the only NGO-
run shelter due to its inability to obtain necessary licenses to provide 
victim assistance. MFSW opened a call for proposals to establish a 
new shelter and selected an NGO with the necessary licenses. The 
MFSW allocated €67,530 ($82,860) to the shelter, including €40,000 
($49,080) for operational costs and €250 ($310) per month for 
each victim accommodated at the shelter, an increase compared 
with €40,000 ($49,080) in 2019. The shelter provided specialized 
services for both potential and officially recognized trafficking victims, 
including immediate needs, health care, psycho-social support, 
legal assistance, and reintegration assistance; the shelter housed 
14 victims in 2020 (two in 2019). The shelter purchased personal 
protective equipment (PPE) and COVID-19 tests and adopted social 
distancing measures, including separate rooms for victims awaiting 
COVID-19 test results. DSCOTPS also donated disinfectants and 
PPE to NGOs and the shelter. The shelter could accommodate 
six victims up to a year, including adult males, adult females, and 
children, in separate living quarters. Adult victims could leave the 
shelter after a security and psychosocial evaluation by shelter staff. 
MFSW operated local social and welfare centers and two regional 
institutions, which provided general services for victims of abuse, 
including trafficking victims. A self-administered evaluation of the 
shelter’s support services concluded beneficiaries and visitors of 
the shelter were satisfied with the quality of care, staff, and facility. 
However, other experts reported concerns with the shelter staff’s lack 
of experience in victim protection, including unnecessary operational 
costs and victim confidentiality concerns. For example, the shelter 
often published photos of victims on social media with censored 
faces but identifiable characteristics, such as clothes and location. 
There were no reports the government penalized victims for crimes 
their traffickers compelled them to commit. The law allowed foreign 
victims to acquire temporary residence permits from three months to 
one year with the ability to extend; no victims applied for temporary 
residence permits in 2019 or 2020. The government cooperated with 
authorities from Kosovo and Serbia to repatriate foreign victims. The 
law provided witness protection, free legal aid, and a psychologist to 
participate in prosecutions. However, observers continued to report 
that the government assigned lawyers with little or no experience to 
victims; one victim received free legal aid, and all victims assisted in 
investigations. Prosecutors continued to implement victim-centered 
approaches for victims who participated in court proceedings, 
particularly child victims. For example, a child victim testified in 
the presence of a social worker with audio/visual equipment, while 
in a separate room from their perpetrator. However, observers 
reported police failed to protect a potential victim from intimidation 
and threats to change her testimony from her at-large perpetrator 
in 2019. Judges did not issue restitution in criminal cases, and 
observers reported some prosecutors did not know they could 
make claims during criminal proceedings. No victim has received 
compensation in civil proceedings, and the law on compensation 
of victims intended to provide financial assistance to victims of 
violent crimes will not go into effect until Montenegro becomes 
a member of the EU. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. The government 
implemented the national anti-trafficking strategy for 2019-2024 
and the national action plan (NAP) for 2020. The government 
established a coordination body for monitoring the implementation 
of the strategy and NAP, which is composed of PD, HSPO, MOI, 
and the Ministry of Justice, Human, and Minority Rights, but it 
met only twice in person, with additional online coordination. 
The government allocated €152,000 ($186,500) to the TIP office 
within the MOI, compared with €155,250 ($190,490) in 2019. The 
national coordinator led the TIP office and overall anti-trafficking 
efforts and chaired the trafficking in persons working group, which 





the international community. The TIP office published information 
on anti-trafficking efforts, but, in previous years, experts reported 
difficulties in sharing and obtaining information from relevant 
government actors, and it was unclear if information coordination had 
improved. The government organized a cooperation agreement with 
law enforcement, relevant ministries, and five NGOs to strengthen 
anti-trafficking efforts. MOI financed six NGO projects to raise public 
awareness on trafficking (12 in 2019), and the government organized 
awareness campaigns at schools, aired an anti-trafficking video on 
public and commercial television stations, and, in cooperation with 
an NGO, launched an awareness campaign targeting the Romani 
community. The government continued to support a hotline for 
trafficking victims; the hotline received 1,657 calls, including five 
from potential trafficking victims (385 calls in 2019, including one 
that initiated an investigation). The Labor Inspectorate inspected 
businesses and identified 351 workers with contract violations, and 
it resolved contract violations for 97 workers. The government did 
not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. 
The government did not have procedures in place to regulate labor 
recruitment agencies. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Montenegro, and traffickers exploit victims 
from Montenegro abroad. Traffickers are predominantly men between 
ages 25 and 49 and members of organized criminal groups that 
operate in the Western Balkans. Victims of sex trafficking identified 
in Montenegro are primarily women and girls from Montenegro, 
neighboring Balkan countries, and, to a lesser extent, other countries 
in Eastern Europe. Traffickers exploit victims in the hospitality 
industry, including bars, restaurants, nightclubs, and cafes. Children, 
particularly Romani, Ashkali, and Balkan Egyptian children, are 
exploited in forced begging. Romani girls from Montenegro reportedly 
have been sold into marriages and forced into domestic servitude 
in Romani communities in Montenegro and, to a lesser extent, 
in Albania, Germany, and Kosovo. Migrants from neighboring 
countries are vulnerable to forced labor, particularly during the 
summer tourism season. International organized criminal groups 
exploit some Montenegrin women and girls in sex trafficking in 
other Balkan countries.
MOROCCO: TIER 2
The Government of Morocco does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Morocco remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
identifying and referring to care 441 trafficking victims; establishing 
support units in each branch of the National Security Directorate 
(DGSN) to assist female victims of crime, including trafficking; 
convicting two Moroccan peacekeepers for sexual exploitation; 
implementing a 2019 initiative to combat child forced begging; 
and launching an online portal detailing resources available to 
trafficking victims and for people to submit trafficking allegations. 
However, the government did not meet the minimum standards 
in several key areas. Investigations, prosecutions, and convictions 
of trafficking cases decreased, with the government reporting it 
investigated 79 alleged trafficking cases involving 138 alleged 
traffickers and prosecuted 69 cases in 2020. Authorities continued 
to conflate trafficking with other crimes such as migrant smuggling. 
Lack of proactive screening and identification measures continued 
to leave vulnerable populations such as migrants vulnerable to 
penalization for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit, 
such as immigration violations.  






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Adopt and systematically implement procedures to proactively 
identify trafficking victims, especially among irregular migrants, to 
appropriate protection services. • Create and implement a national 
victim referral mechanism and train judicial and law enforcement 
authorities on its application. • Investigate, prosecute, and convict 
traffickers using the anti-trafficking law and sentence convicted 
traffickers to significant prison terms. • Train law enforcement and 
judicial officials, child labor inspectors, and healthcare personnel 
on awareness of the anti-trafficking law, victim identification, non-
penalization of victims, and referral best practices using current 
mechanisms with the NGO community, to increase officials’ ability 
to identify internal trafficking cases, as well as cross-border trafficking 
cases as distinct from migrant smuggling crimes. • Provide adequate 
protection services for victims of all forms of trafficking, including but 
not limited to shelter, psycho-social services, legal aid, and repatriation 
assistance. • Disaggregate law enforcement data on human trafficking 
and migrant smuggling crimes. • Increase provision of specialized 
services for populations vulnerable to trafficking and/or financial 
or in-kind support to NGOs that provide these services. • Ensure 
that victims are not punished for unlawful acts traffickers compelled 
them to commit, such as immigration and prostitution violations. • 
Implement nationwide anti-trafficking awareness campaigns.
PROSECUTION
The government decreased efforts to investigate, prosecute, and 
convict traffickers. Law 27.14 criminalized sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking and prescribed penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment 
and a fine between 10,000 and 500,000 dirhams (DH) ($1,120 and 
$56,070) for offenses involving adult victims, and 20 to 30 years’ 
imprisonment and a fine between 100,000 and 1 million DH ($11,210 
and $112,150) for those involving child victims. These penalties were 
sufficiently stringent, and with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate 
with penalties for other serious crimes, such as rape. 
Authorities did not always disaggregate between human trafficking 
and migrant smuggling crimes; thus investigation, prosecution and 
conviction data reported may include human trafficking and other 
crimes. In 2020, the government reported it investigated 79 alleged 
trafficking cases involving 138 suspects; cases included alleged sex 
trafficking, forced labor, domestic servitude, and forced begging. 
Due to the pandemic, the government diverted law enforcement 
away from routine anti-trafficking activities to enforce pandemic 
countermeasures. Despite the reduced function of courts from the 
onset of the pandemic until August 2020 and challenges adapting to 
digital processes and reduced staff, the government reported initiating 
the prosecution of 69 alleged traffickers for sexual exploitation 
and forced labor in 2020 under Law 02-03 and Articles 52, 53, 
and 73. These laws, however, pertained to irregular migration, and 
the government did not disaggregate the data to demonstrate how 
many of the 69 alleged perpetrators committed smuggling crimes 
rather than trafficking crimes. The government reported convicting 
69 traffickers during the reporting period but did not report details 
on the types of trafficking involved. This demonstrated a decrease in 
investigations and prosecutions but maintenance in convictions in 
comparison to 2019, when the government reported it investigated 151 
potential sex and labor trafficking cases, prosecuted 307 individuals, 
and convicted 68 perpetrators; however, 2019 data likely included 
migrant smuggling cases. Convicted traffickers received sentences 







in prison and fines up to 500,000 DH ($56,070); the government 
did not report how many convicted traffickers received sentences 
longer than one year in prison. Although not explicitly reported 
by an international organization as trafficking, the government 
convicted two Moroccan peacekeepers for sexual exploitation with 
trafficking indicators while deployed to UN peacekeeping operations 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Central African 
Republic, though only one of those cases had been officially closed 
with the international organization; prosecution of a third case 
was ongoing at the end of the reporting period. Aside from these 
cases, the government did not report initiating any investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government officials complicit in 
human trafficking. In December 2019, a diplomat posted to the 
Moroccan Mission to the United Nations in New York, his ex-wife, 
and her brother were indicted for, among other crimes, conspiring 
to commit visa fraud from 2006 to 2016 to exploit foreign domestic 
workers from the Philippines, Morocco, and other countries. U.S. 
authorities arrested the former diplomat’s ex-wife in March 2019; 
the other two defendants remained at large. For the third consecutive 
year, the government did not report taking any action to hold the 
former diplomat accountable.
The General Prosecutor continued to ensure there were two 
prosecutors specialized in handling trafficking cases in every 
court of appeal across the country. The government did not report 
cooperation with foreign governments on international trafficking 
investigations, despite requests to do so. The government provided 
ongoing anti-trafficking internal training to law enforcement officers, 
and officials participated in trainings funded and provided by NGOs 
and international organizations.
PROTECTION
The government maintained efforts to identify trafficking victims, 
but it remained without appropriate victim protection services, 
and authorities continued to punish unidentified victims among 
vulnerable populations, such as undocumented foreign migrants. 
In 2020, the government reported it identified 441 trafficking 
victims—including 426 Moroccans and 15 foreigners—and referred 
them to Ministry of Justice (MOJ) protection units and civil society 
organizations for assistance. Of the 441 identified victims, 245 
were female, 196 male, 398 were adults, and 43 were children. The 
government reported it provided victims with legal aid, housing 
assistance, medical care, foreign residence permits, and family 
reunification. This data is similar to 2019, when the government 
reported it identified 423 victims, of whom 277 were Moroccans 
and 146 were foreign victims. The government did not have formal 
victim identification procedures or a national victim referral process 
but continued to collaborate with an international organization to 
establish standard procedures and a draft victim referral mechanism. 
In the absence of a formal referral mechanism, the government 
continued to informally refer victims and provided financial or 
in-kind support to some civil society organizations that provided 
essential services to populations vulnerable to trafficking. During the 
reporting period, each branch of the National Security Directorate 
(DGSN) established a support unit for women victims of violence to 
ensure a more victim-centered approach to sensitive cases, including 
cases involving female trafficking victims. 
The government did not provide shelter or psycho-social services 
specific to the needs of victims of all forms of trafficking. However, it 
continued to provide services to female and child victims of violence, 
including potential trafficking victims, at reception centers staffed 
by nurses and social workers at major hospitals, as well as in MOJ 
protection units in Moroccan courts. Moroccan law enforcement 
agencies reportedly continued to utilize focal points to work directly 
with these reception centers and MOJ units, and they continued to 
use a list of NGO service providers to whom authorities could refer 
trafficking victims for care. The government reported these services 
are available to adult male victims but acknowledged they are more 
difficult to access. Prosecutors in the courts of first instance and the 
courts of appeal—in coordination with the Ministry of Health—
had the authority to order trafficking victims to be removed from 
exploitative situations and to place them in the care of a hospital or 
civil society organization. The government also reported it placed an 
unknown number of officials in courts throughout the country, who 
were responsible for identifying and referring trafficking victims to 
psycho-social support, medical services, and legal aid. The government, 
however, did not report how many—if any—victims these officials 
or prosecutors referred to protection services. NGO service providers 
noted pandemic-related lockdown measures impeded their ability to 
assist trafficking victims and reported trafficking victims were stranded 
for extended periods of time in unsanitary locations or temporary 
shelters. The government continued to encourage victims to cooperate 
in investigations against their traffickers, but it did not report the 
number of victims who did so during the reporting period or if it 
took measures to protect witness confidentiality, nor did it report if 
victims received restitution from traffickers. The government provided 
legal alternatives to the removal of foreign victims of trafficking to 
countries where they might face retribution or hardship.
The Ministry Delegate in charge of Moroccans Residing Abroad 
and Migration Affairs continued to lead the government’s National 
Strategy for Immigration and Asylum, which aimed to regularize 
the legal status of migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers, including 
trafficking victims. Under this strategy, foreign trafficking victims 
could benefit from various services, including reintegration assistance, 
education, vocational training, social services, and legal aid. However, 
the government did not report proactively identifying potential 
trafficking victims during these regularization efforts or how many 
foreign trafficking victims—if any—benefited from these services 
during the reporting period. Due to the lack of proactive screening 
and identification measures, some foreign trafficking victims remained 
unidentified. Furthermore, foreign trafficking victims—especially 
among the sub-Saharan African migrant population—remained 
vulnerable to penalization for unlawful acts traffickers compelled 
them to commit, such as immigration violations. Foreign migrants 
reported they feared arrest and deportation, thereby deterring them 
from reporting trafficking or other types of crimes to the police.
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent human trafficking. The 
national inter-ministerial anti-trafficking committee, which was led by 
the MOJ and included two representatives from civil society, oversaw 
the government’s national strategy for immigration and asylum, which 
included efforts to manage irregular migration, combat trafficking, 
and organize training sessions for security services on asylum, 
migration, and trafficking issues. The government also continued to 
implement a national anti-trafficking action plan, which included 
coordination across relevant ministries. During the reporting period, 
the Ministry of Family, Solidarity, Equality, and Social Development 
implemented a December 2019 initiative to combat forced child 
begging; the initiative aimed to strengthen child protection systems, 
focusing interagency field teams in different regions, and improving 
protection services for child forced begging victims. The government, 
however, relied heavily on NGOs and international organizations 
to address trafficking. As in the previous reporting periods, the 
government—in coordination with an international organization—
continued to organize anti-trafficking trainings and raise awareness of 
the anti-trafficking law among government officials, civil society, and 
vulnerable populations, including women, children, and migrants. 
At the onset of the pandemic, the government established a digital 
portal to field trafficking complaints and outline resources available 
to trafficking victims. The government expanded its regularization 
campaigns to grant legal status and protections to migrants, refugees, 
and asylum-seekers, which helped decrease this population’s 
vulnerability to trafficking.
The government reportedly continued to implement Law No. 19.12—
adopted in October 2018—which provided protections for foreign 






through the National Center for Listening and Reporting for the public 
to report abuse and crimes against children, but the government 
did not report if the hotline received any reports of potential child 
trafficking crimes. During the reporting period, the government 
continued partnering with NGOs that assisted homeless children 
and single mothers in urban areas, particularly Casablanca, to 
prevent vulnerable youth from becoming victims of various forms of 
exploitation, including forced labor. The government conducted 4,886 
labor inspections during the reporting period specifically to verify the 
welfare of 87,584 female workers, including individuals vulnerable to 
trafficking, and inform them of their rights under Moroccan law. The 
Ministry of Labor and Vocational Integration continued to conduct 
child labor inspections in the formal economy across the country, but 
the government reported it remained concerned about child labor 
violations in the informal sector, including potential forced child 
labor crimes. The government reported the labor inspectorate suffered 
from insufficient personnel and resources to address child labor 
violations, including potential child trafficking crimes, within their 
routine work throughout the country. In addition, labor inspectors 
were mobilized to enforce pandemic-related countermeasures. 
Furthermore, there was no national focal point to receive complaints 
about child labor or forced child labor and no national mechanism 
for referring children found during inspections to appropriate social 
services. The government did not report efforts to reduce the demand 
for commercial sex acts or child sex tourism during the reporting 
period. Moroccan peacekeeping forces received anti-trafficking training 
and operated under a “no tolerance” standard for troops involved 
in UN peacekeeping missions. Although not explicitly reported as 
trafficking, an international organization reported receiving three 
allegations of sexual exploitation with trafficking indicators by 
Moroccan peacekeepers deployed to UN peacekeeping missions in 
the reporting period. The government reported that, in 2019, the 
government—in collaboration with the UN—initiated the prosecution 
of three cases of Moroccan peacekeepers for allegations of sexual 
exploitation and abuse, two of whom were convicted during the 
reporting period.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Morocco, and traffickers exploit Moroccan 
victims abroad. Documented and undocumented foreign migrants, 
especially women and children, are highly vulnerable to forced labor 
and sex trafficking in Morocco and as they transit through Morocco 
to reach Europe. Traffickers exploit many migrants who voluntarily 
use smugglers to enter Morocco. In 2020, the number of sub-Saharan 
migrants clandestinely entering the country—the majority of whom 
intend to transit Morocco on their way to Europe—decreased by an 
estimated 30 percent in comparison to 2019; however, the number 
of migrants departing from Morocco for Europe reportedly increased 
due to an eight-fold increase in migrants making the dangerous 
ocean crossing to the Canary Islands. The Spanish government and 
international organizations estimate that 38,000 people, including 
Moroccan citizens, crossed clandestinely from Morocco to Spanish 
territory in 2020 either by sea or over land; the majority, approximately 
21,000, arrived in the Canary Islands. Both sub-Saharan and Moroccan 
migrants making this journey to Spain and further into Europe are 
at risk of trafficking in Morocco and Europe. For example, traffickers 
exploit some female migrants while seeking assistance at “safe 
houses” in Morocco, which usually are run by individuals of their 
own nationality. Some female undocumented migrants, primarily 
from Sub-Saharan Africa and a small but growing number from South 
Asia, are exploited in sex trafficking and forced labor in Morocco. 
Criminal networks operating in Oujda on the Algerian border and 
in northern coastal cities, such as Nador, exploit undocumented 
migrant women in sex trafficking and forced begging; networks in 
Oujda also reportedly exploit children of migrants in forced begging. 
Some female migrants, particularly Nigerians, who transit Oujda are 
exploited in sex trafficking once they reach Europe. Furthermore, 
some contacts claim that entrenched Nigerian networks, working with 
Moroccan criminal elements, exploit primarily Nigerian women in 
sex trafficking and retain control over these victims when they arrive 
in Europe. International organizations, local NGOs, and migrants 
report women and unaccompanied children from Cote d’Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, and Cameroon are 
highly vulnerable to sex trafficking and forced labor in Morocco. 
Some reports suggest Cameroonian and Nigerian networks exploit 
women in sex trafficking, while Nigerian networks also exploit 
women in forced begging in the streets by threatening the victims 
and their families; the victims are typically the same nationality as 
the traffickers. Some women from the Philippines and Indonesia 
and francophone sub-Saharan Africa are recruited for employment 
as domestic workers in Morocco; upon arrival, employers force them 
into domestic servitude through non-payment of wages, withholding 
of passports, and physical abuse.
Traffickers, including parents and other intermediaries, exploit 
Moroccan children in Morocco for forced labor, domestic work, 
begging, and sex trafficking. Some Moroccan boys endure forced 
labor while employed as apprentices in the artisanal, textile, and 
construction industries and in mechanic shops. Although the incidence 
of child domestic workers has reportedly decreased in Morocco 
since 2005, girls are recruited from rural areas for work in domestic 
service in cities and some become victims of forced labor. NGOs 
and other observers anecdotally reported in 2018 that a significant 
number of girls work as domestic help in Moroccan households, 
but it is difficult to determine the extent of the problem because 
of authorities’ inability to access this population. Drug traffickers 
reportedly compel children to participate in drug production in 
Morocco. Some family members and other intermediaries exploit 
Moroccan women in sex trafficking. Some foreigners, primarily from 
Europe and the Middle East, engage in child sex tourism in major 
Moroccan cities; these cases reportedly decreased during 2020 due to 
pandemic-related diminished international travel. Traffickers exploit 
Moroccan adults and children in forced labor and sex trafficking, 
primarily in Europe and the Middle East, particularly in the Gulf. 
Traffickers force Moroccan women into commercial sex abroad where 
they experience restrictions on movement, threats, and emotional 
and physical abuse. During the reporting period, media reported 
Moroccan workers in Spain’s strawberry farms were subjected to 
severe labor conditions, at times amounting to forced labor, and 
sexual abuse. Swedish authorities reported that, since 2016, traffickers 
force homeless boys and young men from Morocco to deal drugs, 
carry out thefts, and perpetrate other criminal activities in Sweden; 
however, these cases have reportedly decreased since 2019.
MOZAMBIQUE: TIER 2
The Government of Mozambique does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking 
capacity; therefore Mozambique remained on Tier 2. These efforts 
included prosecuting all identified cases of trafficking; training 
front-line officials on trafficking; conducting national awareness-
raising campaigns; and updating standard operating procedures 
for provincial and district reference groups to enhance their anti-
trafficking response. However, the government did not meet the 
minimum standards in several key areas. The government investigated 
and prosecuted fewer trafficking cases, convicted fewer traffickers, 
and did not proactively identify trafficking victims other than those 
represented by criminal cases. The government did not finalize a 
draft national referral mechanism for the fourth consecutive year, 
which limited victims’ access to protective services and left potential 
victims unidentified, nor did it finalize implementing regulations 
for the sixth consecutive year; as a result, the protection provisions 








The government also did not adopt a national action plan for the 
eighth consecutive year, hindering overall anti-trafficking efforts. 
Mozambican officials remained without effective policies or laws 
that would regulate foreign labor recruiters and hold them civilly 
and criminally liable for fraudulent recruiting.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Amend the anti-trafficking law to bring the definition of trafficking 
in line with the definition of trafficking under international law. • 
Finalize, implement, and train officials to use standard operating 
procedures for victim identification and the national referral 
mechanism to refer all victims to appropriate care. • Systematically 
and proactively identify trafficking victims by screening vulnerable 
populations—including victims of child abuse, individuals in 
resettlement camps, and foreign nationals, such as migrants from 
neighboring countries and North Korean and Cuban workers—
for trafficking indicators and refer them to appropriate services. • 
Vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes and sentence 
convicted traffickers, including complicit officials, to adequate 
penalties. • Increase provision of comprehensive services, including 
medical care, psycho-social counseling, and shelter, to all victims, 
including males and foreign nationals, and expand the availability 
of protective services for all victims, including long-term shelter 
and reintegration assistance. • Finalize, adopt, and dedicate funds 
to implement the national action plan. • Build the capacity of the 
labor inspectorate and the Women and Children’s Victim Assistance 
Units to identify potential trafficking victims, investigate trafficking 
cases, and refer victims to care. • Hold labor recruiters liable for 
fraudulent recruitment. • Increase coordination among district, 
provincial, and national stakeholders to bolster reporting on the 
government’s anti-trafficking efforts. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. 
The 2008 Law on Preventing and Combating the Trafficking of People 
criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed 
penalties of 16 to 20 years’ imprisonment. These penalties were 
sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate 
with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. 
Inconsistent with international law, the law did not establish the use 
of force, fraud, or coercion as an essential element of the crime. The 
government continued to work with an international organization 
to review draft amendments to bring the 2008 anti-trafficking law in 
line with international standards; however, draft amendments were 
awaiting approval by various stakeholders for the second consecutive 
reporting period.
The government investigated six potential trafficking cases in 2020, 
determining two cases to be trafficking—a Mozambican boy exploited 
in forced labor in Mozambique and a Mozambican woman exploited 
in sex trafficking in Tanzania—involving two suspected traffickers, 
compared with 13 investigations and eight confirmed cases in 2019. 
The government initiated prosecutions on both of these cases in 
2020, compared with eight prosecutions of confirmed cases in the 
previous reporting period. The government convicted one trafficker 
of labor trafficking under the 2008 anti-trafficking law, compared 
with two convictions reported in 2019. Courts sentenced the trafficker 
to six years’ imprisonment. The initiated sex trafficking prosecution 
remained ongoing at the end of the reporting period. With support 
from an international organization, the government contributed 
information on the two confirmed cases of trafficking during the 
reporting period to a national centralized anti-trafficking data 
collection and reporting tool. The government did not report any 
investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees 
complicit in human trafficking offenses; however, corruption and 
official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, 
inhibiting law enforcement action during the year. Similar to previous 
years, alleged traffickers commonly bribed police and immigration 
officials to facilitate trafficking crimes both domestically and across 
international borders, especially to South Africa. Officials and civil 
society stakeholders reported government-imposed restrictions related 
to the pandemic, such as limited travel within the country, curfews, 
and border closures, slowed or inhibited law enforcement activity, 
especially investigations, during the reporting period. 
The government conducted various trainings across the country for 
front-line responders during the reporting period. In partnership 
with international organizations, the government trained provincial 
and district reference groups on the anti-trafficking legal framework, 
victim identification, and investigation skills to at least 250 officials 
throughout Cabo Delgado, Manica, Nampula, Sofala, and Zambezia 
provinces. The government, in partnership with an international 
NGO, also provided training on the differences between trafficking 
and smuggling, and on victim identification and assistance to border 
agents in Maputo Province and at the South African border. The 
government partnered with the Government of Tanzania on the 
aforementioned sex trafficking case, requesting additional evidence 
from Tanzanian officials; coordination remained ongoing at the end 
of the reporting period. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained minimal victim protection efforts. The 
government identified two victims in 2020, a significant decrease 
compared with 22 victims identified the previous reporting period. 
The government, in partnership with an international organization, 
supported the repatriation of the victim exploited in Tanzania; 
law enforcement also accompanied the victim when she returned 
to Tanzania to provide testimony. The government reported 
returning both identified victims to their families; however, the 
government did not report any other services provided to victims. 
The government continued to lack adequate procedures to screen 
vulnerable populations, including foreign migrants and victims of 
child abuse, for trafficking and did not identify any victims outside 
those involved in law enforcement activity. Additionally, front-line 
officials lacked a general understanding of trafficking, which hampered 
victim identification efforts. Officials and civil society organizations 
reported that the actual number of trafficking victims in Mozambique 
was likely significantly higher than the number represented by 
criminal cases. Although a draft national referral mechanism (NRM) 
continued to be informally distributed to officials to identify and 
refer victims, the government did not finalize and fully implement 
the NRM for the fourth consecutive year; observers reported the lack 
of a formal NRM hampered community-level officials’ efforts to 
identify victims, and many potential trafficking cases went unidentified 
during the reporting period. The government did not report progress 
on finalizing implementing regulations for trafficking victims and 
witness protection, hindering the government’s provision of protection 
services for trafficking victims; draft regulations remained incomplete 
for the sixth consecutive reporting period.
Despite government-provided care reportedly being available for 
trafficking victims, the government did not report utilizing these 
services for the past two years. The government generally relied on 
civil society organizations to identify victims of trafficking and refer 
them to care but did not report providing financial or in-kind support 
to such organizations. The Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social 
Action operated three centers that could provide short-term shelter, 
medical and psychological care, family reunification, and legal 
assistance to trafficking victims; however, the government did not 





The government did not have a long-term shelter for trafficking victims 
or an alternative for those in need of long-term shelter. While the 
government specified that it occasionally could provide shelter for 
adult male victims, it did not report identifying any adult male victims 
during the year. Police stations throughout the country had specialists, 
trained by the Office of Assistance to Women and Children Victims of 
Domestic Violence, equipped and available to respond to suspected 
trafficking cases. The government continued to operate facilities in 
more than 215 police stations and 22 “Victims of Violence” centers 
throughout the country offering temporary shelter, food, limited 
counseling, and monitoring following reintegration for victims of 
crime. The government did not, however, provide specific numbers 
of trafficking victims who benefited from these services in 2020. 
The anti-trafficking law required police protection for victims who 
participated as witnesses in criminal proceedings against traffickers, 
but the government did not report providing these services to any 
victims. Mozambican law provided for temporary residency status or 
legal alternatives to the removal of foreign victims to countries where 
they might face hardship or retribution; however, the government did 
not identify any foreign victims for the second consecutive reporting 
period, so it did not implement these provisions. Authorities may 
have penalized trafficking victims for crimes traffickers compelled 
them to commit; observers reported because officials did not use 
standard victim identification procedures, some potential victims, 
particularly irregular migrants, may have been deported or remained 
unidentified in the law enforcement system.
PREVENTION
The government maintained overall efforts to prevent trafficking, 
while slightly increasing efforts to raise awareness of trafficking 
among vulnerable populations. The National Reference Group, 
under leadership of the attorney general’s office, convened regularly 
during the reporting period to coordinate national anti-trafficking 
efforts, and members at the national, provincial, and district levels 
met regularly as working groups to address specific trafficking cases 
and concerns. In partnership with international organizations, the 
government updated standard operating procedures (SOPs) for 
provincial and district reference groups to better equip officials to 
combat trafficking in the context of natural disasters and increasing 
violent extremism; the government reportedly began implementing 
the SOPs in IDP resettlement camps in the northern and central 
provinces to conduct awareness raising within the camps. The 
government remained without a national action plan (NAP) since 
2012; despite having a draft NAP complete since 2017 and continued 
engagement with civil society during the reporting period to review 
the draft NAP, the government did not adopt the NAP for the fourth 
consecutive year. Additionally, the government did not have a 
dedicated budget to combat trafficking, which hampered overall anti-
trafficking efforts. Despite pandemic-related restrictions on travel and 
in-person gatherings, the government continued awareness-raising 
efforts during the reporting period. The government conducted 
national public awareness campaigns in all provinces, but due to 
pandemic-related restrictions, only 2,700 speeches and presentations 
were delivered, compared with 5,000 in 2019. In partnership with an 
international NGO, the government created and distributed via text 
message electronic posters to raise awareness about child trafficking, 
sexual exploitation of girls, and human trafficking risks associated 
with illegal immigration. The attorney general’s office led school 
programs focused on preventing online recruitment. 
The government did not report operating or providing support to a 
hotline exclusively available for adult victims of trafficking; however, 
the government continued providing logistical and technical support 
for an NGO-run hotline that was available to report crimes against 
children, including potential trafficking. With in-kind government 
support, the NGO established a new hotline in Manica in October 
2020 to expand availability to report crimes against children, including 
potential trafficking, outside of Maputo and better respond to callers 
in local languages. In 2020, hotlines identified 17 potential trafficking 
cases, referring potential victims to service providers and reporting 
the cases to the government; however, the government did not report 
responding to these cases. The government did not report training 
labor inspectors to screen workers for trafficking indicators during 
the reporting period and has not done so since 2018. Mozambican 
officials remained without effective policies or laws regulating foreign 
recruiters and holding them civilly and criminally liable for fraudulent 
recruiting. The government did not provide anti-trafficking training 
to diplomats. The government did not make efforts to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Mozambique, and traffickers exploit victims 
from Mozambique abroad. Forced child labor occurs in agriculture, 
mining, and market vending in rural areas, often with the complicity 
of family members. Traffickers lure voluntary migrants, especially 
women and girls from rural areas, from neighboring countries to cities 
in Mozambique or South Africa with promises of employment or 
education, and then they exploit those victims in domestic servitude 
and sex trafficking. Traffickers exploit Mozambican girls in bars, 
roadside clubs, overnight stopping points, and restaurants along 
the southern transport corridor that links Maputo with Eswatini and 
South Africa. Increasingly, traffickers recruit women and girls via the 
internet with promises of employment using fake business profiles 
on social media, then subsequently exploit them in sex trafficking or 
forced labor. Child sex trafficking is a growing concern in the cities 
of Maputo, Beira, Chimoio, Tete, and Nacala, which have highly 
mobile populations and large numbers of truck drivers. As of October 
2020, an international organization reported there were more than 
93,000 IDPs in Mozambique as a result of two tropical cyclones in 
2019; individuals in resettlement camps or otherwise affected by 
the cyclones are increasingly vulnerable to trafficking. Additionally, 
an international organization reported in April 2021 there were 
more than 700,000 IDPs in northern and central Mozambique as 
a result of violent extremism and instability in the region; women 
and children are increasingly vulnerable to recruitment by non-state 
armed groups for forced labor and sex trafficking. 
Traffickers exploit Mozambican men and boys in forced labor 
on South African farms and mines, where victims often work for 
months without pay under coercive conditions before being turned 
over to police for deportation as illegal migrants. Mozambican boys 
migrate to Eswatini to wash cars, herd livestock, and sell goods; some 
subsequently become victims of forced labor. Traffickers exploit 
Mozambican adults and girls in forced labor and sex trafficking 
abroad, including in Angola, Italy, and Portugal. Informal networks 
typically comprise Mozambican or South African traffickers. Reports 
alleged traffickers bribe officials to move victims within the country 
and across national borders to South Africa and Eswatini. North 
Korean nationals and Cuban medical professionals working in 
Mozambique may have been forced to work by the North Korean 
and Cuban governments.
NAMIBIA: TIER 1
The Government of Namibia fully meets the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued to 
demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting 
period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its 
anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Namibia remained on Tier 1. 
These efforts included training social workers on the national referral 
mechanism (NRM) and standard operating procedures (SOPs) 
on victim identification, referring identified victims to care, and 
allocating more funding to NGOs and shelters supporting trafficking 
victims. Although the government meets the minimum standards, it 
identified fewer victims and did not initiate any new prosecutions 
of alleged traffickers. Occasional breakdowns in communication 






ministries led to a lack of coordination among members of the 
National Coordinating Body (NCB).






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Train law enforcement and judicial officials on the Trafficking 
in Persons Act of 2018. • Train all actors on the national referral 
mechanism and standard procedures to proactively identify trafficking 
victims. • Strengthen coordination among government ministries 
to ensure roles and responsibilities are clear and anti-trafficking 
policies are effective. • Increase funding to civil society partners that 
provide accommodation and care to trafficking victims. • Increase 
efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers. • Improve 
communication between government ministries and civil society. • 
Expand efforts to raise public awareness of human trafficking indicators 
and risks through sensitization campaigns and community outreach, 
especially in rural areas. • Screen Cuban medical workers for forced 
labor indicators and refer victims identified to appropriate services.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. 
The Combating of Trafficking in Persons Act of 2018, which came 
into effect in November 2019, criminalized sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to 30 years’ imprisonment, 
a fine not exceeding 1 million Namibian dollars ($68,150), or 
both. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect 
to sex trafficking, commensurate with punishments prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as kidnapping. Courts operated at a 
reduced capacity due to the pandemic, creating judicial backlogs 
during the reporting period. Despite the pandemic’s impact, the 
government initiated 10 case investigations and continued 16 case 
investigations, compared with nine case investigations initiated and 
29 case investigations continued during the previous year. Of the 
10 new investigations, the government initiated four forced labor 
investigations and six sex trafficking investigations. The government 
continued prosecutions of 18 defendants and convicted one trafficker 
in 2020. This compared with prosecutions of 15 defendants initiated, 
prosecutions of four defendants continued, and conviction of one 
trafficker in 2019. The government convicted one South African 
national in a child sex trafficking case pending since 2018; the court 
had not yet sentenced the trafficker at the close of the reporting period. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking 
offenses. However, observers alleged an off-duty immigration official 
threatened officials screening for trafficking indicators in the Hosea 
Kutako International Airport. 
Specialized prosecutors within the Office of the Prosecutor General’s 
Sexual Offenses Unit prosecuted all trafficking cases in the High Court 
and worked closely with prosecutors on cases indicted outside of the 
High Court. The government did not report providing specialized 
anti-trafficking training to law enforcement or judicial officials during 
the reporting period, in part due to pandemic-related restrictions on 
in-person gatherings. This was a decrease compared with training 35 
criminal justice practitioners and 166 immigration officials during the 
previous reporting period. The government maintained bilateral law 
enforcement cooperation agreements with Zimbabwe and Angola; 
however, the government did not report using either agreement for 
mutual legal assistance during the reporting period. An NGO expanded 
a program aiming to increase victim identification at airports to 
include land border crossings, in cooperation with the government.
PROTECTION
The government maintained overall protection efforts but identified 
fewer trafficking victims; the government also significantly increased 
funding allocated to NGOs supporting trafficking victims. The 
government identified 19 trafficking victims, compared with 30 
victims in 2019. This included three Namibian children and one 
Namibian adult exploited in sex trafficking, six Angolan children and 
six Angolan adults exploited in domestic servitude and sex trafficking, 
one Zambian adult exploited in domestic servitude, one Zimbabwean 
adult exploited in sex trafficking, and one Kenyan adult exploited 
in sex trafficking. The government provided assistance and referred 
16 victims to NGO shelters; of the three remaining victims, one was 
repatriated, and two victims found alternate accommodations. The 
government continued implementing SOPs for victim identification 
and the NRM for provision of services. Police and immigration officials 
used anti-trafficking pocket manuals outlining the SOPs and NRM. 
The government, in partnership with an international organization, 
trained 30 social workers from all 14 regions of the country on the 
SOPs and NRM during the reporting period. However, observers 
reported some government and civil society frontline responders 
still did not fully understand their roles within the procedures. In 
practice, labor inspectors and immigration officials contacted the 
Namibian Police Force (NamPol) when they identified a potential 
trafficking victim; NamPol referred victims of all crimes to government 
or NGO-operated temporary shelters and government-provided 
medical assistance. 
There were no shelters or services specifically for trafficking victims, 
but the government and NGOs jointly provided shelter, psycho-social 
services, medical care, and provision of other basic needs to victims 
of trafficking, gender-based violence, and child abuse. NGO shelters 
cared for men, women, and children, although observers noted it was 
sometimes difficult to find shelter for male victims. Child victims 
were placed in government residential childcare facilities and had 
access to education. Foreign victims had access to the same shelter 
and services as domestic victims. Shelter staff did not permit victims, 
including adults, to leave unchaperoned. The government allocated 6 
million Namibian dollars ($408,910) to NGOs and shelters supporting 
trafficking victims in 2020, a significant increase from allocating 
325,000 Namibian dollars ($22,150) during the previous reporting 
period. Seventeen Gender-based Violence Protection Units nationwide 
offered initial psycho-social, legal, and medical support to victims of 
crime, in coordination with the police, the Ministry of Gender Equality, 
Poverty Eradication, and Child Welfare (MGEPECW), the Ministry 
of Health and Social Services, and NGOs. Adult victims were able to 
seek employment and work while receiving assistance, although it 
is unknown how many victims did so during the reporting period. 
Authorities did not condition access to victim services on 
cooperation with law enforcement; the government provided legal 
aid, transportation, and witness protection to victims who chose to 
cooperate with law enforcement proceedings. The government allowed 
victims to testify in rooms separate from the courtroom when such 
rooms were available. All 19 victims identified voluntarily assisted 
law enforcement during the reporting period. Foreign victims could 
obtain temporary residence visas during legal proceedings. The law 
allowed victims to obtain restitution and file civil suits against their 
traffickers; however, no victims to date had received restitution 
or compensation. Authorities screened vulnerable populations, 
including irregular migrants and individuals in commercial sex, for 
trafficking indicators. There were no reports the government detained 
or otherwise penalized trafficking victims for unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. The NCB, chaired by 
the MGEPECW, coordinated the government’s anti-trafficking efforts. 
The NCB met twice during the reporting period, compared with four 
times during the previous reporting period. The government drafted a 
five-year, anti-trafficking national action plan (NAP), which remained 




continued implementing its 2019-2023 NAP on gender-based 
violence, which addressed all forms of trafficking. Due to pandemic 
restrictions on in-person gatherings, the government conducted fewer 
public awareness raising activities. The MGEPECW held an in-person 
event to commemorate World Day against Trafficking in Persons; 
officials distributed brochures on trafficking as part of the MGEPECW’s 
national awareness raising campaign. Several NCB members discussed 
trafficking trends and reporting mechanisms on a popular evening 
television program. The NCB continued circulating awareness raising 
materials electronically. This was an overall decrease compared with 
training 1,120 first responders, community stakeholders, students, 
and media on trafficking prevention and victim identification in 
the previous reporting period. The government provided in-kind 
support to an NGO-operated hotline for gender-based violence, 
child abuse, and human trafficking; the hotline operated daily 
from 8:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. Authorities did not report identifying 
any trafficking victims from the hotline. With support from an 
international organization, the government contributed information 
to a centralized anti-trafficking database that collected national data 
on cases and victims identified and shared it with countries in the 
region. The Ministry of Labor, Industrial Relations, and Employment 
Creation employed an unknown number of labor and occupational 
health and safety inspectors responsible for enforcing laws against 
child labor; the government did not report identifying any victims 
during the inspections. The law regulated recruitment agencies and 
banned employee-paid recruitment fees. The Ministry of Labor, 
Industrial Relations, and Employment Creation oversaw recruitment 
agency licensing and managed a database registering job seekers, 
coordinating overseas job placements, and monitoring employees’ 
arrival in their intended destinations; the government did not report 
identifying any victims or initiating any investigations into fraudulent 
recruitment from the information collected. The government did not 
make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Namibia, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Namibia abroad. Some victims are initially offered legitimate work for 
adequate wages, but then traffickers subject them to forced labor in 
urban centers and on commercial farms. Traffickers subject Namibian 
children to forced labor in agriculture, cattle herding, and domestic 
service, and sex trafficking. Namibians commonly house and care 
for children of distant relatives to provide expanded educational 
opportunities; however, in some instances, traffickers exploit these 
children in forced labor. Among Namibia’s ethnic groups, San and 
Zemba children are particularly vulnerable to forced labor on farms 
or in homes; officials identified Zemba child trafficking victims during 
the reporting period. Traffickers may subject children from less affluent 
neighboring countries to sex trafficking and forced labor, including in 
street vending in Windhoek and other cities as well as in the fishing 
sector. Traffickers may bring Angolan children to Namibia for forced 
labor in cattle herding, agricultural work, and domestic servitude. 
During the reporting period, traffickers exploited individuals from 
Angola, Kenya, Zambia, and Zimbabwe in sex trafficking and forced 
labor. An NGO noted an increase in exploitation of Namibians 
seeking economic opportunity abroad, in part due to the pandemic. 
The same NGO noted an increase in traffickers using online tools, 
such as social media, to advertise false jobs and groom individuals, 
in part due to pandemic movement restrictions. Cuban nationals 
working in Namibia on medical missions may have been forced to 
work by the Cuban government. Traffickers allegedly operate at the 
international airport.
NEPAL: TIER 2
The Government of Nepal does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do 
so. Despite the documented impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the 
government’s anti-trafficking capacity, the government demonstrated 
overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting 
period; therefore Nepal remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
convicting two former officials of corruption-related activities that 
contributed to vulnerabilities in overseas worker recruitment, taking 
steps towards lifting the ban on some female migration overseas, 
and continuing to raise awareness on trafficking. The government 
also hired more personnel for the law enforcement unit dedicated 
to human trafficking—the Anti-Trafficking-in-Persons Bureau (Anti-
TIP Bureau)—which is actively investigating cases and took steps 
towards amending the 2007 Human Trafficking and Transportation 
Control Act (HTTCA). However, the government did not meet the 
minimum standards in several key areas. The government’s laws 
do not criminalize all forms of labor trafficking and sex trafficking, 
and officials’ identification of, and protection for, male trafficking 
victims and transnational labor trafficking victims remained severely 
inadequate compared to the size of the problem. Official complicity 
in trafficking offenses remained a serious problem, both direct 
complicity and negligence. In addition, while the government 
signed a labor memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Israel, it 
required Nepali migrant workers to pay recruitment fees and related 
expenses, inconsistent with international best practice. Furthermore, 
officials continued to encourage migrant workers exploited abroad to 
register cases under the 2007 Foreign Employment Act (2007 FEA), 
which criminalized fraudulent recruitment, rather than refer cases 
to police for criminal investigation of labor trafficking.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Amend the Human Trafficking and Transportation (Control) Act 
(HTTCA) to criminalize all forms of sex trafficking and labor trafficking, 
in line with the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. • Investigate allegations of 
official complicity in trafficking crimes and hold perpetrators criminally 
accountable. • Increase identification and referral of trafficking victims 
to services, especially male labor trafficking victims and females in 
commercial sex through increased training of front-line responders 
on standard operating procedures (SOPs). • Establish SOPs for 
law enforcement to investigate human trafficking cases, including 
referrals between agencies. • Increase investigations, prosecutions, and 
convictions of all trafficking offenses, including criminal investigations 
into labor recruiters and sub-agents for labor trafficking. • Expand 
availability and capacity of victim care, including shelter and 
repatriation, for all victims, especially males and workers exploited 
overseas. • Increase staff, training, and resources to the Department 
of Foreign Employment (DFE) to facilitate full implementation and 
monitoring of the low-cost recruitment policy. • Take steps to eliminate 
recruitment or placement fees charged to workers by Nepali labor 
recruiters and ensure any recruitment fees are paid by employers. • 
Implement the victim-witness protection provisions of the HTTCA. • 
Significantly increase monitoring of children’s homes and orphanages 
and hold accountable those that do not meet the government’s 
minimum standards of care. • Authorize labor inspectors to monitor the 
adult entertainment sector (AES) establishments for labor violations. • 
Remove the HTTCA provision that allows the judiciary to fine victims if 
they fail to appear in court and hold them criminally liable for providing 
contradictory testimony. • Lift current conditions and restrictions on 
female migration and engage destination country governments to create 
rights-based, enforceable agreements that protect Nepali workers from 
human trafficking. • Provide documentation to stateless individuals, 
internationally recognized refugees, and asylum-seekers to allow them 






The government decreased anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. 
The 2007 HTTCA criminalized some forms of sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking. The HTTCA’s definition of trafficking was inconsistent with 
the international definition of trafficking. It limited the definition 
of “human trafficking” to the purchase or selling of a person and to 
causing another person to go into prostitution; did not include a 
demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion as an essential element 
of the base offense; and did not explicitly address forced labor. The 
law separately defined “human transportation” as the taking of a 
person from their home or place of residence, through force, fraud, 
or coercion, for the purpose of prostitution or the keeping a person 
as a slave or bonded labor. The HTTCA prescribed penalties ranging 
from five to 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine, which were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. The 2017 Labour 
Act, which is enforced by specialized labor courts, criminalized forced 
labor and prescribed penalties of up to two years’ imprisonment, 
a fine of up to 500,000 Nepali rupees (NPR) ($4,270), or both. 
Additionally, the 2002 Bonded Labor (Prohibition) Act abolished 
bonded labor and prescribed civil penalties of a fine between 15,000 
NPR and 25,000 NPR ($128-$214). The 2000 Child Labour Act 
criminalized forced child labor and prescribed penalties of up to 
one year imprisonment, a fine of 50,000 NPR ($427), or both. None 
of these laws prescribed sufficiently stringent penalties. The 2007 
FEA criminalized fraudulent and deceptive labor recruitment of 
Nepalese for work abroad and was often utilized in labor trafficking 
cases in lieu of the HTTCA. Penalties prescribed under this law were 
significantly lower than those available under the HTTCA. For the 
sixth consecutive year, the government’s National Committee for 
Controlling Human Trafficking (NCCHT) continued to work on 
revisions to the HTTCA by forming a working committee which 
sought input from civil society stakeholders. The pandemic and 
political unrest impacted the ability of the NCCHT to finalize the 
revisions during the reporting period, which in turn impacted the 
formation of provincial and local level committees for combatting 
human trafficking. The Government of Nepal amended the Human 
Trafficking and Transportation Control Rules (HTTCR) to bring it in 
line with Nepal’s federal system during the reporting period. 
Due to the pandemic, the government closed the courts for three 
months of the reporting period, which impacted the prosecution 
of cases. Once courts reopened, NGOs reported restrictions on 
transportation and COVID-19 testing requirements made it difficult 
to obtain victims’ statements and testimony. During the Nepali fiscal 
year, police conducted 97 investigations involving 240 suspects, 
the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) initiated prosecution 
in 170 cases against 415 suspects, and district courts convicted 
202 traffickers in 88 cases, all under the HTTCA. This is a decrease 
compared to initiating 258 investigations involving 524 suspects, 
initiating 407 prosecutions from previous years, and convicting 231 
traffickers the previous reporting period. The government did not 
report the number of ongoing cases or the sentences prescribed to 
convicted traffickers. District courts acquitted 108 suspects in 48 
cases, compared to 243 acquittals in the previous reporting period. 
Officials did not disaggregate data to distinguish between sex and 
labor trafficking cases, and some cases might not include evidence 
of exploitation in forced labor or commercial sex. Some police and 
prosecutors investigated and prosecuted suspected sex traffickers 
and facilitators for rape and public offenses. 
The government had standard training for labor, immigration, judicial, 
law enforcement, and foreign employment officials that included 
general definitions of human trafficking. International donors 
provided anti-trafficking trainings for the Anti-TIP Bureau. Due to the 
pandemic, police reported they were unable to conduct trafficking 
victim identification trainings, although other trafficking awareness 
trainings were held virtually. Despite these trainings, however, most 
police lacked sophisticated investigative techniques and resources 
to interact with trafficking survivors in a victim-centered way. In 
addition, the dearth of investigators and prosecutors trained to work 
on trafficking cases, coupled with frequent turnover, further hampered 
efforts. The Anti-TIP Bureau, a specialized police unit dedicated to 
trafficking crimes created in 2018, had filled 77 Kathmandu positions 
as well as 240 regional positions by the end of the reporting period. 
While the Anti-TIP Bureau will eventually investigate all human 
trafficking cases, other agencies continued to investigate cases during 
the reporting period. The Nepal Police Women’s Cells (NPWC) had 
female officers in all 77 districts to investigate crimes against women 
and girls, including trafficking, but not all district offices had cells 
that were fully operational. While investigative capacity is improving, 
law enforcement did not proactively identify trafficking cases and 
some of the referrals it received, had occurred more than one year 
prior, which undermined evidence collection and prosecution 
efforts. Moreover, police and prosecutors remained reliant on victim 
testimony for successful cases. Victims often did not want to assist 
in cases against their perpetrators because the perpetrators were 
family friends or relatives. Traffickers often bribed victims and their 
parents not to provide testimony in trafficking cases. Neither the 
Anti-TIP Bureau nor other law enforcement units had the resources 
to effectively coordinate with NGOs and victims on registering cases 
against their traffickers, which made it harder for victims to do so. 
Pandemic related lockdowns and court closures further exacerbated 
these issues during the reporting period. Police and the judiciary did 
not always collaborate, which led to police submitting incomplete 
cases that prosecutors could not pursue in court. Many district courts 
did not comply with the 2013 Supreme Court directive to adopt a 
“fast-track” system for human trafficking cases. This was at times due 
to stipulations of the law that did not allow a fast track court case, 
delays related to the pandemic, and non-trafficking caseloads. While 
the National Judiciary Academy publicized SOPs on investigation and 
prosecution of trafficking cases, whether or not officials employed the 
SOPs varied by judge. The Nepal police have one liaison officer in 
New Delhi. Nepal Police coordinated and cooperated on international 
investigations of trafficking related crimes through INTERPOL and 
other Diplomatic Missions. INTERPOL’s Tools and Services are being 
used to apprehend suspects who have absconded in trafficking related 
cases. Nepali law enforcement agencies also work on an informal 
basis with their counterparts in other countries—most frequently 
India—in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking cases. Due to 
the informal nature of these relationships, data on cooperative efforts 
were not compiled. The government did not report collaboration 
with Gulf countries on trafficking cases, despite high numbers of 
Nepali victims in the region. 
Nepali parents give their children to brokers who promise education 
or work opportunities but instead take them to frequently unregistered 
children’s homes and force them to pretend to be orphans to garner 
donations from tourists and volunteers and where some force children 
into manual labor or begging, force them to entertain visitors for 
donations and sexually abuse them. International organizations 
and NGOs estimated that 80 to 85 percent of children in “children’s 
homes” and orphanages had at least one living parent at home. 
NGOs noted that, although there is increased willingness to take 
action against the operators of children’s homes, prosecution remains 
a challenge. Many of the individuals running these exploitative 
institutions are politically connected and viewed favorably within 
their community. NGOs state that even when arrested, they are almost 
never prosecuted and often use political connections to thwart child 
protective agencies. Prior to the pandemic-related lockdowns, the 
government directed children’s homes to return children to their 
families. The government did not report screening the children 
for trafficking indicators before they were sent home. While 1,500 
children were reunited with their families, NGOs reported 11,000 
remained in registered homes and orphanages. 
The government did not make sufficient efforts to investigate or 
prosecute suspects for bonded labor. The government continued 
to misidentify the majority of transnational labor trafficking cases 
as labor violations and resolved them administratively through the 
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Ministry of Labor, Employment, and Social Security (MoLESS), in lieu 
of criminal investigation, with inadequate sentences for perpetrators. 
Legal experts stated prosecutors could pursue a case under both 
the HTTCA and the 2007 FEA for transnational labor trafficking 
and foreign employment fraud, respectively; however, prosecutors 
regularly refused to do so, believing such action would violate the 
prohibition against double jeopardy. Many migrant workers remained 
unaware of the process for obtaining redress, including in cases of 
trafficking. DFE officials continued to advise abused migrant workers 
to register complaints under the 2007 FEA rather than notify police. 
In January 2020 DFE and the police signed an MOU to allow labor 
trafficking victims to file complaints at local police stations instead of 
requiring them to travel to Kathmandu. During the reporting period, 
the DFE investigated five cases reported at local police stations. Many 
labor trafficking victims preferred to submit claims for restitution 
through the 2007 FEA in lieu of lengthy criminal prosecutions 
under the HTTCA, citing the desire to avoid the stigma associated 
with trafficking, the higher potential for compensation through the 
2007 FEA, and the lack of time and funding to access the centralized 
institutions charged with providing redress. 
The government did not investigate any officials for complicity 
in human trafficking, but corruption and official complicity in 
trafficking crimes remained significant concerns. The pandemic-
related lockdown, a five-month airport closure, and the economic 
fallout in many destination countries disrupted labor migration 
for much of the reporting period and may have removed some 
opportunities for corruption. During previous reporting periods, 
NGOs reported traffickers bribed government officials to include 
false information in genuine Nepali passports and provide fraudulent 
documents to prospective labor migrants or foreign employment 
agents. NGOs had concerns that because a number of government 
officials, including parliamentarians, maintained close ties to foreign 
employment agencies, such officials might have a conflict of interest 
in approving migrant-friendly practices, such as prosecution of 
abusive recruitment agencies and increasing protections for migrant 
workers. In November 2017, the Commission for the Investigation 
of Abuse of Authority arrested the Director General of DFE and two 
DFE officials for allegedly attempting to collect a bribe from a foreign 
employment agency. In December 2020, the former Director General 
was convicted and sentenced to one and a half years in prison and 
a one million NPR ($8,550) fine. One of the DFE officers received 
the same sentence as the former Director General, and the other 
was acquitted. NGOs alleged some police and political party leaders 
were complicit in sex trafficking in conjunction with their financial 
involvement in the AES. Some traffickers, including owners of AES 
establishments and exploitative orphanages, enjoyed impunity due 
to personal connections with politicians and by bribing police to 
avoid raids or procure fraudulent identity documents. 
During the previous reporting period, the UN Human Rights 
Committee heard two cases against Nepali military officials who 
allegedly forced one boy and one girl into labor in 2010 and 2002, 
respectively. In the first case, a Nepali man alleged that when he was 
between 12 and 14 years old, a Nepali army officer forced him into 
domestic work for 18 hours per day without pay from 2010-2012. 
When he escaped in 2012, he alleged the official filed a fraudulent 
complaint of theft, police arrested and tortured him, which medical 
reports substantiated, and the judiciary refused to investigate his 
claims. The committee ordered the government to compensate the 
man, but it refused to do so or to criminally investigate the suspects. 
In the second case, the committee urged the government to support 
a woman’s claim that in 2002, at age 14, the former Royal Nepalese 
Army and police arrested, detained, forced her into labor at military 
barracks, and then they forced her to become an informant on the 
anti-government Maoist forces. The government has yet to initiate 
any criminal investigations or compensation procedures. 
PROTECTION
The government decreased efforts to identify and protect trafficking 
victims. Authorities did not systematically track the total number 
of victims identified and did not have uniform SOPs for victim 
identification and referral to services. NPWC had internal guidelines 
on the identification and treatment of victims, and during the 
reporting period the Ministry of Women, Children, and Senior 
Citizens (MWCSC) finalized and submitted for final approval SOPs 
on victim identification, referral, and data collection. Officials’ poor 
understanding of trafficking and the lack of SOPs hindered proactive 
identification, especially among returning male migrant workers 
exploited abroad. Police did not always recognize that children in 
commercial sex constituted sex trafficking and sometimes removed 
girls 16-17 years old from commercial sex, sent them home, and did 
not refer them to services or file criminal charges against the client. 
NPWC identified 141 victims in its 97 investigations, a decrease 
from 387 victims in 258 cases the previous year. Of the 141 victims, 
traffickers exploited 32 in sex trafficking and two in labor trafficking; 
reports did not specify the type of trafficking for the other 107 
victims. The 141 victims included 62 victims aged 18 or younger 
and eight males, a decrease from 150 victims 18 or younger and 71 
males identified the previous year. The pandemic slowed physical 
monitoring of children’s homes; however, the National Child Rights 
Council, which continued to monitor childcare homes remotely 
and with NGO assistance, removed 48 children from exploitation in 
abusive and unregistered orphanages during the reporting period. The 
orphanages had forced some children into labor making handicrafts 
and begging and had sexually abused other children. The government 
estimated at least one-third of the total registered orphanages did 
not meet government standards and did not have regular oversight. 
Police lacked the staff, resources, and training required to patrol 
Nepal’s nearly 1,100-mile border with India, where significant 
transnational trafficking occurred; therefore, NGOs conducted 
checkpoint inspections where possible but focused almost entirely 
on intercepting female travelers. Police reported NGOs did not always 
alert them when the NGOs identified potential trafficking victims.
Although the government had national standards for victim care, 
referral efforts remained ad hoc and inadequate. NPWC typically 
referred trafficking victims to government-run one-stop emergency 
centers located within hospitals or to NGOs, both of which could 
provide shelter, medical, and legal services. The government did not 
report how many victims it referred to services. NGOs reported that 
pandemic-related lockdowns restricted the availability of resources 
that trafficking victims and survivors rely on. The government referred 
victims to one of the 10 shelters for trafficking victims that NGOs 
operated, with some MWCSC assistance. The government did not 
report how much funding it allocated to the 10 shelters and to its 
embassies abroad to care for victims. While the shelters assisted 
1,158 victims of crime generally during the fiscal year, including 
trafficking victims, the shelters had to restrict or halt several services 
due to pandemic-related restrictions. While organizations offered 
some services online, such as mental health counseling, NGOs noted 
the government’s pandemic-related safety lockdown and social 
distancing requirements created situations similar to those victims 
faced while under traffickers’ control. Moreover, some NGOs were 
unable to maintain their full operations in support of victims, as 
funding streams were reduced or diverted to the pandemic. MWCSC 
and NGOs operated 123 community service centers across 36 districts 
for female victims of gender-based violence, including trafficking. 
MWCSC paid for victim’s basic needs, including lodging, food, health 
services, psycho-social counseling, and capacity building, while 
NGOs cover other administrative and staff costs. NGOs reported 
MWCSC only disbursed the funding when reimbursement was 
requested. To ensure implementation of Nepal’s 2012 National 
Minimum Standards of Victim Care and Protection and Standard 
Operating Procedures on Rehabilitation Centers (SOPRC), the 
NCCHT monitored the 10 rehabilitation homes and required NGOs 
running government-funded rehabilitation homes and shelters to 
periodically submit details of their operations. Similarly, district 
anti-trafficking committees are required to conduct at least one 
monitoring visit to government-funded shelters every six months; the 





hospitals should have provided free medical assistance to trafficking 
victims, they often charged NGOs for such care. MWCSC maintains 
it provides the same services to male and female trafficking victims 
through the Victim Assistance Rehabilitation Fund. Nevertheless, 
international organizations reported male and labor trafficking 
victims frequently did not receive services. Victims could obtain 
restitution from traffickers through criminal proceedings, or if the 
government was unable to collect the fines imposed on traffickers, 
the government could provide back wages from a rehabilitation 
fund. As in prior reporting periods, the government did not report 
if any victims obtained restitution or if the government provided 
any compensation from the fund. 
Overall victim-witness protection mechanisms and the practices 
of police and justice officials remained insufficient. In civil suits 
against their traffickers, most victims remained unaware of the 
HTTCA provision granting the right to private representation. Even 
in cases where victims had private representation, the attorneys 
often could not build strong cases because law enforcement and the 
judiciary denied them access to critical case files and the dates of 
hearings. Police continued efforts to pay for some victim and witness 
transportation and lodging during judicial hearings; authorities did 
not report whether they provided these services to any trafficking 
victims. Victims can provide testimony via video or written statement; 
however, most courts do not have facilities for video conferences 
and even when they do, officials have not often made victims aware 
of the option. Victims continued to report challenges in providing 
testimony, including threats from perpetrators, and the lack of 
compensation and lack of ability to collect compensation when 
awarded. Notably, resource limitations impeded authorities’ provision 
of a victim’s right to police protection, and observers stated victims 
were reluctant to file criminal complaints under HTTCA in part 
because of personal or family safety concerns. The HTTCA authorized 
the judiciary to fine victims who failed to appear in court and hold 
victims criminally liable for providing testimony contradicting their 
previous statements. Some police arrested, detained, and fined adult 
and child sex trafficking victims for crimes their traffickers compelled 
them to commit. The government did not have legal alternatives to 
the deportation of foreign victims. The Department of Immigration 
continued to deport foreign nationals who had overstayed their visas; 
the government did not report whether the department screened for 
trafficking among those deported.
Government services for its nationals exploited abroad remained 
inadequate. The 2007 FEA required the government to appoint 
labor attachés in countries with more than 5,000 registered Nepali 
migrant workers to facilitate claims of abuse, exploitation, and 
repatriation. Due to the cost of the attachés, however, they were 
not present in all required countries. While some embassies could 
provide temporary shelter and repatriate trafficking victims, officials 
acknowledged inadequate staffing and resources created large delays 
in provision of assistance, and the quality of the government-run 
shelters was poor. Nepali embassies in Bahrain, Kuwait, Malaysia, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, and UAE could provide 
emergency shelter for approximately 25 female migrant workers each, 
some of whom were trafficking victims; embassies did not report the 
number of workers assisted. The Foreign Employment Board (FEB) 
acknowledged shelters lacked sufficient space, staff, and resources 
to meet the high demand for assistance. FEB collected fees from 
departing registered migrant workers for a welfare fund to provide 
repatriation and one year of financial support to families of injured 
or deceased workers, which could include trafficking victims. During 
the fiscal year, the fund repatriated 1,398 migrant workers, an increase 
from 84 the previous year and largely the result of pandemic-related 
repatriation policies of destination countries. Additionally, 413 bodies 
of Nepalis who had died while employed abroad were repatriated, 
an increase from repatriation of 391 bodies the previous year. The 
government did not report identifying any trafficking victims among 
those repatriated or initiating any criminal investigations into their 
exploitation. MWCSC funded Nepali embassies to repatriate an 
additional 53 Nepali trafficking victims from India and Sri Lanka, 
as well as united 471 internal trafficking victims with their families 
during the reporting period. FEB could also repatriate undocumented 
migrant workers, including trafficking victims, by requesting funds 
through the finance ministry on an ad hoc basis, but it could not 
provide any other financial support or services. Other government 
agencies repeatedly rejected FEB’s proposal to create a welfare fund 
for undocumented migrant workers exploited abroad, including 
trafficking victims. NGOs bore the primary cost of repatriating Nepali 
trafficking victims from India and noted that due to the lack of formal 
repatriation procedures between countries, repatriation could take 
up to two years. DFE maintained an online migrant worker portal 
that allowed migrant workers facing abusive or untenable situations 
overseas, or someone on the migrant worker’s behalf, to file a request 
for repatriation. NGOs reported many migrants lacked the requisite 
computer access or skills to use the site. NGOs reported coordination 
between the labor ministry and MWCSC remained weak, and labor 
officials did not routinely inform labor trafficking victims about the 
services MWCSC and NGOs could provide. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained overall efforts to prevent human 
trafficking. The NCCHT continued to lead interagency efforts on 
human trafficking. While it coordinated anti-trafficking action within 
the government and with civil society, observers noted frequent 
turnover among members continued to hamper efficacy. Additionally, 
the government operated and funded local anti-trafficking committees 
(LCCHTs) and district anti-trafficking committees (DCCHTs), but as 
the government reorganized these structures over past years, several 
became inactive and had not yet been reinstated. NGOs reported the 
lack of resourced LCCHTs and DCCHTs limited key anti-trafficking 
efforts to the national level, which caused delays. MWCSC did 
not report how much funding it allocated to these committees for 
prevention and protection activities. While the NCCHT continued 
to meet with and train officials from the DCCHTs, observers noted 
the need for improved coordination between the NCCHT, DCCHTs, 
and LCCHTs. MWCSC began amending legislation to redefine 
each committee’s role. A January 2018 MWCSC-led review of the 
2012-2022 anti-trafficking national action plan (NAP) revealed 
the government had implemented less than one-third of the plan’s 
prosecution and capacity-building objectives. During the reporting 
period, the MWCSC formed a task force to revise the NAP in line 
with the government’s new federal structure and issued its eighth 
annual report on the government’s anti-trafficking efforts. However, 
the National Human Rights Commission’s Office of the Special 
Rapporteur on Trafficking in Women and Children did not issue its 
report due to the pandemic. The government continued to conduct 
public awareness campaigns throughout the country, sometimes 
in partnership with NGOs or international organizations. During 
the reporting period, MWCSC produced a radio program to raise 
awareness and disseminate information about trafficking. 
Existing laws did not permit labor inspectors to monitor AES 
establishments for labor violations, which NGOs reported allowed 
many establishments to use children and adult trafficking victims with 
impunity. While the government had special committees to monitor 
the AES to mitigate this regulatory gap, they, too, remained highly 
dependent on individual officers and did not have a comprehensive 
regulatory framework to use when monitoring such establishments. 
Observers estimated only half of AES establishments had valid 
registration. NGOs raised concerns that victims may have had even less 
chance of being identified when, due to the government’s pandemic-
related restrictions, the AES shut down for most of the reporting 
period and may have moved to unmonitored private residences.
The DFE maintained offices in all seven provinces to increase 
prospective migrant workers’ access to foreign employment-related 
services. In addition, the FEB operated approximately 41 Migrant 
Resource/Information Centers at the district level, which provided 
information on authorized recruitment agencies, maximum fees 
that the agencies can charge workers, and information on the risks 
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and challenges of working abroad and potential ways to minimize 
the risks. However, lengthy pandemic-related lockdowns, as well as 
closures of the national airport and border with India, limited the 
ability of Nepalis to travel and subsequently limited the government’s 
trafficking prevention screening efforts designed around cross-border 
movement. With the support of an international organization, the FEB 
revised the two-day pre-departure orientation curriculum for migrant 
workers. Some NGOs also provided training to migrant workers, 
based on the revised curriculum. However, since the course was not 
mandatory, its implementation remained ad hoc. The government 
offered free skill tests for returned migrant workers and provided 
certifications for skills obtained abroad; it did not report how many 
workers utilized these services. During the reporting period, Nepal 
signed a labor recruitment MOU with the Government of Israel to 
provide employment for migrant workers in the fields of agriculture, 
construction, and hospitality. Inconsistent with the international best 
practice of employer-paid fees, the agreement required the migrant 
worker to pay recruitment fees and related migration costs. 
The government’s labor migration policies remained lengthy, costly, 
and sometimes discriminatory against women. The Parliamentary 
Committee for Industry, Commerce, Labour and Consumer Welfare 
issued recommendations to lift the outright ban on migration of 
female domestic workers younger than age 24 to Gulf States and 
mothers with children younger than two, if certain pre-conditions 
were met. Observers had noted such outright bans on migration 
increased the likelihood such women would migrate illegally. These 
pre-conditions stated destination countries should have: a strong and 
separate law for ensuring services, conditions, and the protection of 
migrant domestic workers; a bilateral labor agreement with Nepal 
that ensures workers’ basic rights like wages and weekly and annual 
leave; social security mechanisms that include the migrant worker; 
provisions on occupational safety and health; provisions on working 
hours and additional benefits for extra work; and 24-hour insurance 
coverage. The government did not report how it was implementing 
this recommendation or whether it intended to lift the ban outright. 
Migrant rights activists expressed concern the government continued 
to send Nepali female domestic workers abroad to countries without 
bilateral agreements to protect workers’ rights. 
The government’s 2015 labor migration guidelines included a policy 
requiring foreign employers to pay visa and transportation costs for 
Nepali migrant workers bound for Malaysia and the Gulf and restricted 
agency-charged recruitment fees to 10,000 NPR ($85). Among the 
854 licensed manpower agencies in Nepal, only15 had authorization 
to recruit domestic workers (down from 24). The government 
did not report if it initiated any civil or criminal investigations 
into the agents or agencies. Both NGOs and government officials 
noted the government’s monitoring mechanism of employment 
agencies was ineffective to address non-compliance; agencies regularly 
charged migrant workers fees above the 10,000 NPR ($85) limit. 
An international organization reported DFE continued regular 
monitoring and inspection of recruitment agencies suspected to be 
conducting irregular activities during the pandemic; however, FEB 
did not report if it identified or referred any non-compliance cases 
during the reporting period. Observers reported DFE settled the vast 
majority of labor complaints administratively and neither referred 
violators to the FET for civil penalties nor to police for criminal 
investigation. DFE officials stated employment agencies continued to 
regularly charge Nepali workers during the reporting period for visas, 
airplane tickets, and/or service fees above the cap, and added that 
they believed bilateral labor agreements with destination countries 
would be essential for enforcing labor rights. 
While the informal sector employed more than 70 percent of workers 
in the country, including nearly all child laborers, inspectors did not 
regularly inspect the informal sector for violations, including forced 
labor. The government continued to fund and conduct inspections 
focused specifically on child labor. However, NGOs reported the 
Department of Labor (DOL) did not take meaningful action against 
perpetrators of child and forced child labor and did not undertake 
many unannounced inspections. DOL did not report how many 
child laborers it identified or removed from exploitative conditions 
during the reporting period, and it typically only removed children 
whom employers physically or sexually abused. While civil society 
reported forced and bonded labor at carpet factories, labor inspectors 
did not regularly monitor the factories, and police did not report 
investigations into allegedly exploitative employers. DOL did not 
report referring any employers for criminal investigation or issuing 
assessed administrative penalties. Furthermore, NGOs reported 
DOL encouraged mediation over prosecution, including in cases of 
forced child labor. During the reporting period, as NGOs reported 
the pandemic led to an increased number of children working 
in agriculture, domestic service, and on the streets, DOL passed 
a guideline to declare child labor-free municipalities, which set 
criteria for all local governments to maintain a child labor-free 
environment. The government set a target to declare at least 25 
municipalities child labor-free by July 2021and sent more than 30 
million subscribers text messages to raise awareness. The government 
organized media campaigns and workshops to hold discussions on 
child labor; however, these were limited due to pandemic restrictions. 
The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for 
commercial sex acts. Despite multiple cases of child sex tourism, 
the government did not make efforts to prevent child sex tourism. 
The government did not provide anti-trafficking training to its 
diplomatic personnel. The government officially acceded to 2000 
UN TIP Protocol in June 2020. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Nepal, and traffickers exploit Nepali victims 
abroad. Sex traffickers exploit Nepali women and girls in Nepal, 
India, the Middle East, Malaysia, and—to a lesser extent—other 
Asian countries and Sub-Saharan Africa. Traffickers use Nepal’s open 
border with India to transport Nepali women and children to India 
for sex trafficking. Labor traffickers exploit Nepali men, women, and 
children in Nepal, India, and the Middle East, especially men in the 
construction sector and women in domestic work. The government 
estimates approximately 1.5 million Nepalis work in the Middle 
East, with the vast majority of men in construction in Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and UAE. Nepalis work under oppressive conditions, which 
include forced labor, and there are continuing reports that employers 
retain their passports and sometimes do not pay them for months at 
a time. Due to the Government of Nepal’s previous ban on female 
domestic workers to Gulf countries, many Nepali domestic workers 
in Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia do not have valid work permits, 
which increases their vulnerability to traffickers. Labor traffickers 
exploit Nepali men, women, and children in East Asia—including 
in China, Japan, and Malaysia, and Europe—including Portugal, on 
farms and in construction, factories, mines, begging, and the adult 
entertainment industry. Traffickers bring Nepali victims to Europe 
and Australia on tourist, student, marriage, and work visas. Some 
recruitment agencies and agents engage in fraudulent recruitment 
practices and impose high fees to facilitate forced labor. Traffickers 
target unregistered migrants, including the large number of young 
Nepali women who transit India or men and women who rely on 
unregistered recruitment agents. Some Nepali women who agree to 
arranged marriages through Nepali companies to men in China and 
South Korea are forced into domestic servitude. Traffickers subject 
some migrants who transit Nepal en route to the Middle East to 
human trafficking, including Bangladeshis and Sri Lankans who use 
falsified Nepali travel documents. Some government officials accept 
bribes to include false information in Nepali identity documents 
or provide fraudulent documents to prospective labor migrants, 
which allows recruiters to evade recruitment regulations. Traffickers 
reportedly take advantage of more relaxed pre-departure screenings at 
Kolkata and Chennai airports or bribe Indian officials in New Delhi 
and Mumbai to fly Nepali migrant workers to third countries without 
proper documentation, which increases the workers’ vulnerability to 
trafficking. Labor traffickers also transport Nepali victims through 





increasingly used social media and mobile technologies to lure and 
deceive victims during the government’s pandemic-related lockdown.
Within Nepal, forced labor, including through debt-based bondage, 
of adults and children exists in agriculture, brick kilns, the stone-
breaking industry, and domestic work. For example, traffickers use debt 
to coerce a community of landless Dalit known as Haruwa-Charuwa 
into forced labor in the agricultural sector in certain districts of the 
eastern Terai region of Nepal. A government study documented more 
than 61,000 Nepalis—including approximately 10,000 children—
in forced labor over the past five years, especially in agriculture, 
forestry, and construction. NGOs continued to report some children 
worked in brick kilns, including carrying loads, preparing bricks, 
and performing other tasks at kilns for extended periods. A 2021 
international organization report estimated 17,000 children worked 
in brick kilns. Traffickers subject Nepali and Indian children to forced 
labor in the embroidered textile, or zari industry, as well as in carpet 
factories and stone quarrying. According to the government’s 2017-
2018 labor survey, traffickers force children younger than 15 into 
labor in agriculture, forestry, and construction. Some Nepali brick 
kilns employ Indian migrant laborers, including children, who take 
out large advances that require them to work for subsequent seasons. 
Traffickers exploit debts to compel adults and children into labor in 
carpet factories. Parents sometimes force their children to work in 
carpet factories to repay family debts. Recruitment agents promise 
Bangladeshi workers well-paying jobs in Nepali carpet factories but 
exploit them, including by obtaining tourist visas for them instead of 
work visas and pay less than the agreed wages. Traffickers use children 
to transport drugs across the Indian-Nepali border. 
Traffickers subject Nepali girls, boys, and transgender persons to sex 
trafficking in Nepal on the streets and in the AES, including dance 
bars, massage parlors, and cabin “restaurants,” a type of brothel. 
Sex traffickers increasingly use private apartments, rented rooms, 
guesthouses, and restaurants as locations for sex trafficking. A study 
focused on the Kathmandu Valley determined approximately 17 
percent of workers in the AES are minors and 62 percent of adult 
women in the AES had commenced work while a minor, including 
as young as seven years old. Many women reported a family or friend 
had connected them to the establishment, where they voluntarily 
agreed to waitress-like positions. Their employers then exploited 
them in forced labor or sex trafficking. The study estimated nearly 
30 percent of all minor workers in AES establishments are victims 
of forced labor, usually as restaurant staff, and employers later 
subject many to sex trafficking. Police report an increasing trend of 
AES businesses recruiting Nepali female employees for work abroad 
in the same sector, which increases vulnerability to sex trafficking 
abroad. NGOs alleged some police and political party leaders are 
complicit in sex trafficking because of their financial involvement in 
the AES. NGOs reported girls in early and forced marriages, especially 
in the Terai region among Dalit and Madhesi communities, were 
vulnerable to sex traffickers. 
Under false promises of education and work opportunities, some 
Nepali parents give their children to brokers who instead take them 
to frequently unregistered children’s homes and force them to pretend 
to be orphans to garner donations from tourists and volunteers. 
The government instructed childcare homes to return children to 
their families prior to the government’s pandemic-related lockdown; 
however, NGOs estimate more than 11,000 children remain in registered 
children’s homes and “orphanages,” and international organizations 
and NGOs approximate 80 to 85 percent have at least one living parent. 
Seventy-five percent of registered Nepali orphanages and children’s 
homes are located in the country’s five main tourist districts, out of 77 
national districts. Some of the orphanages and homes force children 
into manual labor or begging, force them to entertain visitors for 
donations, and sexually abuse them. Since 2016, police have identified 
and arrested at least 12 tourists or international volunteers, all men 
older than 50 mostly from Western countries (Austria, Canada, 
Denmark, France, Germany, India, Netherlands, United Kingdom, 
and United States), for sexual abuse of Nepali children, including 
child sex trafficking. NGOs reported some owners of exploitative child 
institutions, including fake orphanages, use political connections to 
thwart child protective agencies and prosecution. Traffickers target 
young, poorly educated people from traditionally marginalized castes 
and ethnic minority communities and increasingly utilize social media 
and mobile technologies to lure their victims. Law enforcement reported 
victims’ families are sometimes complicit in their trafficking. Organized 
criminal networks engage in trafficking in some parts of the country. 
Many Nepalis whose homes or livelihood were destroyed by the 2015 
earthquakes—especially women and children—remain vulnerable to 
trafficking. The government does not provide documentation to most 
of the approximately 10,000 Tibetan refugees in the country, which 
prevents them from legally working, studying, traveling, and accessing 
public services. According to a local NGO, upwards of 6.7 million 
individuals—one-quarter of Nepal's population—lack citizenship 
documentation, rendering them de facto stateless. Nepali law treats 
newly arrived asylum-seekers and UNHCR-recognized refugees as illegal 
immigrants and does not provide for government-issued identification. 
Lack of documentation precludes the participation of all these groups 
in the formal economy and increases their vulnerability to traffickers.
NETHERLANDS: TIER 1‡
The Government of the Netherlands fully meets the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued 
to demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting 
period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its 
anti-trafficking capacity; therefore the Netherlands remained on Tier 
1. These efforts included doubling the number of trafficking victims 
it identified, passing legislation to criminalize knowingly soliciting 
a sex trafficking victim, more than doubling its funding for NGO-
managed shelters for trafficking victims, and increasing efforts to 
combat labor trafficking. Moreover, authorities in Bonaire conducted 
two trafficking investigations, and identified and offered services to 
two victims, the first time in several years that the islands of Bonaire, 
Sint Eustasius, and Saba (BES islands) investigated a trafficking case 
or identified a victim. Although the government meets the minimum 
standards, it convicted fewer traffickers for the third consecutive year 
and anti-trafficking efforts on the Dutch Caribbean islands remained 
weak. The government did not provide support services for foreign 
victims who did not cooperate with law enforcement investigations 
and revoked these victims’ residence permits. Children remained 
vulnerable to trafficking in the protection system, and the government 
did not report complete victim statistics for the reporting period.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, convict, and sentence 
traffickers to significant prison terms. • Provide all potential trafficking 
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‡ The Netherlands, along with the Dutch Caribbean islands of Aruba, Curaçao, and Sint Maarten form the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Although semi-autonomous entities, 
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islands are special municipalities of the Netherlands and are fully under the authority of the Dutch government. 
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victims with care services, regardless of their ability to cooperate 
with an investigation. • Strengthen the child protection system to 
protect against vulnerability to trafficking. • Improve data collection 
quality for law enforcement and ensure the timely release of victim 
identification data for policy evaluation. • Incorporate measurable 
goals into the national action plan. • Increase outreach to potential 
victims in labor sectors and identify victims of forced labor. • 
Improve coordination and information-sharing with anti-trafficking 
counterparts across the Kingdom of the Netherlands, including 
in Aruba, Curaçao, and Sint Maarten. • Implement results-based 
training and mentoring of officials in the BES islands to increase 
identification of victims and prosecution of traffickers. • Expand 
the rapporteur’s mandate or assign another independent body to 
evaluate anti-trafficking efforts and assess trafficking prevalence in 
the BES islands.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained mixed law enforcement efforts. 
Article 273f of the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and 
labor trafficking and prescribed punishments of up to 12 years’ 
imprisonment or a fine of up to €87,000 ($106,750) for trafficking 
offenses involving an adult victim and up to 15 years’ imprisonment 
or a fine of up to €87,000 ($106,750) for those offenses in which the 
victim was a child. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, 
with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as rape. 
Police referred 187 trafficking suspects to the prosecutor’s office for 
further investigation, compared with 145 in 2019. The government 
prosecuted 120 alleged traffickers, compared with 101 in 2019. Courts 
convicted 53 traffickers, compared with 84 in 2019. The government 
did not report complete sentencing data but noted that the average 
prison sentence for convicted traffickers was two years; seven traffickers 
received sentences in excess of three years. The government closed 
the courts between March 2020 and May 2020 due to the pandemic, 
and observers reported pandemic-related restrictions in the first half 
of 2020 limited law enforcement’s ability to conduct investigations. 
Regional police units maintained specialized teams with trained 
anti-trafficking detectives and experts, and the national police 
had dedicated anti-trafficking officers. Specialized anti-trafficking 
prosecutors and judges tried and heard cases. Observers reported 
the police did not allocate sufficient resources to anti-trafficking 
efforts, as the government shifted funding to counterterrorism and 
organized crime investigations. Law enforcement efforts remained 
weak in the BES islands. The Dutch Caribbean Police Corps, which 
operated exclusively in Bonaire, Sint Eustatius, and Saba, conducted 
two trafficking investigations in Bonaire; the investigations were 
ongoing at the end of the reporting period. For the third consecutive 
year, authorities in Sint Eustatius and Saba did not investigate, 
prosecute, or convict any traffickers. Authorities in Bonaire maintained 
a trafficking database, which served as a repository for future leads 
on trafficking cases.
The government continued to participate in international 
investigations and led joint investigation teams with other EU nations, 
including Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, and Romania. 
The government led EUROPOL’s European Multidisciplinary Platform 
Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT) program on human trafficking. 
The Ministry of Justice and Security (MJS) posted new police liaison 
officers in Croatia, Italy, and Poland to monitor migrants vulnerable 
to trafficking. The government provided police and prosecutorial 
assistance and training overseas, and it funded anti-trafficking 
programs in victim source countries; the government supported 
law enforcement capacity-building projects that included combating 
trafficking in Nigeria, Egypt, Mali, Niger, Ghana, Zambia, Morocco, 
and Côte d’Ivoire. Dutch authorities trained customs and coast guard 
officials in the BES islands and seconded Dutch law enforcement staff 
to the BES islands and Aruba, Curaçao, and Sint Maarten; observers 
reported many law enforcement officials were unfamiliar with the 
seconding system, and the countries did not take full advantage of 
this program. The government maintained a 2016 memorandum 
of understanding on law enforcement cooperation, including anti-
trafficking cooperation, with Aruba, Curaçao, Sint Maarten, and the 
United States. The government continued to deliver anti-trafficking 
training to law enforcement; training remained institutionalized 
as part of the standard professional curriculum across agencies. 
Anti-trafficking police officers were required to pass examinations 
in a training course focused on policing commercial sex. Judges, 
prosecutors, and defense attorneys continued to receive specialized 
training in applying the anti-trafficking law and trauma-informed 
care for victims. The government did not report any investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit 
in human trafficking offenses. The government frequently did not 
charge child sex traffickers under the trafficking law but under a sexual 
abuse law (article 248b), which carried lesser penalties. However, the 
government passed legislation in March 2021 to criminalize knowingly 
soliciting a sex trafficking victim with penalties of up to four years’ 
imprisonment and a fine; the approved legislation was awaiting final 
approval by the head of state at the end of the reporting period. The 
government increased the budget for the Aliens Police, Identification, 
and People Trafficking Department by €10 million ($12.27 million) 
for anti-trafficking efforts; a third of the funding was allocated for 
alien registration to bolster non-EU victim identification. 
PROTECTION
The government increased efforts to protect victims. In 2019, the most 
recent year for which official data was available, the government-funded 
national victim registration center and assistance coordinator registered 
1,334 possible trafficking victims, compared with 668 in 2018. Of 
these, 849 were victims of sex trafficking, 424 of labor trafficking, 
including 196 subjected to forced criminality, and 61 of uncategorized 
trafficking. Children comprised 108 of the victims, compared with 
62 in 2018. In 2019, the top five countries of origin of victims were: 
Nigeria (512), the Netherlands (244), Uganda (91), Poland (83), and 
The Gambia (49). The police reported identifying 952 victims (530 
in 2018); regional health care organizations 252 (91 in 2018); labor 
inspectors 46 (75 in 2018); border security 10 (12 in 2018); and other 
organizations identified the remaining victims. Observers stated the 
increase in the number of identified victims was due to government 
training efforts, an increased willingness of international victims to 
self-identify as victims during the asylum process, and improved 
understanding of the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 
in the context of victim identification. Authorities in Bonaire identified 
two victims in 2020; the government offered services to both victims 
and granted one special residency status. 
During the reporting period, observers reported the GDPR, which 
required non-law enforcement organizations to obtain consent 
from the victim before official registration unless a “justified 
interest” existed, continued to deter some victims from registering. 
Nevertheless, experts agreed it was not the GDPR itself that caused 
victims to fear stigmatization as a trafficking victim and withdraw 
from the victim process, but rather the strict interpretation of the 
regulation by many non-law-enforcement organizations out of fear 
of being non-compliant with EU privacy regulations. Experts stated 
the GDPR considered providing care to trafficking victims a “justified 
interest,” and, therefore, the government could provide social services 
without victim consent. Observers stated many stakeholders began 
to provide relevant information for victims who required immediate 
assistance, including medical treatment, and arranged consent with 
the victim afterward. In November 2020, the MJS published a manual 
with guidance to stakeholders on the GDPR and reporting potential 
victims. Additionally, some observers reported an increase in self-
identification among asylum-seekers, especially among individuals 
from Nigeria. An NGO noted, however, that many non-EU third 
country nationals seeking asylum had difficulty in accessing victim 
care services. MJS provided awareness training to the Immigration 









The government funded an extensive network of care facilities for 
both foreign and domestic victims. The government fully funded 
three NGO-managed shelters that provided dedicated services for 
child and adult trafficking victims; the shelters could house 58 
shelter victims, including 14 spaces designated for male victims. 
The government provided €1.44 million ($1.77 million) to the 
shelters, compared with €600,000 ($736,200) in 2019. All shelters 
provided medical and psychological care, schooling, language 
and skills training, and legal assistance; some also provided self-
defense classes, and most had facilities accessible to individuals with 
disabilities. Local governments also funded shelters for domestic 
violence victims, which had dedicated space for trafficking victims. 
The government funded specialized care for up to 36 people in 
six shelters for trafficking victims who also had a psychological 
disorder, developmental limitations, or “substance abuse disease.” 
The government allocated €2 million ($2.45 million) to services for 
victims requiring specialized care. 
Children remained vulnerable in the protection system; civil society 
reported care workers were not sufficiently trained to identify child 
trafficking victims. Observers noted children leaving Dutch asylum 
centers to unknown destinations was a Europe-wide problem that 
needed to be tackled at the European level. The national rapporteur 
and civil society agreed the government was actively engaged in 
addressing this issue, including through law enforcement cooperation 
via the EMPACT project. 
While holding the presidency of the Benelux Union in 2020, the 
government worked with Belgium and Luxembourg to improve 
cooperation on victim protection, including by publishing an updated 
brochure to raise awareness among the public and potential victims 
about anti-trafficking laws and referral and assistance programs in 
each of the three countries. Together with Belgium and Hungary, the 
government continued to administer a project to provide resources 
for social workers, legal experts, and law enforcement authorities, 
among others, to increase knowledge of victim referral and assistance 
mechanisms, particularly for Hungarian victims in the Netherlands 
and Belgium. In 2019, the government provided funding to Aruba 
and Curaçao to support the response to arriving Venezuelan migrants, 
a group vulnerable to trafficking. The governments of Aruba and 
Curaçao allocated a subset of this funding to anti-trafficking efforts in 
2019 and 2020, including awareness campaigns and victim services. 
However, funding for anti-trafficking efforts in Aruba, Curaçao, and 
Sint Maarten remained sporadic and insufficient. 
By the end of the reporting period, 33 of the country’s 35 health care 
regions had a trafficking victim coordinator, and the government 
funded an NGO to assist the two regions without a coordinator. 
The government continued funding a website to provide victim 
identification and referral information to first responders and other 
professionals who may encounter a victim, and it supported an 
initiative by victim care organizations to develop best practices for 
prevention and protection of male victims of sexual exploitation. 
Although victims could request physical separation from a suspect 
during court proceedings, observers expressed concern that frequently 
lengthy trials re-traumatized victims. Judges often awarded restitution 
to victims, and if the perpetrator did not pay the court-ordered amount 
within eight months, the government assumed responsibility for 
collecting the payment from the perpetrator. Authorities reported 
courts ordered higher restitution awards than was typical in a number 
of cases in 2020, highlighting a case in which a judge awarded 
€310,000 ($380,370) to two victims. 
The government permitted potential victims to stay in shelter care 
for a three-month reflection period to begin recovery and decide 
whether to assist law enforcement. During the reflection period, 
non-EU victims had access to specialized shelters but could not 
work. After the reflection period, victims who agreed to assist police 
could continue to stay in shelters. Non-EU victims willing to press 
charges were eligible for a short-term residence permit (B-8 permit), 
valid for a maximum of five years; the B-8 permit allowed non-EU 
victims to seek employment. If authorities decided to prosecute the 
suspected trafficker, the victim was eligible to receive permanent B-8 
legal residency. The government did not report how many foreign 
victims applied for the permanent B-8 permit (333 applied in 2018, 
the most recent year data was available). According to civil society, 
foreign victims who ceased cooperation with authorities lost their 
residence permits and consequently all government-sponsored 
support services. Moreover, some NGOs noted law enforcement 
could quickly drop a case if it did not immediately find sufficient 
potential evidence for a successful prosecution, leading to victims 
potentially being excluded from services. A victim could apply for 
asylum if their case closed without a conviction or they declined 
to assist in an investigation. The government did not report the 
number of potential victims who applied for asylum. A procedure 
also existed to grant victims residency, separate from B-8 eligibility, 
in cases where they were seriously threatened or had serious medical 
or psychological conditions. Authorities worked with civil society 
to repatriate foreign victims unable to acquire residence permits; an 
international organization assisted in repatriating approximately 10 
victims in 2020. The government continued a policy of transferring 
Dublin asylum claimants to their original country of asylum 
registration, including claimants who had potentially been subjected 
to trafficking in another EU country. Civil society observed this 
policy led to the deportation of many victims who were in need 
of support. Authorities noted that when a Dublin asylum claimant 
was returned to a Dublin country of origin, Dutch law enforcement 
shared all investigation data with their counterparts in the country 
of origin to facilitate investigation and prosecution of a case. The 
government extended immigration relief to victims facing deportation 
or repatriation to countries with a high rate of COVID-19 infections 
and to victims who could not return to their home countries due 
to travel restrictions; the government allowed identified victims to 
stay two to six weeks beyond the three-month reflection period 
in specialized shelters for trafficking victims or in asylum centers.
PREVENTION
The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking. The Human 
Trafficking Task Force, chaired by the chief national prosecutor and 
composed of local and national government authorities, the private 
sector, and NGO representatives, set long-term anti-trafficking policies, 
while MJS led the implementation and coordination of anti-trafficking 
efforts. The government continued implementing the 2018 national 
action plan (NAP), focused on improving information sharing among 
stakeholders, identifying more victims, strengthening local governments’ 
anti-trafficking programs, and increasing efforts against labor trafficking. 
Survivors provided input to the NAP through mostly virtual regional 
trafficking “expert” sessions held throughout the reporting period; these 
meetings bolstered information sharing between localities and with 
the national government. Several NGOs criticized the NAP for its lack 
of measurable goals and monitoring tools, although the government 
issued a report in November 2020 on its progress implementing 
the NAP. The national rapporteur, tasked with monitoring policy 
implementation, gathering and reporting statistics, and making 
recommendations to the government, published two reports during 
the reporting period that analyzed victim statistics from 2015-2019 
and trafficking crimes from 2015-2019. The government continued 
multiple awareness campaigns, some of which were conducted by local 
governments or through NGOs. The government continued trainings for 
medical professionals and social service providers and developed two 
toolkits to educate teachers and students to identify trafficking indicators 
at schools. Additionally, the government supported two “innovation 
field labs” in cooperation with a United States university to bring 
together stakeholders to develop new methods to counter trafficking 
within the commercial sex industry and to fight labor trafficking, 
including criminal exploitation. Teams of police, labor inspectors, 
and health care personnel continued conducting inspections of 
commercial sex establishments, which included screening for trafficking 
indicators, but reported the pandemic hampered inspection efforts 
in 2020; the government did not report the number of inspections 
conducted nor if it identified any trafficking victims as a result of 
NETHERLANDS
416
these inspections. Observers noted the government’s increased focus 
on labor trafficking, in particular the government’s attention to the 
living situation and labor conditions of migrant laborers during the 
pandemic. The labor inspectorate continued to focus on sectors with an 
elevated risk of exploitation, such as agriculture and agro-processing. 
The government established a Labor Migrants Protections Taskforce 
that made several proposals to address labor exploitation. Two more 
market sectors (wind energy and agriculture/horticulture) were in the 
process of joining the government’s Covenant on Reducing Human 
Rights Violations in Supply Chains at the end of the reporting period. 
The government compiled a set of measures aimed at discouraging 
demand for commercial sex with children. The government continued 
to implement a national plan against child sex tourism, screened for 
potential child sex tourists at airports in cooperation with foreign 
governments, and posted police liaisons to the Dutch embassies in 
Cambodia and Thailand. Authorities trained immigration, hotel, 
aviation, customs, and labor inspection staff in methods to identify 
victims and child sex tourists. The government organized international 
trainings and conferences, awarded funding for initiatives in source 
countries, and funded anti-trafficking projects in foreign countries 
via its embassies. The government collaborated with Liechtenstein, 
Australia, and the UN to explore methods to detect and disrupt financial 
flows associated with trafficking. The foreign ministry continued 
to conduct outreach to domestic workers associated with foreign 
diplomats, without their employers present, on how to report cases 
of abuse. A government-funded NGO maintained a victim assistance 
hotline during regular business hours. The hotline received 3,782 calls 
in 2019, the most recent year for which data was available; 194 calls 
were requests for shelter.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in the Netherlands. Most identified victims are 
young women enticed by young male traffickers who coerce them 
into sexual exploitation. Labor traffickers exploit adults from Eastern 
Europe, Africa, and South and East Asia in industries such as inland 
shipping, leisure river cruises, agriculture, horticulture, hospitality, 
domestic servitude, and forced criminal activity. There has been a 
notable increase in victims from Africa, particularly Nigeria and 
Uganda. For the first time in several years, Dutch nationals were 
not the leading nationality of victims in 2019. Refugees and asylum-
seekers, including unaccompanied children, are vulnerable to labor 
trafficking. Criminal groups force Romani children into pickpocketing 
and shoplifting rings. Over the last five years, more than 1,600 
foreign children have left refugee centers to unknown destinations 
and remain highly vulnerable to exploitation. The Netherlands is a 
source country for child sex tourists. Refugees and asylum-seekers, 
including children in government-run asylum centers, are vulnerable 
to sex trafficking. Traffickers are overwhelmingly male, and almost 
half of trafficking suspects are Dutch; the average trafficker is younger 
than 35 years old. 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit foreign 
victims in the BES islands. Increasingly, traffickers exploit Venezuelan 
women in sex trafficking on the BES islands. Local authorities believe 
labor traffickers also exploit adults in domestic servitude and in the 
agricultural, retail, and construction sectors. Women in commercial 
sex and unaccompanied children are highly vulnerable to trafficking 
on the islands, and some migrants in restaurants and local businesses 
may be vulnerable to debt bondage.
The BES criminal code criminalizes sex and labor trafficking under 
article 286f, prescribing penalties ranging from six to 15 years’ 
imprisonment. Bonaire prosecuted its first trafficking case in 2012; 
the case was dismissed in 2019 due to lack of victim testimony. 
The mandate of the Netherlands’ national rapporteur does not 
extend to the BES islands; therefore, the office cannot conduct local 
research. Local governments on the BES islands run multidisciplinary 
anti-trafficking teams, which cooperate with each other and with 
Dutch counterparts; however, there has been little evidence of their 
effectiveness. Victims of violence, including trafficking, are eligible 
for compensation from the Violent Offenses Compensation Fund.
NEW ZEALAND: TIER 2
The Government of New Zealand does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included initiating eight trafficking 
investigations, convicting seven offenders for sex trafficking crimes, 
funding programs to aid migrant workers vulnerable to exploitation 
as a result of economic hardship related to the COVID-19 pandemic, 
working to develop new training modules for a variety of government 
officials, and releasing an updated anti-trafficking national action 
plan in March 2021. However, these efforts were not serious and 
sustained compared to the efforts during the previous reporting 
period, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
While the government convicted offenders in more cases of child 
sex trafficking than in previous years, it did not identify any victims 
in these cases as trafficking victims, as it did not use a system to 
specifically designate individuals as trafficking victims, and many 
officials and service providers lacked an understanding of all forms of 
trafficking; this weakened victim protection and may have undermined 
the ability of the government to recognize current trafficking trends 
in the country. Furthermore, the government has never reported 
identifying an adult victim of sex trafficking and did not initiate 
any prosecutions for labor trafficking for the second consecutive 
year. In addition, the failure to sentence the majority of traffickers 
to terms of imprisonment, with six child sex traffickers sentenced to 
terms ranging from six to 18 months’ home detention, significantly 
weakened deterrence, undercut efforts to hold traffickers accountable, 
and did not adequately address the nature of the crime. Therefore 
New Zealand was downgraded to Tier 2. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase efforts to identify victims through proactive screening of 
vulnerable populations. • Increase efforts to vigorously investigate 
and prosecute sex and labor trafficking cases, and sentence convicted 
traffickers to adequate penalties, which should involve significant 
prison terms. • Establish a system, such as a national referral 
mechanism, to ensure victims—including New Zealand citizens—
are appropriately identified as trafficking victims and referred to 
services, as well as to enable the government to track the number 
of victims identified by authorities. • Amend the trafficking statute 
to explicitly define the sex trafficking of children as not requiring 
the use of deception or coercion. • Improve training provided to 
frontline law enforcement, labor inspectors, and social service 
providers, including by ensuring officials understand that children 
in commercial sex are victims of trafficking. • Take steps to improve 
potential victims’ access to services and ensure government-funded 
services are suitable for trafficking victims. • Distribute materials to 
raise public awareness of all forms of human trafficking. • Increase 
resources for anti-trafficking law enforcement. • Improve the content 
and distribution of materials explaining migrant workers’ rights and 
mechanisms for reporting exploitation. • Increase coordination with 
NGOs, social service providers, and other civil society stakeholders on 
anti-trafficking efforts, including victim identification and assistance. 









The government maintained anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. 
The Crimes Act of 1961, as amended in 2015, criminalized sex 
trafficking and labor trafficking. Section 98D (trafficking in persons) 
criminalized all forms of labor trafficking and some forms of sex 
trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to 20 years’ imprisonment, a 
fine not exceeding 500,000 New Zealand dollars (NZD) ($361,530), or 
both; these penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to the 
forms of sex trafficking covered under the provision, commensurate 
with the penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as 
rape. Inconsistent with international law, Section 98D required a 
demonstration of deception or coercion to constitute a child sex 
trafficking offense, and therefore did not criminalize all forms of 
child sex trafficking. However, Section 98AA criminalized all forms 
of child sex trafficking under its “dealing in persons” provision 
and prescribed penalties of up to 14 years’ imprisonment, which 
were sufficiently stringent and commensurate with the penalties 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. The government 
sometimes utilized the Prostitution Reform Act (PRA), including 
Sections 20 and 21 which criminalized the facilitating, assisting, 
causing, or encouraging a child to provide commercial sex, in 
addition to receiving earnings from commercial sex acts provided 
by a child. These sections of the PRA prescribed penalties of up to 
seven years’ imprisonment for the sex trafficking of children, which 
were significantly lower than those available for trafficking offenses 
under Section 98D and 98AA of the Crimes Act. 
During the reporting period, the government initiated investigations 
for eight potential cases of trafficking, initiated two sex trafficking 
prosecutions, and convicted seven offenders for sex trafficking crimes; 
compared with nine investigations, five sex trafficking prosecutions, 
and two convictions (one for labor trafficking and one for sex 
trafficking) in the previous reporting period. The government did 
not initiate any prosecutions for labor trafficking for the second 
consecutive year. Of the seven convicted traffickers, courts convicted 
one under Section 98 AA of the Crimes Act for attempting to purchase 
a child for sexual exploitation (among other charges) and sentenced 
him to five years’ imprisonment. Courts also convicted six for PRA 
violations related to the receiving of or arranging commercial sex 
acts from children and sentenced them to six to 18 months’ home 
detention. A trafficker previously convicted in March 2020 for 
exploiting 13 Samoan victims in forced labor was sentenced to 11 
years’ imprisonment during the reporting period. Although this 
represented the longest term of imprisonment sentenced under 
the trafficking statute to date, the government appealed the judge’s 
sentence, claiming it was “manifestly inadequate.” 
Following the enactment of the trafficking law in 2015, the government 
has exclusively used Section 98D to prosecute labor offenses, and has 
never prosecuted a sex trafficking crime, or a case of internal trafficking, 
under Section 98D. High evidentiary and procedural standards, weak 
trafficking victim identification, and a lack of sufficient resources and 
understanding of all forms of trafficking among some government 
officials continued to result in the prosecution of potential traffickers 
under different statutes, including non-criminal labor violations. 
While the government believed that a requirement that the attorney 
general approve any charges of Section 98D before court proceedings 
could be initiated signaled the seriousness with which the crime was 
treated in New Zealand, some observers reported that in practice 
this encouraged officials to bring alternative charges. Section 98D’s 
requirement that deception or coercion be demonstrated to constitute 
a child sex trafficking offense further resulted in the government 
prosecuting child sex trafficking crimes as violations of the PRA. 
Although authorities claimed this was done to increase victims’ access 
to justice and to quickly impose comparable consequence as those 
convicted for trafficking, during the reporting period this contributed 
to the majority of convicted traffickers avoiding imprisonment. 
This weakened deterrence and undercut the government’s overall 
anti-trafficking efforts. Some experts noted the lack of efforts by law 
enforcement to treat sex trafficking cases appropriately continued to 
minimize the prevalence of the crime and resulted in weak efforts 
to hold traffickers accountable and protect victims. For example, 
police sometimes failed to investigate traffickers complicit in the 
commercial sexual exploitation of children. Furthermore, police 
were not adequately trained to identify indicators of trafficking 
among victims of domestic or family violence, including in cases 
where adult victims were forced into commercial sex, and therefore 
the crime often went unnoticed by authorities.
An anti-trafficking operations group, composed of immigration 
authorities, police, and the children’s ministry, continued to meet 
to increase law enforcement coordination. The labor inspectorate 
investigated forced labor complaints but worked mainly within 
the civil legal system, which may have contributed to the lack of 
criminal prosecution of forced labor crimes when cases weren’t 
referred for criminal investigations. Immigration New Zealand’s (INZ) 
serious offences unit investigated trafficking cases but was limited 
to investigating only those cases in which immigration violations 
were also identified. In September 2020, New Zealand Police (NZP) 
released a strategy for addressing transnational organized crime, 
which included migrant exploitation and trafficking, with the aim 
of improving understanding of transnational organized crime and 
increasing coordination among government agencies. The Ministry 
of Business, Immigration, and Employment (MBIE) continued to 
require immigration officers, labor inspectors, and other relevant 
staff to complete an online training module on human trafficking. 
MBIE worked to develop new training modules for immigration 
officers, labor inspectors, and other frontline officials on identifying 
and investigating trafficking, interviewing victims, and processing 
visas for victims. Although these training modules were not released 
before the end of the reporting period, MBIE’s anti-trafficking team 
presented to more than 350 INZ staff members to increase their 
awareness of trafficking and promote victim protection efforts. NZP 
continued to require anti-trafficking training for all detectives and 
included a trafficking and smuggling chapter in its police manual. The 
government did not report training prosecutors or judiciary officials. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government employees complicit in trafficking offenses.
PROTECTION
The government maintained insufficient victim identification and 
protection efforts. The government reported using a certification 
process by which police formally certify a foreign person as a 
trafficking victim based on reasonable suspicion, enabling victims 
to access a specific visa category for victims of trafficking and services 
such as health care. The government reported investigating cases that 
involved 39 potential foreign victims during the reporting period; 
however, the extent to which these all of cases featured sex trafficking 
or forced labor indicators was unclear, and the government did not 
make any new certifications or find reasonable suspicion any were 
trafficking victims; this was compared with three labor trafficking 
victims certified during the previous reporting period. Despite 
prosecuting suspects for crimes that constitute child sex trafficking 
during the reporting period, the government reported that it did 
not identify any sex trafficking victims. The government has never 
certified a foreign victim of sex trafficking and despite evidence that 
adults, particularly female victims of family violence, were forced into 
commercial sex in New Zealand, the government has never identified 
an adult New Zealander as a victim of sex trafficking.
The government continued to finalize its operational framework to 
outline the process of victim identification, referral, and provision of 
victim services for government agencies, which it began drafting in 
2017. Law enforcement, immigration, and social service personnel had 
formal written procedures to guide officials in victim identification. 
However, beyond the system to certify foreign victims to enable their 
access to additional services, the government lacked a system to 
formally recognize trafficking victims, including victims from New 
Zealand. In addition, it was unclear that formal written procedures 




consistently failed to formally identify children in commercial 
sex—a form of sex trafficking according to definitional standards 
under international law—as victims of trafficking. While victims 
did not need to be certified or formally designated as trafficking 
victims to access support services, a lack of recognition that they were 
subjected to trafficking may have inhibited victims’ ability to obtain 
specialized services. Overall, the absence of a system to formally 
recognize victims of trafficking and track the number identified by 
authorities may have impeded the government’s ability to identify 
trafficking trends and develop effective responses. 
NZP had legal limitations on its ability to proactively screen for sex 
trafficking victims, including those who are New Zealand citizens, 
within the legal commercial sex industry, which was primarily 
regulated by the Ministry of Health. For example, due to regulations 
prohibiting police from inspecting legal brothels without a complaint, 
police relied on health ministry officials and an organization that 
works closely with persons in commercial sex to report potential 
criminal violations. Nonetheless, the government did not report 
providing training to the organization’s staff on definitions or 
indicators of sex trafficking, or procedures for the referral of trafficking 
victims to services. In addition, when interviewing migrants in 
commercial sex, one report indicated police did not always provide 
interpretation for non English speakers, which may have inhibited 
their ability to screen for trafficking indicators. The contact center for 
children’s ministry, Oranga Tamariki, distributed a list of questions for 
hotline staff to ask callers who used certain terms such as trafficking, 
exploitation, and slavery, and maintained a process for handling 
potential child trafficking cases, including to refer cases to police; 
however, the government did not report identifying victims through 
this mechanism.
The government provided victims with a reflection period, the 
length of which was dependent on the individual needs of each 
victim, to recover before deciding whether to cooperate with law 
enforcement. The government did not allocate funding specifically 
dedicated to assist trafficking victims or provide services designed 
for trafficking victims. However, trafficking victims were eligible 
to receive government-funded services available for all victims of 
serious crimes that were provided through arrangements with local 
community groups, and the government provided temporary housing, 
medical services, employment assistance, and other social services, 
as well as emergency grants in cases involving debt-based coercion. 
According to some NGOs, a lack of understanding of trafficking 
among some social service providers and officials, including a lack 
of awareness that children in commercial sex and adults forced to 
engage in commercial sex acts were victims of trafficking, meant 
some victims may have not received adequate or specialized psycho-
social care. Furthermore, some civil society experts reported a lack 
of adequate services available for child sex trafficking victims, that 
services were not easily accessible for victims of labor and sex 
trafficking, and that officials did not provide clear guidance to 
some NGO service providers seeking government assistance. The 
government could fund travel and accommodation expenses for 
victims who had returned to their home countries to travel to New 
Zealand and participate in court proceedings, but it did not report 
funding such expenses for trafficking victims during the reporting 
period. The law authorized the extension of temporary residence visas 
to certified foreign trafficking victims for up to 12 months, which 
also made them eligible for legal employment; and foreign victims 
facing hardship or retribution in their home countries could apply 
for a residence visa. During the reporting period, INZ granted work 
visas to 15 trafficking victims. In 2019 the government took steps 
to reconsider the residence applications of victims denied residency 
by INZ in 2017, after an immigration tribunal subsequently found 
that INZ had failed to adequately investigate their claims of facing 
retributive threats against themselves and their families in their 
home country; during the reporting period, INZ granted residence 
visas to 11 of these victims, as well as to their family members, 
and was processing the applications of four additional victims 
through the end of the reporting period. The law allowed victims 
to receive restitution from criminal proceedings and victims could 
seek compensation from assets forfeited in criminal cases through 
civil claims; however, the government did not report if any victims 
received restitution or compensation during the reporting period.
PREVENTION
The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking. INZ chaired the 
government’s interagency working group on trafficking and operated 
a three-person team responsible for coordinating government efforts 
related to anti-trafficking. As a result of the government’s pandemic 
mitigation efforts, some INZ staff with experience working on anti-
trafficking efforts were reassigned to other departments during the 
reporting period, however the overall number of staff dedicated to 
anti-trafficking efforts remained stable. In March 2021, the government 
released its “Plan of Action against Forced Labor, People Trafficking 
and Slavery” during an anti-trafficking conference co-organized with 
a foreign embassy and a civil society organization. The government 
sought feedback from the public on the action plan in October 2020. 
In contrast with the government’s previous action plan released in 
2009, which only addressed transnational trafficking, the new plan 
recognized all forms of trafficking. INZ held an observatory role within 
an anti-trafficking advisory group co-chaired by two civil society 
organizations. Nonetheless, some NGOs suggested collaboration 
by the government was lacking. The government did not report 
sufficient efforts to raise awareness of sex trafficking, although it 
continued to maintain webpages, distribute pamphlets to raise 
awareness of trafficking indicators and the availability of support 
services. Efforts to host and participate in forums and workshops 
with businesses, students, and other community groups to increase 
awareness were limited by pandemic-related restrictions during 
the reporting period. Some observers continued to report a lack of 
sufficient efforts to increase public awareness of trafficking, noting low 
levels of understanding of the crime across New Zealand, including 
among social service providers and the general public. 
The government continued to distribute guides for employers recruiting 
Filipino workers, and to send welcome emails with workers’ rights 
information to all approved residence, work, and student visa holders 
in 13 languages, as well as other resources for migrant workers. MBIE 
continued to distribute pamphlets, in five languages, which listed 
who was able to legally engage in commercial sex and provided 
information on how to report exploitation, however these materials 
did not specifically address trafficking. In addition, many of the 
materials on migrant workers’ rights and employment laws were 
not clear or distributed effectively, and some workers were unaware 
of their rights or how to report exploitation. The government did 
not operate a trafficking specific hotline; however, workers could 
make complaints through MBIE’s employment rights hotline, which 
referred cases involving worker exploitation to the labor inspectorate. 
Immigration authorities’ delays in processing migrant workers’ 
applications to change conditions of their visas, including changing 
employers, increased trafficking risks and prevented some workers 
from leaving exploitative conditions for extended periods of time. 
The government implemented a 37.6 million NZD ($27.19 million) 
program in July 2020 to assist approximately 12,300 temporary visa 
holders, including migrant workers, who experienced hardship due 
to the pandemic and were unable to return to their home countries. 
Through this program, the government provided essential items 
such as food, housing, clothing, and medication, which may have 
helped alleviate economic disruptions caused by the pandemic and 
decrease these temporary visa holders’ vulnerability to exploitation. 
In December 2020, the government extended additional benefits to 
an estimated 5,800 temporary visa holders, which included cash 
payments to be made through August 2021.
The law prohibited individuals or companies from charging 
employment premiums, such as recruitment fees; labor inspectors 








to recover premiums and seek a penalty against violators, although 
authorities did not report if this occurred during the reporting period. 
Government regulations banned employers who breach employment 
standards from recruiting migrant workers for periods of six to 24 
months and the government published a list of all offending employers 
on its website. Immigration officials and labor inspectors reported 
inspecting legal brothels to ensure working conditions complied with 
the law and conducting investigations and routine audits in work 
places that employed migrant workers. Some sources believed the labor 
inspectorate was under staffed and -resourced, which they felt limited 
its ability to carry out effective inspections and adequately investigate 
exploitative employment, including potential cases of trafficking; 
however, the government began recruiting additional labor inspectors 
during the reporting period. In previous years some observers reported 
penalties proscribed to unscrupulous employers in employment courts 
were often not significant enough to deter exploitative practices. In 
July 2020, Employment New Zealand published online resources 
encouraging businesses to adopt ethical work practices, including to 
address forced labor in supply chains. Oranga Tamariki continued 
to convene a working group to encourage the safety of children 
traveling across New Zealand’s borders, including by promoting 
information sharing among relevant agencies. In December 2020, 
the agency established an international child protection unit, which 
aimed to prevent and address transnational child protection issues, 
including trafficking. The government did not make efforts to reduce 
the demand for commercial sex acts. The government did not provide 
anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in New Zealand. Foreign men and women from 
South and East Asia, the Pacific, and some countries in Latin America 
are vulnerable to forced labor in New Zealand’s agricultural, dairy, 
construction, viticulture, food service, liquor retail, technology, 
hospitality, transport, and domestic service sectors. Unregulated 
and unlicensed immigration brokers operating in New Zealand and 
source countries, particularly in India and the Philippines, facilitate 
trafficking by assisting in the process to issue visas to victims. Some 
foreign workers are charged excessive recruitment fees and experience 
unjustified salary deductions, non- or under-payment of wages, 
excessively long working hours, restrictions on their movement, 
passport retention, and contract alteration. Some employers force 
migrants to work in job conditions different from those promised 
during recruitment, and victims often do not file complaints due 
to fear of losing their temporary visas. The pandemic increased the 
reluctance of many foreign nationals to leave New Zealand, and 
those who breached their visa conditions as a result were increasingly 
vulnerable to exploitation. Furthermore, temporary migrant workers 
in sectors most negatively affected by the pandemic, such as tourism 
and hospitality, are increasingly vulnerable to exploitation. 
While experts assessed the Prostitution Reform Act, which 
decriminalized commercial sex for New Zealand residents, overall 
increased protections for those who willingly engaged in commercial 
sex, traffickers continue to target vulnerable populations, such as 
children, migrants, and adult victims of domestic and family violence, 
for exploitation in sex trafficking. Foreign women from Asia and South 
America in commercial sex are at risk of sex trafficking, especially 
those who do not speak English and who work in private homes, and 
informal or suburban environments where they are more isolated 
from service providers. Some international students and temporary 
visa holders are at risk of sex and labor trafficking. Immigration 
brokers and unscrupulous brothel owners subject some migrants 
to conditions indicative of sex trafficking, including non-payment 
of wages, withheld passports, physical or sexual abuse, threats of 
deportation, monitored movements, limiting access to medical care 
or other social services, and excessive working hours. Some migrants 
are required to pay fines, bonds, recruitment and other fees to 
brothel operators or brokers, which make them vulnerable to debt 
based coercion. Traffickers utilized Section 19 of the PRA, which 
prohibited non-residents from legally working in the decriminalized 
commercial sex industry to use threats of deportation or other adverse 
action from law enforcement to deter migrants in commercial sex 
from reporting verbal or physical abuse, unwanted or unsafe sexual 
practices, or non-payment of wages. Some gang members, boyfriends, 
family members, or others exploit young children and teenagers in 
sex trafficking by facilitating, purchasing, or forcing them to engage 
in commercial sex acts. Some adult women, often those who face 
domestic or family violence, are forced by partners to engage in 
commercial sex acts. Some victims are coerced into commercial sex 
through drug dependencies or threats by family members. One service 
provider reported that a notable proportion of its clients reported 
being forced into commercial sex by their partners in order for their 
partners to purchase or obtain drugs and other substances. However, 
experts suggest the prevalence of forced commercial sex among New 
Zealand women is significantly under-reported and under-detected. 
NICARAGUA: TIER 3
The Government of Nicaragua does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making 
significant efforts to do so, even considering the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Nicaragua remained on Tier 3. Despite the lack of significant efforts, 
the government took some steps to address trafficking, including 
prosecuting four traffickers and offering awareness trainings to 
government officials in the municipality of León. However, the 
government continued to downplay the severity of the trafficking 
problem in Nicaragua, despite civil society reports of increased 
victimization in 2020; it did not convict any traffickers for the third 
consecutive reporting period and victim identification efforts remained 
inadequate. The government did not acknowledge that traffickers 
exploit Nicaraguans in foreign countries, despite media reports 
that foreign officials identified several Nicaraguan victims in 2020. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government employees complicit in trafficking offenses, 
despite endemic corruption and widespread official complicity. The 
government did not cooperate with NGOs to provide protection 
services or include civil society in the national anti-trafficking 
coalition. Prosecution, protection, and prevention efforts in the 
two Caribbean autonomous regions of Nicaragua continued to be 
much weaker than in the rest of the country. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Significantly increase efforts to identify victims of sex and labor 
trafficking, including foreign nationals. • Investigate, prosecute, 
and convict traffickers, including complicit officials. • Vigorously 
implement the National Strategy for Comprehensive Attention to 
Victims of Trafficking in Persons by identifying victims, including 
among vulnerable populations, and effectively refer victims to 
appropriate services. • Partner with NGOs to provide victims short-
term care, long-term care, and reintegration services. • Amend the 
2014 anti-trafficking law to include a definition of trafficking in 
persons consistent with international law. • Increase funding for 
victim protection, finance the trafficking fund, and provide specialized 
services for trafficking victims. • Fulfill the requirement under Law 
896 to include the Nicaraguan Coordinating Federation of NGOs 
working with Children and Adolescents (CODENI) to represent NGOs 
in the National Coalition against Human Trafficking (NCATIP). • 
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Increase training for government officials—including social workers, 
labor inspectors, and law enforcement officials—to facilitate increased 
victim identification and assistance, including securing restitution. 
• Strengthen law enforcement and victim protection efforts in the 
Caribbean autonomous regions, especially through increased staff 
and funding. • Annually report on progress in implementing the 
national action plan.
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. The Law against 
Trafficking in Persons of 2015 criminalized sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking and prescribed penalties ranging from 10 to 15 years’ 
imprisonment; these penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with 
respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for 
other serious crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent with the definition 
of trafficking under international law, the law established the use 
of force, coercion, or deceit as an aggravating factor rather than 
an essential element of the crime; the penalties increased to 16 
to 18 years’ imprisonment for trafficking offenses involving these 
factors. The penalty for child trafficking increased to 19 to 20 years’ 
imprisonment. The law also defined trafficking broadly to include 
all labor exploitation and illegal adoption without the purpose of 
exploitation.
The government reported initiating one sex trafficking investigation 
in 2020, compared with six investigations in 2019—all for sex 
trafficking—and four investigations in 2018. However, in a 
multinational forum, Nicaraguan authorities made contradicting 
reports, citing five new trafficking investigations in 2020. Observers 
expressed limited confidence in government reporting on human 
trafficking, including law enforcement statistics; some alleged the 
government intentionally misclassified trafficking as kidnapping 
or assault to keep trafficking statistics low. The government did not 
make any arrests related to trafficking. The government prosecuted 
four accused sex traffickers in 2020, compared with prosecuting one 
alleged trafficker in 2019 and zero in 2018. In 2020, the government 
did not convict any traffickers, marking the third consecutive reporting 
period without a trafficking conviction. According to government 
officials, the pandemic had no effect on law enforcement efforts to 
combat trafficking in persons. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, 
or convictions of government employees complicit in trafficking 
offenses; however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking 
crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement 
action during the year. Civil society made reports indicative of 
official complicity in trafficking crimes, including public officials 
owning brothels where child sex trafficking may have occurred. 
NCATIP officials were associated with human rights violations, 
some resulting in death, perpetrated against Nicaraguan citizens in 
2018. Despite endemic corruption, the government did not have 
policies to prevent official complicity in trafficking, contributing 
to an environment of impunity and potentially decreasing the 
likelihood of victims reporting trafficking crimes. The government 
reported law enforcement and judicial sector officials attended several 
trafficking-related trainings; international organizations and foreign 
governments provided or otherwise supported most of the trainings 
available in 2020. An unknown number of members of a specialized 
organized crime unit, for example, participated in a course on 
human trafficking sponsored by an international organization. The 
government delivered some trainings virtually due to the pandemic, 
although the government stated the pandemic did not interfere with 
or limit access to training.
PROTECTION
The government further decreased its minimal protection efforts. The 
government identified one trafficking victim in 2020, compared with 
eight trafficking victims in 2019, six in 2018, 12 in 2017, 13 in 2016, and 
30 in 2015. The government reported NGOs and other organizations 
did not identify any additional victims; however, civil society reported 
their organizations continued to identify victims throughout 2020, 
anecdotally reporting increased victimization during the pandemic. The 
government claimed the pandemic did not impact trafficking risk or 
its ability to identify or provide services to victims. The one identified 
victim recognized by the government was a Nicaraguan national; the 
government had no record of foreign trafficking victims exploited in 
Nicaragua or Nicaraguans exploited abroad, despite media reports of 
several cases where Costa Rican, Panamanian, and Spanish officials 
identified Nicaraguan victims exploited in sex and labor trafficking. 
The government did not report implementing or training officials 
to use a set of protocols it reportedly developed in 2019 to facilitate 
identifying child and adolescent trafficking victims among vulnerable 
populations. Officials did not identify any victims in the autonomous 
regions where identification and referral mechanisms were lacking 
and where one-sixth of the population resided.
The government provided medical and psychological attention to 
one trafficking victim in 2020. The government reported agencies had 
allocations for trafficking victim protection in the national budget, 
but these did not provide for specialized services or shelters, nor did 
the government disclose a figure for the allocations. The government 
reported all services were accessible to disabled victims, but did 
not indicate what accommodations it made to ensure access. In 
2020, the government stopped claiming to coordinate with NGOs, 
instead reporting it did not coordinate or collaborate with NGOs on 
victim identification or assistance. NGOs reported there had been 
minimal, if any, communication with the government on victim 
services since 2018.
The government did not provide funding or other support to NGOs 
that provided the majority of available victim protection services in 
the country, leaving victims the government did not acknowledge 
without vital assistance. The government did not report providing 
shelter or other housing support to any victims in 2020. Alleging a 
breach of charter, the government ordered the closure of two NGO 
shelters serving child victims of violence, including trafficking. 
Observers reported the government maintained an unofficial policy 
of placing victims with family members, which put trafficking victims 
at risk of re-victimization by family members who may have been 
complicit in their exploitation. There were no shelters available for 
men. There was limited capacity for long-term shelter services in 
Nicaragua; the government could not provide such care, and NGOs 
had a limited ability to provide extended shelter. The Ministry of 
Family coordinated services for child trafficking victims, including 
medical and legal services and access to education; officials could 
refer child trafficking victims to “special protection centers,” but 
the government often returned child victims to their families’ care, 
despite risk of re-victimization. Both Managua and the more rural 
regions lacked adequate services for trafficking victims.
Law 896 established a dedicated fund for victim protection and 
prevention activities to be financed through budget allocation, 
donations, and seized assets from traffickers. However, for the sixth 
year, there was no indication that the government made the fund 
operational. Law 896 provided victims the ability to testify in advance 
of the trial and allowed testimony via video or written statement 
to encourage participation and protect a victim’s identity; however, 
the government did not report using these provisions during the 
reporting period. Victims could obtain compensation by filing 
civil suits against traffickers; however, the government and NGOs 
reported that, in practice, victims had never exercised this right. The 
government collaborated with Costa Rican officials to investigate 
reports of a Nicaraguan trafficking victim exploited abroad. While 
there were no reports of identified victims penalized for unlawful 
acts traffickers compelled them to commit, authorities frequently 
misclassified cases involving trafficking victims, potentially resulting 
in penalization of unidentified victims. The government did not 
report efforts to screen for or identify trafficking victims among 
migrant populations or individuals in commercial sex. Nicaraguan 
law provided for humanitarian visas for foreign trafficking victims, 








The government maintained its minimal efforts to prevent trafficking. 
The government reported the NCATIP led 16 working committees, 
although civil society reported the coalition and its committees were 
largely dormant, making little contribution to capacity building and 
awareness raising on trafficking. For a sixth consecutive year, the 
NCATIP did not fulfill the requirement under Law 896 to include 
CODENI to represent NGOs. While the NCATIP reported engaging 
with a select group of international civil society organizations, 
authorities excluded local organizations from the coalition’s activities. 
Observers considered the NCATIP to be inactive and ineffectual as 
an anti-trafficking entity and reported the apparent dissolution of a 
number of its regional bodies. The government had a national action 
plan for 2018-2022, which focused on awareness raising; increasing 
technical capacity to investigate, prosecute, and sentence traffickers; 
protecting the rights of victims and witnesses and providing assistance; 
and monitoring and implementing the plan. The government did 
not report, and civil society did not observe, efforts to research or 
monitor trafficking in the country. The government reported a limited 
number of trafficking awareness events, including a multi-agency 
workshop for officials in the municipality of León, but it did not 
report national prevention campaigns similar to those conducted 
in past years. The government reported maintaining two 24-hour 
crime hotlines that could process trafficking complaints and provide 
information on trafficking and gender-based violence, but it did 
not report whether any calls led to trafficking investigations or the 
identification of victims. 
During the reporting period, Nicaraguans continued to encounter 
problems obtaining national identification cards, which increased 
their vulnerability to trafficking and limited their ability to access 
public services. Nicaraguan law criminalized knowingly engaging 
in sex acts with a sex trafficking victim, but officials did not report 
having investigated, prosecuted, or convicted any suspects for such 
acts. The government required private employment agencies to register 
and established minimum wages and maximum hours for adult and 
adolescent domestic workers; it did not report identifying forced labor 
in these sectors. The government did not report any efforts to inspect 
bars or nightclubs suspected of engaging in trafficking, or any efforts 
to reduce demand for commercial sex. The Ministry of Tourism had an 
agreement with more than 5,000 Nicaraguan businesses to monitor 
and report suspected child sexual exploitation in the industry, but 
the government did not report any activity related to this program in 
2020. NGOs reported child sex tourism remained a concern; however, 
authorities did not investigate, prosecute, or convict any tourists for 
child sex trafficking during the reporting period.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Nicaragua, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Nicaragua abroad. Groups considered at heightened risk to human 
trafficking in Nicaragua include women, children, and migrants. 
Traffickers subject Nicaraguan women and children to sex trafficking 
within the country and in other Central American countries, Mexico, 
Spain, and the United States. Victims’ family members are often 
complicit in their exploitation. Traffickers increasingly use social 
media sites to recruit their victims, who are attracted by promises 
of high salaries outside of Nicaragua for work in restaurants, hotels, 
construction, and security. Traffickers also recruit their victims in rural 
areas or border regions with false promises of high paying jobs in 
urban centers and tourist locales, where they subject them to sex or 
labor trafficking. Nicaraguan women and children are subjected to 
sex and labor trafficking in the two Caribbean autonomous regions, 
where the lack of strong law enforcement institutions, rampant 
poverty, a higher crime rate, and recent devastation from hurricanes 
Eta and Iota increase the vulnerability of the local population. 
Nicaraguans who migrate to other Central American countries and 
Europe are reportedly vulnerable to and have been victims of sex 
and labor trafficking, both in transit and after they have reached their 
destinations. In addition, experts report traffickers target for sex and 
labor trafficking Nicaraguan children whose parents left the country 
to work abroad. Nicaraguan adults and children are subjected to 
labor trafficking in agriculture, construction, mining, the informal 
sector, and domestic service within the country and in Costa Rica, 
Panama, the United States, and other countries. Traffickers force 
some children to work in artisanal mines and quarries. Observers 
report traffickers exploit children through forced participation in 
illegal drug production and trafficking. Children and persons with 
disabilities are subjected to forced begging, particularly in Managua 
and near tourist centers. Traffickers subject some male migrants from 
Central American countries transiting Nicaragua en route to Costa 
Rica and Panama in search of employment to labor trafficking in 
these destination countries. Cuban nationals working in Nicaragua 
may have been forced to work by the Cuban government. Nicaragua 
is a destination for child sex tourists from the United States, Canada, 
and Western Europe.
NIGER: TIER 2
The Government of Niger does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts 
to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts 
compared to the previous reporting period, considering the impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Niger remained on Tier 2. These efforts included identifying and 
referring more victims to the government’s shelter in Zinder and 
launching the country’s national referral mechanism (NRM) in 
partnership with an international organization. Additionally, the 
government increased training for officials and civil society members. 
However, the government did not meet the minimum standards in 
several key areas. Authorities reported a decrease in investigations and 
prosecutions, and Niger’s law did not include penalties for adult sex 
trafficking commensurate with those for other serious crimes, such 
as rape. The government did not report investigating, prosecuting, 
or convicting individuals for traditional slavery practices.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Amend the 2010 anti-trafficking law to increase the base penalties 
for adult sex trafficking so they are commensurate with those for 
rape or kidnapping. • Increase efforts to investigate and prosecute 
trafficking crimes, and convict traffickers, including those engaged in 
traditional forms of hereditary slavery, by training additional judicial 
officials, law enforcement, and first responders on the 2010 anti-
trafficking law and the 2003 anti-slavery law. • Increase coordination 
with regional, sub-regional, and international law enforcement 
organizations to investigate and prosecute transnational trafficking 
cases, separate from smuggling cases. • Disseminate and train officials 
on the NRM to increase proactive victim identification and referral to 
services. • Increase the quantity and quality of services available to 
victims in coordination with international organizations as well as 
NGOs. • Continue to fund and empower the National Coordinating 
Commission for the Fight against Trafficking in Persons (CNCLTP) 
and the National Agency for the Fight against Trafficking in Persons 
and the Illicit Transport of Migrants (ANLTP/TIM) to execute their 
mandates. • Screen foreign workers, including Cuban medical workers, 
for trafficking indicators and refer them to appropriate services if 




The government decreased prosecution efforts. Order No.2010-86 
on Combating Trafficking in Persons, enacted in 2010, criminalized 
sex trafficking and labor trafficking. This law prescribed penalties of 
five to 10 years’ imprisonment for trafficking offenses involving an 
adult victim, and 10 to 30 years’ imprisonment for those involving a 
child victim. These penalties were sufficiently stringent. Penalties for 
sex trafficking of children were commensurate with those prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as rape, although the penalties for sex 
trafficking of adults were not.
During the reporting period, the government reported initiating nine 
new investigations (three for sex trafficking, one for forced labor, and 
five for unknown forms of exploitation) and prosecuting 17 suspects 
under the country’s anti-trafficking law (officials did not disclose 
whether these were forced labor or sex trafficking), compared with 
investigating and prosecuting 54 suspects during the previous year. 
Courts convicted four traffickers in two cases during the reporting 
period. Authorities sanctioned the four traffickers with the following 
sentences, one of which was sufficiently stringent: one sentenced 
to six months’ suspended imprisonment and a fine of 50,000 West 
African CFA francs (FCFA) ($95); two sentenced to 12 months’ 
imprisonment with three months suspended; and one sentenced 
to 18 months’ imprisonment with six months suspended and a 
fine of 20,000 FCFA ($38). During the previous reporting period, 
authorities convicted four traffickers and sentenced two perpetrators 
to two years’ imprisonment and the other two offenders to five 
years’ imprisonment and a 500,000 FCFA ($945) fine. As a result 
of diminished in-person staffing intended to slow the spread of the 
pandemic, judicial officials managed significantly reduced caseloads 
during the reporting period. 
Consistent with prior reporting periods, the government did not report 
investigating or prosecuting any marabouts (Quranic schoolteachers) 
who forced children to beg or traditional chiefs who perpetuated 
hereditary slavery practices, including the enslavement of children, 
despite credible information that such practices continued. Some 
victims continued to lack access to justice, as many were uninformed 
about their legal rights and faced challenges accessing the necessary 
judicial resources to seek punitive action against their traffickers. 
Unfulfilled victim protection requirements of the 2010 anti-trafficking 
law, due in part to limited government resources, may have resulted 
in victims inconsistently participating as witnesses and prosecutorial 
delays. 
ANLTP/TIM partnered with an international organization during 
the reporting period to train magistrates and other judicial officials 
on techniques to prosecute suspected traffickers more effectively; 
authorities did not report the number of officials trained. In 2019, 
ANLTP/TIM reported training more than 425 officials. Authorities 
did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting government 
employees for complicity in trafficking crimes; however, corruption 
and official complicity remained concerns and may have impeded 
law enforcement action during the year. 
PROTECTION
The government increased efforts to identify victims and refer them 
to care. The government did not compile comprehensive victim 
identification statistics, nor did it have standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) for victim identification. Despite the lack of SOPs, the 
government reported identifying 95 victims during the reporting 
period. Over the course of the previous reporting period, officials 
reported identifying 47 victims, as well as 232 potential victims in 
one law enforcement operation in partnership with an international 
organization. The government referred all 95 identified victims to the 
Zinder shelter, compared with seven victims in the previous reporting 
year. Beginning in November 2020, government officials managed 
and staffed the shelter, providing victims medical, psycho-social, and 
legal services and coordinated with an international organization to 
deliver individualized reintegration assistance to victims to facilitate 
their return to their country of origin. ANLTP/TIM officials continued 
to liaise with an international organization during the reporting 
period to ensure optimal management of the shelter. 
Officials launched the NRM in September 2020 and partnered 
with an international organization to train all ANLTP/TIM focal 
points on the mechanism. The NRM identified roles for prosecutors, 
judges, law enforcement, labor inspectors, diplomats, international 
organizations, NGOs, and union actors. In October 2020, the ANLTP/
TIM partnered with an international organization to provide training 
for 29 individuals from the Ministries of Justice and Promotion of 
Women and Protection of Children, local education and health 
officials, and a traditional leader and NGOs; the training centered 
on increasing key actors’ ability to implement the NRM, community 
engagement, and improving law enforcement’s efficacy in identifying 
victims. The government broadcasted the training on two national 
television and radio stations in French and Hausa. 
Victims of forced labor and caste-based servitude could file civil and 
criminal complaints simultaneously; however, there were no reports 
they did so during the reporting period. There were no reports officials 
penalized victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to 
commit; however, some victims may have remained unidentified and 
subsequently penalized due to the government’s failure to employ 
systematic measures to identify trafficking victims among vulnerable 
populations. The law provided for the possibility of granting victims 
legal residency in Niger, including the ability to obtain employment, 
if it was unsafe for them to return to their countries of origin; 
authorities did not report granting these protections to victims 
during the reporting period. 
PREVENTION
The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking. CNCLTP 
continued to serve as the coordinating body for the government’s 
anti-trafficking efforts, and the ANLTP/TIM was the government’s 
permanent implementing body to address trafficking in persons. In 
2020, the government reported providing 22 million FCFA ($41,590) 
for the ANLTP/TIM and 12 million FCFA ($22,680) for the CNCLTP, 
compared with funding both the CNCLTP and ANLTP/TIM at 73.5 
million FCFA ($138,940) in 2019. 
The ANLTP/TIM continued to implement its public awareness 
campaigns and used multiple media platforms across Niger to 
familiarize the public with trafficking and the risks of irregular 
migration to Europe. In June, ANLTP/TIM partnered with an 
international organization to rebroadcast a sensitization theatrical 
production developed during the previous reporting period. The 
government expanded its public engagement around its annual 
September 28 anti-trafficking day events for the sixth consecutive 
year, using the 2020 program to host public debates with stakeholders 
from the Islamic community, civil society, and NGOs and to launch 
the NRM in collaboration with an international organization. 
Additionally, ANLTP/TIM trained administrative and customary 
authorities, former smugglers, civil society organizations, women 
and youth associations, law enforcement officers, and media on 
the trafficking indicators in coordination with a law enforcement 
organization. In November 2020, the former ANLTP/TIM director 
general partnered with the United States to provide operational and 
strategic guidance to another government’s anti-trafficking lead. The 
ANLTP/TIM postponed other awareness-raising activities, trainings, 
and workshops as a result of measures to slow the spread of the 
pandemic in the country. 
The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for 
commercial sex acts. Bylaws governing the armed forces required 
troops to receive anti-trafficking training prior to their deployment 
abroad on international peacekeeping missions, and the government 
addressed such requirements through a program conducted by a 
foreign donor. An international organization disclosed there were 
seven open allegations of sexual exploitation against Nigerien 





sanctioning the suspects. For the first time, the ANLTP/TIM trained 
diplomatic and consular officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
International Cooperation, African Integration and Nigeriens Abroad 
to increase their ability to respond to potential trafficking cases abroad.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
 As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Niger, and traffickers exploit victims from Niger 
abroad. Hereditary and caste-based slavery practices perpetuated by 
politically influential tribal leaders continued in 2020. Some Arab, 
Zjerma, and Tuareg ethnic groups propagate traditional forms of caste-
based servitude in the Tillaberi and Tahoua regions, as well as along 
the border with Nigeria. Families may exploit victims of hereditary 
slavery in animal herding, small-scale agriculture, or domestic 
servitude; experts assert victims of hereditary slavery frequently do 
not self-identify or file complaints against their traffickers because 
of a lack of reintegration services and ingrained dependency on their 
trafficker. Another form of traditional bondage known as “passive” 
slavery consists of powerful community members preserving complete 
control of their former servants’ individual freedoms. 
In the Tahoua region, influential chiefs facilitate the transfer of girls 
from impoverished families to men as “fifth wives” for financial or 
political gain. This practice—known as wahaya—results in some 
community members exploiting girls as young as nine in forced labor 
and sexual servitude; wahayu children are then born into slave castes, 
perpetuating the cycle of slavery. Girls fleeing these forced marriages 
are vulnerable to traffickers, who exploit them in commercial sex 
due to a lack of reintegration support exacerbated by continued 
discrimination based on their former status as wahayu. 
Observers stated pandemic-related border closures remained in place 
throughout the reporting period and resulted in an estimated 25,000 
migrants stranded throughout Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger. These 
irregular migrants—many of whom were located in the northern cities 
of Agadez, Arlit, and Dirkou—generally lacked access to livelihoods, 
support networks, and justice, which increased their vulnerability 
to trafficking. Additionally, experts shared anecdotal reports of an 
increase in unaccompanied children in Agadez over the course of 
the reporting period.
Traffickers in Niger predominantly exploit Nigerien children and 
women, as well as West and Central African victims, in sex and 
labor trafficking. Some Quranic schoolteachers (marabouts) exploit 
boys (talibes) in forced labor and begging within Niger, as well as in 
neighboring countries, at times with parents facilitating the trafficking. 
Semi-organized transnational criminal groups force Nigerien and 
neighboring countries’ children to labor in gold, salt, trona, and 
gypsum mines; agriculture; forced begging; commercial sex; stone 
quarries; markets; bus stations; and manufacturing within the 
country. Community members working in the artisanal gold mines 
in Komabangou, Tillaberi, continue to use adolescent boys and some 
girls in potentially exploitative conditions. Criminals exploit girls 
in sex trafficking near the border with Nigeria and along the main 
east-west highway, primarily between the cities of Birni n’Konni 
and Zinder. Brothel owners in Niger sexually exploit some women 
from Nigeria in the country and during their transit to North Africa. 
Some Nigeriens exploit young girls from impoverished families in 
domestic servitude through a system known as confiage. This system 
consists of parents entrusting children to a near relative or a friend 
of the family with the expectation the receiving family will provide 
the child an education. Some receiving families exploit children 
under the confiage system in domestic servitude or sex trafficking. The 
ANLTP/TIM reported some parents “rent” out their children for the 
purposes of forced begging, as guides for vision-impaired individuals, 
or in domestic servitude in a phenomenon called location d’enfant 
(child rental) in the Kantche Department in Zinder. 
Illicit labor recruiters and human smugglers (illicit actors who accept 
payment from individuals seeking to illegally cross international 
borders free from force, fraud, or coercion) facilitate the transport 
of Nigerien women and children to Nigeria, North Africa, the 
Middle East, and Europe where traffickers then exploit victims in sex 
trafficking or forced labor in domestic service and the agricultural 
sector. Smugglers use unpaid transportation fees as a form of debt 
bondage, subsequently coercing some migrants who cannot pay into 
forced labor or commercial sex. Impoverished seasonal migrants—
commonly from the Zinder region—traveling to Algeria for work 
remain vulnerable to forced labor and sexual exploitation. Criminal 
groups consisting of Algerians and Nigeriens may have forced some 
Nigerien children to beg in Algeria during the reporting period.
Niger is a transit country for adults and children from West and 
Central Africa migrating through Algeria, Libya, and Morocco to 
southern Europe, where some duplicitous transporters—or passeurs—
may exploit smuggling clients in forced labor or sex trafficking. 
European support for the government’s implementation of its 2015 
anti-smuggling law, intended to limit irregular migration through 
Niger, has forced previously open (albeit undocumented) migration 
underground and increased migrants’ vulnerability to forced labor 
or sex trafficking by criminal networks. Criminals transport both 
Nigerien and Nigerian women into neighboring West African countries 
and then exploit them in sex trafficking inside Niger, especially in 
northern mining cities or in transportation centers. Media noted 
some law enforcement and border officials reportedly accepted bribes 
from traffickers to facilitate the transportation of victims through the 
country. Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa forcibly recruit Nigerien 
boys to serve as child soldiers in the southern states of Zinder and 
Diffa. Cuban nationals working in Niger on medical missions may 
have been forced to work by the Cuban government. 
NIGERIA: TIER 2
The Government of Nigeria does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking 
capacity; therefore Nigeria was upgraded to Tier 2. These efforts 
included convicting more traffickers and sanctioning the majority 
of perpetrators with significant prison terms; prosecuting officials 
suspected of being complicit in trafficking crimes; improving 
intra-governmental coordination on anti-trafficking operations; 
launching nine new state task forces; and for the first time, the 
Ministry of Defense acknowledged service members sexually exploited 
internally displaced persons (IDPs). Additionally, officials increased 
collaboration with foreign governments on international trafficking 
investigations. However, the government did not meet the minimum 
standards in several key areas. Members of the Civilian Joint Task Force 
(CJTF) in Borno State used two children at an IDP camp checkpoint; 
there continued to be reports of sex trafficking in government-run 
IDP camps; and officials prosecuted fewer suspected traffickers. 
Further, corruption remained a significant concern in the judiciary 
and immigration services, and the Ministry of Defense did not 
finalize its handover protocol to refer child soldiers to care for the 
sixth consecutive year.
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including in support roles, and refer all children to appropriate 
care. • Hold complicit officials as well as individuals affiliated with 
the government – including security officials and CJTF members – 
criminally accountable for trafficking offenses, including for the sex 
trafficking of IDPs and unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers. 
• National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons 
(NAPTIP) and Nigeria Police Force (NPF) enhance coordination 
on law enforcement efforts – including investigating illicit centers 
exploiting women in forced surrogacy – and prosecute suspects while 
respecting the rights of the accused. • Finalize the draft protocol to 
refer children identified in armed conflict to civilian authorities, 
screen for trafficking among those detained, and provide appropriate 
care for all those identified as victims. • Strengthen efforts to identify 
trafficking victims among vulnerable groups, such as children in 
religious schools, IDPs, returning migrants, and children in domestic 
service. • Increase public awareness programming to educate more 
of the population on human trafficking indicators. • Expand shelter 
capacity for identified victims in coordination with other government 
entities, civil society, NGOs, international organizations, and the 
private sector. • Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict 
traffickers – including labor traffickers and those who force children 
to beg – and impose sufficiently stringent sentences involving 
imprisonment. • Work with CJTF and the UN to implement fully 
the child soldier action plan and confirm all children have been 
removed from the CJTF’s ranks. • Facilitate training for local, state, and 
federal judges on the 2015 law, specifically the provision prohibiting 
the issuance of fines in lieu of imprisonment in collaboration with 
international partners. • Increase the capacity of Nigerian embassies 
to identify and provide assistance to victims abroad, including by 
providing replacement travel or identity documents free of charge. 
• Finalize, resource, and implement the country’s 2021-2025 draft 
anti-trafficking national action plan in coordination with civil society, 
NGOs, partner governments, as well as the private sector. • Develop 
and implement a centralized database linking NAPTIP, NPF, and 
other relevant law enforcement agencies. 
PROSECUTION
The government increased convictions, but overall anti-trafficking 
law enforcement efforts were mixed. The Trafficking in Persons Law 
Enforcement and Administration Act (TIPLEAA), as amended in 2015, 
criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed a 
minimum penalty of two years’ imprisonment and a fine of 250,000 
naira ($649) for both sex and labor trafficking; the minimum penalty 
for sex trafficking increased to seven years’ imprisonment and a fine 
of 1 million naira ($2,600) if the case involved a child victim. These 
penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, 
commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such 
as kidnapping. The Edo State anti-trafficking law criminalized sex 
trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed a minimum penalty 
of five years’ imprisonment and a fine of 1 million naira ($2,600) for 
both sex and labor trafficking; the minimum penalty for sex trafficking 
increased to seven years’ imprisonment and a fine of 1 million naira 
($2,600) if the case involved a child victim. These penalties were 
sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate 
with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as kidnapping. 
In total, federal and state authorities investigated 409 cases, prosecuted 
49 suspects, and convicted 36 traffickers during the reporting period, 
according to multiple sources. Authorities reported investigating 
943 cases, prosecuting 64 suspects, and convicting 27 perpetrators 
during the previous year; prison sentences ranged from two to 10 
years’ imprisonment and at least one convicted trafficker was given 
the option of fines in lieu of imprisonment. During the rating 
period, NAPTIP reported opening 381 new investigations (243 sex 
trafficking, 138 forced labor) and continuing 452 investigations 
opened in previous reporting periods; initiating prosecutions against 
40 suspects (36 sex trafficking, four forced labor) and continuing 
13 prosecutions opened in prior years. Authorities reported judges 
convicted 36 perpetrators (14 sex trafficking, two forced labor, 20 
other forms of trafficking) under the TIPLEAA anti-trafficking sections 
13, 15, 16, 18, 21, 23, 24, and 27, sentencing 23 traffickers to average 
terms of imprisonment of three and half years with no option of 
paying fines, sentencing 13 traffickers to terms of imprisonment or 
fines, and ordered two traffickers to pay restitution of 100,000 naira 
($260) and 300,000 naira ($780). Separately, media reported law 
enforcement officers investigated four suspects, two of whom were 
government officials, and officers from the Nigeria Security and Civil 
Defense Corps opened an investigation into two suspects; the cases 
were pending at the close of the reporting period. Law enforcement 
data from prior reporting periods may have included crimes outside 
the international definition of trafficking. Pandemic-related court 
closures lasting from April to June 2020 limited overall judicial 
activity during that period. 
Unlike previous years, NPF reported its officers arrested two traffickers 
in 2020, and media noted NPF officers arrested three suspected 
traffickers exploiting women in “baby factories,” as well as additional 
potential victims in December 2020 and March 2021 in the Ogun 
and Katsina states respectively. “Baby factories” refer to criminal 
enterprises often disguised as orphanages, maternity homes, or 
religious centers – where traffickers hold women against their will, 
rape them, and force them to carry and deliver a child. Experts stated 
this illicit activity was widespread in the country. 
 The Edo State Task Force Against Human Trafficking (ETAHT) 
investigated 17 cases (13 forced labor and four sex trafficking) 
and initiated prosecutions against nine suspects, compared to 
investigating 38 cases and prosecuting 22 suspects in the previous 
reporting period; since its establishment in 2018, the ETAHT has not 
reported convicting a trafficker, although officers stated Edo State 
courts ordered five perpetrators to pay restitution to victims during 
the reporting period. ETAHT officers stated they investigated one 
government official for suspected complicity in trafficking without 
providing additional details on the status of the case; officers did not 
report investigating complicit officials in the prior year.
An international organization verified the CJTF – a non-governmental 
self-defense militia receiving state government funding – used two 
children aged between 15 and 17 to assist at a check point in Borno 
State during the reporting period. The federal and state governments 
did not report investigating or prosecuting CJTF members for recent 
or past allegations of child soldiering recruitment or use. Corruption 
affected all levels of government – including the judiciary, security 
forces, and law enforcement – and undermined accountability for 
trafficking offenses. Sex trafficking reportedly occurred in government-
run detention centers and IDP camps. Without providing statistics, 
observers reported NAPTIP investigated allegations of human 
trafficking in IDP camps, in coordination with Ministry of Defense 
zonal commanders. 
Despite multiple years of allegations, the government did not report 
prosecuting or convicting any suspects – including officials or CJTF 
members – for sex trafficking of IDPs during the reporting period; 
however, the Armed Forces of Nigeria court martialed an enlisted 
soldier in September 2020 for sexually abusing – without clear 
indicators of sex trafficking – a 13-year-old IDP and sentenced him 
to five years imprisonment. Additionally, in response to reports of sex 
trafficking of IDPs in Borno State, the government’s National Human 
Rights Commission partnered with an international organization 
to investigate allegations; officials did not disclose the results of 
the inquiries, although observers noted authorities investigated 
multiple cases but had not prosecuted any suspects as of March 
2021. The government did not report investigating or prosecuting 
officials for reports of sex trafficking in Giwa Barracks or IDP camps 
dating back to 2016. 
For the first time, the federal Ministry of Defense acknowledged 
publicly its personnel had sexually exploited individuals, although 
it continued to deny soldiers recruited children, which impeded 
investigations of allegations from prior reporting periods. During the 






two senior officials from the federal ministries of Agriculture and 
Finance, one immigration officer, an Osun State Agricultural 
Development Corporation official, and an officer in Lagos state 
responsible for enforcing the pandemic-related quarantine; all cases 
were for sex trafficking and were ongoing as of March 2021. The 
government prosecuted and convicted three mid-level and senior-level 
officials for trafficking offenses during the previous reporting period. 
NAPTIP, under the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster 
Management, continued to lead the federal government’s efforts to 
combat trafficking, although officials from the Nigerian Immigration 
Service, NPF, Labor Inspectorate, Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission – as well as the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit, 
in coordination with prosecutors and the judiciary – all had 
responsibilities in supporting the country’s criminal justice response 
to human trafficking. NAPTIP did not have resources to carry out 
sufficient proactive anti-trafficking operations in much of the country, 
and the agency’s officers remained concentrated in state capitals, 
hindering identification and investigation of trafficking in many 
rural areas. 
Observers reported that poor coordination between NAPTIP and 
other government agencies impeded prosecution efforts in prior years; 
NAPTIP and other law enforcement agencies failed to coordinate 
with each other when mandates overlapped, although collaboration 
with other government entities reportedly improved during the rating 
period. Experts stated the lack of a centralized database linking 
relevant law enforcement agencies continued to prevent effective 
coordination. However, from January to March 2021, NAPTIP officers 
conducted law enforcement operations with NPF, Nigeria Immigration 
Service, Armed Forces of Nigeria, and the Office of the National 
Security Advisor to identify 80 child trafficking victims, according 
to media; however, officials stated they have not yet prosecuted any 
human traffickers through these operations, although investigations 
into these cases continued as of March 2021. 
During the reporting period, increasing terrorist activity as well as 
banditry throughout much of the country hindered law enforcement 
and judicial officials’ ability to execute their respective mandates, 
with community defense groups playing a substantial role in judicial 
service delivery and dispute resolution. The government’s capacity 
to respond to trafficking cases in northeast Nigeria continued to be 
limited as Boko Haram, Islamic State West Africa (ISIS-WA), and 
other terrorist groups killed hundreds of Nigerian soldiers, took 
additional territory, and displaced tens of thousands of inhabitants, 
limiting access to remote areas of Borno State. 
Throughout 2020, NAPTIP and observers reported courts increased 
their use of online technology in response to restrictions on in-
person meetings to slow the pandemic’s spread. NAPTIP reported 
delivering 32 trainings for 963 officials in 2020 on topics including 
identifying and investigating human trafficking; in 2019, the 
government reported training 1,165 NAPTIP officers. While the 
Ministry of Justice implemented strict training requirements for 
federal and state judges, there was no corresponding mechanism 
for judges at the local level, which contributed to corruption and 
misapplication of the law. Despite courts sanctioning traffickers 
with increasingly stringent sentences compared to prior years, the 
government acknowledged many judges remained unfamiliar with 
the anti-trafficking law – including the provision requiring judges to 
prescribe sentences that included imprisonment – which hindered 
law enforcement efforts. Further, the judiciary remained slow and 
corrupt generally, which impeded prosecutions and convictions of 
most crimes, including trafficking. NAPTIP’s funding constraints – 
made increasingly dire by diminished revenue due to the pandemic’s 
economic impacts – remained a perennial challenge for the agency, 
exacerbated by costs associated with the agency’s mandate to provide 
shelter to victims. 
In August 2020, NAPTIP coordinated with an international 
organization to launch two legal hubs in Edo and Lagos states, in 
collaboration with the Ministry of Justice and NGOs, with the aim 
of enhancing victims’ access to justice through legal aid counseling 
and representation in court. In February 2021, NAPTIP partnered 
with an international organization and donor to establish a Judicial 
Research Center in Abuja; the center provided NAPTIP officers access 
to resources to strengthen trafficking cases and enhance prosecution 
efforts. 
The Nigerian-United Kingdom (UK) Joint Border Task Force (JBTF) 
– which is Nigerian-led and UK-supported – continued operations 
during the rating period, with observers reporting Nigerian judges 
convicted the country’s first perpetrator for conspiracy related to 
human trafficking, as well as completing their first conviction based 
solely on digital evidence. Experts noted the development of a 
panel of judges focused solely on transnational organized crime 
– including human trafficking – resulted in some courts operating 
more efficiently, and witness testimony provided via video mitigated 
a common delay tactic previously used by some defense attorneys. 
In 2020 – under the JBTF initiative – officials shared intelligence on 
joint investigations with UK and Spanish authorities. 
Over the course of the reporting period, Nigerian law enforcement 
officials collaborated with the Governments of France, The Gambia, 
Germany, Ghana, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland on joint 
investigations, intelligence sharing, and prosecutions. NAPTIP 
reported collaborating with countries to investigate 19 cases of 
transnational human trafficking crimes. Nigerian judicial officials 
were prosecuting one transnational case in the Federal High Court in 
Ibadan and another in the Federal High Court in Lagos as of March 
2021. In October 2020, the government entered into force its bilateral 
agreement with Italy on investigations and extraditions; authorities 
from the two countries coordinated in 2020 on a case involving a 
Nigerian trafficker in Italy. International partners reported corruption 
and capacity issues with some government agencies – including the 
judiciary and the Nigeria Immigration Service – hindered cooperation 
at times. In 2019, two European countries transmitted case files to 
NAPTIP to prosecute organized trafficking networks. 
PROTECTION
The government increased efforts to identify victims, although services 
for many victims remained insufficient. In total, the government – 
including NAPTIP, NPF, and ETAHT efforts – identified approximately 
499 victims and 812 potential victims, according to official, NGO, 
and media reporting. During the previous reporting period, NAPTIP 
identified 181 forced labor victims and 636 potential victims, and 
ETAHT identified 195 victims. NAPTIP reported identifying 434 
victims (135 forced labor and 299 sex trafficking) as well as 321 
potential victims, compared with 181 forced labor victims and 636 
potential trafficking victims in the previous reporting period. Through 
its shelters, NAPTIP provided initial care for all 434 victims and 321 
potential victims, which may have included referrals to government 
facilities for medical care, shelter, legal assistance, psychological 
services, vocational training, or education assistance. During the 
previous reporting period, NAPTIP provided direct support to 1,009 
victims at NAPTIP shelters and referred 71 victims to NGO shelters. 
NPF officers reported identifying 20 potential victims during the 
course of law enforcement operations in 2020 but did not report 
referring the victims to services; NPF did not disclose similar statistics 
for 2019. 
Media reported NPF officers identified at least 21 potential victims 
(separate from the 20 previously referenced) during the course of 
law enforcement operations in December 2020 and March 2021. In 
December, police disrupted a criminal enterprise known as a “baby 
factory” in Ogun State in southwest Nigeria and removed 10 victims 
(four children and six women – four of whom were pregnant), and 
in March 2021, police removed 11 potential victims (nine females 
and two males) from a suspect in the northern state of Katsina 
who was allegedly preparing to send the 11 individuals to Libya for 
onward travel to Europe.
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During the reporting period, ETAHT reported identifying and 
providing comprehensive services to 65 victims; these included 
psychosocial support, medical, and pro-bono legal assistance. 
Additionally, ETAHT delivered pandemic relief materials to more 
than 1,000 returning migrants, some of whom may have been 
victims. This is compared to assisting 428 returned migrants, 195 
of whom were trafficking victims, in the previous reporting period. 
Observers reported victim identification and referral to services 
remained a gap in the government’s efforts. Nonetheless, the 
government had formal written procedures to guide law enforcement, 
immigration, and social services personnel in proactive identification 
of trafficking victims among high-risk populations, and NAPTIP 
reported implementing 32 trainings in 2020 for 963 officials from 
the Armed Forces of Nigeria, police, immigration, and social services 
to identify trafficking victims; NAPTIP reported training 1,165 
NAPTIP officers in 2019. Pandemic-related restrictions on in-person 
meetings resulted in delayed or cancelled training activities in 2020. 
Additionally, the government’s national referral mechanism provided 
formal guidelines for law enforcement, immigration officials, and 
service providers to improve protection and assistance to trafficking 
victims, both within Nigeria and abroad. 
Nigerian law mandated NAPTIP to provide care for victims of crimes 
under both the 2015 anti-trafficking law and 2015 Violence Against 
Persons (Prohibition) Act; NAPTIP’s resources were insufficient to 
provide specialized care for all trafficking victims. Each of NAPTIP’s 
10 zonal commands, including the Abuja headquarters, operated a 
victim shelter during the reporting period, for a total of 10 shelters 
for trafficking victims with a total capacity of 334. NAPTIP shelters 
offered six weeks of initial care, although officials often allowed 
women to stay longer if they desired to do so; access to the shelters 
was not based on victims’ cooperation with law enforcement. If 
there was not space in NAPTIP shelters, agency officials referred the 
victim to NGOs for care. Measures to slow the pandemic’s spread 
– including a five-week nationwide lockdown from March to May 
2020 – limited shelter capacity throughout the country. In 2019, an 
NGO reported a lack of funding combined with NAPTIP’s utilization 
of shelters, as opposed to community-based services, resulted in 
substandard conditions in some shelters; a lack of oversight allegedly 
exacerbated these issues. 
NAPTIP typically required victims to remain in shelters for six weeks, 
although individuals staying longer were able to leave shelters 
unaccompanied absent case-specific security concerns. Through these 
shelters, NAPTIP provided access to legal, medical, and psychological 
services, as well as vocational training, financial empowerment, family 
reunification, and business management skills. These shelters were 
also available to Nigerian trafficking victims exploited abroad upon 
repatriation. NAPTIP had agreements with certain hospitals and 
clinics to provide additional medical and psychological treatment 
for victims, as needed. Additional government and NGO shelters 
provided services, including long-term shelter, to vulnerable children 
and victims of crime, including trafficking; authorities sometimes 
assigned child trafficking victims to foster homes or orphanages for 
care. Foreign victims had access to the same services as domestic 
victims. 
NAPTIP continued to partner with an international organization 
and a foreign donor to implement a screening and sensitization 
campaign to identify sex trafficking victims in IDP camps in Bama 
and other areas near Maiduguri. NAPTIP reached an unreported 
number of camps in the Maiduguri area with screening, sensitization, 
or both; however, due to the deteriorating security situation and 
the pandemic, these activities were generally restricted to areas in 
and around Maiduguri. Additionally, NAPTIP officials reported 
coordinating with the Ministry of Defense’s zonal commanders on 
protection issues pertaining to IDP camps – including in Maiduguri 
– by funding social workers, raising awareness of the crime among 
camp residents, and identifying victims. 
Unlike previous years, observers reported the government did not 
forcibly return Nigerian refugees from Cameroon; however, the 
government did not disclose efforts to screen for indicators of 
trafficking among this population. Between May and August – with 
the country under pandemic-related lockdown – NAPTIP collaborated 
with an international organization to repatriate more than 450 victims 
and potential victims (included in the previously referenced totals 
for potential victims) from Lebanon, Mali, and Niger; observers 
reported the government screened for indicators of trafficking and 
provided these individuals specialized care and reintegration services. 
During the previous reporting period, NAPTIP and an international 
organization screened all returnees from Libya for trafficking indicators 
and referred the identified trafficking victims to NAPTIP facilities or 
NGOs. In 2020, the ETAHT opened a shelter for trafficking victims 
with capacity for 100 victims (60 men and 40 women in separate 
facilities); officials disclosed there was one victim in the shelter as of 
February 2021. Several Nigerian embassies, particularly within West 
Africa, provided funding or in-kind support to repatriate Nigerian 
trafficking victims exploited abroad.
The anti-trafficking law prohibited the penalization of trafficking 
victims for unlawful acts their traffickers, including armed groups, 
compelled them to commit. However, as in past years, the government 
continued to arrest and, in some cases, inappropriately detain for 
prolonged periods – reportedly for a security screening and perceived 
intelligence value – women and children removed from or allegedly 
associated with Boko Haram and ISIS-WA, including women and 
girls who insurgents had forcibly married or sexually enslaved. 
Authorities did not consistently screen the women and children for 
trafficking indicators. 
As previously referenced, observers verified two cases of a CJTF unit 
using child soldiers during the reporting period in support roles at 
an IDP camp checkpoint in Borno State. Following the notification of 
the violation by an international organization, the CJTF demobilized 
the two children and referred them to care, and – in coordination 
with an international organization – senior representatives from 
the Ministry of Justice and Armed Forces of Nigeria, as well as the 
CJTF’s area commander, visited the IDP camp to assess the reports 
and reinforce the zero tolerance policy for use of child soldiers to 
CJTF members. After the delegation’s mission, authorities worked 
with observers to organize a three-day workshop with all CJTF unit 
commanders in Borno’s local government areas to highlight the 
importance of the issue and educate additional militia members. 
Officials stated key issues included limited awareness by new CJTF 
members and communities of the 2017 CJTF-UN child soldier action 
plan to end and prevent forces from recruiting and using children; 
lack of disciplinary measures at the local level; and the CJTF’s Child 
Protection Unit’s limited capacity. 
In 2020, authorities released at least 309 children from military 
detention in Maiduguri; however, children likely remained 
inappropriately detained in military detention centers at the close 
of the reporting period. The military released approximately 334 
children from detention between September 2019 and March 2020. 
For the sixth consecutive year, the government did not officially 
adopt the handover protocol to refer children identified in armed 
conflict to civilian care providers, although observers reported 
authorities implemented key aspects of the handover protocol 
during the reporting period. After release from detention, the military 
generally referred women and children classified through a security 
screening process as “low risk” or “inactive” in the conflict to a 
government-run rehabilitation center. While the standard procedures 
developed in partnership with an international organization improved 
identification of potential trafficking victims among those detained, 
some trafficking victims – including women and children whom 
non-state armed groups forced to be combatants or exploited in 
sexual slavery – remained in detention and subject to criminal 
prosecution, contrary to Nigerian law, for unlawful acts traffickers 






The government collaborated with donors to continue the “Operation 
Safe Corridor” de-radicalization and rehabilitation program for 
combatants formerly associated with terrorist organizations. Some 
women and child ex-combatants participated in this program, in 
addition to men; observers reported allegations of serious abuse in 
past years including life threatening conditions in detention centers 
associated with the program. 
NAPTIP encouraged victims to assist in the investigation and 
prosecution of trafficking cases by providing security, organizing 
private testimony in judge’s chambers or video testimony, and 
providing legal assistance; the government did not report how 
many victims assisted in investigations and prosecutions during the 
reporting period. In response to the pandemic, NAPTIP coordinated 
through the JBTF to expand courts’ use of video to collect testimony 
and allow witnesses in other jurisdictions to give evidence in Nigerian 
criminal trials. During the previous reporting period, NAPTIP used 
video interviewing equipment in Lagos, Benin City, and Kano, while 
video link equipment was installed in Federal High Court courtrooms 
in Lagos, Abuja, and Benin City. 
The government did not have a formal policy to prevent the removal 
of victims to countries where they would face hardship or retribution; 
however, there were no reports of trafficking victims removed to 
such countries during the reporting period. It could grant temporary 
residence visas to a trafficking victim who had a pending criminal, 
civil, or other legal action; the government did not report any foreign 
victims requesting this relief in 2020. 
The victims’ trust fund, financed primarily through confiscated 
assets of convicted traffickers, was available to all victims, but the 
government did not report whether it allocated any funds from the 
trust fund to victims during the reporting period. The anti-trafficking 
law provided for victim restitution; ETAHT officials reported traffickers 
paid restitution to five victims during the reporting period, compared 
with one convicted trafficker ordered to pay restitution during the 
prior reporting period. Victims could also file civil suits against their 
traffickers. While NAPTIP prosecutors regularly sought restitution 
in trafficking cases, officials from the federal agency did not report 
any cases in which traffickers paid restitution to victims, an issue 
exacerbated by judges’ unfamiliarity with that provision of the 
anti-trafficking law.
PREVENTION
The government increased efforts to prevent human trafficking. 
NAPTIP continued to lead the federal government’s efforts to combat 
trafficking, although officials from the ministries of Defense, Justice, 
Foreign Affairs, Labor and Productivity, and Women Affairs and Social 
Development all had responsibilities in supporting the country’s 
response to human trafficking. While ineffective coordination between 
ministries, as well as across federal and state agencies, hindered the 
effectiveness of the country’s anti-trafficking response in the past, 
coordination improved during the current reporting period. 
The inter-ministerial committee on trafficking met on an ad hoc 
basis and helped to develop national policies on trafficking. In 
November, NAPTIP convened key federal and state officials, as well 
as international organizations, civil society, and partner governments, 
to develop the country’s draft 2021-2025 national action plan, 
although the government had not officially adopted the plan as 
of March 2021. Inadequate information management technology 
– including basic infrastructure such as computers and internet 
services, especially in zonal commands outside Abuja – hindered 
data collection, dissemination, and research; many offices continued 
to use paper-based systems for case management. 
Over the course of 2020, NAPTIP reported holding more than 40 
sensitization events using radio, television, and other mediums in 
coordination with partner governments, international organizations, 
and NGOs, estimating the events reached at least 1,890 individuals; 
officials postponed or cancelled numerous in-person events to follow 
protocol intended to slow the pandemic’s spread. Officials did 
not disclose similar details for the prior reporting period. NAPTIP 
continued to integrate anti-trafficking modules into school core 
curricula and performed direct outreach to schools during the 
reporting period. Additionally, in March 2021, NAPTIP coordinated 
with an international organization to launch the “Blue Bus” campaign 
– with financial support from a donor – in Abuja to raise awareness of 
the risks of exploitation associated with irregular migration; officials 
did not disclose how many individuals the campaign reached. The 
ETAHT held a press conference in August, two road walks in July, 
and one road walk in December to raise awareness around trafficking 
issues in Edo State. 
In past reporting periods, the government assisted in the formation of 
state-level anti-trafficking task forces in Edo, Delta, Ondo, Ekiti, and 
Borno states; in 2020, NAPTIP partnered with state governments to 
establish nine new state task forces in Rivers, Cross Rivers, Akwa Ibom, 
Ogun, Oyo, Enugu, Anambara, and Ebonyi, and it reestablished the 
Lagos task force. NAPTIP coordinated with international organizations 
to provide training on victim-centered approaches to addressing 
human trafficking for task force officials. 
The Ministry of Labor and Employment (MLE) reported conducting 
9,877 inspections resulting in the removal of 2,996 children from 
potential child trafficking conditions, and officials referred 1,067 of 
the identified children to the government’s social services; the MLE 
did not provide statistics for 2019. Despite these actions, workers 
employed in the informal economy – including children working 
in agriculture, domestic work, and artisanal mining – remained 
highly vulnerable to trafficking. International observers reported the 
government deployed 130 officers to airports throughout the country 
during the reporting period to assist with screening for trafficking 
indicators, building on NAPTIP’s past sensitization programs at 
transportation hubs. Despite allegations in prior years that Nigerians 
traveled to Togo for child sex tourism, the government did not report 
efforts to address child sex tourism. The MLE regulated private 
employment agencies and instituted a licensing requirement for 
labor recruiters; the government did not report revoking any licenses 
for exploitative recruitment practices during the reporting period. 
The government did not report efforts to reduce the demand for 
commercial sex. 
Each of the nine NAPTIP zonal commands, as well as the headquarters 
in Abuja, operated hotlines for trafficking victims; the hotlines were 
staffed 24 hours per day and staff spoke English and the relevant 
local languages for the region. NAPTIP publicized the hotlines 
through mass media, in written pamphlets, and in coordination with 
international organizations. During the reporting period, NAPTIP 
stated individuals made approximately 12,000 calls to the hotline, 
leading to the identification of 145 victims and 36 investigations 
of suspected traffickers; the government did not provide similar 
statistics for the prior reporting period. 
The Borno State government continued to provide financial and 
in-kind resources to the CJTF, a non-governmental self-defense 
militia responsible for combating Boko Haram and providing 
security for some IDP camps, which used two children during 
the reporting period. The Borno State government continued to 
provide administrative support to help implement the 2017 action 
plan between CJTF and an international organization to end CJTF’s 
recruitment and use of children; despite two verified cases of CJTF 
members using children in support roles at an IDP camp in Borno 
State, an international observer described CJTF’s implementation of 
its 2017 action plan during the reporting period as commendable. 
Since the signing of the action plan in 2017, observers verified the 
CJTF separated more than 2,000 of an estimated several thousand 
children previously affiliated with the group. NAPTIP officials 
reported enhancing awareness raising of the crime in IDP camps 
and coordinating with the Ministry of Defense to bolster protection 
efforts in the camps – specifically around Maiduguri.
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In partnership with a foreign donor, the government provided 
anti-trafficking training to its troops prior to their deployment as 
peacekeepers. According to an international organization, there 
were no reports in 2020 of sexual exploitation by peacekeepers from 
Nigeria deployed to peacekeeping missions, but there remained 
five open allegations, including one from 2019, one from 2018, 
and three from 2017. As of September, two allegations had been 
substantiated, and the international organization repatriated the 
perpetrators, but the Nigerian government had not yet provided the 
full accountability measures taken for all five open cases. Unlike the 
previous reporting period, NAPTIP officers provided pre-departure 
training to ambassadors, chiefs of mission, and deputy chiefs of 
mission on human trafficking principles in February 2021.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Nigeria, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Nigeria abroad. Internal trafficking is prevalent with Nigerian 
perpetrators recruiting victims from rural areas, especially the country’s 
southern regions, for exploitation in commercial sex and forced 
labor in domestic work in cities such as Aboekuta, Calabar, Ibadan, 
Kaduna, Kano, Lagos, and Port Harcourt. Traffickers – including some 
community members – exploit women and girls in domestic service 
and sex trafficking, as well as boys in forced and bonded labor in 
street vending, domestic service, artisanal mining, stone quarrying, 
agriculture, textile manufacturing, begging, and in the tie-dye sector 
in the northwest and southwest of the country. Criminal elements 
recruit foreigners for labor trafficking within the country. 
Rapid population growth drives the country’s informal education 
sector, including Quranic schools – most prevalent in northern regions 
– known as Almajiri, where some teachers abuse their students and 
coerce them to beg; in the latest available estimate from 2010, the 
government estimated as many as 9.5 million boys were studying 
in Quranic schools. Observers report worsening poverty related to 
the pandemic’s economic impacts may increase the enrollment of 
these schools, as well as the risks of exploitation of the children by 
teachers, businesses, and local community members seeking labor. 
Extreme poverty, lack of economic opportunity, corruption, insecurity 
throughout the country, and climate change-related pressure to 
migrate increase Nigerians’ vulnerability to trafficking. 
Primarily in Cross River and other southern states, as well as from 
IDP populations in the north, illicit actors – including some church 
leaders – operate “baby factories,” which the government and NGOs 
describe as a widespread criminal industry in the country; experts state 
the phenomenon is driven by poverty and a lack of opportunity for 
young girls, as well as the demands of the illegal adoption market and 
cultural pressure for large families in Nigeria. Recruiters – or “mamas” 
– operating out of unregulated clinics work with enforcers to control 
the women through childbirth. The traffickers then sell the children, 
sometimes with the intent to exploit them in forced labor and sex 
trafficking. In southern Nigeria, especially Lagos, some women drug and 
“rent” their infants out to street beggars to increase the beggars’ profits. 
In Fall 2020, personnel from the CJTF – a non-governmental self-defense 
militia receiving state government funding – providing security for an 
IDP camp in Borno State used two boys between the ages of 15 and 17 
at a checkpoint; observers reported one of the boys was related to a local 
commander and the CJTF did not recruit the children. The Nigerian 
military coordinated operations with the CJTF intermittently to combat 
Boko Haram and ISIS-WA in northeastern Nigeria. Worsening insecurity 
in northeast Nigeria and pandemic-related movement restrictions 
prevented observers from accessing many areas in Borno State and 
reviewing other regions of concern for child soldier recruitment or 
use. During the previous reporting period, an NGO alleged soldiers in 
Giwa Barracks sexually exploited female detainees. Despite authorities 
releasing some individuals from detention, the government continued 
to detain children as young as five years old whom authorities suspected 
of being associated with Boko Haram or ISIS-WA. 
Nigerian criminal elements transport women and children to other 
West and Central African countries – including Cabo Verde, Cote 
d’Ivoire, Mali, and Senegal – as well as to South Africa, where they 
exploit them in forced labor and sex trafficking; experts report 
mixed migration networks were well organized and involved in both 
smuggling and trafficking operations. Observers reported traffickers 
and smugglers using the mixed migration route through Mali sold 
Nigerian girls into commercial sex in Mali.
Artisanal miners exploit West African children in forced labor in 
Nigeria, including in granite and gold mines. Observers have reported 
agricultural firms in rural Nigeria force Togolese to work in palm 
wine production in rural Nigeria. Nigeria’s ports and waterways 
around Calabar remain transit points for West African children 
subjected to forced labor in Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, and 
Gabon. During the prior reporting period, NGO and media sources 
reported Nigerian traffickers compelled Cameroonian child refugees 
displaced by Cameroon’s Anglophone crisis staying in camps in 
Nigeria to work in forced labor in domestic service and, in some 
cases, into sex trafficking; there were allegations some parents were 
involved in selling their children. 
Authorities identified Nigerian trafficking victims – often exploited by 
Nigerian traffickers – in countries in Africa, Europe, and the Middle 
East during the reporting period. Criminal groups and brothel owners 
exploit Nigerian women and girls in sex trafficking within Nigeria 
and throughout Europe, including in and around Paris, France; Turin 
and Ferarra, Italy; and Madrid, Spain, as well as Austria and Russia. 
NGOs reported that while Italy remained the primary destination 
for Nigerian trafficking victims, illicit networks have shifted to 
other destinations such as France and Spain. According to reports, 
80 percent of women in Spain’s unlicensed brothels are victims of 
sex trafficking, with Nigerians forming a large percentage of that 
population. In France, Nigerian trafficking networks force women 
and girls into commercial sex around Paris and threaten victims’ 
families in Nigeria to maintain control; illicit recruiters target women 
and girls predominantly from impoverished families in Edo State 
and require them to take a loyalty oath to their traffickers. Nigerian 
women and children are recruited and transported to destinations 
in North Africa, the Middle East – including Lebanon, Oman, Saudi 
Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates – as well as Central Asia, and 
exploited in sex trafficking or forced labor. 
Historically, the majority of Nigerian trafficking victims in Europe 
have come from Edo State, via Libya; however, observers noted an 
increasing number originating in other states, to include Delta and 
Kano. Additionally, officials noted Abia, Delta, Ebonyi, Edo, Imo, 
and Kogi states are common origins for trafficking of victims to West 
Africa and Europe. Cases of labor trafficking involving domestic 
workers to the Middle East and Gulf States, as well as men coerced 
into sexual exploitation and drug running to Europe, increased during 
the reporting period, according to an international organization. In 
2019, media and an international organization reported that networks 
consisting of illicit actors profiting from human trafficking and 
smuggling recruited women and girls from IDP camps in Northeast 
Nigeria for ostensibly legitimate jobs in Europe but exploited them 
in commercial sex in the northern Nigerien city of Agadez, North 
Africa, the Persian Gulf, and Europe. 
Criminal actors increased their exploitation of Nigerians in Turkey 
in 2020, according to observers. Experts stated traffickers recruit 
victims directly from asylum or migrant reception centers in Italy 
and elsewhere in Europe. Larger, well-financed, and highly organized 
criminal groups – some of which are linked to Nigerian criminal 
organizations or confraternities originating in Nigerian universities, 
including Black Axe, Eiye, or Maphite – are responsible for much 
of the sex trafficking to Europe, especially in Italy, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom. Additionally, Nigerian sex traffickers operate in 
highly organized criminal webs throughout Europe – known as 
the “Nigerian mafia” in Italy – and many former sex trafficking 






in exchange for leaving sex trafficking themselves. While some 
sex trafficking victims arrive in Europe believing they will be in 
commercial sex, traffickers coerce them to stay in commercial sex 
by altering working conditions and increasing victims’ travel debts. 
Some victims’ parents encourage them to obey their traffickers and 
endure exploitation to earn money. 
Before departure for work abroad, or upon arrival in Europe, many 
Nigerian women participate in a traditional ceremony with a juju 
priest; some traffickers exploit this tradition and tell the women 
they must obey their traffickers or a curse will harm them, which 
prevents victims from seeking assistance or cooperating with law 
enforcement. Although the Oba of Benin – the religious leader of 
Benin City – revoked all previously administered juju spells and 
publicly renounced sex traffickers in 2018, reports continued to 
note traffickers performed the juju ceremonies in neighboring states 
such as Delta. 
Illicit recruiters – including family members and increasingly pastors – 
in Edo and other southern states continue to target individuals seeking 
to travel by air to the Middle East, where wealthy individuals and 
other actors exploit those migrants in forced labor or commercial sex. 
Further, criminal elements exploit irregular migrants in forced labor 
and sexual exploitation at multiple stages of their journey through 
Nigeria, Niger, and Libya. Libyan and Nigerian illicit actors exploit 
Nigerians in Libya in forced labor in construction and agriculture, as 
well as in commercial sex in Benghazi, Misrata, Sabha, and Tripoli; 
traffickers keep victims in “control houses” or “prostitution camps” 
near Tripoli or Misrata until they can repay travel debts. 
As of December 2020, there were approximately 2.1 million IDPs 
in the country and 305,000 Nigerian refugees in other countries; 
many of these IDPs and refugees are vulnerable to traffickers due 
to their limited access to economic opportunity and formal justice. 
Increasing violence stemming from expanding terrorist threats 
exacerbated the vulnerability of many IDPs and limited access 
throughout much of the country for observers to provide updates 
on past allegations of government officials exploiting IDPs in sex 
trafficking. As in past years, reports indicate other IDPs, aid workers, 
government officials, and security forces commit sexual exploitation, 
including sex trafficking, in government-run IDP camps, informal 
camps, and local communities around Maiduguri, the Borno State 
capital. Additionally, there were reports traffickers exploited IDPs 
moving to cities such as Gombe and Kano, as well as to neighboring 
countries to include Niger in forced labor. 
During the reporting period, Boko Haram and ISIS-WA increased their 
practice of forcibly recruiting, abducting, and using child soldiers as 
young as 12 years of age as cooks, spies, messengers, bodyguards, 
armed combatants, and suicide bombers in attacks in Nigeria, 
Cameroon, and Chad. The groups continue to abduct women and 
girls in the northern region of Nigeria, some of whom they subject 
to domestic servitude, sexual slavery, and forced labor. Boko Haram 
routinely forces girls to choose between forced marriages to its 
fighters – for the purpose of sexual slavery – or becoming suicide 
bombers, with the terrorist organization frequently using drugs to 
control victims’ behavior. An NGO reported in prior rating periods 
children detained for association with armed groups in Maiduguri 
Maximum Security Prison in Borno state were confined with adult 
inmates who allegedly exploited the children in commercial sex 
rings in the prison.
NORTH MACEDONIA: TIER 2
The Government of North Macedonia does not fully meet the 
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making 
significant efforts to do so. Despite the documented impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity, the government 
demonstrated overall increasing efforts compared to the previous 
reporting period; therefore North Macedonia remained on Tier 
2. These efforts included convicting more traffickers and issuing 
significant sentences. The government identified more victims and 
increased overall prevention efforts, such as drafting the 2021-2025 
National Strategy and National Action Plan and regularly convening 
coordinating bodies for virtual meetings. However, the government did 
not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. The government 
diverted funding for victim protection towards pandemic response 
efforts, which jeopardized the continuation of mobile identification 
teams (mobile teams) and operations at the shelter for trafficking 
victims. Police did not have adequate funding and equipment to 
conduct proactive investigations, and the Organized Crime and 
Corruption Prosecution Office (OCCPO) lacked sufficient resources, 
including staff, to handle all cases under its jurisdiction. Inadequate 
identification efforts and corruption put potential victims at risk of 
being penalized for crimes they were compelled to commit. Official 
complicity in trafficking crimes remained a concern. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, including 
complicit officials, and impose adequate penalties with significant 
prison terms. • Allocate sufficient resources to victim protection, 
including specialized services for adult male victims, and ensure 
the sustainability of the mobile identification teams and the 
shelter for trafficking victims. • Increase proactive identification 
efforts for trafficking victims and screen for trafficking among 
individuals in commercial sex, irregular migrants, refugees, and 
other at-risk populations. • Allocate sufficient resources to the 
police and prosecutors to proactively investigate trafficking. • Fully 
implement written guidance to prevent penalization of trafficking 
victims for crimes their traffickers compelled them to commit. • 
Establish access to alternative housing to accommodate victims when 
the shelter is full. • Provide accommodation to foreign potential 
trafficking victims in safe and appropriately rehabilitative settings 
and allow victims to leave shelters at will. • Institutionalize advanced 
training for judges, prosecutors, and law enforcement on trafficking 
investigations and prosecutions. • Train first responders on standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) for identifying and referring victims, 
and consistently include social workers in all potential trafficking 
cases. • Improve compensation mechanisms for victims and inform 
them of their right to seek compensation. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Articles 
418(a) and (d) of the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and 
labor trafficking and prescribed a minimum penalty of four years’ 
imprisonment, which was sufficiently stringent and, with regard to 
sex trafficking, commensurate with those for serious crimes, such as 
rape. The OCCPO investigated five cases involving five suspects (four 
cases involving 10 suspects in 2019), and the anti-trafficking task 
force investigated one criminal group with at least eight individuals 
suspected of child trafficking (six suspects in 2019). The government 
did not initiate new prosecutions with only 17 percent of courts 
regularly holding trials due to the pandemic (nine defendants 
prosecuted in three cases in 2019). Courts convicted nine traffickers 
for child sex trafficking and two for child sex trafficking and forced 






zero suspended sentences; all convicted traffickers received sentences 
between four and seven years’ imprisonment (four traffickers received 
seven to 11 years’ imprisonment, and one trafficker received a three-
year suspended sentence in 2019). Appellate courts upheld three 
convictions (appellate courts upheld four convictions and increased 
a sentence of one trafficker from 13 years’ imprisonment to 17, two 
sentences from 12 years’ imprisonment to 14, and one sentence from 
four years and six months to eight years in 2019). 
The Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings and Migrant Smuggling 
Unit’s Anti-Trafficking Task Force (task force) within the Ministry of 
Interior (MOI) led specialized investigations. The OCCPO prosecuted 
trafficking cases but continued to report a lack of resources with only 
10 prosecutors in the office to handle all cases under its jurisdiction. 
Additionally, the task force did not have adequate funding and 
equipment to conduct proactive investigations, and prosecutors did 
not routinely grant specialized investigative measures for trafficking 
investigations. As a result, authorities relied almost exclusively on 
victim testimony with little corroborating evidence. As in previous 
years, local police officers lacked an understanding of trafficking and 
did not consistently notify the task force of potential trafficking cases. 
Observers reported cases languished or were mishandled due to the 
absence of a digital case management system to transfer trafficking 
cases between different police and prosecutors’ offices. 
The government, mostly with technical and financial support 
from donors, international organizations, and NGOs, trained 
judges, prosecutors, and officers in the task force on various anti-
trafficking issues. The government did not conduct any international 
investigations or extraditions. Corruption and official complicity in 
trafficking crimes remained a concern, but in 2018, the government 
amended Article 418(a) to reduce the prescribed minimum of eight 
years’ imprisonment for convicted complicit officials to a minimum 
of five years’ imprisonment. Officials and observers continued to 
report low-ranking police officers may be complicit in trafficking, 
including hiding evidence, bribery, changing patrol routes to benefit 
perpetrators, tipping off perpetrators before raids, and/or direct 
involvement in organized crime. The government charged a civil 
servant with complicity in trafficking in 2017 and a municipal 
inspector for trafficking in 2016; the OCCPO reported that both 
individuals were standing trial before the Skopje Criminal Court 
for migrant smuggling. The government did not report any new 
investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees 
complicit in human trafficking offenses.
PROTECTION
The government maintained victim protection efforts. The government 
identified seven victims (six victims in 2020); five were victims of sex 
trafficking and two were victims of forced labor, including one of 
forced begging (four victims of sex trafficking, one of forced labor, 
and one of forced begging in 2019). Of these, six victims were girls, 
and one was an adult male (four girls and two women in 2019); none 
were foreign victims (one foreign victim from Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and two from Kosovo in 2019). The government, in cooperation with 
NGOs, also identified six potential victims (124 potential victims in 
2019); of these, there were five adults and one child (39 adults and 
85 children in 2019); five were female and one male (91 females 
and 33 males in 2019); and the boy was a foreign potential victim 
(29 were foreign potential victims in 2019). Ministry of Labor and 
Social Policy (MLSP) maintained mobile teams comprised of social 
workers, law enforcement officers, NGO workers, and psychologists in 
five regions for vulnerable populations, including trafficking victims; 
mobile teams assisted 362 street children (mobile teams identified 
86 potential victims and assisted 316 individuals in 2019). Mobile 
teams identify the majority of potential victims every year, and 
experts viewed the teams as a best practice in proactive identification 
and cooperation between civil society and government; however, 
sustainability of the mobile teams remained in doubt with their 
international organization-provided funding ending in 2020, and the 
government reallocating promised resources to pandemic responses. 
In addition to funding constraints, the pandemic mitigation efforts 
limited mobile teams’ ability to proactively identify potential victims. 
MLSP continued to dispatch social workers to screen vulnerable 
populations at border crossings and transit centers, and MLSP 
social workers and police continued to identify potential forced 
labor victims among predominately Romani children engaged in 
street begging and street vending. The government placed identified 
child victims in daycare centers and warned or fined their parents; in 
cases where courts deemed parents unfit to care for their children, 
the state placed the children in orphanages. Government and civil 
society actors raised concerns about the low number of identified 
victims, and experts reported most government agencies lacked 
proactive identification efforts. For example, border agents did not 
consistently screen for trafficking indicators at border crossings, and 
reports documented police abuse and authorities conducting illegal 
pushbacks to Greece. Police did not consistently screen for indicators 
during raids in casinos, nightclubs, and bars. The government 
maintained SOPs for the identification and referral of victims, and 
the Office of the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) within MLSP 
remained responsible for coordinating the identification and referral 
procedures. First responders referred potential victims to the Anti-
Trafficking Unit and/or the NRM, which were authorized to officially 
identify victims. NRM officials and social workers participated in 
interviews with potential victims, but law enforcement did not 
consistently include NRM officials and social workers at the outset 
of identifying potential trafficking cases. 
The government allocated 1.76 million denars ($35,040) to the 
MOI for protection and security of trafficking victims, particularly 
those staying at the shelter for trafficking victims, compared to 2.21 
million denars ($44,120) in 2019. While the government planned 
to allocate 1.5 million denars ($29,920) to MLSP for social services, 
NGO activities, mobile teams, and other types of victim protection 
efforts (2.7 million denars ($53,860) in 2019), it diverted all funding 
to pandemic response efforts. The government still provided 810,000 
denars ($16,160) for direct victim assistance at the shelter for 
trafficking victims, compared to 1.2 million denars ($23,940) in 
2019; however, this covered only a small percentage of the shelter’s 
operating expenses, and the shelter relied heavily on funding from 
the international community to continue operations. The government 
and NGOs provided potential and officially recognized victims with 
protection and assistance, including food, clothing, medical assistance, 
psycho-social support, rehabilitation, and reintegration services. 
However, foreign potential victims required official recognition to 
receive support at the shelter for trafficking victims. MLSP assigned 
a guardian from a social welfare center to victims while they were at 
the shelter, and MLSP-run social service centers maintained one social 
worker at each of the 30 centers dedicated to providing assistance 
to trafficking victims, including psycho-social support, reintegration 
assistance, education, and job placement. The government and 
NGOs provided assistance to 14 official and potential victims (89 
in 2019), including basic necessities to five (89 in 2019), counselling 
and medical assistance to seven (30 in 2019), legal assistance to four 
(seven in 2019), and vocational training for four (three in 2019). The 
government did not provide specialized assistance for adult male 
victims. The shelter for trafficking victims accommodated female 
and child victims with the capacity to house five victims, but the 
government did not have additional capacity to accommodate victims 
if the shelter was full. In 2018, the government amended legislation 
to accommodate domestic and foreign potential trafficking victims 
at the shelter; however, the transit center continued to accommodate 
most foreign potential victims. The shelter allowed victims freedom 
of movement, but the transit center did not permit foreign potential 
victims to leave without a temporary residence permit. Observers 
reported poor living conditions at the transit center. During 2020, 
the shelter housed five victims (five in 2019), and the transit center 
did not house any victims (one foreign victim in 2019). The law 
permitted foreign victims a two-month reflection period to decide 











temporary residence permit, regardless of whether they testify; no 
foreign victims requested residence permits in 2019 and 2020. 
Inadequate identification efforts and corruption put potential victims 
at risk of being penalized for crimes they were compelled to commit. 
Observers reported local police deported foreign potential victims 
before their two-month reflection period expired. Additionally, 
local police detained and deported individuals in commercial sex 
without screening for trafficking indicators or notifying the task force, 
according to experts and government officials. The government, in 
cooperation with an international organization, trained 19 judges on 
non-punishment of trafficking victims. Victims voluntarily cooperating 
in court proceedings generally cannot leave North Macedonia before 
testifying in court; however, prosecutors, with the consent of the 
defense, can make exceptions and allow a victim to leave the country 
prior to testifying in court, upon giving testimony before a prosecutor, 
and in some cases, before a pre-trial procedure judge. Six victims 
gave statements against their alleged traffickers (eight in 2019). 
The government reported no victims required witness protection 
services in 2019 and 2020. Judges did not issue restitution as part 
of criminal sentences, and while victims can claim compensation 
through civil proceedings, the complexity of the process often 
dissuades victims from pursuing action. One trafficking victim was 
successfully compensated in 2020. The government and civil society 
continued efforts to develop a victim compensation fund which 
allowed authorities to allocate compensation to victims from seized 
criminal assets. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. The government 
implemented the 2017-2020 National Strategy and National 
Action Plan, and the National Commission (NC), composed of 
12 government agencies led by the national coordinator, regularly 
met virtually, published its 12th annual report on government 
anti-trafficking efforts, and drafted but did not adopt the 2021-2025 
National Strategy and National Action Plan. The NC also supported 
seven municipal-level anti-trafficking commissions in implementing 
their local action plans. The Anti-Trafficking Secretariat, composed 
of government agencies, the international community, and civil 
society, operated under the NC and held regular meetings virtually. 
In the previous reporting period, the government established an 
independent office of the national anti-trafficking rapporteur within 
the Ombudsman’s Office, selected a new national rapporteur, and 
hired staff for the office. The national rapporteur drafted a report 
on the government’s anti-trafficking efforts and, in December 2020, 
signed a memorandum of understanding with an NGO to cooperate 
on monitoring government efforts. The NC distributed anti-trafficking 
brochures and leaflets, organized workshops and lectures at schools, 
and implemented an awareness campaign for the general public.
The law prohibited illegal and unreported employment and set out 
criteria for labor recruitment, defining the terms of employment, 
employer obligations, and employees’ rights. The NC maintained a 
“Codex of Cooperation” with hospitality and hotel companies to 
prevent forced labor in the tourism industry. The Labor Inspectorate 
conducted regular inspections to verify compliance with labor laws, 
issued warnings and fines, and sanctioned businesses; labor inspectors 
inspected 16,892 businesses in the first six months of 2020 (11,749 
businesses in 2019) and issued fines ranging from $1,080 to $8,630 
for labor law violations ($625 to $7,800 in 2019). The government 
did not operate a hotline, but MOI managed an application to report 
various offenses, including trafficking; the application received three 
trafficking-related reports (three trafficking-related reports in 2019). 
Observers reported cases of Romani children not registered at birth, 
so the parents lacked the registration and identification documents to 
access health care, social protection, and education. The government 
did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in North Macedonia, and traffickers exploit 
victims from North Macedonia abroad. Women and girls in North 
Macedonia are exploited through sex trafficking and forced labor 
within the country in restaurants, bars, and nightclubs. Sex traffickers 
recruit foreign victims, typically from Eastern Europe and the Balkans, 
including Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Romania, 
Serbia, and Ukraine. Citizens of North Macedonia and foreign 
victims transiting North Macedonia are exploited for sex trafficking 
and forced labor in construction and agricultural sectors in Southern, 
Central, and Western Europe. Traffickers exploit Romani children 
through forced begging and sex trafficking within forced marriages. 
Irregular migrants and refugees traveling or being smuggled through 
North Macedonia are vulnerable to trafficking, particularly women 
and unaccompanied minors. 
NORWAY: TIER 2
The Government of Norway does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included investigating more trafficking 
cases; allocating more funding to NGOs for victim assistance; and 
providing significant financial support to campaigns and projects 
aimed at combating sex and labor trafficking, including securing 
trafficking-free supply chains in selected industries. Additionally, 
a 2020 amendment to the immigration law permitted residency to 
foreign victims who testified in a criminal case regardless of whether 
the government prosecuted the case as trafficking. However, these 
efforts were not serious and sustained compared to the efforts during 
the previous reporting period, even considering the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on the government’s anti-trafficking 
capacity. Authorities prosecuted zero trafficking cases for the first 
year ever, convicted only one trafficker—the fewest since 2005, and 
continued to charge traffickers with non-trafficking crimes, such 
as pimping. Victim identification and assistance data remained 
unreliable. For the fourth consecutive year, the government did 
not report an official number of identified and assisted victims 
and continued to delay development of a comprehensive statistical 
system for collecting data, formal identification procedures, and 
a national referral mechanism (NRM). Moreover, authorities did 
not consistently identify potential child trafficking victims and did 
not report identifying or assisting any child victims despite their 
involvement in trafficking cases. Finally, authorities’ sole focus on an 
individual’s lack of residence permit or immigration documentation 
resulted in the deportation of victims without screening for trafficking 
indicators. Therefore Norway was downgraded to Tier 2. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Significantly increase efforts to investigate trafficking cases under the 
trafficking statute and prosecute and convict suspected traffickers. • 
Enhance efforts to proactively identify and assist trafficking victims, 
particularly children. • Report annual data on the number of victims 
identified and assisted by the government. • Screen all foreign 
nationals and asylum-seekers for indicators of trafficking and stay 
deportation of potential victims prior to screening. • Develop and 
implement a reliable comprehensive statistical system for collecting 
and collating data, including on child trafficking, victim identification 





Establish and implement an NRM and victim identification procedures 
that receive adequate input from NGOs, and define processes and 
roles of all relevant government agencies and front-line actors. • 
Improve efforts to understand the demand for forced labor and 
identify victims of labor trafficking and refer them to assistance. 
• Increase training for investigators and prosecutors on applying 
trafficking laws and understanding different aspects of trafficking. • 
Develop and implement a national action plan for 2021.
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. Sections 257 and 
258 of the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed penalties of up to six years’ imprisonment for offenses 
involving adult victims and up to 10 years’ imprisonment for those 
involving child victims. These penalties were sufficiently stringent 
and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties for 
other serious crimes, such as rape. Police investigated 38 trafficking 
cases (17 sex trafficking, 20 labor trafficking, one uncategorized), 
compared with 36 cases in 2019 and 45 in 2018. Five of those cases 
involved 13 child trafficking victims. The government reported zero 
prosecutions, a significant decrease from 19 in 2019 and 13 in 2018 
and the lowest number of reported prosecutions since the government 
has been reporting trafficking data. Courts convicted one trafficker 
for sex and labor trafficking, continuing a multi-year decline from 
four in 2019 and 13 in 2018 and marking the lowest number of 
convictions since 2005. The convicted trafficker received a sentence 
of two years and 10 months’ imprisonment. The government did not 
report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government 
employees complicit in human trafficking crimes. The Norwegian 
government regularly collaborated with other European governments 
at national and local levels to pursue investigations and prosecutions 
of traffickers. In one case, authorities from Norway and Romania 
cooperated to extradite a Romanian trafficker.
During the reporting period, all 12 police districts maintained 
dedicated anti-trafficking units. Experts reported enhanced police 
awareness and willingness to pursue trafficking cases but noted 
limited investigative capacity in some districts. As in previous 
years, investigators and prosecutors continued to charge traffickers 
with non-trafficking crimes, such as narcotics and pimping, which 
subsequently barred victims from access to specific rights. Officials 
noted doing so when it was difficult to meet the burden of proof for 
a trafficking charge under the law, citing cases of online exploitation 
as particularly difficult to prosecute because traffickers hid traces of 
their crime via anonymous servers and other technological backroads. 
Officials noted the need to revise current trafficking laws to adapt 
to increasingly digital and globalized forms of the crime. Officials 
also noted the need to increase efforts to investigate and prosecute 
forced labor cases. Most forced labor cases resulted in prosecutions 
on lesser social dumping charges because the burden of proof was 
difficult and officials did not have a good overview of the forced labor 
market. The government defined social dumping as the act of offering 
foreign workers unacceptably low wages and unreasonable working 
conditions, such as working hours and living quarters, compared with 
what Norwegian workers normally received. Experts assessed more 
systematic training could enhance competence among investigators 
and prosecutors. In 2020, the Norwegian Police Academy conducted 
an online mandatory course for all investigators and prosecutors to 
increase knowledge and awareness about trafficking-related offenses 
and victim identification. The National Criminal Investigation 
Service, which maintained a national police group of experts aimed 
at increasing the understanding and knowledge about trafficking 
within the Norwegian Police Authority, conducted a one-day seminar 
and organized regular meetings for the group throughout 2020. 
The group’s responsibilities included knowledge-sharing between 
police and prosecutors, development of working methods and 
anti-trafficking efforts, and advancing cooperation with relevant 
stakeholders. The Coordination Unit for Victims of Trafficking 
(KOM), which coordinated the government’s anti-trafficking efforts, 
hosted a seminar for 350 participants focusing on strengthening anti-
trafficking cooperation among various stakeholders from national 
and municipal levels as well as civil society and academia.
PROTECTION
The government decreased protection efforts. In 2020, the government 
continued to delay development of a comprehensive countrywide 
statistical system on trafficking, including victim identification and 
assistance data, which originally commenced in 2017. At the time 
of commencement, KOM and the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) decided 
to withhold the number of identified and assisted victims until 
after the government had set up a more formal and reliable system. 
Subsequently, for the fourth consecutive year, the government did 
not report an official number of victims identified or assisted, rather 
it estimated identifying 100 victims in 2020, the same number as in 
2019 (the last reported official statistic was 262 victims identified and 
assisted in 2016). A government-funded NGO reported identifying 116 
potential victims in 2020, compared with 118 in 2019. Restrictions 
imposed during the pandemic, such as lockdowns and border closures, 
reduced the government’s ability to identify and refer potential 
victims to NGOs and other actors who provided assistance, which 
experts noted underscored the need for an NRM. NGOs reported the 
pandemic intensified the shift toward online commercial sex and 
made identifying and assisting sex trafficking victims more difficult. 
Furthermore, experts noted deficiencies in identifying labor trafficking 
victims citing the government’s lack of understanding of the demand 
in certain sectors for forced labor. Although the government had 
neither formal identification procedures nor an NRM, authorities 
utilized informal guidelines to identify and refer potential victims. 
The MOJ and KOM continued to develop an NRM and established 
a working group to facilitate the process, which began in 2018. The 
working group’s initial proposal received wide criticism from various 
stakeholders expressing concern the proposed NRM would reduce 
the reflection period for victims from six months to 45 days, which 
could result in fewer victims assisting authorities in investigations and 
authorities deporting more victims while they were still recovering 
from their abuse. Consequently, the development of the NRM stalled.
The government provided victim assistance through municipal crisis 
centers and government-funded NGOs, including Re-establishment, 
Organizing safe places to stay, Security, Assistance (ROSA), the 
largest project exclusively assisting trafficking victims in Norway. 
These NGOs provided foreign and domestic victims with shelter, 
legal aid, stipends for food, psychological care, medical assistance, 
fitness facilities, and Norwegian-language classes. NGOs reported 
social distancing regulations due to the pandemic dissuaded victims 
from seeking assistance, particularly sex trafficking victims, for fear 
that violating those regulations would result in deportation or 
imprisonment. Additionally, civil society reported when authorities 
investigated and prosecuted a trafficking crime as another crime, 
victims were unable to access assistance granted to trafficking victims 
under Norwegian law. In 2020, ROSA reported assisting 46 victims 
(39 in 2019), and the government estimated assisting 100 victims. 
Parliament allocated 35 million kroner ($4.1 million) to NGOs 
specifically for assistance services, an increase from 30 million kroner 
($3.52 million) allocated in both 2019 and 2018. Oslo’s Labor and 
Social Affairs Department established Human Trafficking Support 
Oslo to assist and support adult victims, including foreign victims in 
a reflection period, and hired 23 employees to support victims in the 
capital region. Human Trafficking Support Oslo received 4 million 
kroner ($468,930) from the government in 2020. The Directorate for 
Children, Youth, and Family Affairs maintained a coordinating unit 
for service and assistance to child trafficking victims and received 5 
million kroner ($586,170) from the government in 2020. The unit 
worked to improve procedures to identify child victims, provide 
training and capacity building activities, and support coordination 
between government authorities. There were no reported cases of 
identified child victims in 2020 despite authorities investigating 
five trafficking cases involving 13 child victims. Municipal child 
welfare services assisted zero child victims, a decrease from three in 





in state-run institutions, such as orphanages, for up to six months. 
According to officials, authorities did not consistently identify child 
victims and maintain statistics. To assist with the identification and 
investigation of trafficking cases involving children, the government 
developed procedures for cooperation among police, immigration 
authorities, and child welfare authorities.
A 2020 provision to the immigration law permitted residency to 
victims who testified in a criminal case regardless of whether it was 
prosecuted as a trafficking case or another crime. Victims under a 
reflection period received legal assistance through an appointed lawyer 
funded by the government, access to health care services, lodging, 
and other necessary support. In 2020, authorities granted a six-month 
reflection period to 16 victims and limited residence permits of up 
to 12 months to three victims, compared with five and 14 in 2019. 
Authorities granted six possible victims residence permits due to 
compelling humanitarian considerations (six in 2019). Observers 
raised concerns that police focused more on an individual’s lack of 
residence permit or immigration documentation than screening them 
for trafficking indicators, resulting in the deportation of potential 
victims. In January 2021, police deported more than 10 individuals 
in commercial sex for violating pandemic-related infection control 
measures. Civil society criticized the National Police Immigration 
Service for deporting the individuals before screening for trafficking 
indicators. Furthermore, the continued closure of the Storskog border 
crossing with Russia to anyone seeking protection prevented the 
screening of trafficking victims along the northern border. During 
the reporting period, an amendment to the law entered into force 
allowing trafficking victims from countries within the European 
Economic Area (EEA) candidacy for full financial reintegration support 
to their country of origin. However, NGOs expressed concern that 
ineligibility for financial support to victims from outside the EEA, 
such as asylum-seekers who received rejected asylum applications, 
exposed them to the risk of re-victimization.
Victims benefited from state compensation through the Compensation 
for Victims of Violent Crimes Act. During the reporting period, the 
government proposed amendments to the Act, which, according 
to civil society, would make restitution contingent on a conviction 
and, if a case did not result in a conviction, require victims to file a 
civil suit against their alleged trafficker to receive compensation—a 
costly, self-funded process most victims could not afford. Civil society 
claimed the requirement contradicted Norway’s obligations under 
international law and conventions, such as the European Council’s 
Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings. The 
amendment also would restrict access to free legal aid until after 
victims filed an official report with the police. Under the existing 
law, victims could access free legal aid in the early stages of their 
case when considering reporting the crime to the police. Civil society 
expressed grave concern regarding the government’s consideration 
of these amendments.
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. During the reporting 
period, the government continued to implement measures from 
the national action plan and provided 190 million kroner ($22.27 
million) total for the four-year period of 2016-2020 to support the 
work of civil society organizations focused on trafficking. Various 
government agencies and ministries responsible for implementation 
provided financial resources toward the plan’s activities but did not 
report the amount of funding allocated in 2020. KOM published 
an annual report providing an overview on victim identification, 
challenges relating to trafficking, and relevant agencies’ anti-trafficking 
activities. The Department of Children and Families conducted 
an awareness campaign informing children about the dangers of 
trafficking. The government invested 40 million kroner ($4.69 
million) in project proposals for Norwegian civil society organizations 
to combat trafficking. ROSA managed a 24-hour hotline for potential 
trafficking victims available in Norwegian, English, Spanish, Arabic, 
and Thai. The government allocated 3 million kroner ($351,700) 
for the hotline, an increase from 1.7 million kroner ($199,300) 
in 2019. In collaboration with other Baltic Sea Region countries, 
the government participated in a project establishing long-term 
cooperation between stakeholders and academia to educate future 
journalists on trafficking issues through workshops, panel discussions, 
and competitions. Authorities of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden facilitated international policing efforts and information-
sharing, including on trafficking-related issues, through Nordic liaison 
officers stationed at 20 Nordic embassies and consulates around 
the world. The government provided international development 
assistance to protect vulnerable groups by contributing 150 million 
kroner ($17.58 million) to trafficking victim assistance. Other 
international projects led by Norway included supporting girls and 
women exploited in commercial sex in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, a center for child trafficking victims in Malawi, and 
information campaigns and victim reintegration and psychological 
support in Burma. The government did not make efforts to reduce 
the demand for commercial sex acts.
As part of its strategy against work-related crime, including labor 
trafficking, in 2020, the government proposed amendments to the 
penalty provision and framework of work-related crimes, including 
stricter regulations for the recruitment of temporary workers. 
Norwegian law prohibited recruitment agencies from charging fees to 
job seekers for placement services and required the labor inspectorate 
to monitor agencies for compliance. In 2020, the government provided 
2 million kroner ($234,470) to the Norwegian Labor Inspection 
Authority for an initiative to end severe labor exploitation; the 
initiative included an awareness campaign educating foreign workers 
on their rights. The Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation 
(NORAD) contributed 50 million kroner ($5.86 million) in 2020 
to the Global Fund to End Modern Slavery to combat trafficking 
with a particular focus on securing trafficking-free supply chains in 
selected industries and preventing trafficking in connection with 
migration. Additionally, NORAD released a call for proposals for 
its Development Program to End Modern Slavery, which sought to 
reduce the prevalence and scope of trafficking in selected partner 
countries and sectors and to cooperate with multilateral and civil 
society organizations. Separately, NORAD pledged 190 million 
kroner ($22.27 million) for a three-year project (2020-2023) targeting 
countries in the Sub-Saharan region of Africa, with a focus on forced 
labor and child labor. The government also participated in a regional 
project to support stakeholders in combating and disrupting labor 
trafficking by analyzing and consolidating information, improving 
assistance to victims, and increasing prosecution of traffickers. In 
an effort to establish better oversight and access to government 
services for potential labor trafficking victims, the government issued 
new passports and national identification cards to foreign citizens 
working in Norway.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Norway, and, to a lesser extent, traffickers 
exploit victims from Norway abroad. As a result of the pandemic, 
traffickers increasingly shifted recruitment methods from in-person 
to online settings, mainly through social media. Trafficking victims 
identified in Norway primarily originate from Eastern and Southern 
European countries, such as Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine, 
with the vast majority being adult women exploited in sex trafficking. 
Authorities report a greater variety of nationalities among trafficking 
victims than in previous years, noting victims from South America 
and Uganda. Additional reports indicate an increase in victims from 
Thailand who come to Norway to reunite with their Norwegian 
spouses, and, once in the country, traffickers exploit them in labor or 
commercial sex. Traffickers exploit women and girls in sex trafficking 
and men and women in labor trafficking, specifically in domestic 
service and construction. Traffickers subject children to forced 
criminal activities and other forms of forced labor, including illegal 
employment in car washes and private housekeeping. Authorities 






The Government of Oman does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do 
so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts compared 
to the previous reporting period, considering the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Oman 
remained on Tier 2. These efforts included establishing dedicated 
counter-trafficking units within the Ministry of Labor (MOL) and 
Royal Oman Police (ROP), identifying and referring more victims to 
care, and employing standardized screening procedures to identify 
potential trafficking victims among those arrested for immigration 
violations or engaging in commercial sex. The government also 
implemented its decision to remove the No-Objection Certificate 
(NOC) to allow migrant workers, including domestic workers, to 
change jobs at the end of a contract without employer permission 
and undertook a new anti-trafficking awareness campaign. However, 
the government did not meet the minimum standards in several 
key areas. The government prosecuted fewer alleged traffickers and 
convicted fewer traffickers overall. The government did not investigate, 
prosecute or, for the third consecutive year, convict any traffickers of 
forced labor. It also continued to require potential trafficking victims 
to have active court proceedings to remain in the government’s 
shelter long-term, and it did not operationalize a national referral 
mechanism (NRM).






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Significantly increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict 
traffickers for forced labor crimes. • Increase use of specialized 
trafficking units within the MOL, ROP, and Public Prosecutor’s 
Office (PPO) to investigate indicators of potential trafficking crimes. 
• Impose dissuasive penalties on employers who withhold their 
employees’ passports. • Expand labor law protections to, and enforce 
legal protections for, domestic workers. • Finalize, implement, and 
train officials on formal procedures to proactively identify and 
refer to care male and female trafficking victims among vulnerable 
populations, such as migrant workers, people in commercial sex, and 
North Korean laborers, whom the North Korean government may 
have forced to work. • Prevent penalization of trafficking victims 
among vulnerable groups, such as those arrested for immigration 
violations or commercial sex or who flee abusive employers and face 
deportation, by utilizing the new screening questionnaire, widely 
disseminating its procedures and training all officials on its use. • 
Ensure effective implementation of recent reforms to the sponsorship-
based employment system that allow all migrant workers to change 
jobs without employer consent upon completion or termination 
of their employment contracts. • Disseminate to stakeholders the 
decision that allows potential victims the option to self-refer to 
protective services and amend the provision that stipulates they can 
only reside in the shelter long-term if they file charges against, or there 
is a corresponding prosecution of, an alleged offender. • Continue to 
expand trainings for officials involved in criminal investigations and 
for hotline operators to ensure accurate characterization of trafficking 
crimes. • Fully implement the newly adopted national action plan 
(NAP) for 2021-2023. • Continue to conduct country-wide public 
awareness campaigns on all forms of trafficking, specifically targeted 
to vulnerable populations, including domestic workers.
PROSECUTION
The government made uneven law enforcement efforts. It continued 
to focus disproportionately on sex trafficking versus labor trafficking 
crimes and reported it prosecuted fewer alleged traffickers and 
convicted fewer traffickers, none of which were for forced labor 
crimes. However, the government increased capacity to investigate 
trafficking crimes by establishing a dedicated counter-trafficking unit 
within the ROP. Oman’s 2008 anti-trafficking law criminalized sex 
trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed punishments of three 
to seven years’ imprisonment and a fine between 5,000 and 100,000 
Omani rial (OMR) ($12,990-$259,740) for offenses involving adult 
victims and seven to 15 years’ imprisonment and a minimum fine 
of 10,000 OMR ($25,970) for offenses involving child victims. 
These punishments were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to 
sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for other 
serious crimes, such as rape. MOL circular No.2/2006 prohibited 
employers from withholding migrant workers’ passports but did not 
specify penalties for noncompliance. During the year, the government 
reportedly retained a foreign law firm to review Oman’s existing 
anti-trafficking legislation and submit recommendations to the 
National Committee to Combat Human Trafficking (NCCHT) in an 
effort to make the law more robust and comprehensive; however, 
the government had not taken any action to amend the law at the 
close of the reporting period. 
The PPO maintained a specialized anti-trafficking unit but did not 
report how many alleged trafficking cases it handled during the 
reporting year. In 2020, the government reported investigating seven 
alleged human trafficking cases, all for sex trafficking, resulting in 
the arrest of 10 suspects. During the previous reporting period, the 
government reported the same number of investigations, six of which 
were sex trafficking investigations and one of which was a forced labor 
case. Authorities prosecuted two suspects in the seven cases under 
the anti-trafficking law on sex trafficking charges; the government 
did not report any forced labor prosecutions during the reporting 
period. One suspect remained involved in an ongoing prosecution 
initiated in 2019 at the close of the reporting period. The number of 
prosecutions was down from the previous year, when the government 
reported prosecuting 26 suspects in the seven cases investigated. In 
2020, the government reported two sex trafficking convictions—down 
from seven in 2019—under the anti-trafficking law. Officials sentenced 
both defendants to imprisonment ranging from three to five years 
and a fine of 5,000 OMR ($12,990). The government planned to 
deport and impose reentry bans on the convicted traffickers upon 
completion of their sentences. The government reported that the 
PPO initially considered labor cases involving foreign workers as 
trafficking cases until proven otherwise but did not prosecute and 
convict any perpetrators for labor trafficking crimes during the year. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government officials complicit in human trafficking.
The government continued efforts to address passport retention. 
The MOL reported investigating 82 passport retention cases in 2020, 
compared with 95 cases the year prior. Officials did not report how 
many such cases it investigated as potential trafficking crimes, though 
the entity did resolve 51 of the 82 cases and referred 11 cases for 
adjudication in labor courts. In December 2020, the ROP established 
a dedicated counter-trafficking unit within the ROP to respond directly 
to reports of trafficking and utilize best practices for investigating 
trafficking crimes and identifying victims. Analogous to the previous 
year, the government did not provide data on its expenditure for 
trafficking-related trainings in 2020; however, it facilitated and fully 
funded seven anti-trafficking trainings for more than 85 officials 
from the police, labor, and social services. The ROP training academy 
continued to educate all incoming cadets on the legal framework for 
trafficking and related crimes, victim identification, and mechanisms 
for transferring potential cases to court and reached an unknown 






The government increased efforts to protect victims. It identified and 
referred more victims to care and strengthened its capacity to screen 
for potential trafficking victims among vulnerable populations; 
however, existing policy limited shelter stays to victims with cases 
under active investigation, and the government continued to lack a 
NRM at the close of the reporting period. The government reported 
identifying 29 female trafficking victims during the reporting period, 
an increase from 25 female victims the previous period. Of the 29 
victims the government identified, three were identified via the 
main trafficking hotline. In addition to the 29 identified victims, 
the government reported three victims self-referred to the shelter for 
the first time, following a change in policy in the previous reporting 
period to allow potential victims to self-refer to the shelter, instead 
of requiring a referral from the PPO. All 32 victims received services 
at the government-operated shelter in Muscat. The government 
continued to lack formalized referral procedures; however, during the 
reporting period, the government created and disseminated a formal 
screening questionnaire for officials to use in identifying potential 
trafficking victims among those arrested for commercial sex, labor 
violations, and fleeing their sponsor. Reportedly, the ROP used this 
questionnaire to screen for trafficking indicators during the arrest 
of 63 women suspected of engaging in commercial sex in February 
2021; however, the government did not report whether it identified 
any of the woman as trafficking victims. The government included 
the development and operationalization of a NRM in previous NAPs; 
however, it did not implement a mechanism and therefore included 
it again in the most recent 2021-2023 NAP. Officials continued to 
reactively refer some victims identified as part of ongoing police 
investigations to the Ministry of Social Development (MOSD) for 
shelter placement and medical and psychological services. The MOL 
was authorized to identify potential victims and refer their cases to 
the ROP but did not report doing so during the reporting period. 
Officials in other government sectors often referred self-identified 
victims first to the police rather than directly to the MOSD for shelter 
placement. During the previous reporting period, the government 
altered its policy to allow potential victims to self-refer to the shelter; 
previously, victims could only obtain government-provided services 
if they filed cases with the PPO which could then issue a referral to 
the shelter. Under the new procedure, once a potential victim self-
referred to the shelter, MOSD reported it alerted the PPO, which 
would formally begin an investigation to determine whether the 
individual was a trafficking victim, allowing the victim to remain 
at the shelter long-term. However, the government continued to 
stipulate that long-term shelter stays had to coincide with active 
trafficking investigations. Some source-country embassies in Oman 
reportedly offered victim services for their nationals but could not 
operate formal shelters without approval from the government, 
which it did not provide. 
During the reporting period, the government allocated 1.79 million 
OMR ($4.64 million)—a marked increase from the previous year’s 
allocation of 198,129 OMR ($514,620)—for accommodations and 
victim care at its permanent shelter, which could lodge up to 50 
women and child victims of forced labor, sex trafficking, or other 
types of abuse. The shelter provided room and board, psychological 
counseling, legal support, monetary stipends, recreational 
opportunities, rehabilitation activities, resiliency training, and 
medical care to victims. Shelter administrators interfaced with judicial 
officials to keep victims regularly informed of the status of their legal 
cases. Shelter policy dictated that victims could depart the premises 
only with a chaperone. As in previous years, the government did not 
provide shelter services for any male victims during the reporting 
period. The government offered complimentary repatriation services 
to victims who did not want to remain in-country. Officials permitted 
and encouraged some victims to stay in Oman for the duration of 
court proceedings against traffickers; the government reported 13 
victims cooperated in criminal cases during the reporting period. 
Officials reportedly encouraged other victims to reach extrajudicial 
settlements for the sake of expediency. The government did not 
allow participating victims the chance to work or leave the shelter 
in the interim, and protracted court cases coupled with prolonged 
unemployment disincentivized victims from participating in trials. 
The NCCHT upheld the tenets of its memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) with a local association to provide pro bono assistance to 
trafficking victims involved in court proceedings, to include seeking 
damages on behalf of trafficking victims and pursuing labor claims 
via MOL mediation. Although the government could facilitate 
new sponsorship for expatriate laborers, most cases during the 
year ended with aggrieved workers unable to switch employers, 
reaching administrative settlements with their former employers, 
and subsequently returning to their home countries. The government 
provided foreign victims with legal alternatives to removal to countries 
in which they may face retribution or hardship, including alternate 
employment under another sponsor; during the reporting period, the 
government provided one victim a no-cost resident card, enabling 
the victim to seek new employment in Oman following the end of 
court proceedings.
The labor law did not adequately cover domestic workers, and the 
2004 Ministerial Decision regulating their employment did not 
provide effective rights protections or adequate complaint mechanisms 
for this population. This decision established broad regulations 
related to monthly wages, adequate room, board and medical care, 
return airfare when the employer terminates the contract, and airfare 
to and from the worker’s home country during approved vacation 
days; however, the decision did not provide standards on working 
hours, weekly rest days, annual vacation, overtime compensation, 
and penalties for employers who breach provisions. The government’s 
2011 standard employment contract for domestic workers included 
provisions from the 2004 decision and required one weekly rest 
day, 30 days of leave, and return flights every two years but had 
no limit on working hours or provisions for overtime pay. Some 
domestic workers experienced non-payment of wages, excessive 
work hours, passport confiscation, and physical and sexual abuse 
during the reporting period. Authorities reportedly detained some 
workers for “absconding” who intended to file grievances against 
abusive employers and did not consistently screen for trafficking 
indicators among vulnerable populations. Some employers could 
compel foreign workers, whose legal status remained tied to their 
employers, to work for lower or no wages under the credible threat 
of deportation. Authorities also continued to treat some potential 
domestic servitude cases as labor violations and did not report 
identifying potential victims of domestic servitude. 
PREVENTION
The government demonstrated increased efforts to prevent trafficking. 
It implemented its decision to remove the employer-controlled 
NOC to allow individuals, including domestic workers, to seek 
new employment without employer approval at the end of their 
contract, which reduced their vulnerability to forced labor; drafted 
and adopted the new National Action Plan to Combat Trafficking 
for 2021-2023; created a specialized counter-trafficking unit within 
MOL’s Inspection Department to improve identification of forced 
labor cases and increase victims’ access to protection services; and 
launched its second formal awareness-raising campaign. 
During the reporting period, the NCCHT issued its new NAP. Under 
the new NAP, the government would develop a NRM, establish 
new shelters outside Muscat, enact a new domestic worker law, and 
establish a deterrent penalty for passport confiscation, among other 
critical activities. In December 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(MFA) hosted a forum to solicit feedback on the NAP and Oman’s 
efforts to combat trafficking with representatives of seven labor-
sending countries, including India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the 
Philippines. The government also reported it consulted the Oman 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, an international organization, 
and other GCC partners in drafting the NAP. The NCCHT did not hold 





reported that several members met frequently to discuss trafficking 
issues and advance counter-trafficking policies. 
In March 2021, the government initiated a three-month national 
trafficking awareness campaign entitled Insan. The campaign, which 
specifically targeted workers, victims, and offenders, had seven goals, 
including enhancing community awareness of trafficking, enabling 
victims to receive protective services, and preventing trafficking crimes. 
The NCCHT held a campaign launch event in which prominent 
Omani officials, media personalities, and sports stars delivered 
messages calling for Omanis to treat victims of trafficking with dignity 
and respect. Due to pandemic-related restrictions, the government also 
live-streamed the event to reach a broader audience. In conjunction 
with the launch, the NCCHT announced a new website to increase 
awareness of trafficking crimes and offer resources for potential victims 
to receive assistance and to report potential cases; information on the 
website was available in 12 different languages, including English, 
Arabic, Hindi, Urdu, Bengali, and Tagalog. During the three-month 
campaign, the NCCHT reported advertising and media activities 
would feature artwork to convey trafficking indicators, such as 
passport confiscation. At various times during the reporting period, 
government-run media and the PPO published information and 
reminders to raise public awareness of trafficking; in February 2021, 
the PPO posted a series of tweets and wrote a press article reminding 
the public of Oman’s anti-trafficking laws. Additionally, the MOL 
conducted educational seminars for 882 companies and held 100 
group meetings to raise awareness of Oman’s labor laws and labor 
recruitment issues during the reporting period.
The MFA continued to fund an international trafficking expert 
to advise and assist interagency entities in carrying out victim-
centered investigations, devising legislative improvements, and 
enhancing information-gathering techniques. The ROP maintained 
the government’s central trafficking hotline and displayed its phone 
number on social media posts, news articles pertaining to trafficking, 
and the newly launched NCCHT website. Officials did not report 
how many calls the police hotline received; however, the government 
did report that it identified three victims via its hotline and referred 
them to care. The MOL operated a labor violation hotline, which it 
promoted in its video on workers’ rights and responsibilities, and 
the MOSD operated one that served as an all-purpose helpline. 
All hotlines reportedly remained active year-round, 24 hours per 
day, and staffed with Arabic and English interpreters; Urdu, Hindi, 
and Bangla-speaking contractors were available. The government 
reported having MOUs regarding migrant workers with Iran, India, 
Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Syria, the Palestinian Authority, 
Egypt, and Morocco; some included articles prohibiting unlawful 
labor recruitment and trafficking. Oman was signatory to a Gulf 
Cooperation Council-wide labor agreement with the Philippines. 
Labor-source country embassy representatives that had labor-related 
agreements with the government reported they experienced good 
cooperation with the MOL and ROP on labor issues involving their 
respective nationals during the reporting period. 
In the previous reporting period, the government announced its 
intent to eliminate the NOC that historically required employees to 
receive permission from their employers to seek new employment—a 
reform that reduced workers’ vulnerability to exploitive situations 
that could constitute forced labor. The government implemented this 
reform in January 2021; the government allowed migrant workers, 
including domestic workers, to change employers upon completion 
or termination of their employment contract without employer 
approval. The MOL General Directorate of Labor must approve the 
contract with the new employer. However, workers who fled allegedly 
abusive employers could not utilize the reform as their contract had 
not expired or been terminated, which was required to request a 
transfer. The government reported expatriate workers could depart 
the country without permission at any time, but a worker’s ability 
to do so was contingent on physically possessing a passport, having 
sufficient travel funds to return home, and not facing any charges, 
including “absconding” charges. Some potential trafficking victims 
who experienced passport confiscation or were subject to spurious 
charges filed by their employers may have been unable to leave the 
country freely during the reporting period; instead, they may have 
been detained and subsequently deported for fleeing an abusive 
employer or forced to remain in Oman in an exploitative situation 
without possession of their travel documentation. 
In August 2018, the MOL issued a ministerial decision stating 
a company must prove it has paid the past three months of an 
employee’s salary before filing a complaint to charge an expatriate 
employee with “absconding.” The ministerial decision stipulated 
that, if a company filed more than five complaints in a month or 
more than 10 in a year, it would be subject to increased inspections 
to ensure it was complying with local labor laws. If the company was 
noncompliant with local labor laws, the MOL would suspend it. The 
ministerial decision also created protections to prevent employers 
from firing employees while on leave or otherwise absent from work. 
During the reporting period, the MOL increased inspections from 
5,629 to more than 8,000 establishments to ensure compliance 
with labor law provisions, screen for trafficking indicators, and 
build awareness against forced labor and exploitative practices 
among the migrant workforce. However, it did not report whether 
it referred any findings to the courts for administrative or criminal 
proceedings or referred any potential trafficking victims to care. The 
MOL also investigated 22,580 labor disputes, resolved 9,057, and 
referred 7,602 cases to judicial authorities for adjudication; 5,921 
cases remained pending at the close of the reporting period. In 
an effort to increase identification of potential instances of forced 
labor and provide victims greater access to justice and protective 
services, the MOL established a dedicated counter-trafficking unit 
within its Inspection Department in August 2020; the unit reported 
it monitored 312 recruiting agencies and inspected 243 agencies of 
the 312 during the reporting period. From these inspections, the 
unit reported that it referred 23 recruitment agencies to the PPO for 
further investigation. Additionally, the unit received 274 complaints 
against recruitment agencies during the reporting year. Of the 274 
complaints, it reached settlements in 85 cases and referred 116 to 
judicial authorities for adjudication; 59 cases remained pending at 
the close of the reporting period and 14 had an unknown status. 
The government did not report any efforts to reduce the demand 
for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit foreign 
victims in Oman. Oman’s migrant worker community comes 
primarily from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Nepal, and some African countries. During the reporting period, 
the government implemented pandemic-related travel restrictions 
that limited migrant workers’ ability to enter and exit the country; 
between March 2020 and October 2020, the government closed 
airports and land borders, limiting workers’ capacity to travel to 
Oman while stranding others within the country who may have 
experienced increased risk of exploitation due to pandemic-related job 
loss or non-payment of wages. Largely as a result of “Omanization,” 
a series of labor-related policies designed to prioritize Omanis for 
employment over expatriates, as well as pandemic-related economic 
downturn and travel restrictions, the number of migrant workers in 
Oman declined in 2020, continuing a trend and effectively reducing 
the pool of vulnerable third-country residents in Oman. Attesting to 
this effect, Oman’s National Center for Statistics and Information 
reported the number of expatriates working declined by 14 percent 
during the year. Additionally, between November 2020 and March 
2021, the government offered irregular expatriate workers the option 
to leave the country permanently without paying work permit-related 
fines if they registered for the exemption; 12,378 workers had used 
this option at the end of the year. Trafficking victims typically migrate 
to Oman willingly and legally. Men generally seek employment in 





seek domestic worker jobs. Male victims are typically from South 
Asia and more vulnerable to forced labor. Traffickers exploit female 
victims, predominantly from South, Southeast, East Asia, and East 
Africa, in forced labor and sex trafficking. Domestic workers who 
flee their employers are also vulnerable to sex trafficking. Some 
employers reportedly “kicked out” their domestic employees, and 
some domestic workers were consequently forced into commercial 
sex. Additionally, terminated migrant workers who were unable to 
depart the country became at greater risk of exploitation, while others 
who contracted COVID-19 or required quarantine experienced salary 
cuts because they could not work. North Koreans working in Oman 
may have been forced to work by the North Korean government.
Expatriate workers seeking low-wage jobs continue to be at risk for 
trafficking under the kafala or visa-sponsorship employment system 
in Oman, which grants recruitment agencies and/or Omani visa 
sponsors significant unilateral control over workers’ residency and 
work visas and therefore their legal status in the country. Although 
the government instituted initial reforms of the sponsorship 
system during the reporting period, this system continues to give 
employers the power to dictate the status of residency permits. Some 
unscrupulous recruitment agencies in Oman and their sub-agents in 
labor-source countries mislead migrant workers in their respective 
countries of origin by providing fraudulent contracts with fictitious 
wages and charging exorbitant recruitment fees. Some victims face 
working conditions significantly worse than recruiting agencies had 
promised. Traffickers subject some of these workers to employment 
practices that constitute forced labor, to include excessive work hours, 
passport confiscation, non-payment of wages, food deprivation, 
and psychological and sexual abuse. Conversely, other workers 
enter Oman with full knowledge of their work obligations; but, 
sponsors ultimately coerce them to work for little or no pay or in 
dire conditions under the credible threat of deportation. In previous 
reporting periods, some workers arrived in Oman on tourist visas or 
by first traveling to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) while willing 
employers secured their Omani work visas, thereby circumventing 
the protective oversight of workers’ home governments. Additionally, 
some victims originally intended to travel to the UAE but were 
subsequently compelled to accept work in Oman, or vice-versa. 
Traffickers often began recruitment in labor-source countries with 
some promising retail jobs in well-known areas, such as Dubai. 
After arriving in the UAE, traffickers transported the migrant laborers 
into Oman and force them to work for lower wages and in austere 
conditions in the absence of legal contracts. However, during the 
current reporting period, pandemic-related travel restrictions and 
border closures limited these practices. Informal labor intermediaries 
operate legally but without regulation in Oman, communicating 
anonymously via social media platforms to promise Omani sponsors 
inexpensive domestic labor at a fraction of the cost stipulated by the 
formal, well-established recruitment agencies.
PAKISTAN: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Pakistan does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included finalizing implementation 
rules for the 2018 Prevention of Trafficking in Persons Act (PTPA), 
adopting a new five-year national action plan to combat trafficking in 
persons and migrant smuggling crimes, and referring more potential 
trafficking victims for care than the previous reporting period. The 
province of Punjab reported more overall convictions for trafficking 
than the previous reporting period. However, the government did 
not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared to the previous 
reporting period, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity. The government decreased 
investigations and convictions of sex traffickers, and authorities in 
Punjab province, where more than half of the population resides, 
continued to disproportionately report nearly all anti-trafficking 
law enforcement efforts, including all convictions. Law enforcement 
efforts against labor trafficking also remained inadequate compared 
to the scale of the problem, and authorities identified significantly 
fewer bonded labor victims. In Sindh, local officials continued to 
perpetrate bonded labor in brick kilns and on farms with impunity. 
For the second year the government did not take adequate action 
against credible reports of official complicity in trafficking. The 
government continued to lack overall adequate resources for victim 
care. Therefore Pakistan remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the second 
consecutive year.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
At both the federal and provincial levels, increase prosecutions 
and convictions of both sex trafficking and forced labor, including 
cases allegedly involving complicit officials, and stringently punish 
perpetrators. • Instruct labor departments to refer all suspected 
bonded labor cases to police for criminal investigation. • Increase 
the number of bonded labor victims identified and referred to 
rehabilitation services through training of provincial police, labor 
inspectors, and social services on standard operating procedures 
(SOPs). • Cease support to non-state armed groups that recruit and/
or use child soldiers. • Amend the PTPA to remove penalty provisions 
that allow fines in lieu of imprisonment for sex trafficking offenses. 
• Train officials on the implementing rules for the PTPA. • Ensure 
victims are not penalized for acts traffickers compelled them to 
commit. • Increase the quality and availability of trafficking-specific 
services, including for males. • Designate specialized prosecutors 
and judges to hear trafficking cases. • Expand services for bonded 
laborers, including shelter, identity documents, and legal assistance. 
•Inspect brick kilns in accordance with relevant laws regulating 
factories and refer suspected bonded labor to law enforcement. • 
Take steps to eliminate all recruitment fees charged to workers. Lift 
restrictions on female migration while negotiating female worker 
protections with destination country governments. • Improve efforts 
to collect and accurately report anti-trafficking data. • Accede to the 
2000 UN TIP Protocol.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained overall law enforcement efforts; it 
decreased sex trafficking investigations and convictions, although 
slightly increased labor trafficking prosecutions and convictions. 
Various Pakistani laws criminalized sex and labor trafficking. The 2018 
PTPA criminalized sex and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties 
of up to seven years’ imprisonment, a fine of up to 1 million Pakistani 
rupees (PKR) ($6,260), or both for trafficking offenses involving 
an adult male victim, and penalties of between two and 10 years’ 
imprisonment, a fine of up to 1 million PKR ($6,260), or both for 
those involving adult female or child victims. These penalties were 
sufficiently stringent. However, with regard to sex trafficking, by 
allowing for a fine in lieu of imprisonment, these penalties were not 
commensurate with those for other serious crimes, such as rape. The 
government continued to use other sections of the Pakistan Penal 
Code (PPC) that criminalized some forms of human trafficking. 
For example, Section 371A and 371B criminalized the buying and 
selling of a person for prostitution and prescribed penalties of up 
to 25 years’ imprisonment and fines. Section 374 criminalized 
unlawful compulsory labor and prescribed penalties of up to five 
years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both. Section 366A criminalized 
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procuration of a “minor girl under 18” and prescribed penalties of 
up to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine. Section 370 criminalized 
buying or disposing of any person as a slave and prescribed penalties 
of up to seven years’ imprisonment and a fine, and Section 371 
criminalized habitual dealing in slaves and prescribed penalties of up 
to life imprisonment and a fine if the imprisonment was less than 10 
years. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to 
sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave 
crimes, such as rape. The federal Bonded Labor System (Abolition) 
Act (BLSA) criminalized bonded labor, with prescribed penalties 
ranging from two to five years’ imprisonment, a fine, or both; these 
penalties were sufficiently stringent. The provincial governments 
have adopted their own labor laws, including anti-bonded labor 
laws, under a devolution process that began in 2010, and federal 
laws apply until provinces enact corresponding laws. 
Punjab investigated 15 cases under the PTPA and prosecuted 14 
cases involving 19 defendants but did not report the conviction of 
any traffickers under the law during the reporting period, compared 
with five investigations involving 85 suspects, an unknown number 
of prosecutions, and 14 convictions the previous year. Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa province (KP) initiated six investigations and six 
prosecutions involving eight defendants under the PTPA, which were 
ongoing at the close of the reporting period. The government reported 
data on trafficking investigations, prosecutions, and convictions 
under the PPC by province and special administrative area. Overall, 
law enforcements and judiciaries investigated 800 sex trafficking 
cases and initiated prosecutions in 756 cases and convicted 91 sex 
traffickers—compared with 916 sex trafficking investigations, 567 
prosecutions, and 131 convictions in the previous reporting period. 
The vast majority of sex trafficking investigations and convictions 
took place in Punjab, where more than half of Pakistan’s population 
resides. The majority of the cases were tried under PPC Section 
371A for the buying and selling of a person for prostitution. The 
government did not report sentences for the convictions. Punjab 
continued to comprise the vast majority of law enforcement efforts 
against sex trafficking; of the national statistics on sex trafficking, 
Punjab reported 90 percent of the investigations and prosecutions, 
as well as all of the convictions. 
The government’s law enforcement action on labor trafficking, 
especially bonded labor, remained inadequate. Despite the existence 
of the BLSA, bonded labor persisted, largely due to ineffective 
enforcement of the law and powerful local officials as perpetrators. 
Punjab was the only province to investigate, prosecute, or convict 
traffickers under the BLSA. Punjab authorities investigated 192 cases 
of bonded labor, prosecuted 174 cases, and convicted 20 traffickers, an 
increase from 77 investigations, 20 prosecutions, and 16 convictions 
in the previous reporting period. The Punjab Department of Labor 
(DOL) additionally filed 461 First Information Reports (FIRs) under 
the Punjab Prohibition of Child Labor from Brick Kilns Act, leading 
to 174 arrests. An international organization stated authorities did 
not adequately enforce the BLSA primarily due to police inaction 
on complaints and lower court judges’ lack of understanding of 
the law. Moreover, in many provinces, including Sindh, the DOL 
handled bonded labor cases and could at most administer financial 
penalties. Punjab did not initiate any investigations for forced labor 
under PPC Section 374, unlawful compulsory labor. Sindh authorities 
initiated 26 investigations and 25 prosecutions under PPC Section 
371 for habitual dealing in slaves, a significant increase from four 
investigations and three prosecutions in the previous reporting period. 
While Sindh police removed at least 3,084 bonded laborers from 
the location of their exploitation during the reporting period, it did 
not initiate criminal investigations. Despite police and prosecutors’ 
responsibility to pursue cases, some authorities reported they did 
not do so because victims could not afford to pay for investigations 
and prosecutions. The government also reported data on several 
penal code sections that criminalized labor trafficking and other 
non-trafficking crimes but did not disaggregate the data to specify 
which cases under these sections were for labor trafficking versus 
non-trafficking offenses. 
Sindh courts intervened sporadically on trafficking cases to remove 
victims from perpetrators but did not criminally prosecute alleged 
traffickers for bonded labor offenses. While Sindh passed legislation 
criminalizing bonded labor in 2015, it continued to lack civil or 
criminal procedures to facilitate its implementation. While the BLSA 
mandated the creation of District Vigilance Committees (DVCs) in 
each province to ensure implementation of the BLSA, including 
reporting and filing cases, the government relied on often illiterate 
bonded labor victims to have knowledge of the BLSA, proactively leave 
their landowners, and file their own cases in the court. Even when 
bonded laborers did so, the courts either did not act on such claims 
or handled them administratively. As a result, trafficking victims who 
came forward often faced retaliation from their exploitative employers. 
The Federal Investigative Agency (FIA) remained the government’s lead 
reporting and coordinating entity on human trafficking. The agency 
focused on transnational offenses, while provincial police generally 
investigated internal human trafficking cases. While FIA and provincial 
police coordinated on an ad hoc basis, overall collaboration remained 
weak and complicated law enforcement efforts and data collection. FIA 
investigated human trafficking and migrant smuggling cases through 
its 24 anti-trafficking law enforcement joint task forces at the federal, 
provincial, and local levels. FIA officials, including all newly inducted 
officers, received regular training on countering trafficking, including 
differentiating between human trafficking and migrant smuggling, 
although official statistics did not always distinguish between the 
crimes. Through increased training, FIA top officials worked during 
the reporting period to instill this understanding at the operational 
level, build capacity, and increase interagency coordination. Foreign 
governments and international organizations funded trafficking-
specific trainings for police, investigators, prosecutors, and FIA 
officials; and government agencies contributed in-kind support to 
some of the trainings. FIA operated satellite offices at three embassies 
abroad in Greece, Iran, and Oman and collaborated with each 
government on possible trafficking cases. In Oman, FIA assisted 
with the repatriation of possible victims and corresponding arrests 
in Pakistan of alleged traffickers associated with a case of two women 
exploited in Dubai. NGOs noted provincial police were reluctant 
to file FIRs—required to launch criminal investigations—into many 
crimes, including trafficking. Furthermore, overburdened prosecutors 
and judges, who frequently lacked adequate training, contributed to 
lengthy trafficking trials and low conviction rates, a problem endemic 
throughout the justice system. The government maintained bilateral 
law enforcement cooperation mechanisms with multiple countries, 
as well as working closely with INTERPOL.
Official complicity in trafficking remained a significant concern, 
impeding anti-trafficking efforts during the reporting period. Despite 
sustained reports, for a second year the government did not report 
any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions into officials allegedly 
complicit in human trafficking offenses. However, the government 
reported it disciplined two Punjab and seven Islamabad FIA officials 
suspected of complicity in trafficking in persons for alleged human 
trafficking violations, including the permanent removal of one official. 
The government did not report initiating criminal investigations in 
these cases. During the reporting period, the government provided 
material support to non-state armed groups that recruited and 
used child soldiers. The government did not report investigating, 
prosecuting, or convicting individuals for child soldiering offenses. In 
July 2019, a 14-year-old child domestic worker reported substantial 
indicators of trafficking by her employer, a parliamentarian in Punjab, 
including sexual abuse and torture. While police registered the 
charges, they did not arrest the parliamentarian, allegedly because the 
provincial government did not allow them to do so. The government 
did not report taking any action on the case during the reporting 
period. In October 2018, police removed a 10-year-old domestic 
worker from the house of a Pakistani army major after allegations 






husband. The government did not report whether the case against the 
employers continued or whether it began investigating an assistant 
sub-inspector of police, whom it had initially suspended for failing 
to file a police report in the case. 
The government did not report any efforts to address local government 
officials’ reportedly endemic perpetuation of bonded labor, which 
created a culture of impunity for offenders. Feudal landlords and 
brick kiln owners used their political connections to facilitate their 
use of forced labor. In some cases, when bonded laborers attempted 
to escape or seek legal redress, police refused to file a case and 
returned bonded laborers to their traffickers. NGOs continued to 
report some police colluded with farm and brick kiln owners to 
create fake criminal cases against victims who attempted to escape 
from situations of bonded labor. Some police reportedly assisted 
employers in kidnapping bonded laborers that authorities or NGOs 
had previously removed from exploitation. Police were reluctant 
to investigate cases of potential bonded labor when wealthy and 
influential individuals, such as local politicians, were the alleged 
perpetrators. Some police reportedly acted against trafficking cases 
only when pressured by media and activists. Observers alleged 
police accepted bribes to ignore prostitution crimes, some of which 
may have included sex trafficking, and border officials might have 
facilitated human trafficking. NGOs also reported police refused to 
register cases of child sexual exploitation, including sex trafficking, 
unless victims paid a bribe. Some garment factories reportedly paid 
monthly bribes to DOL officials to avoid inspections, some factories 
in Sindh prevented government officials from conducting inspections.
PROTECTION
The government maintained protection efforts overall; it reported 
identifying more victims during the reporting period, but its efforts to 
identify and assist bonded labor victims remained severely inadequate. 
Provincial police reported identifying 32,022 trafficking victims in 
2020, a significant increase from 19,954 in 2019. The government 
did not report what accounted for the large increase. This included 
15,255 women, 9,581 men, 6,937 children, and 249 transgender 
victims. Only 30 bonded labor victims were identified in 2020, a 
significant decrease from 760 in 2019. The government reported 
some law enforcement, immigration, and social service personnel 
had SOPs to identify trafficking victims, but it was unclear how 
widely officials disseminated and employed these SOPs. In January 
2021, the Cabinet approved implementation rules for the 2018 
PTPA, which outlined procedures for law enforcement investigations 
and awareness efforts, but it most prominently outlined protection 
procedures, including trafficking indicators for identification and 
services to victims. The rules also outlined minimum standards 
for NGOs providing victim services on a wide array of parameters 
including safety and confidentiality. 
Provincial police referred 11,803 trafficking victims to the government 
or NGOs for care, including 3,744 men – a significant increase from 
799 trafficking victims referred to care in the previous reporting period 
though still inadequate compared with the total number of victims 
identified. Police reported some victims declined to avail themselves 
of government services. Victim services were not available for many 
trafficking victims, with a lack of available shelter and services 
in many regions, particularly for male victims. Government-run 
shelters for women experiencing a range of difficult circumstances, 
including trafficking, were the most predominately available service. 
Punjab operated women’s shelters in each of its 36 districts; Sindh 
operated five women’s shelters in its 29 districts and four centers 
that offered women in distress medical and legal aid and shelter for 
up to 72 hours; Khyber Pakhtunkhwa operated women’s shelters in 
six of its 26 districts and 10 welfare homes for exploited children; 
Balochistan operated one women’s shelter and one shelter for 
destitute male citizens among its 32 districts; and the Islamabad 
Capital Territory had one family and rehabilitation center that served 
women and children. NGOs and local politicians continued to note 
the low quality of victim care at many of these shelters, including 
their lack of basic resources such as showers. Moreover, some of 
the government shelters only provided short-term services, leading 
some victims to return to their abusers, including traffickers. Child 
trafficking cases in which parents might have been complicit were 
of particular concern, since authorities often returned potential 
child trafficking victims to their families immediately following 
identification without effective methods to ensure families would 
not subject their children to trafficking again. Boys could access 
government shelters in many provinces, and the government had 
seven victim shelters in the country that could house male victims 
of trafficking. The government also had “Panargah” shelters that 
could house victims of crime of all genders, including trafficking 
victims. Punjab province reported providing shelter for 378 male 
trafficking victims during the reporting period. Both government 
and NGO contacts noted that, due to cultural norms, male victims 
were less likely to seek or accept assistance. Civil society continued 
to provide victim services without government support. In part due 
to cultural sensitivities, authorities may have charged unidentified 
sex trafficking victims with moral crimes.
Provincial child protection units (CPUs) were active in Punjab, 
Sindh, Balochistan, and KP, and identified and referred children in 
exploitative or vulnerable labor situations to NGO and government 
care. However, some CPUs faced staffing gaps that affected the 
availability and appropriateness of care. There were 14 CPUs in KP, 
but these lacked child protection officers; while the local government 
claimed the pandemic prevented the filling of these positions, NGOs 
reported they have been vacant for years. In prior reporting periods, 
the Punjab Child Protection and Welfare Board operated reception 
centers which identified and registered children living on the street. 
They were closed during the reporting period due to lack of funds 
and a perception that the program was ineffective. 
The BLSA required districts to establish DVCs to ensure implementation 
of the BLSA and provide assistance to bonded labor victims. Punjab 
had DVCs in all 36 districts, and they conducted 188 meetings during 
the reporting period—a decrease from 259 meetings the previous 
year. While Sindh reported it had 29 DVCs, the government did not 
report any specific meetings but noted some conducted raids and 
released bonded laborers, including children. Balochistan was in the 
process of forming DVCs, and authorities in Gilgit-Baltistan created 
a Directorate of Labor, which operates as a covering the region, 
during the reporting period. Some officials believed DVCs frequently 
lacked the motivation, information, and resources necessary to 
combat bonded labor. Some officials also contended district deputy 
commissioners, charged with leading the DVCs, failed to prioritize 
bonded labor among their portfolios and did not convene meetings 
as mandated. Instead, some provincial governments may still rely on 
bonded labor victims to seek social services. Punjab and KP could 
provide free legal aid to bonded laborers who requested assistance. 
NGOs previously reported that because provincial DOLs, including in 
Sindh, have not registered hundreds of brick kilns, the corresponding 
thousands of brick kiln workers could not receive the social welfare 
benefits guaranteed under provincial laws. 
NGOs noted most cases of bonded labor ended with financial 
settlement in lieu of criminal prosecution, in part because police 
and the judiciary often ceased support for victims after authorities 
had removed the victim from exploitation and did not guide them 
through how to pursue a formal civil or criminal case. Bonded laborers 
whom authorities had released from exploitation frequently had no 
alternative employment or housing and sometimes returned to brick 
kilns or farms and assumed more debt. Those who lacked identity 
documents were even more vulnerable since they could not access 
government services such as health care and food stipends. Some 
NGO-run shelters could accommodate bonded laborers, including 
entire families, but often had insufficient resources to provide 
long-term housing. Government policy included protections for 
those cooperating in trafficking-related investigations; however, the 
government did not report how often it granted these protections. 
Victims expressed reluctance to testify against their traffickers due 
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to threats of violence against them and their families. The PTPA 
and sections of the PPC allow courts to provide trafficking victims 
with restitution, but courts did not do so in any cases. During the 
reporting period, the government continued construction of a migrant 
reception center at its border with Iran to assist returned migrants, 
including trafficking victims. The Bureau of Emigration and Overseas 
Employment (BEOE) within the Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis and 
Human Resources Development (OPHRD) employed 19 community 
welfare attachés in 14 destination countries to provide support and 
information to Pakistani migrant workers. BEOE assisted in the 
repatriation of more than 400,000 Pakistanis stranded abroad due 
to the pandemic in 2020, although they did not report screening for 
trafficking indicators or identifying victims among this population. 
The Ministry of Interior (MOI) had the authority to grant extensions 
for foreign victims to stay in the country until the Federal Review 
Board of the Supreme Court reached a decision on repatriation. 
Authorities did not identify any foreign trafficking victims within 
Pakistan; however, in October 2020, KP officials arrested four Afghan 
nationals on trafficking charges of 10 Afghan children. The Afghan 
Consulate in Peshawar facilitated the repatriation of the children to 
their parents in Badakhshan, Afghanistan.
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. MOI 
and FIA, in consultation with civil society stakeholders and an 
international organization, published the National Action Plan to 
Combat Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling for 2021-2025. 
FIA’s research and analysis center collaborated with an international 
organization to create quarterly newsletters on human trafficking and 
migrant smuggling, which were available on the FIA’s website. In 
2020, FIA transitioned from a paper-based system to a computerized 
case management system, allowing efficiencies in data collection 
and information sharing for law enforcement. While experts agreed 
bonded labor remained a significant problem in Pakistan, outside of 
Punjab, provincial governments lacked accurate data of the problem, 
which hampered targeted efforts to address key exploitative districts 
and industries. Labor inspectors remained the front-line officials 
to inspect and identify forced and bonded labor in several sectors, 
including brick kilns, farms, and factories. However, inspectors had 
inadequate training to identify indicators of trafficking, insufficient 
funding to conduct inspections, and a lack of standard procedures 
to refer potential forced and bonded labor cases to police. Moreover, 
inspectors did not have the authority to remove children or bonded 
laborers from exploitative situations. Despite high incidences of child 
and forced labor in agriculture and domestic work, the majority 
of provincial labor laws did not allow labor inspectors to inspect 
these worksites for infractions. In late 2019, the Chief Minister of 
Punjab announced labor inspections of factories would continue 
as normal throughout 2020, after a ban in 2019; however, officials 
did not report the identification of labor violations or indicators 
of trafficking through such efforts. Despite estimates of more than 
264,000 child domestic workers in Pakistan and commonplace 
reports of physical abuse, sexual abuse, and forced labor by employers, 
provincial labor laws and protections did not extend to adult or 
child domestic workers. However, during the reporting period, the 
Islamabad government outlawed child domestic labor by adding 
it to the list of occupations defined as hazardous work under the 
1991 Employment of Children Act. The Balochistan government 
banned employment of children younger than the age of 15 in coal 
mines via a notification to the provincial Chief Inspector of Mines 
in September 2020. Brick kilns fall under the Factories Act of 1934 
and are subject to the same regulations as other factories, including 
workers’ rights provisions. In February 2020, the Lahore High Court 
ordered the Punjab labor department to register all brick kilns within 
six months; in response, the government created a publicly accessible 
online registry of most of the brick kilns by the end of the reporting 
period, although some remained unregistered. 
Provinces continued to use labor laws to investigate, prosecute, 
and convict offenders for child and exploitative labor offenses at 
brick kilns. However, because such laws only prescribed fines and 
authorities did not refer these cases to police for criminal investigation, 
suspected traffickers did not receive sufficiently stringent sentences. 
Punjab reported prosecuting 3,953 brick kilns for lack of compliance 
with labor laws—the same number as in 2018—and imposed fines 
totaling 2.2 million PKR ($13,770). This is a significant decrease 
from prosecution of 7,179 brick kilns in 2019, and a significant 
decrease in the amount of the penalties assessed, from 5.17 million 
PKR ($32,360). Punjab continued to provide identity cards to brick 
kiln workers and birth registration for their children. KP, Punjab, and 
Sindh continued to fund and implement some multi-year programs 
focused on combating the worst forms of child labor and other 
labor abuses. The federal and provincial governments continued 
their nationwide child labor survey for a second year—the first 
since 1996—that will reach approximately 250,000 households. 
The governments allocated funds for the survey, and international 
organizations assisted with implementation. The labor survey has 
been delayed due to the pandemic.
BEOE issued licenses to private employment promoters and 
monitored workers who migrated through licensed agencies. The 
Emigration Ordinance of 1979 prohibited the role of unregulated 
and unregistered sub-agents; however, sub-agents continued to 
operate widely with impunity. The government allowed licensed 
employment promoters to charge migrant workers a service fee 
of 6,000 PKR ($37.55) for a welfare fund to compensate workers’ 
families in case of the workers’ death abroad, and workers to pay all 
the costs associated with overseas employment. While the government 
stipulated employers should provide workers with a receipt for 
these costs, the government did not specify any cost limit and did 
not consistently review migrant workers’ receipts. BEOE cancelled 
licenses of 10 registered employment promoters and suspended 21, 
compared with the cancellation of 28 licenses during the previous 
reporting period; BEOE did not provide details of the agencies’ 
violations. In addition, BEOE reported sharing the information about 
178 cases of illegal recruiters with the FIA. It was unclear on what 
charges BEOE registered these cases. The government continued to 
ban female migrant workers younger than 30 from migrating for 
domestic work and required females 30-35 to obtain special approval 
from OPHRD. The UN and members of civil society argued any ban 
on female migration increased the likelihood such women would 
migrate illegally and therefore heighten their vulnerability to human 
trafficking. BEOE required migrant workers to attend a pre-departure 
briefing at one of its seven offices that included information on what 
to do if the migrant worker encountered problems; however, observers 
asserted these centers did not provide sufficient information on the 
risks of, and assistance to combat, trafficking. Due to pandemic-
related reductions in flights, fewer people traveled abroad for work.
In April 2019, the military announced it would bring more than 
30,000 religious schools, including madrassas, under the government’s 
control, some of which non-state armed groups used to forcibly recruit 
child soldiers. The government continued to host approximately 2.3 
million Afghans with varying levels of legal protection. Through June 
30, 2020, the government provided 878,000 with Afghan Citizen 
Cards (ACCs), which provided temporary legal protection from 
deportation under Pakistan’s Foreigners’ Act, and 1.4 million with an 
extension of proof of registration (POR) cards. The government did 
not extend the validity of either ACCs or PORs past June 2020. While 
the government issued a directive that agencies should not harass 
ACC and POR holders and should continue to honor the POR cards 
while the government decided whether to grant another extension, 
card holders reported hardships. For example, banks refused to allow 
refugees to conduct financial transactions, universities refused to enroll 
refugee students, and provincial authorities prevented refugees from 
crossing provincial borders. The government did not make efforts to 
reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. Pakistan is not a party 







As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Pakistan, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Pakistan abroad. The country’s largest human trafficking problem 
is bonded labor, in which traffickers exploit an initial debt assumed 
by a worker as part of the terms of employment and ultimately 
entraps other family members, sometimes for generations. The 
practice remained widespread. Traffickers, including local government 
officials, force men, women, and children to work primarily in 
bonded labor in Sindh in agriculture and in both Sindh and Punjab 
in brick kilns. Traffickers also force men, women, and children to 
work to pay off exaggerated debts in other sectors in Sindh and 
Punjab and in Balochistan and KP in agriculture and brick kilns 
and, to a lesser extent, in fisheries, mining, and textile-, bangle-, 
and carpet-making. In agriculture, traffickers force workers to labor 
in wheat, cotton, and sugarcane, among other goods. Traffickers 
often did not provide workers with access to their expenditure and 
earnings receipts, so traffickers control how much money they earn, 
the accrual of interest on their debt, and when they have repaid the 
debt. Landlords exploit widespread illiteracy among workers and 
manipulate accounting records to continue the cycle of bonded labor. 
Many feudal landlords and brick kiln owners, who are traffickers 
that employ bonded laborers, are local government officials or use 
their affiliation with political parties to protect their involvement in 
bonded labor. Some landlords use armed guards to restrict bonded 
laborer’s movements, and others buy and sell workers among one 
another. In some kilns that employ entire families, kiln owners 
have sold bonded laborers to repay a family member’s outstanding 
debt. Observers reported employers in Sindh are moving carpet- and 
bangle-making productions into private homes to further increase 
the difficulty in monitoring labor conditions. Reports estimate 
more than 70 percent of bonded laborers in Pakistan are children. 
Traffickers also target lower-caste Hindus, Christians, and Muslims 
specifically for forced and bonded labor. 
Traffickers buy, sell, rent, and kidnap children for forced labor in 
begging, domestic work, and small shops and in sex trafficking. 
According to an international report, there are 8.5 million domestic 
workers in Pakistan, including many children. Media reports cases 
of employers forcing children as young as 7 years old into domestic 
work, where they are often subjected to severe physical abuse, 
including torture, and sexual abuse; several government officials 
were among the suspected perpetrators. According to a prominent 
child rights NGO, the majority of children working in the streets 
in Pakistan are subjected to forced begging and are vulnerable to 
sexual exploitation, including sex trafficking. Begging ringmasters 
sometimes maim children to earn more money and sometimes force 
children to steal. Organized criminal groups force children into drug 
trafficking in Sindh and Balochistan. Due to the consistent lack of 
law enforcement efforts against those who exploited street children, 
including in forced labor and sex trafficking, traffickers operated 
openly and with impunity. Traffickers subject boys to sex trafficking 
around hotels, truck stops, bus stations, and shrines. Traffickers have 
forced Afghan, Iranian, and Pakistani children into drug trafficking 
in border areas and Karachi. In previous years, widespread sexual 
exploitation of boys in one coalmining community in Balochistan 
was reported. Boys as young as 6 years old from Balochistan, KP, 
and Afghanistan, are purportedly lured to work in the mines but 
subjected to sex trafficking; in some cases, parents are complicit 
in sending their children to the mines for sex trafficking. Within 
Pakistan, NGOs and police report some employers, including in 
restaurants and factories, require boy child laborers to provide sexual 
favors to obtain a job with the employer, to keep the job, and/or for 
accommodation. An NGO reported multiple cases of forced labor 
of students in government-run schools. 
Some factories pay monthly bribes to labor department officials to 
avoid inspections. Illegal labor agents charge high recruitment fees 
to parents in return for employing their children, some of whom 
are subjected to forced labor and sex trafficking. Some police accept 
bribes to ignore prostitution crimes, some of which may include 
sex trafficking, and some police may have refused to register cases 
of child sexual exploitation, including sex trafficking, without a 
bribe, according to NGOs. Some Pakistani traffickers lure women 
and girls away from their families with promises of marriage, create 
fraudulent marriage certificates, and exploit the women and girls in 
sex trafficking, including in Iran and Afghanistan. Traffickers targeted 
impoverished Christian communities to send females to China for 
arranged marriages. Upon arrival in China, hundreds of Pakistani 
women reported their “husbands” forced them into commercial 
sex. In other cases, traffickers, including some extra-judicial courts, 
use girls as chattel to settle debts or disputes. Some traffickers force 
victims to take drugs and exploit the drug addiction to keep them 
in sex trafficking. 
The government provided material support to non-state armed groups 
that operated in Pakistan and Afghanistan and recruited and used 
child soldiers. Non-state militant groups kidnap children as young 
as 12, buy them from destitute parents, coerce parents with threats or 
fraudulent promises into giving their children away, or recruit children 
from madrassas; these armed groups force children to spy, fight, and 
conduct suicide attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Traffickers have 
promised Pakistani boys admittance to Afghan religious schools but 
sold them to members of the Afghan security forces for bacha bazi.
Pakistani men and women migrate overseas voluntarily, particularly 
to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), other Gulf states, 
and Europe, for low-skilled employment such as agriculture, domestic 
service, driving, and construction work; traffickers exploit some of 
them in labor trafficking. False job offers, including fake modeling 
advertisements, sham recruitment agencies, and high recruitment 
fees charged by illegal labor agents or sub-agents of licensed 
Pakistani overseas employment promoters entrap Pakistanis in sex 
trafficking and bonded labor, including in Gulf countries. In 2020, 
foreign countries had more than 11,000 Pakistanis detained abroad, 
including more than 3,400 in Saudi Arabia. In many cases, observers 
alleged foreign law enforcement had arrested workers for fraudulent 
documents procured by recruitment agents or for lack of documents 
because their employers had withheld their documents—indicators 
of forced labor. Traffickers have exploited Pakistani girls in sex 
trafficking in Kenya and have forced Pakistani adults, including with 
disabilities, to beg in the UAE. Pakistani boys are vulnerable to sex 
traffickers in Greece. Some traffickers, including organized criminal 
groups, subject Pakistani adults and children to forced labor in 
domestic work, construction, and begging in Iran; some traffickers 
have targeted Pakistanis with disabilities for forced begging. Pakistan 
is a destination country for men, women, and children subjected 
to forced labor—particularly from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Sri 
Lanka. Chinese men working in construction may be vulnerable to 
forced labor in Pakistan. Traffickers exploit women and girls—and, 
to a lesser extent, boys—from Afghanistan, Iran, and other Asian 
countries in sex trafficking in Pakistan. Refugees and stateless persons 
from Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Burma, as well as religious and 
ethnic minorities such as Christians and Hazaras, are particularly 
vulnerable to traffickers in Pakistan. Traffickers exploit Rohingya 
refugees in forced labor in Pakistan.
PALAU: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Palau does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts 
to do so. These efforts included charging one government official 
with labor trafficking, conducting trafficking research with an 
international organization, and providing an identified victim with 
new employment. However, the government did not demonstrate 
overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, 
even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its 
anti-trafficking capacity. The government remained without standard 
PALAU
442
operating procedures (SOPs) for victim identification and referral to 
services, leading to insufficient identification and protection services 
and the penalization of potential victims. Palauan law seemingly 
allowed the prosecution of victims through vague language, and the 
government actively prosecuted and convicted multiple likely victims 
in 2020, including a child. Yet, for the second consecutive year, the 
government did not convict any traffickers. The government continued 
to not investigate indicators of trafficking in labor recruitment and 
contract violations experienced by many foreign workers. Official 
complicity continued to play a role in facilitating trafficking and 
hindered law enforcement efforts. Therefore Palau was downgraded 
to Tier 2 Watch List. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, 
including complicit officials, under trafficking laws, and sentence 
traffickers to adequate penalties, which should involve significant 
prison terms. • Develop, disseminate, and train officials on SOPs for 
the proactive identification of trafficking victims and their referral 
to protection services. • Amend anti-trafficking laws to remove 
sentencing provisions that allow fines in lieu of imprisonment 
for sex trafficking crimes and allow the prosecution of victims for 
unlawful acts traffickers compelled the victim to commit. • Enforce 
the anti-trafficking laws punishing recruiters, employment agents, and 
labor officials for illegal practices that facilitate trafficking. • Increase 
resources for and develop victim protection and rehabilitation services, 
including long-term shelter options, interpretation services, and 
medical and psychological care. • Create and implement a system to 
proactively offer foreign trafficking victims job placements and work 
visa extensions. • Establish and implement witness confidentiality 
procedures. • Increase anti-trafficking awareness among vulnerable 
populations, including foreign migrant worker communities. • 
Establish a mechanism for the systematic monitoring of government 
anti-trafficking efforts. 
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. Sections 2106-2108 
of the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed penalties of up to 25 years’ imprisonment, a fine of 
up to $250,000, or both if the victim was an adult and up to 50 
years’ imprisonment, a fine of up to $500,000, or both if the victim 
was under age 18. These penalties were sufficiently stringent, but by 
allowing for a fine in lieu of imprisonment for sex trafficking crimes 
these penalties were not commensurate with penalties prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as rape. The Ministry of Justice’s 
anti-human trafficking office (AHTO) investigated three potential 
trafficking cases, which included one case of labor trafficking and 
two cases of sex trafficking, compared with five potential trafficking 
case investigations in 2019 and 11 in 2018. The attorney general’s 
office (AGO) did not initiate prosecutions of any alleged traffickers 
during the reporting period, compared with two prosecutions in 2019 
and one in 2018. For the second consecutive year, the government 
did not convict any traffickers; the last conviction was in 2018. The 
government did not report any ongoing trafficking investigations 
from prior reporting periods. In a case from the previous reporting 
period with potential trafficking indicators, the government charged 
the defendant with travel document fraud; the government did not 
report the status of the case at the end of the reporting period. In a 
prosecution initiated in a prior reporting period, the court dismissed 
all trafficking charges; the government did not report a reason behind 
the dismissal. Observers noted official complicity continued to play a 
significant role in facilitating trafficking, hindering law enforcement 
efforts to combat trafficking. The AGO charged the president of a 
state legislature with seven counts of labor trafficking in addition 
to 17 other charges including misconduct in public office and 
assault in the second degree; the case was ongoing at the end of 
the reporting period. In connection with one of the potential sex 
trafficking investigations, the government charged a state governor 
with non-trafficking related charges, including promoting prostitution 
and misconduct in public office; the case was ongoing at the end of 
the reporting period. Palauan authorities cooperated with foreign 
governments on ongoing international trafficking cases. In June 
2020, the government conducted a workshop on online gambling, 
the fraudulent use of “front” businesses, and human trafficking for 
an unspecified number of local business stakeholders. In September 
2020, an unspecified number of government officials participated 
in a virtual anti-trafficking training hosted by a foreign government. 
Despite these trainings, observers stated officials generally continued 
to lack an understanding of trafficking.
PROTECTION
The government decreased efforts to protect victims. The AHTO, 
with assistance from an international organization, continued to 
develop a victim identification tool but reported pandemic-related 
travel restrictions delayed progress; consequently, the government 
remained without SOPs for victim identification and referral to 
services. Although the three new trafficking investigations involved 
65 potential victims, the government reported identifying only one 
victim of labor trafficking – and the foreign national victim self-
identified and sought help – compared with identifying four victims 
in 2019. In a prior reporting period, an international organization 
explained the small number of identified victims by stating only 
the most egregious cases of trafficking were likely to come to the 
attention of authorities because of the lack of proactive identification 
procedures and foreign migrant workers’ reluctance to complain 
to authorities out of fear that such complaints would result in job 
termination and deportation. 
Due to a lack of formal identification procedures and Palauan law, 
authorities penalized victims for crimes traffickers compelled them 
to commit. While the 2005 Anti-Smuggling and Trafficking Act 
granted victims immunity from prosecution for the “act of people 
trafficking,” the vague language permitted prosecution for crimes 
traffickers compelled victims to commit, such as commercial sex 
or petty crime. In 2020, despite the case being investigated for sex 
trafficking, the government charged and prosecuted two potential 
victims for prostitution and violation of their work permit; one 
was convicted and sentenced, and one chose deferred prosecution. 
In addition, the government prosecuted 59 potential victims for 
immigration violations; one of the 59 charged was a child who did 
not have their passport in their possession and said they had been 
told to enter the country on a tourist visa. Ultimately, 57 of the 59 
pled guilty, the child was charged in juvenile court, and one case 
was dismissed as circumstantial. 
The government reported providing assistance to the one victim 
involved in either an investigation or prosecution, compared to six 
victims in 2019. Similar to prior reporting periods, the AHTO offered 
temporary shelter for trafficking victims; however, the identified 
victim stayed at a non-governmental facility. Investigators continued 
to employ local interpreters as needed in Bengali, Mandarin, and 
Tagalog. The government reported spending $500 on victim assistance 
to remove the identified victim from an outer island; it did not report 
funding or providing any other emergency protective services to 
adult trafficking victims, such as medical or psychological care. As 
in prior reporting periods, the lack of support services reportedly led 
some victims to leave the country rather than pursue legal recourse.
For the second consecutive year, the government did not report 





and representation before labor and immigration hearings, compared 
with contributing approximately $15,000 to an NGO for these 
purposes in both 2017 and 2018. Similar to previous years, the AGO 
did not request restitution for trafficking victims, reportedly due to 
an inability to submit admissible evidence. The government offered 
ad hoc short-term legal alternatives to the removal of foreign victims 
to countries where they might face hardship or retribution; the 
attorney general could designate victims as “vulnerable,” making them 
eligible for alternate employment and accommodation assistance. 
The Division of Labor reported providing victims with temporary 
employment placements. The government assisted the identified 
victim with obtaining new employment. The judicial system did not 
keep victim identities confidential and in prior reporting periods, 
defendants in trafficking cases threatened witnesses. 
PREVENTION
The government slightly decreased efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
AHTO continued to lead the coordination of all national efforts to 
combat human trafficking. The AHTO was exclusively responsible for 
the implementation of the national action plan (NAP) and received 
funding from the National Congress. The AHTO also continued to 
oversee the Human Trafficking Task Force, which included members 
from civil society organizations, who assist victims of trafficking 
and recommend anti-trafficking programs and policies. The NAP 
expired in December 2019; similar to the previous reporting period, 
the government, with assistance from an international organization, 
reported it continued to update the NAP to include a five-year plan 
to address all forms of trafficking. Unlike the previous reporting 
period, the Division of Labor did not report conducting general public 
awareness activities on government policies regarding the employment 
of foreign workers; however, the Office of the Special Prosecutor 
continued public awareness campaigns on government corruption 
with a subsection focused on human trafficking. The government did 
not report conducting educational or public awareness campaigns for 
employers or labor recruiters. The government, in partnership with 
an international organization, conducted a research survey focused 
on trafficking knowledge, attitude, and practices; the survey included 
key findings, such as that only one-third of male respondents believed 
that trafficking took place in Palau and approximately half of the 
respondents were either unsure or unaware about the existence of 
a national law to protect trafficking victims within the country. The 
AHTO continued to staff a mobile phone number for trafficking tips 
with on-call AHTO investigators who spoke Palauan and English 
and received an average of three calls per month, resulting in one 
investigation during the reporting period.
In the previous reporting period, the government increased protections 
for foreign migrant workers by approving the labor division’s updated 
rules and regulations. The regulations included an amnesty period 
during the previous reporting period for nonresident workers in 
Palau without legal status to be placed under legal employment and 
new mechanisms to ensure employers had sufficient funds to cover 
wages and return tickets of migrant workers to prevent unauthorized 
deduction of wages. In addition, the regulations mandated that 
employers engaged in illegal recruitment of migrant workers could 
not hire new workers. The government did not report implementation 
of the law in any cases during the reporting period. In the previous 
reporting period, the government reported data collected from the 
foreign migrant workers who had applied for amnesty would be 
used to improve investigation of fraudulent recruiters and increase 
screening for trafficking among migrant workers; the government did 
not report any updates to using this collected data. The government 
did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human trafficking of foreign 
victims occurs in Palau. Palau’s foreign population, about one-
third of the country’s population of 21,400, is especially at risk for 
trafficking. Filipino, Bangladeshi, Nepali, Chinese, Thai, and Korean 
men and women pay thousands of dollars in recruitment fees and 
willingly migrate to Palau for jobs in domestic service, agriculture, 
restaurants, or construction; upon arrival, traffickers exploit some 
in conditions substantially different from what had been presented 
in contracts or recruitment offers, and some become trafficking 
victims. Women from the Philippines and China are recruited to 
work in Palau as waitresses or clerks, but traffickers exploit some in 
sex trafficking in karaoke bars or massage parlors. Foreign workers on 
fishing boats in Palauan waters also experience conditions indicative 
of human trafficking. Cuban nationals working in Palau may have 
been forced to work by the Cuban government. Natural disasters 
and climate-induced displacement significantly increases Palauans’ 
vulnerability to trafficking due to a loss of livelihood, shelter, or family 
stability. Official complicity plays a role in facilitating trafficking. 
Authorities have investigated government officials – including labor, 
immigration, law enforcement, and elected officials – for complicity 
in trafficking crimes.
PANAMA: TIER 2
The Government of Panama does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included investigating more traffickers, 
granting residency and work permits for foreign trafficking victims, and 
providing additional food and hygiene support to trafficking victims 
during the pandemic. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Panama remained on Tier 2. Authorities prosecuted and 
convicted fewer traffickers and identified fewer potential trafficking 
victims. The government did not amend the anti-trafficking law to 
remove the requirement of movement to constitute a trafficking 
crime. The government did not establish a planned trafficking-specific 
shelter. Authorities reported instances of abuse in National Secretariat 
for Children, Adolescents, and the Family (SENNIAF) shelters, which 
may have heightened children’s vulnerability to trafficking. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously prosecute and convict alleged traffickers, including those 
involved in child sex tourism. • Proactively identify trafficking victims, 
including among migrants, domestic workers, and other vulnerable 
groups. • Remove the requirement of movement from the statutory 
definition of trafficking in persons under the criminal code. • Amend 
the anti-trafficking law to include force, fraud, or coercion as essential 
elements of the crime rather than aggravating factors. • Allocate 
dedicated funding for specialized victim services, including through 
the special fund for trafficking victims and monetary support for 
civil society organizations. • Train law enforcement and prosecutors 
to investigate and prosecute traffickers using the trafficking offense 
rather than a lesser offense. • Establish and fund the specialized 
trafficking shelter. • Increase training for government officials in 
victim identification and referral, including proactive screening of 
vulnerable populations such as migrants and individuals in commercial 
sex. • Sentence convicted traffickers to adequate penalties, which 
should involve significant prison terms. • Inform foreign victims 
of their rights as trafficking victims, including access to temporary 
residency permits and services. • Develop and disseminate a procedural 




victims’ applications for restitution from the courts and train judges 
to understand the importance of financial restitution in trafficking 
cases. • Use existing laws and regulations to revoke the licenses of 
fraudulent recruiters. 
PROSECUTION
The government decreased prosecution efforts. Article 456 of the 
penal code did not criminalize all forms of sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking because it required movement to constitute a trafficking 
offense. It prescribed penalties of 15 to 20 years’ imprisonment for 
trafficking offenses involving an adult victim and 20 to 30 years’ 
imprisonment for those involving a child victim or other aggravating 
circumstances; these penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with 
respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed for 
other serious crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent with international law, 
the law established the use of force, fraud, or coercion as aggravating 
factors, rather than essential elements of the crime. The law defined 
trafficking broadly to include illegal adoption without the purpose 
of exploitation, inconsistent with international law. The government 
charged some child sex traffickers with non-trafficking offenses, which 
carried lighter sentences. Article 180 criminalized commercial sexual 
exploitation with penalties of seven to nine years’ imprisonment and 
a fine of 5,200 balboas ($5,200). Article 186 criminalized purchasing 
commercial sex acts from a child and prescribed penalties of five to 
eight years’ imprisonment.
Authorities initiated investigation of 29 trafficking cases (21 for sex 
trafficking and eight for labor trafficking) involving 16 suspects, 
compared with five trafficking investigations (four for sex trafficking 
and one for labor trafficking) involving 12 suspects in 2019 and 32 
investigations (25 for sex trafficking and seven for forced labor) 
involving 19 suspects in 2018. Officials reported ongoing investigations 
of seven cases from previous reporting periods. The government 
prosecuted three alleged traffickers (two for sex trafficking and one 
for labor trafficking), compared with prosecuting 10 alleged traffickers 
in 2019 and 12 in 2018. One accused trafficker awaited trial in a 
prosecution initiated prior to 2020. The government convicted three 
traffickers—one labor trafficker and two sex traffickers—compared with 
convicting 13 sex traffickers in 2019 and eight traffickers—seven sex 
traffickers and one labor trafficker—in 2018. Authorities described the 
labor trafficking conviction as the first under the anti-trafficking law 
since Panama converted to an adversarial system in 2016. The courts 
sentenced the convicted labor trafficker to 80 months’ imprisonment 
and required restitution to the victim, an indigenous child forced into 
domestic servitude largely without pay and barred from attending 
school. Of the three convicted traffickers, courts convicted two of 
commercial sexual exploitation under Article 180, which carried 
lower penalties than the anti-trafficking statute; however, it did not 
acknowledge that the exploitation in this case likely amounted to 
trafficking under international law. Authorities reported a trafficker 
from mainland China convicted in 2019 appealed his case; the courts 
upheld the conviction and reaffirmed the 25-year sentence imposed. 
Officials reported courts closed for approximately three months due to 
pandemic-related restrictions. When courts reopened, trafficking cases 
proceeded slowly; officials attributed the delay to resource limitations 
and shifting priorities during the pandemic. Most investigations 
and hearings proceeded virtually and under altered conditions. 
The government reported pandemic-related illness affecting key 
personnel may have hindered anti-trafficking efforts. To mitigate 
the spread of COVID-19, the government closed most commercial 
establishments and enacted stringent movement restrictions based on 
gender, limiting men and women to two-hour outings on alternate 
days of the week. These movement restrictions were in place for seven 
months. Restrictions did not apply to law enforcement activity, but 
the government diverted officers and other staff from regular duties, 
including investigating trafficking crimes, to enforce the restrictions. 
Observers reported a lack of procedural guidelines for judges and 
prosecutors occasionally hindered successful convictions. 
The government reported reviewing a border official’s conduct for signs 
of official complicity or negligence in connection with the official’s 
decision to allow an alleged trafficker to enter the country with a child 
he claimed to have adopted without verifying the adoption’s validity. 
The government requested the National Migration Service (SNM) 
update its standard operating procedures (SOPs) to prevent recurrence 
but did not pursue further action against the official; the SNM had 
not updated its SOPs at the conclusion of the reporting period. 
Media reports cited allegations of sex trafficking in SENNIAF shelters; 
the government reported it could not substantiate the allegations. 
Otherwise, the government did not report any investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in 
human trafficking offenses. 
The government reported cooperating with Costa Rica in the 
repatriation of a trafficking victim. Panama also hosted the first 
bilateral meeting, conducted virtually, under the 2018 anti-trafficking 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with Colombia; under the 
MOU, the government collected statements from four Colombian 
victims in Panama, which allowed Colombian law enforcement to 
initiate a parallel investigation after the alleged trafficker returned 
to Colombia. The government offered several trainings for law 
enforcement and other officials, including specialized training on 
combating trafficking during the pandemic, for officers at the Ministry 
of Public Security. The government offered anti-trafficking training 
to the National Migration Service, covering trafficking awareness, 
identifying victims, and victim assistance over multiple sessions; the 
Ministry of Justice requested and received training in best practices 
in human trafficking cases for more than 70 officials. Other trainings 
targeted specialized law enforcement units, such as the National 
Police’s intelligence division. The government led most trainings but 
accepted support from international organizations in the form of 
guest speakers and facilitators; due to the pandemic, the government 
conducted most trainings virtually in 2020. 
PROTECTION
The government decreased protection efforts. The government 
identified six trafficking victims in 2020, after screening 11 potential 
victims for trafficking indicators; this compared with 61 potential 
trafficking victims (22 confirmed trafficking victims) in 2019 and 46 
potential trafficking victims in 2018. The government indicated that it 
screened potential victims to confirm their status as trafficking victims 
in a process that could take several months; victims could access shelter 
and other services while their status was pending. The government 
had not yet processed all 61 potential victims identified in 2019. Of 
the six identified victims in 2020, three were sex trafficking victims 
and one was a labor trafficking victim; authorities identified the other 
two individuals as victims of “slavery,” a form of exploitation which 
could amount to trafficking. Officials ultimately identified the five 
other potential victims as victims of other crimes, such as migrant 
smuggling or labor exploitation. Anti-trafficking officials referred 
these victims to the appropriate authorities for further assistance.
Officials referred all victims to the Technical Unit for Attention and 
Protection of Victims and Witnesses (UPAVIT), which provided legal 
and other assistance to victims of all crimes and physical protection 
to victims, witnesses, and experts. The government had guidelines 
for victim identification and protection, which outlined the formal 
procedures, internal processes, and training materials used by referring 
officials and UPAVIT. The National Anti-Trafficking Commission 
supplied an identification form to assist officials who encountered 
potential trafficking victims; however, observers noted the form’s 
distribution was incomplete, leaving some potential victims vulnerable 
to misidentification. In 2020, UPAVIT provided services to 25 victims, 
including several victims identified in previous reporting periods. The 
government trained representatives from the women’s institute and the 
Ministry of Security on victim protection and services. Anti-trafficking 
officials reported significant challenges in identifying victims under 
the government’s pandemic-related movement restrictions, due in part 






shifts in traffickers’ tactics to evade mandatory closures of bars and 
brothels. The government suggested unidentified trafficking victims 
may have departed Panama on pandemic-related humanitarian 
evacuation flights but did not report efforts to screen this population 
for trafficking indicators.
The government maintained the Special Fund for Victims of Trafficking 
in Persons mandated by the anti-trafficking law and established 
an office to manage trafficking funds, but the government did not 
allocate funding specific to the anti-trafficking commission or victim 
services. As a result, agencies drew from their general budgets to fund 
the anti-trafficking commission and the provision of food, shelter 
in hotels, transportation, and psychological and legal services for 
potential victims. Eight victims participated in hospitality sector 
vocational training during 2020. During the pandemic, the government 
coordinated biweekly or monthly deliveries of food and hygiene items 
to victims and their families. In 2020, UPAVIT reported $3,800 in 
expenditures for services to trafficking victims, a significant decrease 
from the $54,540 reported in 2019. The government diverted $57,000 
in funds allocated to victim protection to purchase personal protective 
equipment for law enforcement officials during the pandemic; the 
government had previously coordinated with UNODC to designate 
these funds to establish a shelter for trafficking victims. There were 
no dedicated shelters for trafficking victims. As a result, authorities 
commonly placed victims in hotels and covered the cost of the hotel 
rooms. The government could also refer victims to migrant or women’s 
shelters run by NGOs. In 2020, the government arranged for one victim 
to stay in a hotel while awaiting repatriation; another victim elected 
to remain in the migrant shelter where officials identified her as a 
trafficking victim. Victims sometimes chose to return to their home 
countries or reside with family or friends rather than stay in hotels, 
potentially inhibiting victim-witness support in pending trafficking 
cases. The government could refer child trafficking victims to SENNIAF 
and its network of shelters administered by NGOs and religious 
organizations. However, in 2020, observers and former shelter officials 
alleged widespread abuse in SENNIAF facilities, including mistreatment 
of children with disabilities and sexual abuse. An independent 
investigation verified the pattern of abuse perpetrated by staff and other 
residents, but other allegations remained unsubstantiated, including 
accusations and rumors of sex trafficking associated with the agency’s 
shelters. Officials reported the shelter most commonly serving child 
trafficking victims was not implicated in the investigation. Observers 
reported SENNIAF’s budget was insufficient to support restructuring 
or other largescale efforts to reduce residents’ risk of suffering abuse, 
which heightened their vulnerability to trafficking. 
Foreign national victims were eligible for short-term humanitarian 
visas, temporary residency permits extendable up to six years, and work 
permits. The anti-trafficking commission provided legal assistance to 
victims seeking no-cost residency or work permits. Many administrative 
offices associated with the issuance of visas and permits closed during 
the pandemic; however, the anti-trafficking commission ensured 
victims could apply for and receive these documents throughout 
the year. During the reporting period, the government issued 17 
provisional humanitarian visas and 11 work permits to trafficking 
victims, compared with 20 visas and nine work permits in 2019. 
Officials also renewed work permits for two additional victims 
but did not report issuing any permanent residency permits to 
trafficking victims in 2020, compared with 13 in 2019. The government 
provided 90-day temporary visas to three victims awaiting identity 
documents. The government helped to repatriate one Costa Rican 
victim exploited in Panama; an international organization funded 
the repatriation of one Panamanian victim exploited in trafficking 
abroad. The government made available specialized interview rooms 
to allow victims to provide testimony privately to minimize the risk 
of re-traumatization and allowed prosecutors to request hearings be 
closed to the public, but it did not report using either provision in 
2020. The government seized assets derived from human trafficking 
activities and allocated the proceeds to services for trafficking victims. 
The law allowed victims to request restitution through a complaint or 
civil suit; lawyers from the anti-trafficking commission were available 
to assist victims seeking restitution. Eight trafficking victims filed for 
restitution in criminal cases. In one instance, the courts ordered a 
convicted trafficker to pay $2,000 in restitution to the child victim. 
The remaining seven victims’ requests awaited final rulings at the 
end of the reporting period. Sixteen labor trafficking victims claimed 
compensation from their traffickers through a separate administrative 
process. 
PREVENTION
The government slightly decreased prevention efforts. The anti-
trafficking commission was the lead agency for anti-trafficking efforts 
and was responsible for implementing the 2017-2022 national 
anti-trafficking action plan through a yearly operation plan. The anti-
trafficking commission coordinated the government’s anti-trafficking 
efforts during the reporting period and the Ministry of Security’s 
anti-trafficking office led the commission’s day-to-day activity; the 
commission did not hold any meetings during 2020. The government 
carried out awareness campaigns outlined in the action plan with the 
assistance of international organizations. In 2020, these campaigns 
included an anti-trafficking drawing contest for school-aged children, 
awareness presentations for 30 staff members of a hotel chain, and 
numerous anti-trafficking spots on television and radio channels. The 
government reported the identification of one victim through these 
activities, an LGBTQI+ individual who attended an anti-trafficking 
workshop and later called a hotline to self-identify as a victim of 
trafficking. The government operated several hotlines, including a 
national police hotline to receive tips and a 311 number for the public 
to report possible cases or request inspections of businesses, but it 
did not report the number of calls received related to trafficking. The 
Ministry of Security partnered with an NGO to launch an online 
anonymous reporting portal for criminal activity, including trafficking. 
The Ministry of Labor collected regular reports from all registered 
recruitment agencies; national laws and regulations provided the 
authority to revoke the licenses of fraudulent recruiters and recruitment 
fees, but the government did not report enforcing them. During the 
pandemic, the government allowed employers to terminate employee 
contracts without penalty in sectors where telework was not feasible; 
because migrants were overrepresented in these sectors and limited 
by border closures and movement restrictions, this policy may have 
contributed to increased trafficking vulnerability for migrants. The 
government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial 
sex acts. The government did not report any activities associated with 
the Panamanian Commission against Sexual Exploitation Crimes 
campaign against the sexual exploitation of children or the Ministry 
of Education’s anti-trafficking “liaison” program in 2020, whereas it 
conducted 49 anti-sexual exploitation workshops and several anti-
trafficking seminars for teachers through these programs in 2019. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Panama, and to a lesser extent, traffickers exploit 
victims from Panama abroad. Most identified trafficking victims are 
foreign adults exploited in sex trafficking, especially women from South 
and Central America. However, traffickers also exploit Panamanians 
in sex trafficking in Panama, the Caribbean, and Central and South 
America. Cuban nationals working in Panama may have been forced 
to work by the Cuban government. Traffickers exploit children in 
forced labor, particularly domestic servitude, and sex trafficking in 
Panama. Children living in shelters were vulnerable to recruitment by 
traffickers. Traffickers exploit transgender individuals in sex trafficking 
due in part to increased vulnerability because of discrimination 
and high demand for commercial sex acts from this population. 
Venezuelan and Nicaraguan migrants were increasingly at risk for 
both sex and labor trafficking. Traffickers exploit some adults from 
Central America who transit Panama en route to the Caribbean or 
Europe in sex trafficking or forced labor in their destination countries. 




the pandemic. Traffickers exploit indigenous females from rural, 
impoverished border areas of the country in forced labor. Traffickers 
exploit Central and South American, Chinese, and Vietnamese men in 
forced labor in construction, agriculture, mining, restaurants, door-to-
door peddling, and other sectors using debt bondage, false promises, 
exploitation of migratory status, restrictions on movement, and other 
means. Traffickers have forced victims to consume illegal drugs as a 
coercive measure. Traffickers typically exploit sex trafficking victims 
in bars and brothels; however, officials reported an increase in sex 
trafficking in beauty parlors, spas, houses rented by traffickers, and 
private homes. Traffickers utilize social media and messenger apps 
to recruit victims. Men from the United States have been investigated 
as child sex tourists in Panama. Government officials have been 
investigated and arrested for alleged involvement in trafficking.
PAPUA NEW GUINEA: TIER 2 
WATCH LIST
The Government of Papua New Guinea does not fully meet the 
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making 
significant efforts to do so. The government made key achievements 
during the reporting period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Papua New Guinea 
was upgraded to Tier 2 Watch List. These achievements included the 
government convicting its first trafficker since its inclusion in the 2007 
Trafficking in Persons Report, the utilization of standard operating 
procedures to identify and refer three potential victims for protective 
services, and the continued advancement of a trafficking prosecution 
initiated in a previous reporting period. Despite these achievements, 
the government did not report any new investigations and, for 
the fourth consecutive year, did not report any new prosecutions. 
Endemic corruption among officials, particularly in the logging 
sector, continued to facilitate vulnerability to sex trafficking and 
forced labor among foreign and local populations. An acute lack of 
financial and human resources dedicated to anti-trafficking efforts, 
as well as very low awareness among government officials and the 
public, continued to hinder progress.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
 
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Update, disseminate, and systematically implement existing standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) for victim identification, referral, 
and protection and widely train police, immigration, and customs 
enforcement officers on the SOPs. • Investigate and prosecute 
trafficking offenses and sentence convicted traffickers to significant 
prison terms, including victims’ family members and officials who 
facilitate or directly benefit from trafficking. • Amend the criminal 
code to criminalize child sex trafficking without elements of force, 
fraud, or coercion in accordance with the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. • In 
collaboration with civil society, screen for trafficking indicators among 
vulnerable groups, including internally displaced persons, Chinese 
nationals on Chinese government-affiliated projects, communities 
located near commercial forestry operations, children in communities 
marked by inter-tribal conflict, and individuals—including children—
apprehended for illegal fishing, desertion from foreign-registered 
fishing vessels, illegal logging, illegal gold panning, or immigration 
crimes, and ensure all identified victims are referred to appropriate 
services. • Increase protective services for victims of trafficking in 
coordination with NGOs and international organizations. • Institute 
a policy framework recognizing that traffickers often compel victims 
to commit crimes and increase intra-governmental coordination 
to protect victims from arrest, deportation, or other punishment 
for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit. • Clarify 
who has the authority to designate an individual as a trafficking 
victim and simplify the process for doing so. • Allocate resources, 
including dedicated staff, to government agencies to finalize and 
implement an updated national action plan and SOPs. • Increase 
collaboration with civil society groups, the private sector, and religious 
and community leaders to raise awareness of and reduce demand 
for commercial sex acts and forced labor, especially of children. • 
Take steps to eliminate recruitment or placement fees charged to 
workers by labor recruiters and ensure any recruitment fees are paid 
by employers. • Strengthen the National Anti-Human Trafficking 
Committee (NAHTC) by regularizing its meetings and functions, 
designating senior officials to represent their agencies, increasing 
awareness of and participation in the committee by civil society and 
protection stakeholders, and allocating resources for its activities. • 
Accede to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol.
PROSECUTION
The government increased law enforcement efforts. The Criminal 
Code Amendment of 2013 criminalized most forms of sex trafficking 
and all forms of labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to 
20 years’ imprisonment. These penalties were sufficiently stringent 
and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent with 
international law, the law required a demonstration of force, fraud, 
or coercion to constitute a child sex trafficking offense and therefore 
did not criminalize all forms of child sex trafficking. 
In November 2020, the government obtained its first trafficking 
conviction since the enactment of its 2013 law; this conviction 
concluded a long-running sex trafficking prosecution. The court 
convicted the defendant on six counts of trafficking and one count 
of rape. In December 2020, the court sentenced the trafficker to seven 
concurrent sentences (one for each count) of 20 years’ imprisonment. 
The trafficker was incarcerated at the end of the reporting period. The 
government’s prosecution of an alleged trafficker in connection with 
the same case remained pending at the end of the reporting period. 
The government did not report any new trafficking investigations, 
and for the fourth consecutive year, it did not report any new 
prosecutions. The government did not report any new investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit 
in human trafficking offenses; however, corruption and official 
complicity in trafficking and related crimes remained significant 
concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action during the year.
An international organization provided anti-trafficking training to 
34 judicial officials, and the government provided some logistical 
support for those events. National and provincial officials’ limited 
understanding of trafficking continued to hinder effective law 
enforcement activity. Enforcement agencies and most government 
offices remained weak as a result of underfunding, corruption, 
cronyism, a lack of accountability, and a promotion system based on 
patronage. Observers reported resources and institutional capacity 
among law enforcement and other government agencies were 
redirected or constrained as a result of the pandemic, which may 
have adversely affected the government’s ability to detect and address 
trafficking. The government reported, due to the pandemic, a notable 
decrease in all criminal investigations and a reduction in the number 
of cases heard by the courts due to adjustments in court schedules. 
Observers also ascribed poor prosecutorial efforts to widespread 
observance of customary justice practices, fear of retribution, distrust 
of law enforcement among victims, and insufficient resources and 
political will among law enforcement to conduct investigations, 












The government maintained inadequate efforts to protect victims. 
The government has SOPs for victim identification and referral and 
reported modest implementation, but authorities continued to lack 
a written guide as recommended in the national action plan, and 
general awareness of the SOPs among front-line officers was limited. 
In addition, the SOPs contained inadequate or no measures to screen 
for trafficking indicators among adults arrested for commercial sex 
or among LGBTQI+ individuals. The government reported its efforts 
to collect victim information and conduct screening were hindered 
by movement restrictions and the closure of government offices due 
to the pandemic. During the reporting period, authorities identified 
three potential trafficking victims referred through the SOPs for 
assessment—the same number as in 2019. The government provided 
limited medical and child protective services to the three female 
child victims; all other victim protection services were provided 
by an NGO. The government did not report further demographic 
details on the victims, including nationality. The government did not 
have a structured plan to monitor, secure, identify, or refer victims 
among vulnerable communities or among communities displaced 
as a result of conflict or natural disasters. Logging and mining sites 
primarily operated in remote regions with limited or no government 
oversight. The government conducted some enforcement activities 
against illegal logging sites but did not report or make available 
information on any efforts to identify sex or labor trafficking victims 
at such sites. During the reporting period, the government seized 
at least one foreign fishing vessel and arrested nine crew members 
for illegal fishing; the crew members were deported after paying 
fines. The government did not report whether victim assessments 
had been conducted in the case. In previous reporting periods, the 
government provided law enforcement agencies rapid screening 
forms and related victim identification training; however, police 
continued to rely upon foreign expert assistance to identify victims. 
International organizations reported identifying 10 potential victims 
in the reporting period. 
Civil society organizations provided medical and short-term shelter 
services to victims without financial or in-kind support from the 
government. Women and child victims could receive services 
through NGO-run gender-based violence programs; and while 
male victims could receive ad hoc services through NGOs, there 
were no government- or NGO-services specifically tailored to the 
needs of trafficking victims. The victim identification procedures 
included guidance for protecting foreign victims from punishment 
for immigration crimes the victims’ traffickers forced them to commit; 
however, authorities likely punished or deported some victims for 
such crimes due to ineffective victim identification, poor interagency 
coordination, and a lack of clarity over who had the authority to verify 
an individual as a victim of trafficking and put in place protections 
against deportation or prosecution. Observers reported that a law 
allowing officials to apprehend foreign fishermen for desertion in 
port may have dissuaded some victims of forced labor from escaping 
and reporting their abuses. In prior years, authorities arrested and 
prosecuted children who were forced to pan for gold in areas where 
this activity was illegal; the government last reported efforts to screen 
these children for trafficking indicators in 2017. The law provided 
legal alternatives to the removal of foreign victims to countries where 
they may face hardship or retribution, but the government did not 
report offering this protection to any victims in 2020. The law lacked 
provisions for victims to seek compensation through civil suits.
PREVENTION
The government modestly increased efforts to prevent trafficking. 
The NAHTC continued to lack sufficient resources and commitment 
from the government. The NAHTC did not meet during the reporting 
period, reportedly due to pandemic measures; however, the NAHTC 
was largely inactive prior to the pandemic. The government did not 
appoint specific committee members to represent relevant agencies 
and effectively excluded non-governmental stakeholders. Some 
key interagency stakeholders and responsible senior government 
officials were unaware of its existence. During the reporting period, 
the government commenced work to update its national action 
plan but did not provide detailed information of the status of that 
work or on continued efforts to implement the existing national 
action plan. For the first time since 2012, the government reported 
modest efforts to increase trafficking awareness. On the country’s 
national day against human trafficking, authorities sponsored an 
article in a national newspaper to increase general trafficking in 
persons awareness as part of the government’s 20 Days of Human 
Rights Activism campaign. After the December 2020 sentencing of 
the trafficker, the judge in the case made a widely reported public 
statement urging increased trafficking awareness among the general 
public. The government reported conducting its first trafficking-related 
research without assistance from international organizations to assess 
the scope of domestic servitude cases involving girls, although it did 
not release the findings to the public. 
The government did not operate or support an anti-trafficking 
hotline. The government did not have effective policies to regulate 
foreign labor recruiters or hold them liable for fraudulent recruitment 
practices. With no more than two labor inspectors per province, 
inadequate resources, and endemic corruption, the government 
did not take adequate steps to prevent forced labor in the highly 
vulnerable logging industry. To the contrary, authorities reportedly 
issued forestry permits in violation of preexisting land ownership 
rights and without further oversight, leading to the displacement 
and heightened vulnerability of the land’s previous occupants and 
to increased risk of labor exploitation among forestry workers. 
Furthermore, the government did not report its regulation of 
recruitment fees, which continued to contribute to debt-based 
coercion among foreign workers. The government did not provide 
anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel. The government 
did not make efforts to decrease the demand for commercial sex 
acts. Papua New Guinea is not a party to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Papua New Guinea, and traffickers exploit 
victims from Papua New Guinea abroad. Traffickers use Papua New 
Guinea as a transit point to exploit foreign individuals in other 
countries. Traffickers exploit foreign and local women and children 
in sex trafficking, as well as forced labor in domestic service, the 
tourism sector, manual labor, forced begging, and street vending. 
According to international NGO research conducted in previous 
years, approximately 30 percent of Papua New Guinean sex trafficking 
victims are children under the age of 18, with some as young as 10 
years old. Immediate family or tribe members reportedly exploit 
children in sex trafficking or forced labor. Some parents force children 
to beg or sell goods on the street, and some sell or force their 
daughters into marriages or child sex trafficking to settle debts, 
resolve disputes between communities, or support their families. 
The closing of traditional travel routes due to pandemic-related 
border control restrictions and the imposition of new and complex 
requirements for entry may have increased vulnerability to trafficking 
among foreign migrant workers. Anecdotal reports show an increase 
in online child sexual exploitation, some of which may be child 
sex trafficking, in connection with an increased use of the internet 
during the pandemic. 
Marriages in Papua New Guinea commonly involve a “bride price” 
of money or chattel paid to the wife’s family by the husband’s 
family, who use the bride price as debt to compel the woman to 
remain in abusive or servile marriages. Some parents reportedly 
transfer their children—some as young as 12—to other families 
via informal paid adoption arrangements that, absent monitoring 
or registration practices, increase their risk of trafficking; this is 
particularly prevalent among girls, whom adoptive families often 
seek out as potential sources of future bride-price income. Young 
girls sold into polygamous marriages may be forced into domestic 




trafficking. Within the country, traffickers lure children and women 
with promises of legitimate work or education to travel to different 
provinces, where they are exploited in sex trafficking or domestic 
servitude. Men reportedly engage in transactional sex with girls as 
young as 15 in exchange for money, gifts, or mobile phone credits. 
Tribal leaders reportedly trade the exploitative labor and service of 
girls and women for guns, to forge political alliances, and to settle 
disputes with one other. Traffickers subject Papua New Guinean 
children to forced criminality in illegal gold panning. Boys as young 
as 12 reportedly experience conditions indicative of forced labor as 
porters. Adolescent boys are also increasingly involved in inter-tribal 
and intercommunal armed conflict, possibly via forcible recruitment 
by local leadership. Individuals—particularly women and girls—
displaced as a result of frequent natural disasters and communal 
conflict are at higher risk of trafficking due to poor or nonexistent IDP 
camp security and loss of livelihoods. International observers report 
increasing intercommunal tensions resulting from displacement have 
led to more Papua New Guinean women and girls facing “sorcery” 
accusations from men in an attempt to psychologically coerce them 
into forced labor or sex trafficking.
Malaysian and Chinese logging companies arrange for some foreign 
women to enter the country voluntarily with fraudulently issued 
tourist or business visas; this practice may also be present at other 
internationally owned logging sites. After their arrival, many of 
these women—from countries including Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Thailand, China, and the Philippines—are turned over to traffickers 
who transport them to logging and mining camps, fisheries, and 
entertainment sites and exploit them in sex trafficking and domestic 
servitude. Sex traffickers also reportedly exploit foreign children in 
Papua New Guinea. Chinese nationals working in Papua New Guinea 
may have been forced to work by Chinese companies, including 
state-owned enterprises. Traffickers force Chinese, Malaysian, and 
local men to work at commercial mines and logging camps. Burmese, 
Cambodian, Chinese, Malaysian, Vietnamese, and local men and boys 
seeking work on fishing vessels go into debt to pay recruitment fees, 
which vessel owners and senior crew manipulate to coerce them to 
continue working indefinitely through debt bondage in Papua New 
Guinea’s exclusive economic zone and in other maritime territories, 
particularly in tuna fishing. These fishermen may face little to no pay, 
contract switching, wage garnishing or withholding, harsh working 
and living conditions, restricted communication, and threats of 
physical violence as coercive tactics to retain their labor. Often with 
direct government support, companies reportedly compel these 
workers to carry out illegal logging and fishing activities, making 
them vulnerable to arrest. Government officials reportedly facilitate 
trafficking by accepting bribes to allow undocumented migrants to 
enter the country or ignore trafficking situations, and some may exploit 
sex trafficking victims or procure victims for other individuals in return 
for political favors or votes. Corruption among forestry officials in 
particular may be permissive of forced labor among loggers and sex 
trafficking in communities situated near logging sites; some of these 
officials reportedly accept bribes to issue logging permits in violation 
of environmental standards and land ownership rights, leading to 
displacement and concomitant loss of livelihood that make some 
communities more vulnerable to exploitation.
PARAGUAY: TIER 2
The Government of Paraguay does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Paraguay remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
identifying significantly more trafficking victims; implementing 
a unified approach to victim identification in government 
quarantine facilities; opening temporary shelters for quarantining 
child trafficking victims; establishing a new entrepreneurial grant 
program for trafficking victims; and passing a new national action 
plan to combat trafficking in persons, the first such plan to receive 
presidential approval as required for full implementation. However, 
the government did not meet the minimum standards in several key 
areas. Services for all victims remained inadequate, cooperation with 
civil society remained inconsistent, use of the identification protocol 
and referral mechanism was ad hoc, and the anti-trafficking unit was 
under-resourced. Although the government identified more victims, 
its victim services infrastructure was insufficient to meet the needs 
of this large group. The government’s anti-trafficking law did not 
align with international law.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Expand access to adequate specialized victim services, including for 
male victims. • Investigate and prosecute alleged traffickers, including 
complicit officials, and sentence convicted traffickers to significant 
prison terms. • Fund and implement the 2020-2024 national action 
plan. • Train officials to consistently utilize victim identification 
protocols and referral mechanisms to increase proactive identification 
of trafficking victims. • Increase engagement with civil society actors 
to complement the government’s efforts to prevent trafficking and 
protect victims and encourage regular civil society participation 
in the interagency roundtable. • Increase funding and staffing for 
the Paraguayan National Police Anti-Trafficking Unit (PNPTU). • 
Revise the definition of human trafficking under law 4788/12 to 
ensure force, fraud, or coercion are essential elements of the crime 
as established under the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. • Adopt reforms to 
eliminate abusive practices and working conditions that may amount 
to trafficking in the criadazgo (child servitude) system. • Establish 
the national anti-trafficking secretariat, as required by law. • Train 
law enforcement officials to bolster understanding that child sex 
tourism is human trafficking. • Improve interagency coordination 
and develop a case management database for trafficking cases. • 
Establish adequate penalties to deter child labor violations. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained prosecution efforts. The Comprehensive 
Anti-Trafficking Law 4788 of 2012 criminalized sex trafficking and 
labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to eight years’ 
imprisonment for cases involving adult victims and two to 20 years’ 
imprisonment for those involving child victims; these penalties were 
sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate 
with penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. 
Inconsistent with international law, Law 4788/12 established the 
use of force, fraud, and coercion as aggravating factors rather than 
essential elements of the crime; penalties were increased to two to 
15 years’ imprisonment under such circumstances. Article 139 of 
the penal code, which relates to pimping crimes, could be used to 
prosecute child sex trafficking offenses; it prescribed penalties of 
eight years’ imprisonment for offenses involving children, which 
are significantly lower than the penalties described under the anti-
trafficking law. 
The PNPTU was responsible for investigating trafficking crimes, while 
the Anti-Trafficking Unit (ATU) was the lead prosecuting agency. In 
2020, authorities initiated 106 trafficking investigations, 35 for sex 
trafficking and 71 for forced labor, compared with 141 investigations in 
2019 and 110 investigations in 2018. Officials continued to investigate 






charges against 21 suspected traffickers, compared with 53 in 2019, 
and 25 in 2018. There were 206 ongoing trafficking prosecutions 
initiated in previous reporting periods, where in 2019 there had been 
127 such ongoing cases. Judges convicted three traffickers, all on sex 
trafficking charges, under Law 4788/12, and reported convicting six 
additional individuals of trafficking-related crimes, some of which 
may have amounted to trafficking under international law. This 
compared with 22 trafficking and trafficking-related convictions in 
2019 and 15 in 2018. These traffickers received sentences ranging 
from five to 12 years’ imprisonment; those individuals sentenced 
under related charges received sentences ranging from 24 to 42 
months’ imprisonment. Paraguayan courts closed from April 2020 to 
December 2020 as a public health precaution during the pandemic, 
limiting prosecutors’ ability to try and convict traffickers, but resumed 
adjudication under modified conditions in January 2021. 
Anti-trafficking law enforcement operated with low budgetary 
allocations for a third consecutive reporting period. The PNPTU’s 
staff modestly increased to 41 specialized trafficking officers in 2020, 
compared with 36 officers in 2019, 38 in 2018, and 50 in 2017. 
Observers indicated the unit needed more staff and additional offices 
in high-risk areas, such as the international airport, to adequately 
perform its duties. From April to December 2020, the government 
directed law enforcement officials to work from home to mitigate the 
impacts of the pandemic, where limited access to sensitive materials 
and rolling blackouts hindered investigations. In 2020, the ATU 
cooperated with Argentina, Brazil, and Spain on four trafficking 
investigations, particularly in the Tri-Border Area.
Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained 
significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement activity. The 
government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking 
offenses, though observers continued to allege some officials displayed 
complicity indicators, particularly border agents. Such allegations 
included officials taking bribes from massage parlors and brothels 
where trafficking crimes allegedly occurred, agents issuing passports 
for Paraguayan trafficking victims exploited abroad, and facilitating 
sex trafficking of women and girls on barges operating along the 
Paraguay River. 
PROTECTION
The government increased protection efforts. The government lacked 
a centralized database to aggregate efforts across ministries and 
could not provide comprehensive data on victim protection. There 
were three agencies involved in victim identification: the ATU, the 
Ministry of Women’s Affairs (MWA), and the Ministry of Children 
and Adolescents (MINNA). The government reported identifying 
299 trafficking victims in 2020. By comparison, the government 
reported identifying 86 victims in 2019 and 70 victims in 2018. 
Traffickers exploited more than 150 of the victims identified in 2020 
in forced labor. More than 80 percent of trafficking victims identified 
in 2020 were child victims. Among the 299 victims identified, there 
were 42 women, 187 girls, one man, and 69 boys. The government 
attributed the notable increase in victims identified to implementing 
routine screening for returning migrants required to quarantine 
in government facilities before entering the country to prevent 
the spread of COVID-19; in these facilities, officials from several 
agencies utilized common guidelines to identify potential victims 
of trafficking, with particular attention to unaccompanied children. 
The government had a formal victim identification protocol and 
national referral guide for prosecutors, police, labor inspectors, and 
border officials; however, use of these tools was inconsistent and ad 
hoc. In practice, only some government entities had protocols for 
the proactive identification of victims. 
There were three dedicated shelters for female trafficking victims, one 
managed by the MWA for adults and two shelters for child victims 
managed by MINNA; one of MINNA’s shelters was co-managed by 
an NGO. MWA could also serve female trafficking victims at its two 
domestic violence shelters. Although the government identified 
significantly more victims in 2020, its shelter capacity was insufficient 
to accommodate the large number of victims needing care. In 
response to increased victim identification, MINNA established 
two temporary shelters at the border to allow child trafficking 
victims to quarantine separately from the general population. These 
facilities could accommodate approximately 40 children at one 
time. Otherwise, MINNA reported referring 26 child victims to its 
shelter services, compared with 44 in 2019 and 48 in 2018. Observers 
reported pandemic-related safety protocols may have contributed to 
limited capacity, as well as reduced turnover, in shelters. During the 
quarantine period required for child trafficking victims identified 
at the border, officials from the public defender’s office conducted 
psychosocial evaluations to determine whether the children could 
safely return to their families. Where there were no concerns victims’ 
families were complicit in their trafficking, the public defender’s office 
was responsible for organizing a safe return, including travel and 
chaperone, if necessary; the government released most child trafficking 
victims to the care of family or guardians. The ATU coordinated 
direct cash transfers and food assistance for 39 victims, and the MWA 
provided similar support to 11 victims. In addition to shelter and food, 
the government provided psychological support, social assistance, legal 
advice, and reintegration programs for some victims. The government 
implemented a new entrepreneurial program for trafficking victims 
in 2020, awarding small business seed grants to six female victims. 
The government did not have a shelter to assist male trafficking 
victims; however, the ATU could provide psychological assistance, 
food, and immediate shelter at hotels on an ad hoc basis before 
facilitating the return of male victims to their community of origin. In 
December 2020, the government established an interagency working 
group to ensure provision of services to trafficking victims outside 
of government shelters. The government did not have significant 
engagement with civil society. Aside from some funding provided 
to the NGO operating the MINNA shelter, the government did not 
provide assistance to NGOs contributing to the protection of victims. 
Lack of substantive cooperation with civil society also limited the 
government’s ability to provide comprehensive care. The overall 
quality of care for victims was inadequate due to limited resources 
and the lack of qualified personnel. The ATU continued to provide 
basic assistance to trafficking victims due to insufficient victim services 
provision by other parts of the government. However, the ATU did 
not receive government funding for victim assistance and relied on 
occasional allocations from a victims services fund managed by an 
international organization to assist victims. This funding supported 
the government’s case-by-case provision of food assistance, direct 
cash transfers, and reintegration programming for trafficking victims. 
Government officials reported funding was insufficient to assist 
victims adequately. In 2020, the government authorized emergency 
budgetary reallocations to fund pandemic measures; although these 
redistributions did not target anti-trafficking activities, the reshuffling 
prevented confident reporting on the funds ultimately available to 
combat human trafficking, though most observers agreed they were 
diminished. MINNA provided approximately $38,500 in 2020 to 
the NGO that operated the specialized shelter for underage victims, 
compared with approximately $50,000 in 2019. The government 
helped repatriate at least one victim in 2020, compared with five in 
2019 and five in 2018. Authorities did not provide government officials 
any training on victim protection for the fourth consecutive year. 
PREVENTION
The government modestly increased its prevention efforts. The 
Directorate for the Attention of the Overseas Paraguayan Community 
(DACPE) was the government entity responsible for coordinating 
anti-trafficking programs and convening an ongoing interagency 
roundtable that included intermittent participants from 16 
government agencies. In 2020, the roundtable held 14 sessions, 
compared to six in 2019. Of these 14 virtual meetings, most were 
committee meetings to finalize the draft national action plan. 
Law 4788/12 did not require participation of civil society in the 
roundtable, and authorities provided them a limited role. The 
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roundtable’s plenary sessions were officially open to civil society, 
but a number of NGOs reported they did not receive consistent 
notification of meetings. Poor and informal interagency coordination 
limited the government’s ability to monitor, collect, and report 
statistics. Several observers reported the absence of a dedicated agency 
limited the effectiveness of anti-trafficking efforts. Two NGOs served 
as liaisons between the roundtable and civil society. After several 
years of deliberation, the president approved a 2020-2024 national 
action plan to combat trafficking in persons, the first national 
action plan thus approved; officials reported implementation would 
begin in 2021. The government lacked a national anti-trafficking 
secretariat, despite the 2012 law mandating its creation. Although the 
government’s engagement with civil society on trafficking issues was 
limited, observers noted, the interagency roundtable demonstrated 
increased openness to NGO participation, particularly welcoming 
NGO contributions in the development of the national action plan.
The government did not allocate funds for public awareness 
campaigns; instead, it relied on civil society, businesses, and trade 
unions to run campaigns in high-risk areas. However, the government 
continued to post brochures and posters in bus terminals, airports, 
and border crossings to promote awareness of trafficking, and two 
agencies expanded social media awareness campaigns in response to 
decreased use of public venues during the pandemic. The government 
maintained hotlines to report crimes against women and children, 
including trafficking, as well as a webpage for trafficking and 
exploitation complaints. Authorities did not provide a comprehensive 
report on trafficking calls received via these sources. In prior years, 
the government operated an email inbox and a phone app version 
of the hotline to facilitate digital complaints but did not report any 
complaints received via these means in 2020. The Ministry of Labor’s 
21 labor inspectors conducted 464 worksite inspections. Although 
labor inspections focused heavily on pandemic sanitation protocols 
in 2020, inspectors identified at least eight child labor violations, 
some of which may have amounted to trafficking. Observers noted 
the monetary fines commonly levied against employers for child 
labor violations were not sufficient to discourage the practice. 
The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for 
commercial sex acts; however, a recent revision to the tax code 
prevented brothels from claiming legitimate business status through 
the payment of taxes. Additionally, the government did not identify 
or investigate crimes of child sex tourism in Ciudad del Este and 
the Tri-Border area as trafficking crimes. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs trained diplomatic and consular staff on anti-trafficking laws, 
protocol, and interagency coordination. However, the government 
did not provide anti-trafficking training for all diplomatic personnel 
deployed abroad.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Paraguay, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Paraguay abroad. The practice of compelling children to labor as 
domestic workers, criadazgo, is perhaps the most common form of 
trafficking in the country. Middle- and upper-income families in 
both urban and rural areas take on children, almost exclusively from 
impoverished families, as domestic workers and provide varying 
compensation that includes room, board, money, a small stipend, or 
access to educational opportunities. An estimated 47,000 Paraguayan 
children work in situations of criadazgo; many of these children are 
highly vulnerable to sex and labor trafficking. Although criadazgo 
mainly affects young girls, boys are increasingly at risk. Traffickers 
exploit children from rural areas in sex trafficking and forced labor 
in urban centers. Indigenous persons are particularly vulnerable 
to trafficking. Boys are often victims of forced labor in agriculture, 
domestic service, criminality, and in some cases as horse jockeys. 
Traffickers exploit Paraguayan women and girls in sex trafficking 
within the country, and transgender Paraguayans are vulnerable to 
sex trafficking. In the Chaco region, traffickers exploit adults and 
children in debt bondage. 
Traffickers increasingly utilize social media to recruit victims. Children 
engaged in street vending and begging and working in agriculture, 
mining, brick making, and ranching are vulnerable to trafficking. 
Paraguayan victims of sex trafficking and forced labor have been 
identified in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Mexico, 
Spain, and other countries. Traffickers recruit Paraguayan women as 
couriers of illicit narcotics to Europe and Africa, where they subject 
them to sex trafficking. Traffickers move female trafficking victims 
regionally and to Europe via transit countries including Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, and Spain. Paraguayan women and girls are vulnerable 
to sex trafficking on ships and barges navigating the country’s major 
waterways. Traffickers exploit Paraguayan children in forced labor in 
the cultivation and sale of illicit drugs in Brazil. Foreign victims of 
sex and labor trafficking in Paraguay are mostly from other South 
American countries. The lack of regulatory measures, insufficient 
transnational cooperation, and the fluidity of illicit goods and 
services contributed to increased trafficking risk in and around 
the Tri-Border Area between Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. Civil 
society and victims reported instances of officials—including police, 
border guards, judges, and public registry employees—facilitating sex 
trafficking, including taking bribes from brothel owners in exchange 
for protection, extorting suspected traffickers to prevent arrest, and 
producing fraudulent identity documents.
PERU: TIER 2
The Government of Peru does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts 
to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts 
compared to the previous reporting period, considering the impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Peru remained on Tier 2. These efforts included opening four new 
specialized anti-trafficking prosecution offices, hiring more anti-
trafficking police, and referring 96 girls to specialized government 
shelters for child trafficking victims. The government passed legislation 
strengthening compensation provisions for trafficking victims, 
and it increased training for prosecutors and judges. However, the 
government did not meet the minimum standards in several key 
areas. Authorities prosecuted and convicted fewer traffickers than 
in the previous reporting period, and services for adult victims, 
boys, LGBTQI+ individuals, and labor trafficking victims remained 
inadequate. Although authorities opened several investigations 
into public officials for alleged complicity in trafficking crimes, the 
government did not prosecute or convict any complicit officials. The 
government cut its budget for anti-trafficking activities for a third 
consecutive year, and government funding for combating trafficking 
was severely inadequate. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Increase overall resources to fight all forms of human trafficking and 
allocate dedicated anti-trafficking budgets for member entities of the 
multisectoral commission, as called for in law. • Finalize and implement 
a National Policy Against Trafficking to sustain and strengthen whole-
of-government efforts to combat trafficking beyond expiration of the 
current national action plan. • Increase efforts to prosecute both sex 
and labor trafficking crimes; convict and punish traffickers, including 
complicit officials; and apply adequate sentences to convicted traffickers. 




legal, medical, psychosocial, shelter, case management, educational 
or vocational—and provide services to more Peruvian and foreign 
victims. • Increase the availability of services to meet the needs of adult 
victims, boys, LGBTQI+ individuals, and labor trafficking victims. • 
Amend the anti-trafficking law to prescribe penalties for sex trafficking 
that are commensurate with the penalties prescribed for other grave 
crimes, such as rape. • Proactively screen members of vulnerable groups, 
including individuals in commercial sex and displaced Venezuelans, 
for trafficking indicators and refer suspected victims to protection 
services. • Increase and institutionalize reintegration services for child 
victims transitioning out of shelter care and other victims who decline 
or lack access to shelter accommodation. • Dedicate more resources to 
planning multisectoral, intelligence-driven law enforcement operations 
that include arrangements for prompt removal of victims to secure 
locations segregated from traffickers, victim-centered interviews, quick 
transition to care and shelter for identified victims, and contingency 
planning to avoid holding victims in police stations. • Strengthen 
and institutionalize training for police, prosecutors, and judges on 
enforcing anti-trafficking laws and employing victim-centered trauma-
informed procedures. • Ensure all officials apply a definition of 
trafficking consistent with international law so that all victims exploited 
in sex or labor trafficking receive access to appropriate justice and 
protection. • Improve data collection systems to collect and report 
comprehensive, harmonized, and disaggregated data on anti-trafficking 
law enforcement and victim protection efforts. • Conduct outreach and 
prevention programs targeted to at-risk populations, including rural 
indigenous communities, using culturally appropriate methods and 
local languages. • Enforce laws against crimes that facilitate trafficking, 
such as fraudulent job recruitment, recruitment fees, illegal mining 
and logging, and counterfeit operations.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained prosecution efforts. In March 2021, the 
government amended the penal code, relocating and renumbering 
various provisions. Article 129 (previously Article 153) of the penal 
code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed 
penalties of eight to 15 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving 
adult victims, 12 to 20 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving 
victims between the ages of 14 and 18 years old, and a minimum of 
25 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving victims younger than 
the age of 14. These penalties were sufficiently stringent; however, with 
respect to sex trafficking, these penalties were not commensurate with 
those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. The law defined 
trafficking broadly to include all forms of labor exploitation and 
illegal adoption or child selling without the purpose of exploitation. 
The penal code also included 15 separate offenses for different forms 
of exploitation including “forced labor,” “slavery and other forms of 
exploitation,” and ten crimes involving sexual exploitation. Officials 
often classified trafficking victims and charged trafficking cases under 
exploitation laws, many of which overlapped significantly with one 
another and with Article 129 (previously 153). Many officials only 
applied trafficking statutes to crimes that occurred prior to exploitation. 
The government continued to introduce the new Criminal Procedure 
Code in 32 of 34 judicial districts, which allowed authorities to initiate 
trafficking prosecutions without a victim complaint.
Anti-trafficking police conducted 65 operations in 2020, resulting in 
214 detentions in the first three quarters of the year, compared with 
186 operations and 364 detentions in 2019 and 158 operations and 
423 detentions in 2018. Nearly half the operations were conducted 
in January and February 2020. At the onset of the pandemic, the 
government directed police, including anti-trafficking units, to enforce 
its mitigation and public health measures. The government did not 
provide adequate personal protective equipment to police, and high 
rates of sickness and death among police further diminished their 
capacity to investigate trafficking crimes in 2020. Specialized prosecutors 
participated in 214 anti-trafficking operations and detained 179 
suspects, compared with 252 operations and 209 suspects detained in 
2019 and 201 operations and 151 suspects detained in 2018. In 2020, 
authorities prosecuted at least 44 suspects and convicted 29 traffickers, 
compared with 67 suspects prosecuted and 55 traffickers convicted 
in 2019 and 142 suspects prosecuted and 74 traffickers convicted in 
2018. Judges issued 15 acquittals. The government did not report 
sentencing data for convicted traffickers. Courts and prosecutors offices 
ceased operations for two months between March and May 2020 and 
operated at reduced capacity for the remainder of the reporting period. 
Public health measures such as strict restrictions on movement limited 
prosecutors’ access to case files and related documents, which were 
only available in hard copy, and high infection rates among public 
officials—including specialized prosecutors—further diminished the 
government’s capacity to prosecute traffickers. The judiciary developed 
a system to hear cases online, but implementation of this new platform 
slowed the pace of prosecutions. 
The government maintained specialized anti-trafficking police units 
in all 25 of Peru’s regions as well as Metropolitan Lima, and increased 
the units’ ranks from 394 to 448 officers; the size, capacity, and 
budget of these units varied widely across regions and some regions 
with a high prevalence of trafficking had few specialized officers. 
The government allocated 1.5 million soles ($414,480) to these 
units, which was insufficient for the needs of training, operations, 
office equipment, and technology. The government did not enforce 
a ministerial resolution requiring anti-trafficking police to remain in 
their units for at least two years, and frequent turnover among police 
limited specialized units’ effectiveness in investigating trafficking. In 
2020, the government hired four prosecutors to open specialized 
prosecution offices in four additional regions, bringing the total to 39 
specialized anti-trafficking prosecutors across 12 regions. NGOs and 
government officials reported judges often considered recruitment 
to be an essential element of a trafficking crime; required proof of 
force, fraud, or coercion for child sex trafficking crimes; or reduced 
trafficking charges to lesser crimes. In its March 2021 penal code 
updates, the government created a new section entitled “Crimes 
Against Human Dignity” to include all forms of trafficking and 15 
types of exploitation; local experts reported this change may influence 
officials to better apply these laws in cases involving psychological 
coercion rather than physical restraint. The government conducted 
two weeklong virtual courses on prosecuting trafficking cases for more 
than 700 participants. In addition, the government partnered with 
an international organization to deliver in-depth training through 
certification programs for judges and prosecutors to improve their 
capacity to implement trafficking laws; in 2020, 49 prosecutors and 
111 judges completed six-week and eight-week training programs, 
respectively. Although several ministries collected data to track their 
anti-trafficking law enforcement and victim protection efforts, the 
government lacked a coordinated data collection system, making it 
difficult for authorities to verify statistics, assess efforts, and respond 
to trends. Peru’s overlapping legal framework further complicated 
data collection efforts, as authorities often charged trafficking cases 
as other offenses. 
The government acknowledged official complicity in trafficking 
crimes and corruption at all levels of the Peruvian law enforcement 
and criminal justice systems hampered efforts to hold traffickers 
accountable. Police officers, including members of specialized 
anti-trafficking units, allegedly accepted bribes from traffickers to 
avoid conducting investigations. The alleged complicity of some 
police, along with poor communication, bred mistrust between 
police and prosecutors at both the national and regional levels and 
undermined the effectiveness of anti-trafficking law enforcement 
efforts. Although the government did not prosecute or convict any 
officials for trafficking-related complicity in 2020, authorities opened 
several investigations of government employees for alleged complicity 
in trafficking crimes. In December 2020, prosecutors led an operation 
that resulted in the detention of two anti-trafficking police officers 
and two other government officials for providing protection to 
alleged traffickers and allowing them to operate with impunity. In 
a high-profile case in October 2020, the government detained seven 
police officers for involvement in a child sex trafficking operation 
run by a well-known singer. The case of a former police chief and 
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noncommissioned officer, arrested in 2019 for human trafficking 
and corruption, remained under investigation. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained efforts to identify and protect trafficking 
victims, although services for some groups remained limited. 
Specialized anti-trafficking police units identified 640 suspected 
victims in 2020, compared with 1,054 in 2019 and 1,600 in 2018. 
These victims included 385 adults (all women) and 255 children 
(118 girls and 137 boys); 561 were Peruvian and 79 were from other 
countries. Specialized prosecutors reported identifying 470 victims in 
2020; the government provided updated data for victims identified 
by prosecutors in 2019 (1266) and 2018 (1189). Of these, 411 victims 
were female and 59 were male; 244 were children and 226 adults; 402 
were Peruvian and 68 were from other countries (45 from Venezuela, 
seven from Ecuador, one from Colombia, one from Bolivia, and 14 
from other countries not specified). The government did not report 
the extent to which victim identification statistics overlapped between 
police and prosecutors, nor did it collect data on victims identified 
through other sources. With assistance from an NGO, the government 
published new identification guidelines for municipal inspectors, 
healthcare providers, and frontline police officers. 
Authorities referred all child victims to the Ministry of Women and 
Vulnerable Populations (MIMP), which coordinated shelter or family 
care and provided legal, social service, psychological, and reintegration 
assistance to victims. MIMP operated specialized units for assisting 
children in need of special protections, including all child trafficking 
victims; in 2020, MIMP created six additional specialized units 
bringing the total to 25 units across all of Peru’s regions. These units 
assisted 223 children (204 Peruvian, 15 Venezuelan, two Ecuadorean, 
and two Colombian), and authorities referred 96 girls to specialized 
trafficking victim shelters in 2020, compared with 130 child victims 
assisted and 114 girls referred to specialized shelters in 2019. MIMP 
operated seven specialized shelters exclusively for girls exploited in 
sex trafficking (including some whom authorities classified as sexual 
exploitation victims) in four regions (Cusco, Lima, Loreto, and Puno); 
in total, these facilities could accommodate 130 children. Services 
and staffing in the shelters were generally robust, with the inclusion 
of a full-time attorney, medical personnel, and psychologist. At the 
onset of the pandemic, shelters closed to non-residents, limiting 
the services available to victims. With support from an international 
organization, the government made technological improvements 
to shelters and began offering victims virtual counseling sessions, 
legal services, and communication with their families through part 
of the year. 
The anti-trafficking law required the government to protect victims 
by providing temporary lodging, transportation, medical and 
psychological care, legal assistance, and reintegration assistance; 
several ministries provided these services to victims, but the 
government did not wholly fulfill this mandate. The government 
had an intersectoral protocol for providing protection to trafficking 
victims and several ministries had internal protocols for victim care, 
but authorities implemented them unevenly due to insufficient 
financial and human resources and coordination challenges. The 
government offered specialized trafficking victim services for girls 
exploited in sex trafficking, while other victims could access services 
for victims of gender-based violence or other forms of government 
and NGO support. MIMP operated 52 residential centers for children 
that could accommodate child trafficking victims, including boys, 
but these shelters were not exclusively for human trafficking 
victims and services in these facilities were lacking. Women could 
access legal, psychological, and social services—but not overnight 
accommodation—through MIMP’s nationwide network of Emergency 
Centers for Women, but the government did not collect data on the 
number of trafficking victims the centers assisted. The government 
added 51 new emergency centers in 2020, bringing the total to 
446, though they were temporarily closed between March and May 
2020 following the onset of the pandemic. Numerous civil society 
organizations provided assistance to trafficking victims, including 
two NGOs that were members of the government’s multisectoral 
commission against trafficking, and approximately 70 private shelters 
accepted trafficking victims. Adult victims, labor trafficking victims, 
and male victims had few shelter options, and reports indicated that 
authorities often denied men other services; there were no shelters 
that accepted men. The government provided limited access to services 
for LGBTQI+ victims; authorities frequently discriminated against 
LGBTQI+ individuals and typically did not admit transgender victims 
to government shelters. The government acknowledged inequity 
in service provision to LGBTQI+ victims, particularly transgender 
children, and sought assistance from an international organization 
to develop policies and trainings for service providers on providing 
comprehensive, specialized services for LGBTQI+ child trafficking 
victims. Foreign victims were generally eligible for the same services 
as Peruvian victims, but the government did not specify whether it 
referred any foreign victims to government shelters. Foreign victims 
were eligible for temporary and permanent residency status under 
Peruvian refugee law, but the government did not report whether it 
granted any trafficking victims residency during the year. 
Criminal justice officials often did not employ victim-centered 
methods and at times they conducted anti-trafficking operations 
without adequate resources, such as vehicles to transport victims or 
safe places to screen potential victims, isolate them from suspects, and 
provide immediate care. The Public Ministry’s Victim and Witness 
Assistance Unit (UDAVIT) provided short-term care for 529 victims 
and coordinated referrals to other service providers immediately 
following some law enforcement operations; in comparison, UDAVIT 
assisted 920 victims during the previous reporting period. NGOs 
reported insufficient funding and a lack of training on victim-centered 
methods limited UDAVIT’s capacity to provide consistent, high-quality 
care to victims. Local experts reported UDAVIT sometimes made 
services contingent on victims providing statements to investigators. 
Police and prosecutors did not effectively identify indicators of 
trafficking among women in commercial sex, and officials did not 
effectively distinguish between victims of trafficking and similar 
crimes – leaving some victims unidentified and without access to 
comprehensive trafficking victim services. Victim services were not 
immediately available following law enforcement operations on 
nights and weekends. 
UDAVIT operated 23 emergency spaces that could provide short-term 
accommodation to women and children who were participating in 
investigations and prosecutions. The government assigned victims 
a legal advocate from the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights, to 
safeguard their legal rights and guide them through the legal system, 
after authorities initiated a prosecution. The government had 336 legal 
advocates, including nine that specialized in trafficking. LGBTQI+ 
individuals experienced discrimination from law enforcement and 
were often re-victimized during the criminal justice process. Some 
victims provided statements through interviews in secure Gesell 
chambers, and authorities developed a system to adapt the protection 
measures provided by Gesell chambers to online platforms during 
virtual proceedings. A lack of incentives to participate in investigations 
and limited access to practical services, such as alternative livelihood 
development, led many adult victims to decline government services. 
Officials cited the lack of adequate protective services as a key 
impediment to their ability to effectively combat trafficking in Peru, 
and insufficient services left some groups at high risk of re-trafficking. 
March 2021 updates to the penal code established minimum criteria 
a judge should consider when awarding compensation to trafficking 
victims and granted authority for the government to confiscate a 
trafficker’s property to fulfill payment obligations. However, the 
government did not report whether any courts ordered or victims 
received compensation in 2020. The government reported assisting 
foreign trafficking victims to remove fines or other penalties they may 
have incurred from undocumented entry; however, due to inadequate 
victim identification procedures, authorities may have fined or penalized 




compelled them to commit. At times, authorities placed child victims in 
police stations among children apprehended for crimes, where victims 
faced conditions similar to detention while waiting for referral to shelter. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. The government’s 
multisectoral commission against trafficking, led by the Ministry of 
Interior (MOI) and comprised of 13 government agencies and two 
NGOs, continued to coordinate implementation of the national 
action plan against human trafficking, in effect through 2021. The 
commission drafted a National Policy Against Human Trafficking, 
but did not submit the final draft for congressional approval during 
the reporting period. Pandemic-mitigation measures and political 
instability limited the capacity of the multisectoral commission to 
effectively coordinate activities during the reporting period. The 
government did not submit an annually-mandated report to congress 
on its progress toward implementation of the national action plan, 
due each September. The government allocated a specific line-item 
budget of 2.35 million soles ($649,350) to the MOI for anti-trafficking 
efforts in 2020, a significant decrease from approximately 4 million 
soles ($1.11 million) allocated in 2019 and other ministries funded 
anti-trafficking activities through their general budgets. A 2019 law 
required the commission to prepare, and the Ministry of Economy 
and Finance (MEF) to prioritize, a multisectoral budget request that 
included dedicated anti-trafficking budgets for member entities of 
the multisectoral commission; MOI submitted this request to MEF 
in January 2020, but MEF did not approve it during the reporting 
period. Officials reported inadequate funding hindered their ability 
to effectively combat human trafficking, especially victim protection 
efforts.
The government had a separate commission, inter-ministerial 
protocol, and national plan for combating forced labor and child 
labor. Labor inspectors had a mandate to monitor employment 
agencies for compliance with regulations against charging workers 
recruitment fees or retaining workers’ identity documents or personal 
items, and the government reported labor inspectors referred cases 
of fraudulent recruitment to specialized anti-trafficking prosecutors. 
However, the government did not report whether it took enforcement 
action against employment agencies for any of these practices during 
the reporting period. The government maintained labor inspection 
units that specialized in forced and child labor; in 2020, these units 
participated in at least one joint operation with specialized anti-
trafficking police that led to identification of trafficking victims. In 
October 2020, Peru’s congress approved legislation granting domestic 
workers basic employment rights and legal protections—such as 
minimum wage and maximum working hours—equivalent to those 
of other workers, decreasing their vulnerability to exploitation. Under 
an agreement with the Cuban government, the Peruvian Ministry 
of Health committed to paying a $2,000 monthly stipend to each 
member of a Cuban medical mission working in Peru between 
June and December; the direct payments to personnel may have 
decreased their vulnerability to being exploited in forced labor by 
the Cuban government. 
The government operated two 24-hour telephone hotlines for the 
public to report suspected cases of trafficking, though they could 
only accommodate Spanish speakers. In response to an increase in 
calls from the public during the pandemic, MOI increased funding 
for one of the lines and trained 85 percent of its operators during 
the reporting period. With support from an NGO, MIMP produced 
and published online a guide for children to recognize the risks of 
human trafficking during the pandemic. In June 2020, the government 
partnered with civil society organizations to deliver a three day virtual 
training to 44 journalists from across the country to improve their 
knowledge and strengthen methods for covering trafficking. The MOI 
conducted two digital awareness campaigns to provide information 
on trafficking, reaching 400 community leaders, parents, and students 
in Lima and a nearby city, and it organized a digital campaign to 
raise awareness among children of the risks of exploitation through 
online platforms. National and regional authorities participated in a 
nationwide multi-platform media campaign run by an international 
organization, aimed at influencing public opinion to reduce social 
tolerance of trafficking. 
The government made strong efforts to issue national identity 
documents to all Peruvian citizens, including through programs 
designed to reach remote, indigenous communities where trafficking 
risks were high; the pandemic slowed these efforts during the reporting 
period. The government did not permit transgender individuals to 
change their gender on identity documents; this lack of access to 
accurate documentation increased their vulnerability to exploitation. 
The government did not report efforts to prevent child sex tourism, 
although border closures and travel restrictions in response to the 
pandemic halted tourism for much of the year. The government 
conducted law enforcement operations and made arrests for illegal 
mining and logging, crimes which fueled the demand for sex and 
labor trafficking.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Peru, and traffickers exploit victims from Peru 
abroad. Traffickers exploit Peruvian and foreign women and girls, and 
to a lesser extent boys, in sex trafficking within the country; traffickers 
increasingly recruit victims through social media platforms, often 
through false employment offers or deceptive romantic relationships. 
Traffickers lure Peruvian, Venezuelan, and Bolivian women and 
girls to remote communities near mining and logging operations 
through false promises of lucrative employment opportunities and 
exploit them in sex trafficking after arrival. Tourists from the United 
States and Europe purchase sex from child trafficking victims in 
areas such as Cusco, Lima, and the Peruvian Amazon. In the Loreto 
region, criminal groups facilitate transportation of foreign tourists 
by boat to remote locations where traffickers exploit women and 
children in sex trafficking in venues on the Amazon River. Traffickers 
exploit Peruvian and foreign adults and children in forced labor in 
the country, principally in illegal and legal gold mining and related 
activities, logging, agriculture, brick-making, unregistered factories, 
counterfeit operations, organized street begging, and domestic 
service. Traffickers subject Peruvians to forced labor in gold mines 
and service jobs in nearby makeshift camps; traffickers compel victims 
through deceptive recruitment, debt-based coercion, isolation and 
restricted freedom of movement, withholding of or non-payment of 
wages, and threats and use of physical violence. Traffickers subject 
children to forced labor in begging, street vending, domestic service, 
cocaine production and transportation, and other criminal activities. 
Remaining members of the narcoterrorist organization Shining Path 
use force and coercion to subject children and adults to forced labor 
in agriculture, cultivating or transporting illicit narcotics, and domestic 
servitude, as well as to carry out terrorist activities, and at times recruit 
children using force and coercion to serve as combatants or guards. 
Indigenous Peruvians, many of whom live in remote areas with 
limited access to government services, are particularly vulnerable 
to trafficking. LGBTQI+ Peruvians are vulnerable to trafficking, 
including re-exploitation; transgender women and girls also lack 
access to accurate documentation and are at particularly high 
risk. Since 2016, more than 1,000,000 Venezuelans fleeing the 
humanitarian crisis in their country have entered Peru; Venezuelan 
adults and children are vulnerable to sex and labor trafficking—
often lured through false employment offers—en route to or after 
arrival in Peru. Among the 85 Cuban medical professionals the 
government contracted to assist during the pandemic, some may 
have been forced to work by the Cuban government. The pandemic’s 
negative impact on economic opportunity exacerbated existing risks 
among vulnerable communities and led to an increased number of 
individuals vulnerable to trafficking. Pandemic-mitigation measures 
increased risks among children who were not able to leave their homes 
or attend school for much of the year, especially LGBTQI+ children 
or others who ultimately fled abusive or difficult situations in their 
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homes. Local experts report an increase in online sexual exploitation of 
children, in which traffickers sexually exploit children in live internet 
broadcasts in exchange for compensation. Illicit activity, including 
sex and labor trafficking, is common in regions of the country with 
limited permanent government presence, including remote mining 
and logging areas and the Valley of the Apurímac, Ene, and Mantaro 
Rivers (VRAEM). Illegal mining and logging operations fuel the 
demand for sex and labor trafficking in Peru. 
Traffickers exploit Peruvian women and children in sex trafficking 
in other countries, particularly within South America. Also, they 
exploit women and girls from neighboring countries in Peru. 
NGOs and foreign authorities report traffickers exploit transgender 
Peruvians in sex trafficking in Argentina, Italy, and Sweden. Traffickers 
subject Peruvian adults and children to forced labor in other South 
American countries, the United States, and other countries. NGOs and 
government officials reported that official complicity in trafficking 
crimes and widespread corruption in Peruvian law enforcement and 
judicial systems continue to hamper anti-trafficking efforts. 
PHILIPPINES: TIER 1
The Government of the Philippines fully meets the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued 
to demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting 
period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its 
anti-trafficking capacity; therefore the Philippines remained on Tier 1. 
These efforts included prosecuting more traffickers than the previous 
reporting period, including significantly more defendants charged 
with using child soldiers and sentencing the majority of convicted 
traffickers to significant terms of imprisonment. The government also 
increased the number of prosecutors assigned to anti-trafficking task 
forces and the number of staff to its anti-trafficking coordination 
body. The government opened a specialized shelter and one-stop 
service center in Manila and provided assistance to more than 1,000 
victims. Although the government meets the minimum standards, it 
did not convict any officials for complicity in trafficking crimes and 
did not vigorously investigate labor trafficking crimes that occurred 
within the Philippines or provide training to labor inspectors on the 
indicators of trafficking. The government also identified fewer victims 
than the previous reporting period and resources for law enforcement 
and specialized services for victims remained inadequate. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict complicit 
officials and labor traffickers. • Strengthen the capacity of local 
government units to provide reintegration services for trafficking 
survivors, including trauma-informed care, job training, and in-
country employment. • Provide increased support to government 
and NGO programs that provide specialized care for trafficking 
victims, including child victims of online sexual exploitation. 
• Establish and implement a process to ensure systematic and 
ongoing input from a diverse community of survivors on the design, 
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of anti-trafficking 
policies and programs. • Increase efforts to ensure victims receive 
court-ordered restitution and compensation ordered through civil 
judgments. • Increase resources for anti-trafficking task forces 
to conduct timely investigations, coordinated operations, and 
prosecutions while providing robust victim and witness assistance 
services. • Increase efforts to identify and assist labor trafficking 
victims, including by providing training to law enforcement, social 
service providers, and labor inspectors on indicators of trafficking. 
• Provide increased resources for law enforcement units designated 
to investigate all forms of trafficking. • Consistently implement the 
coordinated interagency response to providing services to returning 
Filipinos who experienced sex and labor trafficking overseas. • 
Create a central database for information on illegal recruiters and 
human trafficking cases to facilitate interagency coordination in 
detecting, investigating, and prosecuting traffickers. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. The 2003 
and 2012 anti-trafficking acts criminalized sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to 20 years’ imprisonment 
and fines of between 1 million and 2 million pesos ($20,760 to 
$41,520). These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with 
respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for 
other serious crimes, such as rape. In response to pandemic-related 
restrictions, which resulted in court closures, the Supreme Court 
issued a circular to facilitate the continuation of court filings and 
proceedings through email and video conferencing, which enabled 
the government to secure some trafficking convictions through video 
conferencing. However, equipment and stable internet connections 
were not consistently available, especially for victim-witnesses. Law 
enforcement authorities conducted 248 anti-trafficking coordinated 
operations and investigated 233 cases of alleged illegal recruitment, 
compared with 482 investigations reported in 2019. The government 
initiated prosecution of 377 alleged traffickers (an increase from 
266 in 2019); these included 36 labor trafficking defendants (24 
in 2019), 272 sex trafficking defendants (239 in 2019), and 69 
defendants charged with using a child for soldiering (three in 2019). 
The government convicted 73 traffickers under the anti-trafficking 
act and related laws (89 traffickers in 2019). Most of the convicted 
traffickers subjected children to sex trafficking, including 25 who 
sexually exploited children online (compared to 32 in 2019); three 
committed labor trafficking (five in 2019). The courts sentenced nearly 
all of the sex traffickers convicted under the anti-trafficking act to 15 
years’ imprisonment or more and fines ranging from 500,000 to 2 
million pesos ($10,380 to $41,520);16 received a life sentence and 
fines of 2 million to 5 million pesos ($41,520 to $103,790). The court 
sentenced six sex traffickers under related cybercrime laws to varying 
terms of imprisonment: four years, 15 years, life imprisonment, and 
reclusión perpetua (permanent imprisonment) with fines ranging 
from 500,000 to 2 million pesos ($10,380 to $41,520). Of the three 
labor traffickers convicted under the anti-trafficking act, the court 
sentenced one trafficker to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 1 
million pesos ($20,760); the government did not report sentencing 
information for the other two labor traffickers. 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) continued to oversee and support 
operations and training for 24 interagency anti-trafficking task 
forces (a DOJ-led task force, a national interagency task force, 16 
regional task forces, and six air and seaport task forces, including the 
reactivated task force at Manila’s international airport). Designated 
prosecutors led the task forces with the assistance of prosecutors who 
worked on trafficking cases in addition to their regular workloads; 
they were responsible for enhancing law enforcement efforts and 
ensuring the reporting, referring, and filing of trafficking cases. 
DOJ approved a 59 percent increase in the number of prosecutors 
assigned to the task forces during the reporting period, increasing 
the number of prosecutors from 236 in 2019 to 376 in 2020. The 
government conducted trainings on online sexual exploitation of 
children (OSEC) for law enforcement and prosecutors and worked 
with NGOs to provide training on investigating labor trafficking of 
Filipino overseas workers. In 2020, the Philippine National Police 
(PNP) conducted nine trafficking seminars for 322 officers, as well 








Development (DSWD) field offices conducted training and webinars 
for more than 1,000 officials, which focused primarily on OSEC. 
Local governments also funded three online trainings conducted by 
an NGO to improve the capacity of law enforcement to identify and 
investigate OSEC. With support from a foreign government, DOJ 
and the national prosecutions service worked to develop online 
learning materials to improve the capacity of prosecutors to pursue 
trafficking cases. In addition, the National Bureau of Investigation 
(NBI) worked to develop a basic and advanced program of instruction 
for its trafficking course. 
Through continued operation of the Philippine Internet Crimes 
Against Children Center, the PNP Women and Children’s Protection 
Center (PNP-WCPC) and the NBI Anti Human Trafficking Division 
(NBI-AHTRAD) partnered with foreign law enforcement agencies and 
an NGO to improve the effectiveness of investigations of OSEC. The 
PNP led the investigation of most OSEC cases and operated regional 
WCPC cyber protection units focused specifically on OSEC crimes. 
Police and prosecutors continued the use of recorded child victim 
interviews at the inquest stage and in some trials, which reduced the 
number of times officials interviewed victims and the potential for 
re-traumatizing children who served as witnesses. Courts continued 
to use plea bargaining in human trafficking cases, particularly in 
OSEC cases, which significantly decreased the time to reach case 
resolution and further reduced the potential for re-traumatizing 
child witnesses in trials, many of which involved traffickers who 
were family members. The Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking 
(IACAT) continued to use the prosecutor’s trafficking case management 
system to monitor case progress and outcomes. In September 2020, 
as part of a project to improve the pace and monitoring of trafficking 
prosecutions, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) of the 
Supreme Court issued a circular directing judges and court clerks to 
submit copies of decisions involving violations of the trafficking law 
to IACAT. Despite these advances, government agencies continued 
to report the need for additional anti-trafficking law enforcement 
personnel, funds for operations, and equipment for forensic analysis 
of digital evidence due in part to the extremely high volume of 
cybercrime tips related to child sexual exploitation the DOJ Office of 
Cybercrime (OOC) received each month. During the March to May 
2020 government-mandated, community-wide quarantines, OOC 
reported receiving a 264 percent increase in online tips related to 
child sexual exploitation compared with the same time period in 
2019, which further exacerbated the need for additional resources. 
Slow moving courts, the need for additional training on handling 
digital evidence in hearings and trials, and too few prosecutors also 
hindered the effective and timely prosecution of trafficking crimes. 
NGOs reported police did not take sufficient steps to investigate and 
arrest purchasers of commercial sex, including foreign sex tourists and 
those who purchased commercial sex acts from trafficking victims, and 
often did not question customers who were present during operations 
in entertainment establishments. However, the government convicted 
six foreign nationals who entered the Philippines for the purpose 
of engaging in child sex tourism. Philippine officials continued 
to cooperate with foreign governments on the investigation and 
prosecution of trafficking cases. 
Reports of immigration, police, and other officials complicit in 
trafficking continued. IACAT established a working group to draft 
guidelines on the identification and monitoring of trafficking-related 
corruption cases. The government transferred a prosecution initiated 
in the previous reporting period involving a police officer for cyber-
facilitated sex trafficking to a new region to ensure an impartial 
prosecution; the case remained ongoing at the close of the reporting 
period. DOJ continued to investigate nine Bureau of Immigration 
(BI) officers for facilitating the illegal airport departure of potential 
trafficking victims. According to media reports, BI investigated 
allegations that at least 28 immigration officials facilitated the 
exploitation of 44 Filipinas in trafficking in Syria. The government 
filed corruption charges against 18 immigration officials who allegedly 
received kickbacks for ensuring the entry of migrant workers at 
airports and arrested an NBI official who received bribes from the 
immigration officials for not pursuing criminal charges against 
them. Prosecutors filed charges against a police officer who aided a 
suspected trafficker to avoid prosecution. The government did not 
convict any officials for complicity in trafficking crimes during the 
reporting period. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained protection efforts. The government 
lacked a reliable mechanism to consolidate statistics on the total 
number of victims identified and assisted. However, Philippine law 
enforcement reported identifying 1,216 victims of trafficking during 
operations, compared with 1,443 victims in 2019. The government 
did not report how many potential trafficking victims the IACAT 
Sea/Air Task Forces identified through operations or deferred 
departures, compared to 2,500 in 2019. The BI Travel Control and 
Enforcement Unit (TCEU) identified and referred 295 potential 
victims of trafficking to IACAT task forces, compared with 337 
potential victims of trafficking and 92 potential victims of illegal 
recruitment in 2019. The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) 
foreign missions, primarily in the Middle East and Asia, identified 
2,429 potential Filipino trafficking victims (6,772 in the preceding 
period). The vast majority of these victims reported experiencing 
illegal recruitment; fewer than 10 were victims of sex trafficking. 
The Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO) Actionline against 
Human Trafficking received 2,849 calls, and it identified and assisted 
15 potential human trafficking victims and eight OSEC victims. 
The government allocated 22.9 million pesos ($475,370) to implement 
DSWD’s recovery and reintegration program for trafficked persons, 
a decrease from 24.4 million pesos ($506,510) in 2019. DSWD 
implemented the national referral system, maintained the national 
recovery and reintegration database, and continued to operate 44 
residential care facilities that provided services to victims of trafficking 
and other forms of exploitation. Of these facilities, 24 served children, 
13 served women, four served older persons, one served men, and 
two operated as temporary processing centers. In December 2020, 
ICACT opened its Trafficking in Persons center in metro Manila, 
which will serve as a specialized shelter for trafficking survivors and a 
one-stop service center for reporting potential cases of trafficking and 
providing referrals without the need for victims to contact multiple 
agencies. During the reporting period, the center provided temporary 
accommodation for potential victims prior to their referral to other 
shelters pending the results of COVID-19 testing. The government 
continued the construction of a shelter for men in region nine 
where armed conflict continued; however, the construction of a 
temporary shelter and one-stop center near a regional international 
airport was temporarily halted as the government diverted funding 
to its pandemic response. DSWD reported serving 1,205 trafficking 
victims, of whom 849 were female and approximately 75 percent were 
adults, compared with 2,194 victims served in 2019. Of these, the 
government reported 629 victims of labor trafficking, 361 victims of sex 
trafficking, including 157 child victims of online sexual exploitation, 
and five children engaged in armed conflict; it was unclear if the 
remaining 207 victims faced forced labor or sex trafficking. DSWD 
provided psychosocial support and trauma-informed assistance to 
all survivors. Services also included case management, temporary 
shelter; livelihood assistance; education/skills training; hygiene kits; 
referral; victim/witness assistance; airport assistance; transportation 
assistance; home visits; medical assistance; and financial assistance. 
DSWD referred trafficking survivors to the local social welfare and 
development office in their community for follow up services, which 
observers noted often lacked the personnel and resources to provide 
individualized case follow up. Staff permitted adult victims residing 
in shelters to leave unchaperoned, provided there were no threats to 
their personal security or psychological care issues. DSWD assisted 
foreign national victims, including through temporary shelter and 
psycho-social intervention, and coordinated repatriation with the 
relevant foreign embassies. The government continued to partner 
with NGOs for specialized residential care and reintegration services 
for child victims of OSEC; however, pandemic-related restrictions 
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impacted the ability of NGOs to provide support during in-person 
operations and shelter visits, and most assistance was provided virtually 
or through phone calls. Such specialized assistance services as well 
as reintegration follow up services and job training and placement 
remained inadequate to address the needs of adult trafficking victims. 
The government continued to support victims who served as witnesses 
during trials, and hired one additional victim-witness coordinator 
during the reporting period. Seven regional task force victim-witness 
coordinators provided trauma-informed support and assistance, 
including by providing continuous support throughout the criminal 
justice process, to 130 victims (291 in 2019). Eleven trafficking victims 
entered the witness protection program in 2020 (40 in 2019), which 
included housing, livelihood and travel expenses, medical benefits, 
education, and vocational placement. In addition, the DOJ operations 
center personnel provided transportation and security that enabled 74 
victims to participate in case conferences and hearings. The government 
could award compensation to trafficking victims through its crime 
victims’ compensation program. The government did not report any 
orders of restitution paid by traffickers to victims of trafficking, and 
NGO observer reported that although judges could award victims 
compensation for damages, victims almost never received damages 
in practice and courts lacked effective mechanisms to collect damages 
from traffickers.
DFA, in collaboration with the IACAT and its member agencies, 
implemented whole-of-government procedures to ensure interagency 
coordination of services for repatriated Filipino trafficking victims. The 
government continued to deploy DSWD social workers in Philippine 
diplomatic missions in Hong Kong, Kuwait, Malaysia, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, South Korea, and the United Arab Emirates. DFA allocated 1 
billion pesos ($20.76 million) for the Assistance to Nationals Fund 
(ATN), which covered assistance such as airfare, meal allowance, 
shelter, medical care, and other needs of overseas Filipino workers 
(OFWs). DFA reported only partial expenditures from the ATN 
totaling 28.38 million pesos ($589,130) for the reporting period. 
DFA did not report expenditures under its Legal Assistance Fund for 
OFWs, to which it allocated 200 million pesos ($4.15 million) for 
legal assistance. DFA provided nine Philippine overseas missions 
with funds to support shelters or temporary accommodations for 
Filipino trafficking victims awaiting the resolution of their cases or 
their repatriation. In 2020, DFA reported assisting 2,575 potential 
victims of human trafficking identified by overseas missions in 2020, 
of which the majority experienced illegal recruitment, a significant 
decrease compared to 3,581 victims of trafficking and 4,479 victims 
of illegal recruitment assisted in the previous reporting period. 
DSWD social workers, responsible for assisting distressed overseas 
Filipinos and their families, assisted 1,133 victims of trafficking or 
illegal recruitment, compared with 2,788 in 2019. Social services 
provided to OFW trafficking victims included coordination with the 
host government, contract buy-out, shelter, provision of personal 
necessities, medical aid, financial assistance, payment of legal fees, 
repatriation, and referral to appropriate agencies. With donor support 
and in cooperation with an NGO, the IACAT operated the Task 
Force Against the Trafficking of Overseas Filipino Workers, which 
assisted 1,230 Filipino domestic workers repatriated from the Middle 
East in 2020 who reported experiencing indicators of trafficking. 
DFA also reported assisting in the repatriation of 327,511 Filipino 
workers who had lost their jobs or had not been paid wages as a 
result of the pandemic; however, the overseas workers task force and 
immigration officers experienced difficulties screening repatriated 
workers for indicators of trafficking due to health and safety protocols 
implemented in response to the pandemic. Following media reports 
that Filipina trafficking victims seeking shelter at the Philippines 
Embassy in Syria faced abuse from embassy staff members, DFA 
launched an investigation into the allegations, recalled five staff 
members, and repatriated the 34 victims in February 2021.
PREVENTION
The government increased its efforts to prevent trafficking. IACAT, the 
lead coordinating body responsible for overseeing and monitoring 
implementation of the government’s anti-trafficking efforts and 
which the secretaries of DOJ and DSWD chaired and co-chaired 
respectively, convened two regular and two special-topic meetings 
during the reporting period to share information and coordinate 
policies. Three NGOs participated as members of IACAT, which also 
involved additional NGOs, private sector representatives, and survivors 
in technical working groups and other fora. IACAT conducted three 
virtual focus group discussions with survivors to seek feedback on 
protection services, case management, and to identify gaps in the 
provision of services. The government decreased the IACAT Secretariat’s 
budget to 65.2 million pesos ($1.35 million) from 92.9 million 
pesos ($1.93 million) in 2019. However, a congressional initiative 
resulted in the addition of 8 million pesos ($166,070) to IACAT’s 
budget for in 2020. In addition, IACAT increased its staff from 116 
to 142 employees. In partnership with an NGO, IACAT organized 
and co-hosted a virtual summit to gather relevant stakeholders 
and experts to share best practices in combating the online sexual 
exploitation of children, including internet-facilitated trafficking. 
However, NGOs noted insufficient resources within the government’s 
anti-trafficking structures, especially for law enforcement, specialized 
trainings, and support services, and for ensuring local government 
units implemented trafficking laws. 
IACAT, its member agencies, and anti-trafficking regional task forces 
continued to lead national, regional, and local-level trafficking 
awareness raising events. The government hosted a webinar to raise 
awareness of forced labor in the fishing industry and to discuss the 
government’s response to the issue. The government launched the 
Barangay IACAT to serve as a platform for educating local governments 
units and the public about trafficking and how to report cases. 
CFO operated a hotline and DFA Office of Migrant Workers Affairs 
maintained a HELP Facebook page for Filipinos working abroad 
who were in distress and their families to request assistance. The 
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) overseas labor officers 
continued to review overseas Filipino workers’ labor contracts and 
assist them with labor contract violations and allegations of abuse. 
In October, DOLE issued regulations that required employment 
agencies applying for an operating license to provide an affidavit 
stating they would not engage in or facilitate acts involving trafficking, 
illegal recruitment, or violations of child labor laws, as well as a 
similar order for employers of domestic workers. POEA also filed 
508 administrative charges against licensed recruitment agencies for 
disallowed practices, resulting in the cancellation of 22 agencies’ 
licenses, compared with 1,107 and 16 in the previous reporting 
period, respectively. 
The lack of a centralized database tracking illegal recruitment and 
human trafficking continued to hamper the government’s efforts 
to prevent trafficking and hold traffickers accountable. The labor 
inspectorate was underfunded and understaffed, and the government 
did not report providing training for labor inspectors to identify 
indicators of trafficking, which may have impeded the government’s 
ability to identify potential cases of forced labor. The government did 
not prioritize identifying forced labor on fishing vessels and employed 
notably few inspectors dedicated to conduct inspections on fishing 
vessels. Labor inspections were suspended during community-wide 
quarantines related to the pandemic from March through May 2020; 
full inspections resumed from August onwards. Despite conducting 
more than 13,900 labor inspections, the government reported 
identifying only four child labor violations in 2020. The government’s 
interagency child labor quick action teams removed 18 children from 
hazardous and exploitative work situations, including six victims of 
sex trafficking. DOLE did not close any establishments involved in 
child sex trafficking, compared with three closures in 2019. 
The BI-TCEU continued to screen departing passengers and deferred 
the departure of 11,706 passengers (31,211 in 2019), including 294 
potential victims of trafficking, due to incomplete or suspicious travel 
documents or misrepresentation. BI stopped 35 foreign registered sex 








efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. POEA reviewed 
19 bilateral labor agreements with other countries and signed three 
new bilateral agreements. DOJ hosted a webinar in October 2020 
to introduce government officials to initiatives aimed at addressing 
human trafficking in public procurement and supply chains. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in the Philippines, and traffickers exploit victims 
from the Philippines abroad. The government processes approximately 
2.3 million new or renewed contracts for Filipinos to work overseas in 
nearly 170 countries each year; however, temporary travel restrictions 
related to the pandemic prevented many Filipino workers from 
departing for overseas employment during the reporting period. A 
significant number of Filipino migrant workers become victims of 
sex trafficking or labor trafficking in numerous industries, including 
industrial fishing, shipping, construction, manufacturing, education, 
home health care, and agriculture, as well as in domestic work, 
janitorial service, and other hospitality-related jobs, particularly in the 
Middle East and Asia, but also in all other regions. Traffickers, typically 
in partnership with local networks and facilitators and increasingly 
using social networking sites and other digital platforms, recruit 
unsuspecting Filipinos through illegal recruitment practices such 
as deception, hidden fees, and production of fraudulent passports, 
overseas employment certificates, and contracts to exploit migrant 
workers in sex and labor trafficking. In January 2021, media reported 
traffickers fraudulently recruited dozens of Filipino domestic workers 
to work in the United Arab Emirates but instead transported them 
to Damascus for forced domestic work. Using tourist visas available 
in Middle East countries where many Filipinos work in household 
service jobs, traffickers lure children from remote areas of Mindanao 
and other regions then sell them to employment sponsors who 
exploit them. Traffickers also use student and intern exchange 
programs, and fake childcare positions as well as porous maritime 
borders to circumvent the Philippine government and destination 
countries’ regulatory frameworks for foreign workers and evade 
detection. Traffickers exploit Filipinos already working overseas 
through fraudulent employment offers to work in another country. 
Traffickers took advantage of the absence of adequate immigration 
personnel at smaller airports in the Philippines. 
Forced labor and sex trafficking of men, women, and children within 
the country remains a significant problem. Traffickers exploit women 
and children from rural communities, conflict- and disaster-affected 
areas, and impoverished urban centers in sex trafficking, forced 
domestic work, forced begging, and other forms of forced labor in 
tourist destinations and urban areas around the country, and exploit 
men in forced labor in the agricultural, construction, fishing, and 
maritime industries, sometimes through debt-based coercion. NGOs 
and government officials continued to report cases in which family 
members sold children to employers for domestic labor or sexual 
exploitation, and there are reportedly hundreds of thousands of 
children involved in selling and begging on the streets who are at 
risk to exploitation. One study found that approximately 50,000 
Filipino children are employed as domestic workers in the Philippines, 
including nearly 5,000 who are less than the age of 15. A significant 
percentage of working children faced hazardous working conditions, 
including in mines, factories, and farms, where they likely experienced 
indicators of forced labor. Indigenous persons and many of the 
approximately 340,000 internally displaced persons in Mindanao 
are at risk of trafficking, including through fraudulent promises of 
employment. Non-state armed groups operating in the Philippines, 
including the New People’s Army, Maute Group, the Moro National 
Liberation Front, the Abu Sayyaf Group, and the Bangsamoro Islamic 
Freedom Fighters, recruit and use child soldiers, at times through 
force, for combat and noncombat roles. The Islamic State reportedly 
subjects women and girls to sexual slavery. 
Traffickers exploit Chinese and other Asian women in commercial sex 
in locations near offshore gaming operations that cater to Chinese 
nationals; however, the pandemic resulted in a massive departure 
of Chinese nationals employed in offshore gaming operations 
during the reporting period which resulted in deceased reports of 
sex trafficking among this community. Sex trafficking also occurs in 
tourist destinations, such as Boracay, Angeles City, Olongapo, Puerto 
Galera, and Surigao, where there is a high demand for commercial 
sex acts. Although the availability of child sex trafficking victims in 
commercial establishments declined in some urban areas, child sex 
trafficking remains a pervasive problem, typically abetted by taxi 
drivers who have knowledge of clandestine locations. Many sex 
tourists in the Philippines are convicted or charged sex offenders or 
pedophiles in their home countries and are most commonly citizens 
of Australia, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States with an increasing number of reports from Canada, Morocco, 
Iraq, and Denmark. Filipino men also purchase commercial sex acts 
from child trafficking victims. Law enforcement information indicates 
that the Philippines is one of the largest known sources of online 
sexual exploitation of children, in which traffickers sexually exploit 
children, individually and in groups, in live internet broadcasts in 
exchange for compensation wired through a money transfer agency 
by individuals most often in another country, including the United 
States, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom. The traffickers are 
often parents or close relatives who operate in private residences or 
small cyber cafes and many child victims, girls and boys, are younger 
than 12 years. Identified hotspots for this form of sex trafficking in 
Luzon and Visayas include Iligan, Lapu-Lapu, Pampanga, Quezon 
City, Malabon, Pasig, Taguig, and Caloocan. Reports cited a nearly 
265 percent increase in unconfirmed reports of online child sexual 
abuse during the pandemic. Economic impacts of the pandemic, 
combined with an increased amount of time children spent at home, 
resulted in an increasing number of families to force their children 
into online sexual exploitation. 
Officials, including those in diplomatic missions, law enforcement 
and immigration agencies, and other government entities, allegedly 
have been complicit in trafficking or allowed traffickers to operate 
with impunity. Some corrupt officials allegedly accept bribes to 
facilitate illegal departures for overseas workers, operate sex trafficking 
establishments, facilitate production of fraudulent identity documents, 
or overlook illegal labor recruiters. Reports in previous years asserted 
police conduct indiscriminate or fake raids on commercial sex 
establishments to extort money from managers, clients, and victims. 
Some personnel working at Philippine embassies reportedly withhold 
back wages procured for their domestic workers, subject them to 
domestic servitude, or coerce sexual acts in exchange for government 
protection services. There were anecdotal reports that police and 
local government units subjected individuals who had voluntarily 
surrendered to officials in relation to the government’s anti-drug 
campaign to forced labor. 
POLAND: TIER 2
The Government of Poland does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Poland remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
convicting more traffickers at the final instance level, revising victim 
identification and referral standard operating procedures (SOPs) for 
police and border guards, and launching a new awareness campaign 
to improve identification of victims among foreign migrants. The 
government also published a manual for employers to assist them 
in identifying forced labor in their businesses and supply chains. 
However, the government did not meet the minimum standards in 
several key areas. The government prosecuted fewer traffickers and 
prosecutors continued to classify trafficking crimes as lesser crimes. 




resources for victim services, thereby constraining overall protection 
efforts. Government efforts to identify and protect child victims and 
to identify forced labor victims remained inadequate and authorities 
lacked a central mechanism to cross-reference and consolidate law 
enforcement statistics.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Vigorously investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes, particularly 
forced labor cases, and sentence convicted traffickers to significant 
prison terms. • Increase training for prosecutors and judges on the 
importance of prosecuting under the anti-trafficking statute, the 
severity of trafficking crimes, and a trauma-informed, victim-centered 
approach to conducting trials. • Increase funding for comprehensive 
victim services, including specialized accommodation for child 
and male victims. • Proactively identify labor trafficking victims, 
including by strengthening the capacity of the Labor Inspectorate to 
identify victims of forced labor and refer them to services. • Increase 
training for law enforcement on the element of coercion in trafficking 
crimes to ensure that victims are not penalized for crimes their 
traffickers compelled them to commit. • Improve central operational 
coordination and data collection for anti-trafficking activities. • 
Establish procedures or specialized units to ensure trafficking cases 
are handled by trained prosecutors. • Appoint trauma-informed 
officials to conduct child victim witness interviews in a child-friendly 
manner. • Increase efforts to identify child sex trafficking victims 
and victims among vulnerable groups, particularly unaccompanied 
children and migrants.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Article 189a of 
Poland’s penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed punishments of three to 15 years’ imprisonment. These 
penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, 
commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such 
as rape. Article 189a replaced Article 253 of the criminal code, 
which prosecutors could still use in cases that started when Article 
253 was in effect. Article 253 of the criminal code also prescribed 
punishments of three to 15 years’ imprisonment. In addition, Article 
203 criminalized inducing an adult into prostitution through force, 
fraud, or coercion, and Article 204.3 criminalized inducing a child 
into prostitution; both articles prescribed punishments of one to 
10 years’ imprisonment. 
The government lacked a central mechanism to cross-reference and 
consolidate law enforcement statistics and did not consistently 
disaggregate sex and labor trafficking data. Law enforcement 
authorities initiated 22 investigations under Article 189a (22 in 2019 
and 33 in 2018); five were for sex trafficking, eight for forced labor, 
and nine for multiple forms of exploitation. Prosecutors initiated 46 
investigations from cases referred by police and border guards (67 in 
2019 and 79 in 2018) and prosecuted 20 defendants under Article 
189a (46 in 2019 and 47 in 2018); 12 were for forced labor and 
eight for sex trafficking. The government also investigated 16 cases 
and prosecuted four defendants under Article 203 or Article 204.3, 
compared with 25 cases investigated and 27 defendants prosecuted 
in 2019. In one case, the court placed a defendant indicted for 
exploiting at least 100 victims for forced labor in pre-trial detention. 
Due to pandemic-related restrictions and subsequent information 
processing delays, the government did not report overall first and final 
instance (appeals) conviction data for 2020; however, the National 
Prosecutor’s Office (NPO) reported 12 final convictions under Article 
189a (compared with 10 final convictions under Articles 189a and 
253 in 2018, the most recent year for which data was available); eight 
for sex trafficking, one for forced labor, and three for other forms 
of exploitation. In the previous reporting period, first-level courts 
issued 31 convictions under Article 189a and 20 convictions under 
Article 203. According to media reports, in one case an appeals court 
sentenced three traffickers to three and a half, six, and seven years’ 
imprisonment for forcing a victim into commercial sex. In a separate 
case, media reported an appeals court sentenced one trafficker to one 
and a half years’ imprisonment for exploiting 18 Ukrainian victims 
for forced labor. The government reported that law enforcement 
efforts were diverted to pandemic-related activities throughout the 
year and up to nine percent of the police force contracted COVID-19. 
Moreover, courts considerably limited their operations during the 
first months of the pandemic, and law enforcement was limited in 
its ability to collect evidence and interview victims and witnesses; 
one NGO reported that the legal validity of online interpreter-aided 
testimony was unclear under the law, leading the police to not register 
some potential trafficking crimes. 
The National Police maintained an anti-trafficking department 
with 11 officers, along with 17 regional offices, each with three to 
eight officers investigating trafficking, child pornography, and child 
sexual abuse. The Central Bureau of Investigations maintained an 
anti-trafficking coordinator at its headquarters and in each of its 17 
regional branches, and the Border Guard operated a specialized central 
team and had 10 regional anti-trafficking coordinators. Each regional 
prosecutorial office had a trafficking expert to assist local prosecutors 
who could assume responsibility for more complex cases. Although 
the NPO monitored all trafficking cases throughout the country, 
cases had to be classified as trafficking in the investigation stage to 
enter the monitoring system. Experts reported district prosecutors 
often qualified trafficking as lesser offenses, such as pimping or 
violation of workers’ rights. Observers noted it was difficult to meet 
the evidentiary threshold to prosecute a crime under the trafficking 
statute. The NPO continued using a formal mechanism established 
in 2018 for law enforcement to refer discontinued or dismissed 
trafficking investigations and prosecutions for review to the prosecutor 
responsible for coordinating trafficking investigations. However, an 
NGO reported there was no formal mechanism for civil society to 
refer cases to the NPO for reconsideration. The police referred 11 
cases to NPO (seven in 2019); NPO agreed with the police that five 
cases potentially involved trafficking (six in 2019), and all five cases 
remained under investigation at the end of the reporting period. 
NPO requested additional information from the police on three of 
the cases and had not decided the remaining three cases by the end 
of the reporting period. 
Observers reported that despite the continued increase in labor 
trafficking in Poland, the government rarely prosecuted forced labor 
cases due to the difficulty in collecting evidence in these cases, the 
low number of victims who self-identify as forced labor victims, and 
a lack of political will to prioritize a form of trafficking that largely 
affects foreign migrants or Polish citizens residing abroad. Moreover, 
the law did not have a clear definition of what constitutes forced 
labor in the criminal code, which contributed to law enforcement’s 
under-identification of labor trafficking, and prosecutors and 
judges often lacked expertise in labor trafficking cases. Additionally, 
observers reported prosecutors and judges lacked familiarity with 
victim-centered approaches, the impact of trauma on victims, and 
the severity and complexity of the crime. Observers reported the 
frequent rotation of government officials focused on trafficking, 
both at the national and provincial levels, negatively impacted the 
government’s understanding of the complexity of the crime. Many 
of the government’s institutionalized training programs for police, 
border guards, prosecutors, judges, consular officers, asylum officers, 
and labor inspectors on various anti-trafficking issues, including 
SOPs, victim interviews, joint investigations, and other basic and 
specialized training, were conducted fully or partially online due to 
the pandemic. The government did not report any investigations, 





trafficking crimes. Authorities collaborated on investigations with 
counterparts in the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, and other EU 
countries, and prosecutors issued a European Arrest Warrant for a 
suspected trafficker residing in the UK. 
PROTECTION
The government demonstrated mixed protection efforts; while it 
revised SOPs to improve victim identification efforts, during the 
reporting year it identified far fewer victims. The National Police 
and Border Guard identified 82 potential victims (221 in 2019 and 
162 in 2018) and referred 39 to care facilities (104 in 2019 and 47 
in 2018); the government reported all victims were offered services, 
but some chose not to accept them. Observers reported pandemic-
related restrictions were largely to blame for this decrease, and an 
NGO stated police capabilities were reduced during the year. The 
Office for Foreigners identified two asylum applicants as potential 
trafficking victims—one forced begging victim from Moldova and 
one sex trafficking victim from Ukraine. The National Intervention-
Consultation Center for Victims of Trafficking (KCIK), run by two 
government-funded NGOs, provided assistance to 166 potential 
victims (226 in 2019 and 168 in 2018), including 40 victims of sex 
trafficking, 70 victims of forced labor (including three for forced 
criminality, one for domestic service, and one for forced begging), 
and 56 victims of other types of exploitation; 102 were female and 
64 were male and 109 were foreign victims. Police reported regularly 
conducting investigations at escort agencies to proactively identify 
potential sex trafficking victims. The government maintained SOPs 
for the identification, referral, and support of trafficking victims, 
including standardized indicators and specific indicators to identify 
child victims. The government revised the SOPs for the National 
Police and Border Guard in 2020 to improve identification and 
referral efforts, and the Ministry of Interior (MOI) designed a poster 
with a list of trafficking indicators to assist police and border guards 
with identifying potential trafficking victims. However, police and 
prosecutors acknowledged authorities lacked the expertise to identify 
forced labor and child victims, particularly among unaccompanied 
children. As in the previous two years, labor inspectors did not 
identify any victims in 2020 and noted challenges in determining 
whether an offense constituted a violation of workers’ rights or 
forced labor. Law enforcement used indicators with sample questions 
focused on freedom of movement but did not take psychological 
coercion or subtle forms of force into consideration. The Ministry 
of Family and Social Policy conducted a training session for 30 
social workers focused on victim identification, crisis intervention, 
and cooperation with other institutions on victim protection. Civil 
society representatives reported effective cooperation with the national 
police and border guard on victim referral procedures during the 
reporting period. 
KCIK provided adult and minor victims with medical and 
psychological care, shelter, legal counseling, welfare support, 
reintegration services, and referrals to orphanages and foster care 
for child victims. KCIK operated two shelters for adult female victims, 
a small shelter for men with capacity to accommodate three adult 
male victims, and rented apartments for victims who did not prefer 
shelters. The government allowed victims to seek employment and 
work while receiving assistance and leave the shelters unchaperoned 
and at will; shelters and housing were available for victims with 
disabilities. The government provided specialized shelter and housing 
to 42 victims in 2020 (58 in 2019). Victims also could receive 
general assistance (social, medical, psychological, legal) in 168 crisis 
intervention centers operated and funded by local governments, 20 
of which maintained staff trained on assisting trafficking victims; 
KCIK arranged accommodations for 23 victims using crisis centers 
and other locations (54 in 2019). 
Funding for victim services remained stagnant for the sixth year 
following a 10 percent increase in 2015. In 2020, the government 
allocated 1.1 million zloty ($296,260) to two NGOs that run KCIK, 
the same amount as in 2019 and 2018. The government also allocated 
80,000 zloty ($21,550) to train welfare assistance personnel on 
identification of victims and provision of assistance to trafficking 
victims and witnesses, the same amount as in 2019. Experts said 
limited government funding for victim assistance constrained service 
provision, particularly outside of Warsaw and Katowice. Shelter 
capacity for male victims was insufficient given the increasing number 
of male labor trafficking victims. Observers expressed concern the 
national system for child victim assistance did not properly address 
the needs of unaccompanied children and noted the government 
placed unaccompanied child victims in foster families or orphanages 
unprepared to assist child victims. All foreign victims from outside 
the European Economic Area (EEA) formally identified by law 
enforcement were entitled to social welfare benefits, including 
crisis intervention assistance, shelter, meals, necessary clothing, and 
financial assistance; in the first six months of 2020, 16 non-EEA 
national victims received assistance, compared with 20 in the first 
six months of 2019 (32 total in 2019). Victims from the EEA had 
access to the full scope of welfare benefits offered to Polish citizens 
if they could prove habitual residency, but NGOs reported some 
victims, particularly from Romania and Bulgaria, were unable to prove 
this through the required documentation; in 2020, KCIK provided 
assistance to six EEA nationals (four Bulgarians and two Romanians). 
Authorities reported screening individuals in vulnerable populations, 
including individuals in commercial sex and migrants, when detaining 
and arresting. Foreign victims were entitled to a three-month reflection 
period, during which they could stay legally in Poland to decide 
whether to assist in the criminal process;11 victims used this benefit 
during the reporting period (120 in 2019). Foreign victims were 
eligible for a residence permit valid for up to three years, which 
entitled them to work, and could apply for permanent residency; 
authorities granted residence permits to 15 foreign victims in 2020, 
including nine from Uganda, two each from Colombia and the 
Philippines, and one each from India and Ukraine. The government 
coordinated with an international organization to repatriate two 
foreign victims (three in 2019), one to Bulgaria and one to Colombia. 
Polish law permitted victims to provide testimony via video or written 
statements; audio-video recording of testimony was obligatory 
for victims younger than 15 years of age and for victims of sexual 
crimes, including sex trafficking. The government reported the 
majority of victims identified by prosecutors agreed to cooperate 
in investigations of their traffickers. However, experts noted law 
enforcement and prosecutorial interview techniques lacked a trauma-
informed approach, hindering opportunities to build rapport with 
traumatized victims, who then were less likely to provide reliable 
testimony. NGOs reported judges interviewed children and did 
not receive training on child-friendly, victim-centered, or trauma-
informed interviewing techniques, which re-traumatized victims. 
Prosecutors rarely requested restitution in criminal proceedings but 
a court awarded 1,000 zloty ($269) in compensation to each of six 
victims (eight in 2019). Victims also could receive compensation in 
civil suits; the government did not report if any victims filed such 
suits during the reporting year.
PREVENTION
The government modestly increased prevention efforts. The MOI 
maintained an advisory body, chaired by the Minister of Interior 
and including interagency and civil society representatives, that 
was tasked with evaluating the implementation of anti-trafficking 
projects, monitoring national action plan (NAP) implementation, and 
preparing annual reports. Civil society continued to express concern 
that this body lacked authority and could not compel government 
agencies to provide resources for anti-trafficking efforts. The advisory 
body met twice during 2020, as did three of its working groups. In 
January 2021, one of these working groups met to develop a victim 
identification and referral SOP for labor inspectors, to complement 
SOPs already in place for the National Police and Border Guard. MOI 
organized two virtual meetings with provincial-level interagency 
anti-trafficking teams, resulting in the establishment of a special 




increasing the exchange of best practices. The Council of Ministers 
formally approved the 2019-2021 NAP in April 2020, although it had 
previously been approved in 2018 by an inter-ministerial group. For 
the third consecutive year, the government allocated 135,000 zloty 
($36,360) for the implementation of the NAP. MOI published an 
annual implementation report and maintained a web portal with 
relevant statistics, publications, and information on victim assistance. 
The government lacked a central mechanism to cross-reference and 
consolidate trafficking-related statistics, hindering officials’ ability 
to assess the scope of trafficking and the efficacy of law enforcement 
efforts. The government launched an awareness campaign targeting 
migrants at risk of being exploited in Poland by placing billboards 
with a hotline number in three languages throughout a city and 
airport and displaying a banner with a message in nine languages 
on the government’s online visa application portal. The government 
created a leaflet in four languages for migrants at risk of exploitation 
and coordinated with NGOs and the UK to place posters on online 
job advertisement portals with information on legal employment in 
Poland and abroad, risk factors for trafficking, and assistance resources. 
Provincial-level interagency anti-trafficking teams in all 16 regions 
continued prevention and public awareness campaigns, including 
by distributing leaflets and showing a mobile exhibition on forced 
labor. Observers noted these provincial-level anti-trafficking teams 
were uncoordinated and uneven in their effectiveness. 
A government-funded NGO operated a 24-hour hotline for trafficking 
victims and witnesses, which received 9,504 calls (6,899 in 2019); 
the hotline did not maintain statistics on how many calls were 
trafficking-related or resulted in investigations and victims identified. 
Local authorities could ban employers previously convicted of 
trafficking from hiring foreigners; the government did not report 
whether any entities were banned. The National Labor Inspectorate 
(NLI) reported 54 job recruitment agencies to local authorities for 
operating illegally; the government removed 19 job recruitment 
agencies from the official registry of legally operating recruitment 
agencies (39 in 2019). Due to pandemic-related restrictions, NLI 
inspections were limited to emergency situations for four months 
of 2020. The NLI conducted 429 inspections of job recruitment 
agencies (651 in 2019) and reported one case of potential trafficking 
involving Ukrainian migrant workers. The regional prosecutor’s 
office declined to continue the investigation; after an appeal from 
the NLI a first instance court upheld the decision in February 2021 
to discontinue the case. Additionally, the NLI continued distributing 
information leaflets in English and Ukrainian that were created for a 
2017-2019 awareness campaign targeting employers and workers to 
encourage legal employment among migrant workers, in particular 
from Ukraine, and to provide practical information to employers 
on legally hiring foreign workers. NLI branch offices conducted 
several activities throughout the year to promote legal employment 
and raise awareness about forced labor, including by participating 
in radio and television programs to discuss the protection of labor 
laws and providing counseling services to employment offices on 
legal employment and forced labor indicators. Additionally, an 
interagency advisory body within the Ministry of Development 
Funds and Regional Policy published a manual for employers on 
how to identify victims and prevent forced labor in businesses and 
supply chains; the manual includes questionnaires employers can 
use to identify potential victims. In cooperation with civil society, 
the government held a workshop in October 2020 for the business 
community to review the new manual and provide practical guidelines 
for its implementation. However, observers reported authorities took 
six to 12 months to issue combined residence and work permits 
to migrants, who often worked illegally during this time and were 
vulnerable to exploitation. MOI participated in a Council of the Baltic 
Sea States (CBSS) taskforce that updated the region’s transnational 
referral mechanism, as well as in a CBSS project to review national 
legislation, court cases, and possible obstacles in combating labor 
trafficking. The government did not make efforts to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex acts. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Poland, and traffickers exploit Polish victims 
abroad. Traffickers exploit Polish women and children in sex trafficking 
within Poland and other European countries, notably France and 
Germany. Traffickers exploit men and women from Poland for forced 
labor in Europe, primarily Western and Northern Europe and in 
particular Germany, Norway, Sweden and the UK. Traffickers exploit 
women and children from South America and Eastern Europe—
particularly Bulgaria, Romania, and Ukraine—in sex trafficking in 
Poland. Labor trafficking is increasing in Poland; victims originate 
from Europe, Asia, South America, and Africa. Traffickers increasingly 
exploit migrants in forced labor among Poland’s growing Ukrainian, 
Belarusian, Filipino, and Vietnamese populations, particularly in 
agriculture, restaurants, construction, domestic work, and the garment 
and fish processing industries. Observers reported the pandemic 
increased migrant workers’ vulnerability to trafficking; the number 
of potential Ukrainian victims exploited in trafficking in Poland and 
seeking assistance upon their return to Ukraine increased twofold 
in 2020. Traffickers recruit children, particularly Roma, for forced 
begging in Poland.
PORTUGAL: TIER 2
The Government of Portugal does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included investigating more suspects 
and awarding restitution to victims. The government also updated 
its national referral mechanism and issued slightly more residence 
permits to trafficking victims than the year prior. However, these 
efforts were not serious and sustained compared to the efforts during 
the previous reporting period, even considering the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on the government’s anti-trafficking capacity. The 
government prosecuted fewer suspects and did not report convicting 
any traffickers at the time of this report. The government identified 
significantly fewer victims for the second consecutive year and the 
fewest since 2008. The government did not identify any Portuguese 
or child victims as a result of ongoing gaps in victim identification. 
The government also continued to lack legal safeguards to protect 
victims from prosecution for crimes their traffickers compelled them 
to commit. Therefore Portugal was downgraded to Tier 2.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Improve efforts to proactively identify victims within the country, 
including Portuguese nationals, children, and sex trafficking victims, by 
systematically training government officials, particularly immigration 
police, labor inspectors, and law enforcement, on proactive victim 
identification among vulnerable groups. • Vigorously investigate, 
prosecute, and convict traffickers, including complicit officials and 
sentence those convicted to significant prison terms. • Coordinate 
the collection of trafficking data across the government, including 
for convictions and sentencing, and improve documentation of 
the use of victim services. • Enact a legal provision on the non-
punishment of victims to ensure that trafficking victims are not 
inappropriately penalized for unlawful acts traffickers compelled 
them to commit, including administrative and immigration-related 






police, prosecutors, and magistrates on victims’ right to restitution. 
• Allow formal victim identification and referral from entities other 
than the police, including civil society, social workers, and health care 
professionals. • Implement strong regulations and oversight of labor 
recruitment companies that are consistently enforced by investigating 
fraudulent labor recruitment and ensuring cases with indicators of 
labor trafficking are prosecuted under the trafficking statute. • Allocate 
additional resources and capacity for labor inspectors to detect labor 
trafficking. • Utilize the witness protection program for trafficking 
victims. • Enforce the law prohibiting recruitment fees charged to 
workers and ensure any recruitment fees are paid by employers.
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. Article 160 of 
the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and 
prescribed penalties of three to 10 years’ imprisonment, which were 
sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate 
with those for other serious crimes, such as rape. Some child sex 
trafficking offenses could also be prosecuted under Article 175, 
which addressed pimping crimes; it prescribed penalties of one to 10 
years’ imprisonment. Article 159 prohibited slavery and prescribed 
penalties of five to 15 years’ imprisonment. 
In response to the pandemic, the government ordered a national 
lockdown for three months in 2020. However, it categorized actions 
related to anti-trafficking as an essential activity and orders mandating 
restricted movement did not apply to trafficking victims in emergency 
situations. Additionally, although some procedural changes were 
required, the government reported that anti-TIP officials, units, and 
coordinating bodies continued to operate during the reporting period, 
allowing anti-trafficking efforts to continue unimpeded, including 
investigations and criminal proceedings in courts. The government 
did not have specialized investigation units dedicated to human 
trafficking, but the government reported there were several teams who 
had received special training to investigate trafficking. In 2020, the 
government initiated a total of 82 human trafficking investigations 
(42 for sex trafficking and 40 for labor trafficking) with an additional 
95 ongoing cases from prior years (23 for sex trafficking and 72 for 
labor trafficking); compared with 63 in 2019, 114 in 2018, and 103 
in 2017. Authorities prosecuted 23 defendants in 2020 based on 
preliminary data provided, a significant decrease compared with 
58 in 2019. In 2020, the government did not report convicting any 
traffickers; a decrease compared with three in 2019 and 25 in 2018. 
The investigation and prosecution of a Portuguese consular officer, 
who was indicted in 2019 on several charges including human 
trafficking and falsification of documents, continued during the 
reporting period; the diplomat allegedly committed the trafficking 
crime, which involved a housekeeper, while in Guinea-Bissau. In 
2020, the government co-organized and led six online training events 
for more than 163 migration professionals; immigration officials 
provided training on human trafficking to 101 consular officers 
and an unknown number of regional law enforcement officials. 
A government-funded NGO developed and delivered a training 
program for 87 participants in the law enforcement, social work, 
health, education, justice, and employment sectors. The government 
also provided a webinar to 81 labor inspectors on labor trafficking 
in 2020, as well as a training on trafficking indicators to 16 law 
enforcement officials. 
PROTECTION
The government decreased protection efforts. In 2020, authorities 
identified 13 confirmed victims and NGOs identified 13 presumed 
victims, a decrease for the second consecutive year and the fewest total 
victims since at least 2008. This number compared with 45 confirmed 
victims and 33 presumed victims in 2019 and 49 confirmed and 203 
presumed in 2018. Of the confirmed victims, five were female sex 
trafficking victims, and eight were male labor trafficking victims. Five 
of the confirmed trafficking victims were from Romania, seven were 
from Pakistan, and one was unidentified. Of the presumed victims, 
10 were female, and three were male; at least eight were from India; 
and at least nine were exploited in labor trafficking. Experts raised 
concerns regarding gaps in the government’s efforts to proactively 
identify trafficking victims—the government did not identify any 
Portuguese victims in 2020 and, unlike 2019, the government also did 
not identify any child victims. The government continued to utilize 
its national victim identification and referral mechanism, which was 
widely used and distributed to all front-line officials who had a role 
in victim identification and referral, including NGOs, social service 
workers, and health care workers. The government updated the referral 
mechanism in 2020 to include new organizations providing services 
to trafficking victims. The government’s Observatory on Trafficking in 
Human Beings continued to distribute checklists to law enforcement, 
NGOs, health care professionals, labor inspectors, and social workers 
on identifying victims of sex trafficking and forced labor, including 
victims of forced begging and criminality. The government continued 
to provide a victim identification handbook to labor inspectors. 
Upon encountering a potential victim, law enforcement personnel 
conducted an initial standardized risk assessment and systematically 
referred individuals deemed vulnerable or at risk to one of five 
regional multidisciplinary NGO teams to receive specialized shelter 
and assistance. The multidisciplinary teams included psychologists 
and social workers. Front-line responders, including police and 
NGOs, could identify and refer presumed victims to services, but only 
law enforcement officials could formally “confirm” an individual 
as a trafficking victim. Police, judges, and prosecutors determined 
whether to confirm a victim by analyzing evidence and the presence 
of trafficking indicators. GRETA reported there was no timeline for 
authorities to confirm official victim status; the process depended 
on the duration of the related prosecution. 
In 2020, the government maintained 2019 funding amounts for 
trafficking shelters, victim repatriation, and the multidisciplinary 
regional teams at €1.5 million ($1.84 million), with €1.5 million 
($1.84 million) earmarked each year through 2022. Adult victims 
and their minor children had the right to shelter; health care; psycho-
social, legal, and translation and interpretation services; a reintegration 
program; and education and employment training. The government 
referred 23 total victims (17 male and six female) to shelter services 
in 2020, a decrease compared with 57 in 2019. The government also 
enrolled four trafficking victims in its reintegration program, which 
included accommodation in an independent apartment. However, 
aside from shelter and reintegration, the government did not report 
how many victims utilized other available services provided by the 
shelters during the reporting period. The government had a total 
of five government-funded NGO-operated shelters exclusively for 
trafficking victims—two for adult female victims and their minor 
children, two for adult male victims, and one for children. In response 
to the pandemic, the government implemented additional protective 
measures for human trafficking victims in shelters, including social 
distancing and quarantine rooms, which may have reduced overall 
capacity. Adult victims could leave the shelters at will unless authorities 
determined victims’ safety was at risk. Child victims received care 
under Portugal’s child protection system or through its shelter for child 
trafficking victims, which could accommodate up to seven children. 
Courts permitted some victims of crime to testify by deposition 
or video conference, but the government did not report whether 
this protection was extended to any trafficking victims during the 
reporting period. The government had a comprehensive witness 
protection program that could be utilized by trafficking victims, but it 
did not report whether any were afforded this protection during the 
reporting period. The government offered victims a reflection period 
of 30 to 60 days, during which they could recover before deciding 
whether to cooperate with law enforcement. The law also provided 
for a one-year residence permit for victims based on cooperation 
with law enforcement or a personal situation regarding their security, 
health, family situation, or vulnerability; authorities could renew this 
permit indefinitely. In response to the pandemic, the government 
issued an order to grant foreign national victims with pending 
applications permanent residency. Of the 25 permits requested by 




issued to victims from Guinea, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Senegal; 
an increase compared with 16 residence permits issued in 2019. 
Courts awarded restitution to at least five victims from four cases in 
2020, an increase compared with none reported in 2019. Portuguese 
law allowed victims to file civil suits against their traffickers, but 
the government did not report awarding damages to any victims 
during the reporting period. Victims could seek compensation from 
the government if the convicted trafficker was unable to pay the 
awarded damages, but the government did not report providing any 
compensation to trafficking victims during the reporting period and 
GRETA noted this rarely occurred. NGOs reported many victims were 
unwilling to come forward and cooperate with authorities for fear 
of prosecution. GRETA reported the lack of a specific provision in 
Portuguese law protecting victims from prosecution for unlawful acts 
traffickers compelled them to commit could leave victims vulnerable 
to individual prosecutors’ decisions to bring charges. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. The government’s 
multi-stakeholder anti-trafficking network, led by the national 
rapporteur on trafficking, included representatives from various 
central and local government agencies and three NGOs, met an 
unknown number of times in 2020. The government had a national 
anti-trafficking action plan for 2018-2021, which the National 
Rapporteur, under the auspices of the Commission for Citizenship 
and Gender Equality, monitored and coordinated. In 2020, the 
government launched a national anti-trafficking public awareness 
campaign that targeted potential trafficking victims and front-line 
officials and aimed to increase cooperation with NGOs, international 
organizations, universities, and health centers. The campaign included 
web conferences with high-level participation, events in all five 
regions by the multidisciplinary NGO teams, and the dissemination 
of 296 victim identification cards to law enforcement agencies, 
social workers, and health professionals. The National Commission 
for the Promotion of the Rights and the Protection of Children 
and Young People published materials highlighting the risks of 
trafficking on its website, which targeted children, parents, and civil 
society. The government also created a second website, available in 
several languages, that targeted migrants and aimed to disseminate 
information to trafficking victims during the pandemic. A government-
funded NGO trained 250 victim support officers, health professionals, 
and social workers on trafficking prevention, available services to 
victims, and how to raise awareness of human trafficking.
Temporary employment agencies required a license to operate and 
were prohibited from charging a recruitment or placement fee to 
workers. Though illegal, the immigration and border service asserted 
that this practice still frequently occurred; recruitment companies 
would charge foreign workers for the issuance of employment 
contracts, social security registration, transportation, lodging, gas, 
water, and electricity, deducting funds directly from their salaries, 
which could increase vulnerability to debt bondage. Portuguese 
law criminalized passport withholding and contract switching; 
however, fraudulent labor recruitment remained a concern during 
the reporting period. GRETA noted a need to strengthen monitoring 
and regulation of temporary employment and recruitment agencies, 
especially those employing and recruiting domestic workers. Though 
the government made efforts to raise awareness among labor recruiters 
and brokers during the reporting period, including through the 
continued offering of workshops on corporate social responsibility 
pertaining to the prevention of human trafficking, the government 
did not report any efforts to investigate or prosecute labor recruitment 
agencies for fraudulent recruitment or labor trafficking. While 
labor inspectors could refer suspected labor trafficking cases to the 
police, the government did not have a dedicated budget or staff to 
detect labor trafficking cases. The government did not report the 
number of labor inspections conducted in 2020, nor if any labor 
trafficking victims were identified as a result. Labor inspectors 
frequently conducted joint inspections with the immigration and 
border service when foreign workers were present, which may have 
intimidated undocumented potential victims and posed a barrier to 
the identification of victims. The government, in partnership with 
international organizations, provided international anti-trafficking 
training to Tunisia and Morocco, as well as to Angola, where the 
government provided training to 50 police officers and magistrates. 
The government also signed a bilateral cooperation agreement in 
December 2020 with the Government of Cabo Verde’s Observatory 
for Monitoring and Identification of Trafficking Victims, though 
no concrete results were reported. The government did not make 
efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. Each of the five 
multidisciplinary government-funded NGO teams operated a hotline 
available 24 hours a day and in several languages, additionally there 
was a shelter and protection center phone line also operated by a 
government-funded NGO and a government hotline for children 
in danger; however, the government did not report how many calls 
these received and how many, if any, trafficking victims it identified 
through any of the hotlines in 2020. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Portugal, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Portugal abroad. The majority of trafficking victims are from India, 
Moldova, Pakistan, and Romania, but victims also originate from 
West Africa, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America, specifically 
Brazil. Labor traffickers exploit foreign victims in agriculture, 
construction, and domestic service; seasonal migrant workers are 
especially vulnerable. Traffickers transport victims to farms located in 
the interior of the Alentejo region or western Portugal, where they are 
comparatively isolated. Cubans working in Portugal may have been 
forced to work by the Cuban government before the Government of 
Portugal ended the use of Cuban medical professionals in December 
2019. A few doctors reportedly remained in the country until their 
contracts ended in 2020. Traffickers often use fraudulent recruitment 
methods to exploit Portuguese victims in restaurants, agriculture, 
and domestic service, primarily in Portugal and Spain. Sex traffickers 
exploit foreign women and children, mostly from Africa and Eastern 
Europe, and Portuguese women and children within the country. 
Sex traffickers have exploited Portuguese citizens in other countries, 
mostly in Europe. Traffickers exploit children from Eastern Europe, 
including Romani children for forced begging and forced criminal 
activity in Portugal. Authorities report traffickers facilitate the transfer 
of asylum-seeking women and children, many from West Africa, to 
Portugal; traffickers obtain false documents before moving them to 
other European countries for sex trafficking. Sub-Saharan trafficking 
networks increasingly use Portugal as a route into the Schengen area 
to exploit children for both sex trafficking and forced labor. Traffickers 
sometimes exploit soccer players in labor trafficking; these victims, 
including some children, are often from Brazil.
QATAR: TIER 2
The Government of Qatar does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts 
to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts 
compared to the previous reporting period, considering the impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Qatar remained on Tier 2. These efforts included reporting its first 
forced labor conviction under the anti-trafficking law and identifying 
more victims and referring them to care at the new trafficking 
shelter. The government announced and implemented reforms to 
its sponsorship system, including the removal of the No Objection 
Certificate (NOC) to allow all workers to transfer jobs at any time 
during their contract period. It also began to allow its Qatar Visa 
Centers (QVCs) in critical labor-source countries to process domestic 
worker visa applications to minimize contract switching for foreign 
workers vulnerable to trafficking. However, the government did not 





did not routinely investigate crimes such as employer passport 
retention, withholding of wages, labor violations, and complaints of 
abuse as potential trafficking crimes. Although the government had 
formal victim identification and referral procedures, not all officials 
systemically used them, which may have left trafficking victims 
unidentified and unable to receive protection services. Authorities 
also reportedly arrested, detained, and deported potential trafficking 
victims for immigration violations, prostitution, or fleeing their 
employers or sponsors, including in cases where victims have been 
compelled to do so. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase the number of trafficking investigations, especially by 
investigating passport retention, withholding of wages, labor 
violations, and complaints of abuse as potential trafficking crimes. 
• Expand training for law enforcement to better identify potential 
trafficking cases. • Increase efforts to prosecute trafficking offenses, 
particularly forced labor crimes, and to convict and punish traffickers 
under the anti-trafficking law. • Increase the capacity of the specialized 
trafficking units within the Public Prosecutors Office (PPO) and 
Ministry of Interior (MOI) and ensure the units exclusively handle 
cases with a trafficking nexus. • Undertake serious efforts to prevent 
penalization of trafficking victims by screening for trafficking 
indicators among those arrested for immigration violations or 
prostitution, or those who flee abusive employers and face counter 
charges and deportation. • Routinely apply and widely disseminate 
formal procedures to proactively identify and refer to care victims of 
all forms of trafficking, including Cuban medical professionals, and 
institute regular trainings for all officials on how to employ these 
procedures systematically. • Continue to implement reforms to the 
sponsorship system by streamlining exit and transfer procedures to 
mitigate the burden on workers and prohibit employers from filing 
absconding charges or canceling residency permits in retaliation 
for workers utilizing these reforms. • Develop standard operating 
procedures and institute trainings for officials to fully implement 
the 2018 domestic worker law. • Broaden implementation of the 
Labor Dispute Resolution Committees (LDRCs) to expedite cases 
pertaining to contract or employment disputes and increase the 
capacity of LDRCs to refer suspected trafficking cases for criminal 
investigative proceedings. • Provide adequate staff and resources to 
manage the 14 existing Qatar Visa Centers to reduce instances of 
contract substitution. • Ensure the Wage Protection System covers 
all companies and individuals. 
PROSECUTION
The government increased overall anti-trafficking law enforcement 
efforts. The 2011 anti-trafficking law criminalized sex trafficking 
and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to seven years’ 
imprisonment and a fine of up to 250,000 Qatari riyal (QR) ($68,680) 
for offenses involving adult male victims, and up to 15 years’ 
imprisonment and a fine of up to 300,000 QR ($82,420) for offenses 
involving adult female or child victims. Heads of recruiting agencies 
found guilty of trafficking faced up to five years’ imprisonment and a 
fine of up to 200,000 QR ($54,950). These penalties were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Under Law 
number 4 of 2009, the government criminalized the confiscation 
of workers’ passports by a sponsor, punishable by a maximum fine 
of 25,000 QR ($6,870).
During the reporting period, the government investigated and 
prosecuted two sex trafficking cases and convicted three individuals, 
two for forced labor and one for violating the domestic worker 
law. The government reported it investigated and prosecuted one 
case for sex trafficking and one case for forced labor during the 
previous reporting period; it did not report any convictions. Despite 
pandemic-related court closures from March 15 to June 1, the 
government reported the investigation of two sex trafficking cases 
and subsequent referral to the PPO for criminal proceedings under 
the anti-trafficking law; both cases remained ongoing at the close of 
the reporting period. In a case stemming from the previous reporting 
period, the Criminal Court charged two Pakistani citizens under the 
anti-trafficking law for forced labor and sentenced the defendants to 
10 years’ imprisonment, a fine of 200,000 QR ($54,950) each and 
deportation from Qatar upon completion of their sentences. One of 
the defendants reportedly hired two domestic workers in Pakistan 
and brought the workers with her to Qatar, where she forced them 
to work without pay and physically abused them for several years 
in her home; according to case details, the second defendant also 
lived in the home. Additionally, the court ruled that both defendants 
pay the victims 1 million QR ($274,730) each in compensation. 
This case was Qatar’s first forced labor conviction; in the previous 
reporting period, the government did not report any convictions for 
sex or labor trafficking. In August 2020, the first instance Criminal 
Court convicted a Qatari national, for the first time, for violating the 
domestic worker law and sentenced her to one year imprisonment 
for physically abusing three domestic workers and denying the 
workers freedom of movement outside of her home. The PPO filed 
a separate case for forced labor under the anti-trafficking law, but the 
case was archived after the victims accepted financial compensation 
in return for dropping the charges. The PPO prosecuted a variety of 
cases exhibiting trafficking indicators under the labor laws, residency 
laws, or the penal code; these cases included 13 instances of violence 
against domestic workers, 20 cases of passport confiscation, and 66 
cases of visa fraud. The government reported it issued verdicts in 
three cases of violence against domestic workers under the penal 
code, 12 verdicts for passport confiscation under the Labor Law, 
and 37 verdicts for visa fraud under the Residency Law; it solely 
administered fines in all of these verdicts, while the remainder of 
cases remained pending in the prosecution stage. 
The LDRCs received 2,679 labor-related complaints, from which 
ensued 2,214 judiciary verdicts (down from 7,561 verdicts out of 
11,703 complaints the previous reporting period, a 78 percent drop in 
complaints), and the remainder resulted in out-of-court settlements 
or archived grievances due to incomplete evidence. The significant 
drop in labor-related complaints was likely a result of the closure 
of the LDRCs for most of the reporting period (between March 
and December 2020) due to the pandemic; they only reopened at 
30 percent capacity after December. The government reported it 
launched a hotline so workers could continue to submit complaints 
during the reporting period while the LDRCs were closed; however, 
the government did not report how many complaints the hotline 
received or the outcome of these grievances, including whether 
any were referred for further investigation or criminal prosecution. 
In most workplace grievances, the government reported it issued 
verdicts in favor of the employees and not their employers. Prior to 
reaching LDRC, a worker could file a complaint with the Ministry 
of Administrative Development, Labor and Social Affairs (MADLSA) 
where the complaint had to be resolved amicably within one week 
or MADLSA would refer the complaint to the committee. The law 
mandated the LDRCs to reach resolution within three weeks for any 
contract or labor dispute, which aimed to help reduce the heavy 
financial burdens placed on laborers often left without income or 
housing while waiting on case closure. NGOs and media sources 
consistently reported that cases took significantly longer to resolve in 
practice and in many instances of non-payment or delayed payment 
of wages, the worker did not receive the wages they were owed. 
Additionally, the government did not report if the LDRCs had a 
mechanism to refer any of the complaints received that had trafficking 
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indicators to the MOI for further investigation; and as the committees 
almost exclusively handled cases of non- or delayed payment of wages, 
a trafficking indicator, potential victims of forced labor may not have 
been identified during the reporting period. The government did not 
report investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government 
officials for complicity in human trafficking offenses.
Several government entities did not routinely categorize forced 
labor as human trafficking, but rather as criminal assaults and 
immigration or labor law violations. Prosecutors almost universally 
used the Qatari penal code to address trafficking crimes rather 
than the anti-trafficking law due to perceived swiftness and higher 
likelihood of successful prosecutions under charges that were easier 
to prove and more straightforward, which weakened deterrence 
of the crime. Consequently, authorities rarely punished traffickers 
with dissuasive penalties. Instead, authorities prosecuted victims 
regularly for immigration and prostitution violations, rather than 
identifying them as trafficking victims and referring them to care. The 
government lacked a clear and efficient judicial process to prosecute 
trafficking crimes or enforce labor law violations, and its primary 
solution for resolving labor violations continued to be a transfer of 
employer sponsorship, mandated back payment of wages, fines, and 
blacklisting of companies. One prosecutor within the PPO specialized 
in trafficking crimes, and the government continued to build up its 
dedicated trafficking police and prosecution units; however, because 
the units received all cases related to violations of residency and labor 
law, their capacity to focus solely on trafficking cases remained low.
As in previous years, the National Human Rights Committee alongside 
other government entities financed and conducted specialized, 
extensive trainings on trafficking issues. The Police Training Institute 
of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) held an unknown number of 
courses and workshops for officers and staff, including departments of 
passports, border crossings, search and follow-up, human rights, and 
criminal investigations, which investigate and deal with trafficking 
cases. The government coordinated with an international organization 
and NGOs to improve training programs for government workers 
in disciplines with a trafficking nexus, such as labor inspection. The 
Institute for Public Administration delivered a comprehensive three-
day training on trafficking, specifically on identifying potential cases 
of forced labor, to all inspectors; the institute subsequently adapted 
the training for the Labor Relations Department and the staff of the 
MADLSA complaints hotline. During the reporting period, the NCCHT 
organized and coordinated two training sessions and workshops on 
trafficking issues with a foreign embassy in Doha on investigative 
techniques and best practices for interviewing potential trafficking 
victims, attended by an unknown number of staff.
PROTECTION
The government maintained mixed protection efforts. It identified 
and referred more victims to its trafficking-specific shelter and 
provided alternative accommodation to victims despite pandemic-
related shelter closures, but officials did not consistently use standard 
procedures to identify victims and refer them to care, increasing the 
possibility that authorities wrongfully penalized some unidentified 
trafficking victims. The government continued to use its trafficking-
specific shelter designated for both male and female victims, which 
consisted of six refurbished villas for a maximum capacity of 200 
residents, managed by the Qatari Red Crescent Society through an 
agreement with the government. The shelter was equipped with a 
health center, computer lab, dining facility, and laundry room, and 
had a budget of nearly $823,000 per annum. Victims could receive 
counseling and leave freely; officials assisted them with repatriation, 
if desired. 
During the reporting period, the government identified and referred 
35 trafficking victims for housing and protective services, compared 
to 10 victims identified and referred to care in the last reporting 
period. The government did not provide disaggregated data on 
victim nationality or type of trafficking for the current reporting 
period. The government reported the trafficking shelter was closed 
from March to September 2020 due to an outbreak of COVID-19 
infections among the shelter’s residents and the government’s desire 
to use the shelter as temporary living quarters for COVID-19 patients. 
The government reported that while the shelter was shut down, 
officials temporarily referred victims to foreign embassies, while 
others who were infected received free medical services regardless 
of legal status. The government-funded Aman Protection and Social 
Rehabilitation Center continued to provide basic medical care, social 
services, psychological treatment, housing, repatriation assistance, 
and reintegration for female and child victims of domestic abuse, 
including female workers who fled their sponsors. During the 
reporting period, the center provided shelter to a total of 71 victims 
of domestic violence, which included 42 Qataris and 29 foreign 
nationals. The Aman Center (Aman) could host victims of trafficking 
in coordination with the National Committee to Combat Human 
Trafficking (NCCHT) but did not report if it identified any of the 
71 vulnerable women and children as trafficking victims during the 
reporting period. Aman provided repatriation assistance to those 
who wished to return to their home countries. Aman had a budget 
of approximately $3.8 million annually. Residents had the right to 
leave of their own volition without supervision, although chaperones 
were on call in the event security was needed; residents also could 
access the shelter even if their employers filed charges against them. 
Several foreign diplomatic missions ran all-purpose shelters for their 
female nationals, including Indonesia, Kenya and Philippines, which 
an unknown number of trafficking victims used.
The government had formal victim identification procedures and a 
referral mechanism, but not all officials systematically followed these 
procedures. The government previously revised its victim referral 
mechanism to coordinate victim identification and referral efforts 
between the government and NGOs; the referral system included the 
provision of shelter, health care, and legal assistance to trafficking 
victims. The Ministry of Labor worked with the embassies of labor-
source countries to determine which cases it should refer to the 
trafficking shelter. Some officials reportedly used an existing manual to 
identify potential trafficking victims, but law enforcement personnel 
and other government entities did not report proactively screening for 
any trafficking indicators among vulnerable populations, including 
domestic workers, who the labor laws typically isolated and excluded 
from some protections. However, during the reporting period, the 
NCCHT worked with an international organization to produce a 
booklet for use by officials who may come into contact with potential 
trafficking victims; the booklet highlighted key trafficking legislation 
and information on how to recognize the crime and identify victims, 
as well as their rights. Generally, some government agencies did not 
categorize the abuse of domestic workers as forced labor or human 
trafficking cases due to a lack of evidence or witnesses and therefore 
sometimes failed to identify victims; however, some domestic workers 
voluntarily left the country in lieu of filing complaints or pursuing 
charges against their traffickers. 
Systemic hurdles continued to limit victim protection and access 
to justice, especially for domestic workers, who remained highly 
vulnerable to forced labor. The March 2018 Domestic Worker Law 
stipulated that domestic workers were required to have government-
verified contracts; to receive adequate employer-provided food, 
accommodation, medical benefits, one day off per week, limited 
10-hour workdays, sick leave, return flight tickets once each year, 
three weeks paid vacation per year, and full end-of-service payments; 
to be guaranteed access to the dispute resolution committees to 
resolve workplace grievances; and to be given allowances to leave 
their employers in cases of exploitation or violation of contract terms. 
However, lack of clarity in the law, inadequate mechanisms to enforce 
the provisions, and obstacles in reporting violations continued to leave 
this population at risk for forced labor and without care or justice. 
NGOs reported concerns that the 2018 law left several provisions 
vague, including mechanisms to ensure employers actually paid 
workers or provided entitled annual leave; additionally, details on 





were limited. The law did not refer to paid overtime and allowed for 
a workday that exceeded the 10-hour limit if there was an agreement 
between the employer and employee. According to the law, employers 
who breached their obligations on key provisions related to working 
hours, living conditions, weekly rest day, annual leave, and end of 
service benefits should receive a fine, which could be doubled if 
the employer failed to pay the worker on time; the government 
convicted one Qatari employer for violating the domestic labor law 
by physically abusing three domestic workers during the reporting 
year but did not report if it fined other employers for violating other 
provisions of the law. The government reported MADLSA inspectors 
could not conduct inspections in private residences without written 
permission from the PPO, limiting its ability to enforce protections 
outlined in the law and identify key trafficking indicators or potential 
trafficking victims from inspections. Although domestic workers 
have been able to file grievances with the LDRCs since 2018, workers 
rarely filed complaints due to prolonged court proceedings, the 
uncertainty the employee would receive the wages they were owed 
even if the dispute ended in the employee’s favor, fear of retaliation 
from employers, and the limited scope in types of complaints the 
committees handle.
Because officials did not widely use formal identification and 
screening procedures, some unidentified trafficking victims may 
have been detained and deported for contravening Qatari labor 
and immigration laws, even for unlawful acts traffickers compelled 
them to commit. The legal system lacked adequate privacy laws 
to protect victims against potential retribution and often did not 
provide adequate assistance or protection for victims during legal 
proceedings. Victims who lodged complaints were sometimes the 
subject of spurious countercharges by their employers that resulted 
in administrative deportation proceedings. Officials reported it 
did not consider “absconding” charges until after the resolution of 
existing labor disputes or criminal proceedings, including trafficking 
crimes, although labor attachés and worker advocates noted that in 
practice it was often difficult for workers to overcome the burden 
of such charges. Police often detained workers without legal status 
for immigration violations and fleeing their employers or sponsors, 
including potential trafficking victims. Police sometimes detained 
workers for their sponsors’ failure to register them or renew their 
residency documents as required by Qatari law. Authorities sometimes 
charged potential sex trafficking victims with zina (sex outside of 
wedlock) and subsequently deported them. The government generally 
encouraged victims to testify against their traffickers by providing free 
legal counseling, ensuring their safety, and allowing them to pursue 
financial compensation. However, authorities did not offer such 
protections in all cases, and many workers still opted to return home 
rather than remain in the country to assist prosecutors in convicting 
traffickers. Through the MOI, victims could change employers in 
cases of violated contractual terms, such as employers not paying the 
victim or forcing them to work excessive hours. The government did 
not report how many victims received legal support or were granted 
transfer-of-employer approval during the reporting year. During the 
reporting period, the MOI reported having transferred 2,902 workers 
who suffered some form of abuse or violation of their contracts in 
2020, down from 6,531 workers in the previous reporting period; 
however, the government did not report if any of these workers were 
trafficking victims. Interior officials had the authority to extend the 
residency of a domestic worker pending the resolution of a case 
but did not report if it provided any workers this service during the 
reporting period. The law stated the complaining party could reside 
in Qatar pending resolution of legal proceedings. The government 
reported it did not deport those who faced retaliation or retribution 
in their country of origin.
PREVENTION
The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking. The NCCHT 
reportedly met monthly to implement its National Action Plan to 
combat trafficking, which spanned from 2019-2022 and prioritized 
prevention, protection, prosecution, and regional and international 
cooperation. During the previous reporting period, the Supreme 
Judiciary Council began drafting its own strategic action plan with 
specific goals related to trafficking, increasing judicial awareness, 
and enhancing practices to identify and address forced labor cases; 
however, the council did not report whether its own action plan 
was completed or if it had begun to be implemented during the 
year. During the reporting period, the government coordinated with 
an NGO and an international organization to launch a campaign 
specifically designed for domestic workers and their employers to raise 
awareness on precautions related to the pandemic, best practices and 
guidance on how to contact the COVID-19 hotline and the MADLSA 
hotline for labor complaints through text messages in English, Arabic, 
Urdu, Nepali, Bengali, Tamil, Sinhala, Malayalam, Telugu, Hindi, 
Swahili, Bahasa, and Tagalog. The messages also reminded workers 
of their rights and employers of their legal obligations under the 
domestic workers law. The government and its partners sent a total of 
1.85 million text messages to domestic workers in Qatar and 92,620 
text messages to employers of domestic workers. The campaign 
included an awareness raising video that officials disseminated in 
conjunction with International Domestic Workers Day in June 2020. 
Additionally, the government launched a series of public service 
announcements on traditional and social media on how to identify 
forced labor indicators, such as passport confiscation. In coordination 
with an international organization, labor inspectors disseminated 
a flyer on passport confiscation and promoted it through social 
media in conjunction with World Day Against Trafficking in Persons. 
The QVCs, established to help regulate the recruitment process 
in eight critical labor-source countries, organized two awareness 
campaigns during the reporting period on worker rights in Qatar. The 
government maintained its publication and distribution of manuals 
for expatriates in Arabic, English, and several labor-source country 
languages on proactive victim identification, domestic worker rights, 
and ways to combat trafficking in Qatar. It continued to publish and 
disseminate “worker rights” pamphlets in English, Arabic, Hindi, 
Bengali, Nepali, and Tagalog that contained relevant articles from 
the labor and sponsorship laws. In March 2020, the Government 
Communications Office and MADLSA launched a messaging service 
on an internet communications platform to clarify Qatar’s labor law 
and regulations for employers and employees. Officials maintained 
multiple hotlines for use by vulnerable migrant workers, including 
trafficking victims; as in the previous year, the government did not 
report how many calls the lines received. 
The government continued to implement its January 2020 decision to 
extend the abolishment of the exit permit requirement to additionally 
allow workers not protected under the labor law, including domestic 
workers, workers of ministries and other government entities, public 
institutions, sea and agriculture workers, and workers employed 
in casual work, to depart Qatar without employer approval at any 
time during the course of an employment contract. Employers in 
the private sector still had the right to designate as critical no more 
than five percent of their workforce, who required employer approval 
prior to exiting the country; however, domestic workers could not 
be deemed critical. As of August 2020, MADLSA had approved 
42,171 requests for exit permit exemptions. NGOs continued to 
express concern with a condition of the decision that required 
domestic workers to inform their employer in person 72 hours 
prior to their departure, as this requirement could give time to an 
abusive employer to use retaliatory measures against workers, such 
as filing absconding charges to stop the worker from leaving Qatar. 
Other NGOs reported that some immigration officials still required 
employers to complete paperwork before allowing workers to the 
leave the country, suggesting that awareness of the decision was low 
across government agencies. 
In August 2020, through the amendment of the labor law by Law 
No. 18 of 2020 and the amendment of the Sponsorship Law by Law 
No. 19 of 2020, the government announced the abolishment of 
the NOC, which allowed all workers, including domestic workers, 
to change jobs without the permission of their employers after 
fulfilling certain conditions – including completing a probationary 
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period and serving notice. Workers could electronically notify their 
employers of their desire to quit, giving them the notice period 
mandated by the law before moving to a new job. The worker could 
initiate the transfer through MADLSA’s digital system, which notified 
the employer of the transfer and through which the worker could 
submit the required documents to begin the process. The worker 
would receive notification that the transfer was complete via text 
message from MADLSA, and the new employer then would initiate 
a digital employment contract for the new job for the worker to 
sign. Upon authentication of the digital contract, the worker could 
begin working for the new employer. Since August 2020, MADLSA 
reported more than 100,000 workers had initiated an employment 
transfer. The government included a provision in these amendments 
to ensure all workers could change jobs without the notice period 
if the employer did not fulfill their legal obligations to the worker, 
such as endangering the worker’s health, assaulting the worker, or 
misrepresenting contract terms. However, media sources and NGOs 
reported several obstacles during implementation of the reform; 
such as instances of employers retaliating against an employee who 
initiated a transfer by canceling their visa or filing an absconding 
charge prior to the transfer being completed – rendering the worker 
illegal and at increased risk of trafficking, detention, or deportation. 
Moreover, some workers did not seek transfers for fear of threats 
and retaliation from their employer; NGOs reported officials of 
labor-source country embassies advised workers, especially domestic 
workers, to continue in their current employment if they were paid 
on time and there was no threat to life. Overall, NGOs reported that 
although the removal of the exit permit and the abolishment of the 
NOC were improvements, the sponsorship system would continue to 
persist as long as both the employee’s work and residence visas were 
tied to an employer and employers could continue to file absconding 
charges against a worker as a retaliatory measure.
The government continued to employ its Wage Protection System 
(WPS), which required employers to pay workers electronically on 
a timely basis in accordance with the labor law and automatically 
flagged instances of wage abuse. The government reported 97 percent 
of laborers in Qatar were registered in the WPS at the close of the 
reporting period; however, it reported 83 percent of laborers actually 
received payments via the system, while more than 65,000 companies 
were registered for wage disbursements through this mechanism 
during the reporting year. The WPS continued to exclude workers 
not covered by the Labor Law, including domestic workers, sea and 
agricultural workers, government employees, casual workers, and 
workers in the petroleum sector. However, in April 2020, MADLSA 
and the Qatar Central Bank adopted measures to promote and 
facilitate domestic workers’ access to bank accounts, thereby enhancing 
their wage protection and lessening their risk to exploitation and 
potential instances of forced labor; an international organization 
also reported that a proposal to extend coverage of the WPS to 
domestic workers was under deliberation at the close of the reporting 
period. MADLSA’s Wage Protection System Unit worked to detect 
non-compliance in the WPS and subsequently penalize companies 
and employers; however, MADLSA’s enforcement efforts depended 
on the PPO and lacked the formal authority to issue fines or other 
stringent penalties. Accordingly, during the reporting year, MADSLA 
blacklisted 6,743 companies for non-compliance with the WPS, 
which barred the companies from placing public bids, applying for 
bank loans, seeking new projects, or recruiting new employees and 
transferring employees. MADLSA could refer companies to the PPO 
for criminal proceedings, and in severe cases of non-compliance, the 
PPO could penalize a company through fines. However, referrals to the 
PPO were rare – as wage abuse cases could be very lengthy in court. 
The government did not report if it referred any of the blacklisted 
companies to the PPO for criminal prosecution, or if it classified 
any as potential trafficking cases. In August 2020, the government 
announced a non-discriminatory minimum wage through Law 
No. 17 of 2020, which came into force in March 2021, applying 
to all workers in all sectors, including domestic workers; MADLSA 
reported the new law would positively affect 300,000 workers. In 
addition to the basic minimum wage, the law required employers 
to ensure that workers have decent accommodations and food, and 
the law stipulated allowances employers must provide for those 
provisions. Although this law could likely improve living conditions 
of workers, and thereby lessen their vulnerability to exploitation and 
abuse, experts have claimed the strength of the WPS’s monitoring 
system would determine the success of the minimum wage, and that 
penalties would need to become more stringent and applied more 
swiftly to ensure compliance.
During the reporting year, MADLSA reported conducting 27,996 
worksite and 7,963 accommodations visits, which resulted in 4,026 
violation reports and referrals to the PPO, up from 2,553 reported 
violations during the previous reporting period. The government 
blacklisted 136 recruitment agencies and temporarily closed 263 
worksites for violation of summer work hours; however, analogous 
to previous years neither MADLSA nor the PPO investigated any of 
these cases as potential trafficking crimes. As in previous years, the 
government was unable to provide data on the following: the number 
of domestic worker complaints, non-payment of wages filings, and 
other migrant worker-reported grievances related to the inspections. 
The government continued to work with ILO’s Doha office to 
strengthen anti-trafficking operating capacity and generate sustainable 
labor reform efforts throughout Qatar. The government maintained 
50 bilateral agreements and five memoranda of understanding with 
labor-source countries that addressed recruitment issues and worker 
rights, and it worked with individual countries to certify vetted labor 
recruitment offices to reduce fraud or excessive debts that could 
facilitate labor trafficking.
In the previous reporting period, the government opened 14 QVCs 
in eight critical labor source countries (providing 80 percent of the 
total workforce in Qatar), to include Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and 
Sri Lanka. The centers were responsible for finalizing all procedural 
elements pertaining to labor recruitment, including fingerprinting, 
medical examinations, verifying educational certificates, signing 
contracts in local languages, issuing Qatari residency permits prior 
to source country departure, opening bank accounts for workers, 
and attempting to ensure employers pay all fees. The QVCs aimed 
to reduce instances of contract-switching, in which recruiters lured 
workers under one contract in home countries and subsequently 
forced them to sign new ones with lower wages once in Qatar by 
ensuring one unified contract was concurrently filed abroad and 
in Qatar. In January 2021, the QVC in Dhaka, Bangladesh began 
to process work visas for domestic workers; in addition, the MOI 
announced it planned to include issuance of domestic worker visas 
at other QVC locations. Previously, the QVCs did not accommodate 
domestic worker applications. The government did not make efforts 
to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government did 
not provide anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit foreign 
victims in Qatar. Men and women from Bangladesh, Cameroon, India, 
Indonesia, Kenya, Nepal, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Sudan, Uganda, and other countries voluntarily migrate to Qatar as 
unskilled laborers and domestic workers, often paying illegal and 
exorbitant fees to unscrupulous recruiters in their home countries, 
thereby increasing their vulnerability to debt bondage. Many migrant 
workers subsequently face conditions indicative of labor trafficking, to 
include restricted movement, delayed salaries or payment withholding, 
denial of employment-associated benefits, passport confiscation, 
and threats of deportation; in a small number of cases, migrant 
workers face physical, mental, and sexual abuse as well as threats 
of serious physical or financial harm. Anecdotally, sex traffickers 
force some women who migrate for legitimate employment offers 
to engage in commercial sex. As of February 2021, the government 
reported that there were no DPRK workers remaining in Qatar. 
Cuban nationals working in Qatar may have been forced to work 





Qatar’s unskilled migrant workers are the largest group at risk of 
trafficking; those employed as domestic workers remain the most 
vulnerable. Unscrupulous recruiters in source countries and employers 
in Qatar exploit economic migration to prey on prospective workers. 
Predatory recruitment agencies in labor-sending countries extract 
inflated fees from aspiring migrant workers or lure them to Qatar 
with fraudulent employment contracts, rendering workers vulnerable 
to forced labor once in the country. Among foreign workers, female 
domestic workers are particularly vulnerable to trafficking, as Qatar’s 
culture of privacy can lead to isolation in private residences because 
officials lack authority to enter them. Since January 2020, domestic 
workers have the right to leave the country without permission from 
their employers; and since August 2020, domestic workers have the 
right to change employers at any time under certain conditions 
without permission from their employers. Despite this, awareness 
and enforcement of the law providing these rights remain limited. 
Additionally, individuals in Qatar sell “free” visas to migrants and 
occasionally demand regular payments, enabling migrant workers 
to work illegally and without legal recourse against their respective 
sponsors. Many businesses reportedly fail to pay their expatriate 
employees in a timely manner or at all, forcing workers to choose 
between leaving the country with heavy debts or staying in Qatar 
with the hope of eventually being paid. 
The pandemic increased the vulnerability of low-income workers 
in Qatar. The government adopted measures in March 2020 to ease 
the negative financial effects of the pandemic on businesses, which 
allowed employers to reduce salaries, alter contract terms, and 
change workers’ employment status from active to indefinite paid 
leave. Additionally, workers of cleaning companies stopped receiving 
wages for months due to pandemic-related restrictions. Terminated 
workers were unable to return to their home countries due to lack of 
flights, and many were forced to stay in Qatar for months without 
pay. The government reported it did not deport residents who were 
unable to work, but it did not provide amnesty to those who lost their 
migration status due to job loss. Although the government implored 
companies to continue paying workers during the pandemic, it did 
not require companies to do so, and job loss and non-payment of 
wages forced many workers to seek informal employment, increasing 
their vulnerability to exploitation and trafficking. The government 
reported it provided healthcare services cost-free for all workers in 
Qatar, regardless of nationality. 
Qatar’s employment-based sponsorship system, which continues 
to undergo significant reform, continues to place control 
disproportionately in the hands of employers, who have unilateral 
power to cancel residence permits; up until the current reporting 
period, employers were also able to prevent workers from changing 
employers and deny permission for them to leave the country. 
Debt-laden migrants who face abuse or are misled often avoid 
reporting their exploitation due to fear of reprisal or deportation, the 
protracted recourse process, or lack of knowledge of their legal rights, 
thereby exacerbating or prolonging their forced labor situation. Many 
migrant workers often live in confined, unsanitary conditions, and 
many complain of excessive working hours and hazardous working 
conditions. Reports allege the vast majority of expatriate workers’ 
passports were in their employers’ possession, despite laws against 
passport confiscation.
ROMANIA: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Romania does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included investigating more trafficking 
cases; convicting more traffickers; and establishing a dedicated unit 
for prosecuting trafficking crimes composed of seven prosecutors. 
Additionally, the government issued regulations for minimum 
standards for licensed service providers assisting child trafficking 
victims and signed cooperative agreements with the Bucharest 
municipal government and the Romanian Orthodox Church, laying 
the foundation for a joint project establishing a future shelter for 
repatriated victims. However, the government did not demonstrate 
overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, 
even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-
trafficking capacity. Alleged complicity in trafficking crimes persisted, 
particularly with officials exploiting children while in the care of 
government-run homes or placement centers. Authorities identified 
fewer trafficking victims and did not adequately screen for trafficking 
indicators or identify victims among vulnerable populations, such 
as asylum-seekers, individuals in commercial sex, or children in 
government-run institutions. Moreover, the government did not 
provide sufficient funding for assistance and protection services, 
leaving most victims without services, susceptible to re-traumatization, 
and at risk of re-trafficking. Because the government has devoted 
sufficient resources to a written plan that, if implemented, would 
constitute significant efforts to meet the minimum standards, Romania 
was granted a waiver per the Trafficking Victims Protection Act from 
an otherwise required downgrade to Tier 3. Therefore Romania 
remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the third consecutive year.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Proactively identify potential victims, especially among vulnerable 
populations, such as asylum-seekers, individuals in commercial sex, 
and children in government-run institutions, through enhanced 
training for police officers and labor inspectors on recognizing 
indicators of exploitation. • Vigorously investigate and prosecute 
trafficking cases under the trafficking statute and punish convicted 
traffickers, including complicit officials, with significant prison 
sentences. • Significantly increase the quality and availability of 
specialized victim services for adults and children, including by 
training local child protection officers who work with victims and 
ensuring they have the necessary resources, such as funding. • Amend 
legislation to allow for financial support to NGOs for victim services 
and develop and institute a formal mechanism for administering 
the funds. • Expand efforts to train officials involved in judicial 
proceedings, particularly judges, on working with trafficking cases and 
victims, sensitivity to trafficking issues, and understanding all forms 
of trafficking. • Increase the number of police officers investigating 
trafficking crimes and financial investigators specializing in trafficking 
cases. • Increase efforts to enforce child labor laws, especially in rural 
areas and where social welfare services lacked personnel and capacity 
to address violations. • Develop an integrated system of public 
records and government databases for prosecutors to identify and 
seize traffickers’ assets. • Significantly increase anti-trafficking training 
for law enforcement officials on working with victims, evidence 
collection, and understanding psychological coercion and integrate 
that understanding of psychological coercion and the related trauma 
and impacts on victims into government-wide responses. • Permit 
authorities to sanction recruiting agencies for practices contributing to 
trafficking, such as charging workers with recruitment fees. • Increase 
the quality of psychological counseling and improve access to medical 
assistance for victims. • Provide knowledgeable legal counsel and 
courtroom protections for victims assisting prosecutions. • Revise 
the restitution mechanism to include minimizing court fees and 






The government increased law enforcement efforts. Articles 210 and 
211 of the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed penalties of three to 10 years’ imprisonment for 
offenses involving an adult victim and five to 10 years’ imprisonment 
for those involving a child. These penalties were sufficiently stringent 
and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. On November 2, 
2020, the government passed amendments to the penal code that 
increased the penalties prescribed for trafficking offenses involving 
child victims, which were previously the same as those involving 
adult victims. However, the amendment also inadvertently shortened 
the statute of limitations for all trafficking crimes involving children 
committed prior to the adoption of the amendment. In an effort to 
correct the error, Parliament adopted a new law on November 29, 
2020, which returned the statute of limitations to its original form 
for any cases arising after that date. However, all cases occurring 
prior to November 29, 2020, would remain subject to the shortened 
statute of limitations, thereby negatively effecting the government’s 
ability to prosecute these crimes.
The Organized Crime and Terrorism Investigation Directorate 
(DIICOT) and the Department for Combating Organized Crime 
(DCCO) were responsible for investigating and prosecuting trafficking 
cases. DIICOT and DCCO reported pandemic-related restrictions and 
infections among police and prosecutors constrained their ability 
to open new investigations and process ongoing cases. In 2020, 
authorities opened 552 new trafficking cases (498 sex trafficking and 
54 labor trafficking), compared with 532 in 2019 and 695 in 2018. 
In contrast to previous years, the government reported the number of 
prosecutions exclusively related to trafficking rather than a combined 
number of trafficking cases and cases related to other crimes, such as 
pandering. This methodological change in reporting made it difficult 
to compare prosecution statistics from previous years. Prosecutors 
indicted 234 alleged traffickers (220 sex trafficking and 14 labor 
trafficking), a decrease from 347 in 2019 and 399 in 2018, and froze 
approximately 7.96 million Romanian lei (RON) ($2.01 million) 
in assets in 2020. Courts convicted 142 traffickers, an increase from 
120 in 2019 and 130 in 2018. The majority of convicted traffickers 
received sentences ranging from one to 12 years’ imprisonment; 29 
convicted traffickers received suspended sentences. The use of plea 
bargains by prosecutors allowed for traffickers to receive reduced 
sentences, as well as guilty pleas, which reduced traffickers’ sentences 
by one-third and led to many lenient or suspended sentences. During 
the reporting period, pandemic-related travel restrictions caused 
several joint operations to be postponed. Nevertheless, DIICOT and 
DCCO participated in 35 joint investigative teams with European 
counterparts (80 in 2019, 36 in 2018). In one case, authorities from 
Romania, Austria, and the United Kingdom (UK) cooperated on a sex 
trafficking investigation that resulted in the arrest of 22 traffickers and 
confiscation of 18,700 RON ($4,720), €4,300 ($5,280), numerous 
luxury items, and several weapons and ammunition. In a separate 
case, a joint Franco-Romanian team of judges and police cooperated 
to investigate a sex trafficking network involving seven women forced 
into commercial sex; authorities arrested 10 traffickers, many of 
whom were members of the same family. In another case, a joint 
operation between Romanian and Spanish police led to the arrest 
of eight traffickers and identification of 10 labor trafficking victims; 
the case involved family members of a Romanian organized crime 
group who exploited victims in the agricultural sector in Spain. 
Unrelated, Romanian, Moldovan, and French authorities pursued a 
labor trafficking case resulting in the arrest of 38 traffickers (three in 
Romania); seizure of 19 vehicles, weapons, phones, and approximately 
€100,000 ($122,700); and freezing 11 bank accounts. The investigation 
began in 2018 when French authorities intercepted a van transporting 
Moldovan migrants carrying counterfeit Romanian documents. The 
transnational trafficking organization, set up by a Romanian national 
living in France, smuggled at least 40 Moldovan citizens to France 
to exploit them in the construction sector. The illegal profits from 
the trafficking scheme totaled nearly €14 million ($17.18 million).
Persistent, low-level official complicity in trafficking crimes remained 
a significant concern, undermining law enforcement action during the 
year. In some cases involving complicit officials, DIICOT investigated 
without the support of other police forces out of concern that those 
police were either involved in the case or would not investigate 
the allegations. In 2020, DIICOT investigated a member of the 
gendarmerie for sex trafficking and placed the individual under 
judicial supervision during the investigation. Additionally, DIICOT 
reported prosecutors indicted a police officer for trafficking and courts 
convicted an employee of a government-run residential center for 
child trafficking. Several NGOs expressed suspicion that staff working 
in government placement centers for children and residential centers 
for persons with disabilities facilitated trafficking. A 2020 report by 
a Special Parliamentary Committee to Investigate Missing Children 
and Human Trafficking identified complicity at the local level among 
children housed in institutions, inadequate disciplinary measures 
for child welfare officials who abused children in their care, lack of 
expertise among police to proactively identify trafficking victims, and 
a staffing crisis within the police. During the reporting period, the 
National Authority for the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Children 
and Adoption (ANDPDCA) and the police signed an agreement to 
develop and implement a referral mechanism for trafficking cases 
among children housed in institutions. Additionally, to address the 
significant number of child sexual abuse cases, including potential 
sexual exploitation cases, in 2019 the police established a 15-officer 
unit dedicated to investigating such crimes as a three-year pilot 
project. As a result of the project’s successful conviction rate and the 
number of backlogged cases referred by other police units around the 
country, authorities extended the project’s term, which was initially 
scheduled to conclude in early 2021, and doubled the number of 
officers from 15 to 30 assigned to it.
Deficiencies within law enforcement and knowledge gaps impeded 
efforts to address trafficking. Authorities often charged suspected 
traffickers for crimes other than trafficking, such as pandering and 
pimping. DCCO and DIICOT continued to operate with limited 
staff and resources. As a result, overextended officers and prosecutors 
handled multiple cases simultaneously and struggled to build strong 
cases for prosecutions. To address this deficiency, in 2020, DIICOT 
established a dedicated unit for prosecuting trafficking crimes and 
assigned seven prosecutors to the unit that began operations in April 
2021. Furthermore, authorities reported a lack of investigative tools 
and software that would allow them to perform faster and more 
effective online investigations. According to DIICOT, the lack of an 
integrated system of public records and government databases made 
it difficult for prosecutors to identify and seize traffickers’ assets. 
Likewise, NGOs noted that a limited number of dedicated financial 
investigators—eight covering the entire country—restricted financial 
investigations and asset seizures, inhibiting evidence collection in 
trafficking cases to corroborate witness testimony. In response, the 
government submitted a request to the Ministry of Interior to hire 
42 financial investigators nationwide; the request remained pending 
at the end of the reporting period. NGOs reported that, while legal 
authorities developed some sensitivity to trafficking victims’ situations, 
some police officers and judges continued to lack specialized training 
and sensitivity toward sex trafficking cases and trafficking issues, 
including a basic understanding of the crime and victim trauma. 
The National Anti-Trafficking Agency (ANITP), the government’s 
lead agency for coordinating anti-trafficking efforts, organized 90 
trainings for police, social workers, labor inspectors, and front-line 
officials on investigating trafficking cases and victim identification 
and assistance. ANITP and county prefects organized 37 workshops 
for police, members of the gendarmerie, social workers, and local 
government officials on best practices for preventing and combating 
trafficking and protecting victims. DIICOT organized several courses 
on interviewing victims and defendants, and police academies held 
routine anti-trafficking training sessions as part of their regular 
curricula. ANITP and the General Inspectorate of the Border Police 







The government maintained insufficient protection efforts. Authorities 
used the existing national victim identification and referral mechanism 
to identify victims and refer them to care. While ANITP drafted a 
new referral mechanism in 2018 with the support of NGOs, the 
government did not implement it for the third straight year. In 
2020, the government changed its reporting methodology under 
the National Mechanism for Identification and Referral of Victims 
to allow any entity, including diplomatic missions, NGOs, and other 
organizations, to identify victims. Authorities identified 596 victims 
(429 sex trafficking, 131 labor trafficking, and 36 victims of attempted 
or uncategorized trafficking), compared with 698 in 2019 and 497 in 
2018. Of the 596 victims, 255 were children. Authorities identified 
one foreign victim (zero in 2019 and 2018), but observers estimated 
there were numerous cases, particularly among asylum-seekers. Experts 
reported authorities had not identified any victims among asylum-
seekers in the past five years. An intergovernmental organization 
attributed the problem to a lack of experienced, qualified interpreters 
working with asylum-seekers. According to NGOs, authorities’ limited 
contact with victims, movement restrictions during lockdown, and law 
enforcement’s focus on enforcing the restriction negatively affected 
identification efforts. Additionally, the lack of specialized training on 
the psychological trauma of trafficking on victims hindered authorities’ 
ability to correctly identify potential victimization. Observers reported 
authorities did not proactively identify victims among individuals 
in commercial sex, and continued to fine persons in commercial 
sex, including children, without screening for trafficking indicators. 
However, observers reported authorities typically dropped charges 
or fines once investigators and prosecutors realized a suspect was a 
trafficking victim. Moreover, authorities did not identify victims in 
key locations of concern, such as government placement centers, and 
identification typically occurred only after a criminal investigation 
started. NGOs claimed the government did not include in its statistics 
victims identified by foreign governments and other stakeholders; 
consequently the actual number of victims likely was higher than 
the reported number.
After identified victims consented to the referral process, they 
received assistance. Assistance was not conditional upon a victim’s 
cooperation with law enforcement, but upon a person’s status as an 
identified trafficking victim. As in previous years, fewer than half of 
identified victims received assistance. In 2020, approximately 35 
percent (210) of identified victims received assistance from public 
institutions, public-private partnerships, and NGOs, a decline from 
49 percent in 2019 and 48 percent in 2018. The government provided 
emotional support, psychological counseling, legal assistance, and 
career counseling to domestic and foreign victims. The law permitted 
foreign victims “tolerated status” for up to six months and granted 
asylum-seekers the right to work after three months. Authorities 
referred identified adult victims to ANITP and child victims to 
Child Protection Services (CPS). Victims received protection and 
assistance services in government-run facilities and in NGO-run 
trafficking shelters. The government maintained a limited number of 
government-run shelters designated for vulnerable adults, including 
trafficking victims. Authorities placed child victims in general child 
facilities or in facilities for children with disabilities run by CPS. 
Despite children representing 43 percent of identified victims, CPS 
managed only two centers focused specifically on child trafficking 
victims. CPS in each county received funding from local governments 
to maintain teams of social assistants, psychologists, lawyers, and 
pediatricians, who were responsible for providing services to victims. 
However, these teams utilized the same methodology regardless of 
the type of abuse identified. NGOs reported local CPS did not have 
adequate expertise in trafficking and resources to provide quality care. 
ANPDCA also reported local CPS lacked the necessary knowledge that 
would allow them to justify funding requests for specialized services. 
In an effort to provide consistent quality care to child trafficking 
victims, in 2020 the Ministry of Labor issued a regulation requiring 
minimum standards of assistance for child victims. Under the new 
regulation, licensed service providers offering shelter and assistance to 
identified child victims must adhere to a set of specific requirements, 
including providing safe environments, specialized psychological 
counseling, and visitations with families. Notwithstanding, perennial 
problems of abuse and neglect of children housed in institutions, 
coupled with the lack of proactive identification and assistance in 
government facilities, left children in placement centers vulnerable 
to trafficking. The 2020 parliamentary report stated CPS employees 
who oversaw children housed in institutions did not proactively 
try to prevent trafficking, sometimes encouraged girls to become 
involved in sex trafficking, or knowingly tolerated the exploitation 
of child trafficking victims. NGOs noted in certain counties CPS 
officials acted as accomplices to traffickers.
Overall services for victims remained inadequate and left victims at 
risk of re-trafficking. Government funding for NGO assistance and 
protection services remained limited. While the government relied 
on NGOs to accommodate and assist victims, it did not allocate 
grants directly to NGOs due to legislation precluding direct funding. 
A 2018 bill that would provide NGOs with funding for victim services 
remained pending in Parliament. Despite Romanian law entitling 
all victims to psychological and medical care, the government did 
not provide more than one mental health counseling session and 
did not finance medical care costs. NGOs paid all psychological 
services costs for victims due to the government’s refusal to reimburse 
psychologists who assisted victims. NGOs also covered victims’ 
emergency medical care costs because the government did not 
provide financial assistance and medical care required payment 
upfront. Furthermore, access to medical care required Romanian 
victims to return to their home districts to obtain identity documents. 
The process presented logistical and financial hurdles for many 
trafficking victims; NGOs also covered these costs. Additionally, 
while the government reported facilitating the repatriation of 33 
victims abroad, it did not report funding repatriation expenses. NGOs 
and an international organization typically absorbed the costs. The 
government reported allocating approximately 26.5 million RON 
($6.68 million) to local governments, but it did not report how much, 
if any, was for trafficking-related services. Observers noted insufficient 
funding of social protection services by local governments persisted.
In general, victims lacked adequate support during criminal cases. 
Reports of victim intimidation during and after court proceedings 
persisted. NGOs reported many courts did not impose sanctions 
on traffickers’ lawyers when they harassed and mocked the victims 
during proceedings. Judges relied heavily on the victim’s in-person 
testimony, preferably in front of their trafficker, further traumatizing 
victims. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) found that 
Romanian courts lacked national practices to protect child victims of 
sexual assault. The ECHR held that, because of the lack of a national 
practices to protect children, Romania did not meet its obligations 
to punish perpetrators of child sexual assault under criminal law. In 
an effort to address these systemic challenges, the government took 
some small steps forward during the reporting period. Prosecutorial 
offices in Constanta, Vrancea, and Valcea inaugurated three child-
friendly hearing rooms with the help of two NGOs that contributed 
funding. ANITP’s efforts to inform victims of their legal rights and 
provide psychological support led to increased participation of 
victims in criminal proceedings. In 2020, 433 victims participating in 
criminal proceedings accessed services available to victims assisting 
law enforcement (255 in 2019); these services included concealing 
victims’ identities, providing protection at victims’ residences, and 
transporting victims to and from legal proceedings. The government 
allocated 19,600 RON ($4,940) for the legal assistance of victims 
provided by public legal counsel. However, the lawyers assigned often 
lacked experience working with trafficking victims, and courts did 
not always grant free legal aid to victims, particularly if they were not 
sex trafficking victims. Also, access to free legal aid was contingent 
on proof of indigence. Romanian law permitted foreign victims 
who cooperated with authorities to receive a renewable, six-month 
temporary residence permit. Additionally, in 2020, the government 
ceased publishing the names of all trial witnesses, including children, 





privacy and safety. In doing so, though, the government removed all 
case information, creating concerns about transparency. NGOs raised 
concerns the removed case information, such as length of trials and 
court decisions, was crucial for tracking Romania’s anti-trafficking 
efforts and requested the government restore that information. As 
of the end of the reporting period, the government restored a few 
dozen cases, which did not include the names of victims, to the 
database. The law entitled victims to reparation from their traffickers; 
however, victims generally could not afford the fees necessary to 
initiate civil trials or, in cases in which judges ordered restitution, 
to pay court officers to collect the money owed from traffickers. If 
victims did not obtain restitution in court, the government could 
reimburse for expenses related to hospitalization, material damage 
caused by the traffickers, and revenues victims lost while being 
trafficked. In the event traffickers’ assets were not seized but a guilty 
verdict was reached, the government could pay material damages 
for documented expenses such as medical bills. Throughout 2020, 
courts ordered defendants to pay 33 victims. The National Agency 
for the Administration of Seized Assets (ANABI) managed and sold 
assets confiscated from convicted criminals, and the money obtained 
following the selling of the assets could be used to pay the victims 
and cover lawsuit-related expenses. Despite these provisions, ANABI 
did not compensate any victims in 2020.
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. During the reporting 
period, the government adopted an action plan as part of the 2018-
2022 national strategy, and dedicated financial resources to all of 
the proposed activities. The plan assigned financial and operational 
responsibility to various government agencies and ministries, which 
allocated approximately 41.2 million RON ($10.39 million) toward 
the proposed activities. ANITP continued to publish yearly reports 
and statistics on trafficking and organized 94 awareness campaigns, 
compared with 85 in 2019, focused on educating children and 
adults on all forms of trafficking, including forced begging within 
the country and abroad. In October 2020, to better assist Romanian 
trafficking victims in Bavaria, the Romanian consulate general 
in Munich organized a cross-border conference on systemic and 
procedural gaps that occur in the repatriation, referral, and assistance 
of victims from Germany to Romania. In partnership with the 
Romanian embassy in Denmark and a Copenhagen-based migrant 
center, ANITP implemented an awareness campaign targeting 
the Romanian community in Denmark, which comprised more 
than 30,000 Romanians. In addition, ANITP signed cooperative 
agreements with the Bucharest municipal government and the 
Romanian Orthodox Church. The agreements laid the foundation 
for a national anti-trafficking campaign aimed at raising awareness 
throughout the Church’s vast community and among vulnerable 
populations, such as homeless persons and victims of violence, 
and for a joint project establishing a future shelter for repatriated 
victims. Furthermore, ANITP managed a 24-hour hotline but only 
staffed an operator during regular business hours. The hotline 
provided services in Romanian and English and primarily focused 
on informing Romanians about working abroad safely. The hotline 
received 15 calls (seven in 2019) regarding potential trafficking 
cases, seven of which DCCO investigated. In 2020, the government 
adopted a national strategy to implement UNSCR 1325/2000 on 
women, peace, and security; the strategy included measures to train 
Romanian troops on the protection of victims of sexual violence, 
including trafficking, and a plan to develop a reporting and response 
mechanism on sexual exploitation and abuse committed by members 
of the military as well as civilians carrying out missions abroad. The 
government made efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex 
acts, including awareness campaigns aimed at educating purchasers 
on the nexus between sex trafficking and commercial sex.
In 2020, DCCO participated in a series of prevention activities at 
border crossing points to raise awareness on labor trafficking and 
identify potential victims. The General Inspectorate for Immigration 
conducted a campaign educating employers who hired foreign workers 
about workers’ rights and the risks of exploitation. While the criminal 
code prohibited Romania-based recruitment companies from charging 
recruitment fees and facilitating the exploitation of citizens abroad, the 
government did not punish companies for practices that contributed 
to trafficking, such as charging recruitment fees. Throughout 2020, 
the Labor Inspectorate conducted 580 inspections on employers who 
hired foreign workers and 1,499 inspections on temporary staffing 
agencies and recruitment agencies. Before issuing a work permit to 
foreign workers, the General Inspectorate for Immigration verified 
job offers and employers’ profiles to prevent fraud. According to 
some NGOs, police remained unresponsive to reports of labor 
trafficking, and labor inspectors lacked the competency for detecting 
trafficking and the legal authority for unannounced inspections to 
several categories of worksites. ANPDCA monitored and coordinated 
all programs for the prevention and elimination of child labor 
and investigated child labor abuse reports. The government did 
not effectively enforce child labor laws, especially in rural areas 
and where social welfare services lacked personnel and capacity 
to address violations. According to ANPDCA, official statistics did 
not reflect the magnitude of the crime as incidents of child labor 
frequently went unreported and official statistics were limited to 
police-documented cases. Experts noted a continued lack of awareness 
about labor trafficking among stakeholders and insufficient attention 
to identifying cases and labor law violations.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Romania, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Romania abroad. Romania remains a primary source country for sex 
and labor trafficking victims in Europe. The vast majority of identified 
victims (72 percent) in 2020 are sex trafficking victims. Traffickers 
are typically Romanian citizens working as part of an organized 
crime group based on family and ethnic ties, who subject Romanian 
women and children to sex trafficking in Romania and other European 
countries, including Finland, France, Italy, Spain, and the UK. Experts 
continue to report Romanian women recruited for sham marriages 
in Western Europe; after entering these marriages, traffickers force 
the women into commercial sex or labor. Children represent nearly 
50 percent of identified trafficking victims in Romania. Government 
officials and NGOs report increased recruitment of children via the 
internet and social media as a result of the pandemic. Media outlets 
allege the online sexual exploitation and abuse of girls as young 
as 12 years old. Children housed in institutions, particularly girls 
living in government-run homes and placement centers for disabled 
persons, remain vulnerable to sex trafficking. Several NGOs note 
former residents of government-run homes or residential centers 
serve as recruiters of underage girls from the same facilities. Traffickers 
exploit Romani children in sex trafficking and forced begging. Child 
labor abuse continues to be underreported, with children as young 
as five exploited in child labor. Traffickers subject Romanian adults 
and children to labor trafficking in agriculture, construction, hotels, 
manufacturing, and domestic service, as well as forced begging and 
theft in Romania and other European countries. Some reports suggest 
traffickers operating in Romania and Moldova exploit Moldovan 
women and girls from Romania in operations in Europe; the extent 
of the trafficking is unknown. Romania is a destination country for 
a limited number of foreign trafficking victims, including migrants 
from Africa, Europe, and South and Southeast Asia, exploited in the 
construction, hotel, and food-processing industries. NGOs report 
a recent rise in the number of migrants, citing an unusually high 
number of migrants from Northern Africa and the Middle East 
entering Romania and a record number of them – approximately 
6,000 – submitting applications for asylum in 2020. While their 
main goal is to continue their path toward Western and Northern 
Europe, many of these migrants may be or may become trafficking 
victims while in Romania. Furthermore, government corruption 
in law enforcement and the judiciary continues to enable some 








The Government of Russia does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making 
significant efforts to do so, even considering the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Russia remained on Tier 3. Despite the lack of significant efforts, 
the government took some steps to address trafficking, including 
by facilitating the return of Russian children from Iraq and Syria, 
identifying some victims, and extending work and residence permits 
for foreign workers in response to the pandemic. However, during 
the reporting period there was a government policy or pattern of 
trafficking. The government was actively complicit in the forced labor 
of North Korean workers. The government did not screen North 
Korean workers for trafficking indicators or identify any North Korean 
trafficking victims, despite credible reports in previous years that 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) operated work 
camps in Russia and exploited thousands of North Korean workers 
in forced labor. Although the government took steps to repatriate 
North Korean workers in accordance with UN Security Council 
resolutions (UNSCRs), citizens from the DPRK continued to arrive 
throughout the year, many of whom likely engaged in informal labor. 
While the Russian government reported the number of North Korean 
workers in Russia declined in 2020, the government issued almost 
3,000 new tourist and student visas to North Koreans in 2020 in 
an apparent attempt to circumvent the UNSCRs. Separate from this 
complicity, the government did not initiate any new prosecutions of 
suspected traffickers and convicted only one trafficker. Authorities 
continued to lack a process for the identification of victims and 
their referral to care, and the total number of victims identified by 
the government remained negligible compared with the estimated 
scope of the problem. Moreover, the criminal code did not establish 
a definition for a victim of trafficking, hindering identification 
efforts and limiting access to victim services. Authorities routinely 
penalized potential victims, including by detaining and deporting 
potential forced labor victims for immigration violations, and 
prosecuted sex trafficking victims for prostitution crimes without 
screening for trafficking indicators. The government offered no 
funding or programs to provide services for trafficking victims. As in 
previous years, the government did not draft a national strategy or 
assign roles and responsibilities to government agencies to combat 
human trafficking.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes and convict traffickers 
under the trafficking statutes, including complicit officials and 
suspected trafficking cases related to North Korean workers in 
Russia, respecting due process. • Implement a formal policy to 
ensure identified trafficking victims are not punished or deported for 
unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit. • Develop and 
implement formal national procedures to guide law enforcement, 
labor inspectors, and other government officials in identifying 
and referring victims to service providers, particularly among 
labor migrants and individuals in commercial sex, and screen for 
trafficking indicators among individuals arrested for commercial 
sex or immigration violations. • Given significant concerns that 
North Korea forces its citizens to work abroad, screen North Korean 
workers, students, and tourists for trafficking indicators and refer 
them to appropriate services. • Allocate funding to state bodies 
and anti-trafficking NGOs to provide specialized assistance and 
care to victims. • Create a national anti-trafficking action plan and 
establish a central coordinator for government efforts. • Ensure 
victim identification and protection measures are not tied to the 
prosecution of a trafficker and allow all first responders to officially 
identify potential trafficking victims and refer them to care. • Ensure 
screening of children returned from Iraq and Syria for child soldiering 
indicators and provide them with rehabilitation and reintegration 
support. • Provide victims access to legal alternatives to removal 
to countries where they face hardship or retribution. • Amend the 
criminal code to include a definition of human trafficking that is 
consistent with the definition under international law. • Create a 
central repository for publicly available information on investigation, 
prosecution, conviction, and sentencing data for trafficking cases. 
• Increase efforts to raise public awareness of both sex and labor 
trafficking, including among children.
PROSECUTION
The government decreased already minimal law enforcement efforts. 
Articles 127.1 (trafficking in persons) and 127.2 (use of slave labor) 
of the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking. 
Article 127.1 prescribed penalties of up to five years’ prison labor or 
up to six years’ imprisonment for offenses involving an adult victim, 
and three to 10 years’ imprisonment for those involving a child 
victim. Article 127.2 prescribed penalties of up to five years’ prison 
labor or up to five years’ imprisonment for offenses involving an 
adult victim, and up to five years’ prison labor or three to 10 years’ 
imprisonment for those involving a child victim. These penalties were 
sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate 
with punishments prescribed for other serious crimes, such as 
kidnapping. However, inconsistent with the definition of trafficking 
under international law, these articles established the use of force, 
fraud, or coercion as an aggravating factor, rather than an essential 
element of the crime. There were reports authorities often prosecuted 
trafficking crimes under related statutes, including Articles 240 
(involvement in prostitution), 240.1 (receiving sexual services from 
a minor), and 241 (organization of prostitution), the penalties for 
which were generally lower than the penalties prescribed for trafficking 
offenses. The government did not report comprehensive data on 
trafficking criminal cases, making it difficult to assess the adequacy or 
effectiveness of law enforcement efforts. Media reports and publicly 
available data revealed some details on trafficking cases investigated 
and prosecuted, including some conviction information, during the 
reporting period, although the limited number of cases reported did 
not constitute an adequate law enforcement response compared with 
the scale of human trafficking in Russia. Some publicly available 
data was likely duplicative or contradictory of information from 
other sources, as no single agency was responsible for maintaining 
comprehensive law enforcement statistics. 
Russia’s federal-level Investigative Committee and media publicly 
reported the government initiated four sex trafficking investigations 
in 2020 and had two ongoing sex trafficking investigations and one 
ongoing forced labor investigation; the government initiated three 
investigations in 2019 and 14 in 2018. The government did not report 
initiating any prosecutions under Articles 127.1 and 127.2 during 
the reporting period, compared with prosecuting two defendants 
for sex trafficking under Article 127.1 in 2019. The government 
reported convicting one trafficker for exploiting two men in forced 
labor, a decrease from eight convictions in 2019 and 21 in 2018. 
The government reported sentencing the convicted trafficker to 
10.5 years’ imprisonment. Media reports in the past revealed the 
government sometimes prosecuted cases involving baby-selling as 
trafficking, and in 2020, authorities investigated several cases of 
children born through surrogacy as trafficking, both crimes that 
fall outside the international definition of trafficking. Authorities 
continued to prosecute suspected traffickers under commercial sex 
and pimping statutes but did not report data on the frequency of 
these prosecutions. NGOs reported that hundreds of trafficking-related 
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cases were reported to authorities, but the government processed 
most under other administrative or criminal codes, which suppressed 
statistics and masked the scale of the problem. A 2019 supreme 
court clarification highlighted the criminal liability of those who 
recruit victims into trafficking situations, but this did not lead to an 
increase in prosecutions or convictions during the reporting period. 
Law enforcement training centers provided instruction on trafficking 
identification. Russian authorities did not report cooperating in any 
new or ongoing international investigations in 2020. 
Official complicity in trafficking crimes remained a significant 
concern. Media reported that Russia-backed forces recruited Syrian 
children to fight as mercenaries in Libya; recruiters reportedly 
offered the children money to guard installations and volunteer for 
groups that are involved in hostilities. NGOs reported government 
officials and police regularly accepted bribes in exchange for not 
pursuing trafficking cases and officials often benefitted financially 
or materially from trafficking crimes. An NGO reported that some 
police officers accepted bribes in the form of unpaid sexual services 
or rape of individuals in commercial sex in exchange for not pursuing 
sexual exploitation cases. While the government did not report 
any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government 
employees complicit in human trafficking offenses, civil society 
noted the government intentionally investigated official complicity 
cases under non-trafficking statutes, such as Article 290 (bribery) of 
the criminal code. Media reported the arrest in December 2020 of 
a federal official for allegedly receiving bribes from a nightclub at 
which some women were reportedly being sexually exploited; the 
official was investigated for bribery under Article 290. 
Despite credible reports of the forced labor and slave-like conditions 
perpetuated by the DPRK government on North Koreans working 
in Russia, the Russian government did not report any investigations 
into those conditions. Migrant laborers from the DPRK continued 
to work in Russia, especially in the Far East, often under conditions 
of forced labor. Although the government claimed it would cease 
issuing new work permits to North Korean laborers and repatriate 
all of the workers by the end of 2019 in accordance with UNSCRs 
2375 and 2397, authorities failed to return all workers by the 
deadline and cited the DPRK’s pandemic-related border closures as 
an obstacle in this effort. According to media reports, the government 
reported approximately 500 DPRK workers remained in the country 
at the onset of the pandemic in March 2020. Despite reports that 
the government ceased issuing new work permits to North Korean 
laborers, observers noted many laborers continued to enter the 
country via fraudulent channels to work informally, for example 
by obtaining tourist or student visas. The government issued 2,609 
student and 256 tourist visas in 2020 to North Korean citizens, 
a decrease from 16,613 tourist and 10,345 student visas in 2019; 
however, experts noted that many of these visa holders worked 
illegally in Russia, making them vulnerable to trafficking. Additionally, 
media reported the DPRK was preparing to send workers to Russia 
in the spring of 2021. Although government representatives publicly 
stated authorities asked DPRK workers to leave voluntarily, it was not 
evident that authorities screened workers for trafficking indicators or 
offered victims options to legally remain in the country. A February 
2016 agreement between Russia and the DPRK enabled Russian 
authorities to deport North Koreans residing “illegally” in Russia, 
possibly even those with refugee status. Observers noted this may 
increase the risk of labor trafficking for North Koreans working in 
Russia and might subject victims to grave harm as DPRK authorities 
reportedly arrested, imprisoned, subjected to forced labor, tortured, 
and sometimes executed repatriated trafficking victims.
PROTECTION
The government maintained negligible efforts to protect victims. 
The government did not develop or employ a formal system to 
guide officials in proactive identification of victims or their referral 
to available services. The law did not specifically define who was a 
trafficking victim or differentiate trafficking victims from victims of 
other crimes; experts noted this hindered identification measures 
and limited access to victim services. The government reported the 
identification of 52 trafficking victims in 2020, compared with 61 
in 2019 and 19 in 2018. According to law enforcement statistics, of 
these 52 identified victims, 50 were female sex trafficking victims 
and two were male forced labor victims. Available data did not 
specify national origin in all cases, but most victims identified 
were Russian. NGOs reported identifying approximately 80 victims 
during the reporting period, none of whom were referred by the 
government. NGOs estimated the actual number of victims to be 
in the thousands. Police regularly avoided registering victims in 
criminal cases that were unlikely to be solved in order not to risk 
lower conviction rates. The government also did not have a program 
to protect or support victims who participated in the investigation 
or prosecution of their alleged traffickers. Authorities reportedly 
pressured some victims to cooperate in investigations without any 
offer of protection. Although informal cooperation between law 
enforcement and NGOs at the local level resulted in some victims 
receiving limited services, NGOs reported a significant number of 
cases go unreported due to the lack of a formal referral mechanism, 
victims’ fears, and the lack of government assistance to victims. The 
government maintained a readmission agreement with the EU to 
assist in the repatriation of Russian citizens but did not keep official 
statistics on how many trafficking victims it assisted in this way; there 
were no reported cases of trafficking victims repatriated to Russia 
under this agreement in 2020.
As in previous years, the government did not provide funding or 
programs for protective services dedicated to trafficking victims. 
NGOs provided all protection services, including shelter, food, legal 
services, basic medical and psychological support, interpretation, 
facilitating the return of documents or wages, and assisting in the 
resettlement or repatriation of victims, although few were able 
to provide specialized assistance for trafficking victims. NGOs 
reported experiencing financial hardship due to the pandemic while 
also receiving more requests for assistance. Authorities did not 
routinely screen potential victims seeking assistance at government-
funded homeless shelters for trafficking indicators; in prior years, the 
shelters provided medical and psychiatric aid, and referred victims 
to international NGOs and other homeless shelters located in many 
of Russia’s regions. As in previous years, there were no reports of 
victims assisted in these shelters in 2020; NGOs reported they do 
not send victims to these shelters because of their poor conditions 
and the risk that victims may be vulnerable to further trafficking. The 
government did not actively cooperate with civil society. Despite the 
lack of formal cooperation, NGOs reported working with some local 
government-run centers to provide assistance to potential victims 
on an ad hoc basis. The government continued the repatriation of 
Russian children, including potential trafficking victims, whose parents 
were alleged fighters with ISIS. ISIS was known to use child soldiers 
and perpetrate other forms of trafficking. The government did not 
report screening specifically for indicators of trafficking, but media 
reports indicated the children received counseling. Media reported 
the government paused repatriation flights for several months due 
to the pandemic but resumed repatriation efforts in August 2020. 
The government reported repatriating 144 children from Iraq and 
Syria in 2020; by the end of 2020, the government had repatriated 
274 children since the start of the program in 2017.
Similar to previous reporting periods, the government took steps 
to limit or ban the activities of civil society groups, including some 
dedicated to anti-trafficking activities, through measures such as 
“foreign agent” laws. Civil society reported one NGO leader was 
harassed and eventually indicted on criminal charges in 2020 for his 
efforts to raise awareness about the use of forced labor at the 2014 
Sochi winter Olympics. The government passed laws in December 
2020 that introduced new penalties and widened the definition 
of a “foreign agent” to include both individuals and unregistered 
organizations; experts believed the increased financial scrutiny that 
will be applied to NGOs as a result of these new laws will limit 





crime for individuals or organizations to provide material assistance 
to people considered to be in Russia illegally; authorities could 
prosecute NGOs who assisted unlawfully present victims of trafficking. 
Authorities also penalized victims for unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit. Authorities treated foreign victims 
as illegal migrants and criminally charged them with prostitution 
or unlawful presence in country; many victims were detained or 
deported without being screened for trafficking indicators. Authorities 
frequently prosecuted Russian and foreign victims of sex trafficking 
for engaging in commercial sex and did not take proactive measures 
to identify victims during raids on brothels. Authorities punished 
child victims of forced criminality, often together with the traffickers 
who forced them to commit these crimes. Authorities did not screen 
other vulnerable populations, such as migrant workers or foreign 
women entering Russia on student visas, despite evidence of their 
intention to work or other vulnerabilities to trafficking. Authorities 
reportedly prosecuted Russian citizens returning from Syria and Iraq, 
where some were subjected to trafficking, under anti-terror laws, 
without screening them for indicators of trafficking. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained minimal efforts to prevent trafficking. 
The government had neither a designated lead agency to coordinate 
its anti-trafficking efforts nor a body to monitor its anti-trafficking 
activities or make periodic assessments measuring its performance. 
Russia did not have a national action plan. The government continued 
to operate regional migration centers where foreign migrants who 
did not also need visas to enter the country could obtain work 
permits directly from the government; however, an international 
organization estimated only half of eligible migrants obtained 
these permits as they entailed large upfront and monthly fees and 
sometimes required multiple time-consuming trips to the center. 
The international organization noted migrants who were not able 
to complete the permit process were increasingly vulnerable to labor 
exploitation and trafficking due to their lack of proper documentation. 
Recruitment agencies that sought to employ Russians overseas were 
required to obtain a license from the ministry of internal affairs, but 
no such requirement existed for agencies recruiting foreign workers, 
which increased the vulnerability of such workers to forced labor. The 
Moscow city government financed the creation of a migration center 
in Tashkent to alert Uzbekistani migrant workers about job vacancies 
in Moscow and link them with potential employers. The center was 
designed to facilitate online interviews, background checks, and 
professional skill certification for potential migrant workers; however, 
it was unclear whether officials screened applicants for trafficking 
indicators. Authorities conducted scheduled and unannounced 
audits of firms employing foreign workers to check for violations 
of immigration and labor laws – with penalties in the form of fines 
and/or revocation of foreign worker permits. While these raids took 
place with some regularity, the use of undocumented or forced 
labor remained widespread due to complacency and corruption. 
In response to the pandemic, the government extended work and 
residence permits for foreign workers several times and allowed 
employers to hire foreign nationals and stateless persons during these 
periods. Moreover, in January 2021 the lower house of government 
approved a bill to provide temporary identity cards with a 10-year 
validity to stateless persons. The government participated in a Council 
of the Baltic Sea States project to establish long-term cooperation 
and exchange of best practices between students and teachers of 
journalism from the Baltic Sea Region on how to report on human 
trafficking. The government provided no funds to NGOs to carry out 
prevention and awareness campaigns. Prevention campaigns were 
hampered by a law that made it a crime to talk to children younger 
than 16 about sexual issues and exploitation. The government did 
not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. 
The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand for 
participation in international sex tourism by its citizens, despite 
allegations of such actions by its citizens. There were anecdotal 
reports the government provided anti-trafficking training to some 
of its diplomatic personnel.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Russia, and victims from Russia are exploited 
abroad. Although labor trafficking remains the predominant form 
of human trafficking in Russia, sex trafficking also occurs. Traffickers 
exploit workers from Russia and other countries in Europe, Central 
Asia, Southeast Asia, China, and DPRK in forced labor in Russia. 
Instances of labor trafficking have been reported in the construction, 
manufacturing, logging, textile, transport, and maritime industries, 
as well as in sawmills, agriculture, sheep farms, grocery and retail 
stores, restaurants, waste sorting, street sweeping, domestic service, 
call centers, and begging. Labor traffickers also exploit victims in 
criminal activities such as drug trafficking, facilitation of illegal 
migration, and the production of counterfeit goods. According to 
an NGO, foreign nationals increasingly enter the country illegally 
with the help of criminal groups, which subsequently increases the 
migrants’ vulnerability to trafficking. There are reports of widespread 
forced labor in brick factories in the Dagestan region. Experts estimate 
there were approximately 10-12 million foreign workers in Russia 
prior to the start of the pandemic, only 2.5 million of whom were 
formally registered; the government reported that nearly half of 
all migrants left the country as a result of the pandemic. Many of 
these migrant workers experience exploitative labor conditions 
characteristic of trafficking cases, such as withholding of identity 
documents, non-payment for services rendered, physical abuse, lack 
of safety measures, or extremely poor living conditions. According 
to an international organization, children of migrant workers are 
vulnerable to forced labor in informal sectors. According to press 
reports, 2.3 million Ukrainians resided in Russia, including more 
than one million who escaped Russian aggression in Ukraine. 
International organizations estimate up to 40 percent of these 
migrants were working unofficially and vulnerable to both forced 
labor and sex trafficking; most identified victims of forced begging 
in recent years are Ukrainian. Subcontracting practices in Russia’s 
construction industry result in cases of non-payment or slow payment 
of wages, which leave workers at risk of labor trafficking. Organized 
criminal groups often recruit victims from within their own ethnic 
communities. Traffickers have been known to pose as landlords 
renting rooms to migrant laborers in order to recruit victims and 
coerce them into forced labor. There are reports of Russian citizens 
facing forced labor abroad. Traffickers lure minors from state and 
municipal orphanages into forced begging, forced criminality, child 
pornography, sex trafficking, and use by armed groups in the Middle 
East. Organized criminal groups recruit victims for forced begging 
from state institutions for the elderly and people with disabilities; 
these institutions are not trained on how to identify trafficking and 
sometimes facilitate the exploitation. 
Women and children from Europe (predominantly Ukraine and 
Moldova), Southeast Asia (primarily China and the Philippines), 
Africa (particularly Nigeria), and Central Asia are victims of sex 
trafficking in Russia. NGOs report an increasing number of sex 
trafficking victims are from Africa, arriving illegally and legally as 
students. Sex trafficking occurs in brothels, hotels, and saunas, among 
other locations. During the 2018 World Cup, Russia relaxed its visa 
requirements, allowing all Fan ID holders to enter and exit Russia 
without a visa through December 31, 2018. Traffickers exploited 
this system to bring foreign sex trafficking victims into the country, 
especially from Nigeria; NGOs report many victims remain in Russia. 
Observers note migrant workers are also vulnerable to sex trafficking. 
Homeless children are exploited in sex trafficking. Russian women 
and children are reportedly victims of sex trafficking in Russia and 
abroad, including in Northeast Asia, Europe, Central Asia, Africa, 
the United States, and the Middle East. Traffickers use social media 
to recruit, monitor, and control victims. Russian criminal groups 
threaten family members to coerce women into commercial sex in 
Russia and abroad. Women from Russia’s North Caucasus region 
as well as women from Central Asia residing in Russia have been 
recruited to join ISIS through online romantic relationships and are 
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subjected to exploitation once they arrive. Wives and children of 
foreign fighters are sold after their spouse or father is killed in action.
The ILO Committee of Experts noted its deep concern in 2016 
that some provisions of the Russian criminal code, which include 
compulsory labor as possible punishment, are worded broadly 
enough to lend themselves to application as a means of punishment 
for the expression of views opposed to the government. Corruption 
among some government officials and within some state agencies 
creates an environment enabling trafficking crimes. In recent years, 
criminal cases have involved Russian officials suspected of allegedly 
facilitating trafficking by enabling victims’ entry into Russia, providing 
protection to traffickers, and returning victims to their exploiters; in 
some instances, officials have engaged directly in trafficking crimes. 
Employers sometimes bribe Russian officials to avoid enforcement of 
penalties for engaging illegal workers. Prior to 2018, the DPRK sent 
approximately 20,000 North Korean citizens to Russia annually for 
work in a variety of sectors, including logging in Russia’s Far East. 
An estimated 500 North Korean workers remained in Russia as of 
March 2020, as did approximately 2,865 North Korean citizens who 
entered on student and tourist visas in 2020; observers note a growing 
trend in the use of non-labor visas to bring DPRK workers to Russia. 
Many of these North Korean citizens are subjected to conditions of 
forced labor by the North Korean government.
Russia-led forces reportedly recruit Syrian children to guard 
installations and fight in Libya. Uncorroborated reports of Russia-
led forces using children as soldiers, informants, and human shields 
in eastern Ukraine continue, but the number of such reports has 
decreased since the early years of the conflict. Russia-led forces 
reportedly used children to take direct and indirect part in the armed 
conflict to perform armed duty at checkpoints, and served as fighters, 
guards, mailpersons, and secretaries.
RWANDA: TIER 2
The Government of Rwanda does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Rwanda remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
identifying more victims and referring them to care; increasing 
national awareness and prevention campaigns; and organizing 
government and NGO long-term care shelters into a government-
managed network. The government also increased sex trafficking 
investigations and prosecutions and convicted a sex trafficker for 
the first time. However, the government did not meet the minimum 
standards in several key areas. The government investigated fewer 
trafficking cases and prosecuted and convicted fewer traffickers 
compared to the previous year. The government lacked a victim-
witness support program and did not maintain shelters for male 
victims. The government detained thousands of potential victims 
in district transit centers without conducting adequate screening or 
referring identified victims to proper care and assistance. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Systematically and proactively screen and identify trafficking victims, 
especially among vulnerable populations, including among gender-
based violence (GBV) victims, persons in commercial sex, those from 
the LGBTQI+ community, children experiencing homelessness, and 
those at government transit centers. • Increase effective trafficking 
investigations and prosecutions, particularly domestic forced labor 
and sex trafficking cases, while respecting due process and human 
rights. • Finalize and implement the national referral mechanism 
and train officials on its use. • Develop and implement a victim-
witness support program and expand training for law enforcement 
and legal professionals working with victim-witnesses. • Expand 
victim and shelter services, including for male victims. • Adopt 
and implement an updated national anti-trafficking action plan. • 
Implement trafficking identification and protection measures for 
Rwanda’s refugee population. • Develop and implement a centralized 
data system of trafficking crimes, with data disaggregated by type of 
trafficking, and train law enforcement and immigration officials in 
relevant ministries on its use.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained mixed law enforcement efforts to 
combat trafficking crimes. The 2018 anti-trafficking law criminalized 
sex trafficking and labor trafficking. The law prescribed penalties of 
10 to 15 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 10 million to 15 million 
Rwandan francs ($10,530 to $15,790), which increased to 20 to 25 
years’ imprisonment and a fine of 20 million to 25 million Rwandan 
francs ($21,050 to $26,320) if the offense was transnational in nature. 
These penalties were sufficiently stringent, and with regard to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other serious 
crimes, such as rape. However, the law defined trafficking broadly to 
include illegal adoption without the purpose of exploitation. The fact 
that the government did not compile disaggregated data on trafficking 
crimes made year-to-year comparisons difficult. Although sporadic 
pandemic-related lockdowns throughout the reporting period and 
increased efforts to enforce lockdown and curfew directives impeded 
law enforcement efforts to investigate trafficking crimes, authorities 
initiated 35 trafficking investigations (12 on sex trafficking and 23 on 
labor trafficking) involving 46 suspects, compared to 86 investigations 
in 2019 and 63 in 2018. The government prosecuted three cases—
two labor trafficking cases and one sex trafficking case—involving 
two defendants, compared to prosecuting 11 labor trafficking cases 
involving nine alleged traffickers during the previous reporting 
period. Courts convicted one trafficker for both forced labor and 
sex trafficking crimes, and a second trafficker for forced labor; both 
received 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 10 million Rwandan 
francs ($10,530) on the labor trafficking charges and sentenced one 
defendant to an additional 20 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 20 
million Rwandan francs ($21,050) for sex trafficking. This was the 
government’s first reported sex trafficking conviction. Comparatively, 
in 2019, the government convicted two traffickers for forced labor 
crimes and sentenced them to 20 years’ imprisonment plus a fine of 20 
million Rwandan francs ($21,050). Prosecutions of nine defendants 
remained pending from previous years. A six-week government 
closure due to the pandemic hampered law enforcement efforts. 
The government reported border closures due to the pandemic 
limited law enforcement’s ability to identify and investigate potential 
trafficking cases at border points. Observers reported work from home 
slowed law enforcement and judicial court proceedings. Observers 
also reported senior government officials directed law enforcement 
to enforce pandemic-related curfews, which reduced capacity to 
investigate potential trafficking crimes. The government did not 
report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government 
employees complicit in human trafficking offenses. 
Scarce resources, deficient operating procedures, and a lack of a 
centralized data system inhibited law enforcement efforts to investigate 
trafficking cases, prosecute suspected perpetrators, and convict 





cases and interceptions at border crossings and did not prioritize 
identifying and investigating possible internal trafficking crimes. 
Although the government reported sharing information with other 
governments, it reported difficulty obtaining evidence for domestic 
and transnational investigations and prosecutions. In February 2020, 
the government entered into an extradition agreement with Uganda; 
however, the government did not report using the agreement during 
the reporting period. 
Rwanda Investigation Bureau (RIB) continued to operate a 15-officer 
anti-trafficking unit in its criminal investigations division. The 
Rwanda National Police (RNP) directorate responsible for anti-GBV 
efforts also oversaw anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts and 
had three officers in each of the country’s 78 police stations who 
served as points of contact for trafficking victims. Despite limited 
resources, the government increased training to law enforcement 
and legal practitioners; it provided anti-trafficking training as part 
of its professional development curricula and standard training for 
immigration officers, police, labor inspectors, judicial officials, social 
workers, and other relevant officials several times throughout the 
reporting period. In addition, the government trained 1,452 law 
enforcement officials and one-stop center personnel as well as 22 
service providers from various government institutions, civil society 
organizations, and NGOs on trafficking and the identification, 
treatment, and referral of trafficking victims, compared to training 
308 individuals during the previous reporting period. Additionally, 
the government collaborated with an international organization to 
provide training to 15 immigration officials on the prosecution of 
trafficking crimes. In June 2020, the government sponsored a training 
for 15 prosecutors and their assistants on investigating trafficking cases 
and prosecuting suspects. The government also collaborated with a 
foreign government to provide training to an unknown number of 
officials on the victim-centered approach in law enforcement efforts.
PROTECTION
The government minimally increased protection efforts. The 
government identified and referred more victims to care, but it 
neglected to conduct adequate screening of potential victims detained 
at government transit and detention centers. The government 
identified 131 trafficking victims in 2020, compared with 96 victims 
in 2019. Officials referred 37 victims to government and NGO 
shelters for assistance, compared to 30 during the previous reporting 
period. In 2019, the government collaborated with an international 
organization to develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) for 
victim identification and referral; however, due to limitations imposed 
by the pandemic, the government did not finalize and implement the 
SOPs during the reporting period. Law enforcement, immigration 
officials, and social workers in government one-stop centers had 
victim identification guidelines, but implementation remained 
limited and officials reported lacking knowledge and training to 
screen specifically for trafficking among GBV victims they assisted. 
In addition, sources reported challenges distinguishing trafficking 
from other crimes such as forced marriage, abduction, commercial 
sex, migrant smuggling, and rape; concurrently, sources reported a 
need for gender-specific victim identification procedures. Immigration 
authorities emphasized screening of foreign workers for trafficking 
indicators when such workers arrived at border posts. 
The government decreased funding for victim care due to pandemic-
related budget shortfalls; it dedicated 206 million Rwandan francs 
($216,840) for victim care in 2020 compared to 233 million Rwandan 
francs ($245,260) in 2019. Despite decreased funding, the government 
continued to operate its network of 44 one-stop centers to assist GBV 
and trafficking victims. The government’s one-stop centers—located 
in hospitals and district capitals—provided short-term shelter and 
psycho-social, medical, and legal services to victims. The government 
did not report how many trafficking victims it assisted at the one-
stop centers; however, NGOs reported assisting 21 victims referred by 
the one-stop centers. NGOs reported the one-stop centers primarily 
focused on the needs of female victims; assistance for male victims 
remained insufficient and service providers lacked knowledge on 
how to prevent further trauma and revictimization. The government 
organized 16 government-run and 12 NGO-run shelters into a network 
for the provision of longer-term care; the government operated and 
oversaw the network during the reporting periods. The long-term 
shelters provided up to six months of shelter services for human 
trafficking and GBV victims.  The extent and quality of services varied 
between locations, particularly regarding the provision of adequate 
psycho-social counseling, and social workers did not always screen 
and identify trafficking victims as distinct from GBV victims. The 
government continued to distribute to all relevant stakeholders a 
directory of service providers to assist trafficking victims developed 
in the previous reporting period, in partnership with an international 
organization. The government and NGOs reported adult victims were 
free to leave shelters and support programs on their own accord. 
NGOs reported foreign victims had the same access to services as 
domestic victims. The government reported providing and funding 
counseling services, medical care, literacy and numeracy education, 
and vocational training for the reintegration of identified former 
child soldiers – both boys and girls – and treating and discharging a 
total of 82 children in 2020. NGO service providers offered general 
assistance and support in refugee camps, but a lack of capacity and 
resources inhibited the development and implementation of effective 
procedures, screening, and assistance to victims of trafficking in refugee 
camps. NGOs reported a lack of coordination and collaboration 
between the government and civil society inhibited their ability to 
provide assistance for trafficking victims. 
The 2018 anti-trafficking law stated that trafficking victims should 
not be detained, charged, or prosecuted for their involvement in any 
unlawful activity that was a direct consequence of being exploited. 
However, due to a lack of formal identification procedures, authorities 
sometimes penalized victims for forced begging and other crimes their 
traffickers compelled them to commit. The government continued 
operating transit centers that advocacy groups and NGOs reported 
detained vulnerable persons and potential trafficking victims – 
including those in commercial sex, homeless adults and children, 
members of the LGBTQI+ community, foreign nationals, and children 
in street vending and forced begging – and did not adequately 
screen for trafficking indicators. Observers reported the government 
held many potential victims of trafficking in these centers, which 
functioned as de facto detention facilities, for up to six months. 
Observers further noted that authorities often released detainees back 
on the streets abruptly and without notice, thereby exposing them 
to possible revictimization. Former detainees often reported being 
detained and moving through the detention centers a few times a 
year. NGOs also reported law enforcement officials may have arrested 
on immigration charges and deported potential foreign trafficking 
victims without first screening for trafficking indicators. While some 
centers provided detainees and identified victims with psychological 
counseling, education, vocational training, and reintegration services, 
not all transit centers offered the same services.
The government repatriated an unknown number of Rwandan 
victims identified abroad. The anti-trafficking law also required 
the government to provide support to identified trafficking victims 
abroad by covering the cost of transportation and repatriation to 
Rwanda. In 2020, the Ministry of Justice and the Directorate General 
for Immigration and Emigration drafted two ministerial orders to 
clarify responsibilities for interagency coordination to support the 
repatriation of victims and coordination of efforts to identify and 
assist internal victims; however, the government had not released the 
orders by the end of the reporting period. Media and NGOs reported 
victims received support packages of 250,000 Rwandan francs ($263) 
upon reintegration into their home communities. In 2019, the 
government collaborated with an international organization to draft 
SOPs to serve as the basis for these ministerial orders; however, the 
SOPs had yet to be adopted at the end of the reporting period. The 
2018 anti-trafficking law called for the government to provide legal 
assistance and information to victims in a language they understood; 




victims to whom it provided such assistance. The National Public 
Prosecution Authority continued to operate two safe houses for 
witnesses in criminal cases, which were available to trafficking victims; 
however, the government did not report the number of trafficking 
victims who used safe houses during the reporting period. An NGO 
previously reported that seven of the one-stop centers had video 
recording equipment to allow victims the ability to testify via video 
testimony; however, the government did not report using this option 
during the reporting period. The anti-trafficking law also protected the 
identity of victims by allowing court proceedings to be conducted by 
camera and permitting the use of a video link, but the government 
did not report providing any victims with these protections during 
the reporting period. The anti-trafficking law continued to permit 
foreign victims to remain in Rwanda for a minimum of six months 
or until legal proceedings concluded. The government did not report 
whether it granted this immigration relief to any victims during the 
reporting period; however, the government did report efforts not to 
deport foreign victims who faced retribution in their home countries. 
The anti-trafficking law continued to allow victims to file civil suits 
against traffickers and stated that victims were exempt from paying 
any associated filing fees, but the government did not report any 
suits filed during the reporting period.
PREVENTION
The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
interagency anti-trafficking technical committee continued to lead 
coordinated national anti-trafficking efforts and met every two 
months despite insufficient funding and pandemic-related closures. 
Due to the government’s lockdown and strict curfews during the 
pandemic, the government had not yet adopted the draft national 
action plan drafted in partnership with an international organization 
and quasi-governmental entities in the previous reporting period. 
During the reporting period, the government drafted two ministerial 
orders to clarify responsibilities of interagency coordination to 
combat human trafficking as well as responsibilities on victim 
protection and referral; due to the pandemic lockdown, work-from-
home logistical and resource limitations, and the government’s 
efforts to mitigate pandemic-related economic and social issues, 
the orders remained unsigned at the end of the reporting period. 
The government continued its ad hoc monitoring of trafficking 
trends and anti-trafficking efforts and incorporated the results 
into regular public activity reports; the government consulted with 
victims and survivors and included their input when developing the 
national action plan. Due to the domestic effects of the pandemic, 
the government and an international organization reported a need 
for more detailed assessments of internal trafficking and efforts to 
combat it. The government conducted national and local awareness-
raising campaigns at community events, government celebrations, and 
within refugee camps. In January 2021, the government conducted 
an awareness raising campaign in Rusizi. The government conducted, 
in collaboration with an international organization, cross-border 
community dialogue meetings, roundtable discussions, trainings, 
live radio talk shows, and awareness messaging and campaigns on 
national news broadcasts and social media across seven districts, 
which involved community leaders and members, civil society 
representatives, teachers, parents, and victims. An international 
organization reported the government increased radio and social 
media programs to increase awareness of trafficking threats and 
facilitated video presentations in refugee camps to educate refugees 
and asylum-seekers on identification and reporting of trafficking 
cases and tips. RIB, RNP, and other government agencies and human 
rights commissions continued to operate national hotlines for 
reporting crimes, including trafficking, that were staffed by social 
workers trained to identify and refer trafficking cases. These hotlines 
accommodated speakers in English, French, Kinyarwanda, and 
Kiswahili, and advertised in public awareness campaigns on TV, 
radio, and social media. The government reported identifying nine 
victims via the hotline. The government made efforts to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex acts. The government deployed officers 
to discourage consumers from frequenting commercial sex locations 
by arresting women in the commercial sex industry; however, the 
government did not report screening for sex trafficking victims at 
these locations. 
The government had policies to regulate labor recruitment companies, 
which required their registration with the Rwandan Development 
Board, licensing from the Ministry of Labor, submission of monthly 
reports to the government, writing labor contracts in one of the 
official languages and in a language that both the employee and 
employer understand, and including salary, date of payment, and 
dispute settlement procedures in employment contracts. Nevertheless, 
observers reported the government did not require labor contracts 
with foreign companies operating in Rwanda. The government 
reported labor inspectors and local authorities were trained to 
identify forced labor; however, NGOs reported the limited number 
of inspectors and insufficient funds hindered the government’s 
labor inspections. The government reportedly prosecuted fraudulent 
recruitment companies in the past; however, there were no reports 
of these efforts during the reporting period nor were there reports 
of efforts to rectify other labor issues identified by the researchers. 
In an effort to reduce vulnerability to trafficking, the government 
implemented a policy to allow hospital and health centers to register 
babies immediately after birth. The government and an international 
organization carried out joint refugee verification exercises where 
authorities issued refugee identity cards and travel documents 
throughout the reporting period. In February 2020, the president 
ordered military forces to ensure all recruits were at least 18 years 
of age at intake; the government’s age verification program was 
ongoing at the end of the reporting period. The government sought 
coordination with other governments on transnational labor issues. 
In 2019, the government signed a framework agreement with United 
Arab Emirates to allow further agreements on labor safety and worker 
recruitment; implementation of the agreement remained pending 
at the end of the reporting period. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Rwanda, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Rwanda abroad. Traffickers exploit Rwandan children and young 
adults, some of whom are secondary school students between the 
ages of 13 and 18 in commercial sex in hotels, at times with the 
cooperation of hotel owners. Traffickers subject Rwandan men, 
women, and children to sex trafficking and forced labor in domestic 
work, and in the agricultural, mining, industrial, and service sectors 
in Rwanda. Traffickers exploit Rwandan women and girls in forced 
labor, specifically in domestic service, bars, and restaurants, and exploit 
men and boys in forced labor in mines and plantations. Traffickers 
subject Rwandan adults and children to sex trafficking and forced 
labor in domestic work, agricultural, industrial, and service sectors 
abroad, including in China, India, Kenya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Uganda, Zambia, and parts of East Asia. NGOs reported cultural 
norms minimized laborers’ rights and consequently made identifying 
forced labor difficult. Traffickers transited victims through Uganda 
and Tanzania before reaching final destinations that include African, 
East Asian, and Middle Eastern countries. In 2016, Tanzanian men 
forced some Rwandan girls into marriages and these girls may have 
experienced commercial sexual exploitation through these marriages. 
Observers reported an increase in domestic trafficking, possibly due 
to the impact of the pandemic. International organizations reported 
increased vulnerability to trafficking among Rwandans due to the 
pandemic and a dwindling economy. Migrant workers migrated 
from rural areas to urban areas, specifically Kigali, in search of job 
opportunities and, consequently, became vulnerable to traffickers. 
Observers reported pandemic-related border closures reduced the 
number of victims transiting out of the country. Traffickers target 
vulnerable populations such as youth experiencing homelessness, 
orphaned children, children with disabilities, young women and girls, 
unemployed adults, and internally displaced persons. International 





servitude and then force them into prostitution. In October 2020, 
an NGO reported forced street begging as a new form of trafficking 
exacerbated by the pandemic. Observers report parents renting out 
their children during the day to beg. Local human rights groups 
reported in 2017 employers of some Rwandan girls in domestic work 
terminated their employment after the girls became pregnant and 
were therefore unable to return to their home villages; subsequently, 
they were sexually exploited. An international organization reported 
that 43 percent of children with disabilities did not attend school, 
increasing their vulnerability to be targeted by traffickers. In 2019, an 
international organization reported a number of children living in 
refugee camps may have departed the country to the DRC for unknown 
reasons and observers suggested the children might have joined armed 
groups operating in the DRC. In 2020 and 2018, an international 
organization reported Rwandan children were demobilized from 
armed groups in the DRC. Traffickers in neighboring countries 
continue to pose as labor recruitment agents to recruit and transport 
small numbers of victims through the country. A study found that 
most victims were Rwandan or Burundian in origin, and traffickers 
tended to transit victims through porous borders. Victims tend to 
know traffickers and recruiters; researchers report parents of victims 
occasionally were complicit in trafficking. Traffickers tend to be 
male, but females increasingly make up a substantial percentage of 
traffickers. Sometimes parents send their children to live with relatives 
to improve their economic situation, but the children become victims 
of child sex trafficking or domestic servitude. Traffickers deceive 
guardians and victims with false promises of better opportunities 
for employment in neighboring countries. Greater access to the 
internet and social media platforms continues to create new and 
easier opportunities for traffickers to access and recruit victims. 
Observers report traffickers employ coercive means to control and 
keep their victims in their exploitive positions; coercive tactics include 
isolating and restricting victims’ movements, depriving them of 
money, restricting their ability to communicate, threat and use of 
violence, drugs, debt bondage for children of victims, and retaining 
identity or travel documents. 
Sources report traffickers move victims more easily across borders 
due to a trilateral agreement among the governments of Kenya, 
Rwanda, and Uganda that allows foreign nationals to use national 
identification in lieu of a passport. In 2019, sources reported a new 
migration pattern developed by traffickers transiting victims through 
each of these countries on their way to Ethiopia and Kenya before 
they embark on their journey to the Middle East. In 2020, Rwanda 
hosted 146,000 refugees and asylum seekers from the DRC and 
Burundi. Refugees fleeing conflict and political violence in Burundi 
and the DRC remain highly vulnerable to trafficking in Rwanda 
due to an inability to secure legitimate employment and stigma 
within the country, and some are exploited by traffickers in other 
countries after transiting Rwanda. Researchers report some parents in 
refugee camps receive money in exchange for their daughters’ work 
in domestic service or in the commercial sex industry. Researchers 
report Burundians and Congolese were at risk for trafficking. There 
were no reports of forcible or coerced recruitment out of the Mahama 
refugee camp by Rwandan government officials since 2015.
SAINT LUCIA: TIER 2
The Government of Saint Lucia does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Saint Lucia remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
updating standard operating procedures for victim identification 
and referral to protective services; hiring an additional judge and two 
prosecutors to address criminal case backlog, including trafficking 
cases; funding an NGO for victim assistance; granting citizenship 
to a foreign trafficking victim; and receiving Cabinet approval for 
an amendment to make the penalties for trafficking commensurate 
with penalties for other serious crimes. However, the government 
did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. The 
government did not conduct any trafficking investigations using the 
Counter-Trafficking Act; has not initiated a prosecution since 2015; 
and has never convicted a trafficker. The government did not enact 
or fund a new national action plan. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Increase efforts to identify vulnerable individuals, especially 
children, migrants, and Cuban medical professionals, screen them 
for trafficking, and refer them to services. • Investigate, prosecute, 
convict, and punish perpetrators of sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
under the Counter-Trafficking Act. • Approve the amendment to the 
anti-trafficking law to remove sentencing provisions that allow fines in 
lieu of imprisonment for sex trafficking offenses. • Develop a national 
action plan for 2020 and onwards. • Reduce court backlog and pretrial 
detention delays affecting trafficking cases. • Develop and implement 
labor recruitment policies, hire and train more inspectors for labor 
trafficking inspections, and improve interagency coordination on 
labor issues. • Implement standard operating procedures on a 
victim-centered approach to guide police, immigration, labor, child 
protection, judicial, and social welfare officials on victim identification 
and referral. • Continue to train law enforcement officials to gather 
evidence of trafficking cases appropriate for prosecution. • Provide 
legal mechanisms for all victims to work and receive temporary 
formal residency status.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained minimal law enforcement efforts. The 
2010 Counter-Trafficking Act criminalized sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment 
or fines up to 100,000 Eastern Caribbean dollars (XCD) ($37,040) 
for offenses involving an adult victim; the maximum imprisonment 
penalty increased to 10 years’ imprisonment for those involving a child 
victim. This penalty was sufficiently stringent; however, by allowing 
for a fine in lieu of imprisonment, the prescribed punishment for 
sex trafficking was not commensurate with those for other serious 
crimes, such as rape. The Cabinet approved an amendment to the 
2010 Counter-Trafficking Act that would remove the option of 
a standalone fine as a penalty for convicted traffickers; the draft 
amendment remained pending for passage in Parliament at the 
end of the reporting period because pandemic-related restrictions 
precluded its consideration. 
The government did not conduct any trafficking investigations 
during the reporting period, compared with three investigations in 
2019, two in 2018, zero in 2017, and three in 2016. The government 
reported investigating 30 child sex trafficking cases under the Child 
Justice Act, of which an NGO referred 28, but did not specify under 
which provisions of the law. After the NGO notified the human 
trafficking task force of the cases, the task force reported it would 
share the Counter-Trafficking Act with the police and encourage them 
to treat the cases as trafficking cases. The government continued to 
seek authorization from a foreign government to send investigators 
to neighboring country to investigate an unauthorized international 
adoption case involving the suspected trafficking of two children 
initiated in the previous reporting period. The government has 
not initiated a trafficking prosecution since 2015. The government 
has never convicted a trafficker, and courts have closed trials or 
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dismissed charges in all trafficking prosecutions since 2016. Police 
suspended surveillance and sting operations normally carried out 
at nightclubs and sporting events during the reporting period due 
to the pandemic. Observers reported significant court backlogs and 
pretrial detention of defendants for all serious crimes, including 
trafficking cases, that could last as long as six years. The government 
hired an additional judge and two prosecutors to help reduce the 
backlog of such cases. There was no separate budget for trafficking 
cases, and court resources remained limited. The Royal Saint Lucian 
Police Force had three officers in the Major Crimes Unit dedicated to 
trafficking investigations, and its Vulnerable Persons Unit could also 
investigate potential trafficking cases involving children or sexual 
exploitation. The government did not report any investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit 
in trafficking offenses. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained protection efforts. The government did 
not identify any potential trafficking victims. The NGO noted the 28 
victims it identified was higher than in previous years, when it referred, 
on average, one individual per year; it attributed the increase to greater 
financial insecurity as a result of the pandemic. The government 
identified two child trafficking victims in 2019, zero victims between 
2016 and 2018, and ten victims in 2015. Authorities used standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) for victim identification, referral, and 
protection; the task force formally approved updates to these SOPs 
in March 2021. The government reported hiring 113 Cuban medical 
workers to assist in the pandemic response and signed a bilateral 
agreement with Cuba governing the work and living arrangements for 
the medical professionals. The government reported the agreement 
provided the workers with free living accommodations, free dental 
and medical care, and a stipend that varied based on position (i.e., 
doctor, nurse, or administrative). The government did not specify 
whether it paid the Cubans directly but said the medical workers 
remained in physical possession of their passports. The government 
did not report additional measures to screen the individuals for 
trafficking indicators. The police screened an unknown number of 
individuals involved in a human smuggling operation for trafficking 
indicators and did not identify any as trafficking victims. Specially 
trained police officers interviewed potential trafficking victims and 
reported generally screening for trafficking indicators when detaining 
or arresting individuals involved in commercial sex, migrants, and 
those in other vulnerable groups. Police lacked sensitization and 
training on sex trafficking and sex tourism, particularly involving 
children. 
The government reported it worked with NGOs and encouraged them 
to report cases. The government did not maintain a dedicated shelter 
for trafficking victims and had an agreement with NGOs to provide 
shelter for victims when the need arose; the government did not report 
referring any victims to NGO shelters during the reporting period. 
The government reported it provided 72,000 XCD ($26,670) in 2020 
to fund an NGO to provide victim assistance including shelter, food, 
clothing, and counseling services. The government allocated 81,000 
XCD ($30,000) in the federal budget for trafficking-related activities 
in 2019, including victim protection and assistance, but no confirmed 
trafficking victims were identified during the reporting period. The 
government did not allocate any funds for victim protection in 
2018 and 2017, compared with 1 million XCD ($370,370) in 2016 
for victim care related to a 2015 labor trafficking prosecution. The 
Division of Human Services entitled victims to counseling, meals, 
accommodation, medical care, toiletries, clothing, and in some cases, 
allowances; the government did not report providing these services 
during the reporting period. The Office of Gender Relations could 
refer trafficking victims to NGOs for legal, health, advocacy, and 
crisis services. Adult victims were able to leave shelters at-will, but the 
government did not allow them to work or receive formal residency 
status because it considered victims wards of the state; however, 
the government permitted victims who were material witnesses in 
a criminal case to remain and work in the country. The Division of 
Human Services could place child victims in one of two children’s 
homes, but it did not report doing so during the reporting period. 
The 2010 Counter-Trafficking Act contained victim protection 
provisions, such as privacy measures, the ability to testify via video 
link, and witness protection, to encourage victims to participate 
in the investigation and prosecution of traffickers. The law also 
provided for victim restitution and other compensation in cases of 
traffickers’ conviction. The government did not report using these 
provisions during the reporting period. Foreign victims had the same 
access to care as domestic victims, and the government could assist 
foreign victims seeking repatriation. During the reporting period, 
the government granted citizenship to a Sri Lankan trafficking victim 
and began processing a citizenship application from another Sri 
Lankan trafficking victim who held refugee status; the case remained 
pending at the end of the reporting period.
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. With the 
support of the Prime Minister, the Ministry of Home Affairs and the 
Ministry of National Security led the task force consisting of relevant 
agencies and NGOs, which met in March 2021. In response to the 
pandemic, the government shut its borders and effectively stopped 
tourism from late March 2020 to July 2020 and then imposed strict 
entry requirements during a COVID-19 outbreak from October 2020 
to the end of the reporting period; authorities diverted government 
resources, including those for trafficking and the task force, to its 
pandemic response. The government diverted further resources, 
including those for trafficking, to address an outbreak of dengue 
fever. In addition, government personnel focused primarily on the 
pandemic response and worked from home due to social distancing 
requirements, inhibiting the government’s ability to implement 
anti-trafficking efforts. The government reported the official in 
charge of drafting the new national action plan was diverted to the 
Ministry of Education as it began to implement new virtual public 
education efforts in response to pandemic-related restrictions. The 
task force canceled all its public awareness events and in-person 
trainings, including for diplomats. The task force reported issuing 
trafficking-related press releases and promoting trafficking awareness 
on social media. The public could still make referrals through a police 
command center control room and 24-hour hotline launched in 
2019, which handled calls in English and Saint Lucian Creole French; 
the government did not report any trafficking-related referrals from 
the hotline during the reporting period. In 2020, the government 
started a comprehensive study to provide recommendations on 
targeting economic development plans to reduce the vulnerability 
of economic populations to trafficking and other crimes; the study 
remained ongoing at the end of the reporting period. 
The government did not report any changes to its regulations and 
oversight of labor recruitment or efforts to regulate recruitment 
practices. While labor laws prohibited most forms of forced or 
compulsory labor, the government did not enforce them effectively. 
Expert observers noted there were not enough trained labor inspectors 
to monitor all sectors for labor trafficking and that inspectors usually 
visited suspect areas only after receiving a complaint. In addition, 
coordination between ministries and departments dealing with 
labor issues was poor, hindering enforcement efforts. In 2020, the 
government reviewed the Labor Act, which specified the Labor 
Department’s authorities; the Attorney General was reviewing the 
revised draft legislation at the end of the reporting period. Authorities 
cited limited resources and pandemic-related restrictions as the 
reasons for a 50 percent reduction in labor inspections during the 
reporting period. The Labor Department reported an insufficient 
operational budget in 2020, and authorities said inspectors did not 
have enough office facilities, telephone and inspection tools, or 
transportation to access some remote areas. Authorities reported all 
inspections looked for child labor, but they did not conduct child 
labor-specific inspections; inspectors did not receive child labor-








sex tourism during the reporting period, nor did it take measures to 
reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Saint Lucia, and traffickers exploit victims 
from Saint Lucia abroad. Traffickers exploit local children in sex 
trafficking. Government officials, civil society, and educators reported 
Saint Lucian children from economically disadvantaged families 
are at risk of child sex trafficking, often encouraged or forced by 
parents and caretakers in exchange for goods or services. NGOs 
reported an increase in suspected cases of sex trafficking involving 
children during the reporting period. Civil society has also reported 
women, or in some cases older teenagers, recruit younger children 
to provide commercial sex to adults at street parties. Documented 
and undocumented migrants from the Caribbean and South Asia, 
including domestic workers, are vulnerable to trafficking. Foreign 
women who work in strip clubs and in commercial sex are at risk of 
sex trafficking. NGOs report that disadvantaged young women from 
rural areas are vulnerable to sex trafficking, and children from poor 
communities are also vulnerable to sexual exploitation. According 
to the government, business owners from Saint Lucia, India, China, 
Cuba, and Russia are the most likely traffickers in the country. Cuban 
medical professionals working in Saint Lucia may have been forced 
to work by the Cuban government.
ST. VINCENT AND  
THE GRENADINES: TIER 2
The Government of St. Vincent and the Grenadines does not fully 
meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but 
is making significant efforts to do so. The government demonstrated 
overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, 
considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-
trafficking capacity; therefore St. Vincent and the Grenadines remained 
on Tier 2. These efforts included increased training for police, the 
addition of an NGO as a member of the Anti Trafficking in Persons 
Unit (ATIPU), the updating and funding of an anti-trafficking national 
action plan, and expanded public awareness campaigns. However, 
the government did not meet the minimum standards in several key 
areas. Authorities have not prosecuted a trafficking case since 2015 
and have never convicted a trafficker. The government’s anti-trafficking 
law, which allowed for fines in lieu of imprisonment, was not 
commensurate with penalties for other serious crimes. Government 
agencies cited a lack of resources for anti-trafficking efforts. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase investigations of suspected sex and labor trafficking cases, 
particularly among children. • Vigorously prosecute and convict 
traffickers, and sentence convicted traffickers to significant prison 
terms. • Amend the trafficking law to remove sentencing provisions 
allowing fines in lieu of imprisonment for sex trafficking offenses. • 
Increase government funding and resources across all relevant agencies 
to combat trafficking. • Improve the quality and specialization of 
victim services. • Screen vulnerable populations, including Cuban 
medical workers, for trafficking indicators and refer trafficking victims 
to care. • Focus training for police, prosecutors, and the judiciary on 
improved evidence collection in trafficking cases, ensuring evidence 
presented meets applicable legal standards. • Increase the capacity 
of labor inspectors to identify and refer to care victims of labor 
trafficking, including children. • Eliminate recruitment or placement 
fees charged to workers. • Continue to raise awareness about labor 
trafficking and sex trafficking and the need for public cooperation 
in law enforcement investigations in traditional and social media. 
• Create new bilateral agreements with relevant source countries to 
better coordinate and combat trafficking.
PROSECUTION 
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. The Prevention 
of Trafficking in Persons Act of 2011 criminalized sex trafficking and 
labor trafficking and prescribed punishments of up to 15 years’ 
imprisonment, a fine of 250,000 Eastern Caribbean dollars ($92,590), 
or both. These penalties were sufficiently stringent; however, by 
allowing for a fine in lieu of imprisonment, the penalties for sex 
trafficking offenses were not commensurate with those for other 
serious crimes, such as rape. 
The ATIPU investigated one case of labor trafficking, compared with 
five suspected cases in 2019 and four cases in 2018. The case involved 
one alleged trafficker and eight potential victims, all of whom were 
young women recruited to work as nannies and housekeepers in the 
Grenadines. Authorities did not prosecute the suspected trafficker 
during the reporting period; the investigation remained ongoing. 
Authorities did not prosecute any alleged traffickers under the 
Trafficking Act during the reporting period, with the last prosecution 
in 2015, and the government has never convicted a trafficker. The 
lack of prosecutions – including in the latest case – and convictions 
and the dismissal of past trafficking cases over several years indicated 
shortcomings in the government’s ability to acquire sufficient 
evidence to bring cases to trial. Authorities indicated the police 
needed additional personnel and resources to investigate and collect 
evidence effectively in trafficking cases. The ATIPU reported it needed 
additional staff, computer and office equipment, office space, and 
a dedicated vehicle to combat human trafficking more effectively. 
During the reporting period, the ATIPU had to request vehicles on 
an ad hoc basis from the police force’s general motor pool. The 
pandemic response restricted the ATIPU’s activities, and investigative 
agencies reported a reduction in reports of suspected trafficking cases. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, 
or convictions of government employees complicit in trafficking 
offenses. Court cases for all matters during the reporting period were 
delayed due to physical distancing restrictions due to the pandemic; 
the government suspended jury trials from mid-March through late 
June 2020, while pre-trial hearings took place virtually. The ATIPU 
conducted surveillance at the airport and seaports of entry, marinas, 
bars, and nightclubs, entertainment spots, restaurants, beaches, and 
social events to identify possible signs of recruitment of potential 
trafficking victims. The government reported that a lack of awareness 
about human trafficking impeded the public from reporting suspected 
trafficking cases and cooperating on trafficking investigations. The 
ATIPU funded and conducted specialized anti-trafficking training 
– covering the law and trial process, child trafficking, victim care, 
trafficking indicators, and causes and consequences of the crime – 
for 181 new police recruits, the entire staff of the Sexual Offenses 
Unit, and more experienced police officers taking a refresher course. 
The ATIPU reported sharing human trafficking information with 
regional organizations and with three foreign governments in the 
region to compare case similarities and learn from their experience 
in identifying and handling trafficking cases. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained minimal victim protection efforts. 
Authorities screened eight potential trafficking victims in 2020, 
compared with five in 2019 and four in 2018. The government 
reported that a formal referral procedure existed for potential 
trafficking victims, by which the ATIPU, immigration department, 
or labor department had responsibility to interview and screen 
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potential victims, and then refer those identified as victims to a 
crisis center the government funded and operated in collaboration 
with NGOs for victims of domestic violence and trafficking; the 
center offered a shelter, social care, and medical, psychological, and 
financial assistance. The government reported that adult victims had 
the option to leave the shelter at will. Some observers noted that 
the government’s victim referral process did not include referrals 
from civil society and kept potential victims in law enforcement 
custody instead of moving them to the crisis center. The government 
did not provide shelter facilities for male victims, and outside 
observers noted the quality of care for victims was not sufficient. 
During the reporting period, the government provided funding to 
the Ministry of National Security, which oversaw the ATIPU, but it 
did not report the specific amount provided for trafficking victim 
services, as it was allocated through existing budgets of different 
ministries. Provisions in the trafficking act called for protections 
for victims before, during, and after a trial, such as keeping the 
names of victims and their families confidential, witness protection 
programs, and facilities for victims to testify via video; however, the 
government did not use these provisions for any victims during the 
reporting period. The anti-trafficking law provided foreign victims 
with the possibility of temporary and permanent residence permits 
and protected victims from immediate deportation; victim benefits 
were not linked to cooperation with law enforcement. Authorities 
did not grant temporary or permanent residency to any victims 
during the reporting period. Foreign victims who remained in the 
country were allowed to work. The government did not report any 
cases where the courts ordered restitution paid to trafficking victims 
during the reporting period; it also did not report any situations 
where victims required government assistance with repatriation. 
The government invited Cuban medical workers in the country to 
assist in the pandemic healthcare response and signed a bilateral 
agreement with Cuba governing the work and living arrangements 
for the medical professionals. The government reported Cuban 
medical workers retained their passports; however, authorities did 
not report screening the medical workers for trafficking indicators or 
implementing measures to ensure workers kept their wages. 
PREVENTION 
The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking. The national 
task force, led by the prime minister, coordinated the anti-trafficking 
efforts of various government agencies. Despite the impediments 
caused by the pandemic, the ATIPU continued to convene both 
in-person and virtual interagency meetings during the reporting 
period. The ATIPU officially added a domestic NGO as a member in 
September 2020. The government updated and funded the country’s 
anti-trafficking National Action Plan for the period 2021-2025. To 
raise public awareness, the ATIPU produced quarterly and annual 
trafficking reports and presented them to the House of Assembly; 
the ATIPU also made the reports publicly available. The pandemic 
displaced large numbers of workers, and the government implemented 
an unemployment insurance program for this population, which 
may have reduced their vulnerability to human trafficking. The 
ATIPU operated three 24-hour English-speaking hotlines, including 
a dedicated trafficking hotline, an emergency number, and a police 
operator, and it also monitored an email address for reporting 
suspected trafficking cases; authorities identified eight potential 
victims via the hotline during the reporting period compared to 
none in 2019. Health-related restrictions hindered in-person delivery 
of trainings and public awareness campaigns during the reporting 
period; however, the government funded and provided trafficking 
sensitization sessions in-person and virtually for an NGO, four 
churches, two schools, and 25 health care workers during the reporting 
period. The Prime Minister commemorated the UN World Day 
against Trafficking in Persons with a radio address, and the ATIPU 
used radio and TV to urge citizens to be vigilant and alert the 
authorities of potential trafficking cases. The ATIPU continued its 
awareness-raising campaign by disseminating posters, stickers, and 
brochures at the international airport and other popular sites; it also 
partnered with an NGO to place new anti-trafficking banners in the 
arrivals and departures areas of the international airport. The ATIPU 
participated in two crime prevention exhibitions hosted by the police’s 
Crime Prevention Unit in July and December 2020, one virtually 
and one in-person. The government did not provide anti-trafficking 
training to its diplomatic personnel in 2020 due to pandemic-
related impediments; in previous reporting periods, the government 
provided such training on a biannual basis to coincide with the 
return of accredited diplomats for consultations in Kingstown. The 
government routinely conducted both planned and unannounced 
labor inspections of hotels, farms, stores, bars, industries, security 
workplaces, and domestic work locations, although their stated lack 
of personnel and funding may have prevented coverage of work 
sites with the most vulnerable workers. Labor department officials 
reported conducting 37 inspections in 2020, compared to 42 such 
inspections in 2019. Authorities conducted all the inspections 
at work sites. The government did not report whether labor laws 
regulate labor recruiters or ban employee-paid recruitment fees. The 
government did not train labor inspectors on child labor, although 
the government reported labor inspectors screen for indicators of 
child labor and trafficking and police receive training to investigate 
child labor crimes. The government did not make efforts to reduce 
the demand for commercial sex acts. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and traffickers 
exploit victims from St. Vincent and the Grenadines abroad. Foreign 
women in commercial sex in the country may have been exploited 
in sex trafficking, and foreign workers from South America, the 
Caribbean, and Asia may have been exploited in forced labor both 
in the country and while in transit. Cuban nationals working in St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines may have been forced to work by the 
Cuban government. Foreign workers employed by small, foreign 
owned companies may be vulnerable to labor trafficking. Men, 
women, and children have been victims of forced labor, primarily 
in agriculture; government officials and civil society suspect drug 
traffickers exploit workers in forced labor in the production of 
marijuana. Outside experts continued to indicate adults may have 
exploited their children in sex trafficking to generate income while 
others purchased commercial sex from children. 
SAUDI ARABIA: TIER 2 
The Government of Saudi Arabia does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking 
capacity; therefore Saudi Arabia was upgraded to Tier 2. These 
efforts included reporting more investigations, prosecutions, and 
convictions overall, particularly for forced labor; implementing its 
national referral mechanism (NRM); and providing robust training 
on the mechanism, identification, and referral procedures across all 
government agencies. The government also reported disaggregated 
victim identification and referral data for the first time, provided 
greater access to interpretation and legal services for victims, and 
coordinated with NGOs for the first time to provide protection 
services to victims. The government also held its largest awareness 
campaign and utilized existing mechanisms to refer labor violations 
that exhibited trafficking indicators for criminal investigation and 
prosecution. However, the government did not meet the minimum 
standards in several key areas. It continued to fine, jail, and/or 
deport migrant workers for prostitution or immigration violations, 
many of whom may have been unidentified trafficking victims. In 
addition, officials regularly misclassified potential trafficking crimes 
as administrative labor law violations or failed to refer such cases for 








place during the reporting period, in March 2021, the government 
began to implement labor reforms, allowing all expatriate workers 
covered under the Labor Law—with the exclusion of domestic 
workers—to obtain an exit and re-entry visa, obtain final exit visas, or 
change employers without an employer’s permission at the conclusion 
of their contract or after one year. These reforms may remove some 
aspects of employers’ unilateral control over the covered workers 
that could be used to create conditions of forced labor. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Continue to investigate as potential trafficking crimes (not just 
as administrative issues) indicators of trafficking such as passport 
retention, withholding of wages, labor violations, and complaints 
of abuse. • Undertake serious efforts to prevent penalization of 
trafficking victims by proactively screening for trafficking among 
those arrested for immigration violations, prostitution, or those who 
flee abusive employers and face countercharges and deportation. • 
Ensure border guards and police are adequately trained to proactively 
identify potential victims and disseminate new screening protocols 
widely across the Kingdom. • Regularly use and train officials on 
the national referral mechanism to ensure victims among vulnerable 
populations, including domestic workers, illegal foreign workers, 
deportees, and persons in commercial sex, receive proper care and 
are not wrongfully penalized. • Expand implementation of electronic 
contracts so that workers can utilize the new labor reforms and include 
domestic workers in these reforms. • Amend the anti-trafficking 
law to remove sentencing provisions that allow fines in lieu of 
imprisonment for sex trafficking offenses. • Continue to increase 
efforts to prosecute and convict traffickers, and sentence convicted 
traffickers to significant prison terms under the anti-trafficking law. • 
Pursue criminal investigations against all officials allegedly complicit 
in trafficking crimes. • Expand usage of the specialized Public 
Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) sub-units to detect potential trafficking 
cases across the country. • Institute regular trainings for government 
officials on identifying cases of both labor and sex trafficking and 
differentiating between forced labor and labor-related crimes. 
PROSECUTION
The government increased law enforcement efforts. The 2009 anti-
trafficking law criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and 
prescribed punishments of up to 15 years’ imprisonment, a fine of up 
to 1 million Saudi Arabian riyal (SAR) ($266,670), or both; penalties 
increased under aggravating circumstances, including trafficking 
committed by an organized criminal group or against a woman, child, 
or person with disabilities. These penalties were sufficiently stringent; 
however, by allowing for a fine in lieu of imprisonment, the penalties 
for sex trafficking were not commensurate with those prescribed 
for other serious crimes such as kidnapping, false imprisonment, 
or sexual abuse. The Council of Ministers’ Decision 166 prohibited 
withholding workers’ passports as a lesser criminal offense, punishable 
by fines. During the reporting period, the government established a 
committee advised by an international organization and composed 
of the Ministry of Interior (MOI), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), 
Ministry of Justice (MOJ), the PPO, the Ministry of Human Resources 
and Social Development (MHRSD), and the Saudi Human Rights 
Commission (HRC) to consider amendments to the 2009 anti-
trafficking law. The government did not draft an amendment during 
the reporting period.
As in the previous reporting period, officials disaggregated and shared 
law enforcement data by the type of trafficking and comprehensive 
case specifics, including reporting the number of traffickers sentenced 
and the penalties prescribed. While several government entities 
disclosed their respective law enforcement datasets, the disparate, 
contradictory totals suggested limited interagency coordination. 
During the reporting period, the MOI reported investigating 610 
potential trafficking cases, the PPO reported investigating 106 cases, 
and the MOJ reported 
investigating 59 potential trafficking cases, totaling 775 cases involving 
1,111 alleged traffickers. Of these 775 cases, 570 were for forced 
labor, four for child sex trafficking, and 35 for sex trafficking, with 
the remainder for forced begging and “slavery-like practices.” During 
the previous reporting period, the government investigated 320 
potential trafficking cases. During the current reporting period, the 
government reported prosecuting 127 individuals in 52 cases; it 
did not report how many cases and individuals it prosecuted in the 
previous reporting period. Of the 52 cases prosecuted, the government 
reported convicting 62 defendants under the anti-trafficking law, 
compared with convicting 46 defendants in the previous year. The 
government reported it acquitted an unknown number of traffickers 
in 22 cases, suspended proceedings for an unknown number of 
traffickers in one case, and three cases of forced labor involving an 
unknown number of traffickers remained in the prosecution stage at 
the close of the reporting period. Of these 62 defendants convicted, 
38 were for forced labor, 11 for sex trafficking, six for forced begging, 
and seven for “slavery-like practices.” The government reported it 
sentenced all convicted traffickers to terms of imprisonment ranging 
from three months to six years and two months (with the majority 
receiving one year or more), plus fines, travel bans, and confiscation 
of personal assets used to facilitate each crime. In another reported 
case, courts sentenced a Saudi male to one year imprisonment and 
a 10,000 SAR fine ($2,670) for recruiting several domestic workers 
from their employer’s homes and forcing them to work in domestic 
servitude. Additionally, the courts sentenced two Indian males to three 
years’ imprisonment each for forcing a woman into commercial sex 
through threats of physical abuse. The government did not report any 
investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees 
complicit in human trafficking crimes; however, corruption and 
official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, 
inhibiting law enforcement action during the year.
The government reported launching several initiatives during the 
reporting period to continue to investigate, prosecute, and convict 
criminal cases, including cases of trafficking, through digital platforms. 
The government launched electronic litigation services through its 
Najiz platform. The MOJ reported receiving 7,000 written pleadings, 
held more than 6,000 virtual hearings, and issued more than 2,200 
judgments. It also launched tele-trials, allowing trials to be held 
remotely in five courts and five prisons across the Kingdom; it held 
1,443 remote trials during the reporting period, including for an 
unknown number of trafficking cases. Government officials in many 
instances continued to misclassify trafficking cases as administrative 
immigration or labor law violations without routinely undertaking 
criminal investigations or prosecutions against traffickers. The PPO 
maintained 107 trafficking-specific, operational investigative sub-
units within PPO branch offices (two in Riyadh and the remainder 
in the capital of each province) to identify potential trafficking cases 
among existing criminal cases. The PPO continued to have a panel 
of five human trafficking experts who informed anti-trafficking 
policy and served as resources at the PPO headquarters and for 
circuit offices. Throughout the reporting period, the Kingdom’s 
human trafficking entities conducted 29 anti-trafficking trainings, 
some in close partnership with two international organizations and 
others conducted solely by MHRSD and MOI; the trainings reached 
more than 2,424 private and public sector representatives. The 
programs covered topics such as victim identification and referral, 
trafficking data management, inspection procedures, and investigative 
processes for trafficking crimes. In partnership with an international 
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organization, the government disseminated information packets and 
held six workshops to improve overall trafficking case management 
approaches, including case research, investigation, evidence-collection, 
and inspection techniques, all aimed at developing the capabilities of 
criminal and labor courts, specialized PPO investigators, and criminal 
investigation officers from various sectors of the MOI on advanced 
criminal investigation methods and mechanisms for prosecuting 
defendants in trafficking cases.
PROTECTION
The government increased efforts to protect trafficking victims. During 
the reporting period, the government identified and referred 1,255 
trafficking victims to government-run shelters, a decrease compared 
with 1,457 trafficking victims it identified and referred to care 
during the previous year. For the first time, the government provided 
disaggregated victim identification data by type of trafficking—of 
the 1,255 identified victims, 906 were forced labor victims, mostly 
in the domestic work and industrial sectors, while the remainder 
included 46 sex trafficking victims, 18 victims of enslavement, 218 
victims of forced begging, nine victims of child trafficking, and 54 
victims of “slavery-like practices.” Seventy-three victims were children. 
The victims were nationals of Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, 
Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Turkey, Uganda, 
Vietnam, and Yemen.
During the reporting period, the government, in collaboration with 
two international organizations, facilitated robust training of relevant 
government entities on the NRM launched at the end of the previous 
reporting period, as well as best practices on victim identification and 
referral. The training reached 1,331 people, including MHSRD officials, 
shelter staff, call center and hotline staff, HRC branch officials, 
Ministry of Health (MOH) and Ministry of Education (MOE) officials, 
members of the Domestic Workers Dispute Resolution Committee, 
representatives from 29 recruitment agencies, and members of charity 
organizations in the Kingdom. Following the dissemination of the 
hard-copy NRM to front-line officials, government agencies, NGOs, 
civil society, and other stakeholders during 2020, the government 
began development of an electronic version of the NRM to better 
coordinate agencies and track and input data on identification and 
referrals in real-time; however, it had not implemented the electronic 
NRM by the end of the reporting period due to limitations imposed 
by the pandemic. The government continued to publish information 
pertaining to trafficking indicators on relevant government websites 
and distributed leaflets with similar material to all official stakeholders 
to ensure potential victims could be identified and referred to 
protective services according to the NRM. 
MHRSD remained responsible for the operation of shelters across 
the country for vulnerable populations and abuse victims, and 
the entity disclosed the government allocated approximately 25 
million SAR ($6.7 million) to specifically support trafficking victims 
during the year. MHRSD operated shelters for child victims of forced 
begging in Mecca, Jeddah, Dammam, Medina, Qassim, and Abha, in 
addition to welfare centers for vulnerable female domestic workers 
and trafficking victims in 13 locations throughout the Kingdom. 
Each shelter provided accommodation, social services, health care, 
psychological counseling, education, and legal assistance. The 
government offered these services to all victims it identified during 
the reporting period. Diplomats from labor-source countries had 
regular access to their nationals residing in government-run shelters 
and reported conditions and quality of services in the shelters varied 
slightly across the Kingdom but were overall satisfactory and safe. 
Some embassies and consulates—including those of Bangladesh, 
India, Indonesia, Nigeria, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Uganda—also 
operated shelters for their respective nationals. Foreign diplomats 
noted that Saudi officials frequently left potential trafficking victims 
at their respective embassies rather than referring them to Saudi 
shelters and noted that Saudi government shelters accepted only 
female domestic workers, not men or women from other employment 
sectors. The government reported that it planned to gradually shift 
shelter responsibilities to NGOs and open a dedicated trafficking 
shelter for all potential victims of trafficking in coordination with 
NGOs, although the opening of the shelter was delayed due to the 
pandemic. In an effort to identify entities that could support this 
new shelter, the government, in cooperation with an international 
organization, conducted a workshop with 71 representatives of 
civil society organizations in January 2021. During the reporting 
period, some embassies of labor-source countries reported that 
the government shelters stopped accepting new victims since the 
pandemic began. However, for the first time, the government reported 
coordinating with various NGOs to provide protection services to 
potential trafficking victims during the year as a result of limited 
capacity of government shelters to take victim referrals due to 
COVID-19 testing requirements, suspension of flights to repatriate 
victims already sheltered, and compliance with social distancing 
requirements. The government reported it launched a community 
fund during the reporting year to support the non-profit sector 
in supporting those affected by the pandemic; individuals and 
institutions made donations so NGOs could implement initiatives 
and provide support to vulnerable communities, including the 
provision of protection services to potential trafficking victims. The 
government reported 19 additional potential trafficking victims 
received support from NGOs during the reporting period.
The Labor Law does not apply to domestic workers; therefore, its 
protections do not extend to such workers. However, Decision 
No.310/1434 of 2013 granted some protections for this population 
through regulations on working hours, rest periods, annual leave, 
end of service benefits, written employment contracts, and payment 
of wages on a monthly basis. Under this decision, domestic workers 
included both male and female household workers, private drivers, 
gardeners, and security guards. International NGOs continued to 
express concern that because the Labor Law did not protect these 
workers, the law did not explicitly prohibit charging recruitment fees 
to workers or confiscating a domestic worker’s passport. Additionally, 
the law did not require compensation for overtime, nor did it limit 
the workday to eight hours (domestic workers could work up to 15 
hours a day including breaks). The law also included vague provisions 
on suitable accommodation, paid sick leave, and healthcare. NGOs 
reported domestic workers could experience non-payment of salaries, 
forced confinement, food deprivation, excessive workloads, and severe 
psychological, physical, and sexual abuse. Domestic workers could 
change employers with sponsor permission anytime and without 
sponsor permission after two years of employment; a transfer of 
sponsorship could be made at any time without the employer’s 
permission in several circumstances, including if the employer 
failed to pay the salary of the worker for three consecutive months, 
failed to obtain a residency permit or renew an expired permit, 
abused the worker, or filed a false absconding charge against the 
worker. However, domestic workers continued to require sponsor 
permission to receive an exit permit, and the newest reforms to the 
sponsorship system that provided expatriate workers covered under 
the Labor Law the ability to change employers and leave the country 
permanently or leave and re-enter without employer approval did 
not apply to domestic workers. 
There were persistent complaints among migrant workers of unpaid 
wages, passport retention, physical or sexual abuse, or substandard 
working conditions, all of which were trafficking indicators. As in 
previous years, the government often deported migrant workers 
without proactively screening for signs of trafficking during the 
reporting period. On average, it deported 700-800 Ethiopian 
laborers per week, according to Ethiopian officials familiar with 
the deportations. Reasons for deportations included alleged 
violations of work, residence, and entry rules. In October 2020, 
several prominent NGOs and media outlets reported that tens of 
thousands of Ethiopians, Yemenis, and other migrants had been 
detained in overcrowded and unsanitary immigration detention 








labor-source countries, including Ethiopia. Reports indicated that 
some of the detained migrants arrived from Yemen, pushed out 
by Houthi attacks, and that others were undocumented migrants 
working illegally in Saudi Arabia; however, a few migrants with valid 
residency permits were also detained. In September 2020, labor-
source countries, including Ethiopia, began accepting return flights, 
but the government did not report if it screened those deported or 
repatriated for trafficking indicators before departing. In an effort 
to increase capacity to screen for potential trafficking victims, the 
PPO directed all its branches and law enforcement agencies to 
cease deportation of any potential trafficking victims or anyone 
involved in an active trafficking case without the PPO’s prior approval. 
Additionally, during the reporting period, the National Committee 
to Combat Human Trafficking (NCCHT) formed a subcommittee 
of MOI, MHRSD, PPO, and HRC staff to ensure proper procedures 
for screening and identifying potential victims of trafficking were in 
place at detention centers; however, the government did not report 
any outcomes from this subcommittee at the close of the reporting 
period or whether authorities identified any trafficking victims as 
a result. The government instructed each circuit court to screen 
defendants for potential trafficking indicators and to drop pending 
charges against identified trafficking victims. However, diplomats 
from several labor-source countries reported Saudi authorities 
regularly detained, fined, and/or jailed their nationals, including 
some unidentified trafficking victims, for immigration violations as 
a result of having been subjected to forced labor or sex trafficking. 
Furthermore, since the government did not routinely screen for 
potential trafficking indicators among vulnerable populations and 
police frequently arrested and/or deported undocumented migrant 
workers, authorities likely arrested and deported unidentified victims 
during the year.
The government extended to all identified trafficking victims the 
option of remaining in the country—either in a shelter or via transfer 
to a new employer—during judicial proceedings, or alternatively 
an immediate exit visa; these benefits did not require a successful 
prosecution or cooperation with law enforcement personnel. However, 
in previous reporting periods, diplomatic representatives from labor-
source countries reported trafficking victims were not permitted to seek 
employment while residing in government-run shelters. In October 
2020, the MHRSD began implementation of a new policy, issued 
under Circular No.65551, which granted work permits and temporary 
residence to workers identified as potential trafficking victims so they 
could work, if they chose, while their labor dispute or criminal case 
was adjudicated; this included potential trafficking victims whose 
work permits had expired. The government reported that it developed 
this specific policy after soliciting input from potential trafficking 
victims during the year and that a potential victim could receive this 
benefit regardless of whether they resided in the shelter; however, 
it did not report how many work permits or temporary residence 
it granted to potential trafficking victims. The government reported 
it allowed victims to submit testimony in written form or remotely 
via recording as they preferred, and it ensured victims’ identities 
remained confidential. In contrast, diplomats from several labor-
source countries reported the government advised some victims to 
testify in person. The government reported that a potential victim’s 
testimony was only taken if the potential victim provided informed 
consent, in adherence with the NRM. In June 2020, the PPO issued 
Circular No.63677 that stressed no potential victim of trafficking 
should be repatriated without their testimony being taken first (if 
they provided informed consent), as unreliable flight schedules due 
to the pandemic caused some potential victims to depart the country 
before their statement could be submitted. The law entitled trafficking 
victims to legal assistance, security protection, translation services, 
and the right to immediate repatriation or continued residence in 
country until resolution of the case, in addition to medical and 
psychological care, shelter, and rehabilitation. In regard to legal 
assistance, the government reported that victims were provided 
with seven lawyers in 16 trafficking cases, four counsels in 18 cases, 
and received legal guidance from a law firm in one case during the 
reporting period. In November 2020, the government activated the 
Unified Translation Center Initiative to provide translation services 
to the courts and judicial facilities to protect the rights of non-Arabic 
speaking victims in court proceedings. The initiative, which had 22 
interpreters that covered 20 languages, handled approximately 800 
cases each month during the reporting period, including an unknown 
number of trafficking cases. Officials permitted victims to obtain 
restitution directly from the government and/or by filing civil suits 
against traffickers; however, such settlements rarely took place through 
the established system and reportedly generally occurred outside of 
civil court proceedings through government-supported mediation 
efforts. These proceedings often did not entail criminal prosecution, 
and officials preferred to reimburse back-wages informally and/
or assist in repatriating the victims, neither of which was a victim-
centered or trauma-informed practice. 
PREVENTION
The government demonstrated increased efforts to prevent trafficking, 
including significant steps to reform its sponsorship system, allowing 
expatriate workers covered under the Labor Law to obtain an exit 
and re-entry visa, obtain final exit visas, or change employers at the 
conclusion of their contract or after one year without an employer’s 
permission, therefore lessening workers’ vulnerability to forced 
labor. It demonstrated improved progress on implementation of 
its 2017-2020 national action plan (NAP) to combat trafficking 
that focused on monitoring, prevention, building government 
capacity, inter-ministerial coordination, effective law enforcement, 
and provision of protective services for victims. The NCCHT reported 
meeting approximately every two weeks throughout the reporting 
period; it created a subcommittee to draft the next iteration of the 
NAP to be published in 2021. The committee actively increased its 
engagement with civil society organizations through workshops and 
training, created a subcommittee to review the anti-trafficking law, 
and established an executive arm of the committee responsible for 
trafficking case processing and management and ensuring effective 
application of the NRM—which included points of contacts from 
each agency represented on the committee, as well as the MOH, the 
Saudi Red Crescent Society, the MOE, the Saudi Bar Association, and 
the General Organization for Technical and Vocational training. 
Additionally, the government renewed its anti-trafficking partnership 
with the IOM in March 2021 and held a roundtable with two 
international organizations and 13 embassies, including labor-source 
countries, to discuss the Kingdom’s recent changes to the labor law 
and to receive feedback on ways to improve its trafficking response. 
In October 2020, the Saudi government joined the second annual 
Anti-Trafficking Forum in the Middle East, hosted by the United 
Arab Emirates.
The government continued to operate and utilize its online domestic 
labor portal known as Musaned, meaning “support” in Arabic. This 
system consisted of a website and smartphone application that allowed 
potential employees in various sectors and individual employers 
to verify the license of a recruitment agency, review materials on 
employee and employer rights and responsibilities (in Arabic and 
English only), complete and electronically sign contracts, and request 
a visa. The system intended to eliminate unregulated brokers, increase 
transparency and accountability of recruitment agencies and work 
contracts, and reduce the risk of forced labor. It also included a 
complaints resolution mechanism and associated resources. Musaned 
also served as a tool for authenticating contracts for domestic workers. 
Diplomats from multiple labor-source countries reported Musaned 
enhanced the ability of embassies to monitor newly arrived nationals. 
However, in some cases, embassies found some information entered in 
the platform, such as address of residence and place of work, was either 
missing or incorrect following a transfer, impeding efforts to track 
reported victims of abuse and trafficking. Finally, MHRSD continued 
a pilot program called Weddi (“friendly” in Arabic), which was an 
alternative dispute resolution mechanism whereby a worker could 
electronically submit a complaint and supporting documentation. 
If either the employee or employer rejected the proposed resolution 
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via arbitration, officials would automatically transfer the case to the 
MOJ labor courts for administrative settlement. 
Pursuant to a ministerial circular promulgated in September 2019, 
authorities continued to implement a mechanism to electronically 
verify work contracts to prevent contract switching and fraudulent 
documentation. The initiative aimed to obligate all private sector 
companies to sign contracts with their employees enabling MHRSD to 
electronically account for, authenticate, and monitor all employment 
contracts in the private sector. During the reporting period, the 
MHSRD further developed this electronic contract program into 
a Single Electronic Contract to ensure compliance with labor laws 
through provisions on contract data, type of work, salary, duration 
of contract, working hours, weekends and annual leave, making the 
system mandatory for all private sector companies in November 2020. 
Each contract was verified by both the employer and employee and 
filed through the Mudad electronic platform. It also granted employees 
access to their contract and ensured MHSRD could impose sanctions 
on establishments that contravened the terms contained therein. 
The e-contract could also be used in a potential labor dispute as an 
enforceable deed to protect the rights of the employee. Representatives 
from labor-source countries reported the e-contact was a helpful tool 
that enhanced transparency and accountability for their nationals 
who raised labor disputes against an employer during the reporting 
year. The government reported that if an employer did not have an 
e-contract on file that an employee could approve electronically, the 
employer could be fined up to 3,000 SAR ($800), multiplied by the 
number of employees at the company. At the end of the reporting 
period, MHSRD reported 5,000,000 ratified contracts existed within 
the Mudad system, out of a total of 9,000,000 employee contracts 
in the Kingdom. 
During the reporting period, the government continued to expand 
usage of its Wage Protection System (WPS), which required employers 
to pay foreign workers by electronic transfer via a Saudi bank, 
thereby permitting the government to track disbursements and 
prevent non- or delayed payment of wages—a key forced labor 
indicator prominent across the Kingdom. In December 2020, the 
government extended the WPS to require 100 percent of private sector 
companies to register, including those with just one employee. The 
government reported it also used the Mudad platform to track WPS 
compliance in real-time, and through this electronic platform, a 
notification of payment was sent to the employee. The government 
reported that in instances where employers withheld wages from the 
employee, the system required the employer to explain the reason 
for non-payment; the explanation would be sent to the employee for 
approval. If approval was not given, the MHSRD reported it would 
investigate the employer and screen for other potential trafficking 
indicators. This system became mandatory during the reporting 
period and continued to review payrolls and impose penalties for 
any firm that failed to maintain at least 80 percent compliance on a 
monthly basis, resulting in suspension of government services and 
recruitment privileges. Authorities penalized companies for less 
than 80 percent compliance and/or for failing to submit monthly 
WPS data. The government reported a 2020 compliance rate of 
68.33 percent for companies with 30 employees or more, and a 
compliance rate of 13 percent for companies with 11-29 employees. 
In total, the government reported 5,659 violations of companies for 
non-compliance in both the WPS and e-contract system. Although 
the WPS was not available for domestic workers, the government 
continued to mandate individual employers of domestic labor issue 
prepaid payroll or salary cards as soon as the domestic worker arrived 
in the Kingdom to ensure a legal working relationship between 
employer and employee and safeguard employees’ prescribed wages. 
In the previous reporting period, the government removed the 
requirement for employer approval to receive a final exit visa for 
commercial or domestic workers whose sponsors failed to pay 
required fees, renew a worker’s status, or were absent; however, 
the majority of workers continued to need employer permission 
to depart the country or change sponsors for the majority of the 
reporting period, rendering them at greater risk of forced labor. As 
part of a larger suite of labor reforms announced by the MHRSD in 
November 2020 through Ministerial Resolution No.51848/1442, 
which the government began to implement in March 2021, private 
sector workers no longer needed their employer’s permission to travel 
abroad (obtain an exit and re-entry visa), obtain final exit visas, or 
change employers at the conclusion of their contract or after one 
year; this provided increased freedom of movement and lessened the 
risks of forced labor for seven million private sector workers in the 
Kingdom. Sources reported the government intended to use both the 
Abshir and Qiwa electronic applications to automate the process for 
transferring employment, notifying an employer of an employee’s 
departure and re-entry, and providing an employee a final exit visa. 
Several NGOs expressed concern these initial reforms did not include 
the 3.7 million domestic workers employed in Saudi Arabia, a group 
highly vulnerable to abuse. The government reported domestic 
workers would be added to the reforms at an unspecified later date. 
NGOs also reported concerns that although the reforms were a step in 
the right direction, the sponsorship system would continue to persist 
as long as both the employee’s work and residence visas were tied 
to an employer. Additionally, these organizations noted the reforms 
did not abolish the exit permit entirely—a worker must still submit 
a request to MHRSD for an exit permit, and the ministry will, in 
turn, notify the employer electronically of their worker’s departure. 
The employer had ten days to lodge an inquiry into the worker’s 
exit permit request, and an employer’s inquiry could potentially be 
used to deny the worker an exit permit.
The government made efforts to prevent vulnerability to exploitation 
and potential trafficking for migrant workers who experienced job 
loss, expired visas, and loss of wages related to the pandemic. The 
MHSRD reported all work permits for migrant workers that expired 
between March 18 and June 30 were automatically extended for three 
months, benefitting more than 1.5 million workers; the government 
extended this initiative several times during the reporting period to 
address vulnerabilities of workers who lost residency status due to 
expired permits as part of pandemic response measures. Additionally, 
the government allowed laborers to temporarily work for other 
employers through the Ajeer program, which created more jobs for 
migrant workers whose employers could not afford to employ them, 
benefitting 7,115 workers. The government also reported extending 
the validity of all re-entry visas for migrant workers stranded abroad 
due to the suspension of international flights and whose visas expired 
while abroad; this initiative benefitted nearly seven million workers 
during the reporting period. To regulate the employer-employee 
relationship at the onset of the pandemic, the government invoked 
Article 41 of the labor law in April 2020, allowing employers and 
employees to agree to reduced salaries and work hours or paid 
annual leave as part of their entitlement to avoid firing employees 
and rendering them more vulnerable to trafficking due to an irregular 
status. However, this policy also allowed employers to implement 
a period of unpaid leave with employee consent, which may have 
put some workers at greater risk of exploitation.
During the reporting period, the NCCHT launched Twitter accounts 
in both Arabic and English to raise awareness on trafficking 
crimes and consistently monitored the online traffic each account 
received throughout the year. In its largest awareness-raising 
campaign ever, the NCCHT and HRC jointly launched a week-
long #UnitedAgainstTrafficking campaign in conjunction with 
World Day against Trafficking in Persons on July 30, 2020. The 
HRC published and disseminated an educational video describing 
trafficking in persons to the general public and activated the hashtag 
#UnitedAgainstTrafficking_KSA through the HRC’s English and Arabic 
social media accounts. Numerous social media influencers and high-
level government officials amplified the campaign through their own 
accounts. The PPO, Border Guard, and Passport Authorities published 
videos related to the campaign, and numerous other government 
bodies and officials amplified the message, including Saudi embassies 








traditional media as well as through art exhibits from local artists. 
The government also sent text messages to 40 million mobile phones 
to raise awareness of the dangers posed by trafficking and the need 
for all to combat the crime. In an effort to raise awareness on the 
Labor Reform Initiative and associated reforms to the sponsorship 
system, the government published videos and infographics in multiple 
languages and informational service guides to ensure targeted groups 
and the public received adequate information on the reforms. 
Additionally, to socialize the reforms with labor-source countries, 
companies and recruitment agencies, and other stakeholders, the 
government hosted informational workshops in various regions, 
including Riyadh, Jeddah, and the Eastern province, which were 
attended by at least 8,000 companies and recruiting agencies, and 
held awareness and informational meetings at the Saudi Chamber 
of Commerce in Mecca, Taif, and Medina. Finally, the government 
held two workshops in collaboration with more than 30 embassies 
of labor-source countries on leveraging services offered through the 
new reforms, such as applications for residency permits or transfer 
requests for workers to be requested through Abshir and Qiwa, as noted 
above. Additionally, MHRSD officials launched a program during the 
reporting period to send labor attachés to key labor-source countries 
to enhance coordination on suspected trafficking cases and ensure 
workers from labor-source countries were adequately informed of 
their rights before arriving in Saudi Arabia. The government reported 
the first Saudi representative arrived in Philippines in September 
2020, with six additional attachés planned for Bangladesh, Egypt, 
India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. 
Officials operated a 24-hour call center that received calls in nine 
major labor-source country languages: Amharic, Arabic, Bengali, 
English, Hindi, Indonesian, Malay, Tagalog, and Urdu. The call center 
received approximately 280 calls per day on average. The MHRSD 
complaint hotline number was also included in pamphlets received 
by all expatriate workers who entered the Kingdom during the year. 
The government reported it identified 374 potential trafficking cases 
via its hotline and referred 14 of those cases to the MOI for further 
investigation during the reporting period. The MOI’s crime reporting 
app, Koolna (“All of Us”), added a feature that allowed users to 
report trafficking crimes as a standalone option in November 2020. 
In March 2020, the HRC began piloting a multilingual call center 
that received calls, texts, and Whatsapp messages and operated 24 
hours and seven days a week, equipped with a specific trafficking 
option and staffed with operators trained on identifying potential 
trafficking cases. The call center could receive calls in English and 
Arabic; the government reported that additional languages would 
be added in 2021. Additionally, the NCCHT established a reception 
and management group for trafficking-related complaints, and the 
committee reported receiving an unknown number of cases through 
an email address during 2020. The government reported that once 
a case was received, the group coordinated with the HRC and other 
agencies to refer the case for further processing. Some workers and 
labor-source country officials reported impracticalities and technical 
difficulties getting through to operators using this phone line, citing 
poorly trained and under-resourced staff. 
The government sought to eliminate vulnerabilities in labor 
recruitment through its deployment of labor inspectors and HRC 
officials—400 of whom specialized in trafficking crimes—who 
conducted 843,419 field visits to monitor the application of 
employment and recruitment laws. The government reported 17 
potential trafficking cases were identified during these inspections 
and referred to the MOI for further investigation. During the 
reporting period, diplomatic representatives from several countries 
reported an improvement in Saudi government oversight over labor 
recruitment and the proper implementation of labor contracts. 
Although authorities instructed labor inspectors to ascertain, through 
field inspections and an understanding that withholding employees’ 
passports, residency permit, or personal/family insurance cards 
was indicative of trafficking, among other investigative steps to 
safeguard employees against the crime, the government did not 
report investigating or referring for criminal prosecution any passport 
retention crimes. The government circulated a questionnaire for 
labor inspectors to complete for situations where they suspected 
a trafficking crime; inspectors sent the forms to the MHRSD’s anti-
trafficking department. The HRC Secretariat reported receiving 102 
general complaints from workers during the reporting period; nine 
of those complaints were for passport confiscation, which the HRC 
referred to the MHRSD, which then referred the complaints to 
the MOI and PPO for further investigation. The MHRSD reported 
processing 670 complaints filed through its Domestic Labor Dispute 
Committee and Trafficking Hotline Program and referred an unknown 
number of suspected trafficking cases to the MOI and PPO for 
further investigation. In addition, the MHRSD, in collaboration 
with the MOJ, launched a remote amicable resolution initiative to 
ensure workers and employers could complete procedures while 
maintaining health and safety precautions due to the pandemic; 
17,000 workers benefitted from this remote option. The government 
had several bilateral labor agreements with primary labor-source 
countries, including Ethiopia and Indonesia, which set minimum 
wage standards and regulated protections and benefits for laborers, 
such as work hours, mandatory time off, and overarching work 
conditions. The government did not report efforts to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex acts. The government provided anti-
trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Saudi Arabia. Adults— primarily from South 
and Southeast Asia and East Africa—voluntarily migrate to Saudi 
Arabia to work in a variety of sectors, including construction, 
agriculture, and domestic service. Many of these low-skilled laborers 
are employed in substandard conditions that heighten their risk of 
forced labor. Some traffickers or unscrupulous labor brokers illegally 
recruit migrants to work in Saudi Arabia and subsequently force 
them to work in domestic servitude. Undocumented entry across the 
Kingdom’s southwestern border serves as a key gateway for vulnerable 
Yemeni, Ethiopian, and Somali workers, in particular. The Kingdom’s 
migrant laborer population continued to be the largest group at 
risk of human trafficking, particularly female domestic workers 
due to their isolation inside private residences and vulnerability to 
employer abuse. The pandemic further increased the vulnerability 
of trafficking among domestic workers, as regional and nationwide 
curfews created obstacles to reach assistance from police stations, 
hospitals, or NGOs. Labor- source countries also reported increased 
work hours and complaints of abuse among domestic workers. The 
government reported efforts to address migrant workers vulnerability 
exacerbated by the pandemic, such as job-loss or delayed or non-
payment of wages. According to the General Authority for Statistics, 
there are approximately 13.1 million foreign workers in Saudi Arabia; 
the largest populations during the reporting period were from 
Bangladesh, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Sudan, and Yemen. In previous years, the government prosecuted 
some foreign citizens who may have been subjected to trafficking or 
related indicators and sentenced them to death in cases involving 
murder; however, there were no instances during this reporting 
period. Non-payment or late payment of wages remain the prominent 
complaint from foreign workers in the Kingdom; this concern was 
further exacerbated during the reporting period by the pandemic, as 
the unemployment rate among foreign workers increased significantly 
and heightened this group’s vulnerability to trafficking. Instances of 
employers withholding workers’ passports also remains a significant 
problem. Trafficking perpetrators include businesses of all sizes, 
private families, recruitment agencies in both Saudi Arabia and 
labor-source countries, gangs, and organized criminal elements, 
to include third-country nationals. Chinese nationals working in 
Saudi Arabia may have been forced to work on projects managed 
by state-owned enterprises, and Cuban nationals working in Saudi 
Arabia may have been forced to work by the Cuban government.
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Due to Saudi Arabia’s requirement, under its sponsorship system, 
for foreign workers to obtain permission for an exit visa from their 
employers to be able to legally depart the country, some laborers 
are forced to work beyond their contract term because their Saudi 
employers refuse to grant exit permission or pay the exit fee required 
by Saudi law. In 2019, The government took initial steps to reform 
this system and reduce worker liability; however, during the reporting 
period, in a purported move to provide workers greater freedom, the 
government announced the Labor Reform Initiative, implemented 
in March 2021, which provides private sector workers the ability to 
change employers, obtain exit and re-entry visas, and obtain exit visas 
at the end of their contract or after one year, without the previous 
employer’s permission. However, this initiative does not benefit 
domestic workers, continuing to place this vulnerable group at higher 
risk of trafficking. Although most migrant workers sign contracts 
delineating their rights, some report work conditions substantially 
differ from those outlined in their contracts. Other workers never 
see their work contracts, heightening their risk of forced labor and 
debt-based coercion. Additionally, some migrant workers voluntarily 
enter into illegal arrangements where they seek freelance work while 
concurrently paying a Saudi national to sponsor their initial residency 
permit, thereby becoming vulnerable to extortion and debt-based 
coercion by their sponsors. Some migrants from Yemen and the 
Horn of Africa who enter Saudi Arabia illegally via the Yemeni 
border— involuntarily or through consented smuggling— may be 
trafficking victims. Previous reports alleged some Saudi citizens 
engaged in sex tourism abroad, where they engaged in temporary 
or seasonal nonbinding “marriages,” which included payment for 
short-term sexual access to children and adults whom the purchaser 
then abandoned. In Saudi Arabia, begging by women and children 
remains a problem and a significant vulnerability to forced labor 
with reported upticks in forced begging during the holy month 
of Ramadan and the Muslim pilgrimages of Hajj and Umrah. The 
child beggar population is composed primarily of unaccompanied 
migrant children, most heavily from Yemen and Ethiopia, but 
approximately five percent are Saudi national children of unknown 
parents. Traffickers compel some of these women and children to 
work as part of organized begging rings. 
As the leader of a multi-nation coalition that commenced military 
operations against Houthi rebel forces in Yemen in 2015, Saudi 
Arabia paid, materially supported, trained, and commanded Sudan’s 
Rapid Support Force (RSF). Media alleged in a previous reporting 
period that Sudanese officers associated with RSF took bribes from 
families to permit children to serve as combatants in Yemen. Saudi 
Arabian officers allegedly trained and exercised tactical control over 
some RSF units. Past reporting claimed that in some instances Saudi 
Arabia funded Yemeni militias that hired children in combatant 
roles, and that the Saudi Arabian government had provided salaries, 
uniforms, weapons, and training to Sudanese combatants (which 
included children aged 14-17 years old) in Yemen.
SENEGAL: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Senegal does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included implementing the third phase 
of its program to remove vulnerable children, including trafficking 
victims, from the streets, increasing investigations, prosecutions, and 
convictions, and adopting a new national action plan. However, the 
government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared 
to the previous reporting period, even considering the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity. The government 
did not investigate or prosecute traffickers exploiting children in 
forced begging consistent with the 2005 anti-trafficking law and 
did not take action against officials who refused to investigate such 
cases during the reporting period. Officials did not consistently use 
the 2005 anti-trafficking law to prosecute alleged traffickers and 
continued to apply penalties inconsistent with the law. Efforts to 
identify adult trafficking victims and refer them to services remained 
weak. Therefore Senegal remained on the Tier 2 Watch List for the 
second consecutive year. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Explicitly direct law enforcement and judicial officials to significantly 
increase efforts to actively investigate and criminally prosecute 
trafficking offenses, including those who exploit children in forced 
begging. • Punish convicted traffickers with significant prison 
terms consistent with the 2005 anti-trafficking law. • Ensure draft 
legislation and implementing decrees developed to regulate daaras 
(Quranic schools) explicitly prohibit forced begging; approve the draft 
legislation and implementing decrees, and allocate adequate resources, 
including inspectors, to enforce their implementation. • Establish 
a system to automatically trigger police or judicial investigations of 
alleged traffickers when potential trafficking victims are identified, 
including potential child forced begging victims. • Increase the 
number of investigators, magistrates, prosecutors, and judges trained 
on application of the 2005 anti-trafficking law. • Strengthen the 
anti-trafficking task force’s (CNLTP) authority to coordinate anti-
trafficking activities among agencies conducting anti-trafficking work. 
• Establish and enforce standard operating procedures to ensure 
officials, including local administrative officials, regularly inspect 
daaras to ensure they do not force children to beg and meet child 
protection standards. • Proactively screen for trafficking indicators 
among vulnerable populations—including child beggars, Senegalese 
women traveling abroad for domestic work, returning migrants, 
domestic and foreign workers on Chinese-operated fishing vessels, 
and North Korean workers—and investigate cases, refer victims to 
services, and prevent their penalization. • Provide technical and 
financial support to local governments seeking to combat human 
trafficking, including child forced begging, and regulate daaras. • 
Develop a framework to regulate overseas labor recruitment and 
provide pre-departure sensitization for labor migrants on their rights 
to prevent exploitation of Senegalese workers abroad. • Ensure labor 
inspectors inspect the informal sector for forced labor. • In partnership 
with NGOs, expand access to protective services for trafficking victims 
outside of Dakar and for adults. • Broaden efforts to raise public 
awareness of trafficking, including child forced begging in daaras. 
• Implement the Systraite database system in Senegal’s 14 regions. 
PROSECUTION
The government modestly increased anti-trafficking law enforcement 
efforts; however, the government maintained insufficient efforts to 
investigate and prosecute cases of child forced begging. Senegal’s 2005 
Law to Combat Trafficking in Persons and Related Practices and to 
Protect Victims criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking. The 
law prescribed penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine 
for sex trafficking and labor trafficking—except forced begging—and 
prescribed lesser penalties of two to five years’ imprisonment and 
a fine for forced begging. These penalties were sufficiently stringent 
and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. While the 2005 
anti-trafficking law criminalized forced begging, provisions in the 
penal code that allowed seeking of alms under certain conditions 
may have hampered law enforcement officials’ ability to distinguish 
traditional alms-seeking and exploitation through forced begging. 






in collaboration with an international organization; the legislation 
remained pending before the Ministry of Justice at the end of the 
reporting period. 
Due to the pandemic, courts were closed for five months during 
the reporting period. Despite this, in data collected from five of 
Senegal’s 14 regions, the government reported investigating at least 
14 trafficking cases, prosecuting 19 alleged traffickers, and convicting 
12 traffickers, including one Senegalese, five Burkinabes, one Malian, 
one Ivorian, and four Nigerians; this was an increase compared 
with 12 investigations, prosecutions of 17 alleged traffickers, and 
convictions of five traffickers during the previous reporting period, 
with data from five regions. The government did not prosecute or 
convict any alleged traffickers for child forced begging, compared 
to one conviction the previous reporting period. Judges sentenced 
five traffickers convicted of forced labor to sentences between three 
months and two years’ imprisonment, six traffickers convicted of sex 
trafficking to sentences between two and 10 years’ imprisonment, 
and one trafficker convicted of an unknown form of trafficking to 
two years’ imprisonment. Officials did not consistently use the 2005 
anti-trafficking law to prosecute alleged traffickers and continued to 
apply penalties inconsistent with the law. The court sentenced 11 
out of the 12 convicted traffickers to a prison term over one year, 
compared with two out of five convicted traffickers during the previous 
reporting period; however, the court sentenced only four traffickers to 
penalties in compliance with those prescribed in the anti-trafficking 
law. When officials identified a potential forced begging case, they 
often issued administrative penalties to the alleged perpetrators 
instead of criminally investigating and prosecuting the case, in part 
due to public pressure associated with the social influence of Quranic 
teachers. By not criminally investigating or prosecuting these forced 
begging cases, the government did not adequately hold traffickers 
accountable. Despite allegations of government complicity—either by 
refusing to investigate trafficking offenses or pressuring the judiciary 
to drop cases—the government did not report any investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government officials complicit in 
human trafficking offenses. 
The government continued to partner with an international 
organization to implement “Systraite”—an anti-trafficking database 
to collect law enforcement and victim protection data—in the 
regions of Dakar, Saint Louis, Thies, Kedougou, and Tambacounda; 
the pandemic delayed expansion to additional regions during the 
reporting period. The government and an international organization 
provided trainings on the database to 20 local judicial actors within 
all five regions. Due to pandemic-related gathering restrictions, the 
government could not provide specialized training to magistrates 
and prosecutors on identifying, investigating, and prosecuting 
human trafficking cases during the reporting period, compared to 
training 30 magistrates and prosecutors on case investigation and 
prosecution in the previous reporting period. Many law enforcement 
and judicial personnel remained unaware of the provisions of 
the 2005 law, which, coupled with limited institutional capacity, 
inhibited efforts to prosecute and convict traffickers under the law, 
and collect data on such efforts. Observers reported investigative 
magistrates lacked training to identify trafficking cases, leading to 
potential misclassification of charges in applying penalties according 
to the 2005 trafficking law. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained efforts to identify and protect trafficking 
victims. The government identified and referred to services 129 foreign 
adult trafficking victims from Sierra Leone, Nigeria, and Burkina 
Faso, and 6,187 vulnerable children, including potential child 
trafficking victims, during the reporting period. This was a significant 
increase compared with identifying 1,358 vulnerable children, 
including potential child trafficking victims, during the previous 
reporting period. Law enforcement, immigration, and social services 
personnel had formal written procedures to proactively identify 
trafficking victims among vulnerable populations. However, adult 
victim identification and referral to services remained insufficient. 
Authorities housed 87 Sierra Leonean female adult trafficking victims 
in the defendants’ property until the Sierra Leonean embassy in Dakar 
repatriated them; authorities referred the other 42 adult trafficking 
victims identified during the reporting period to an international 
organization for care. The Ministry of Women, Family, Gender, and 
Child Protection (MWFGCP) referred 598 children to its shelter at 
the Ginddi Center for care during the reporting period, compared 
to 359 children in the previous reporting period. An NGO in Saint 
Louis identified and cared for an additional 164 child trafficking 
victims. During the reporting period, the government implemented 
the third phase of its “Le retrait des enfants de la rue” campaign to 
remove vulnerable children, including forced begging victims, from 
the street in Dakar following similar operations in 2016 and 2018; the 
government identified and referred to care 6,187 vulnerable children, 
including potential trafficking victims, during the campaign. The 
government placed children at the Ginddi Center or temporary shelters 
outside of Dakar until they could be returned to their families or 
placed with a foster family. Each child received medical care, clothing, 
food, and psycho-social support. Some religious leaders continued 
to mobilize against the campaign, placing immense pressure on 
officials to discontinue the effort. Officials observed children back in 
the streets after having returned them to their families. Despite law 
enforcement officials accompanying child protection actors to ensure 
the actors’ safety during the operations, authorities did not initiate 
investigations of suspected traffickers following the identification 
of forced begging victims. As in past phases, this practice inhibited 
subsequent investigations and prosecutions of traffickers and failed 
to deter future exploitation. 
Authorities inconsistently applied the victim referral system, and it was 
not available in all regions of the country. Authorities referred victims 
identified along Senegal’s borders to an international organization and 
government center for questioning before referring them to NGOs or 
government centers for protective services. In Dakar and rural areas, 
law enforcement, civil society, and community protection groups 
generally referred children to the government or NGOs for social 
services and repatriation; however, authorities were not always aware 
of the shelters and services available, especially for adults, which at 
times caused delays in the provision of services. 
The Ginddi Center, under the aegis of the MWFGCP, provided 
temporary shelter and basic care to both foreign and domestic child 
victims. The government provided 269.8 million West African CFA 
francs (FCFA) ($510,020) to the Ginddi Center in 2020, an increase 
compared with 150 million FCFA ($283,550) in 2019. The center 
provided meals, shelter, psycho-social care, clothing, and vocational 
training; two staff nurses provided basic medical care. The center 
expanded its capacity but continued to lack space, limiting the 
number of victims authorities could remove from exploitation 
and how long victims could remain at the center. As a result, the 
government at times sent victims to the center for immediate services, 
and then to NGOs or to partner daaras—which the government had 
certified met capacity, hygiene, and security standards and did not 
engage in forced begging—that provided children with follow-on 
support until family reunification. The pandemic further strained 
providers’ limited resources and insufficient staffing levels, and 
delayed victims’ reintegration. The Ministry of Justice operated three 
shelters (CPAs) for child victims of crime, witnesses, and children in 
emergency situations, which child trafficking victims could access. 
Outside of Dakar, international observers reported NGOs often had 
to provide critical shelter and trafficking victim services due to a 
lack of government resources. Shelter and services for adult victims 
remained severely inadequate. Several NGOs operated shelters 
for trafficking victims throughout the country; however, only one 
private shelter located in Dakar could accommodate female adult 
victims, while no shelters were available for male adult victims. The 
Ministry of Health and Social Action organized a two-day training for 
approximately 30 officials on child protection issues; the Ministry of 
Justice, through the Department of Supervised Education and Social 
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Protection, also participated in the training to discuss administrative 
and judicial procedures for child trafficking cases.
The law provided alternatives to the removal of foreign victims who 
may face hardship or retribution upon return, including the option 
to apply for temporary or permanent residency; the government did 
not report how many victims received this relief during the reporting 
period. The 2005 anti-trafficking law includes provisions for victim 
protection during trials including allowing video-taped testimony; the 
government did not report using these provisions during the reporting 
period. Victims could legally obtain restitution; the government 
did not report requesting restitution during the reporting period. 
Victims could file civil suits against their traffickers; however, no 
victims reportedly used this provision during the reporting period 
and many victims were unaware of the option.
PREVENTION
The government modestly increased prevention efforts. During 
the reporting period, the government adopted the 2021-2023 anti-
trafficking national action plan following a three-day workshop to 
consult with international organizations and civil society stakeholders 
on strategies to improve efforts to combat trafficking. The government 
allocated 60 million FCFA ($113,420) to the CNLTP in 2020, a 
significant increase compared with 16 million FCFA ($30,250) 
allocated in 2019. The government canceled a decree to move the 
CNLTP from within the Ministry of Justice to the Office of the 
Presidency to increase the CNLTP’s authority. The Ginddi Center 
continued to operate a hotline for child victims of crime in three 
languages. The hotline received 4,881 calls during the reporting period; 
the government did not report the number of criminal investigations 
initiated or the number of potential trafficking victims identified as 
a result of the calls; however, Ginddi Center staff retrieved children 
requiring assistance and brought them to the center for care. The 
government conducted an awareness-raising campaign during the 
third phase of “Le retrait des enfants de la rue” in collaboration with 
an NGO; the campaign included print and television coverage, 
billboards, flyers, posters, and distributable materials for events 
organized by the MWFGCP. 
Four municipal governments within Dakar continued implementing 
provisions developed with an international organization to increase 
oversight of daaras; provide food, hygiene, and medical services to 
children in daaras; and decrease incidents of forced begging. As a 
result, all four local municipalities passed regulations prohibiting 
child begging; child begging was reduced to zero percent in one 
municipality and reduced by 25 percent in the other three. As part 
of “Le retrait des enfants de la rue,” the government closed numerous 
unsafe daaras for health and safety violations. The government 
allocated 378 million FCFA ($714,560) for emergency pandemic 
response for vulnerable children, providing over 72,000 hygiene 
kits to more than 500 daaras. For the third consecutive year, the 
draft bill and implementing decrees to modernize daaras remained 
pending approval by the National Assembly during the reporting 
period; if passed, the bill would outline requirements that daaras must 
meet in order to be eligible for government subsidies. Furthermore, 
the draft legislation and the draft presidential decrees that would 
operationalize the legislation specified standards that daaras would 
need to maintain; for the first time, the government would have 
the oversight and authority to approve or deny the opening of new 
daaras and to close daaras that do not meet requirements. However, 
neither the draft legislation nor any of the implementing decrees 
explicitly prohibit child forced begging. The CNLTP continued to 
participate in the West Africa Network for the Protection of Children, 
a sub-regional referral mechanism for vulnerable children, including 
trafficking victims, comprising NGOs and officials from neighboring 
countries focused on combating trafficking. The government regulated 
labor recruiters and brokers but did not report any investigations into 
fraudulent recruitment during the reporting period. The government 
did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. 
The task force’s tourism police forces continued to monitor the resort 
areas of Saly and Cap Skirring for indicators of child sex tourism 
and other abuses, although they did not report identifying any cases 
of child sex tourism. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
domestic and foreign victims in Senegal, and traffickers exploit 
victims from Senegal abroad. Forced begging is the most prevalent 
form of trafficking; some Quranic teachers and men who claim to 
be Quranic teachers force children to beg in Dakar and other major 
cities in Senegal. In 2019, an NGO estimated 100,000 children living 
in residential daaras across Senegal are compelled to beg. The same 
NGO estimated that traffickers coerce nearly 30,000 children to beg 
in Dakar alone. In addition, a 2017 NGO-led study identified more 
than 14,800 child forced begging victims in Saint-Louis and reported 
that 187 of the city’s 197 daaras send children to beg for at least 
part of the day. Traffickers fraudulently recruit victims through the 
pretext of traditional cultural practices called confiage where parents 
send children to live with family or acquaintances in order for the 
child to have better access to education and economic opportunities; 
traffickers then exploit the children in forced labor and sex trafficking. 
Traffickers subject Senegalese children and women to sex trafficking 
and forced labor in domestic servitude and gold mines. Internal 
trafficking is more prevalent than transnational trafficking, although 
traffickers exploit boys from The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, 
and Mali in forced begging in Senegalese cities as well as in forced 
labor in artisanal gold mines in Senegal.
Traffickers exploit Senegalese women and girls in domestic servitude 
in neighboring countries, Europe, and the Middle East. Reports 
indicate traffickers exploit most Senegalese sex trafficking victims 
within Senegal, particularly in the southeastern gold-mining region of 
Kedougou. Traffickers also subject Burkinabes, Ghanaians, Guineans, 
Malians, and Nigerians to forced labor and sex trafficking in mining 
communities. The government continued to allow North Korean 
companies to operate in Senegal in construction and other sectors 
in potential violation of applicable UN Security Council resolutions; 
North Korean workers in Senegal may have been forced to work by 
the North Korean government. Chinese-owned and operated vessels 
flagged to Senegal may have exploited West African men, including 
Senegalese, and Chinese workers in forced labor. The pandemic’s 
impact on Senegal’s economy, particularly the informal sector, and 
foreign vessels’ decimation of its fishing stock, are causing a surge in 
irregular migration to Europe, including Spain; these migrants are 
vulnerable to trafficking. In 2018, authorities identified Ukrainian and 
Chinese women exploited in sex trafficking in bars and nightclubs. 
West African women and girls are subjected to domestic servitude 
and sex trafficking in Senegal, including for child sex tourism for 
tourists from Belgium, France, Germany, and other countries. Child sex 
tourism primarily occurs in the cities of Dakar and Saint Louis, and to 
a lesser extent in Cap Skirring and La Petite Côte, in traditional tourist 
areas and increasingly in private residences. In 2018, a government 
and international organization report alleged some Saudi diplomats 
in Senegal are complicit in fraudulently recruiting and exploiting 
some Senegalese women in domestic servitude in Saudi Arabia. 
In 2017, an international organization identified more than 1,100 
Senegalese migrants in Libya who were vulnerable to trafficking. 
Many migrants reported traveling through Burkina Faso, Mali, and 
Niger to reach Libya, with the intent to reach Europe.
SERBIA: TIER 2
The Government of Serbia does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do 
so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts compared 
to the previous reporting period, considering the impact of the 





remained on Tier 2. These efforts included convicting more traffickers 
and identifying more victims. The government increased resources to 
the Center for Protection of Trafficking Victims (CPTV), and judges 
granted “especially vulnerable witness status” to more victims. The 
government organized virtual awareness campaigns, including funding 
a competition to produce media projects on trafficking. However, 
the government did not meet the minimum standards in several key 
areas. The government continued to lack proactive identification 
efforts, particularly screening of migration flows and individuals in 
commercial sex. CPTV continued to lack resources and staff necessary 
to adequately assess victims and coordinate care placement, and the 
government indefinitely closed the Urgent Reception Center (URC) 
due to pandemic-related issues and its inability to obtain a license. 
The government halted direct assistance and referral procedures during 
the pandemic-related state of emergency from March 2020 to May 
2020, forcing NGOs to provide all victim assistance measures with 
no government funding. Authorities penalized more victims and did 
not protect victims’ rights during court proceedings, including a lack 
of victim confidentiality and legal representation. The Anti-Trafficking 
Council did not meet, and official complicity in trafficking crimes 
remained a significant concern.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, including 
complicit officials, and impose adequate penalties. • Increase efforts 
to proactively identify victims, including among migrants, individuals 
in commercial sex, refugees and asylum seekers, and unaccompanied 
children engaged in street begging. • Allocate sufficient resources 
to enable the Center for the Protection of Trafficking Victims to 
officially identify victims and implement victim protection efforts. 
• Allocate adequate funding to NGOs providing victim support 
services. • Implement access to justice measures and victim-centered 
approaches, such as protecting victim confidentiality, providing legal 
representation, and preventing re-traumatization and intimidation. 
• Train investigators, prosecutors, and judges on victim-centered 
approaches and establish mechanisms to refer cases to trained 
prosecutors and judges. • Fully implement written guidance to 
prevent penalization of trafficking victims for crimes committed as a 
direct result of being subjected to trafficking. • Establish transparent 
standards and procedures for NGOs to obtain licenses for providing 
support services. • Update the national referral mechanism by 
formalizing cooperation with and reimbursement to NGOs and 
delegating specific roles and responsibilities to government agencies. 
• Improve training for government personnel on victim assistance 
and referral and ensure access to victim assistance for foreign victims. 
• Provide labor inspectors and market inspectors the resources and 
training necessary to regulate recruitment agencies and investigate 
cases of fraudulent recruitment. • Integrate Roma groups into policies 
and programs on regarding victim protection.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Article 388 of 
the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and 
prescribed penalties ranging from two to 12 years’ imprisonment for 
offenses involving an adult victim and three to 12 years’ imprisonment 
for those involving a child victim. These penalties were sufficiently 
stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
those for serious crimes, such as rape. Law enforcement investigated 
22 new cases (23 cases in 2019). Of these, 15 were sex trafficking 
cases, and seven were forced labor. The government prosecuted 42 
defendants (47 in 2019). Of these, 33 were for sex trafficking, and 
9 for forced labor. The government continued prosecutions of 53 
defendants from previous years. Courts convicted 18 traffickers 
(15 sex traffickers in 2019) and acquitted seven individuals. All 18 
traffickers received imprisonment, but the government did not collect 
or report information on the length of sentences. Observers reported 
judges often issued light sentences for traffickers, and some judges 
displayed victim-blaming mentalities and biases against vulnerable 
populations, particularly the Romani community. Police organizations 
suffered from COVID-19 outbreaks, and courts delayed trials due 
to pandemic mitigation measures and/or lawyers and defendants 
testing positive for COVID-19. While judges and prosecutors worked 
shorter hours due to pandemic mitigation measures, prosecutors 
organized some virtual hearings for extraordinary circumstances. 
The Criminal Police Directorate maintained an Anti-Trafficking Unit 
within the Directorate to Combat Organized Crime. In 2019, the 
Ministry of Interior (MOI) created a new labor division to investigate 
forced labor. The government maintained specialized units in Belgrade, 
Nis, and Novi Sad, and it appointed at least two officers to investigate 
trafficking in the 27 regional police administrations. The government 
continued to use a trafficking task force to coordinate efforts to 
proactively investigate trafficking and maintained a separate human 
smuggling and trafficking task force that also investigated trafficking. 
Experts reported hiring freezes at local levels required specialized 
officers to investigate unrelated crimes, and specialized units required 
additional capacity and equipment, including computers, vehicles, 
and technical investigative tools. The Public Prosecutor’s Office 
maintained specialized prosecutors for trafficking cases, who acted 
as single points of contact for investigators and care providers and 
provided operational guidance; however, the government did not have 
a system to consistently refer trafficking cases to these prosecutors or 
to judges trained or experienced on trafficking issues. Prosecutors did 
not effectively distinguish between labor rights violations and forced 
labor and often charged or offered plea deals in sex trafficking cases 
for mediating prostitution, including cases with child victims. The 
government, at times in cooperation with international organizations, 
provided virtual trainings for prosecutors, labor inspectors, police, 
and judges on various anti-trafficking issues. The government assisted 
158 trafficking-related cases through INTERPOL and 233 cases 
through EUROPOL. Similar to a case of alleged complicity of MOI 
officials in 2019, authorities investigated two cases with multiple 
allegedly complicit police officers in Sabac and Presevo who may 
have solicited sexual services from trafficking victims. In 2018, law 
enforcement charged a police officer involved in sex trafficking; the 
trial was ongoing during the reporting period. Despite ongoing 
and repeated allegations of official complicity, especially in sex 
trafficking, the government did not report any new prosecutions 
or any convictions of government employees complicit in human 
trafficking offenses. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained victim protection efforts. The government 
identified 48 victims (36 in 2019). Of these, 21 were victims of sex 
trafficking, 14 of forced labor (including two of forced begging), 
four of forced criminality, and nine of multiple types of exploitation; 
17 were children; five were foreign victims; and the majority were 
female. First responders referred 130 potential victims to CPTV 
(135 in 2019); law enforcement referred 59 potential victims, social 
welfare organizations referred 43 potential victims, and NGOs 
and international organizations referred 18 potential victims; four 
potential victims self-identified; and private citizens and other 
institutions referred six potential victims. The government maintained 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the identification, referral, 
and support of trafficking victims, including standardized indicators 
and guidelines to identify victims in migrant flows, schools, and 
high-risk sectors. However, the SOPs did not provide clear roles and 
responsibilities for civil society, and implementation remained weak 
with a lack of proactive identification efforts, including screening 
of migrant flows and individuals in commercial sex. In previous 
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years, some first responders, particularly Centers for Social Work 
(CSW), justified cases of potential forced child begging and forced 
labor involving Roma as traditional cultural practices and customs. 
CPTV assessed and officially recognized adult victims referred by 
first responders and developed a protection and assistance plan for 
each victim. CSW assessed and officially recognized child victims. 
In 2019, GRETA and other experts reported CPTV lacked the staff 
to review cases in a timely manner and resources to travel to the 
location of potential victims and interview them in person. Experts 
continued to report the lack of transparency regarding the official 
victim assessment and CPTV’s inability to assess potential victims 
consistently. For example, CPTV did not provide official victim status 
to some potential victims, who were later determined by civil society 
as trafficking victims, a trend that re-victimized some victims. Civil 
society reported government spending was suspended during the 
COVID-19 state of emergency from March 2020 to May 2020, which 
halted direct assistance and referral procedures. 
The government allocated 23 million dinars ($240,080) to CPTV and 
the URC, compared with 3 million dinars ($31,320) for only CPTV 
in 2019. The government could not provide information on funds 
allocated to all victim protection efforts in 2019 and 2020 and did not 
provide funding to NGOs despite relying heavily, and at times solely, 
on their victim support and reintegration services. The government 
and NGOs provided psycho-social, legal, educational, medical, 
financial, and reintegration support; all potential victims in 2020 (121 
in 2019) and all official victims in 2020 (184 in 2019) received some 
form of government assistance. The government reported providing 
equal protection to foreign and domestic victims, but foreign victims 
faced obstacles in accessing support, according to experts, who noted 
some local communities limit shelter accommodation to Serbian 
nationals. Although the government required victims to be referred 
only to licensed service providers, licenses were difficult to obtain 
because the government lacked official standards and criteria to 
approve licenses. The government opened the URC in February 2019, 
managed by CPTV and designed to provide safe shelter and services 
with the capacity to accommodate six victims; however, the URC 
closed in September 2020 due to staff testing positive for COVID-19 
and its inability to obtain a license. Of the two major NGOs that 
work on trafficking issues, one was licensed to provide housing 
and victim assistance, and the other was licensed to administer an 
SOS hotline. In 2019, CPTV reported difficulties in fulfilling their 
expanded responsibilities from a coordinating body to one that 
also provided direct assistance at the URC due to a continued lack 
of capacity and staff, including technical staff and skills to provide 
support to victims, and a lack of resources to afford basic office 
equipment, food, hygiene products, and shelter renovations. Civil 
society reported CPTV relied on its scare resources to support the 
URC with food, toiletries, and access to vehicles. 
CSW operated shelters for domestic violence victims that also 
accommodated female trafficking victims. GRETA visited a CSW-run 
shelter in Sremska Mitrovica in January 2018 and reported “good 
living conditions,” but these shelters generally lacked the specialized 
programs and trained staff necessary for working with trafficking 
victims. Additionally, after the closure of the URC, only one NGO 
operated a specialized shelter for trafficking victims. The government 
maintained a drop-in shelter for street children, and CSW returned 
child victims to their families, referred them to foster care, or placed 
them in one of the two Centers for Children without Parental Care; 17 
potential child victims were accommodated in general shelters (31 in 
2019), seven were accommodated in shelters for asylum seekers and 
migrants (11 in 2019), and 21 were placed in foster families (25 in 
2019). The government did not provide specialized accommodation 
for male victims. An NGO rented accommodation for male victims 
as needed, and male victims could access all other rehabilitation 
services offered to female victims. CPTV maintained a protocol with 
the National Employment Service (NES) to assist victims in finding 
employment; CPTV did not refer any victim to NES for assistance 
in 2020 (two in 2019). The government provided foreign victims 
temporary residence permits (TPR) renewable up to one year and 
allowed potential foreign victims to stay for three months; authorities 
granted one victim a TPR and assisted two victims in obtaining 
documents to apply for a TPR (no victims received a TPR in 2019, 
but two victims renewed their TPRs). The government repatriated 10 
victims to Serbia, compared with repatriating two victims to Serbia 
and one victim to Albania in 2019. Observers reported the lack of a 
standardized database to collect information on trafficking victims 
created obstacles in managing cases and monitoring access and 
quality of support services. 
Authorities continued to penalize victims for crimes their traffickers 
compelled them to commit; authorities penalized at least eight 
victims of sex trafficking, forced begging, and forced criminality with 
imprisonment, probation, and fines (at least four in 2019). Victims’ 
ability to access support services and assistance was not contingent 
on cooperating with law enforcement investigations, but once a case 
was reported to police, authorities required victims to cooperate with 
investigations and testify during prosecution, including children; 68 
victims, 36 adults and 32 children, participated in court proceedings 
(103 in 2019). In previous years, observers reported Serbian authorities 
threatened some victims with prosecution for non-cooperation. Judges 
did not grant witness protection to trafficking victims or adequately 
protect victims’ rights during lengthy court proceedings. The law 
designated officially recognized victims as a “particularly vulnerable 
group” eligible for special assistance and procedural consideration, but 
judges did not consistently assign the status of “especially vulnerable 
witness” or “protective witness status” to trafficking victims, including 
children; these statuses allowed witnesses to testify without the 
defendant present, testify via video link, and access witness protection. 
Judges granted “especially vulnerable witness status” to 20 victims 
(none in 2019) but did not grant “protective witness status” to any 
victims in 2020 (none in 2019). Observers reported an absence of 
victim confidentiality measures; one example included the MOI 
publishing information on a trafficker who was the victim’s father, 
and as a result, media organizations easily identified the victim. 
Similarly, law enforcement leaked victims’ personal information 
to media organizations that published the information and details 
of their exploitation, which resulted in the victims experiencing 
threats and intimidation. Victims also frequently appeared in front 
of their traffickers during trial and, in previous years, did not receive 
notification when authorities released their traffickers from custody. 
Police escorted victims to and from court, but, in 2019, police did 
not consistently conduct “safety assessments” of official victims and 
often sent victims home to potentially exploitative family members. 
In 2020, CPTV did not hire legal representation for victims due to lack 
of funds, compared with spending 547,054 dinars ($5,710) on legal 
representation in 2019. Judges did not issue restitution in criminal 
cases and continued to encourage victims to seek compensation 
solely by filing civil suits. Civil suits were lengthy, expensive, and 
required the victim to face their trafficker multiple times; only one 
victim has received compensation to date. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. The government 
implemented the anti-trafficking strategy for 2017-2022 and the 
national action plan (NAP) for 2019-2020. The government allocated 
7.88 million dinars ($82,270) to implement the 2019-2020 NAP. 
The Anti-Trafficking Council did not meet in 2020 (met once in 
2019), and the Special Working Group on Strategy Implementation 
and Monitoring held four meetings (the same number as in 2019). 
Nineteen municipal governments maintained multidisciplinary 
anti-trafficking teams. The government organized virtual awareness 
campaigns targeting students, co-funded a competition to produce 
media projects on trafficking, and allocated 703,355 dinars ($7,340) to 
television stations in Krusevac for local awareness campaigns. In 2019, 
the government allocated 2.15 million dinars ($22,440) to media 
projects on trafficking issues and organized educational and outreach 
activities. The government operated three anti-trafficking hotlines but 
did not report the number of trafficking-related calls. The government 





government did not prohibit recruitment fees, and observers reported 
that tourist agencies also performed labor recruitment and were 
largely unregulated. Additionally, civil society reported recruitment 
agencies re-formed under different names after authorities revoked 
their licenses and reported instances of the translations of contracts 
into English and/or Serbian being substantively different from the 
original contract in the origin country’s language. In previous years, 
GRETA reported the Market Inspectorate may take up to two months 
to react to reports of fraudulent employment offers. The government 
did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Serbia, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Serbia abroad. Traffickers exploit Serbian women in sex trafficking in 
Serbia, in neighboring countries, and throughout Europe, particularly 
Austria, Germany, Italy, and Turkey. Traffickers exploit Serbian 
nationals, primarily men, in forced labor in labor-intensive sectors, 
such as the construction industry, in European countries (including 
Austria, Belgium, Croatia, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Montenegro, Russia, and Switzerland) and the United Arab Emirates. 
Traffickers exploit Serbian children, particularly Roma, within the 
country in sex trafficking, forced labor, forced begging, and petty crime. 
Foreign victims identified in Serbia were from Albania, Cameroon, 
Croatia, Denmark, Germany, Mali, Nigeria, North Macedonia, and 
Pakistan. Thousands of migrants and refugees from the Middle 
East, Africa, and Asia transiting through or left stranded in Serbia 
are vulnerable to trafficking within Serbia.
SEYCHELLES: TIER 2
The Government of Seychelles does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking 
capacity; therefore Seychelles was upgraded to Tier 2. These efforts 
included initiating more prosecutions; convicting more traffickers; 
allocating more resources for victim care; increasing provision of 
protective services for foreign victims and victims cooperating with 
law enforcement; and establishing interagency committees to improve 
protections for victims of child sex trafficking. The government 
also achieved the country’s first sex trafficking conviction under the 
2014 anti-trafficking law. However, the government did not meet 
the minimum standards in several key areas. The government did 
not implement its standard operating procedures (SOPs) for victim 
identification and referral or its victim assistance mechanism, and it 
did not have any shelters or care facilities that offered comprehensive 
services for trafficking victims. The government did not establish a 
secretariat to support the National Coordinating Committee against 
Trafficking in Persons (NCCTIP), hindering the committee’s ability to 
fulfill its mandate to direct anti-trafficking efforts across government 
agencies and drive national policy. The government remained without 
a national action plan for the sixth consecutive year.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Implement the official standard operating procedures for victim 
identification and referral and provide specialized training to 
government officials to proactively identify trafficking victims by 
screening vulnerable populations for trafficking indicators, including 
individuals involved in commercial sex, refugees, and foreign 
nationals, such as Bangladeshi and Cuban medical workers. • Refer all 
identified victims to rehabilitation and protection services, including 
child victims, Seychellois, and foreign nationals, such as Bangladeshi, 
Chinese, and Cuban workers. • Establish or designate a dedicated 
space for trafficking victims to receive specialized, comprehensive care, 
including short- and long-term shelter, medical assistance, and psycho-
social counseling. • Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict 
traffickers and sentence convicted traffickers, including complicit 
officials, to adequate penalties under the 2014 anti-trafficking law. 
• Finalize, adopt, and implement a national action plan to drive 
national efforts to combat all forms of trafficking. • Implement 
the requirements of the 2014 anti-trafficking act, including hiring 
personnel for the secretariat to support the National Coordinating 
Committee and allocating resources to the Trafficking in Persons 
Fund. • Train labor inspectors to identify potential forced labor 
victims during routine inspections, including in the international 
trade zone and migrant workers’ work sites, and to report potential 
trafficking violations to appropriate officials. • Remove the required 
fee for migrant workers to file a complaint with the Labor Tribunal. 
• Adopt a law prohibiting the retention of passports by employers 
of migrant workers. • Allocate adequate funding and resources for 
victim services and front-line officials. • Conduct anti-trafficking 
awareness campaigns to increase the understanding of the crime 
among the local population and the large number of foreign tourists 
and migrant workers entering the country. • Utilize the national 
centralized anti-trafficking data collection and reporting tool. 
PROSECUTION
The government increased law enforcement efforts to combat 
trafficking. The Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons Act of 2014 
criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking. The law prescribed 
penalties of up to 14 years’ imprisonment and a fine up to 500,000 
Seychelles rupee ($23,910) for offenses involving adult victims, and 
a maximum of 25 years’ imprisonment and a fine up to 800,000 
Seychelles rupee ($38,260) for those involving child victims; 
these penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with those for other serious crimes, such 
as rape. Although the anti-trafficking law criminalized child sex 
trafficking, unclear and conflicting statutes in the penal code did not 
clearly define the ages of consent, causing confusion between the 
traditionally understood age of consent (15 years of age) and the 
legal age of majority (18 years of age). In 2017, the government, in 
collaboration with an international organization, began development 
of implementing regulations for the 2014 antitrafficking law to 
address protective measures for trafficking victims; however, the 
government did not finalize these regulations for the third consecutive 
year, hindering systematic victim protection efforts. In 2020, the 
Child Law Reform Committee (CLRC) drafted new legislation that 
reportedly expands protections for child sex trafficking victims and 
increases law enforcement’s obligation to investigate and prosecute 
cases of child sex crimes, including trafficking; the new legislation 
had not yet been presented to the National Assembly at the end of 
the reporting period.
The government investigated three cases — one for sex trafficking, one 
for forced labor, and one involving both sex and labor trafficking — in 
2020, compared with 18 investigations of forced labor in the previous 
reporting period. The government arrested 11 suspected traffickers 
— 10 Seychellois nationals and one Nepali national — during the 
reporting period. The government reported initiating 12 prosecutions 
–including all 11 suspected traffickers arrested as part of investigations 
during the reporting period and one suspected trafficker in a case 
ongoing from previous years — compared with zero prosecutions in 
the previous reporting period. All 12 prosecutions remained ongoing 
at the end of the reporting period. The government continued to 
prosecute three defendants charged with sex trafficking in 2019 
SEYCHELLES
492
and reported new details revealing additional trafficking indicators. 
The government convicted two traffickers in 2020, compared with 
zero convictions in 2019. Courts sentenced a Seychellois national 
involved in a 2019 sex trafficking case to 25 years’ imprisonment 
in the first sex trafficking conviction under the 2014 anti-trafficking 
law. The government also reported convicting and sentencing a 
Seychellois national involved in a 2018 labor trafficking case to 
three years’ imprisonment and a fine of 75,000 Seychelles rupee 
($3,590). The government prosecuted a police officer involved in 
the aforementioned 2019 sex trafficking case; courts convicted the 
official but sentenced him to 12 years’ imprisonment under sexual 
assault charges, rather than trafficking. The government did not host 
trainings for law enforcement officials for the second consecutive year. 
With support from an international organization, the government 
had access to a national centralized anti-trafficking data collection 
and reporting tool in place since 2015, but did not use it, despite 
officials receiving training.
PROTECTION
The government increased efforts to protect victims of human 
trafficking. The government reported identifying 14 victims of 
trafficking during the reporting period, compared with zero victims 
identified in 2019. Of the 14 victims identified, traffickers exploited 
nine victims in both forced labor and sex trafficking and four in forced 
labor. The government reported that all 14 victims were adults — ten 
male and four female — and all were foreign nationals from Kenya, 
Nepal, and India. As part of an ongoing sex trafficking case initiated 
in 2020, the government reported that up to 80 Seychellois female 
adults and children may have been exploited in sex trafficking or 
sexually abused; however, the government did not report formally 
identifying any of these individuals as trafficking victims during the 
reporting period. The government provided counseling and psycho-
social services to an unspecified number of these potential victims. 
NCCTIP reported spending 498,480 rupees ($23,840) for victim 
care in 2020, compared with 360,020 Seychelles rupees ($17,220) 
in 2019. The government reported providing short-term shelter 
and basic needs to nine victims and repatriating all 14 identified 
victims. There were no trafficking-specific shelters to assist victims 
in the country. As in prior years, the Social Affairs Department of 
the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs provided foreign victims 
who were waiting to give testimony in court with accommodation in 
private guesthouses, homeless shelters, or a facility previously used 
to hold suspected criminals, where they had freedom of movement; 
the government continued to provide this service to 10 Bangladeshi 
victims of forced labor identified in prior years. The government did 
not systematically implement its 2015 victim identification and referral 
tool, which continued to hinder protection efforts. The government 
did not proactively screen vulnerable populations, such as migrant 
workers or individuals in commercial sex, for trafficking indicators 
and relied on victims to self-report. The government did not train 
officials on implementing the victim identification and referral tool, 
and the police continued to use procedures independent from the 
national SOPs. 
The 2014 anti-trafficking law allowed the government to place 
witnesses under protection and, if the court found it necessary, to 
hold trafficking trials in private for the sake of victim or witness 
confidentiality and privacy; the law also ensured victims could testify 
through closed circuit television and that courtroom accommodations 
could be made for the psychological comfort of the victim. The 
government reported offering these services in all prosecutions 
conducted during the reporting period. Additionally, the government 
provided the 14 repatriated victims the option to provide evidence via 
video-conferencing in the upcoming trials of their alleged traffickers. 
The 2014 anti-trafficking law allowed for limited legal alternatives 
to victim removal to countries in which they would face hardship; 
the law permitted the Minister of Home Affairs to decide whether 
to allow a foreign victim to stay in the country for 30 days, issue 
a permit letting the victim to stay in the country for a period until 
the completion of legal proceedings, or deport the foreign victim. 
During the reporting period, the government provided five victims of 
forced labor with new work permits, allowing them to begin working 
with a new employer, compared to zero in the previous reporting 
period. The anti-trafficking law allowed the government to provide 
restitution to victims from the fine imposed on the accused or from 
the Trafficking in Persons Fund; however, the government has never 
allotted resources to the Trafficking in Persons Fund and did not 
provide restitution to any victims during the reporting period. The law 
protected trafficking victims from detention or prosecution for illegal 
entry into Seychelles, but it did not protect victims from prosecution 
for other unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit. There 
were no reports that the government inappropriately detained or 
penalized trafficking victims for crimes traffickers compelled them 
to commit; however, because officials did not use standard victim 
identification procedures, victims may have remained unidentified 
in the law enforcement system.
PREVENTION
The government maintained overall efforts to prevent trafficking, while 
increasing targeted efforts to prevent child sex trafficking. NCCTIP, 
established to direct anti-trafficking efforts across government agencies 
and drive national policy, met six times during the reporting period. 
The government allocated 1.18 million Seychelles rupees ($56,490) 
for committee operations and programming, such as victim assistance 
and prevention efforts, an increase compared with 784,020 rupees 
($37,490) in 2019. During the reporting period, oversight of NCCTIP 
shifted from the Ministry of Social Affairs to the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs, which reportedly provided more clarity on the committee’s 
responsibilities. For the fourth consecutive year, the government 
did not hire personnel for a secretariat to support the Coordinating 
Committee as required under section IV of the 2014 anti-trafficking 
act; this continued to hinder the committee’s ability to fulfill its 
mandate. In April 2020, the government established the HighLevel 
Committee to Address Child Protection Matters (CACPM) to evaluate 
existing child sexual exploitation prevention measures. Based on 
CACPM’s recommendation, the government established the CLRC 
in June 2020 to review existing laws and propose legal reforms to 
strengthen protections for child victims of various crimes, including 
child sex trafficking. The government did not have a national action 
plan (NAP) for the fifth consecutive year; NCCTIP reportedly drafted 
an updated 2021-2023 NAP, which was awaiting final approval by 
the Ministry of Internal Affairs at the end of the reporting period. 
For the first time since 2016, the government conducted various 
national public awareness campaigns to educate the public on human 
trafficking. The government distributed 1,500 pamphlets and leaflets 
on labor trafficking – in English and French – to the international 
airport, seaports, relevant government agencies, and employers of 
migrant workers, and NCCTIP organized media sensitization targeting 
frontline officials. The government maintained hotlines operated 
by the police, immigration, and social services departments for 
reporting crimes, including trafficking. The employment department 
maintained a hotline to address concerns about forced labor and 
reported 900 calls during the reporting period, compared with 64 
calls in 2019. The government did not provide any hotline data 
specific to trafficking and did not report identifying any trafficking 
victims via hotline calls during the reporting period.
Trafficking vulnerabilities in labor recruitment and monitoring 
persisted throughout the country, especially in the Seychelles 
International Trade Zone (SITZ). The Ministry of Employment (MOE) 
reported inspecting 573 work sites for indications of trafficking, 
compared with 237 inspections by the MOE and 501 total in 2019; 
however, the government did not report identifying any potential 
forced labor victims or reporting any potential trafficking violations 
for law enforcement action as a result of the inspections. The MOE 
continued to lack jurisdiction in the SITZ; this limited its ability 
to protect migrant workers and screen for trafficking, as it was 
considered ex-territorial and managed by the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA). The FSA reportedly denied the MOE’s requests to 







pandemic-related health precautions. The inter-ministerial Special 
Task Force, which had a mandate to address the living and working 
conditions of migrant workers, was inactive during the reporting 
period. In accordance with the Employment Act, MOE reviewed 
all contracts for migrant workers to ensure compliance with its 
provisions, including acceptable accommodations; however, the 
government did not have effective policies or laws regulating or 
providing oversight for labor recruiters. Seizure and retention of 
passports by employers remained legal under Seychellois law, unless 
proven it was specifically for the purpose of further trafficking a person; 
however, in the previous reporting period, the government drafted 
an amendment to the immigration bill that reportedly prohibits 
passport retention of foreign workers. The government did not report 
sending the bill to parliament for the second consecutive reporting 
period. The government continued to utilize the labor tribunal for 
laborrelated complaints and continued to require a fee for migrant 
workers to file a complaint. In 2019, the government began drafting 
a new immigration bill that would require the provision of work 
permit cards for all citizens and foreign workers that includes anti-
trafficking information and contact information for assistance; the 
bill was awaiting approval by the National Assembly at the end of 
the reporting period. The government did not make efforts to reduce 
the demand for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Seychelles. Traffickers exploit some Seychellois 
girls and, according to some sources, boys in child sex trafficking, 
particularly on the main island of Mahé; peers, family members, and 
pimps exploit them in bars, guest houses, hotels, brothels, private 
homes, and on the street. Traffickers may exploit young drug addicts 
in sex trafficking, and sex traffickers have exploited Eastern European 
women in hotels. In 2017, there were reports of possible high-level 
corruption, which allowed wealthy citizens from Gulf countries to 
coordinate the travel of young women aboard private planes, some 
of whom may have been trafficking victims. Traffickers exploit 
Malagasy women who transit Seychelles in forced labor, primarily 
in domestic servitude, and sex trafficking in the Middle East. Nearly 
17,000 migrant workers — including individuals from Bangladesh, 
India, China, Kenya, Madagascar, and other countries in South Asia 
— make up approximately 20 percent of the working population 
in Seychelles and are primarily employed in fishing, farming, and 
construction; credible reports indicate traffickers subject migrant 
workers to forced labor in these sectors. NGOs report traffickers 
exploit migrant workers aboard foreign-flagged fishing vessels in 
Seychelles’ territorial waters and ports using abuses indicative of 
forced labor, including nonpayment of wages and physical abuse. 
Labor recruitment agents based in Seychelles exploit migrant workers 
in labor trafficking, often with the assistance of a local Seychellois 
accomplice. Migrant workers often sign their employment contracts 
upon arrival in the Seychelles and frequently cannot read the language, 
which traffickers exploit in fraudulent recruitment tactics. There were 
reports of employers routinely retaining migrant workers’ passports 
to prevent them from changing jobs prior to the expiration of their 
two-year contracts, increasing their vulnerability to forced labor. 
Cuban medical professionals working in Seychelles may have been 
forced to work by the Cuban government.
SIERRA LEONE: TIER 2 
The Government of Sierra Leone does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Sierra Leone remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
significantly increasing investigations and prosecutions, allocating 
funding to an NGO for protective services, and adopting a new 
anti-trafficking national action plan. However, the government did 
not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. Shelter and 
services, especially for male victims, remained inadequate and limited 
to Freetown. The government continued its moratorium on labor 
migration, increasing vulnerability to trafficking. Law enforcement 
did not investigate past reports of corruption and official complicity 
in trafficking crimes.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Expand victim shelter and services, including for male victims, outside 
of Freetown. • Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict 
traffickers, following due process, and sentence convicted traffickers 
with significant prison terms in accordance with the law. • Train police, 
prosecutors, and judges to investigate and prosecute trafficking cases. 
• Train all officials on the standard victim identification measures 
and national referral mechanism to ensure trafficking victims receive 
timely services. • End policies that encourage labor migration to 
occur through informal channels, increasing migrants’ vulnerability 
to trafficking. • Implement the new Labor Migration Policy, including 
pre-departure education about labor rights, improving recruitment 
agency licensing procedures, and increasing the capacity of Sierra 
Leonean missions to support victims. • Amend the 2005 anti-
trafficking law to remove sentencing provisions that allow for a fine in 
lieu of imprisonment for sex trafficking offenses. • Proactively screen 
for trafficking indicators among vulnerable populations, including 
Sierra Leonean women traveling abroad for domestic work, women 
in commercial sex, irregular migrants, children in informal foster 
care arrangements, and Cuban medical professionals. • Continue 
efforts to raise public awareness of trafficking. • Coordinate with the 
governments of Liberia and Guinea to prosecute transnational cases, 
coordinate victim protection, and prevent trafficking. • Improve 
data collection on anti-trafficking law enforcement and victim 
assistance efforts.
PROSECUTION
The government moderately increased anti-trafficking law enforcement 
efforts. The 2005 anti-trafficking law criminalized sex trafficking 
and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to 10 years’ 
imprisonment, a fine, or both. These penalties were sufficiently 
stringent; however, by allowing for a fine in lieu of imprisonment, 
the penalties for sex trafficking were not commensurate with the 
penalties for other grave crimes, such as rape. The Sexual Offences 
Act criminalized sex trafficking under its “forced prostitution” and 
“child prostitution” provisions and prescribed penalties of up to 15 
years’ imprisonment; these penalties were sufficiently stringent and 
commensurate with penalties for other grave crimes such as rape. 
Draft legislation to replace the 2005 anti-trafficking law to remove the 
possibility of a fine in lieu of imprisonment for convicted traffickers, 
increase penalties, and improve victim protection measures remained 
pending at the close of the reporting period.
The government reported investigating 72 cases, prosecuting at least 
30 defendants in 33 cases, and convicting one trafficker during the 
reporting period; this compared with 30 investigations, prosecution of 
nine defendants, and conviction of three traffickers during the previous 
reporting period. The convicted trafficker fraudulently recruited a 
Sierra Leonean woman and exploited her in domestic servitude in 




fine as victim compensation. Judicial inefficiencies, general corruption, 
and procedural delays prevented courts from holding traffickers 
accountable and diminished faith in the judicial system. As a result, 
victims’ families often accepted payments from traffickers rather than 
pursue cases in court, and families sometimes exerted pressure on 
victims to not participate in investigations and prosecutions against 
their alleged traffickers due to security concerns, community ties to 
alleged traffickers, and the high cost and travel required to participate 
in such cases. In many cases, either victims did not agree to testify 
against their traffickers and prosecutors dropped the charges or 
victims could not meet the travel requirements for court appearances 
and judges dismissed their cases. During the reporting period, the 
government continued to expedite trafficking cases by referring 
trafficking prosecutions directly to the High Court, bypassing the 
preliminary investigation stage, which sometimes was a three-year 
process. In addition, the chief justice assigned a dedicated judge 
and the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) assigned special prosecutors for 
trafficking cases. In previous years, traffickers reportedly bribed 
prosecutors not to prosecute cases and bribed judges to dismiss 
cases; it is not clear whether this remained an issue. The government 
did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of 
government employees complicit in human trafficking crimes; 
however, corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes, 
particularly in the judiciary, remained significant concerns, inhibiting 
law enforcement and judicial action during the year. In a previous 
reporting period, an NGO alleged police officers raped potential 
child trafficking victims and, in some cases, transported victims to 
police stations where they were sexually abused. 
Due to the pandemic, the government did not report providing 
specialized anti-trafficking training to law enforcement or judicial 
officials, compared to training 74 law enforcement officials, 120 
border officials, and 30 judges, magistrates, and prosecutors in the 
previous reporting period. The government continued to cooperate 
with the governments of Guinea and Liberia on trafficking cases and 
border security, and it implemented standard operating procedures 
on victim identification with the Government of Guinea during 
the reporting period. During the reporting period, the government 
cooperated with the Government of Liberia on two trafficking cases, 
with one case resulting in the arrest and extradition of one alleged 
trafficker to Sierra Leone. In the other case, the governments assisted 
the Government of Liberia in investigating a Liberian recruitment 
agency exploiting Togolese and Guinean workers in Sierra Leone.
PROTECTION
The government maintained efforts to identify and protect victims. 
The government identified 73 trafficking victims during the reporting 
period, compared with 76 victims identified in the previous reporting 
period. This included 29 women exploited in forced labor, 22 
children exploited in unspecified forms of trafficking, and 22 foreign 
male victims exploited in unspecified forms of trafficking. Officials 
referred women and child victims to NGOs for shelter services, while 
authorities temporarily sheltered male victims at law enforcement 
facilities. The government had standard procedures to identify 
trafficking victims, including victims among vulnerable populations, 
and refer them to services; however, inconsistent application and 
lack of training on the procedures delayed provision of services to 
victims. In some cases, victims slept at police stations due to a lack 
of appropriate housing authorities, especially for male victims, 
and Ministry of Social Welfare (MSW) officials did not uniformly 
implement the standard protocols for referring victims to NGOs 
for specialized care. 
The government relied on NGOs to care for trafficking victims; 
however, the government allocated 50 million Leones ($5,000) 
and provided limited food assistance to an NGO operating a shelter 
specifically for female and child trafficking victims in 2020. During 
the reporting period, the shelter provided medical, psycho-social, 
educational, legal, vocational, family tracing, and reintegration support 
to at least 52 trafficking victims; unlike in previous reporting periods, 
adult victims were permitted to leave the shelter unchaperoned. 
Another NGO operated a shelter for vulnerable children, including 
trafficking victims. No shelters could accommodate adult male 
victims. The government sometimes provided adult male victims 
with funds to rent housing during investigations, but often they 
slept at police stations while investigations were ongoing; 22 foreign 
male adult victims identified during the reporting period stayed at 
Transnational Organized Crime Unit (TOCU) facilities during an 
investigation, and the government did not refer them for additional 
services. In some cases, law enforcement temporarily sheltered child 
victims in their own homes during investigations. The government 
assisted in the repatriation of 130 Sierra Leoneans from Lebanon, 
many of whom were domestic workers, including potential trafficking 
victims, by providing travel documents and purchasing airline 
tickets. The government also assisted in the repatriation of 80 Sierra 
Leoneans from Kuwait and two Sierra Leonean child trafficking 
victims from Guinea. The Sierra Leonean embassy in Senegal assisted 
an international organization in repatriating 59 Sierra Leonean 
victims by providing travel documents and paying for mandatory 
COVID-19 tests. An international organized identified and assisted 
at least 97 Sierra Leonean trafficking victims exploited in the Middle 
East during the reporting period. 
The government supported victims participating in trials against their 
traffickers by providing immigration relief, legal services, transportation, 
and lodging. In addition, prosecutors requested closed court sessions to 
protect victims’ identities and prevent re-traumatization during trials. 
The government did not report how many victims, if any, voluntarily 
participated in investigations and prosecutions during the reporting 
period, compared with 51 victims during the previous reporting period. 
The law allowed victims to obtain restitution, and at least one victim 
received restitution during the reporting period. While victims could 
file civil suits against their traffickers, none did so during the reporting 
period. The law provided legal alternatives to removal of trafficking 
victims to countries in which victims would face retribution or hardship; 
the government did not report providing these services to any victims 
during the reporting period. There were no reports the government 
detained or otherwise penalized trafficking victims for unlawful acts 
traffickers compelled them to commit; however, due to inconsistent 
application of victim identification procedures, authorities may have 
detained some unidentified victims.
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The anti-
trafficking task force, chaired by the MSW and MOJ, adopted a new 
2021-2023 national action plan. The government did not report 
allocating funds to the government’s anti-trafficking efforts in fiscal 
year 2021, a significant decrease from allocating 1 billion Leones 
($100,030) to anti-trafficking efforts, including implementation 
of the national action plan, in 2020. Regional anti-trafficking task 
forces amplified the central task force’s efforts in all 16 districts. In 
partnership with an international organization, the government 
trained 60 regional task force members, including government 
officials, law enforcement, and civil society, in three districts on 
victim protection. Despite the pandemic’s impact on the government’s 
ability to conduct in-person awareness raising activities, the task 
force continued radio anti-trafficking campaigns and held online 
panel discussions. Additionally, the government cosponsored a 
UNGA panel event commemorating the 20th anniversary of the UN 
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children. 
The government continued its moratorium on recruitment of Sierra 
Leoneans for employment abroad. The government’s past and current 
efforts to prevent exploitation of labor migrants by restricting Sierra 
Leoneans’ access to safe and legal migration routes drove Sierra 
Leoneans to migrate through informal channels, subsequently 
increasing their vulnerability to trafficking. In addition to its existing 
u memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Government of 








of Foreign Affairs signed an MOU with the Government of Lebanon 
on safe labor recruitment; however, neither could be implemented 
while the labor migration moratorium remained in effect. While 
MLSS had strict licensing procedures for new recruitment agencies 
to prevent exploitation of migrant workers, it continued to issue 
business registration certificates before TOCU had finished vetting 
the prospective agencies. The MLSS launched its new Labor Migration 
Policy to improve protections for migrant workers in Sierra Leone 
and Sierra Leoneans working abroad. The policy required the creation 
of a technical working group and included provisions on increasing 
capacity of Sierra Leonean diplomatic missions to provide protection 
services to workers abroad; increasing awareness of labor rights prior 
to workers’ departure through mass communication outlets such 
as radio, television, and billboards; improving recruitment agency 
licensing procedures; and developing bilateral labor migration 
agreements with destination countries on complaint mechanisms and 
migrants’ rights. The government promoted the policy in 11 districts 
but did not fully implement it by the end of the reporting period. 
The MLSS only conducted labor inspections in Freetown and within 
the formal sector; the government did not report identifying any 
potential trafficking victims during the inspections. The government 
did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex 
acts. The government did not provide anti-trafficking training to its 
diplomatic personnel.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Sierra Leone, and traffickers exploit victims 
from Sierra Leone abroad. Traffickers recruit victims largely from 
rural provinces to urban and mining centers for exploitation in sex 
trafficking and forced labor in domestic service, artisanal diamond 
and granite mining, petty trading, portering, making ceramics, rock 
breaking, quarrying, street crime, and begging. Traffickers exploit 
victims in fishing and agriculture, and sex trafficking or forced 
labor through customary practices, such as forced marriages. The 
government reported child sex trafficking—especially of children 
from poor homes—was a serious problem, including at beaches 
and in nightclubs. Local demand fueled the majority of child sex 
trafficking, although foreign tourists were also clients at beaches and 
in nightclubs. In 2018, an NGO reported Chinese-owned companies 
helped to fuel child sex trafficking in Freetown, citing specifically 
workers on Chinese-owned fishing vessels who bring girls to their 
boats at night for commercial sexual exploitation. Traffickers exploit 
traditional foster care practices called menpikin to convince parents 
to hand over their children by promising to provide an education 
or better life but instead exploit the children in various forms of 
forced labor including domestic servitude, street vending, mining, 
agriculture, scavenging for scrap metal, okada (motorbike taxi) 
driving, and sometimes commercial sex. Traffickers exploit children 
from neighboring West African countries in forced begging, forced 
labor, and sex trafficking in Sierra Leone, and traffickers exploit Sierra 
Leonean children in Mali, Niger, and increasingly Guinea for forced 
labor and sex trafficking. School closures and economic vulnerability 
due to the pandemic are increasing children’s susceptibility to 
exploitation, including in commercial sex and forced marriage. In 
previous years, traffickers exploited Chinese, Indian, Lebanese, Kenyan, 
Pakistani, and Sri Lankan men in forced labor in Sierra Leone. Cuban 
nationals working in Sierra Leone on medical missions may have been 
forced to work by the Cuban government. Traffickers have exploited 
boys and girls from Sierra Leone reportedly as “cultural dancers”—and 
possibly also for sexual exploitation—in The Gambia. Sierra Leonean 
adults voluntarily migrate to other West African countries, including 
Mauritania and Guinea, as well as to the Middle East and Europe, 
where traffickers exploit some into forced labor and sex trafficking. 
Sierra Leonean-Kuwaiti trafficking networks fraudulently recruit 
Sierra Leoneans for education in Europe and the United States but 
subject them to domestic servitude in Kuwait. Traffickers also exploit 
Sierra Leonean women in domestic servitude in Oman, Iraq, Egypt, 
Qatar, and Lebanon. Traffickers move women through Guinea, 
The Gambia, Liberia, and Senegal en route to exploitation in the 
Middle East. Since 2017, an international organization repatriated 
at least 1,500 Sierra Leoneans from Libya and other Middle Eastern 
countries, some of whom were victims of slavery and sex trafficking. 
In previous reporting periods, an international organization reported 
some Libyan soldiers sold stranded Sierra Leonean migrants in their 
custody to Libyan and Middle Eastern traffickers.
SINGAPORE: TIER 1
The Government of Singapore fully meets the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued to 
demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting 
period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on 
its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Singapore remained on Tier 
1. These efforts included convicting one sex trafficker under its 
trafficking law and one under the Women’s Charter, providing grants 
to NGOs for awareness-raising campaigns, opening a temporary 
shelter to allow for social distancing, and training law enforcement 
and immigration officials on victim identification and trafficking 
legislation enforcement. Courts also upheld the government’s 
previous two labor trafficking convictions during appeal. Although 
the government meets the minimum standards, it did not take steps 
to eliminate recruitment fees charged to workers by Singaporean labor 
recruiters and ensure any recruitment fees are paid by employers. 
The government identified fewer victims, and NGOs continued to 
express concern that some potential unidentified victims were subject 
to punishment or deportation due to a lack of understanding by 
authorities on the impact indebtedness and psychological coercion 
has on a trafficking victim. While the government worked to limit 
the spread of COVID-19 among its large migrant worker population, 
it implemented regulations that allowed employers to limit the 
movement of migrant workers and kept these regulations in place 
longer than restrictions on the general public, thereby possibly 
increasing forced labor risks for migrant workers.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Using the 2014 anti-trafficking law, increase investigations and 
prosecutions, particularly of labor trafficking, including cases involving 
domestic workers, debt manipulation, or psychological coercion; and 
convict and sentence convicted traffickers to penalties proportionate 
to the seriousness of the crime. • Increase resources for investigative 
and prosecutorial training on trafficking for Ministry of Manpower 
(MOM) officials who handle labor violations. • Strengthen efforts 
to proactively identify trafficking victims, including by conducting 
training for frontline law enforcement officials with a focus on 
screening for psychological coercion among women in commercial 
sex and individuals in debt. • Continue to implement reforms to 
the work permit sponsorship system so it does not provide excessive 
power to sponsors or employers in granting and maintaining the 
legal status of migrant workers. • Take steps to eliminate recruitment 
fees charged to workers by Singaporean labor recruiters and ensure 
any recruitment fees are paid by employers. • Strengthen the legal 
framework to enhance protection for victims from punishment for 
unlawful acts the trafficker compelled the victim to commit. • Develop 
formal policies to provide all victims the right to robust protective 
services. • Continue to strengthen cooperation and dialogue with 






The government maintained law enforcement efforts during the 
reporting period; while investigations and prosecutions decreased, 
it convicted one trafficker under its trafficking law and one under 
the Women’s Charter, and courts upheld two previous labor 
trafficking convictions. The 2014 Prevention of Human Trafficking 
Act (PHTA) criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and 
prescribed penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment and fines up to 
100,000 Singapore dollars (SGD) ($75,640), which were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as kidnapping. In 
addition, Article 140 of the Women’s Charter criminalized “forced 
prostitution” involving detention or physical force, and Article 141 
criminalized the movement of women and girls for “trafficking” 
but did not define this term. Penalties prescribed for these offenses 
included a maximum of seven years’ imprisonment and a fine of 
up to 100,000 SGD ($75,640). The government investigated most 
suspected labor trafficking cases as labor law offenses under the 
Employment of Foreign Manpower Act (EFMA), or the Employment 
Act, which carried lower penalties than the anti-trafficking law.
In 2020, authorities investigated 19 trafficking cases, a decrease 
compared with 51 in 2019. Of these, 12 were cases of suspected sex 
trafficking, compared with 30 cases in 2019. MOM investigated seven 
suspected labor trafficking cases, compared with 21 cases in 2019. 
The government instituted pandemic-related restrictions including 
border closures and a nationwide partial lockdown and reported 
these subsequently resulted in fewer trafficking investigations. MOM 
determined that none of the suspected labor trafficking cases in 
2020 violated the PHTA and prosecuted the majority of these cases 
under the EFMA for failure to pay fixed monthly salaries, collection 
of kickbacks, and illegal employment. MOM also determined none 
of the suspected sex trafficking cases in 2020 violated the PHTA 
and proceeded with either charges under the Women’s Charter or 
issuances of stern warnings which did not result in penalties or jail 
time. The government did not initiate any prosecutions under the 
PHTA in 2020, compared with two alleged sex traffickers prosecuted 
in 2019. The government reported two labor trafficking cases and 
one sex trafficking case, initiated in an earlier reporting period, were 
ongoing. Due to pandemic-related restrictions, the government 
reported transitioning some court cases to an internet-based video 
software program to avoid court delays. 
The government convicted one trafficker under the PHTA in 2020, 
compared with three traffickers convicted under the PHTA in 2019. 
In June 2020, courts convicted one perpetrator for sex trafficking, 
under the PHTA, in addition to charges under the Women’s Charter 
and the penal code, in a case originating from 2016, and sentenced 
the perpetrator to 30 months’ imprisonment and a fine of 3,000 
SGD ($2,270). In August 2020, courts convicted another potential 
sex trafficker under the Women’s Charter (after initially charging 
the perpetrator under the PHTA but subsequently amending the 
charges), in a case originating from 2019, and sentenced them to 16 
months’ imprisonment and a fine of 6,000 SGD ($4,540). Courts 
upheld the previous conviction of two labor traffickers, under the 
PHTA from the previous reporting period; both perpetrators were 
incarcerated and serving their sentences at the end of the reporting 
period. The government had yet to prosecute or convict any cases of 
domestic servitude under the PHTA. The government convicted and 
imprisoned several employers of foreign domestic workers under 
non-trafficking laws for cases involving abuse, physical assault, and/
or sexual assault. 
Some NGOs continued to believe authorities set unreasonably 
high standards for crimes to qualify as trafficking and lacked an 
understanding of trafficking indicators such as indebtedness, 
psychological coercion, and deception, which continued to hamper 
proper victim identification. The government undertook efforts to 
increase research and awareness on the issue of psychological coercion. 
The government reported police, immigration, and MOM officials were 
continuously trained on anti-trafficking measures; in 2020, more than 
440 such officials received legislation enforcement training and victim 
identification training. The government continued to partner with 
and participate in international trainings with foreign governments 
and to work closely with international counterparts on several cross-
border investigations. In prior reporting periods, NGOs reported the 
occurrence of excessive force against individuals in commercial sex by 
police officials during raids of unlicensed brothels but that authorities 
took credible actions against such cases. The government did not 
report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government 
officials complicit in human trafficking offenses. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained protection efforts. Police, labor, 
and immigration officials had standard operating procedures 
for identifying victims, and the government had a victim referral 
process among government officials, civil society organizations, 
and foreign embassies. The government reported identifying 23 
potential trafficking victims (16 sex and seven labor trafficking 
victims), compared with 62 potential victims (18 sex trafficking 
victims and 44 labor trafficking victims) in 2019. Three of the 23 
potential trafficking victims were referred to NGOs for assistance; 
several others were referred to the Ministry of Social and Family 
Development for counselling and other services. The government 
reported providing assistance to 24 potential trafficking victims in 
2020, including 16 who received shelter services. All police officers 
received basic training and refresher courses on victim identification; 
however, several NGOs continued to report officials failed to recognize 
key indicators of trafficking when interviewing potential victims, 
particularly in cases involving psychological coercion or debt bondage, 
and among migrant workers. NGOs continued to voice concern that 
police did not consistently screen for trafficking indicators when 
police raided unlicensed brothels; as a result, the government may 
have prosecuted or punished unidentified sex trafficking victims for 
immigration violations or public solicitation, which traffickers likely 
compelled them to commit. Several NGOs reported a number of 
the cases they encountered exhibited trafficking indicators and that 
authorities may have penalized or deported numerous unidentified 
labor trafficking victims. 
During the pandemic, NGOs reported frontline officers who were 
deployed to migrant worker dormitories were primarily focused 
on pandemic-mitigation efforts and did not proactively screen for 
trafficking indicators; as a result some victims may have remained 
unidentified. In 2020, public health experts and NGOs reported 
limited living space allocated in migrant worker dormitories 
and subsequent poor hygiene standards exacerbated the spread 
of COVID-19 among migrant workers, resulting in the majority 
of confirmed cases. In June 2020, the government announced it 
would build new dormitories for migrant workers to improve living 
standards; in addition, the government reported working with NGOs 
to provide food, reusable masks, medical assistance, and personal 
products to migrant workers. However, during the reporting period, 
the government instituted regulations that allowed employers to limit 
the movement of migrant workers. NGOs reported migrant workers’ 
freedom of movement was restricted and limited to a greater extent 
than the general population, which may have hindered unidentified 
trafficking victims from seeking help, and reported instances of 
wrongful confinement of migrant workers by employers. 
The government guaranteed food, shelter, psycho-social services, and 
other basic assistance to trafficking victims under the PHTA and used 
administrative discretion to provide additional support measures, 
customized according to victims’ needs, including interpreters, medical 
services, temporary work permits, and resettlement assistance. The 
government reported that services were provided to victims on an 
individual basis based on assessments conducted by NGOs. Some 
victims likely did not receive all services necessary for rehabilitation 
as some services are provided on a case-by-case decision, and some 







policy mandating the provision of these services to all victims. 
The government reported spending approximately 156,000 SGD 
($118,000) to provide care and support services for trafficking victims, 
an increase from 108,000 SGD ($81,690) the previous year. The 
government continued to fully fund shelters for the cost of caring 
for trafficking victims. The government had four shelters with a 
total capacity of 220 places for female trafficking victims and their 
children (these shelters also served victims of domestic violence, 
abuse, and other crimes). During the pandemic, the total capacity 
was reduced due to safe distancing measures; the Ministry of Social 
and Family Development opened an additional temporary shelter 
to ensure sufficient capacity. MOM funded two shelters, with a total 
capacity of 68 individuals, for male foreign workers, one of which 
was specifically designated for use by male trafficking victims. The 
government provided partial funding and oversight to 21 homes 
serving vulnerable children. The government opened an additional 
temporary shelter during the pandemic to ensure sufficient capacity 
due to pandemic-related restrictions within the other shelters. 
Authorities permitted freedom of movement outside of the shelter 
for most shelter residents but restricted movement for residents 
deemed to be under physical threat. Several other NGOs and two 
foreign government embassies also provided shelter to trafficking 
victims and others who had experienced labor exploitation. The 
government issued special immigration passes that allowed foreign 
victims to remain in the country for the duration of the investigation 
and legal proceedings. However, an NGO reported that contrary 
to current policy, which would allow a foreign victim to apply 
for new employment and a work permit after the proceedings are 
over, authorities most likely required foreign victims to leave the 
country in practice. The government allocated funding for NGOs to 
provide victims with trauma recovery and safe resettlement services 
including counseling, medical care, skill development, legal support, 
employment, and assistance with resettlement in the victim’s home 
country. In 2020, an NGO continued to support 11 foreign labor 
trafficking victims referred by the government in an earlier reporting 
period. The government reported that five victims continued to 
utilize short-term work permits, available for the duration of their 
legal process, compared with seven victims in the previous reporting 
period. In a prior reporting period, the High Court stipulated that in 
criminal cases of abuse of foreign domestic workers, courts should 
consider compensation for pain and suffering as well as restitution for 
wages. NGOs continued to offer victims of trafficking pro bono legal 
assistance to pursue civil court claims for damages; the government 
reported no victims sought restitution in 2020. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
interagency task force, co-chaired by the Ministry of Home Affairs 
and MOM, coordinated anti-trafficking efforts through its “National 
Approach against Trafficking in Persons, 2016-2026.” Due to the 
pandemic, the task force did not hold its annual stakeholder 
consultation with NGOs, businesses, and academia to review the 
implementation of the national approach. Some representatives 
of the task force were reportedly diverted from their regular duties 
to address pandemic-related tasks, such as mitigating COVID-19 
cases within migrant worker dormitories. The government reported 
conducting monthly, and sometimes twice-a-week, meetings with an 
NGO coalition focused on supporting migrant workers throughout 
the pandemic. The government continued to budget 80,000 SGD 
($60,510) to provide grants to civil society for awareness-raising 
campaigns; an NGO received a grant to produce educational videos 
to raise public awareness of trafficking. Singapore’s Employment 
Agencies Act (EAA) mandated licensing and regulation of recruitment 
agents. The EAA rules capped the maximum recruitment fee an 
employee may pay an agent at one month’s salary for each year 
of a valid work permit or the period of the employment contract, 
whichever was shorter, and subject to an overall maximum of two 
months’ salary. The majority of migrant workers in Singapore paid 
fees to agents in Singapore as well as to recruitment agents in their 
home country, which contributed to the workers’ vulnerability to debt 
bondage. During 2020, MOM prosecuted five recruitment agencies 
and issued warning letters to another 53 recruitment agencies for 
not being licensed, compared with the prosecution of 18 unlicensed 
agents in 2019. 
MOM continued to manage the work permit process for foreign 
workers; Singaporean employers applied to MOM to sponsor skilled 
and semi-skilled workers whose employment and legal immigration 
status was tied to that specific employer. NGOs stated this restriction 
on job mobility, coupled with the ability of employers to terminate 
a worker’s employment at any time without the need to show cause, 
created a form of “structural coercion” that prevented some foreign 
migrant workers from resisting and contesting exploitation. MOM 
permitted foreign workers to transfer their immigration status to a new 
employer during a short time window, though previous employers 
had the first right of renewal and could cancel the work permit, 
limiting the employee’s ability to find new employment. Singapore 
law did not prescribe a minimum wage. Under the Employment Act, 
wages were negotiated and outlined in individual contracts of service. 
Requirements were less detailed for foreign domestic workers and 
fishing crews employed locally, who were covered under the EFMA, 
and for whom employers were legally required to provide a document 
containing employment terms such as monthly salary, number of 
rest days, and agency fees. MOM continued to implement a policy 
stating that if employers reduced a migrant worker’s salary from 
what was stated on the application for the employee’s work permit, 
they must notify MOM after both the employer and employee had 
agreed to the change in writing. An NGO continued to note that 
this policy did not address the unequal power dynamic between 
employer and employee given the vulnerability of those who paid 
recruitment costs to be coerced to sign a new salary agreement through 
the threat of termination and repatriation. In 2020, 11 employers 
were convicted for making false declarations of higher salaries to 
obtain employee work passes. During the previous reporting period, 
MOM implemented a new work permit condition prohibiting 
employers of foreign domestic workers from retaining any wages 
or money belonging to the domestic worker; NGOs reported the 
retainment of wages was still common. In a prior reporting period, 
two NGOs and a local bank introduced fee-free bank accounts for 
all foreign domestic workers and low-wage migrant workers, into 
which their salaries can be electronically paid. MOM continued its 
work permit system to allow employers or recruitment agents to 
open one of these bank accounts on behalf of the employee as part 
of the recruitment process; due to the pandemic, the government 
required employers of migrant workers living in dormitories to open 
bank accounts for their workers and pay them electronically. Since 
the introduction of the accounts, two NGOs estimated that more 
than 770,000 migrant workers had bank accounts in 2020, and 
the government reported helping to open an additional 100,000 
accounts during the pandemic. NGOs reported that despite these 
efforts, some of the workers were still being paid in cash, were not 
receiving their full base salaries, or had expenses illegally deducted 
from their pay. In the previous reporting period, the Ministry of Law 
introduced new measures to decrease the risk of indebtedness for 
foreign workers; these included limiting unsecured loans, prohibiting 
targeted advertisement towards vulnerable groups, and barring the 
facilitation of loans by unauthorized third parties.
In the previous reporting period, the government expanded the 
mandatory 2017 “settling in program” from foreign migrant workers 
in the construction industry to include foreign migrant workers in 
manufacturing, marine, and processing industries. Migrant workers 
must attend the one-day orientation class, entirely delivered by 
an NGO, within 14 days of arriving in Singapore; one of the five 
modules covers employment rights and information on how to get 
help if necessary. An NGO reported that after completing the settling 
in program many migrant workers were still unaware of their rights 
or whom to reach out to for help. In addition to worker programs, 
an employer program is mandatory for first-time employers of 




reported that over time employers likely forget many of the rules and 
regulations because they only have to complete the program once 
and can complete the program online. The government continued to 
screen a pre-departure video at overseas testing centers for construction 
workers to explain foreign workers’ employment rights in Singapore. 
MOM continued to publicize its phone number and a mobile phone 
application, as well as three NGO-operated 24-hour hotlines, for 
migrant workers who experience problems. MOM conducted ongoing 
campaigns to inform employers of the consequences for withholding 
passports or salaries. The government created and disseminated a 
migrant worker bulletin which provided pandemic-related updates 
including medical information, awareness of potential scams, and 
policy requirements; the bulletin was distributed multiple times per 
week to NGOs, on mobile phone applications, and to dormitory 
officials. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand 
for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit foreign 
victims in Singapore. Some of the 848,200 foreign work permit 
holders who comprise almost one-quarter of Singapore’s labor force 
are at risk of trafficking. Most victims migrate willingly for work in 
construction, domestic service, performing arts, manufacturing, 
the service industry, or commercial sex. To migrate, many workers 
assume large debts to recruitment agents in their home countries 
and sometimes in Singapore, placing them at risk for debt bondage. 
Foreign women who arrive in Singapore to work in the entertainment 
sector, including nightclubs and bars, may be vulnerable to labor 
trafficking. Traffickers compel victims into sex trafficking or forced 
labor through threats of forced repatriation without pay, restrictions 
on movement, physical and sexual abuse, and withholding wages 
and travel documents, such as passports. Some recruitment agencies 
illegally engage in contract switching and charge workers fees more 
than the legal limit. Foreign workers have credible fears of losing 
their work visas and being deported, since employers have the 
ability to repatriate workers legally at any time during their contracts 
with minimal notice. Unscrupulous employers exploit the limited 
transferability of low-skilled work visas to control or manipulate 
workers. In previous reporting periods, some employers, including 
traffickers, reportedly relied on repatriation companies to seize, 
confine, and escort foreign workers to the airport for departure from 
Singapore, including through the use of assaults, threats, and coercion, 
to prevent them from complaining about abuses to authorities. 
Foreign women sometimes arrive in Singapore with the intention of 
engaging in Singapore’s regulated commercial sex sector, but under 
the threat of serious harm or other forms of coercion, they become 
victims of sex trafficking. Some fishing vessel captains of long-haul 
boats that transit or dock at Singaporean ports use physical abuse to 
force men to perform labor. A small number of Singapore residents 
facilitate and engage in child sex tourism abroad, including in nearby 
Batam, Indonesia.
SINT MAARTEN: TIER 2  
WATCH LIST§
The Government of Sint Maarten does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included converting existing trainings 
to virtual delivery amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the 
government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared 
to the previous reporting period, even considering the impact of 
the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity. The 
government did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting 
any traffickers. Further, the government did not report identification 
of trafficking victims, nor did it provide services to victims identified 
in previous reporting periods. The government did not update its 
national action plan (NAP), which expired in 2018, and interagency 
coordination was severely lacking. Therefore Sint Maarten was 
downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Significantly increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict 
traffickers, as distinct from smugglers. • Proactively identify trafficking 
victims, such as by screening migrant workers for trafficking indicators; 
provide adequate protection to those identified; and cease the 
deportation of victims. • Increase the availability of protection services, 
including shelters, in partnership with NGOs, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, and international organizations. • Improve coordination 
and information-sharing with anti-trafficking counterparts across 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands. • Train law enforcement officials, 
prosecutors, and judges on proactive victim identification and victim-
centered approaches to trafficking cases. • Re-establish the central 
reporting bureau to improve coordination of victim protection 
and prevention efforts. • Adopt and implement formal standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) to guide officials, including health 
workers, on victim identification and referral. • Inform victims and 
potential victims of their rights. • Increase outreach to all incoming 
migrants, including domestic workers and individuals with temporary 
entertainment visas, to ensure they are informed of their rights and 
ways to seek assistance. • Raise awareness among the general public 
and vulnerable groups about human trafficking in Sint Maarten.
PROSECUTION
The government decreased prosecution efforts. Article 2:239 of the 
penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and 
prescribed penalties of up to nine years’ imprisonment or a fine for 
offenses involving a victim 16 years of age or older, and up to 12 
years’ imprisonment or a fine for those involving a victim under 
the age of 16. These penalties were sufficiently stringent, and with 
respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as kidnapping. 
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, 
or convictions related to trafficking in 2020. In 2019, authorities 
investigated one case, prosecuted one suspected sex trafficker, and 
convicted one labor trafficker, which was the country’s first conviction 
under the anti-trafficking statute since 2012. Sint Maarten had a 
police unit assigned to combat trafficking in persons and human 
smuggling (the anti-HTHS unit), consisting of seven officers. In 2020, 
the government utilized law enforcement, including the anti-HTHS 
unit, to enforce movement restrictions to mitigate the spread of 
COVID-19. The anti-HTHS unit operated with limited resources and 
without a dedicated budget; observers reported the unit frequently 
prioritized human smuggling over trafficking investigations. The 
anti-HTHS unit collaborated with other agencies, including the Royal 
Netherlands Marechaussee and the joint Dutch Caribbean Coast 
Guard, but this coordination was not formalized, and observers 







§ Sint Maarten is a semi-autonomous entity within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. For the purpose of this report, Sint Maarten is not a “country” to 
which the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking in the Trafficking Victims Protection Act apply. This narrative reflects how Sint Maarten 
would be assessed if it were a separate, independent country. However, the Kingdom is an important contributor to the Government of Sint Maarten’s 
anti-trafficking efforts. 
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The government addressed trafficking in persons and migrant 
smuggling via joint institutions, limiting the resources available for 
anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. Officials conflated the two 
crimes, hindering the effectiveness of prosecution, prevention, and 
protection efforts. The government reportedly held virtual training 
seminars related to trafficking in persons but did not report details on 
the topics covered or officials reached. The pandemic caused delay and 
cancelation of routine anti-trafficking training for law enforcement. 
The government did not report any substantive collaboration with 
foreign governments on trafficking cases.
PROTECTION
The government significantly decreased protection efforts. Authorities 
did not identify any victims in 2020, compared with 29 in 2019 and 
42 in 2018, and, for the third consecutive year, the government did 
not report providing any protection services, including to victims 
identified in past years. Officials did not provide updates on the 
status of 20 potential foreign victims identified in 2019 and allowed 
to remain in the country while adjudicating their immigration 
status, nor did the government report whether these individuals 
remained in Sint Maarten. The government did not have SOPs for the 
identification or referral of victims and, instead, relied on informal 
agreements between government agencies. Immigration officials and 
other stakeholders had an NGO-developed checklist of trafficking 
indicators to facilitate victim identification; observers reported 
officials did not proactively identify potential victims. The government 
distributed the checklist and brochures on victim identification for 
officials who might interview potential victims. Additionally, officials 
claimed to screen among adult entertainment workers for trafficking 
indicators during immigration procedures, labor inspections, and 
mandatory medical screenings; however, the government did not 
report identifying victims of trafficking through these screenings. 
Observers reported the government failed to adequately inform 
potential victims of their rights as trafficking victims.
The government did not have a lead agency responsible for victim 
protection; this role was previously held by the National Reporting 
Bureau on Human Trafficking, which ceased operations in 2018. There 
were no dedicated shelters for trafficking victims, but the government 
could, on a case-by-case basis, refer victims to an international 
organization or NGOs for shelter. An NGO-run shelter for victims of 
domestic violence could sometimes accommodate female trafficking 
victims; in past years, the government provided financial support to 
the shelter, but did not report doing so in 2020. The government did 
not report any victims receiving shelter in 2020. Foreign victims could 
apply for temporary residency status for the duration of criminal 
proceedings against their trafficker, which the government used to 
encourage victim cooperation in the investigation and prosecution 
of traffickers; however, it last reported granting a residence permit 
through the program in December 2015. The anti-trafficking law 
allowed victims to request restitution as part of criminal cases or 
file a civil suit against traffickers; however, the government did not 
report any victims pursuing this action during the reporting period. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained minimal efforts to prevent trafficking. 
The national anti-trafficking coordinator nominally led efforts 
to combat trafficking in persons but had no budget or staff in 
this capacity and had other full-time law enforcement duties. The 
government did not have an anti-trafficking coordinating body, and 
a regional law enforcement group concluded Sint Maarten lacked 
functional interagency coordination on trafficking. Officials reported 
no efforts to draft a NAP to combat trafficking; the previous NAP 
expired in 2018. An existing border security agreement between the 
Netherlands, Curacao, and Sint Maarten (the Onderlinge Regeling 
Vreemdelingenketen) purportedly included trafficking. The government 
delayed a planned public awareness campaign as a result of the 
pandemic but provided no further reports of new or ongoing efforts 
to raise awareness of trafficking. The government did not make efforts 
to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government did 
not report whether it continued the practice of informing employers 
of migrant workers about applicable laws. The government did not 
report having a hotline for public reports of trafficking and other 
crimes; the border control agency maintained an immigration hotline.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Sint Maarten. Some brothel and dance club 
owners exploit women and girls from Latin America, the Caribbean, 
Eastern Europe, and Russia in sex trafficking. Illicit recruiters reportedly 
target foreign women in Sint Maarten’s commercial sex industry 
through debt-based coercion; women from Haiti, Dominican 
Republic, and Venezuela are especially vulnerable to sex trafficking 
in Sint Maarten. Government officials reported a significant number 
of migrant workers are vulnerable to traffickers’ coercive schemes 
in domestic service, construction, Chinese-owned markets, retail 
shops, landscaping, and housekeeping. Authorities report traffickers 
may coerce Asian and Caribbean workers in exploitative conditions 
indicative of forced labor. Criminal actors, including smugglers, 
subject migrants—specifically Cuban and Brazilian nationals—
transiting Sint Maarten en route to the United States and Canada 
to forced labor or sex trafficking. There are indications traffickers 
exploit Colombian and Venezuelan women traveling to the islands 
under false pretenses in forced labor or sex trafficking.
SLOVAK REPUBLIC: TIER 2
The Government of the Slovak Republic, or Slovakia, does not fully 
meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but 
is making significant efforts to do so. The government demonstrated 
overall increasing efforts compared with the previous reporting 
period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its 
anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Slovakia remained on Tier 2. These 
efforts included investigating more trafficking cases and increasing 
the percentage of traffickers that received significant prison terms. The 
government also continued to fund an NGO that operated several 
victim assistance programs and increased funding for prevention 
activities. However, the government did not meet the minimum 
standards in several key areas. The government prosecuted fewer 
suspects, convicted fewer traffickers, and did not adequately and 
proactively identify foreign or domestic trafficking victims within 
the country. The government also decreased efforts to identify labor 
trafficking victims through joint-inspections and continued to lack 
legal safeguards to protect victims against potential prosecution 
for administrative and immigration-related offenses. Further, the 
government did not report adequately training prosecutors and 
judges on trafficking.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Continue to vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, 
and sentence those convicted to significant prison terms. • Continue 
to increase training for judges and prosecutors with a focus on a 
victim-centered, trauma-informed approach to law enforcement 
efforts and trial as well as the use of psychological coercion and fraud 
as means of trafficking. • Continue to improve sentencing norms by 
sensitizing judges to the severity of trafficking crimes and the full range 
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of penalties available. • Improve efforts to proactively identify victims 
within the country, especially foreign nationals, including by training 
government officials, particularly border police, labor inspectors, 
and municipal law enforcement, on proactive victim identification 
among vulnerable groups. • Allow formal victim identification by 
and referral from entities other than the police, including civil society, 
social workers, and healthcare professionals. • Improve the quality 
of human trafficking training courses available to prosecutors and 
judges. • Ensure labor trafficking is investigated and prosecuted as 
a trafficking crime and not pursued as an administrative labor code 
violation. • Increase migrant worker protections by increasing efforts 
to monitor labor recruitment companies, including prosecutions for 
fraudulent labor recruitment. • Amend the law on the non-punishment 
of victims to ensure that trafficking victims are not inappropriately 
penalized for acts traffickers compelled them to commit, including 
administrative and immigration-related offenses. • Continue efforts 
to inform foreign worker groups of worker rights and responsibilities 
and victim assistance resources in their native languages. • Streamline 
definitions and methodologies for gathering law enforcement and 
victim data. • Update public awareness campaigns to portray human 
trafficking in a more realistic manner. • Issue and implement revised 
formal written procedures for a victim referral mechanism that outline 
roles for all officials and stakeholders in order to improve victims’ 
access to and the quality of assistance. • Improve the coordination 
of protection services to children. • Explore utilization of the witness 
protection program for trafficking victims. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Section 179 of 
the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed penalties of four to 10 years’ imprisonment. These 
penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, 
commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. 
Government officials initiated investigations of 28 cases, a significant 
increase from 16 investigations in 2019 but similar to 27 cases in 
2018; 47 investigations initiated in these and prior reporting periods 
remained ongoing. Of the 28 investigations, 15 cases were for sex 
trafficking, seven were for labor trafficking (three for forced begging 
and four for forced labor), and six were combinations of multiple 
forms of trafficking; all suspects were Slovak nationals. Prosecutors 
indicted 14 alleged traffickers in 2020, a significant decrease compared 
with 38 in 2019 and 21 in 2018; the government did not report 
further details on the type of trafficking. Prosecutors obtained 
convictions for nine traffickers in 2020, a slight decrease from 11 
in 2019, but similar to eight in 2018. Of the nine convictions, six 
traffickers received significant prison sentences and three received 
suspended sentences. Courts sentenced three traffickers to four years’ 
imprisonment, two to seven years’ imprisonment, and one to nine 
years’ imprisonment. Of the convicted traffickers, seven were male 
and two were female; seven were Slovak nationals, one was Czech, 
and one was Romanian. Courts did not dismiss any trafficking 
cases in 2020 and there were no acquittals. Compared with 2019, 
courts convicted fewer traffickers in 2020; however, of the convicted 
traffickers, the government issued significant prison sentences to 66.6 
percent – an improvement compared with 45 percent of traffickers 
issued significant prison sentences in 2019 and zero in 2018. Though 
the issuance of suspended sentences decreased in 2020, it remained 
a serious concern; over the past seven years, approximately 68.6 
percent of all trafficking convictions resulted in fully suspended 
sentences or a fine. In December 2020, the national anti-trafficking 
coordination committee, the Expert Group, received a report from 
the General Prosecutors Office as well as another report from the 
Information Center (IC) within Ministry of Interior (MOI) in March 
2021, which included the analysis of previous sentences for traffickers, 
with a specific emphasis on the use of section 39 of the criminal 
code which permitted judges to reduce sentences below minimum 
thresholds; however, no further details were available. Corruption, 
inefficiency, and lack of accountability within the judicial branch 
remained concerns during the reporting period and may have hindered 
law enforcement efforts. In 2020, police formalized an international 
operation with Germany and EUROPOL to investigate a suspected 
human trafficking operation, which allegedly abused the Slovak 
visa regime to transport Vietnamese victims to Germany for the 
purposes of forced labor and sex trafficking. Through 2020, police 
and prosecutors continued to cooperate on several international 
investigations with the United Kingdom (UK), though unlike prior 
years, the investigations did not identify any new suspects or victims. 
During the reporting period, the government reported extraditing 
one alleged trafficker to the UK. The government did not report any 
investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees 
complicit in trafficking crimes. 
The irregular migration unit within the Bureau of Border and 
Alien Police (BBAP) coordinated all national anti-trafficking law 
enforcement efforts, which may have affected the number of trafficking 
victims the government identified domestically. Though there was 
no dedicated trafficking unit within the prosecution service, cases 
were usually assigned to those with experience prosecuting trafficking 
and prosecutors followed written guidance to provide victims with 
information on the prosecution process and resources available 
to them. Each of the eight regional prosecutorial offices had a 
human trafficking lead who could provide guidance and oversight 
on trafficking-related cases. Coordination between law enforcement 
and prosecutors remained effective. Civil society and the victim-care 
service provider continued to express concern that many prosecutors 
and judges assigned to trafficking cases were not adequately trained 
on victim-centered and trauma-informed approaches or on the 
specificities of trafficking crimes. Some prosecutors and judges 
continued to misunderstand non-violent, psychological coercion 
and fraud as means for the crime, had not used either in any recent 
trafficking cases, and continued to rely predominately on evidence 
of force and physical limitations on victims’ liberty in trials. Experts 
noted that the inadequate quality of anti-trafficking training courses 
available to prosecutors and judges at the Judiciary Academy may 
have contributed to their continued misunderstanding of the crime. 
Prosecutors and some front-line officials continued to view possible 
cases of labor trafficking as administrative labor code violations and 
did not prosecute as trafficking crimes. The national police continued 
to provide training for and cooperate with the financial intelligence 
unit of the national criminal agency to uncover suspicious transactions 
indicative of trafficking but did not uncover any trafficking cases as 
a result of the cooperation. While the MOI and police enhanced 
coordination and cooperation on gathering law enforcement and 
victim identification statistics, differences in how various institutions 
gathered law enforcement statistics continued to hinder effective 
comparison and monitoring of trafficking-related efforts. 
In 2020, the government provided comprehensive anti-trafficking 
training on proactive victim identification and indicators, trauma-
informed and victim-centered approaches, and available services 
to one judge, one prosecutor, and 19 high court clerks. The MOI’s 
IC provided extensive training to 90 police investigators on victim-
centered, trauma-informed approaches to victim interviewing during 
the reporting period. The MOI’s Crime Prevention Department 
organized seven human trafficking training sessions for 164 front-
line officials, including community and social workers, municipal 
police officers, front office client centers, and district government 
offices. The MOI also organized anti-trafficking training on a victim-
centered approach for 48 regional crime prevention coordinators. 
Compared to the reported 480 officials the government trained in 
2019, this was a decrease. However, the government reported it was 
unable to provide additional, previously planned trainings to its 
officials due to pandemic-related restrictions. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained protection efforts. The government 
identified 50 victims in 2020 (53 in 2019) and an additional 11 
victims (13 in 2019) were either self-identified or identified by the 










the total to 61 (66 in 2019). Of the victims identified, 34 were female, 
(12 girls), and 27 were male (three boys). The government identified 
at least 22 sex trafficking victims and 26 labor trafficking victims, 
including 10 forced begging victims, with the remaining experiencing 
multiple forms of trafficking. Of the victims identified, 60 were Slovak 
nationals and one was a Chinese foreign national. Children comprised 
nearly 26 percent of the total victims identified. The Expert Group 
formally adopted, published online, and distributed an updated 
National Referral Mechanism (NRM) for victim identification and 
referral, which included some improvements such as highlighting 
trauma-informed approaches to victim identification and care and 
explaining forced labor situations. However, many prior concerns 
remained unaddressed, including the continued lack of clear roles and 
tailored guidelines for all front-line officials and stakeholders who 
were most likely to encounter trafficking victims – including, health 
care specialists, employees of foster homes, and counselors of offices 
of labor, social affairs, and family – in order to improve victims’ access 
to and quality of assistance. Additionally, the updated NRM focused 
heavily on describing the potential trafficking situations of foreign 
nationals in Slovakia or Slovak nationals abroad but included little 
on trafficking situations Slovak nationals could experience within 
Slovakia. Law enforcement officials or the State Secretary of the MOI 
were the exclusive entities with authority to formally identify victims 
and approval by the State Secretary was required prior to enrollment 
in the victim-care program. The government trained 17 employees of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on victim identification and distributed 
written guidelines to those within Slovakia and its embassies abroad, 
which resulted in the identification of 10 potential trafficking victims 
by Slovakian embassy staff abroad in 2020. Further, in 2020, the 
government partnered with a government-funded NGO to train 15 
social workers and shelter employees on proactive victim identification 
and referral. However, despite training, the identification of foreign 
national and Slovak victims within the country remained a challenge. 
The national police reported the majority (40 of 61) of Slovak victims 
were exploited in other countries, resulting in few victims identified 
within Slovakia. Further, despite their significant presence, only 
one victim was a foreign national. While there were no reports the 
government penalized victims for crimes their traffickers compelled 
them to commit, trafficking victims may have remained unidentified 
in asylum-seeker and irregular migrant detention facilities. GRETA 
continued to express concerns related to the ability and willingness 
of labor inspectors and the Border and Alien Police to thoroughly 
screen illegally employed foreign nationals or asylum-seekers for 
trafficking indicators and refer them to assistance before deporting 
them. Asylum-seekers could be kept in detention for up to six 
months per Slovak law; the Center for Legal Aid visited two detention 
centers during the reporting period, but the staff were not trained 
to identify human trafficking victims and did not report identifying 
any victims in 2020. A government-funded NGO administering the 
victim-care program conducted seven visits to asylum-seeker facilities 
and detention facilities for irregular migrants, but it did not identify 
any victims in 2020 or in any prior year. In its June 2020 Report, 
GRETA urged the government to increase the quality of screening for 
trafficking victims by ensuring officials were adequately trained in 
victim identification at asylum-seeker and irregular migrant detention 
facilities. The victim-care service provider reported providing pre-
return assistance to 13 Slovak nationals and voluntary returns to 
four. The foreign victim identified in 2020 elected to enroll in the 
national victim-care program and had been issued a work permit. 
Of the 61 total victims identified, only 12 decided to enter the 
government-funded victim-care program in 2020 (17 of 66 in 2019 
and 16 of 56 in 2018). The program continued to assist an additional 
nine victims enrolled from previous years. Of persistent concern, 
government officials and the victim-care service provider continued 
to note that after concluding the victim-care program, survivors 
remained in poor physical and mental states and frequently ended 
up on the streets. In its June 2020 Report, GRETA noted concern 
regarding the traditionally low participation in the victim-care 
program and urged the government to investigate further. In 2020, 
the government provided €212,450 ($260,680) to one NGO that 
operated the national victim assistance program, voluntary return, and 
the national trafficking hotline, a slight decrease from the €215,000 
($263,800) allocated in 2019. The government-funded, NGO-run 
victim assistance program provided Slovak and foreign victims 
with shelter, financial support, repatriation to Slovakia, health care, 
psychosocial support, legal assistance, interpretation services, and 
job training. In response to the pandemic, the victim-care service 
provider prepared a crisis plan that focused on the introduction of 
preventive and sanitation measures to ensure the safety and health 
of all victims enrolled in the victim-care program. The government 
reported that foreign victims, including both EU nationals and third 
country nationals, had access to the same scope and quality of victim 
care and support. All potential victims were eligible for at least 30 
days of crisis care; victims enrolled in the assistance program were 
eligible for up to 180 days of care without having to participate in 
an investigation. However, victims who chose to cooperate with law 
enforcement were eligible to access victim care for the duration of 
the investigation and trial, which was often much longer than 180 
days; in 2020, 54 (22 men, 32 women) out of 61 victims identified 
cooperated with police and prosecutors. Beginning in January 2021, 
foreign victims, including trafficking victims, who had been granted 
temporary residency, were included under the general government-
funded healthcare insurance scheme, which improved the provision 
of healthcare services to potential foreign trafficking victims who 
chose not to enroll in the victim-care program. The government 
did not have dedicated shelters for trafficking victims, but rather 
accommodated victims in domestic violence shelters, with men 
and women housed separately, or in homeless shelters. There were 
limited accommodations for victims with families. Children were 
not usually assisted through the national victim-care program, 
rather authorities placed unaccompanied child trafficking victims in 
the care of child protective services in a government-run children’s 
home or an NGO-run crisis home for children. However, if a child 
trafficking victim required additional services, it was possible to utilize 
trafficking-specific services through the national victim-care program, 
as one such child did in 2020. The government-run children’s home 
was officially designated as responsible for child trafficking victims, 
among other child victims, and could accommodate up to eight 
victims. Referral of child victims to care was not systematic and 
officials noted that coordination between these two victim-care 
regimes required improved streamlining. 
It was unnecessary for the government to grant work permits as 
foreign victims received subsidiary protection and could work legally, 
though NGOs noted obstacles, including length of stay, sometimes 
precluded this. The law authorized permanent residency for foreign 
victims who would face hardship or retribution if returned to their 
country of origin; authorities issued no such residence permits 
during the reporting period. The government granted asylum to 
one trafficking victim in 2020. The pre-trial and trial process was 
lengthy and not always adapted, nor prosecutors or judges sufficiently 
trained, to avoid re-traumatization of victims. The 2017 crime 
victim’s protection act provided psychological assistance to victims 
in pre-trial proceedings, banned direct cross-examination of victims, 
and allowed recorded testimony as official trial evidence, among 
other protections. NGOs reported the government, including police 
and judges, implemented and applied the new law inconsistently, 
and police continued to lack proper interviewing rooms. Experts 
expressed concern that the law’s limit of one victim interview may 
hinder opportunities to build rapport with traumatized victims, 
who are unlikely to provide reliable testimony in a single interview 
session. Though not systematic, judges were generally willing to 
accommodate requests to provide a separate waiting area for victims 
and to remove the suspected trafficker from the courtroom during 
victim testimony. Further, a new guideline, issued in 2020, required 
investigators to invite the government-funded NGO administering 
the victim-care program to victim interviews, to ensure victims knew 
their rights regarding the victim-care program, free legal advice, and 
restitution. Witness protection programs existed, but the government 
has never utilized these programs for any trafficking victim; in its 
June 2020 report, GRETA continued to urge the government to utilize 
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its witness protection programs for trafficking victims. Though the 
process was complicated, the 2017 crime victim’s protection act 
enabled the government to grant between €5,800 ($7,120) and 
€29,000 ($35,580) in compensation to victims from state funding 
for the year 2020; during the reporting period, the victim-care service 
provider requested and received €16,890 ($20,720) in compensation 
for one trafficking victim. Prosecutors could file for restitution from 
traffickers in criminal cases; however, unlike 2019, courts did not 
report awarding restitution to any victims in 2020. Civil society 
continued to allege that prosecutors were frequently reluctant to 
request restitution in trials to avoid prolonging already lengthy 
proceedings. Additionally, victims could seek damages through 
civil suits, but unlike 2019, no victims were awarded damages in 
2020. NGOs continued to argue excessive legal costs and length of 
proceedings discouraged many victims from filing civil suits. Under 
the 2018 act, victims who opted to seek compensation from their 
traffickers through a civil suit could not also request restitution 
through criminal proceedings. Experts continued to assert that 
judges did not award criminal restitution or civil damages in the 
majority of cases. The law provided a narrow interpretation of 
the non-punishment of victims, giving prosecutors discretion to 
terminate criminal prosecution only for offenses committed by 
negligence and offenses carrying a maximum sentence of five years’ 
imprisonment; it did not cover administrative or immigration-related 
offenses and GRETA noted that some prosecutors were unaware of 
the non-punishment clause.
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The State 
Secretary of the MOI was the official national coordinator for the 
fight against trafficking. The Expert Group within the MOI’s Crime 
Prevention Department functioned as the national anti-trafficking 
coordination committee, met five times during the reporting period, 
and successfully coordinated policy documents, implemented anti-
trafficking programs with civil society, organized trainings, and 
coordinated awareness-raising campaigns. The Expert Group comprises 
21 members, including both government ministries and NGOs. The 
IC also contributed to national coordination by administering 
contracts for the victim-care program, gathering trafficking data, 
publishing an annual human trafficking report, and functioning as 
the national rapporteur. However, the IC continued to face challenges 
reconciling the data from different institutions, particularly data on 
prosecutions and convictions, and GRETA questioned whether, as the 
national rapporteur, the IC was sufficiently independent to critically 
monitor national efforts. The government continued to fund and 
implement its 2019-2023 anti-trafficking national action plan. The 
MOI allocated €11,140 ($13,670) in 2020 for grants for prevention 
activities and awareness-raising on a variety of crimes, including on 
trafficking, an increase compared with no reported amount in 2019 
and €39,700 ($48,710) in 2018. The MOI maintained staff at eight 
regional centers throughout Slovakia who could offer information 
and assistance on trafficking prevention, victim identification, and 
assistance, in addition to crimes against the elderly and hate crimes. 
The government launched extensive trafficking prevention and 
public awareness campaigns to engage the public, though trafficking 
was sometimes portrayed in a sensationalized manner. In light of 
the pandemic, the government successfully changed its in-person 
awareness campaigns to virtual platforms in order to continue 
prevention efforts. During the reporting period, the government 
continued to use television, radio, and social media to help raise 
trafficking awareness; it also employed 30 billboards along major 
roadways to promote its anti-trafficking helpline. The Crime Prevention 
Department conducted 66 awareness-raising sessions that reached 
2,352 students and the IC organized an anti-trafficking art exhibition 
visited by approximately 200 school children. In 2020, the IC printed 
and distributed 1,500 human trafficking self-identification flyers 
with contact information for the national anti-trafficking helpline, 
translated into eight foreign languages. The IC also distributed 500 
flyers on victims’ rights to government institutions and 5,600 brochures 
on general trafficking indicators. In October 2020, the government 
partnered with the British Embassy to raise awareness regarding 
the possibility of restitution for trafficking victims and highlighted 
traffickers who were sentenced to significant prison sentences. 
The labor ministry continued to distribute a brochure to foreign 
workers on trafficking indicators, the labor code, and the rights 
and obligations of foreign employees in eight languages; however, 
the government did not report how many foreign workers received 
the brochure. Despite a 10 percent decrease from 2019 due to the 
pandemic, the number of foreign workers in Slovakia remained 
significant during the reporting period, resulting in continuing 
concerns regarding fraudulent labor recruitment and low victim 
identification in this vulnerable population. The 2004 law on 
employment services prohibited labor recruiters from charging a 
recruitment fee to workers and employment agencies were required 
to register with the government. During the reporting period, the 
government did not investigate or prosecute any cases of fraudulent 
labor recruitment as trafficking crimes, though it fined several labor 
recruiters for labor code violations. In its June 2020 report, GRETA 
urged the government to strengthen monitoring of recruitment 
and temporary work agencies. Experts and civil society continued 
to urge the government to increase efforts to inform foreign worker 
populations of their rights; lack of awareness of the availability of 
services, language barriers, and fear of immigration officials continued 
to prevent some foreign victims from seeking help from authorities. 
The lack of pre- and post-arrival training for foreign workers continued 
to concern civil society organizations. 
In 2020, the labor inspectorate and BBAP conducted 57 joint 
inspections of worksites, a significant decrease compared with 101 
in 2019, 332 in 2018, and 340 in 2017. During the joint inspections 
in 2020, officials reported screening 1,282 individuals, including 566 
foreign workers (1,522 in 2019 including 891 foreign workers; 3,000 
in 2018 including 1,200 foreign workers; and 3,200 people, including 
1,700 foreign workers in 2017). While some of the decrease in the 
number of inspections in 2020 was due to the pandemic, inspection 
numbers have steadily decreased since at least 2017. Despite the 
large foreign-worker population in Slovakia with an increased risk of 
trafficking, the government has not reported identifying any trafficking 
victims through the joint inspections for at least four years, continuing 
to raise concerns regarding their ability to identify trafficking victims, 
despite training. GRETA noted that joint inspections tended to take 
an immigration control approach rather than a victim-centered 
approach and continued to recommend anti-trafficking training for 
all labor inspectors, especially on victim identification and referral. 
Foreign trafficking victims without legal employment status may 
have been reluctant to discuss their trafficking situation with labor 
inspectors for fear of deportation, as it is regular practice for labor 
inspectors to contact the immigration officials if illegally employed 
foreign workers are identified. A government-funded anti-trafficking 
hotline, operated by an NGO, took calls for 12 hours a day in five 
languages, and received approximately 354 calls related to trafficking. 
The hotline identified two victims and both were enrolled in the 
victim-care program. The government did not make efforts to reduce 
the demand for commercial sex acts. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Slovakia, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Slovakia abroad. Traffickers exploit Slovak men and women in labor 
trafficking in agriculture, manufacturing, and construction in Western 
Europe, increasingly in German-speaking countries. Traffickers exploit 
Slovak women in sex trafficking in Austria, Denmark, Germany, 
Switzerland, the UK, and other European countries. With the departure 
of the UK from the European Union, including new restrictions on 
freedom of movement, authorities have noted the UK is a less frequent 
destination for traffickers. Increasingly, traffickers exploit victims 
domestically within Slovakia, a recent development exacerbated by 










mostly from the Balkans and South-East Asia, are vulnerable to forced 
labor in Slovakia and may be unable or afraid to seek assistance 
from authorities. Some temporary workers from non-EU European 
countries, recruited for the manufacturing and construction industries, 
are subjected to conditions indicative of forced labor, including 
non-payment of wages. Women from South-East Asia are vulnerable 
to sex trafficking and forced labor in domestic service, restaurants, 
massage parlors, or spas. Slovak women of Romani descent are 
particularly vulnerable to sex trafficking; traffickers transport them 
to the UK by force or deception for sham marriages for the purpose 
of sex trafficking or forced labor. Roma girls are vulnerable to forced 
traditional Romani marriages, which often includes the transfer 
of the girl into the care of her new “husband” where she is forced 
or coerced into domestic service. In some cases, parents of Slovak 
Roma children exploit their children in forced criminal activity in the 
UK. Traffickers force Slovak men, women, and children of Romani 
descent, and Slovaks with physical and mental disabilities to beg 
throughout Western Europe. Traffickers exploit children without 
family or relevant support structures who leave institutional care 
facilities in sex and labor trafficking. 
SLOVENIA: TIER 1
The Government of Slovenia fully meets the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued to 
demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting period, 
considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-
trafficking capacity; therefore Slovenia remained on Tier 1. These efforts 
included training more officials, identifying more victims, increasing 
funding for victim assistance, and convicting more traffickers than 
the prior reporting period. The government also adopted a national 
anti-trafficking action plan. Although the government meets the 
minimum standards, the government prosecuted fewer suspects than 
the prior reporting period, investigations and prosecutions for labor 
trafficking remained low compared with sex trafficking, and funding 
for prevention projects decreased. Gaps in victim identification 
resulted in the government not identifying any male, child, or labor 
trafficking victims, and the government did not report awarding any 
restitution to victims. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate and prosecute both sex and labor trafficking 
crimes and impose on all convicted traffickers adequate penalties that 
involve significant prison terms. • Improve efforts to proactively identify 
victims, especially children, males, and victims of labor trafficking. 
• Prioritize investigation and prosecution of labor traffickers and 
improve coordination between labor inspectors and police. • Ensure 
labor trafficking is investigated and prosecuted as a trafficking crime 
and not pursued as an administrative labor code violation. • Increase 
training to all front-line officials on victim identification for labor 
trafficking and consider a partnership with NGOs for labor trafficking 
victim identification. • Increase efforts of prosecutors to systematically 
request restitution for victims in criminal trials, including for both 
EU and non-EU citizen victims, and increase victim access to the 
state fund for crime victims. • Amend the definition of trafficking 
under Slovenian law to align more closely with the definition under 
international law. • Enforce the elimination of recruitment fees charged 
to workers and ensure any recruitment fees are paid by employers. • 
Establish a process to ensure systematic provision of care and designated 
facilities for child victims of trafficking, including enhanced training 
of caregivers and foster care parents. • Appoint a national rapporteur 
to provide independent review of government anti-trafficking efforts. 
• Establish a specialized police unit dedicated to investigating human 
trafficking, with sufficient resources, to ensure the prioritization of 
trafficking investigations. • Utilize the witness protection program 
for trafficking victims.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Article 113 of 
the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and 
prescribed penalties ranging from one to 10 years’ imprisonment for 
offenses involving an adult victim and three to 15 years’ imprisonment 
for those involving a child victim or other aggravating factors. These 
penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, 
commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as 
rape. However, inconsistent with the definition of trafficking under 
international law, Article 113 established the use of force, fraud, or 
coercion as an aggravating factor rather than an essential element of 
the crime. 
In 2020, though most court proceedings were postponed due to the 
pandemic, investigations of serious crimes, which included human 
trafficking, continued uninterrupted. During the reporting period, police 
conducted 12 trafficking investigations involving 12 suspects (nine 
from Slovenia, two from Dominican Republic, and one from Romania), 
compared with 14 investigations in the prior reporting period. During 
the reporting period, authorities initiated six prosecutions, a significant 
decrease compared with 32 prosecutions in the prior period. The 
government did not report investigating or prosecuting any suspects for 
labor trafficking during the reporting period. The government convicted 
seven traffickers in 2020, five of which were for labor trafficking, 
specifically forced criminality; this compared with five convictions in 
the prior period. Courts sentenced five traffickers to significant prison 
terms—one trafficker received a sentence of four years’ imprisonment 
and a fine, and four traffickers received sentences of three years and 
10 months’ imprisonment and fines. Courts convicted an additional 
two traffickers who pled guilty to trafficking but had not sentenced 
them by the close of the reporting period. Though the government 
reported fining convicted traffickers €15,500 ($19,020) and confiscating 
€111,800 ($137,180) in 2020, it did not report awarding any of the 
money to trafficking victims as restitution. The government did not 
report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of officials 
complicit in human trafficking offenses. 
The government continued to conduct specialized human trafficking 
training during the year, although some sessions switched to virtual 
platforms in response to pandemic-related restrictions. The government 
reported training 32 mobile unit investigators from the Ministry of 
Finance, 763 police officers, 173 judges, 50 diplomats, 50 employees 
working with asylum-seekers, and 48 socials workers and experts; this 
was a significant increase compared with 324 officials trained in 2019. 
The government maintained police attachés in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia to assist in coordination of 
international cases, though there were no international cases reported in 
2020. While the government did not have a specialized anti-trafficking 
investigation unit, each of the eight police districts had at least one 
officer responsible for coordinating trafficking investigations, creating a 
de facto nation-wide coordination network. However, NGOs expressed 
concern the police units responsible for investigating human trafficking 
were overburdened and understaffed; NGOs urged the government to 
establish dedicated police units to investigate and prioritize human 
trafficking. Several NGOs noted concerns regarding poor coordination 
between labor inspectors and police, which may have hindered the 
identification of labor trafficking cases. NGOs continued to assert the 
government did not prosecute labor traffickers because authorities 
instead pursued cases as administrative labor code violations, resulting 
in lesser consequences and decreased deterrence. The government 
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continued to dedicate two prosecutors with specialized expertise to 
prosecuting cases involving human trafficking. The government reported 
extraditing one Slovenian trafficking suspect from Canada in 2020.
PROTECTION
The government increased victim protection efforts. In 2020, the 
government identified 65 sex trafficking victims, a significant increase 
compared with 31 victims in 2019 but similar to 70 victims in 2018. 
All of the victims were adult females. Of the 65 victims, 26 were from 
Ukraine, 17 from Dominican Republic, seven from Serbia, five from 
Romania, three from Paraguay, two from Croatia, two from Moldova, 
one from Colombia, one from Slovenia, and one from Venezuela. 
Experts raised concerns regarding gaps in victim identification as the 
government again did not identify any child victims; it also did not 
identify any male or labor trafficking victims in 2020. NGOs identified 
an additional 12 victims in 2020. The government referred and 
provided assistance to all 65 victims, including providing psychological 
assistance to all victims as well as housing for two victims (one from 
Slovenia and one from Ukraine) in a government-funded, NGO-run 
safe house. The government also enrolled five trafficking victims (two 
from Slovenia, one from Madagascar, and one unknown) into its 
reintegration program. The government increased its allocation for 
housing victims in 2020 to €145,520 ($178,550), compared with 
€120,000 ($147,240) in 2019. Government officials continued to 
utilize the national Manual for Identification of Victims of Trafficking 
in Persons. The majority of victims continued to be proactively 
identified by police, and coordination between police and NGOs 
was strong; however, observers reported ongoing concerns regarding 
the under-identification of labor trafficking victims and the tendency 
for officials to overlook cases of labor trafficking. Following victim 
identification, government regulations required police to refer 
victims to one of two NGOs that had formal cooperation agreements 
arrangements with the government to ensure adequate provision 
of care to the victims. NGOs noted continued strong cooperation 
with police on the identification of sex trafficking victims, as police 
continued to invite NGO care-providers to police interactions with 
commercial sex establishments to assist in victim identification; 
however, authorities did not take similar concrete steps regarding NGO 
requests to cooperate on identification of labor trafficking victims. 
The government continued to partially fund two NGOs, supplemented 
by private donations, which provided trafficking-specific crisis and 
safe housing for victims. Both NGOs were among a wider range 
of organizations providing services such as counseling, psycho-
social support, legal representation during investigations and court 
proceedings, and filing of documentation for residency status. All 
victims could receive crisis housing for a maximum of 30 days, 
after which victims could enter safe housing for as long as court 
procedures remained ongoing; however, in 2020, the government did 
not report providing crisis housing to any of the 65 identified victims. 
Crisis housing and safe housing services were available for 30 days 
regardless of victim cooperation with law enforcement. Both foreign 
and domestic victims had access to the same protection services and 
had free movement in and out of shelters. Though the government 
did not identify any children during the reporting period, child 
victims of trafficking continued to lack adequate assistance, as there 
were no designated facilities for unaccompanied child trafficking 
victims. If identified, child trafficking victims could be sheltered with 
unaccompanied migrant children and receive care through the Center 
for Social Work. GRETA highlighted a concern over unaccompanied 
child victims disappearing from public care, urging the development 
of more suitable accommodations for children with fully trained staff 
or foster parents. While acknowledging the issues, the government 
did not report taking concrete steps to effectively address the lack of 
adequate facilities for children or children disappearing from public 
care during the reporting period. 
Non-EU foreign victims had a 90-day reflection period to remain in 
Slovenia while recovering and considering whether to participate in 
an investigation. However, the government did not allow them to 
work during this period. Victims cooperating in criminal proceedings 
could temporarily stay for 180 days or longer, if needed, for the trial 
of their trafficker, but had limited options to extend their stay after 
the conclusion of criminal proceedings. The government did not 
issue any temporary stay permits during the reporting period. When 
participating in pretrial and criminal proceedings, victims had a right to 
interpretation services and a protective escort, though the government 
did not report how many victims received these services during the 
reporting period. While awaiting case adjudication, asylum-seekers 
were unable to legally work, though many did so illegally, which 
NGOs stated could increase their vulnerability to labor trafficking 
due to their illegal status, lack of knowledge of local labor laws, and 
language barriers. The 2018 GRETA report urged improving the process 
of providing comprehensive information to victims in a language 
they could understand to assess their options, including participation 
in programs to resist re-victimization. NGOs also noted there were 
insufficient professional interpreters fully trained in translating the 
details of rights of potential trafficking victims for asylum intake 
proceedings. Some victims were reluctant to speak with social workers 
and counselors about their situation, given that the same interpreters 
assisted in the different contexts of law enforcement investigations 
and court proceedings on their case. Only citizens of EU countries 
were eligible to apply for compensation from the state fund for 
crime victims; however, the government did not report awarding 
compensation to any victims during the reporting period. During 
the reporting period, prosecutors did not request restitution for any 
victims in criminal proceedings; historically, prosecutors typically did 
not do this, though there were no legal barriers to prevent it, instead 
requiring victims demand restitution for themselves in a separate court 
case. Experts urged prosecutors to systematically request restitution 
for victims at criminal trials. All victims, including non-EU citizens, 
could seek damages by filing a civil suit, though due to legal costs, 
victim re-traumatization, and the desire to avoid additional court 
proceedings, most victims did not pursue damages. The government 
had a witness protection program that trafficking victims could utilize, 
but it did not report using the program to protect any victims during 
the reporting period. Under the witness protection act, victims could 
provide testimony via video or written statements, and courts kept 
victim identities confidential.
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts; while the government 
adopted a new national anti-trafficking action plan and increased 
personnel resources to the Anti-Trafficking Service Office, it did not 
conduct any anti-trafficking public awareness campaigns or prevention 
projects due to a decrease in funding for 2020. The Ministry of 
Interior’s (MOI) national coordinator for counter trafficking in persons 
continued to head the government’s interdepartmental working 
group (IWG), though the pandemic limited many of the trafficking 
prevention activities originally scheduled. The Anti-Trafficking Service 
Office within the MOI expanded from one to three dedicated staff 
members and continued to provide comprehensive support for 
investigators and victim service providers. The IWG included NGO 
representatives and met three times during the reporting period to 
organize and coordinate awareness efforts. The government adopted 
a new national anti-trafficking action plan in March 2021 to cover 
2021-2022. Slovenia remained without an official independent 
national anti-trafficking rapporteur, a key GRETA recommendation. 
The federal government diverted funds to address the pandemic 
and therefore did not provide any funding in 2020 for NGO-led 
awareness raising projects; however, the city of Ljubljana provided 
€18,910 ($23,200). Compared with €104,000 ($127,610) in funding 
in 2019, this was a significant decrease. The government subsequently 
did not conduct any awareness raising during the reporting period, 
a significant decrease from the extensive efforts made in 2019 that 
reached an estimated 320,770 people. The government continued 
to host a website, in both English and Slovenian, which raised 
awareness of forced labor and labor exploitation through its manual 
for companies and employers; provided information on investigations 







provided a portal for anonymous reporting of potential trafficking 
victims. The IWG published an updated handbook for employers 
on preventing and recognizing forced labor in October 2020. The 
government also continued to fund two NGO hotlines, available in 
several languages, offering assistance to both domestic violence and 
trafficking victims, although the hotlines did not track the number 
of calls received or how many had trafficking indicators. 
Generally, the government had effective policies and laws regulating 
labor recruiters; however, NGOs urged increased monitoring and 
enforcement of these laws. The law prohibited contract switching, the 
charging of placement or recruitment fees to workers, and passport and 
wage withholding. However, NGOs noted labor trafficking received 
insufficient attention and resources to conduct adequate investigations. 
While the law allowed employers to pay recruitment fees, in practice, 
NGOs assessed the government did not effectively enforce the law, and 
employers frequently passed these fees on to workers through salary 
deductions and other means. NGOs continued to assert authorities 
pursued many labor trafficking cases as administrative labor code 
violations, resulting in lesser consequences and decreased deterrence. 
Further, authorities often prosecuted and shut down the legal entity 
or company rather than the perpetrator responsible; the perpetrator 
would then establish another company under a new name and 
continue to exploit victims in labor trafficking. The government 
reported conducting 62 labor inspections in 2020. As part of its 
inspection efforts, the government held a joint action day (JAD) in 
September 2020, where police and financial inspectors conducted 
19 of the 62 total inspections; inspectors targeted transportation 
workers, cleaning companies, and the agricultural sector. The 
government reported identifying one potential labor exploitation 
victim during the JAD. Asylum centers and an NGO funded by the 
MOI continued to screen all new migrant and asylum arrivals for 
trafficking indicators, but the government did not report whether it 
identified any trafficking victims. In partnership with the Government 
of Austria, the government continued funding an anti-trafficking 
program in Serbia. The government did not make efforts to reduce 
the demand for commercial sex acts. The government continued 
the implementation of an initiative that resulted in 13 companies, 
including an additional four in 2020, committing to an action plan to 
respect human rights in business and supply chains, with a particular 
emphasis on preventing forced labor in supply chains. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Slovenia, and to a lesser extent, traffickers 
exploit victims from Slovenia abroad. Slovenes, as well as foreign 
workers and undocumented migrants from countries such as Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Romania, 
Serbia, Slovakia, and Ukraine are vulnerable to labor trafficking, 
including forced begging or domestic servitude in a variety of sectors 
including construction, transportation, hospitality, and domestic 
service. Sometimes these persons are in transit to Western Europe, 
particularly Austria, Germany, or Italy, where traffickers exploit them 
in forced labor. Temporary work agencies continue to exploit workers, 
which sometimes amounts to labor trafficking. While awaiting case 
adjudication, asylum-seekers are legally unable to work, increasing 
their vulnerability to labor trafficking. Traffickers exploit women and 
children from Slovenia, Eastern European, Western Balkan, Southeast 
Asian, and Latin American countries in sex trafficking within Slovenia, 
and many also transit to Western Europe, primarily Germany and 
Italy, where they are at risk of sexual and labor exploitation. Ethnic 
Roma are particularly vulnerable to trafficking, especially forced 
begging, in Slovenia.
SOLOMON ISLANDS: TIER 2
The Government of Solomon Islands does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Solomon Islands remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
allocating a budget to review existing trafficking legislation and 
develop a comprehensive trafficking statute, as well as to accede to 
the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized 
Crime (UNTOC) and its supplementary Protocols, including the 
2000 UN TIP Protocol. The government, in close coordination with 
relevant partners, conducted anti-trafficking training for government 
stakeholders, updated victim identification and protection standard 
operating procedures (SOPs), and for the first time in 25 years funded 
inspections and monitoring of labor laws by an interagency business 
committee. However, the government did not meet the minimum 
standards in several key areas. General lack of awareness of the 
crime and applicable laws among front-line officers, coupled with 
under-resourced protection services and widespread observance of 
informal justice models, adversely affected the government’s ability to 
respond effectively to trafficking cases. While the government reported 
identifying four potential victims, it did not report the purpose of 
the victims’ exploitation; it is therefore possible that the individuals 
were victims of other crimes. The Labor Division did not conduct 
systematic monitoring and inspection activities at logging operation 
sites or in the fishing or mining sectors. Victim protection services 
remained inadequate, and while the government reported closing 
several investigations, it did not advance any cases to prosecution 
or convict any traffickers. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Draft, enact, and implement a stand-alone trafficking in persons law 
prohibiting all forms of the crime, proscribe dissuasive penalties, and 
remove sentencing provisions under current legislation that allow fines 
in lieu of imprisonment for sex trafficking crimes occurring outside 
of Solomon Islands. • Investigate and prosecute both sex trafficking 
and labor trafficking offenses and convict and punish traffickers, 
including complicit officials, with significant prison sentences. • 
Increase efforts to identify Solomon Islander and foreign victims of 
sex trafficking and labor trafficking within the country, including in 
agriculture, the fishing, logging, and mining industries, and in relation 
to illicit commercial activities. • Provide comprehensive training on 
all relevant trafficking laws and victim identification procedures to 
immigration officials, law enforcement officers, and social service 
providers, including at the provincial level. • Increase government 
support for victim protection, including through the allocation of 
funding to shelter services with specialized trafficking knowledge and 
resources and benefiting both male and female victims. • Increase 
efforts to collect data on trafficking trends in Solomon Islands and 
disseminate among interagency anti-trafficking stakeholders. • 
Institute a campaign to raise public awareness of trafficking, including 
among remote logging and mining communities in all provinces. • 
Adopt and implement the 2020-2025 national action plan (NAP) 
on human trafficking and people smuggling and increase funding to 
relevant ministries for its implementation. • Ratify existing forestry 
legislation to include minimum social safeguards and child protection 
policies. • Accede to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained its law enforcement efforts. The 
penal code, together with the Immigration Act, criminalized sex 







criminalized child sex trafficking under its “child commercial sexual 
exploitation” provision and prescribed penalties of up to 15 or 20 
years’ imprisonment, based on the child’s age. Article 145 of the penal 
code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking when the offense 
occurred within the country. Article 145(2) applied to trafficking 
offenses involving an element of force, fraud, or coercion; it prescribed 
penalties of up to 20 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving adult 
victims and up to 25 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving 
child victims. Article 145(3) prescribed penalties of up to 15 years’ 
imprisonment for offenses that did not involve an element of force, 
fraud, or coercion. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, 
with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as kidnapping. The Immigration Act 
criminalized other forms of trafficking, including crimes in which the 
recruitment, transportation, harboring, or receipt of the trafficking 
victim occurred outside Solomon Islands. The Immigration Act 
prescribed penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment, a fine of up to 
45,000 Solomon Islands dollars ($5,820), or both for the trafficking 
of adults; it prescribed a penalty of up to 10 years’ imprisonment, a 
fine of up to 90,000 Solomon Islands dollars ($11,640), or both for 
the trafficking of children. These penalties were sufficiently stringent, 
but with respect to sex trafficking, by allowing for a fine in lieu of 
imprisonment, they were not commensurate with penalties prescribed 
for other serious offenses. Authorities continued to charge some 
trafficking cases under criminal statutes carrying lesser penalties. In 
coordination with a regional body, the government continued to 
review the Immigration Act in an effort to identify gaps in trafficking-
specific provisions, among others. The government allocated 920,000 
Solomon Islands dollars ($118,960) to support the development of 
a comprehensive trafficking in persons statute and to accede to the 
UNTOC and its supplementary Protocols.
The government reported opening investigations of two potential 
trafficking cases involving two alleged perpetrators and four potential 
victims during the reporting period, compared with two investigations 
in 2019. Similar to the previous reporting period, the government did 
not report initiating any new prosecutions. Authorities concluded 
two investigations initiated in the previous reporting period. The 
government did not advance the cases due to an absence of evidence 
and testimony, and it deported the alleged perpetrators. In addition, 
authorities did not advance three potential forced labor cases initiated 
in a prior reporting period involving an unspecified number of 
suspects and potential victims. The government did not report 
any convictions during the reporting period, a decrease from one 
conviction in 2019.
In partnership with an international organization, the Department 
of Immigration (DOI) conducted joint training for an unspecified 
number of law enforcement and other anti-trafficking stakeholders 
on definitions, investigations, and psycho-social care for victims. 
The government reported conducting training focused on trafficking 
law enforcement, investigation, prosecution, victim identification, 
and protection to law enforcement officers, service providers, public 
solicitors, and prosecutors, and it shared plans to provide similar 
training to judicial officials. Geographic challenges, insufficient 
funding of enforcement agencies, lack of technical expertise, and a 
lack of awareness of the crime and of the relevant laws among front-
line officers, particularly in remote areas of the country, adversely 
affected the government’s ability to respond effectively to trafficking 
cases. In addition, observers ascribed a higher likelihood of acquittals 
and dismissals of such cases to backlogs in court, incomplete 
investigations, insufficient evidence or lack of testimony, and safety 
concerns among victims and their families. Traditional justice practices 
involving retribution or informal restitution arrangements between 
victims’ families and their traffickers, continued to supplant formal law 
enforcement efforts and further complicated victims’ access to justice. 
Authorities did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting 
any government officials for complicity in trafficking offenses. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained efforts to protect trafficking victims. 
Key stakeholder agencies and protection partners relied on victim 
identification and referral processes that were unevenly applied to 
potential trafficking cases. The government, in conjunction with 
an international organization, undertook efforts to update and 
integrate among all stakeholders victim identification, referral, and 
protection SOPs; however, full implementation of the updated 
SOPs and coordination mechanisms was contingent on the future 
passage of the updated NAP. An international organization continued 
to provide training on victim identification and assistance to an 
unspecified number of law enforcement officials. The government 
reported identifying four potential trafficking victims (three overseas 
Solomon Islanders and one foreign national in Solomon Islands), 
compared to five victims in 2019 and 39 in 2018; however, the 
government did not report the purpose of exploitation in these cases, 
and some or all of them may have been other crimes. Authorities 
did not report identifying any cases of internal sex trafficking despite 
its reported prevalence throughout the country. Authorities referred 
the individuals to an international organization for repatriation, but 
pandemic mitigation measures, including the lack of commercial 
flights, reportedly hindered these efforts, and the government did 
not report whether the identified victims were repatriated.
Despite significant resource constraints due to the pandemic, the 
government provided its recurring budget allocation of 380,000 
Solomon Islands dollars ($49,130) to fund investigations, public 
awareness, and victim protection and assistance from DOI’s budget, 
compared with 386,700 Solomon Islands dollars ($50,000) for 
shelter services and victim care in 2019. The government did not 
provide trafficking-specific services. The Royal Solomon Islands 
Police operated a domestic violence shelter in Honiara that could 
provide services to women and child sex trafficking victims; however, 
most trafficking victims came from the provinces, making services 
exclusively located in Honiara difficult to access. The government 
did not provide shelter for adult males or victims of labor trafficking. 
Observers noted these insufficiencies in protection services likely 
discouraged some victims from testifying in court proceedings, thereby 
hindering prosecutorial progress. The Immigration Act granted the 
government authority to provide temporary residence permits for 
foreign victims to assist police with investigations, and it insulated 
victims against prosecution for immigration-related crimes traffickers 
compelled them to commit. However, the government did not 
report providing these or other services to foreign victims identified 
during the reporting period, nor did it report providing services to 
foreign victims identified in previous years. The government did not 
report if it would extend these protections to victims whose cases 
were investigated under the penal code. The government developed 
a victim protection policy in connection with the proposed NAP 
focused on provisions to encourage victims’ voluntary participation in 
investigations and prosecutions; implementation was ongoing at the 
end of the reporting period. In the absence of established systematized 
and evenly applied identification and referral procedures, victims 
were more vulnerable to penalization for unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit; observers reported in prior years that 
authorities may have arrested and prosecuted sex trafficking victims 
for commercial sex violations without screening to determine whether 
they were trafficking victims. Due to lengthy legal processes, fear 
of retaliation by traffickers or prosecution by police, and a lack of 
incentives to remain and participate in cases, it was likely some 
unidentified foreign victims opted to return to their home countries. 
The government reported trafficking victims could seek compensation 
from their employers through civil suits, although it reported that 
no victims had ever filed such suits.
PREVENTION
The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking. Despite 
challenges and restrictions associated with the pandemic, the Anti-











government agencies and members of civil society, met on a regular 
basis. The government and its partners continued drafting the NAP 
against Human Trafficking and People Smuggling 2020-2025 to 
increase internal policy and operational coordination and to prepare 
the government to accede to and implement the UN Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime and its supplementary 
protocols; however, the government did not formally adopt or 
implement the NAP by the end of the reporting period. In a nationally 
syndicated address about the pandemic, Prime Minister Sogavare 
raised concern about human trafficking in the fishing sector and 
committed his government to efforts, in partnership with international 
organizations, to develop a policy framework to eliminate modern 
slavery and sexual exploitation on national and foreign fishing vessels 
operating in Solomon Islands’ waters. The address was significant as, 
according to an international organization, many Solomon Islanders 
had not heard the term “human trafficking” before; for those that 
had, the newspaper was the most cited source. The government 
also reported completion of both its National Security Strategy 
and National Border Strategy. The new strategies focused on issues 
relevant to trafficking, including migration, transnational crime, 
labor, trade, employment, and investment; implementation was 
ongoing at the end of the reporting period. In partnership with the 
Solomon Islands Forestry Association, DOI reportedly continued 
to conduct awareness-raising campaigns targeting communities 
near logging and mining operations; the campaign focused on the 
country’s trafficking laws and the repercussions of involvement in 
trafficking in persons. 
An international organization, in cooperation with the government, 
conducted a research study focused on trafficking in the fishing 
industry; the report was under pre-publication review at the end 
of the reporting period. Unlike in prior years, the Labor Division 
did not report conducting any monitoring and inspection activities 
at logging operations or in the fishing or mining sectors. Forestry 
officials stated a lack of industry regulation or laws outlining child 
protection and social safeguards prevented them from detecting and 
investigating potential abuses, including trafficking, related to logging 
operations’ impact on local communities. The government continued 
collaborating with a local chamber of commerce to establish a 
policy for discouraging abuses, including worker exploitation, in 
labor-intensive industries. The interagency Business Monitoring 
Joint Agency Committee (BMJAC) was tasked with monitoring, 
inspecting, and investigating breaches of labor laws. During the 
reporting period, the government funded BMJAC inspections and 
monitoring activities throughout the country for the first time 
in 25 years; the national inspections and monitoring focused on 
compliance issues, trafficking in persons, and revenue collection. The 
government reported inspection of 450 foreign investments in six 
provinces. However, the government did not report identifying any 
victims from the inspections, nor did it take comprehensive measures 
to assess or address forced labor in supply chains or enforce its law. 
In a prior reporting period, the ministries of health and medical 
services and of home affairs jointly introduced a civil birth registration 
program to improve statistical recordkeeping on local populations—a 
step an international organization previously recommended as a way 
to better understand and address trafficking vulnerabilities throughout 
the 900 islands within the country’s diffuse maritime territory. The 
government established a working committee during the reporting 
period to review legislation and policies related to the program. 
Authorities reported an ongoing process to update this registration 
program through a centralized electronic system. The government 
did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. 
Solomon Islands was not a party to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Solomon Islands, and traffickers exploit 
victims from Solomon Islands abroad. Traffickers subject local, South 
Asian, and Southeast Asian men and women to forced labor and sex 
trafficking in Solomon Islands, and local children are subjected to 
sex trafficking and labor trafficking. Women from China, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines often pay large recruitment fees for 
jobs in Solomon Islands and upon arrival are forced or coerced into 
commercial sex. Labor traffickers exploit men from Indonesia and 
Malaysia in the logging, fishing, palm oil, and mining industries. 
Fishermen from Indonesia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, 
North Korea, and Fiji report situations indicative of labor trafficking, 
including non-payment of wages, dire living conditions, violence, and 
limited food supply, on Taiwan-flagged fishing vessels in Solomon 
Islands’ territorial waters and ports. Traffickers subject Solomon 
Islander children to sex trafficking and forced labor within the 
country, sometimes in exchange for money or goods, particularly 
near foreign logging camps, on foreign and local commercial fishing 
vessels, and at hotels, casinos, nightclubs, and other entertainment 
establishments. The inflow of a cash economic system, coupled with 
the continuation of an unregulated logging industry, has increased 
vulnerability to trafficking in remote communities, specifically for 
women and children. Contacts have observed a recent increase in 
commercial sex—and a concomitant uptick in sex trafficking—
resulting from certain economic changes. Family members are often 
the facilitators of such transactional agreements. Natural disasters 
significantly increase Solomon Islanders’ vulnerability to trafficking; 
Solomon Islanders affected by a cyclone in 2020 may be at higher 
risk of trafficking due to the economic hardships caused by the 
destruction. Anecdotal reporting showed an increase in the sexual 
exploitation of girls, some of which may have been sex trafficking, 
as many returned to remote villages as a result of the pandemic.
Some official corruption—especially in relation to facilitating irregular 
migration and involvement in the fishing and forestry sectors—may 
enable trafficking. Some boys, girls, and young women are recruited 
for domestic work and subsequently exploited in commercial sex 
at logging camps. Under informal or traditional justice practices, 
parents frequently receive payments for sending young women 
and girls into forced marriages with foreign workers at logging and 
mining companies, where many of them are exploited in domestic 
servitude or sex trafficking. Often these payments are rendered after 
the victims escape or are returned home as informal compensation 
brokered by local leadership. In this way, local community leaders 
may also benefit financially from these arrangements. Mining and 
logging camp leadership reportedly force boys to serve as solairs—illicit 
brokers procuring girls for sexual and domestic service in worker 
lodging facilities—and logging camp personnel force young males 
to work as domestic servants and cooks. Following the government’s 
decision to cease issuance of new logging licenses, a decline in the 
industry has contributed to an increase in internal economic migration 
of communities located in former logging areas; these displaced 
communities may be at higher risk of sex trafficking and forced 
labor. Elsewhere, Solomon Islander children may be subjected to 
forced labor in the agricultural sector, forced harvesting of seafood, 
and forced criminality in the manufacturing and transportation of 
drugs and in pickpocketing. Anecdotal reports show an increase 
in children involved in street vending, begging, and pickpocketing 
during the pandemic. To pay off debts, some parents reportedly 
sell their children to other families via “informal adoption” that 
often involves forced labor or sexual servitude. Traffickers also use 
Solomon Islands as a transit point to subject foreign individuals to 
trafficking in other countries.
SOUTH AFRICA: TIER 2  
WATCH LIST
The Government of South Africa does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 




convict traffickers, sentencing convicted traffickers to substantial terms 
of imprisonment, and continuing a few investigations into officials 
allegedly complicit in trafficking. In addition, the government passed 
and began implementing, including training officials on, standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) for referring trafficking victims to care. 
However, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, even considering 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity. 
Corruption and official complicity in human trafficking remained 
a significant obstacle, and the government did not take action in 
most reported cases. Law enforcement was notably less engaged 
on trafficking during the reporting period, and multiple observers 
reported agencies did not investigate some reported trafficking cases, 
even when they had the resources and cooperative survivors to help 
build cases. While the government maintained modest shelter and 
protection services for victims, it identified substantially fewer victims 
and only referred approximately half of those identified to care. 
Moreover, some law enforcement continued to inappropriately arrest 
and detain suspected sex trafficking victims during raids targeting 
commercial sex establishments. The government removed, and did 
not replace, a key official who led inter-ministerial anti-trafficking 
efforts, which hampered coordination. For the eighth consecutive 
year, the government did not promulgate implementing regulations 
for the 2013 Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons 
(PACOTIP) act’s immigration provisions. Therefore South Africa was 
downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict officials complicit 
in trafficking crimes and traffickers within organized crime syndicates. 
• Increase efforts to identify human trafficking victims and, using the 
victim referral SOPs, systematically refer them to care. • Increase human 
trafficking training to South African Police Service (SAPS) officers 
throughout the country, to include strengthening SAPS capacity and 
computer forensics to investigate child exploitation leads. • Fill the 
role of Chair of the National Intersectoral Committee on Trafficking 
in Persons (NICTIP) to lead interagency anti-trafficking efforts. • Pass 
Department of Home Affairs (DHA) implementing regulations. • 
Increase resources and training for front-line responders to identify 
trafficking victims, including by screening for trafficking indicators 
among vulnerable populations, such as women in commercial sex, 
children, LGBTQI+ persons—including refugees and migrants—and 
Cuban medical workers. • Promulgate the immigration provisions 
in Sections 15, 16, and 31(2)(b)(ii) of PACOTIP. • Amend the anti-
trafficking law to remove sentencing provisions that allow fines in 
lieu of imprisonment for sex trafficking crimes. • Ensure victims are 
issued appropriate immigration identification documents to receive 
protective services. • Extend the availability of drug rehabilitation 
services to trafficking victims. • Accredit or establish additional 
trafficking-specific shelters for male, female, transgender, and child 
victims. • Reduce demand for commercial sex, including by prosecuting 
individuals, including police, who purchase commercial sex and 
launching an education campaign. • Establish a channel for civil 
society to safely report allegations of official corruption and complicity 
to the government. 
PROSECUTION
The government decreased anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts, 
including maintaining insufficient efforts to address widespread official 
complicity in trafficking. PACOTIP criminalized sex trafficking and 
labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to life imprisonment, 
a fine of up to 100 million South African rand (ZAR) ($6.82 million), 
or both. The penalties were sufficiently stringent; however, with regard 
to sex trafficking, by allowing for a fine in lieu of imprisonment, 
the prescribed punishment was not commensurate with those for 
other serious crimes, such as rape. The implementing regulations for 
PACOTIP’s immigration provisions found in Sections 15, 16, and 31(2)
(b)(ii) have not been promulgated; therefore, critical sections of the 
act remained inactive for the eighth consecutive year. The Criminal 
Law (Sexual Offenses and related matters) Amendment Act of 2007 
(CLAA) also criminalized the sex trafficking of children and adults 
and prescribed penalties of up to life in prison; these penalties were 
sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate 
with other serious crimes, such as rape. The Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act of 1997 (BCEA), amended in 2014, criminalized 
forced labor and prescribed maximum penalties of three to six years’ 
imprisonment. In addition, the Children’s Amendment Act of 2005 
prescribed penalties of five years to life imprisonment or fines for the 
use, procurement, or offer of a child for slavery, commercial sexual 
exploitation, or to commit crimes. Prosecutors sometimes relied on 
the Prevention of Organized Crime Act of 1998 in combination with 
CLAA, which added additional charges—such as money laundering, 
racketeering, or criminal gang activity—and increased penalties of 
convicted defendants.
The Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI, or Hawks) 
collaborated closely with the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) 
to compile evidence and build cases. Together they investigated 31 
cases of trafficking during the reporting period. This is an increase 
compared to investigating 24 new cases in the previous reporting 
period. Most suspected traffickers were foreign nationals, particularly 
from Nigeria, China, and Bangladesh. The government prosecuted 
31 new trafficking cases of an unknown number of individuals and 
continued prosecutions in 14 cases from prior reporting periods, 
compared to prosecution of 71 individuals for trafficking crimes in 
an unknown number of cases during the previous reporting period. 
The government convicted seven traffickers in an unknown number 
of cases, compared to the conviction of eight traffickers in five cases in 
the previous year. Judges sentenced two traffickers to life imprisonment 
and five traffickers to between 22 and 25 years’ imprisonment. While 
in the previous year, judges utilized the solicitation of sex trafficking 
victims section of the anti-trafficking act and convicted 34 people for 
sexual exploitation, grooming for sexual exploitation, solicitation, 
and keeping a brothel, the government did not report data for these 
provisions during the reporting period. 
The government continued, from prior reporting periods, some 
law enforcement actions against government officials allegedly 
complicit in human trafficking offenses. The court convicted a former 
Johannesburg Metro Police Department superintendent on three 
counts of rape and human trafficking; he awaited sentencing at the 
close of the reporting period. A 2019 case against four police officers 
in Pretoria accused of human trafficking, kidnapping, and extortion 
of 10 Bangladeshi nationals remained ongoing. The government did 
not report an update on the Ministry of Defense’s December 2019 
task team created to investigate sexual exploitation and abuse cases 
within its armed forces dating back to 2014. The government placed 
a “prominent person” under investigation for labor exploitation and 
money laundering involving 105 Ethiopian victims allegedly forced 
to make counterfeit goods in two factories. 
Despite these actions, NGOs and researchers continued to report 
widespread official complicity in human trafficking that went 
unaddressed, particularly among the Department of Home Affairs 
(DHA), the Department of Social Development (DSD), SAPS, and 
the DPCI. An academic report made allegations that law enforcement 
protected traffickers, including that at least three dozen police 
protected or tipped off traffickers, SAPS officials leaked information 
on operations to traffickers, and DSD returned survivors to their 








forced individuals to work on her farm but did not report whether it 
was investigating the case. International organizations reported that 
in one trafficking case, police returned a victim to her trafficker. Some 
officials committed sex trafficking by forcing individuals to perform 
commercial sex acts in exchange for visas or residence permits. Civil 
society reported to law enforcement cases of sex trafficking of Basotho 
women from Lesotho in South African brothels, but law enforcement 
did not take action that resulted in investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions. Observers reported the lack of progress over several years 
to disrupt the suspected traffickers was due to official complicity 
of both Basotho and South African officials closely linked to the 
brothels. There were continued reports of officials accepting bribes 
to: falsify trafficking victims’ travel documents, not report trafficking 
in brothels, not prosecute pimps who facilitated trafficking, and 
facilitate deportation of migrants so farm or factory managers would 
not have to pay their workers. Some police accepted kickbacks from 
organized criminal syndicates, which often facilitated trafficking, 
and some police did not pursue traffickers out of fear of reprisals. 
NGOs and asylum applicants reported immigration officials sought 
bribes from asylum seekers seeking legal permits to remain in the 
country, which may have increased vulnerability to traffickers. Civil 
society and observers continued to report that the government lacked 
a safe process, free from retribution, for reporting alleged police 
corruption and complicity, and that even when civil society did report 
such allegations, the government did not respond. In the previous 
reporting period, the government and four NGOs began negotiating 
memoranda of understanding on procedures for the NGOs to safely 
submit sensitive information, including on corruption and official 
complicity; the parties did not finalize these memoranda during the 
reporting period.
Law enforcement agencies, particularly SAPS, had insufficient resources 
to address all reported trafficking cases, including child trafficking 
leads. Even when agencies had sufficient resources and civil society 
referred suspected trafficking cases, however, civil society reported 
that some law enforcement units were notably less responsive to 
trafficking referrals than in previous years and were, on multiple 
occasions, unwilling to initiate investigations into the reported cases. 
Western Cape and City of Cape Town had “Vice Squads” within their 
law enforcement that had responsibility to proactively identify sex 
trafficking within commercial sex establishments. Some observers 
reported positive experiences working with the unit, while others 
noted they were only reactive and did not proactively investigate tips 
of alleged sex trafficking. In part due to the pandemic, the government 
did not comprehensively monitor or investigate forced child labor or 
the labor trafficking of adults in the agricultural, mining, construction, 
and fishing sectors. NGOs that provided trafficking victim care reported 
police were noticeably less responsive to their case inquiries and 
did not provide status updates on ongoing cases. Victims reported 
this lack of clarity on their case status, as well as the frequent delays 
in court cases and low prospects of success, dissuaded them from 
participating in trials against their traffickers. 
The pandemic reduced the government’s capacity to provide 
training; thus, it trained fewer law enforcement, social workers, and 
judicial officials on trafficking than in the previous reporting period. 
Nevertheless, it collaborated with international organizations to 
hold 12 in-person and virtual anti-trafficking trainings. The trainings 
reached 283 officials, including from police, social services, and labor 
officials. This was a decrease from leading 24 interdisciplinary trainings 
that reached 359 front-line officials and collaborating with NGOs 
and an international organization to conduct another 16 trainings 
that reached at least 680 participants during the previous reporting 
period. Police lacked training on trafficking, particularly in how to 
conduct anti-trafficking investigations and treat trafficking survivors. 
PROTECTION
The government decreased victim identification and protection efforts. 
The government and NGOs identified 16 trafficking victims. In prior 
reporting periods, the government did not disaggregate the number 
of victims that it newly identified during the reporting period. The 
government’s ongoing cases involved 226 victims, including those 
identified in previous reporting periods. This was a substantial 
decrease from prior years when there were 377 victims (2019) and 
260 victims (2018) involved in ongoing cases. More than half of the 
victims involved in ongoing cases came from outside of South Africa, 
including 91 victims from Mozambique, significant numbers from 
Bangladesh, China, and Zimbabwe, and several victims from Lesotho, 
Botswana, and Mozambique. Most agencies, including SAPS, DSD, 
NPA, and the Department of Justice and Constitutional Development 
(DOJCD), had procedures to identify and refer trafficking victims to 
care, in accordance with PACOTIP. Implementation of these procedures 
varied by department and province, with some officials aware of the 
referral procedures, particularly regarding vulnerable groups. To fill 
this gap, the government adopted new SOPs for trafficking victim 
identification and referral to care. With an international organization, 
the government began conducting trainings on the SOPs, which 
reached more than 100 officials, and continued to rollout the SOPs 
to all provinces. In some cases, officials continued to arrest suspected 
sex trafficking victims, and in at least one case, officials returned a 
victim to her trafficker. 
The government provided shelter and/or services to 105 victims, a 
large decrease from referring more than 210 victims to services in the 
previous reporting period. NGOs criticized SAPS for not identifying 
victims; some SAPS officers failed to follow referral guidelines. The 
DHA had no formal, written procedures to guide the handling of 
trafficking cases; for the second year, draft regulations awaited approval 
by the DHA Minister at the close of the reporting period. Although a 
range of government and non-government entities identified victims, 
DSD was responsible for designating and certifying trafficking victim 
status and authorizing the provision of protective services. In addition, 
DSD was responsible for monitoring the provision of protective 
services, preparing victim-witnesses for court, and accompanying 
them through trial and repatriation, if applicable. NGOs reported 
that front-line officials responsible for receiving referrals were often 
unreachable, and that DSD and SAPS sometimes were not informed 
of their responsibilities to certify and refer victims, a necessary step 
before victims could receive care of any kind. In prior years, NGOs 
reported that SAPS sometimes left victims at shelters without first 
contacting DSD; there was no evidence this had changed, although it 
was unclear whether SAPS brought victims to shelters generally during 
the pandemic. While SAPS was supposed to open investigations for 
all suspected trafficking victims identified and coordinate with the 
provincial DSD representative, NGOs reported this was not consistently 
done, making case follow-up difficult. Observers reported there was an 
insufficient number of shelters and that some DSD shelters occasionally 
refused to accept trafficking victims due to security concerns or drug 
addiction. There were no reports that the government ameliorated 
these issues during the reporting period. Police indicated they often 
did not have interpreters to acquire victim-witness statements within 
the two-day window during which charges must be filed, even if 
interpreters existed in the province.
The government continued oversight and partial funding of 13 
accredited NGO-run multipurpose shelters and oversaw 88 shelters 
that provided temporary care to victims for up to 72 hours. In some 
rural areas, however, NGOs reported that due to insufficient space in 
shelters, officials turned away female victims of crime. The government 
provided NGOs a stipend on a per-person, per-night basis for the 
safe houses. NGOs, however, reported they could not always access 
available funds with the urgency required after identifying victims. 
Only one shelter provided care exclusively for trafficking victims, 
and only one shelter provided care for male trafficking victims; no 
shelters provided care exclusively for male victims. LGBTQI+ persons, 
particularly transgender persons and migrants, were especially at 
high risk for trafficking due to social stigmatization; there was one 
shelter dedicated solely for victims from the LGBTQI+ community, 
in the Western Cape. Shelters accessible to persons with disabilities 
provided limited services; however, the government did not report 




The overall quality of victim care varied dramatically by province, 
gender, and circumstance. Gauteng, KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), and 
Western Cape provinces generally offered adequate standards of 
care in urban areas; trafficking victims in these provinces, even if 
identified in a rural area, were generally able to access care. Victim 
care in other provinces was sometimes inadequate; to address this, 
authorities sometimes transferred victims from provinces offering 
low levels of care to provinces offering high levels of care. The 
government operated a network of 55 Thuthuzela Care Centers 
(TCCs)—full-service crisis centers to assist victims of rape and sexual 
violence, including potential trafficking victims, but did not report if 
TCCs assisted any victims of trafficking during the reporting period. 
NGOs reported that government shelter staff sometimes failed to keep 
victims informed about their case status or to provide dependency 
counseling and adequate security. Victims could not seek employment 
while receiving initial assistance, but South African citizens, South 
African residents, and registered refugees could seek employment 
while a court case was pending; other foreign victims could not seek 
employment, even if they cooperated with law enforcement and their 
trials extended several years. As in prior years, there was at least one 
NGO report of a case in which police arrested and detained suspected 
sex trafficking victims. For the second year, the government reported 
it did not arrest or prosecute any trafficking victims for immigration 
offenses. The government provided repatriation assistance to four 
foreign trafficking victims identified in South Africa.
Officials made some efforts to encourage victims to participate in 
the investigation and prosecution of traffickers. It provided increased 
services to victim-witnesses, including psycho-social services and 
court preparation, the option to testify via video conference, and 
enhanced shelter and witness protection if the victim-witness faced 
danger due to his or her participation in the case. In contrast, 
however, the government only allowed victims 48 hours to decide 
whether to serve as a witness and receive these services, which was 
insufficient. Law enforcement took victim statements in confidential 
and safe environments. The government provided two victims with 
interpreters, 18 with specialized medical care, 62 with specialized 
psycho-social support, six with formal letters of recognition, and 
26 with transportation. In most of these categories, the numbers of 
victims who received these services represented large decreases from 
the previous reporting period. Law enforcement referred 36 victims to 
the DPCI Coordinator for Trafficking to ensure authorities assigned 
officers trained in victim-centered investigations to the cases – a 
large decrease from 164 victims referred in the previous reporting 
period. While PACOTIP allowed judges to order victim restitution in 
trafficking cases, judges did not do so in any cases during the reporting 
period. PACOTIP allowed for trafficking victims to receive relief from 
deportation; however, the government did not promulgate regulations 
to implement this provision, and they remained awaiting approval 
for the second year. As a result, if undocumented foreign national 
victims did not participate in law enforcement investigations, the 
government sometimes deported them. DHA often required foreign 
nationals to renew their immigration paperwork every two weeks, 
which placed an unnecessary financial and logistical burden on them 
and the NGOs providing their care. As a result of the pandemic, 
however, the government may have waived some of these restrictions. 
PREVENTION
The government decreased efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
government continued to implement the 2019-2022 National Policy 
Framework to improve capacity and coordination to combat trafficking 
among government agencies. During the reporting period, however, 
the government removed the individual occupying the position of 
chair of NICTIP, which directed all governmental trafficking efforts and 
the framework, and did not communicate the change to stakeholders. 
The position was not filled by the end of the reporting period. 
NICTIP and its provincial task teams met irregularly to coordinate 
counter-trafficking efforts, although many officials lacked consistent 
access to the internet to join virtual meetings. Coordination and 
communication challenges were exacerbated by the lack of NICTIP 
leadership and the inconsistent government participation in meetings 
with civil society. Some of the provincial task teams ceased meeting 
or functioning. There was no accountability mechanism to ensure 
these groups met their mandates; officials in positions of authority 
with the ability to facilitate change rarely attended meetings. The 
government conducted national awareness-raising activities during 
the reporting period, although due to the pandemic, there were 
fewer such activities than in the previous reporting period. The 
Deputy Minister of DOJCD conducted at least 15 radio interviews 
on trafficking, and DSD hosted several webinars on topics related 
to child trafficking. 
The Department of Labor made some effort to monitor workplaces 
for forced labor. The department had an insufficient number of 
inspectors, and enforcement in the informal and agricultural 
sectors was inconsistent. While inspectors had the legal authority 
to investigate private farms, they reported difficulty in securing access. 
Despite these challenges, however, inspectors made some notable 
efforts, including raiding a Chinese-owned factory in Durban, 
where 14 local workers were forced to manufacture face masks; 
and discovering two makeshift factories where 105 Ethiopians were 
forced to make counterfeit goods. SAPS operated a hotline that 
could receive reports of potential trafficking cases; however, the 
government did not report how many calls the hotline received or 
whether it identified any trafficking victims as a result of calls to the 
hotline. The government and civil society directed most trafficking-
related calls to the NGO-operated National Human Trafficking 
Resource Line, which the government advertised. It did not report 
how many trafficking tips it received during the reporting period 
but reported a substantial increase in job-vetting requests from 
individuals who had suspicions about the legitimacy of job offers. 
The South African National Defense Forces (SANDF) maintained a 
hotline for reports of sexual exploitation by armed forces but did 
not report whether it received any calls regarding such exploitation 
during the reporting period. 
The government took steps to increase data collection and sharing 
regarding trafficking in the country. The Department of Science 
collaborated with a foreign donor to develop its first baseline study 
of the scale and nature of trafficking in South Africa. To further 
address a self-acknowledged data gap, DOJCD was reportedly 
developing a new integrated information system to collect data 
on, and improve responses to, trafficking. With support from an 
international organization, the government contributed information 
to a centralized anti-trafficking database that collected national data 
on criminal cases and victims identified and shared it with countries 
in the region. Nevertheless, some officials publicly downplayed the 
existence of trafficking, which stymied public awareness and data 
collection efforts. The government did not make efforts to reduce 
demand for commercial sex or forced labor. The Government launched 
the Generic and Sector Specific Training Manual on the PACOTIP 
Act during the reporting period, which contained a training plan 
for peacekeepers. The government did not report providing anti-
trafficking training to its peacekeepers during the reporting period. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in South Africa, and traffickers exploit victims 
from South Africa abroad. Traffickers recruit victims from poor 
countries and poor and/or rural areas within South Africa, particularly 
Gauteng province, and exploit them in sex trafficking locally and 
in urban centers, such as Johannesburg, Cape Town, Durban, and 
Bloemfontein. South African trafficking rings exploit girls as young 
as 10 years old in sex trafficking. In some cases, traditional family 
practices contributed to victims’ vulnerability to traffickers. For 
example, the practice of ukuthwala continued, the abduction of girls 
as young as 14 for forced marriage, particularly in remote villages 
in Western Cape, Eastern Cape, and KZN Provinces; girls in forced 
marriage are vulnerable to sex trafficking and forced labor by their 








persons to engage in commercial sex acts. Traffickers sometimes 
employ forced drug use to coerce sex trafficking victims. 
Traffickers force adults and children, particularly those from poor 
and rural areas and migrants, into labor in domestic service, mining, 
begging, street vending, food services, criminal activities, agriculture, 
and the fishing sector. Traffickers reportedly exploit South Africans 
in forced labor in some fruit and vegetable farms across the country. 
In 2020, one NGO reported an increase in children forced into 
commercial sex or labor by their families. Because many domestic 
workers do not have formal contracts, employers fired many without 
notice or pay during the pandemic, rendering them vulnerable to 
traffickers. Some domestic employers restricted workers’ movements 
and forced them to remain at their worksites during the pandemic, 
which increased the workers’ vulnerability to forced labor and abuse 
by those employers. For both internal and transnational trafficking, 
traffickers increasingly use social media to lure victims to urban centers 
within South Africa, including posting fake job advertisements on 
social media. Official complicity in trafficking crimes, especially by 
police, persisted. Some well-known brothels previously identified 
as locations of sex trafficking continue to operate with officials’ 
tacit approval. Some officials seek bribes from asylum seekers and 
the government rejected most asylum applications, which rendered 
asylum seekers increasingly vulnerable to traffickers. Some refugees 
were unable to exercise their right to employment, which may have 
increased their vulnerability to traffickers. 
To a lesser extent, syndicates recruit South African women to Europe 
and Asia, where traffickers force some into commercial sex, domestic 
service, or drug smuggling. Traffickers operating in South Africa 
increasingly are from Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Cameroon, and Ghana. Syndicates, often dominated by Nigerians, 
force women from Nigeria and countries bordering South Africa 
into commercial sex. In some cases, sex traffickers exploit women 
in brothels disguised as bed and breakfasts. Mozambican crime 
syndicates use the eastern border of Kruger National Park to transport 
South African men to other parts of the country for forced labor, 
which are the same routes the syndicates use to facilitate other 
crimes. Recruiters entice women from Asia and countries bordering 
South Africa with offers of legitimate employment but, upon arrival, 
some subject the women to domestic servitude or forced labor in 
the service sector. Traffickers exploit women from Lesotho in sex 
trafficking in South Africa. Traffickers exploit foreign male victims 
aboard fishing vessels in South Africa’s territorial waters. Traffickers 
subject Pakistanis and Bangladeshis to forced labor through debt-
based coercion in businesses owned by their co-nationals. In one 
case, a Nepali trafficker fraudulently recruited a Nepali man to 
South Africa and exploited him in forced labor. Traffickers exploit 
young men from neighboring countries who migrate to South Africa 
for farm work; some are subsequently arrested and deported as 
undocumented immigrants. Chinese businessmen have recruited 
workers to South Africa and forced them to work in factories. The 
Cuban government may have forced its citizens to work in South 
Africa, including at least 187 Cuban doctors and medical staff sent 
to all provinces to combat the pandemic. These agreements typically 
require payment directly to the Government of Cuba, which gives 
the medical workers between 5 and 15 percent of the salary only 
after they completed the mission and returned home. 
SOUTH SUDAN: TIER 3
The Government of the Republic of South Sudan does not fully meet 
the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and, even 
considering the documented impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on 
the government’s anti-trafficking capacity, is not making significant 
efforts to do so; therefore South Sudan remained on Tier 3. Despite the 
lack of significant efforts, the government took some steps to address 
trafficking, including convening its anti-trafficking inter-ministerial 
task force consistently, cooperating with an international organization 
to release approximately 189 child soldiers, and launching a nation-
wide awareness campaign. However, during the reporting period 
there remained a government policy or pattern of employing or 
recruiting child soldiers. Government security and law enforcement 
officers continued to recruit and use child soldiers, at times by 
force, and did not hold any members of the South Sudan People’s 
Defense Forces (SSPDF) or South Sudan National Police Services 
(SSNPS) criminally accountable for these unlawful acts. Authorities 
did not report investigating or prosecuting any forced labor or sex 
trafficking crimes for the ninth consecutive year. The government 
made negligible efforts to proactively identify and protect trafficking 
victims, did not report identifying any victims in 2020, continued 
to arrest and imprison child sex trafficking victims, and continued 
to indiscriminately arrest and imprison individuals for prostitution 
violations without screening for indicators of trafficking.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Cease all recruitment and use of children by government forces and 
associated militias and immediately release all child soldiers under 
the command or influence of government forces and affiliated militias 
and, in partnership with international organizations, transfer them 
to appropriate civilian rehabilitation and reintegration programs. 
• Train law enforcement and social workers to identify trafficking 
victims, particularly among vulnerable groups such as children, 
individuals in commercial sex, and internally displaced persons. • 
Increase funding and human resources for the Technical Taskforce on 
Anti-Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Persons in the Republic of 
South Sudan (Taskforce). • Train law enforcement officers, prosecutors, 
and judges—including officials serving on the Gender Based Violence 
and Juvenile Court—on the 2008 Child Act, 2008 Penal Code, and 
2018 Labor Act so officials can more effectively investigate, prosecute, 
and convict traffickers, including military officials complicit in the 
unlawful recruitment, use, and sexual exploitation of children. • 
Starting in Juba, establish and implement victim identification 
screening and referral procedures in partnership with international 
organizations and civil society to prevent penalization of trafficking 
victims for unlawful acts their trafficker compelled them to commit. 
• Following due process and respecting human rights, investigate 
and prosecute suspected trafficking offenses under existing laws and 
convict traffickers, including complicit government officials. • Amend 
the 2008 Penal Code or pass a comprehensive anti-trafficking law 
to criminalize adult sex trafficking and prescribe penalties that are 
sufficiently stringent and commensurate with other grave crimes, 
such as rape. • Provide additional financial and staffing support to 
the SSPDF’s Directorate of Child Protection to facilitate efforts to 
identify perpetrators of child soldiering and refer cases to civilian 
courts. • Contribute human resources and provide in-kind support 
for the second phase of the awareness raising initiative in Eastern, 
Central, and Western Equatoria. • Accede to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol.
PROSECUTION
The government continued to demonstrate negligible law enforcement 
efforts to hold traffickers accountable. The 2008 Penal Code, 2008 
Child Act, and 2018 Labor Act criminalized some forms of sex 
trafficking and labor trafficking. Article 277 of the penal code 
prohibited forced labor and prescribed penalties of up to two years’ 
imprisonment, or a fine, or both; these penalties were not sufficiently 
stringent. Article 276 criminalized buying or selling a child for the 




years’ imprisonment and a fine, which was sufficiently stringent and 
commensurate with punishment prescribed for other serious crimes, 
such as rape. Articles 254 and 258 criminalized the procurement of a 
child for prostitution and the facilitation of the prostitution of a child 
by the child’s parent or guardian and prescribed penalties of up to 10 
years’ imprisonment and a fine; these penalties were also sufficiently 
stringent and commensurate with those prescribed for other serious 
crimes, such as rape. The criminal code did not explicitly criminalize 
adult sex trafficking and conflated human trafficking with smuggling 
by requiring movement across borders. Article 282 prohibited and 
prescribed a sufficiently stringent punishment of up to seven years’ 
imprisonment for the sale of a person across international borders. 
Articles 31 and 32 of South Sudan’s 2008 Child Act prohibited the 
recruitment and use of children for military or paramilitary activities, 
and prescribed punishments of up to 10 years’ imprisonment for such 
crimes. The 2018 Labor Act prohibited forced labor and prescribed 
penalties of up to five years’ imprisonment, a fine, confiscation of 
property, cancellation of a business license, or closure of business, 
or a combination thereof; these penalties were sufficiently stringent.
The government reported authorities did not investigate, prosecute, 
or convict any traffickers for the ninth consecutive year. In 2020, 
the government contributed logistical support for an international 
organization to provide training for the Directorate of Nationality, 
Passports, and Immigration on human trafficking indicators, 
compared with partnering with the same organization to train 
approximately 30 officials in 2019. However, most police and judicial 
officials continued to lack a basic understanding of trafficking in 
persons and frequently conflated human trafficking and migrant 
smuggling. Officials estimated customary courts handled 80 percent of 
all cases due to capacity limitations of statutory courts, further limiting 
accountability for accused sex and labor traffickers. In December 
2020, the government inaugurated the Gender Based Violence and 
Juvenile Court, although authorities did not report it trying any 
human trafficking cases. This specialized court—located in Juba—
provides dedicated and expedited trials for gender based violence 
and juvenile cases, which may include cases involving trafficking 
in persons. The government convened the Technical Taskforce with 
the stated objective of bringing South Sudan’s legal framework into 
harmony with the 2000 Palermo Protocols. In February 2021, the 
Taskforce completed a legal framework gap analysis, with technical 
assistance from an international organization, to examine existing 
laws and identify articles that law enforcement can use to complement 
the 2008 Penal Code until a comprehensive TIP law is developed. 
Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained 
significant concerns; however, the government did not report 
investigating, prosecuting, or convicting government employees 
complicit in human trafficking offenses. Despite the ongoing 
recruitment and use of child soldiers by the SSPDF, SSNPS, and allied 
militias, the government has never held an offender criminally or 
administratively accountable for such crimes. The lack of resources for 
basic operations, a dearth of trained judicial officials, and corruption 
throughout the justice sector continued to impede law enforcement 
efforts. 
PROTECTION
The government decreased protection efforts. Officials did not report 
identifying any victims during the reporting period, compared with 
identifying 19 potential victims in 2019. International organizations 
stated the government may have identified some victims during 
the reporting period, but pandemic-related movement restrictions 
limited access and verification throughout much of the country. 
Members of the National Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration Commission (NDDRC) and other government officials 
cooperated with an international organization to demobilize and 
release approximately 189 child soldiers during the reporting period; 
international organizations provided psychosocial and reintegration 
assistance for the children following their release. The government’s 
enlistment procedures required an age assessment, usually done 
through a dental exam, as many South Sudanese do not have access 
to birth registration documents. Government officials noted many 
SSPDF officers did not meet their annual training requirements to 
increase their awareness of international standards and obligations 
around child soldier recruitment and use due to ongoing conflict, 
poor communication, and general lack of capacity. The SSPDF’s 
Directorate for Child Protection, headed by a brigadier general, 
maintained responsibility for investigating allegations of child 
soldiering. Despite ongoing reports government forces continued 
to recruit and use child soldiers, officials did not report opening any 
inquiries into complicit officers. 
Social stigma and fear of punitive law enforcement actions continued 
to discourage victims—particularly those subjected to sex trafficking—
from reporting crimes to law enforcement officers. The government 
has not passed any laws or policies to protect victims from prosecution 
for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit, although 
the Minister of Gender reported opening special protection units 
during the reporting period at police stations in all 10 states, with six 
in Juba. The government designed these units to provide safe spaces 
for vulnerable populations; however, authorities acknowledged 
that the lack of female officers and high staff turnover limited the 
units’ effectiveness. Officials did not report providing services to any 
victims of trafficking. Security forces and law enforcement continued 
to lack a formal mechanism to identify potential victims, resulting 
in officials indiscriminately arresting individuals in commercial sex 
without screening, including known child sex trafficking victims. 
The government did not provide specialized services for trafficking 
victims or legal alternatives to the removal of foreign victims to 
countries where they would face hardship or retribution, nor did 
it offer legal assistance or other mechanisms to encourage victims 
to assist in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking crimes.
PREVENTION
The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking. In coordination 
with an international organization, the government convened the 
Taskforce, co-chaired by the Ministries of Interior and Justice, multiple 
times during the reporting period. For the second consecutive year, the 
Taskforce did not accomplish its primary objectives of ratifying the 
Palermo Protocol and enacting the country’s migration policy, which 
intends to improve the country’s ability to manage migration flows 
including trafficking victims and smuggling clients. The government 
did not have a trafficking-specific national action plan, although 
officials worked with an international organization to produce 
the country’s first comprehensive report on trafficking in persons, 
publicizing it in July 2020. 
Trafficking awareness remained low among officials and the public, 
hindering the government’s anti-trafficking efforts. During the 
reporting period, the Taskforce launched the first phase of its 
nationwide awareness-raising campaign in partnership with an 
international organization. The Taskforce coordinated with law 
enforcement and judicial officials, as well as civil society in Awiel 
in Northern Bahr El Ghazal, Rumbek in Lakes, Kapoeta in Eastern 
Equatoria, and Wau in Western Bahr El Ghazal. The awareness raising 
initiative included education and training components, and it lasted 
between five and seven days in each state. 
Government security forces actively continued to recruit child soldiers, 
at times by force, and did not fully implement the existing action 
plan to demobilize child soldiers currently within the forces. In 
addition, poor command and control among SSPDF units and 
ongoing instability throughout the country hindered implementation. 
Authorities did not make efforts to address the labor exploitation 
of South Sudanese nationals working abroad or foreign nationals 
within South Sudan. Officials did not make efforts to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex acts. The government did not provide 
anti-trafficking training for its diplomatic personnel and South Sudan 









As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in South Sudan, and traffickers exploit victims 
from South Sudan abroad. South Sudanese women and girls, 
particularly those from rural areas or who are internally displaced, 
are vulnerable to domestic servitude throughout the country. Male 
occupants of the household sexually abuse some of these women 
and girls while traffickers force others to engage in commercial sex 
acts. Prominent South Sudanese individuals in state capitals and 
rural areas sometimes force women and girls into domestic servitude. 
South Sudanese and foreign businesspeople exploit South Sudanese 
girls in sex trafficking in restaurants, hotels, and brothels in urban 
centers—at times with the involvement of corrupt law enforcement 
officials. South Sudanese individuals coerce some children to work 
in construction, market vending, shoe shining, car washing, rock 
breaking, brick making, delivery cart pulling, gold mining, begging, 
and cattle herding. South Sudanese and foreign business owners 
recruit men and women from neighboring countries—especially the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Republic 
of the Congo, and Uganda—as well as South Sudanese women 
and children, with fraudulent offers of employment opportunities 
in hotels, restaurants, and construction, and they force them to 
work for little or no pay or coerce them into commercial sex. An 
international organization reported Eritrean, Ethiopian, and Kenyan 
business owners recruited and exploited their compatriots, who enter 
South Sudan with valid visas and travel documents, to exploit them 
in forced labor or sex trafficking. Traffickers sexually exploit women 
most frequently in the country’s capital, Juba, and in Nimule, a city 
located on the border with Uganda. 
The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the population’s vulnerability to 
exploitation during the reporting period, compounding already severe 
economic challenges. The closure of restaurants and hotels in Juba due 
to COVID-19 restrictions resulted in job losses particularly affecting 
migrant women, who became more vulnerable to sexual exploitation 
by business owners. Reports of child, early, and forced marriages rose 
with an increase in food insecurity, due to bride prices serving as an 
alternative source of revenue for families. An international organization 
reported criminal networks use traders and trucks transporting goods 
and produce to bypass COVID-19-related movement restrictions and 
move trafficking victims throughout the country. The government’s 
pandemic-related lockdowns—beginning in March 2020—resulted 
in decreased access to support and assistance for victims. 
Child, early, and forced marriage remains a nationwide problem, 
with families forcing some girls into marriages as compensation for 
inter-ethnic killings; husbands and their families may subsequently 
subject these girls to sexual slavery or domestic servitude. East 
African migrants transiting through South Sudan to North Africa 
remain vulnerable to forced labor and sex trafficking. Observers 
report traffickers exploit individuals along the country’s borders with 
Uganda and Kenya where economic activities are concentrated, as 
well as in artisanal mining operations along South Sudan’s border 
with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
Violent conflict continued throughout the year, resulting in 
approximately 1.3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
and 2.2 million South Sudanese refugees living in neighboring 
countries as of December 2020, compared with 1.5 million IDPs 
and 2.2 million refugees in December 2019. These groups, including 
orphaned children, are at increased risk of trafficking and other forms 
of exploitation within South Sudan and neighboring countries due 
to sometimes limited access to formal justice and support networks. 
Unaccompanied children in camps for refugees or internally displaced 
persons are particularly vulnerable to abduction by sex or labor 
traffickers. Inter-ethnic abductions and abductions by external criminal 
elements and armed groups remain common, especially in Jonglei, 
Unity, and Upper Nile states; traffickers exploit some abductees in 
forced labor or sex trafficking. 
An international organization estimated government and opposition-
affiliated forces have recruited more than 19,000 child soldiers since 
the start of the conflict in 2013, and armed groups continued to 
recruit and use children during the reporting period. Experts assess 
there are currently between 7,000 and 19,000 child soldiers within 
South Sudan as of February 2021. Both the SSPDF and the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army - In Opposition signed or recommitted to 
action plans for child soldier demobilization and reintegration, but 
implementation remains incomplete. Government forces—including 
SSNPS—use children to fight and perpetrate violence against other 
children and civilians, to serve as bodyguards, staff checkpoints, and 
in other security support roles. According to the Revitalised Agreement 
on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan signed in 2018, the 
parties committed to refrain from the recruitment or use of child 
soldiers by armed forces or militias in contravention of international 
conventions. Governmental and non-governmental groups continued 
to retain, recruit, and use child soldiers during the reporting period, 
with observers reporting armed groups used 48 percent of children 
in combat roles. Experts note more children fight on behalf of locally 
organized armed groups rather than formally organized groups with 
centralized command and control structures. International observers 
reported groups recruited and used child soldiers in Central and 
Western Equatoria, Unity, Western Bahr el Ghazal, and Greater Upper 
Nile. Observers reported armed groups used young boys to guard or 
raid cattle, a key source of income for many South Sudanese. 
SPAIN: TIER 1
The Government of Spain fully meets the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued to 
demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting 
period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its 
anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Spain remained on Tier 1. These 
efforts included assisting more trafficking victims, opening a new 
trafficking shelter, increasing efforts and results regarding international 
investigations, and continuing to issue significant prison terms for 
convicted traffickers. Although the government meets the minimum 
standards, investigations, prosecutions, and convictions decreased; 
and, notably, the government did not prosecute any alleged labor 
traffickers. Gaps remained in victim identification protocols and 
resulted in the government identifying fewer victims. Additionally, 
the government continued to lack a national anti-trafficking action 
plan to guide its efforts. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Increase investigations, prosecutions, and convictions of trafficking 
offenses, particularly for forced labor. • Increase training of front-
line officials on proactive victim identification, in particular among 
vulnerable populations such as irregular migrants, unaccompanied 
minors, and workers in industries and agricultural regions with 
high incidences of labor exploitation. • Adopt and implement one 
comprehensive national action plan that addresses both sex and 
labor trafficking and clearly outlines the roles of law enforcement and 
victim care providers. • Increase worker protections by implementing 
strong regulation and oversight of recruitment companies that 
are consistently enforced, including prosecuting fraudulent labor 
recruitment. • Allow formal victim identification without requiring 
SPAIN 
514
law enforcement interaction. • Allow formal victim identification by 
and referral from entities other than the police, including by labor 
inspectors, asylum case workers, healthcare professionals, social 
workers, and NGOs. • Expand victim service centers to all autonomous 
communities. • Continue to increase witness protection resources 
available to victims and expert witnesses, including increasing safety 
and security measures and considering measures to protect their 
identities. • Increase resources, including personnel, to the office 
of the national rapporteur and consider making it independent. • 
Increase protection and security of unaccompanied migrant children 
from traffickers operating in immigration detention centers. • Train 
all prosecutors and judges on human trafficking and a victim-
centered approach to law enforcement. • Improve state compensation 
mechanisms, including re-distribution of confiscated traffickers’ 
assets to victims. 
PROSECUTION 
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. Article 177 bis of 
the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking, 
prescribing penalties from five to eight years’ imprisonment, which 
were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, 
commensurate with those for other serious crimes, such as 
kidnapping. The rapporteur, NGOs, and GRETA reported the penal 
code did not clearly define forced labor, which made prosecutions 
difficult; the government had a draft stand-alone trafficking law to 
address forced labor, among other issues, but did not pass the law 
during the reporting period. Law enforcement officials adapted to 
pandemic-related restrictions by holding meetings virtually, though 
many victim and suspect interviews were postponed and courts shut 
down for six weeks. According to provisional data for 2020, law 
enforcement initiated 83 new human trafficking investigations (62 
sex trafficking, 19 labor trafficking, and two forced criminality), a 
decrease compared with 103 (82 sex trafficking, 16 labor trafficking, 
two forced criminality, and three forced begging) in 2019. In addition 
to law enforcement investigations, the Office of the Prosecutor 
initiated 119 new investigations of 530 suspects, compared with 167 
investigations of 637 suspects in 2019. From the investigations, law 
enforcement arrested 235 suspects in 2020 (173 for sex trafficking, 56 
for labor trafficking, and six for forced criminality), compared with 
285 suspects in 2019. Law enforcement conducted targeted operations 
against 66 criminal organizations involved in human trafficking 
and exploitation in 2020, a significant increase compared with 11 
in 2019. The judiciary initiated prosecutions of 52 suspects – all for 
sex trafficking – a significant decrease compared with 127 in 2019 
(117 for sex trafficking and 10 for labor trafficking). Prioritization 
of prosecuting labor trafficking offences remained a challenge, 
and there were no labor trafficking prosecutions in 2020. In 2020, 
courts convicted 32 traffickers for sex trafficking, compared with 44 
convictions in 2019 (37 for sex trafficking, four for labor trafficking, 
and three for forced criminality). Of the convicted traffickers, 29 were 
Nigerian, two were Spanish, and one was Moldovan. Sentences were 
significant; all sentences were more than one year, with the longest 
being 35 years and 6 months’ imprisonment; all cases except one 
included significant restitution for victims. Courts imposed separate 
sentences on multiple criminal offenses. 
The Interior Ministry coordinated law enforcement efforts to combat 
trafficking and had specialized law enforcement units to address 
human trafficking. The government adapted to pandemic-related 
restrictions by switching to virtual platforms to continue providing 
training to an unknown number of officials in 2020. The prosecutor’s 
office provided training on detection of trafficking, focusing on 
labor trafficking and a victim-centered approach, to an unknown 
number of officials. Compared with 2019, authorities increased 
cooperation on international law enforcement investigations, 
including with INTERPOL, Lithuania, Switzerland, Czech Republic, 
Italy, Nigeria, Austria, Colombia, and Romania; cooperation resulted 
in the identification of at least 85 victims, the arrest of at least 113 
suspected traffickers, and the conviction of seven traffickers in 2020. 
The government did not have judges or courts that specialized in 
trafficking, but with regard to sex trafficking, cases could be heard in 
courts dedicated to crimes related to gender-based violence. Experts 
concluded, however, that judges often lacked adequate training 
on human trafficking cases and had limited access to specialized 
trafficking training. Coordination between law enforcement, NGOs, 
and specialized trafficking prosecutors continued to be effective, 
though this varied by region. Several government entities adopted 
plans to help protect victims during the mandatory home confinement 
periods caused by the pandemic; this included a working group 
established by the prosecutor’s office, which met weekly and included 
police and specialized NGOs. In January 2021, the prosecutor’s office 
also established a new police liaison position to increase coordination 
with police, closely monitor human trafficking cases, and increase 
convictions, especially considering the additional investigative 
obstacles created by the pandemic. The government did not report 
any new investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government 
officials complicit in trafficking offenses. 
PROTECTION 
The government maintained mixed protection efforts – while 
victim identification decreased, victim assistance increased. In 
2020, the three-month, pandemic-related national shutdown made 
identifying sex trafficking victims particularly difficult as the majority 
of inspections were traditionally conducted in clubs, all of which 
were closed during much of the year. Law enforcement continued 
efforts to identify trafficking victims during the reporting period, 
but gaps remained, and the government did not report identifying 
any child or Spanish national victims in 2020. In 2020, authorities 
reported identifying 226 victims (130 of sex trafficking, 89 of labor 
trafficking, and seven of forced criminality). This was a significant 
decrease compared with 467 victims (250 of sex trafficking, 173 of 
labor trafficking, 24 of forced criminality, and 20 of forced begging) 
identified in 2019, but similar to the 225 identified in 2018. In 2020, 
victims predominantly came from Colombia, Venezuela, Romania, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, and China. Law enforcement officials were the 
sole entity that could identify victims, and the government reported 
that formal victim identification was not tied to law enforcement 
cooperation. However, in its 2018 report, GRETA stated that law 
enforcement could only formally identify victims who cooperated 
in criminal investigations. Victims identified by NGOs or other 
entities outside of law enforcement, were not included in national 
statistics; according to NGOs, this, coupled with continued gaps in 
victim identification among irregular migrants and asylum seekers, 
resulted in probable underreported official victim statistics. However, 
victims who chose not to cooperate with law enforcement had the 
same rights and access to victim assistance. Experts asserted that 90 
percent of women in commercial sex in Spain could be unidentified 
sex trafficking victims within the decriminalized commercial sex 
industry, and GRETA concluded victim identification statistics did 
not reflect the scale of trafficking. The government continued to 
utilize its national victim identification and referral protocols and 
usually coordinated formal victim identification with an NGO that 
would then assume care of the victims. The government lacked 
systematic victim identification protocols at temporary reception 
centers for irregular migrants and asylum seekers. The increased 
number of newly arrived irregular migrants, including 23,000 to 
the Canary Islands in 2020 (compared with 2,700 in 2019), were 
vulnerable to trafficking; officials did not identify any trafficking 
victims from among these numbers, but given the large number of 
vulnerable individuals, civil society suspected unidentified trafficking 
victims were among the new arrivals. The government continued to 
implement victim identification protocols at the Madrid airport and 
in 2020 added the Barcelona airport, as well, but it did not report 
how many victims were identified. The government continued 
to provide training to border police, though victim identification 
by border police remained low compared with identification by 
NGOs. Fourteen of the 17 autonomous communities in Spain 
continued to use their own protocols for trafficking victims, which 
they implemented simultaneously with the national protocol. 





assisting approximately 1,468 victims and 4,661 potential victims 
in 2020, including job training for at least 148 potential victims and 
safe housing for at least 98 victims. Additionally, at least 16 victims 
received witness protection and 129 received legal assistance from 
government funded NGOs. This compared with government-funded 
NGO assistance to 638 victims and 4,842 potential victims in 2019. 
In 2020, the government allocated €6.5 million ($7.98 million) 
to NGOs providing victim assistance, the same amount allocated 
in 2019. Additionally, in 2020, the autonomous communities 
and municipalities received €20 million ($24.5 million) from 
the central budget for assistance to female sex trafficking victims, 
the same as 2019. The government, through victim service offices, 
referred victims to government-funded NGOs, which provided 
free healthcare, legal assistance, shelter, social welfare benefits, 
language training, psychological services, and funds for repatriation 
to victims. However, not all regions and cities had victim service 
offices; GRETA reported victim services were available in all regions 
except Castilla La Mancha, La Rioja, and the autonomous cities of 
Ceuta and Melilla. While receiving assistance in shelters, victims 
had the freedom to come and go, and foreign victims could receive 
assistance in returning home, if they wished. The government enacted 
a pandemic contingency plan in 2020, which included alternatives 
to traditionally available accommodation and a daily subsidy; 
though civil society noted many victims were unable to access this 
new assistance due to their lack of internet access or a bank account 
and poorly coordinated accommodation services in some regions. 
Law enforcement authorities reported increasing assistance to some 
trafficking victims who had been abandoned by their traffickers 
during the pandemic, which included providing victims with basic 
necessities like water and electricity. In 2020, Murcia opened a new 
shelter for victims of trafficking and sexual exploitation, and Granada 
began offering online psychological services to sex trafficking victims, 
targeting rural communities, in response to the pandemic. There were 
specialized centers for child victims of crime, and seven NGO-run 
trafficking shelters assisted child victims. GRETA cited NGO reports 
that unaccompanied migrant children in Ceuta and Melilla were 
vulnerable to trafficking in immigration detention centers, with 
reported cases of children disappearing from these centers; however, 
migration to these regions decreased significantly in 2020. Shelters 
for male victims remained limited. 
Prosecutors were required to seek restitution from defendants during 
all criminal proceedings unless the victims expressly waived that right; 
in 2020, all but one of the 19 victims of convicted traffickers received 
significant restitution from the perpetrators. The crime victim statute 
provided victims with the right to state compensation, but authorities 
have not reported awarding any state compensation to date. Assets 
seized from convicted defendants supported a fund used to fight 
trafficking and to assist victims; however, victims rarely received these 
assets as the process remained complicated. NGOs continued to report 
inconsistent application of victim protections by judges and called for 
legal reform to better protect witnesses, including permitting video 
testimony in all cases and increasing measures to protect the identity 
of NGO expert witnesses, whose testimony could not be anonymous 
under current law. The government allowed non-EU victims to apply 
for reflection periods of 90 days, during which they could recover 
while deciding whether to assist law enforcement; the government 
reported granting this protection to three trafficking victims in 2020. 
Foreign victims could request a renewable residence permit for up 
to five years based on their cooperation with law enforcement, but 
most usually received a permit for one year, and could apply for 
permanent residency after that five-year period. The government 
reported issuing five-year residence permits to three victims, temporary 
protection assistance to 15 victims, and international protection 
to 25 victims in 2020. Despite this, civil society reported that the 
majority of victims decided not to cooperate with law enforcement. 
In both of its evaluations, GRETA expressed concern that reflection 
periods for non-EU citizens were contingent upon an application to 
the immigration police. Citizens of EU member states, however, were 
not limited to the 90-day reflection period and faced no deadline for 
claiming social services or cooperating with authorities. 
PREVENTION 
The government maintained prevention efforts. The national 
rapporteur was responsible for coordination, analysis, and assessment 
of efforts across the government and held two coordination meetings 
with representatives from the government, a formal NGO group, 
and law enforcement in 2020. Though meetings were still convened, 
pandemic-related restrictions prevented the national rapporteur from 
holding its usual quarterly meetings. The rapporteur and government 
generally included NGOs in proceedings and coordination efforts. 
Despite the large scope of work, the rapporteur’s office had a very 
limited staff. GRETA criticized the office of the rapporteur’s ability 
to evaluate government efforts due to its prominent inter-ministerial 
coordination function and asked the government to consider creating 
a fully independent evaluation body. The government continued to 
publish data on its law enforcement efforts and victims identified. 
The government’s Delegate Against Gender-based Violence continued 
to play a central role in coordinating efforts against sex trafficking, 
including meetings for the Social Forum composed of central 
and regional government officials and NGO representatives. The 
government did not have an anti-trafficking national action plan 
for the reporting period; however, the government reported drafting 
a 2021-2025 national strategy to combat gender-based violence, 
including sex trafficking, and a separate national plan for forced labor. 
In cooperation with an NGO, the civil guard continued to distribute 
an unknown number of awareness brochures about indicators 
of forced trafficking, available in nine languages, at airports and 
seaports, including the Canary Islands. The civil guard also continued 
to distribute leaflets to an unknown number of irregular migrants 
about labor trafficking. The government launched a new campaign in 
the form of an action guide for sex trafficking victims that provided 
resources and detailed victims’ rights. The Barcelona municipal 
government distributed awareness brochures with trafficking 
indicators, translated into eight languages, to service providers 
and health professionals. The Spanish police supported a hotline 
that operated 24/7 and could be used for all crimes, including for 
reporting suspected trafficking cases; in 2019, the most current year 
data was available, the hotline received 2,349 communications, 
resulting in the identification of 387 victims of trafficking and 
exploitation and the arrest of 1,039 suspects. Irregular migrants and 
asylum seekers remained vulnerable during the reporting period. 
Approximately 41,900 irregular migrants arrived in Spain in 2020, 
of which 23,000 arrived at the Canary Islands. Upon migrants’ 
arrival, the government screened for trafficking victims in temporary 
reception centers, but the centers were overcrowded and GRETA 
concluded there was no systematic victim identification protocol. 
An NGO identified 51 trafficking victims who applied for asylum, 
but the government did not report how many victims were granted 
asylum. Fraudulent labor recruitment remained a significant concern 
during the reporting period, especially in agriculture, and may have 
increased worker vulnerabilities to forced labor. The government did 
not have robust licensing or accreditation requirements for labor 
recruiters to operate, other than being subject to inspection and a 
requirement that “responsible declaration” be made. Though illegal, 
some labor recruitment companies and intermediaries probably 
charged recruitment or job placement fees to foreign workers 
which could increase vulnerability to debt bondage. Additionally, 
labor officials noted concerns regarding the practice of companies 
sub-contracting or illegally seconding their employees to other 
companies—all of which may have increased worker vulnerabilities 
to exploitation. In 2020, Spanish authorities reported conducting 
3,298 labor inspections targeting labor exploitation and 1,128 labor 
inspections targeting sexual exploitation; however, labor inspectors 
did not have the authority to identify trafficking victims. Trafficking 
victims could only be identified through joint inspections between 
labor inspectors and law enforcement officers, but the government 
did not report how many trafficking victims were identified as a result 
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of any joint inspections. The government did not report whether any 
Spanish labor recruitment agencies were investigated or prosecuted 
for labor trafficking during the reporting period. Labor inspectors 
did not have the proper authority to inspect private households, 
despite the large number of domestic and care workers in Spain. The 
government reported extending an unknown number of expiring 
work permits for migrant workers who could not return home due to 
pandemic-related travel restrictions, which allowed them to continue 
working legally. The government had at least 20 labor attaches at 
Spanish embassies abroad who reported labor trafficking cases to the 
government and increased international cooperation with Bolivia, 
Paraguay, Peru, and Moldova though anti-trafficking training and 
information exchanges. The government significantly increased efforts 
to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts through several public 
awareness campaigns against soliciting commercial sex. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
foreign victims in Spain and to a lesser extent, Spanish victims in 
Spain and abroad. Labor trafficking is under-identified in Spain. 
Authorities report the pandemic increased worker vulnerabilities 
and contributed to the rise in labor trafficking in 2020, especially in 
Catalonia. Labor traffickers exploit men and women from Eastern 
Europe, South and East Asia, particularly Pakistan, in the textile, 
agricultural, construction, industrial, beauty, cannabis, retail, and 
domestic service sectors. Traffickers from Romania, Spain, Nicaragua, 
and Honduras often exploit their own family members in labor 
trafficking. Chinese and Vietnamese mafia groups increasingly 
exploit Vietnamese victims in labor trafficking in agriculture and 
on illegal cannabis plantations. Migrant workers from Morocco are 
vulnerable to labor trafficking on fruit farms and are often misled 
and fraudulently recruited. Chinese and Nigerian mafia groups 
commonly work with a local Spanish collaborator. In 2020, the 
three-month, pandemic-related national shutdown—including 
home confinement and limited freedom of movement—coupled 
with the increased use of private residences instead of brothels or 
clubs, exacerbated vulnerabilities for sex trafficking victims. Civil 
society reported victims’ debts to their traffickers and subsequently 
the traffickers’ control over the victim, increased during the pandemic 
because victims were sometimes unable to work and earn money. 
Sex traffickers exploit women from Eastern Europe, South America, 
Central America, Vietnam, the Dominican Republic, China, and 
Nigeria. Authorities report Venezuelan and Colombian women 
now make up the largest demographic of sex trafficking victims. Sex 
traffickers exploit Venezuelan women fleeing the collapsing social 
and economic conditions at home. Spanish law neither permits 
nor prohibits prostitution, and NGOs believe the vast majority of 
individuals in commercial sex in Spain are trafficking victims. Sex 
traffickers are increasingly using online platforms to recruit, exploit 
victims, and book apartment rentals to make their illicit operations 
difficult to track; this was exacerbated by the pandemic. The rising 
numbers of newly arrived irregular migrants, including 23,000 to 
the Canary Islands in 2020, are vulnerable to trafficking. Nigerian 
criminal networks recruit victims in migrant reception centers in Italy 
for forced prostitution in Spain. Unaccompanied migrant children 
continue to be vulnerable to sex trafficking and forced begging.
SRI LANKA: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Sri Lanka does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking; however, it is making 
significant efforts to do so. These efforts included increasing 
prosecutions and investigating allegations of sexual exploitation of 
children at a state-run orphanage. The government also continued 
to work with international organizations on anti-trafficking training 
and awareness raising. However, the government did not demonstrate 
overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, 
even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its 
anti-trafficking capacity. The government did not report efforts to 
investigate some allegations of official complicity, including those 
from previous years. The government achieved fewer convictions 
and its efforts to identify Sri Lankan forced labor victims abroad 
remained inadequate. Moreover, the Sri Lankan Bureau of Foreign 
Employment (SLBFE) continued to handle some migrant labor 
complaints administratively, many of which may have had indicators 
of forced labor, instead of referring these cases to police for criminal 
investigation for potential trafficking crimes. Because the government 
has devoted sufficient resources to a written plan that, if implemented, 
would constitute significant efforts to meet the minimum standards, 
Sri Lanka was granted a waiver per the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act from an otherwise required downgrade to Tier 3. Therefore Sri 
Lanka remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the third consecutive year. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Improve efforts to vigorously investigate and prosecute suspected 
traffickers, including isolated reports of officials allegedly complicit 
in trafficking, with fair trials and convict and sentence traffickers to 
adequate penalties involving significant prison terms. • Increase 
efforts to proactively identify trafficking victims, including among 
undocumented migrant workers abroad, women in commercial sex, 
and Chinese nationals working on Chinese government-affiliated 
projects. • Ensure victims are not penalized for unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit, including through increased training 
of law enforcement and the judiciary. • Provide support to victims 
who participate in trials against their traffickers, including the cost 
of lodging and travel expenses during trials. • Use Section 360(C) 
of the penal code to prosecute child sex traffickers. • Improve victim 
services, including their quality and accessibility, and ensure shelter 
and specialized services are available for all identified victims, 
including men and victims exploited abroad. • Increase regular 
monitoring of licensed recruitment agencies and refer allegations 
of criminal violations to law enforcement. • Vigorously improve 
efforts to address child sex tourism, including proactive identification 
of victims, engagement with hotels and tourism operators, and 
investigation of establishments and intermediaries who allegedly 
facilitate the crime. • Eliminate all recruitment fees charged by labor 
recruiters to workers. • Expand the foreign employment bureau’s 
mandate to include regulation of sub-agents. • Promote safe and legal 
migration, ensure migration regulations do not discriminate based 
on gender, and increase awareness among prospective migrants of 
the steps necessary for safe migration and resources available abroad. 
• Through the anti-trafficking task force, continue to institutionalize 
sustained government coordination efforts.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. 
Section 360(C) of the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking and prescribed penalties of two to 20 years’ imprisonment 
and a fine, which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other serious 
offenses, such as rape. The government also used other sections of the 
penal code to investigate and prosecute sex trafficking crimes. Section 
360(B) criminalized offenses relating to the sexual exploitation of 
children and prescribed penalties of five to 20 years’ imprisonment and 
a fine. Additionally, Section 360(A) criminalized offenses relating to 
procurement and prescribed penalties of two to 10 years’ imprisonment, 






The Criminal Investigation Department’s (CID) anti-trafficking unit 
and police initiated 14 trafficking investigations (six sex trafficking 
and eight forced labor), compared with 10 investigations during the 
previous reporting period. The government initiated 27 prosecutions 
(16 under procurement, two under trafficking, and nine under sexual 
exploitation of children statutes), a decrease from 46 prosecutions 
(35 under the procurement statute) during the previous reporting 
period. The government secured the conviction of three traffickers 
under the procurement statute 360(A) and acquitted the defendants 
in three cases compared with the conviction of 10 traffickers (seven 
for procurement and three for trafficking) in the previous reporting 
period. Courts sentenced two traffickers to two years’ imprisonment 
and suspended one trafficker’s sentence. By issuing lenient sentences 
to convicted traffickers, courts created potential safety problems 
for trafficking victims and weakened deterrence. The government 
noted investigations stalled from mid-March to May 2020 due to 
the pandemic-related lockdown, and COVID-19 infections of key 
personnel also limited the government’s law enforcement response. 
All new investigations remained ongoing at the close of the reporting 
period. Due to the pandemic, court hearings were delayed until the 
latter part of 2020 and once resumed, the government indicated it 
encountered challenges securing the attendance of witnesses. Of the 
reported trafficking investigations initiated in the previous reporting 
period, CID referred one sex trafficking case to the attorney general’s 
department (AGD) for prosecution while the other three cases 
remained under investigation. SLBFE referred three forced labor cases 
from the previous reporting period to the AGD while two remained 
under investigation. The AGD reported 147 trafficking cases remained 
pending prosecution (112 under procurement, 29 under trafficking, 
and six under sexual exploitation of children statutes) at the close 
of the reporting period. Additionally, the National Child Protection 
Agency (NCPA) referred 82 cases of possible child sexual exploitation 
to police. The police dismissed 28 allegations with the remaining 54 
investigations ongoing at the end of the reporting period. 
Prosecutors’ reliance on victim testimony, difficulty securing evidence 
from victims, and judges’ issuance of suspended sentences contributed 
to both the government’s general reliance on procurement charges 
and the lenient sentences applied under Section 360(C). Prosecutors 
could pursue procurement cases without the cooperation of the 
victim. Due to the lack of financial support and requirement that 
victim-witnesses travel to the courts, many trafficking victims cannot 
afford to participate in the law enforcement process, including to 
provide testimony. Additionally, lengthy trials—a problem endemic 
throughout the criminal justice system, as well as stigma faced by 
victims further deters many from participating in trials. As in previous 
reporting periods, Sri Lankan diplomatic missions did not refer any 
witness and victim affidavits from abroad to CID for investigation. 
The government allocated 6.1 million Sri Lankan Rupees (LKR) 
($32,970) to the SLBFE’s anti-trafficking unit, a decrease from 8.6 
million LKR ($46,490) allocated to the unit in the previous year. 
Police continued to conduct anti-trafficking training for new recruits. 
NCPA in collaboration with an NGO and academic institution, 
developed and distributed a tri-lingual training manual for law 
enforcement officers and child protection officers on child trafficking. 
In partnership with international organizations, other government 
agencies continued to conduct anti-trafficking training; however, due 
to the pandemic, some trainings were delayed or conducted virtually.
Concerns about official complicity remained and the government 
did not make sufficient efforts to investigate all allegations or report 
any prosecutions or convictions of allegedly complicit officials. The 
government investigated allegations of sexual exploitation of children 
at orphanages, but some allegations of child sexual abuse, possibly 
involving child sex trafficking, persisted. Officials report that the 
police arrested the head of an orphanage, one of its staff members, 
and the probation commissioner with oversight of the orphanage. 
According to officials, no elements of sex trafficking were found during 
the investigation. The government did not report efforts to investigate 
past allegations, reported in international organization reports, that 
some male and female Sri Lankan trafficking victims who fled abusive 
employers overseas and sought refuge at Sri Lankan embassies reported 
certain Sri Lankan consular officers sent female trafficking victims 
back to their exploitative employers and “sold” other women back 
to their exploitative employment agencies or new employers for 
financial gain. The same organization noted that embassy staff are 
able to facilitate new contracts for workers overseas upon consent of 
the worker and new employer, provided there are no other restrictions, 
which further contributes to perceptions of complicity between 
employers and embassies—especially when workers are victimized 
or otherwise dissatisfied with the new workplace. According to a 
July 2019 international organization report, some migrant workers 
bribed officials to obtain fraudulent “family background reports” 
and pre-departure training certificates required for legal migration. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained victim identification and protection 
efforts. The government identified more trafficking victims overall 
than the previous reporting period but did not identify any trafficking 
victims among Sri Lankan migrant workers exploited abroad and 
lacked adequate protection for Sri Lankan trafficking victims abroad. 
Twenty victims were identified by the government out of 56 potential 
trafficking victims screened during the reporting period, an increase 
from 13 potential trafficking victims identified during the previous 
reporting period. The 20 victims identified by authorities were Sri 
Lankan females exploited for forced labor. The government had 
standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the identification and 
referral of potential victims to services but did not implement them 
uniformly; both government representatives and members of civil 
society stated the capacity of local officials to identify trafficking 
victims remained low, especially among women in commercial sex. 
Officials and NGOs failed on occasion to identify forced labor and sex 
trafficking that did not involve transnational movement, especially of 
children, and categorized those cases as other crimes. The government 
began to use physical interviews that included trafficking indicators 
to identify potential foreign victims among migrants intending to 
extend their visas. The government also reported screening eighteen 
female foreign nationals for indicators of trafficking after their arrests 
for possible visa violations, six of the foreign nationals were identified 
as potential trafficking victims and referred to the CID.
The State Ministry of Women and Child Development closed its 
trafficking-specific shelter for female victims due to lack of usage in 
the previous reporting period. The government set aside space for 
female trafficking victims in a government-funded domestic violence 
shelter, but a magistrate’s order is required to use the shelter, which 
trafficking victims who did not seek court assistance could not obtain. 
No government shelter could accommodate adult male victims, 
although the government stated it could provide shelter if male 
victims sought it. The government provided 21 Nepali victims shelter 
to facilitate their testimony at trial; the government reported none of 
the Sri Lankan victims requested shelter. The government partnered 
with international organizations to provide medical, psycho-social, 
legal, and some reintegration support to identified victims regardless 
of their decision to cooperate with law enforcement. Observers 
reported reintegration assistance remained inadequate to support 
victims. Officials and NGOs reported in 2019 that due to a lack of 
oversight shelter workers and older residents in some government- 
and privately-run homes sexually exploited child residents, possibly 
including trafficking victims. 
Civil society noted that, at the local level, a lack of capacity and 
sensitization among police, immigration officials, and judges was an 
impediment to proper screening for trafficking victims. Additionally, 
lack of awareness and misunderstanding led some local authorities 
to believe sex trafficking victims were engaged in illegal conduct 
rather than consider them victims and may have resulted in officials 
arresting or detaining sex trafficking victims without proper screening. 
When properly identified, the government did not penalize trafficking 
victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit. Law 
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enforcement reported many victims were reluctant to pursue cases 
against their alleged traffickers due to the social stigma attached with 
trafficking, and many victims could not afford the travel required to 
assist in prosecution of their traffickers. While Sri Lankan law has 
established a victim and witness compensation fund to assist in 
these circumstances, the government did not provide any funding 
to trafficking victims or witnesses during the reporting period. When 
authorities officially identified foreign victims of trafficking, the 
victims had equal access to rehabilitation services. Foreign victims 
who cooperated in prosecutions could receive a visa extension until 
the end of the trial; however, Sri Lankan law did not provide foreign 
victims with legal alternatives to deportation to countries where they 
might face hardship or retribution after trial completion or for victims 
who did not cooperate in the prosecution of traffickers. 
SLBFE operated 15 short-term shelters at Sri Lankan diplomatic 
missions in 14 countries for female migrant workers in distress; 
however, the government reduced the number of labor attachés serving 
in Sri Lankan embassies and at the SLBFE, due to budget shortfalls 
related to the pandemic response, reducing human and financial 
resources previously available for assistance and protection of migrant 
workers abroad. During the reporting period, the shelters served 892 
migrant workers. NGOs continued to identify Sri Lankan female labor 
trafficking victims returning from Gulf countries. According to an 
international organization, when carrying out screening and despite 
their training, some labor attachés often did not know what questions 
to ask migrant workers, what evidence to look for, or whom to contact 
in other agencies to refer potential cases. Sri Lankan diplomatic 
missions continued to provide funding and logistical support to 
international organizations that repatriated Sri Lankan migrant workers 
exploited abroad. Due to the pandemic, the government facilitated 
repatriation of more than 90,000 workers in 2020. According to the 
government, it did not identify any trafficking victims among those 
who were repatriated. Migrant workers who had gone abroad illegally 
or who possessed expired work permits are not always screened for 
indicators of trafficking raising concerns that some officials might be 
conflating human trafficking with migrant smuggling. Embassy shelters 
could only accommodate females, so it was unclear where exploited 
male migrant workers stayed before repatriation. Some migrant workers 
at the shelters reported poor conditions, including inadequate food, 
unsanitary living conditions, and insufficient legal assistance. Only 
Sri Lankan workers who had registered with SLBFE prior to departure 
could access legal assistance from Sri Lankan embassies, including 
assistance securing back wages from employers. However, due to the 
pandemic, SLBFE made resources from the Worker’s Welfare Fund, 
including legal services, medical care, accommodation, and food, 
available to migrant workers regardless of their registration status. 
Although SLBFE maintained district-level offices, it usually required 
repatriated migrant workers to visit the main office in Colombo 
to launch an investigation into recruitment and labor violations, 
including trafficking, which many of the indebted and daily wage 
workers could not afford. As a result, trafficking victims continued to 
withdraw complaints or not come forward. Some officials at SLBFE 
reported in 2019 that, contrary to the SOPs, they only referred potential 
trafficking victims to services after initiating a police investigation. 
SLBFE continued to operate a transit shelter near the Colombo airport, 
primarily for returned migrant workers who suffered abuse abroad. 
During the reporting period, SLBFE reported assisting 33 migrants 
at the shelter and it did not report identifying trafficking victims 
among those assisted. As in previous years, the lack of government 
identification of trafficking victims contrasted with the complaints 
from workers abroad. In 2018, the most recent year for which such 
data was available, 3,809 Sri Lankan migrant workers in more than 
19 countries reported labor-related complaints to SLBFE, including 
indicators of trafficking. The vast majority of complainants were 
females in domestic work in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, and the 
United Arab Emirates; male migrant workers in Saudi Arabia also 
reported many labor violations. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained minimal prevention efforts. The National 
Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force (NAHTTF) continued to meet, 
despite obstacles related to the pandemic lockdown, and finalized 
a new anti-trafficking NAP. NAHTTF drafted the 2021-2025 NAP 
with input from NGOs, international organizations, academics, 
and other relevant experts and in February 2021, the government 
adopted it, designating each task force member the lead on specific 
activities. Observers assessed that despite the efforts of the Ministry 
of Justice, the lead of the NAHTTF, insufficient coordination among 
NAHTTF members, and between the NAHTTF and civil society 
stakeholders, remained. The government, in coordination with an 
international organization, developed radio and TV campaigns to 
raise awareness of trafficking; distributed leaflets; and held forums 
with local officials, NGOs, and the public. The campaigns targeted 
potential victims, prospective migrant workers, and first responders, 
as well as the general public. In addition, SLBFE conducted awareness 
raising programs for prospective migrant workers within Sri Lanka 
and at some of its embassies abroad, particularly in the Middle East. 
In January 2021, the government amended the Employment 
of Women, Young Persons and Children Act No. 47 of 1956 to 
increase the minimum age of employment from 14 to 16 years 
old. Additionally, the law specified that a person between the ages 
of 16 and 18 may be employed but subject to conditions, including 
a prohibition from working in jobs defined as hazardous. The 
Department of Labor (DOL) also launched an official YouTube 
channel to raise awareness of the labor law and added five short videos 
on the hazardous forms of child labor. Labor inspectors identified 
and referred for prosecution six child labor violations in 2020. Labor 
inspectors only had the authority to inspect private residences for 
violations against child domestic workers if a complaint was received. 
Additionally, pandemic-related movement restrictions adversely 
impacted the ability of DOL to conduct inspections and collect 
evidence regarding complaints and led to a temporary suspension 
of routine inspections, although child labor inspections continued. 
Overall, in 2020, DOL conducted 44,439 labor inspections, including 
a special investigation into the fisheries industry which concluded 
there was not widespread child labor. 
SLBFE maintained its ban on migration of male and female domestic 
workers younger than 21, female domestic workers younger than 25 
to Saudi Arabia, and female domestic workers younger than 23 to 
other parts of the Middle East. SLBFE also required all female migrant 
workers younger than 45 to submit a “family background report” to 
ensure the woman did not have children younger than age five and 
that she had obtained either her husband or a guardian’s consent 
to work abroad; authorities did not require spousal or guardian 
consent for male migrant workers. Observers reported any ban on 
migration increased the likelihood of migrating illegally and therefore 
heightened vulnerability to human trafficking. Beginning in October 
2020, agencies and individual sponsors were also required to obtain 
a “No Objection Certificate” (NOC) from the Sri Lankan Embassy for 
any female domestic worker migrating to Oman; this also required the 
worker to register with SLBFE. According to the new procedure, the 
Oman Police will only issue employment visas to Sri Lankan female 
domestic workers who submit both the NOC and an employment 
contract. To mitigate the risk of increased exploitation of domestic 
female migrant workers, the SLBFE issued a circular on December 
30, 2020, instructing all licensed foreign employment agencies to 
submit a semi-annual report, starting February 1, 2021, that confirms 
the whereabouts of female domestic migrant workers until those 
workers return to Sri Lanka. The government did not make efforts to 
eliminate the legal fees that SLBFE and recruitment agencies charged 
to migrant workers, which increased workers’ vulnerability to labor 
traffickers. SLBFE required each migrant worker to pay a registration 
fee equivalent to more than one month’s salary that required renewal 
every two years. Additionally, an international report published in 
2019 noted some workers reported recruitment agencies charged an 






SLBFE’s lack of monitoring enabled agencies to charge fees in excess 
of the legal amounts; some workers paid as much as 1 million LKR 
($5,410) for the entire recruitment process, including fees charged 
by illegal sub-agents. SLBFE’s unit at the main international airport 
in Colombo detected migrant workers who attempt to leave the 
country for employment abroad without proper registration. During 
the reporting period, the unit detected 12 individuals who attempted 
to go abroad for employment using tourist visas and 75 who did 
not have the proper documents for SLBFE registration. According 
to observers, during the pandemic, the government further limited 
outward migration and only permitted migration to a few countries 
involving a few licensed agents. For those Sri Lankan migrant workers 
overseas, the government negotiated with immigration authorities 
to waive penalties and other violations of immigration laws caused 
by the pandemic, facilitated free legal service, and secured general 
amnesty for migrant workers out of immigration status.
During the reporting period, SLBFE created an online system for 
registering and responding to complaints. Civil society and exploited 
migrant workers abroad continued to report cases of exploitative 
labor to SLBFE, including non-payment of wages, contract fraud, and 
document retention. SLBFE officers in the conciliation division do 
not always recognize elements of trafficking and may handle cases 
administratively, rather than referring the case to police. During the 
reporting period, SLBFE raided 30 recruitment agencies and filed 
cases against all 30 for illegal practices. This was a decrease from 
252 raids in the previous reporting period, as SLBFE suspended 
three foreign recruitment agencies for illegal practices, compared to 
suspending 62 agencies the previous reporting period. SLBFE did 
not have the legal authority to regulate sub-agents, which officials 
recognized contributed to trafficking. The government continued 
to draft an amendment to the Foreign Employment Act to address 
the oversight of sub-agents and the investigative authority of MFE 
officials, including SLBFE. 
The government did not report efforts to reduce the demand for 
commercial sex. NCPA continued awareness campaigns targeted to 
parents and children on child abuse, including child sex tourism 
in Sri Lanka’s Coastal Belt. The government did not report efforts 
to reduce the demand for child sex tourism. Due to the pandemic 
foreign tourism largely came to halt in 2020. The NCPA continued to 
run a hotline to report child abuse. The hotline received 61 reports of 
child trafficking during the reporting period; it did not identify any 
victims or potential trafficking cases from these allegations, as the 
complaints are still under investigation. The government provided 
anti-trafficking training to its troops prior to their deployment as 
peacekeepers.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Sri Lanka, and traffickers exploit victims 
from Sri Lanka abroad. The majority of Sri Lankan trafficking cases 
involve traffickers forcing Sri Lankan migrant workers into labor 
overseas. Traffickers exploit Sri Lankan men, women, and children 
in forced labor in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and the United 
States in the construction, garment, and domestic service sectors. 
Approximately 1.5 million Sri Lankans work in the Middle East, 
predominately in construction and domestic work, as well as in 
professional services. The majority of Sri Lankan female migrant 
workers seek employment in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Japan, 
and South Korea, and authorities have identified labor trafficking 
victims among these workers. Over the past five years, thousands of 
Sri Lankan female migrant workers—especially from Nuwara Eliya, 
Ampara, and Batticaloa—reported employers exploited them in 
forced labor in domestic work in the Gulf. Before leaving Sri Lanka, 
many migrant workers accumulate debt to pay high recruitment fees 
imposed by unscrupulous labor recruitment agencies—most of them 
members of Sri Lanka’s association of licensed foreign employment 
agencies—and their unlicensed sub-agents. For labor trafficking 
in domestic work, some traffickers target Sri Lankan women with 
existing debts and use promises of a large advance to defraud them 
into accepting the positions. Some Sri Lankan migrant workers in the 
Gulf report employers retained their identity documents, including 
passports and work permits, which restricts freedom of movement 
and is a common means of coercion for labor and sex trafficking. 
Some recruitment agencies commit fraud by changing the agreed upon 
job, employer, conditions, or salary after the worker’s arrival. Some 
recruitment agencies lure workers with promises of work abroad but 
send them with fraudulent or incorrect documents—including tourist 
visas instead of work visas—so victims are subject to penalization, 
including jail time and deportation, if they seek assistance abroad. An 
international organization reported in 2019 that sub-agents colluded 
with officials to procure fake or falsified travel documents to facilitate 
travel of Sri Lankans abroad. According to 2018 media reporting, 
at least six government-licensed recruitment agencies in Sri Lanka 
admitted that, if prospective Middle Eastern employers request, they 
force female migrant workers to take contraceptives before departure 
to provide a “three-month guarantee” maids will not become pregnant 
after arrival. Per the same 2018 reporting, sources alleged this was 
also used to cover up sexual exploitation by recruitment agents 
and employers, including sex trafficking. Traffickers have forced Sri 
Lankan women into commercial sex in South and Southeast Asian 
countries, among other countries. During the reporting period, 
traffickers increased their use of social media to reach out to workers 
and vulnerable communities due to pandemic-related restrictions 
in mobility. Sri Lanka is a transit point for Nepali women subjected 
to forced labor in the Middle East. Media estimates roughly 7,500 
Chinese workers are in Sri Lanka, mainly employed on projects run 
by Chinese state-owned enterprises and may be vulnerable to forced 
labor by the Chinese government; allegations of illegal migrant labor 
from China suggest the number may be higher.
Within Sri Lanka, traffickers exploit men, women, and children 
in forced labor and sex trafficking. Traffickers recruit women from 
rural areas with promises of urban jobs in the hospitality sector, 
salons, spas, and domestic work but exploit some in forced labor or 
commercial sex. Due to the pandemic, observers report increasingly 
unethical labor recruitment practices within the local labor market, 
especially targeting women, as illegal sub-agent recruiters shift their 
focus from overseas jobs. Additionally, observers stated they believe 
more young women and girls were engaged in commercial sex due 
to pandemic-related economic hardships. Traffickers reportedly 
exploit boys and girls in commercial sex, including in coastal areas 
for child sex tourism, including in hotels, on beaches, and during 
annual festivals, though tourism volumes fell substantially in 2020 
during the pandemic. Reports allege some hotels allow clients 
to book “services” with children for child sex tourism, and some 
hotels use intermediaries to provide their guests with males and 
females—including children—for commercial sex. In addition 
to foreign tourists—including from Germany, Russia, India, and 
China—researchers report significant local demand for underage 
commercial sex. In recent years, traffickers have subjected women from 
other Asian countries to sex trafficking in Sri Lanka, though foreign 
arrivals in Sri Lanka were suspended as of March 2020 due to the 
pandemic. Traffickers may have exploited migrant workers brought 
to Sri Lanka on tourist visas and foreign women in commercial sex 
in Sri Lanka. Some observers have long reported that some local 
government and security sector officials forced women who asked for 
information about their missing husbands, or widows who attempted 
to claim government benefits from their deceased husbands’ military 
service, to perform commercial sex acts in exchange for information 
and/or government benefits. Officials and NGOs reported some 
workers and residents in government and private shelters that care 
for trafficking victims sexually abused and exploited some of the 
institutionalized children. Officials reported incidents of children 
being used for drug trafficking in previous years. Some child and 
women domestic workers in Colombo are subjected to physical, 
sexual, and mental abuse, non-payment of wages, and restrictions of 
movement—indicators of labor trafficking. Labor traffickers exploit 
children in small boutiques and informal markets. The government 
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does not grant asylum or refugee status, nor does it allow refugees 
or asylum-seekers to work or attend school, although it did allow 
international organizations to provide some services.
SUDAN: TIER 2 
The Government of Sudan does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Sudan was upgraded to Tier 2. Security forces ceased forcibly 
recruiting and using child soldiers; the government drafted and 
passed amendments to the 2014 anti-trafficking law that criminalized 
sex trafficking as well as labor trafficking; and officials investigated 
more potential cases and convicted more traffickers. Additionally, 
the country’s National Committee to Combat Human Trafficking 
(NCCHT) expanded awareness raising activities and coordinated 
with an international organization to enhance journalists’ ability to 
report on human trafficking cases, actions which began to improve 
the country’s limited understanding of the crime. However, the 
government did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. 
Lenient sentencing, resulting in all traffickers receiving inadequate 
terms of imprisonment or fines, undercut efforts to hold traffickers 
accountable and weakened deterrence. For the second consecutive 
year, there were allegations officials may have sexually exploited 
refugees in government run camps. Further, officials identified fewer 
trafficking victims and did not report providing care to any victims. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Increase efforts to investigate and prosecute traffickers as well as 
complicit officials, including distinguishing those allegedly responsible 
for labor and sex trafficking as distinct from migrant smuggling or 
kidnapping crimes. • While respecting fair trial guarantees, sentence 
convicted traffickers to adequate penalties according to the country’s 
anti-trafficking law. • Provide sufficient human and material resources 
to the NCCHT, and open satellite offices in the following states with 
a high prevalence of human trafficking: North Kordofan, South 
Kordofan, West Kordofan, Gedaref, and Kassala. • Increase training 
for security and judicial officials on distinguishing trafficking from 
other crimes such as migrant smuggling and kidnapping for ransom, 
and ensure recipients use this guidance to train other officials. • 
Coordinate with civil society and international organizations to 
disseminate existing standard operating procedures (SOPs) for 
authorities and first responders to identify adult sex and labor 
trafficking victims. • Ensure authorities do not penalize trafficking 
victims for crimes committed as a direct result of unlawful acts 
traffickers compelled them to commit, such as women coerced into 
commercial sex acts. • The Civilian Led Transitional Government 
(CLTG) proactively ensures Sudan’s armed forces do not recruit or 
use child soldiers and increases efforts to investigate and prosecute 
officials who have been complicit in child soldier recruitment and 
use. • Implement and dedicate adequate resources to the 2020-
2022 national anti-trafficking action plan. • CLTG works with 
civil society, international organizations, and the private sector to 
establish additional shelter options for victims. • Develop a data 
collection and information management system in collaboration 
with international organizations to more effectively organize law 
enforcement data. • Draft and finalize a standalone smuggling law 
to enhance judicial officials’ ability to prosecute migrant smuggling 
crimes separate from human trafficking crimes.
PROSECUTION
The government increased its overall law enforcement efforts; the 
CLTG strengthened its anti-trafficking legal framework and convicted 
more potential traffickers, but insufficiently stringent sentencing 
hindered accountability for perpetrators. Observers reported the 
government closed the country’s courts from March to August 2020 
to slow the pandemic’s spread, resulting in severely decreased judicial 
activity; courts operated at diminished capacity from August to the 
end of the rating period. Sudanese law criminalized sex trafficking and 
labor trafficking. For the majority of the reporting period, the 2014 
anti-trafficking law criminalized some forms of sex trafficking and 
some forms of labor trafficking but failed to define what constituted 
exploitation. Additionally, inconsistent with international law, 
Sudan’s anti-trafficking legal framework required a demonstration of 
force, fraud, or coercion to constitute a child sex trafficking offense 
and therefore did not criminalize all forms of child sex trafficking. 
However, in February 2021, the government amended the law to 
define exploitation and remove the requirement of a demonstration 
of force, fraud, or coercion in child trafficking crimes, thereby 
aligning the law with the international definition of trafficking. 
The law prescribed between three and 10 years’ imprisonment for 
base offenses involving adult male victims and between five and 
20 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving adult female and 
child victims or involving additional aggravating circumstances; 
these penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex 
trafficking, commensurate with the penalties prescribed for other 
serious crimes, such as rape. Article 14 of the Sudan Armed Forces 
Act of 2007 criminalized recruiting children younger than 18 years 
old by members of the armed forces, enslaving civilians, or coercing 
civilians into prostitution, and prescribed penalties between three 
years’ imprisonment and death.
The NCCHT reported authorities investigated 118 suspects and 
prosecuted 36 cases involving 80 suspected traffickers from April 
2020 to January 2021. Ministry of Justice officials reported courts 
convicted eight traffickers; although authorities stated all eight cases 
involved exploitation, they may have included migrant smuggling 
crimes as well. Courts sentenced one perpetrator to six months’ 
imprisonment as well as a fine of 100,000 Sudanese pounds ($1,820) 
and sanctioned the other seven perpetrators with fines only. The 
government’s insufficient sentencing weakened deterrence and 
were not in line with sanctions required by the country’s anti-
trafficking law. Separately, police coordinated with an international 
law enforcement organization in March 2021 to arrest more than 
20 suspected traffickers who were exploiting children in a plastics 
factory and transporting potential victims illicitly to the Middle East. 
In 2019, the government reported investigating and prosecuting 97 
suspected traffickers and convicting five perpetrators; in 2018, the 
government reported investigating 150 trafficking cases, prosecuting 
30 of those cases, and convicting 45 traffickers. 
The government reported providing training to military advisors, 
lawyers, and judges on trafficking principles; however, authorities 
continued to conflate human trafficking, migrant smuggling, and 
kidnapping for ransom, which impeded accurate assessment of 
Sudan’s anti-trafficking law enforcement data. Experts noted the 
lack of a standalone smuggling law impeded judicial officials’ efforts 
to prosecute migrant smugglers separate from human traffickers. 
Additionally, law enforcement officers stated potential foreign victims 
declining to cooperate with investigators impeded prosecutions of 
transnational cases during the rating period.
Authorities reported investigating allegations of sexual exploitation 
and abuse—which may have included aspects of sex trafficking to 
include transactional sex—by officials from the Commission of 





the results of an investigation into allegations made in 2020 by the 
close of the rating period. Experts noted in past years some law 
enforcement and border officers were complicit in or otherwise 
profited from trafficking crimes specifically related to exploiting 
migrants along Sudan’s borders. The government did not report 
efforts to investigate complicit officials in 2019. 
PROTECTION
The government decreased efforts to identify and protect victims. 
The NCCHT reported Ministry of Interior officials identified 494 
potential victims through law enforcement operations in 2020 (280 
in Khartoum, 125 in Gedaref, 68 in Kassala, 14 in Nile River, and 
seven in North), compared with identifying approximately 1,200 
potential victims in 2019; however, due to a dearth of training and 
the resulting conflation between migrant smuggling and human 
trafficking, some of the potential victims officers identified may 
have been individuals who purchased the services of smugglers 
to cross international borders illegally and were not exploited in 
forced labor or sex trafficking. Officials stated they referred some 
victims to shelters in coordination with NGOs and international 
organizations. The National Council for Child Welfare did not report 
providing services to victims in 2020, compared with collaborating 
with donors, international organizations, and civil society to provide 
shelter and medical services to 84 potential child trafficking victims 
in 2019. The lack of shelters adversely affected the country’s ability 
to protect victims once identified. 
For the second consecutive year, officials did not report disseminating 
or implementing child trafficking victim identification SOPs developed 
in 2018 in partnership with an international organization. The 
government’s past denial of sex trafficking occurring within Sudan, 
coupled with authorities’ inconsistent screening of vulnerable 
populations, likely resulted in the arrests and detention of women 
whom traffickers forced into commercial sex. Sudan’s Domestic 
Workers Act of 2008 provided a legal framework for employing and 
registering domestic workers with limited labor rights and protections; 
however, the government did not report registering or protecting 
any domestic workers under the law during the reporting period.
Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) officials continued to staff the Child 
Rights Unit (CRU) (established in 2019), which led the government’s 
child protection efforts in conflict areas. The CRU reported providing 
training focused on the rights of the child in conflict—including 
sensitization on the illegality of child soldier recruitment and use—
to 2,000 officials from April 2020 to January 2021; in the previous 
rating period, CRU officials implemented 71 training activities and 
reached more than 5,000 personnel. Additionally, the government 
inspected Rapid Support Forces (RSF) units in November 2020 to 
ensure there were no cases of child soldier recruitment or use; there 
were no reports SAF or RSF units recruited or used child soldiers during 
the rating period. In December 2020, 25 SAF officers coordinated 
with an international organization and NGO to hold a workshop 
to update the military’s training manual on child rights, including 
child soldier prevention and referral; Ministry of Defense officials 
did not report finalizing the manual. The Sudanese Joint Chiefs of 
Staff continued to issue and disseminate command orders every 
three months during the reporting period directing military officials 
to follow the government’s ban against using individuals younger 
than 18 years of age in support or combat roles. 
PREVENTION
The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking. The NCCHT 
formally extended the government’s 2020-2022 national action plan 
into 2023, with a focus on prevention, protection, and prosecution. 
The NCCHT convened at least three times from November 2020 
to March 2021 despite the government limiting operations for the 
entirety of the reporting period; the committee met approximately 
three times over the course of 2019. Observers noted a lack of human 
and material resources—as well as a limited presence outside of 
the capital—hindered the NCCHT’s ability to execute its mandate. 
In October 2020, the NCCHT signed a memorandum of understanding 
with a partner government to develop the committee’s institutional 
capacity as well as its reporting and national legislative capabilities; 
in February 2021, the government formally adopted amendments 
to its 2014 anti-trafficking law. Following meeting restrictions and 
office closures ordered by the country’s Supreme Committee for 
Health Emergencies from March 2020 to June 2020 to mitigate the 
pandemic’s spread, government offices operated with half staffing 
up to the rating period’s conclusion.
In 2020, the government supported an awareness raising initiative 
using 84 radio programs to sensitize community members in the 
eastern city of Kassala on the risks of human trafficking and irregular 
migration. Additionally, officials partnered with an international 
organization in December 2020 to hold workshops for 16 journalists 
to enhance their ability to report on human trafficking issues; the 
trainings were held in Khartoum, North Darfur, Gedaref, Blue Nile, 
North, South, South Kordofan, and Red Sea states. In 2019, officials 
held a workshop to raise awareness of exploitation in domestic work. 
Authorities did not report whether the Kassala state government 
finalized its state-level action plan, drafted in 2018 and intended to 
mirror the national action plan. Ministry of Labor inspectors were 
responsible for providing oversight of recruitment agencies, but 
they did not report investigating or sanctioning fraudulent recruiters 
during the reporting period. The government did not report providing 
anti-trafficking training for its diplomatic personnel. Officials did 
not report efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Sudan, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Sudan. Traffickers exploit homeless children in Khartoum—including 
Sudanese and unaccompanied migrant children from West and 
Central Africa—in sex trafficking and in forced labor for begging, 
public transportation, large markets. Business owners, informal 
mining operators, community members, and farmers exploit children 
working in brick-making factories, gold mining, collecting medical 
waste, street vending, and agriculture; the aforementioned traffickers 
expose the children to threats, physical and sexual abuse, as well as 
to hazardous working conditions with limited access to education 
or health services. Criminal groups exploit Sudanese women and 
girls – particularly internally displaced persons (IDPs) or those from 
rural areas – in domestic work and in sex trafficking. 
Due to regional instability and conflict, there are more than 2.5 
million IDPs and 1 million refugees in Sudan—populations with 
increased susceptibility to forced labor or sex trafficking. For the 
second consecutive year, observers reported concerns that government 
officials from the Commission of Refugees and General Intelligence 
Service were potentially sexually exploiting refugees—including newly 
arrived Ethiopians—in Sudan. Additionally, due to the government’s 
refugee encampment policy which restricts refugees from moving 
freely within the country, some refugees utilized migrant smugglers 
inside Sudan which further increased their risk of exploitation. 
Additionally, reports alleged corrupt RSF officials financially benefited 
from their role as border guards and took a direct role in human 
trafficking. The non-governmental armed groups Justice Equality 
Movement and Sudan Liberation Movement/Transitional Council 
recruited and used child soldiers in Darfur during the reporting period. 
Large populations of Eritrean, Ethiopian, and other African asylum 
seekers, as well as Syrians—populations vulnerable to trafficking due 
to their economic fragility and lack of access to justice—resided in 
Khartoum while planning to travel to Europe. Sudanese traffickers 
compel Ethiopian women to work in private homes in Khartoum 
and other urban centers. Well-organized and cross-border criminal 
syndicates force some Ethiopian women into commercial sex in 
Khartoum by manipulating debts and other forms of coercion. 
Attempting to escape conflict and poverty, many East African victims 
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of trafficking initially seek out the services of migrant smugglers, who 
coerce the migrants into forced labor or sex trafficking. 
Due to the years of conflict in South Sudan, the South Sudanese 
refugee population in Sudan was more than 700,000 in 2020; 
many of these refugees remain vulnerable to forced labor and 
sex trafficking in Sudan. In 2018, an international organization 
documented cases of traffickers exploiting West and Central African 
nationals—primarily from Chad, Mali, and Niger—arriving in Sudan 
via irregular migratory routes. 
Darfuri armed groups exploit some migrants in forced labor or sex 
trafficking. Smugglers linked to the Rashaida and Tabo tribes abduct 
Eritrean nationals at border crossings, extort them for ransom, and 
subject them to abuse, including trafficking. Other cross-border 
tribes also force abductees to perform domestic or manual labor, 
and abuse them in other ways, including exploiting them in forced 
labor or sex trafficking.
SURINAME: TIER 2
The Government of Suriname does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Suriname remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
adopting a formal victim referral process, renovating a dedicated 
shelter for trafficking victims, finalizing a new annual national 
action plan (NAP), and increasing screening for trafficking indicators 
during labor inspections. However, the government did not meet 
the minimum standards in several key areas. Authorities investigated 
fewer cases, initiated no prosecutions for the third year in a row, did 
not convict any traffickers, and did not consistently screen vulnerable 
individuals for trafficking indicators.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Train and support all officials in contact with vulnerable individuals 
to implement the victim identification and referral protocol to identify 
trafficking victims, especially among temporary workers from Cuba 
and among children and migrants from Cuba, Haiti, Venezuela, and 
other countries. • Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, convict, 
and sentence traffickers, including officials complicit in sex or labor 
trafficking. • Provide vulnerable individuals with trauma-informed 
assistance, reintegration support, and interpretation in their language 
prior to, during, and after screening for trafficking. • Train judges 
at all levels of the judiciary in human trafficking and the trafficking 
law and sensitize judges and prosecutors to the issue of secondary 
trauma. • Prosecute child sex and labor trafficking cases under the 
trafficking statute and provide specialized child protection services 
with trained providers. • Conduct trauma-informed training for 
police and labor inspectors and hire enough staff to conduct targeted 
inspections in urban, remote interior, and off-coast fishing locations 
where trafficking is most likely to occur. • Provide additional resources 
to the Police Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Unit. • Build the capacity 
of and collaborate with NGOs to increase outreach to potential 
trafficking victims among vulnerable groups. • Develop and execute 
a robust monitoring and evaluation framework for anti-trafficking 
policies and efforts and publish the results.
PROSECUTION 
The government maintained prosecution efforts. Article 334 of the 
criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and 
prescribed penalties of up to nine years’ imprisonment and a fine of 
100,000 Surinamese dollars (SRD) ($7,000) for offenses involving 
a victim 16 years of age or older, and up to 12 years’ imprisonment 
and a fine of 100,000 SRD ($7,000) for those involving a victim 
under the age of 16. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, 
with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as rape. 
Police reported initiating six investigations (four for sex trafficking 
and two for labor trafficking), compared with eight investigations 
in 2019, three in 2018, and 10 in 2017. Police referred one sex 
trafficking case involving a Surinamese victim for prosecution but 
later dropped the case due to insufficient evidence; the victim also 
chose not to cooperate with the prosecution. Following investigations, 
authorities referred two trafficking investigations for prosecution as 
other crimes. Police continued to investigate another sex trafficking 
case at the end of the reporting period. Police investigated a fishing 
company for forced labor and a hotel for labor trafficking; no labor 
trafficking was identified in either case. 
The prosecutor’s office did not initiate any new trafficking prosecutions 
during the reporting period and has not initiated any prosecutions 
since 2017. The government did not report any convictions for human 
trafficking in 2020, compared with 18 in 2019, seven in 2018, and 
three in 2017. The government did not report the status of four 
pending prosecutions involving 12 suspected traffickers initiated in 
previous years. The government did not report any new investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit in 
trafficking offenses. The president noted in a speech in March 2021 
in the National Assembly that the government would punish civil 
servants who were complicit in human trafficking, specifically those 
caught selling residency permits to organizations guilty of human 
trafficking, as well as those assisting these organizations when people 
enter the country. He further called on police and justice officials 
to intensify trafficking investigations and prosecutions generally.
The 13-person Police TIP Unit was the sole agency responsible 
for the investigation of sex trafficking, forced labor, and migrant 
smuggling cases throughout the country. The Police Youth Affairs 
Department also investigated any case involving persons younger 
than 18; the government reported the two units collaborated closely. 
During the reporting period, the Police TIP Unit determined one 
case initially investigated as trafficking was in fact a case of sexual 
abuse and referred it to the Police Youth Affairs Department. The 
TIP Unit referred trafficking investigations to prosecutors trained in 
human trafficking. The prosecutor’s office had no prosecutors working 
solely on trafficking cases, and there were no courts specifically 
dedicated to human trafficking. The anti-trafficking funding for these 
bodies was part of their overall budgets. The TIP Unit consistently 
lacked sufficient funding, staffing, and other resources—including 
transport—to adequately investigate human trafficking cases. There 
were no operations in the interior of the country during the reporting 
period, although the permanently-manned checkpoints strategically 
located across the country on roads leading to the interior—set up 
in prior reporting periods as an alternative to expensive one-off 
raids—continued to function. Authorities were considering additional 
checkpoints at the end of the reporting period.
The pandemic significantly impacted the government’s efforts to 
coordinate, execute, and monitor its anti-trafficking law enforcement 
efforts. Illegal movement across the eastern, western, and southern 
borders continued, despite pandemic-related border closures. The 
TIP Unit adapted operations to health protocols but could not 
monitor establishments that closed as a result of the pandemic. The 
TIP Unit faced staffing shortages as some of its staff tested positive 







pandemic-related shutdown and continued to have a large backlog 
of cases, including trafficking cases—a situation exacerbated by the 
pandemic. The Ministry of Justice and Police, in cooperation with 
an international organization, initiated a project to provide technical 
assistance, including on human trafficking. 
PROTECTION 
The government maintained protection efforts. The government 
identified one victim during the reporting period, compared with 
identifying three victims in 2019. The government reported the victim 
declined government assistance. The Trafficking in Persons Working 
Group approved and partially implemented the First Response to the 
Victim of Trafficking in Persons Protocol, which outlines procedures 
for interacting with potential trafficking victims. The Police TIP Unit 
used the protocol during the reporting period, but the pandemic 
hampered its implementation and use by other care providers and 
first responders. Experts reported the government did not effectively 
identify victims among children, migrants in the interior, and in 
brothels emerging in private homes. In March 2020, authorities 
signed a special agreement with Cuba to allow 120 Cuban medical 
workers to help combat the pandemic; 51 Cubans came to the country 
during the reporting period, joining approximately 50 already in the 
country. Reports indicated the Cuban medical workers may have 
been exploited in forced labor; the government reported it did not 
screen the workers for trafficking indicators. The government reported 
partnering with an international organization to screen close to 500 
migrants, predominantly Cubans, at the closed border with Guyana; 
authorities did not identify any trafficking victims. There were no 
reported cases of Suriname nationals exploited abroad. 
No NGOs in the country specifically worked on human trafficking, 
although an international organization and other NGOs included 
trafficking victim protection in their activities. In March 2021, the 
president called for greater access to police and justice services for 
trafficking victims and for specialized training for counselors and 
shelter staff to provide support to victims, emphasizing the need to 
focus on community reintegration; he also directed border authorities 
to improve their screening of people entering the country to identify 
possible victims. The Ministry of Justice and Police used a referral 
process by which they moved victims to the Bureau of Victim Services 
for shelter, medical care, counseling, and other care funded out of their 
regular budget. The Bureau of Legal Aid could provide victims with 
legal assistance, if necessary. Under the new protocol, the government 
offered these services to potential victims upon first encounter with 
them. The government did not place time limits or conditions 
upon services, except for shelter; authorities did not require victim 
cooperation with law enforcement to receive care. The government 
continued to make available minimum quality services during the 
pandemic and offered them to foreign and domestic victims and those 
with disabilities. The government funded and operated a trafficking 
shelter for women and children; it was in the same complex as a 
shelter for victims of domestic violence. During the reporting period, 
the government completed physical renovations to the trafficking 
shelter to improve its functionality in serving victims. The trafficking 
shelter was the only facility the government had available for human 
trafficking victims. The government did not report any victims used 
the shelter during the reporting period. Previous efforts to place 
child trafficking victims in a shelter for abused children were not 
successful. Children who did not want to return to their homes had 
the option of entering a childcare facility or staying with a foster 
family. Special counseling was available for child victims, along with 
their families. Victims were free to leave the shelter, but only with a 
chaperone. The government reported being willing to assist foreign 
victims to apply for temporary or permanent residency and a work 
permit, but there were no longer term shelter options available for 
foreign victims. Victims could apply for temporary or permanent 
residency whether or not they assisted with trials, although there are 
no reported cases of victims using either of these provisions. Victim-
witnesses could obtain employment, move freely within the country, 
or travel abroad. There was no witness protection program, although 
victims in shelters received police protection. Courts could obtain 
testimony from victims in the early stages of judicial investigations 
in case victims were not available during the trial process, although 
this could weaken testimony in cases where victims were not given 
time for rehabilitation before providing testimony. In the case of 
foreign victims, prosecutors usually used a victim’s initial report as 
testimony in the case, as victims often returned to their countries 
of origin before a trial was completed; in almost all cases, courts 
lost contact with the victim once the victim departed the country. 
However, victims continued to have the right to testify after providing 
an initial statement and/or after receiving counseling. The defense 
attorney continued to have the right to question the victim. Testimony 
via video or written statements was possible. Victims had the right 
to seek restitution through a civil process, though no such case has 
ever been filed. 
Vulnerable individuals who violated the terms of their stay could be 
deported before being screened for trafficking, but the government 
reported it stopped deportations as part of its pandemic response 
measures unless the deportation involved persons suspected of 
committing a crime apart from having an irregular status, upon which 
the government deported the person on immigration violations 
without a separate criminal process. The government reported 
immigration status was not cause for deportation during the reporting 
period. The government reported it did not knowingly detain, fine, or 
jail potential trafficking victims for crimes their traffickers forced them 
to commit. In the previous reporting period, outside organizations 
reported the government jailed human trafficking victims under the 
Alien Act for having been in the country illegally after being referred 
to the TIP Unit for assistance; no such cases were reported during 
this reporting period. 
PREVENTION 
The government increased prevention efforts. The government 
adopted a new annual NAP for 2020-2021, which designated the TIP 
Working Group as the primary interdepartmental group responsible 
for monitoring and implementing the NAP, coordinating government 
efforts to combat trafficking, and making recommendations to the 
government, including on legislation. The TIP Working Group, 
coordinated by the Director of Operations of the Ministry of Justice 
and Police, composed of representatives of the police, prosecutor’s 
office, and Ministries of Justice and Police, Defense (immigration), 
Labor, Foreign Affairs, and Social Affairs, and reported to the Minister 
of Justice and Police on the effectiveness of the NAP and addressed 
emerging issues on a whole of government basis. The incoming 
government terminated the TIP Working Group’s mandate in 
July 2020 and did not formally restore it until November 2020; 
however, the members of the TIP Working Group remained active in 
coordinating efforts, including drafting the NAP. The main priorities 
of the plan were to strengthen security at the borders, raise awareness 
of criminal activities related to trafficking, create a victim identification 
procedure, promote safe return of victims to their country of origin, 
and provide adequate medical treatment and shelter to victims with 
legal status. The government did not seek input from survivors or 
NGOs in drafting the NAP. The government allocated 2.4 million 
SRD ($167,950) in 2020 to the agencies that combat trafficking, 
although that amount was not specifically allocated for trafficking. 
Despite the pandemic and a severe economic crisis, the government 
reported it did not divert financial resources from human trafficking, 
but placed implementation of the plan on hold because of the 
pandemic. Authorities struggled to compile data due to pandemic-
related travel restrictions and delays. 
The government continued to operate a 24-hour anti-trafficking 
hotline in the interagency National Command Center. The hotline 
primarily operated in Dutch, English, and Sranan Tongo. The 
government made informational flyers and brochures in different 
languages with the anti-trafficking hotline number and posted the 
flyers at multiple entry points, police stations, doctors’ offices, and 
other locations. The government halted other awareness campaign 
activities because of the pandemic. The government did not conduct 




did not publicly post an assessment of its anti-trafficking efforts but 
made the information available upon request. 
Labor laws prohibited employers, recruiters, and labor agents from 
charging workers recruitment fees, confiscating workers’ passports 
or travel documents, switching contracts without workers’ consent, 
or withholding wages as a means of keeping workers in a state of 
compelled service. Labor laws required all employment agencies to be 
licensed before recruiting domestic and foreign employees, and they 
had to receive permission from the Ministry of Labor before entering 
into work mediation with employees. The Labor Inspectorate under 
the Ministry of Labor increased its staffing from 50 to 70 people and 
appointed a new head as part of its reorganization. The government 
assigned the Labor Inspectorate as the lead agency responsible for 
overseeing the implementation of pandemic protocols in different 
business sectors, which significantly increased its reach to conduct 
regular inspections; however, the government did not provide sufficient 
funding, staffing, or equipment to cover all tasks. Most inspections 
were unannounced, but the law did not allow labor inspectors to 
inspect private homes or farms, and police had to be escorted and 
have a special warrant for any inspections on private property. The 
government reported fining businesses up to 250 SRD ($17.50) for 
each foreign worker employed without having the proper registration 
paperwork. Labor inspectors also screened for indicators of human 
trafficking but did not report identifying any labor trafficking cases 
through such measures among its increased inspections during 
the reporting period. No inspectors were solely dedicated to child 
labor, but the government trained all inspectors to identify child 
labor and instructed them how to handle suspected cases, with the 
Labor Inspectorate required to report alleged cases of child labor 
and forced labor to the police within 45 minutes. The government 
warned businesses against hiring foreign workers without proper 
documentation and provided information on employment scams 
and fraudulent job offerings to businesses and workers through 
print and social media and on television, including public service 
announcements with contact information for questions or concerns. 
Authorities also could accept information on labor violations reported 
by the public. Migrant workers could not enter and exit the country, 
except for repatriation, after the borders closed in March 2020. The 
government only allowed repatriation flights between the United 
States, Netherlands, Cuba, Haiti, and Dominican Republic, along with 
occasional charter flights to Aruba and Brazil. Foreigners who were in 
the country when the borders closed and could not repatriate could 
register, have their stay permits extended, and work temporarily. The 
government provided this service to persons who entered the country 
legally, but overstayed, and whose stay permit expired before the 
borders were closed. Limited unemployment benefits only went to 
citizens. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand 
for commercial sex acts. The government did not make efforts to 
reduce participation in international and domestic child sex tourism. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Suriname, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Suriname abroad. Reported cases of trafficking in Suriname’s remote 
jungle interior, which constitutes approximately 80 percent of the 
country, have increased in recent years; limited government presence 
in the interior renders the full scope of the problem unknown. Weak 
immigration policies, difficulty controlling Suriname’s borders, 
and the draw of the gold and timber trade have led to an influx of 
immigrants from different countries entering Suriname legally and 
remaining in country after their legal stay expired. These persons 
become particularly vulnerable to sex and labor trafficking. Traffickers 
target the increasing influx of migrants into Suriname, particularly 
those from Haiti and Venezuela, as well as those from Brazil, Cuba, 
Dominican Republic, and Guyana. Migrant women and girls are 
especially at risk for sex trafficking in Suriname, including in brothels, 
massage parlors and hair salons, and illegal gold mining camps 
in Suriname’s interior. Individuals involved in commercial sex 
offered through newspaper ads and social media are also at risk for 
trafficking. Adult and child migrant workers in agriculture, retail 
shops, construction, and on fishing boats off Suriname’s coast are 
at risk of trafficking, as are children working in agriculture, small 
construction, gold mines, and informal urban sectors. Given their 
irregular status, migrant groups avoid seeking assistance from the 
authorities for fear of criminalization or deportation, making them 
vulnerable to traffickers. Chinese associations, and allegedly some 
Hong Kong traffickers, recruit and exploit Chinese immigrants in 
sex and labor trafficking in the mining, service, and construction 
sectors. Surinamese women in neighboring countries are at risk of 
sex trafficking. Some Surinamese parents exploit their daughters 
in sex trafficking. Traffickers may transport victims through routes 
in Suriname’s interior that bypass official checkpoints. There are 
reports of corruption and local official complicity in trafficking 
crimes that may impede anti-trafficking efforts. While traffickers 
are predominantly male, authorities have prosecuted and convicted 
women for human trafficking. Traffickers may exploit victims from 
the same migrant populations. The pandemic exacerbated trafficking 
risks as individuals engaged in commercial sex began to do so in 
private homes or more poorly protected clubs in the interior, making 
them vulnerable to trafficking. Organizations representing the HIV 
positive and LGBTQI+ communities also reported these groups 
became particularly vulnerable as they faced increased poverty. 
SWEDEN: TIER 1
The Government of Sweden fully meets the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued to 
demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting period, 
considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-
trafficking capacity; therefore Sweden remained on Tier 1. These efforts 
included prosecuting and convicting more traffickers and increasing 
the minimum penalty for the purchase of commercial sex acts from 
children following the entry into force of a 2020 amendment to the 
penal code. In addition, the government assessed the application 
process for residence permits to determine whether additional 
government actors should be allowed to apply on behalf of victims. 
Furthermore, as part of a four-year project, the government allocated 
18 million krona ($2.2 million) to strengthen labor market regulation 
compliance efforts and review compliance developments, including 
efforts to prevent forced labor. Although the government meets the 
minimum standards, authorities investigated fewer trafficking cases 
and identified fewer trafficking victims. Additionally, the police did 
not proactively identify trafficking victims among unaccompanied 
children. The government delayed funding the national support 
program (NSP) for victim assistance, which offered the only effective 
unconditional assistance provided to victims, resulting in the 
program’s prolonged cessation. Moreover, the government did not 
provide overall consistent and sufficient funding for victim services, 
and assistance to victims was conditional on their cooperation with 
investigations and prosecutions.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Proactively identify trafficking victims, including among 
unaccompanied children, by providing clear procedures for identifying 
child victims and training relevant workers to recognize trafficking 
indicators. • Ensure adequate financial support for victim services by 
introducing a sustainable financial mechanism for consistent funding 





access to assistance, regardless of whether they cooperate with 
authorities. • Investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers under 
the trafficking statute and punish them with significant prison terms. 
• Provide adequate assistance and opportunity for recovery to all 
foreign victims by allowing additional government actors to apply for 
residence permits. • Increase efforts to identify labor trafficking victims 
and prosecute and convict labor traffickers. • Train officials involved 
in judicial proceedings, particularly judges, on all aspects of trafficking 
and understanding current anti-trafficking laws. • Increase the number 
of prosecutors who specialize in trafficking cases. • Enhance awareness 
efforts to educate asylum-seekers and unaccompanied children on the 
risks of sexual exploitation, forced criminality, and forced begging. 
• Establish specialized housing for trafficking victims, including for 
male victims. • Strengthen international law enforcement cooperation 
to prevent and investigate child sex tourism.
PROSECUTION
The government increased law enforcement efforts and strengthened 
anti-trafficking laws. Chapter 4 Section 1a of the Penal Code 
criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed 
penalties of two to 10 years’ imprisonment, which were sufficiently 
stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with those 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Chapter 4 Section 1b 
criminalized a lesser offense of “human exploitation,” which included 
the exploitation of individuals for labor or begging, and prescribed 
penalties of up to four years’ imprisonment; these penalties were also 
sufficiently stringent. In January 2020, an amendment to Chapter 6 
Section 9 entered into force, increasing the penalties for the purchase 
of commercial sex acts from a child from a fine or up to two years’ 
imprisonment to a maximum of four years’ imprisonment.
According to the National Police, pandemic-related effects, such as 
reduced movement into Sweden, caused a decline in investigations. 
As a result, in 2020, police investigated 191 trafficking cases (109 sex 
trafficking, 41 labor trafficking, 41 uncategorized) and 80 human 
exploitation cases, compared with 272 and 47, respectively, in 2019. 
Authorities prosecuted 21 traffickers (seven sex trafficking, 14 labor 
trafficking) and convicted 12 traffickers (seven sex trafficking, five 
labor trafficking), a significant increase from four prosecutions and 
convictions in 2019. Of the 12 convicted traffickers, seven received 
sentences ranging from two to six years’ imprisonment; three received 
fines; and two received suspended sentences. Authorities convicted 
a migration official working at the Swedish embassy in Nigeria 
to one year in prison for facilitating trafficking-related crimes. In 
2020, Swedish authorities collaborated with foreign governments 
on transnational investigations, including a pan-European case led 
by Europol involving child trafficking.
The National Police and the Migration Agency maintained 
coordinators focusing exclusively on leading their respective agencies’ 
anti-trafficking efforts. During the reporting period, the police 
trafficking rapporteur reported the government restored previously 
diverted resources that went toward other priorities, such as organized 
crime. Conversely, the Migration Agency coordinator noted a lack 
of government funding and the pandemic hindered the agency’s 
anti-trafficking efforts. In 2020, the police trafficking rapporteur and 
agency coordinator conducted online training for police, judges, and 
agency staff. The National Police incorporated trafficking training 
as part of the education program for new police recruits to improve 
awareness within the police force. The National Police also offered 
an online course for police officers and an annual advanced training 
course for all police officers and prosecutors working on trafficking 
cases. The Migration Agency provided guidance to migration agents 
on how to detect potential trafficking cases. The national courts 
offered training for judges and lawyers that included sections on sex 
trafficking and child victims; however, experts reported some judges 
continued to lack a sufficient understanding of trafficking cases and 
current trafficking laws. NGOs also reported the need for specialized 
prosecutors working on trafficking cases. The Prosecutor’s Office 
offered online education on trafficking issues with the goal to train 
all personnel to identify trafficking violations and enhance their 
ability to engage with victims. Additionally, the office’s educational 
center developed new methods for working on trafficking cases and 
monitoring the standards of current methods. The Swedish Coast 
Guard, police, and customs officials participated in joint regional 
intelligence operations in trafficking cases involving travel by sea.
PROTECTION
The government marginally maintained victim protection efforts. 
NGOs identified 131 victims, compared with 162 victims in 2019. 
Authorities and frontline professionals utilized the existing national 
referral mechanism to identify and refer victims. In 2020, as a result 
of the pandemic and tightened migration policy, the Migration 
Agency reported a substantial reduction in the number of asylum 
applications submitted, receiving approximately 13,000 applications 
(492 from unaccompanied children), compared with 21,000 (902) 
in 2019, marking the lowest recorded number in the last 20 years, 
and allowing authorities to process and screen more efficiently 
applicants for trafficking indicators. The agency identified 366 
potential trafficking victims among asylum-seekers, compared with 
481 in 2019. Of the 366 potential victims, 48 were children—a 
decrease of nearly 50 percent from 92 in 2019. Experts noted many 
unaccompanied children were either trafficking victims or at risk 
of becoming victims, particularly of sexual exploitation or forced 
criminality. Experts also noted the police did not proactively identify 
potential victims among unaccompanied children and expressed 
concern that the number of reported cases misrepresented the real 
scale of child trafficking in Sweden.
Municipalities, in collaboration with NGOs and other government 
agencies, were the primary providers of victim services, including 
medical and psychological care, shelter, and social assistance. 
Assistance opportunities to victims and their families through 
municipalities were conditional on victims cooperating with 
authorities. Municipalities funded assistance and appropriate services, 
and the government subsequently reimbursed the expenses. However, 
statistics on the costs incurred by the municipalities were unavailable. 
Although the country lacked shelters dedicated solely to trafficking 
victims, some municipalities ran shelters offering services to sex 
trafficking victims. Adult female trafficking victims could receive 
services at women’s shelters for victims of domestic and honor-
related violence. Authorities referred child victims to social services 
officials, who placed child victims in foster care or group housing. 
There was no protected housing available to male trafficking victims. 
The Gender Equality Agency, which managed anti-trafficking efforts 
for the government, led a network of approximately 40 NGO-run 
safe houses. NGOs reported insufficient funding and the pandemic 
hindered the ability to assist victims. Furthermore, social distancing 
protocols to contain the spread of the pandemic contributed to 
victims staying at shelters for longer periods than anticipated, thereby 
unintentionally preventing other victims from receiving shelter, when 
care shelters had reached maximum capacity. In 2020, the Gender 
Equality Agency delayed funding the NSP, a civil society platform 
representing 20 NGOs that provided assistance to victims and that 
ceased operations in 2019 due to lack of funding. Experts expressed 
concern the temporary cessation of the NSP’s operation meant Sweden 
no longer fulfilled its international commitments regarding assistance 
to victims because the NSP offered the only effective unconditional 
assistance provided to victims. The program focused on victims who 
in their current state did not have a right to assistance through the 
formal system. Ultimately, the government allocated 1.5 million krona 
($183,550) to the NSP, and it resumed operations in the middle 
of the reporting period. However, NGOs considered the amount 
allocated inadequate to comply with obligations and demand. In 
previous years, funding for the program fluctuated—zero in 2019; 
800,000 krona ($97,900) in 2018; zero in 2017; and 500,000 krona 
($61,180) in 2016. NGOs criticized the Gender Equality Agency for 
poor coordination on anti-trafficking efforts.




contemplate cooperation with law enforcement, during which they 
were eligible for assistance and emergency financial aid; however, 
only an investigating police officer or prosecutor could file an 
application for residence permits, limiting availability to victims 
already in contact with law enforcement. In an effort to ensure 
availability of adequate assistance and opportunity for recovery to 
all foreign victims regardless of their cooperation with authorities, 
the government started an evaluation of the application process for 
residence permits to determine whether additional government actors 
should be allowed to apply on behalf of victims. Foreign victims who 
cooperated with authorities received temporary residence permits, 
which allowed them to seek employment. Sixty trafficking victims 
received permits in 2020 (44 in 2019).
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. The government 
continued to implement its national action plan; however, experts 
raised concerns regarding the lack of resources dedicated to the plan 
as demonstrated by the inconsistent funding of the NSP. The Gender 
Equality Agency maintained a regional coordinator in each of the 
country’s seven regions who assisted police and judicial authorities 
with trafficking cases. Authorities from Denmark, Finland, Norway, 
and Sweden facilitated international policing efforts and information-
sharing, including on trafficking-related issues, through Nordic liaison 
officers stationed at 20 Nordic embassies and consulates around 
the world. In collaboration with other Baltic Sea Region countries, 
the government participated in a project establishing long-term 
cooperation between stakeholders and academia to educate future 
journalists on trafficking issues through workshops, panel discussions, 
and competitions. National and regional authorities conducted 
training for workers in the hotel, restaurant, and taxi sectors on how 
to detect potential trafficking victims. In 2020, Sweden and France 
continued to conduct a joint campaign raising awareness on sex 
trafficking. The Gender Equality Agency continued conducting a 
three-year study on the scope of sex trafficking in Sweden, focusing 
on children exploited in commercial sex. As part of the study, 
the agency collected and disseminated educational materials to 
professionals on responding to sex trafficking cases and mapped 
local and regional support initiatives. The Bar Association offered 
training on the commercial exploitation of children, including child 
sex trafficking and child sex tourism. The National Police’s Department 
of National Operations handled investigations involving Swedish 
citizens suspected of child sex tourism and assisted police departments 
throughout Sweden on matters of child sex trafficking. The National 
Police’s specialized cybercrime unit maintained a child protection 
team that trained travel agencies to detect and report child sex 
tourism. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand 
for participation in international sex tourism by its citizens, despite 
allegations of such actions by its citizens. The National Taskforce 
Against Prostitution and Human Trafficking (NMT) launched an 
information campaign aimed at female commercial sex trafficking 
victims with messages in six languages. The campaign collaborated 
with the 24-hour National Women’s Helpline, which supported 
victims of violence, including trafficking. In addition, NMT operated a 
helpline for potential trafficking victims to receive support and advice. 
The government funded both helplines with an annual budget of 
20 million krona ($2.45 million). During the reporting period, the 
government developed a comprehensive action program to prevent 
and combat men’s violence against women, including trafficking, as 
well as the exposure of members of the LGBTQI+ community to all 
types of violence. The government made efforts to reduce the demand 
for commercial sex acts, including awareness campaigns aimed at 
educating purchasers of commercial sex and an assessment of the 
purchase of sexual acts legislation (Chapter 6, Sections 9 and 11). 
The assessment examined the effectiveness of the legislation and its 
application with the goal to reveal how the judicial system handles 
such crimes from investigation to sentencing. The assessment also 
analyzed the nexus between the purchase of commercial sex and 
trafficking and the role of social services.
Authorities and NGOs acknowledged labor trafficking was an 
increasing problem, especially for seasonal workers and vulnerable 
migrants. In 2020, the National Audit Office published a report 
examining Swedish efforts to combat labor trafficking and proposing 
activities to strengthen the government’s anti-trafficking work. 
Experts recommended better interagency coordination to facilitate 
the identification of labor trafficking cases. In an effort to identify 
cases, authorities conducted mandatory interviews with foreign 
workers employed in at-risk sectors and seeking to extend their 
work permits. The Migration Agency conducted background checks 
on companies employing foreign workers and occasionally denied 
work visas in cases where employment contracts did not meet the 
necessary requirements. Additionally, the agency developed a training 
module on trafficking and provided a manual to assist migration 
agents in detecting trafficking cases. Multiple agencies carried out 
joint workplace inspections as part of a major EU effort against labor 
exploitation. As part of a four-year project, the government allocated 
18 million krona ($2.2 million) in 2020 to strengthen labor market 
regulation compliance efforts and review compliance developments, 
including efforts to prevent forced labor. The government participated 
in a multi-country anti-trafficking taskforce that evaluated trafficking 
related to migration flows. The International Development Agency 
in conjunction with an international organization continued 
implementing a five-year project aimed at ensuring Asian companies 
pursue ethical recruitment and employment of migrant workers.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Sweden, and, to a lesser extent, traffickers 
exploit victims from Sweden abroad. Most traffickers are the same 
nationality as their victims and are often part of criminal networks 
engaged in multiple criminal activities, although an increasing 
number of reported cases involve traffickers who are family members 
or have no ties to organized crime. Police report traffickers exploit 
transgender women from countries in South America, such as 
Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil, and Peru, in commercial sex in Sweden. 
Most sex trafficking and labor trafficking victims originate from 
Eastern Europe, Africa, East Asia, and the Middle East. Sex trafficking 
remains the most prevalent form of trafficking in Sweden with 
most cases involving women and children from West Africa and 
Eastern Europe. Authorities and NGOs report the prevalence of 
Swedes traveling abroad, primarily to East Asia, for the purpose of 
child sex tourism. Victims of labor trafficking, who largely originate 
from Eastern Europe, East Asia, and West Africa, face exploitation in 
the service, cleaning, private delivery, and construction industries. 
Since 2010, there has been an increase in labor trafficking cases. 
The migration agency notes increased exploitation in the private 
delivery industry, such as messengers and food delivery drivers, 
who work under conditions that violate Swedish labor laws. Police 
report citizens of Thailand working in nail salons and massage 
parlors exploited in trafficking. Cases among seasonal berry pickers 
have decreased significantly in recent years; however, individuals 
mostly from Asia and Bulgaria, continue to face exploitation in the 
agricultural sector. Roma, primarily from Bulgaria and Romania, 
remain vulnerable to forced begging and criminality and, to a 
lesser extent, sex trafficking. As a consequence of the pandemic, the 
Migration Agency reports a substantial reduction in the number of 
asylum applications submitted, marking the lowest recorded number 
in the last 20 years. Asylum-seekers, particularly those from Africa, 
Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and South America, as well as many 
stateless individuals, are at risk of trafficking. In recent years, traffickers 
subjected Moroccan boys and young men to forced criminal activity, 
though reports indicate a decline in the number of victims in 2020. 
Unaccompanied children are especially vulnerable to trafficking, 
with a majority of suspected child trafficking victims arriving in 






The Government of Switzerland does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included increased cooperation on 
international investigations, which resulted in the identification of 
victims and the arrest of traffickers abroad. The government also 
increased funding for victim assistance and public awareness and 
prevention projects; continued to hold cantonal roundtables; and 
continued to ensure early access to legal aid in the asylum process. 
However, these efforts were not serious and sustained compared to 
the efforts during the previous reporting period, even considering 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, on the government’s anti-
trafficking capacity. Lenient sentencing, resulting in 60 percent of 
traffickers receiving fully suspended sentences or fines, undercut 
efforts to hold traffickers accountable, weakened deterrence, created 
potential security and safety concerns—particularly for victims who 
cooperated with investigations and prosecutions, and was not equal 
to the seriousness with which other similar crimes were treated 
regarding sentencing. The government did not report the number 
of trafficking investigations for the third year in a row and reported 
fewer convictions, which could not be attributed to pandemic-related 
court closures. Law enforcement efforts on labor trafficking remained 
low compared with sex trafficking, and the government lacked 
comprehensive and sufficiently disaggregated data on trafficking. 
For the third consecutive year, the government decreased victim 
identification and identified the fewest victims since 2015. The 
government remained without a national standardized identification 
and referral mechanism and continued to lack legal safeguards to 
protect trafficking victims against potential prosecution. Therefore 
Switzerland was downgraded to Tier 2. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Vigorously investigate and prosecute suspected labor and sex 
traffickers and sentence convicted traffickers to adequate penalties, 
which should involve serving significant prison terms. • Establish 
a standardized national identification and referral mechanism for 
all victims. • Increase victim identification training for all front-line 
officials, with increased focus on identifying labor trafficking. • 
Increase law enforcement efforts for labor trafficking and provide 
sufficient resources, personnel, and training. • Coordinate and 
centralize the collection of trafficking data across the government, 
including sufficiently disaggregating data between trafficking and 
other forms of exploitation, as well as between sex and labor 
trafficking. • Provide sufficient personnel and funding to specialized 
anti-trafficking police units as well as the Specialist Unit Against 
the Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants (FSMM) to 
coordinate national anti-trafficking efforts. • Adopt a national 
anti-trafficking action plan to effectively and efficiently coordinate 
national efforts across all cantons. • Expand authorities for labor 
inspectors to allow for the identification of trafficking victims. • 
Increase access to specialized services, especially for labor trafficking 
victims, asylum-seekers, male, child, and transgender victims. 
• Amend the anti-trafficking provision of the criminal code to 
include force, fraud, or coercion as an essential element of the 
crime in accordance with international law and ensure that the 
criminal code clearly defines labor exploitation. • Ensure labor 
trafficking is investigated and prosecuted as a trafficking crime and 
not pursued as an administrative labor code violation. • Enact a legal 
provision in addition to the existing non-punishment legal norm to 
protect specifically trafficking victims from prosecution for acts that 
traffickers compelled them to commit. • Strengthen international 
law enforcement cooperation to prevent and investigate child sex 
tourism. • Appoint a national rapporteur to provide independent 
review of government anti-trafficking efforts. • Increase worker 
protections by eliminating recruitment or placement fees charged 
to workers by Swiss labor recruiters and ensure employers pay 
any recruitment fees. •Utilize the witness protection program for 
trafficking victims.
PROSECUTION 
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. Article 182 of 
the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed penalties of up to life imprisonment and/or a fine; 
the penalties included prison sentences of no less than one year for 
offenses involving a child victim and those where the trafficker acted 
for commercial gain. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, 
with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as kidnapping. Inconsistent with the 
definition of trafficking under international law, Article 182 does not 
include a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion as an essential 
element of the crime. Additionally, both adult and child sex trafficking 
crimes could be prosecuted under Article 195 of the criminal code 
(“exploitation of sexual acts” and “encouraging prostitution”), which 
prescribed penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment or fines. NGOs 
stated the lack of an explicit legal definition for labor exploitation 
under Article 182 complicated labor trafficking investigations 
and limited data collection necessary for prevention efforts. The 
government did not disaggregate data on law enforcement efforts 
between sex and labor trafficking for Article 182. 
In 2020, court proceedings were postponed while courts closed 
due to the pandemic. Federal courts closed for one month, and 
cantonal courts may have been closed longer as directives varied by 
canton; however, most courts adapted by utilizing virtual platforms 
to continue processing cases. For the third consecutive year, the 
government did not report the number of human trafficking 
investigations in Switzerland in 2020. In 2020, cantonal authorities 
prosecuted 136 defendants, 61 under Article 182 and 75 under 195. 
This compared with 146, 59 under Article 182 and 87 under Article 
195, in 2019. Of the 136 prosecutions, at least 75 suspects were 
prosecuted for sex trafficking under Article 195, but the government 
did not report whether any prosecutions involved labor trafficking 
as it did not disaggregate data between sex and labor trafficking 
under Article 182. The government reported most federal statistics, 
including conviction data, on a year delay. The government convicted 
15 traffickers in 2019; four under Article 182, eight under Article 195, 
and three under both. The total number of convictions represents 
a decrease compared with 21 in 2018, including two under Article 
182, 17 under Article 195, and two under both. At least 11 of the 
convictions pursued under Article 195 involved sex trafficking, but 
the government did not report whether any convictions involved 
labor trafficking as it did not disaggregate data between sex and 
labor trafficking under Article 182. Historically, prosecutions and 
convictions for labor trafficking were low, while NGOs continued 
to assert many labor trafficking cases were instead pursued as 
administrative labor code violations, resulting in lesser consequences 
and decreased deterrence. Of the 15 convictions in 2019; courts 
fully suspended the prison sentences of nine traffickers (60 percent) 
and only issued fines to two of these traffickers of 800 and 1,000 
Swiss francs ($908 and $1,140). Courts sentenced five traffickers 
(33.3 percent) to significant prison terms and partially suspended a 
prison sentence to one trafficker, which was more than one year (6.6 
percent), for a total of 40 percent of traffickers serving significant 
prison time of one year or longer. Two of the traffickers were also 
issued fines of 500 Swiss francs ($570). This compared with 21 
traffickers convicted in 2018, of whom, 33 percent served one year 




compared to 2018, it increased. The government’s lenient sentencing 
practices weakened deterrence, potentially undercut efforts of police 
and prosecutors, and created security and safety concerns, particularly 
for victims who cooperated with investigations and prosecutions. 
While the length of some sentences increased, over the past five years, 
approximately 64 percent of all trafficking convictions resulted in 
fines, fully suspended sentences, or prison sentences of less than 
one year, which did not serve to deter the crime or adequately reflect 
the nature of the offense. NGOs observed that lenient sentencing 
of convicted traffickers also resulted in infrequent restitution for 
victims. As a comparison, in 2019 of the 72 convicted rapists, 62 
(86 percent) were sentenced to significant prison sentences of 
one year or longer in prison. The government did not report any 
investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees 
complicit in human trafficking offenses. Authorities continued to 
report the prevalence of “lover boy” traffickers, which was a method 
of trafficking that involved young male traffickers who coerce girls 
and women into sex trafficking, often through a sham romantic 
relationship. This method of trafficking affects both Swiss nationals 
and foreign nationals and NGOs noted that “lover boy” traffickers 
continued to operate with impunity – though 42 instances of this 
type of trafficking was reported in 2020, zero prosecutions had been 
initiated against such traffickers to date. Nigerian sex trafficking 
victims remained numerous during the reporting period, although 
there were few corresponding prosecutions involving Nigerian victims. 
Trafficking investigations and prosecutions fell strictly under 
the jurisdiction of individual cantons except for cases involving 
organized criminal networks, which fell under federal police 
(FedPol) jurisdiction. At least six of 26 cantons had their own 
specialized anti-trafficking police units, but NGOs raised concerns 
that these units lacked sufficient funding and personnel, given the 
government’s competing priorities for other crimes. The government 
had specialized prosecutors, with trauma-informed training, who 
usually handled human trafficking cases. Civil society continued 
to report the government’s predominant focus on sex trafficking 
hindered the identification of labor trafficking cases as well as their 
prosecution. Insufficient personnel, resources, and the absence 
of a mandate that included human trafficking, hampered in-
depth labor inspections; additionally, civil society reported labor 
inspectors frequently regarded foreign victims as criminals working 
illegally. NGOs also reported that insufficient coordination between 
cantons hindered law enforcement efforts against organized human 
trafficking networks, with frequent duplication of efforts. In 2020, the 
government reported most law enforcement trainings were delayed 
until 2021 due to pandemic-related restrictions – compared with 
the approximately 230 officials trained in 2019. The government 
continued to facilitate international investigations and criminal 
trials, including with Nigeria, Romania, and Spain, which resulted 
in the arrest of 23 suspects and the identification of 25 victims. Law 
enforcement assisted in 24 new international trafficking cases during 
the reporting period, two of which related to extradition, 18 to mutual 
legal assistance, and two to delegation of prosecution; an increase 
compared to 21 cases in the prior reporting period. In 2020, through 
two joint action days between law enforcement, labor inspectors, 
and EUROPOL, the government reported conducting at least 151 
labor inspections that resulted in the identification of at least three 
potential victims; a decrease compared with the identification of five 
victims, 46 potential victims, and 10 suspects in 2019. However, the 
government reported that several joint action days were postponed 
due to the pandemic. Switzerland continued to maintain a network 
of at least 10 police attachés posted abroad, who provided support 
to government prosecution authorities in combating trans-border 
crime, including human trafficking. 
PROTECTION
The government decreased victim protection efforts. While civil 
society asserted that the pandemic caused a shift in government 
priorities and resources away from human trafficking, civil society 
also noted that low prioritization of victim identification occurred 
prior to the pandemic. For the third consecutive year, authorities 
reported identifying fewer total victims, the fewest since 2015. In 
2020, cantonal authorities reported identifying 117 victims (150 in 
2019 and 170 in 2018). Under article 182, authorities identified 53 
human trafficking victims but did not sufficiently disaggregate data 
between sex and labor trafficking; a decrease compared with 83 human 
trafficking victims identified in 2019. Under article 195, authorities 
reported identifying 64 victims; however, this was a broader statistic 
that included victims of sex trafficking but may have also included 
victims of sexual exploitation; this compared with 67 victims in 2019 
and 106 in 2018. The government did not report identifying labor 
trafficking victims, as it did not adequately disaggregate data. Of 
the trafficking victims identified by the government in 2020, eight 
were children, 15 were Swiss, 11 were male, and 106 were female. 
The federal government continued to lack national standard victim 
identification and referral procedures across cantons; however, it 
continued to distribute and update a previously updated victim 
identification checklist. NGOs expressed concerns that officials 
prioritized the identification of sex trafficking victims over labor 
trafficking, although the majority of the victims NGOs separately 
identified and assisted were labor trafficking victims. The Zurich police 
reported training an unknown number of NGOs on the identification 
of sex trafficking victims. Victim care varied across the cantons, 
and civil society continued to criticize the absence of a national 
victim protection program to ensure uniformity in victim assistance 
across the country. Cantonal authorities maintained jurisdiction on 
providing protection for victims, and trafficking victims were entitled 
to utilizing free and immediate assistance centers that varied from 
canton to canton. Eighteen of 26 cantons had roundtables, which 
functioned as victim referral mechanisms; roundtables included 
police, prosecutors, and NGOs. NGOs highlighted that eight cantons 
remained without roundtables for victim identification and referral. 
FSMM reported holding 15 cantonal roundtables to improve cantonal 
interaction and coordination on anti-trafficking measures in 2020. 
Victim assistance was available in at least 24 out of the 26 cantons, 
providing a wide-ranging network of care facilities mainly tailored 
to the needs of women and children; however, trafficking specific 
services varied from canton to canton. At least 13 cantons maintained 
referral agreements with NGO-operated victim assistance facilities 
that specialized in trafficking. 
The Swiss Victim Assistance Law entitled all adult trafficking victims 
access to the government-funded women’s shelters or assistance 
centers for victims of abuse and to special safeguards during criminal 
proceedings; however, the government did not report how many 
trafficking victims received shelter or special safeguards during the 
reporting period. At least four government-funded and NGO-operated 
shelters continued to provide specialized assistance for victims of 
trafficking, two of which provided services to children. However, 
according to GRETA and civil society, the government did not have 
specialized shelters or assistance for child victims of trafficking, nor 
did it have standardized identification procedures for children. With 
the noted variances, most cantons generally provided victims with a 
minimum of four weeks of emergency lodging and living allowance, 
several hours of consultations with a lawyer, mental health counseling 
and medical treatment, transportation, and translation services. If 
recovery required more time, the victim assistance law obligated the 
government to assume the additional cost of longer-term care. Victims 
had free movement in and out of shelters. While victim assistance 
was not dependent on cooperation with law enforcement, some 
NGOs asserted that authorities sometimes used victim penalization 
to pressure victims into cooperating with law enforcement. In 2020, 
the government granted 506,960 Swiss francs ($575,440) to seven 
NGOs for victim assistance, as well as 63,240 Swiss francs ($71,780) 
to two NGOs for prevention and public awareness projects for 2021; 
an increase compared with 453,290 Swiss francs ($514,520) granted 
in 2019 for 2020. 
Government-funded NGOs provided assistance to 184 trafficking 








assisted in 2019. Additionally, the government provided government-
funded trafficking-specific counseling for 85 potential sex trafficking 
victims in 2019, compared with 306 victims in 2018. Many NGOs 
reported assisting fewer victims in 2020, which could have been due 
to pandemic-related restrictions, resulting in victim isolation and 
limited access to victims by NGOs and authorities; NGOs also reported 
difficulty in obtaining the necessary government documents to help 
victims due to the closure of government offices. A variety of sources 
referred victims to NGO services, including other NGOs, government-
operated counseling centers, government offices, foreign consulates, 
police and judicial authorities, health care sector employees, lawyers, 
and family. Civil society stated services for labor trafficking victims 
were limited, and the government lacked case management resources 
for victims in the asylum system. According to NGOs, services for 
child and male victims were inadequate, especially counseling and 
victim referral resources. The government provided male victims 
temporary shelter in hotels or government-funded NGO-operated 
shelters in at least five cantons. The government had a witness 
protection program that trafficking victims could utilize, but the 
government did not report providing this protection to any victims 
during the reporting period.
The government also facilitated additional assistance to foreign victims 
of trafficking, which included financial support and residence permits; 
however, authorities granted few long-term residence permits and 
instead provided victims with repatriation assistance to help them 
return home. In 2020, the government provided repatriation assistance 
to 17 victims, compared with 27 in 2019, and provided 67,000 Swiss 
francs ($76,050) to an international organization for repatriation 
assistance in 2020. Cantonal immigration authorities were required to 
grant victims a minimum 30-day reflection period to decide whether to 
participate in judicial proceedings against their traffickers, but longer 
stays generally required cooperation with law enforcement. Foreign 
victims who were willing to cooperate with law enforcement could 
be granted a six-month residence permit, renewable for the duration 
of the investigation and criminal proceedings, after which, victims 
were required to depart the country. NGOs stated that victims who 
gave unclear statements to law enforcement due to trauma suffered 
were often denied residence permits. 
The government could also grant short-term residence permits based 
on hardship that victims might face upon return to their country 
of origin, but the application of this benefit varied by canton. In 
2020, the government granted 37 individuals reflection periods, 
62 short-term residence permits, and 15 hardship-based residence 
permits (compared with 52 reflection periods, 71 short-term residence 
permits, and 14 hardship-based residence permits in 2019). In 2020, 
the government did not report the number of trafficking victims that 
were granted refugee status or temporary admission; compared with 
three granted refugee status and 13 granted temporary admission 
in 2019. Authorities continued to note the growing number of 
trafficking victims among asylum-seekers during the reporting period. 
The State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) did not report the exact 
number of victims undergoing the asylum process in 2020, compared 
with 73 in 2019. The government reported that the majority of 
trafficking victims were identified during the asylum procedure; NGOs 
stated that implementation of the 2019 asylum law which ensured 
early access to legal aid increased successful victim identification. 
However, civil society criticized the government for not systematically 
referring foreign victims to services once identified and often shifting 
responsibility to the legal advisor. The victim’s legal advisor could 
refer victims to NGOs for assistance, but the government did not 
offer financial support for victim assistance, according to an NGO. 
The government’s border police screened newly arrived asylum-
seekers alone to eliminate the potential influence of traffickers 
operating within migrant camps, and specialists at SEM ensured 
identification and coordination practices remained consistent across 
the federal asylum reception centers. However, NGOs and GRETA 
continued to report asylum accommodations and psychological 
counseling in asylum centers were inappropriate and insufficient for 
assisting victims. Victim services were only available to victims who 
experienced trafficking within Switzerland; asylum-seekers remained 
vulnerable as they could be deported back to their first country 
of EU entrance without first receiving victim protection. GRETA 
noted cantons often did not transfer victims detected in the asylum 
system to specialized trafficking victim support centers because of 
financial constraints and instead continued to host them in asylum 
centers. GRETA also noted the lack of adequate accommodation and 
supervision for unaccompanied children, and lack of a systematic 
approach; GRETA urged the government to address these issues in 
its 2019 report. In response to the pandemic and to prevent delays 
in application processing, the government reduced the number of 
people participating in asylum application interviews, enhanced 
sanitation and reconfigured interview rooms to reduce exposure 
and transmission, extended deportation deadlines, and added up 
to 600 new housing units to respect social distancing guidelines. 
To encourage victims’ cooperation with law enforcement, the law 
allowed victims to keep their identities confidential if they were in 
danger and to testify in a separate room from the defendant. The 
government prohibited cross-examinations for child trafficking 
victims, testimonies were videotaped, and authorities were limited 
to two interviews to minimize re-traumatization. Trafficking victims 
could receive restitution from their trafficker through criminal 
proceedings; however, unlike prior years, the government did not 
report awarding restitution to any victims in 2019, compared with 
25 victims in 2018 and 31 victims in 2017. NGOs observed lenient 
sentencing of convicted traffickers also resulted in infrequent 
restitution for victims. GRETA and civil society noted restitution 
amounts were insufficient, especially compared with other serious 
crimes such as rape, and traffickers frequently did not pay. Trafficking 
victims could also pursue damages through a civil case, but the 
government did not report awarding damages to any victims during 
the reporting period. Victims could seek compensation from the 
government if the convicted trafficker was unable to pay the awarded 
restitution or damages, but the government did not report awarding 
compensation to any victims during the reporting period. GRETA 
criticized the lack of viable avenues for victim restitution when 
victims had no verifiable expenses or employment losses because 
the courts found it difficult to quantify the specific amount of 
lost income. While the government had a legal norm prohibiting 
the non-punishment of victims of crimes, the relevant provision 
of Swiss law did not explicitly address human trafficking or the 
criminal coercion often experienced in trafficking cases. Although 
the government continued to screen for trafficking victims, NGOs 
asserted that penalization of victims was common, with victims 
frequently charged with violating immigration laws, labor laws, local 
prostitution regulations, or violating pandemic-related restrictions 
as compelled by their traffickers. In its 2019 report, GRETA urged 
the government to adopt a provision on the non-punishment of 
specifically trafficking victims and encouraged additional training 
of public prosecutors in this regard.
PREVENTION 
The government maintained prevention efforts. Under FedPol, FSMM 
coordinated national efforts, including anti-trafficking policies, 
information exchange, cooperation, and training. In 2020, due to 
pandemic-related restrictions, FSMM cancelled its national meeting 
of the heads of the cantonal anti-trafficking roundtables, which 
focused on improving cantonal interaction and coordination on 
anti-trafficking measures; however, the government reported holding 
roundtables in 15 cantons. Following a 2018 restructuring of the 
FSMM, civil society and GRETA continued to express concerns 
regarding a decrease in a victim-centered, multidisciplinary 
and collaborative approach to trafficking. NGOs asserted that 
the government provided insufficient personnel and funding to 
FSMM, which hindered their ability to coordinate national anti-
trafficking efforts for all 26 cantons. The government remained 
without an official independent national anti-trafficking rapporteur. 




expiration of its 2017-2020 plan and did not draft a new plan during 
the reporting period. After prior civil society reports of inaction, 
the government reported completing several action items under its 
now expired plan, including the appointment of trafficking victim 
identification specialists in the police and public prosecutor’s offices, 
improvement of the identification process within the asylum system, 
and the funding of an awareness campaign on male trafficking 
victims through several podcasts. The government continued to 
fund an NGO to operate the national anti-trafficking hotline; the 
government reported receiving 63 calls to the hotline in 2020, 42 of 
which were likely cases of human trafficking, involving 70 presumed 
victims. The government, in partnership with an NGO, included 
the hotline’s contact information in a flyer for labor inspectors and 
in various federal publications. The government continued a prior 
awareness campaign targeting victim identification and assistance 
by health care providers, but due to pandemic-related restrictions, 
the government only held one training in 2020. Government 
authorities asserted that labor inspectors continued to lack the 
mandate to initiate trafficking investigations or identify trafficking 
victims, however, if inspectors did identify any victims, they were 
required to refer potential trafficking cases to police. Joint inspections 
between labor inspectors and police were rare and only occurred 
a few times a year. However, while labor inspectors continued to 
lack a trafficking mandate, in recognition of the critical role labor 
inspectors had in identifying trafficking victims, in July 2020, 
the labor directorate published and distributed a flyer for labor 
inspectors on the identification of victims of labor exploitation 
and trafficking, and in August 2020, the government launched a 
trafficking awareness campaign for labor inspectors. The government 
had effective regulations for labor recruitment companies during 
the reporting period, but enforcement of the regulations remained 
a concern. Swiss labor recruitment agencies required a license and 
were liable if foreign recruitment agencies did not uphold Swiss 
recruitment regulations. However, Swiss employers could charge a 
registration or placement fee to workers, which could increase their 
vulnerability to debt bondage. Although fraudulent labor recruitment 
remained a concern during the reporting period, the government 
did not report holding any labor recruitment agencies accountable 
for labor trafficking. In October 2020, four government-funded 
NGOs established a national network to combat human trafficking, 
which enabled NGOs specializing in human trafficking to create a 
forum for national dialogue, but no further results were reported. 
The government continued to provide funding to foreign countries 
for anti-trafficking efforts, including computer equipment to Serbia 
for the national anti-trafficking coordinator; funding for a regional 
anti-trafficking project in Russia and Central Asia; a responsible 
recruitment program in Sri Lanka; and, in partnership with an 
international organization, an anti-trafficking national action plan 
and traveling exhibition under the bilateral migration partnership with 
Nigeria. Programs to fund anti-trafficking assistance to Bangladesh, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo also continued during the 
reporting period, as did contributions to the FAIRWAY program, the 
Better Work program, the Sustaining Competitive and Responsible 
Enterprises program, and the International Recruitment Integrity 
System program, which focused on workers’ rights, forced labor in 
global supply chains, and ethical labor recruitment. The government 
reported training an unknown number of its consular officials on 
victim identification abroad. The government did not demonstrate 
efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. While the 
government participated in several international law enforcement 
efforts to increase government and law enforcement collaboration 
on child sex tourism, the government did not demonstrate overall 
efforts to reduce the demand for international sex tourism by Swiss 
nationals. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Switzerland. The pandemic exacerbated 
vulnerabilities for trafficking victims, and sex traffickers are 
increasingly using online platforms to recruit, exploit victims, and 
book apartment rentals to make their illicit operations difficult to 
track. Victims’ debt to their traffickers, and subsequently the traffickers’ 
control over the victims, increased during the pandemic because 
victims were sometimes unable to work and earn money. Victims’ 
access to services was limited due to pandemic-related restrictions 
in 2020, which increased isolation and vulnerabilities to trafficking. 
Traffickers can frequently be family members, friends, or romantic 
partners, as well as agencies offering fraudulent employment, travel, 
and marriage. Traffickers are both Swiss and foreign nationals; 
foreign traffickers typically have the same nationality as their victims. 
Although the vast majority of traffickers are male, female traffickers 
are not uncommon, especially women from Nigeria and Thailand. 
Traffickers are increasingly mobile and adaptable, switching industries 
and locations frequently. Sex traffickers exploit both foreign and 
domestic women, transgender individuals, and children. Traffickers, 
often involved with criminal networks, increasingly exploit female 
and transgender victims from Thailand. Swiss nationals continue to 
engage in child sex tourism abroad. Authorities report an increase in 
young male traffickers, known as “lover boys,” coercing vulnerable 
Swiss girls and women into sex trafficking, often through a sham 
romantic relationship. The majority of sex trafficking victims identified 
by the government are from Eastern Europe, West Africa, notably 
Nigeria, and Asia, particularly Thailand. Traffickers continue to 
fraudulently recruit and later coerce Nigerian women and girls to 
stay in exploitative situations using a “voodoo oath” they are forced 
to swear. Foreign trafficking victims originate primarily from Central 
and Eastern Europe (particularly Bulgaria, Hungary, and Romania), 
with increasing numbers from Asia and Africa (especially from 
China, Nigeria, and Thailand) but also from Latin America (Brazil 
and Dominican Republic). Traffickers often force female victims 
among asylum-seekers from Angola, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Nigeria 
into commercial sex and domestic servitude. More than one-third of 
female trafficking victims are asylum-seekers who sought protection 
after arriving in Switzerland. Labor traffickers exploit men, women, 
and children in domestic service, health care, agriculture, hospitality, 
catering, postal courier services, construction, tourism, and in forced 
criminal activity. Male victims among asylum-seekers come primarily 
from Afghanistan and Eritrea and are exploited in forced labor. Forced 
begging, especially among the Roma communities, has increased 
in recent years. 
SYRIA: TIER 3
The Government of Syria does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts 
to do so, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, 
if any, on the government’s anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Syria remained on Tier 3. During the reporting period, there was 
a government policy or pattern of employing or recruiting child 
soldiers. The government did not hold any traffickers criminally 
accountable, including complicit government officials, nor did it 
identify or protect any trafficking victims. The government’s actions 
directly contributed to the population’s vulnerability to trafficking, 
and it continued to perpetrate human trafficking crimes routinely. 
The government and pro-Syrian regime-affiliated militias continued 
to forcibly recruit and use child soldiers, resulting in children facing 
extreme violence and retaliation by opposition forces; the government 
also did not protect and prevent children from recruitment and use 
by armed opposition forces and designated terrorist organizations. 
The government continued to arrest, detain, and severely abuse 
trafficking victims, including child soldiers, and punished them for 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Criminalize all forms of human trafficking. • Stop the forcible 
recruitment and use of child soldiers by government forces and 
pro-government militias. • Proactively identify victims of all forms 
of trafficking and provide them with appropriate protection services, 
including long-term care for demobilized child soldiers. • Ensure 
trafficking victims are not punished for crimes traffickers compelled 
them to commit, such as child soldiering. • Investigate, prosecute, 
and convict perpetrators of sex and labor trafficking and the unlawful 
recruitment and use of child soldiers, including complicit officials.
PROSECUTION
The government made no discernible anti-trafficking law enforcement 
efforts, and the government and government-affiliated militias 
remained complicit in the unlawful recruitment and use of child 
soldiers. The violent conflict continued to amplify the magnitude 
of human trafficking crimes occurring within Syria. Decree No.3 
of 2010 appeared to criminalize some forms of sex trafficking and 
labor trafficking, but it did not include a clear definition of human 
trafficking. This decree prescribed a minimum punishment of seven 
years’ imprisonment and a fine between one million and three million 
Syrian pounds ($800 and $2,390), a penalty that was sufficiently 
stringent but, with respect to sex trafficking, not commensurate 
with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Law 
No.11/2013 criminalized all forms of recruitment and use of children 
younger than the age of 18 by the Syrian armed forces and armed 
groups; however, the government made no efforts to prosecute child 
soldiering crimes perpetrated by government and pro-regime militias, 
armed opposition groups, and designated terrorist organizations. The 
government did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting 
suspected traffickers, nor did it investigate, prosecute, or convict 
government officials complicit in human trafficking, including child 
soldiering offenses. The government did not provide anti-trafficking 
training for officials.
PROTECTION
The government did not identify or protect trafficking victims. The 
government did not protect children from forcible recruitment and 
use as soldiers and in support roles by government forces and pro-
government armed groups, armed opposition groups, and terrorist 
organizations. The government continued to severely punish victims 
for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit, such as 
child soldiering and prostitution. The government routinely arrested, 
detained, raped, tortured, and executed children for alleged association 
with armed groups and made no effort to offer these children any 
protection services. During the reporting period, there were isolated 
reports of the government detaining women and children—including 
unaccompanied children—across Syria for suspected family ties 
to foreign ISIS fighters; some of these individuals may have been 
unidentified trafficking victims. The government neither encouraged 
trafficking victims to assist in investigations or prosecutions of their 
traffickers nor provided foreign victims with legal alternatives to their 
removal to countries in which they may face hardship or retribution.
PREVENTION
The government made no effort to prevent human trafficking; the 
government’s actions continued to amplify the magnitude of human 
trafficking crimes in the country. The government did not implement 
measures to prevent children from unlawful recruitment and use 
as combatants and in support roles by government, pro-regime 
militias, opposition armed groups, and terrorist organizations. The 
government did not raise awareness of human trafficking among 
the general public or officials. The government did not report efforts 
to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts, nor did it prevent 
child sex tourism by Syrian nationals abroad. The government did 
not provide anti-trafficking training for its diplomatic personnel.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Syria, and traffickers exploit Syrian victims 
abroad. The situation in Syria continues to deteriorate amid the 
ongoing conflict with sub-state armed groups of varying ideologies 
exerting control over wide geographic swaths of the country’s territory. 
As of December 2020, human rights groups and international 
organizations estimate between 220,000 and 550,000 people have 
been killed since the beginning of protests against the Bashar al-
Assad regime in March 2011. This vast discrepancy is due in large 
part to the number of missing and disappeared Syrians whose fates 
remained unknown. More than half of Syria’s pre-war population of 
23 million has been displaced; as of September 2020, the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees reported there were 6.6 million IDPs, 
2.6 million of whom were children, and more than 5.5 million 
Syrian-registered refugees outside the country. Syrians that remain 
displaced in the country and those living as refugees in neighboring 
countries are extremely vulnerable to traffickers. Syrian children are 
reportedly vulnerable to forced early marriages, including to members 
of terrorist groups such as ISIS—which can lead to sexual slavery and 
forced labor—and children displaced within the country continue to 
be subjected to forced labor, particularly by organized begging rings.
Despite the territorial defeat of ISIS at the beginning of 2019, it 
continued to force local Syrian girls and women in ISIS-controlled 
areas into marriages with its fighters, and it routinely subjected women 
and girls from minority groups into forced marriages, domestic 
servitude, systematic rape, sexual slavery, and other forms of sexual 
violence. Incidents of human trafficking increased, and trafficking 
victims were trapped in Syria in 2014 when ISIS consolidated its 
control of the eastern governorates of Raqqa and Deir al-Zour. 
ISIS publicly released guidelines on how to capture, forcibly hold, 
and sexually abuse female slaves. As reported by an international 
organization, ISIS militants’ system of organized sexual slavery and 
forced marriage is a central element of the terrorist group’s ideology 
and systemic means of oppression. ISIS subjected girls as young as 
nine years old, including Yezidi girls abducted from Iraq and brought 
to Syria, to sexual slavery and other forms of sexual violence. Although 
ISIS no longer maintains territory inside Syria at the end of 2020, 
according to an NGO, approximately 2,800 Yezidi women and girls 
remain missing; reports indicate some of these women and girls 
remained with ISIS in eastern Syria or were held in Al-Hol camp. 
The recruitment and use of children in combat in Syria remains 
common, and since the beginning of 2018 international observers 
reported a continuation in incidents of recruitment and use by armed 
groups. Syrian government forces, pro-regime militias, and armed 
non-state actors, including the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and FSA-
affiliated groups, Kurdish forces, ISIS, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), 
al-Qa’ida, and Jabhat al-Nusra—the al-Qa’ida affiliate in Syria—recruit 
and use boys and girls as child soldiers. Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS 
also have used children as human shields, suicide bombers, snipers, 
and executioners. Militants also use children for forced labor and as 
informants, exposing them to retaliation and extreme punishment. 
Some armed groups fighting for the Syrian government, such as 
Hezbollah, and pro-regime militias known as the National Defense 
Forces, or “shabiha,” forcibly recruit children as young as six years 
old. During the reporting period, there were reports armed groups, 
including the Syrian National Army and Samarqand Brigade, abducted 
or recruited children to be used in hostilities outside of Syria, in 
particular in Libya. ISIS forces continue to deploy children—some 
as young as eight years old—into hostilities. Despite the territorial 
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defeat of ISIS, it continued to target children for indoctrination at 
schools and camps for IDPs, endangering children and preventing 
their access to education. Before the liberation of Raqqa in October 
2017, ISIS operated at least three child training camps in the city, 
where it forced children to attend indoctrination seminars and 
promised children salaries, mobile phones, weapons, a martyr’s place 
in paradise, and the “gift” of a wife upon joining the terrorist group. 
The Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG and YPJ) in northwest 
Syria continued to recruit, train, and use boys and girls as young as 12 
years old. Since 2017, international observers reported that YPG and 
YPJ recruited—at times by force—children from displacement camps 
in northeast Syria. NGOs alleged that some Popular Mobilization 
Forces-affiliated militias in Iraq recruited boys in Iraq to fight in Syria. 
As in previous reporting periods, credible sources widely reported that 
Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Iranian Basij 
Resistance Force, and IRGC-supported militias actively recruited and 
used—including through force or coercive means—Afghan children 
and adults, Afghan migrant and refugee men and children living in 
Iran, Syrian children, and Iranian children, to fight in IRGC-led and 
-funded Shia militias deployed to Syria. 
Terrorist groups, including ISIS and HTS, reportedly forced, coerced, 
or fraudulently recruited foreigners—including migrants from Central 
Asia and women, including Western women—to join them. Central 
Asian women traveling with men to Syria are also vulnerable to sex 
trafficking and forced labor on arrival; many are reportedly placed 
alongside other Central Asian family members in makeshift camp 
communities, where their travel and identity documentation is 
confiscated, and their freedom of movement is restricted. Many of 
these women report having lost their husbands to armed conflict, 
after which their economic hardships and confinement in the 
camps make them vulnerable to coercive local marriages that may 
feature corollary sex trafficking or forced labor indicators. During 
the reporting period, thousands of foreign women remained in IDP 
camps across northeastern Syria, and some had suspected family ties 
to foreign ISIS fighters; some of these individuals may have been 
unidentified trafficking victims. As of January 2021, an international 
organization reported 27,000 children, including 8,000 children of 
foreign terrorist fighters, remained at IDP camps across northeastern 
Syria, including Al-Hol, managed by the Syrian Democratic Forces 
(SDF); humanitarian actors had access to these camps to provide 
services. A portion of these children were potential human trafficking 
victims used in direct hostilities or in support roles by armed groups, 
including ISIS. In February 2021, an international organization 
reported the repatriation of foreign children from camps across 
northeastern Syria had slowed significantly due to the pandemic. 
During the reporting period, the SDF and Syrian government detained 
children, including trafficking victims, for their alleged association 
with armed groups. An international organization verified at least 
11 cases of sexual violence against girls in detention by government 
forces that occurred in previous years. 
In June 2019, the SDF, and by association the YPG and YPJ, took steps 
to end the recruitment and use of children and demobilize children 
within SDF ranks after adopting a UN Security Council Resolution-
mandated action plan. In 2020, the UN confirmed the SDF had 
demobilized 86 children, including 56 girls, and, working with the 
Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (SNES), returned 
them to their families for community-based reintegration, pursuant 
to UN requests. The SDF and SNES in August 2020 announced the 
establishment of the Civil Complaints Mechanism, a key component 
of the child soldier demobilization initiative, which provides parents 
a single SNES and SDF point of contact to inquire about, identify, and 
demobilize children from the SDF. In 2020, the SDF also continued 
implementing the action plan by facilitating training on it with an 
international organization and withdrawing from schools it was 
using for military purposes. 
In July 2020, a nongovernmental organization reported government 
officials subjected LGBTQI+ persons in Syria to various forms of 
sexual violence, including cases amounting to sexual slavery, in 
military detention centers, prisons, and checkpoints. Isolated media 
reporting alleged Syrian men were fraudulently recruited to fight in the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict believing they were going to Azerbaijan 
for work opportunities. In July 2020, the Indonesian government 
repatriated 104 Indonesian migrant workers from Syria, some of 
whom may have been trafficking victims. In January 2021, media 
reported traffickers fraudulently recruited dozens of Filipino domestic 
workers to work in the United Arab Emirates but instead transported 
them to Damascus for forced domestic work; media reported the 
Government of Philippines repatriated 34 victims in February 2021. 
The Syrian refugee population is highly vulnerable to sex trafficking 
and forced labor in neighboring countries, particularly Jordan, 
Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey. International organizations report a high 
number of child and early marriages of Syrian girls among refugee 
populations, which increases their vulnerability to trafficking. Syrian 
refugee women and girls are also vulnerable to forced or “temporary 
marriages”—for the purpose of commercial sex and other forms of 
exploitation—and other forms of sex trafficking in refugee camps, 
Lebanon, Jordan, and cities in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region, including 
Sulaimaniya. Illicit prostitution rings in Turkey and Lebanon compel 
Syrian refugee women and girls into sex trafficking. In Turkey, some 
female Syrian refugees are reportedly exploited in sex or labor 
trafficking after accepting fraudulent job offers to work in hair salons, 
modeling, entertainment, or domestic work. In Turkey, Lebanon, 
and Jordan, Syrian refugee children continue to engage in street 
begging or peddling goods, some of which may be forced or coerced. 
Syrian children are also observed working in Turkey’s agricultural 
sector and informally in textile workshops and the service sector, 
where they experience long working hours, low wages, and poor 
working conditions; children in these sectors may be vulnerable to 
forced labor. In Jordan and Lebanon, traffickers force Syrian refugee 
children to work in agriculture alongside their families; in Lebanon’s 
Bekaa Valley, Syrian gangs force refugee adults and children to work 
in agriculture under harsh conditions, including physical abuse, 
with little to no pay. LGBTQI+ persons among the Syrian refugee 
population in Lebanon are reportedly vulnerable to sex trafficking. 
During the reporting period, Sudanese authorities identified seven 
Syrian trafficking victims in Khartoum. 
TAIWAN: TIER 1
Taiwan authorities fully meet the minimum standards for the 
elimination of trafficking. Authorities continued to demonstrate 
serious and sustained efforts during the reporting period, considering 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on their anti-trafficking 
capacity; therefore Taiwan remained on Tier 1. These efforts included 
investigating and sentencing more traffickers to significant prison 
terms. Authorities identified the highest number of victims in three 
years, with increased identification of children and domestic victims. 
In addition, authorities continued to enhance victim identification 
protocols and labor inspection resources in the vulnerable maritime 
industries and recovered more illegally withheld wages from 
abusive fishing vessel operators than in 2019. Although Taiwan 
met the minimum standards and individual agencies established 
and disseminated improved victim identification methodologies, 
some official stakeholders continued to operate under disparate and 
often ineffective victim identification procedures, complicating some 
victims’ access to justice and protective care. Authorities’ insufficient 
staffing and inspection protocols continued to impede efforts to 
identify, investigate, and prosecute forced labor on fishing vessels 
in Taiwan’s highly vulnerable Distant Water Fleet (DWF). Taiwan 
authorities’ lack of specific labor laws ensuring the rights of migrant 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase inspections and, where appropriate, prosecute the senior 
crew and owners of Taiwan-owned and -flagged as well as Taiwan-
owned, foreign-flagged fishing vessels suspected of forced labor in the 
DWF, including vessels stopping in special foreign docking zones. • 
Implement port entry restrictions for Taiwan-flagged, foreign-owned 
fishing vessels whose operators have a trafficking criminal record 
or have otherwise been implicated in trafficking crimes overseas. 
• Increase efforts to prosecute and convict traffickers under the 
anti-trafficking law, and sentence convicted traffickers to adequate 
penalties, which should include significant prison terms. • Enact and 
implement policies to expedite maritime forced labor investigations 
and reduce suspect flight. • Expand the mandate of foreign port-based 
Fisheries Agency (FA) personnel to include detection of forced labor 
indicators, and train all maritime inspection authorities on victim 
identification, referral, and law enforcement notification procedures. • 
Conduct comprehensive, victim-centered interviews to screen foreign 
fishing crewmembers for forced labor indicators during portside and 
at-sea vessel inspections. • Formally include civil society input into 
the labor broker evaluation process. • Amend relevant policies and 
legislative loopholes to eliminate the imposition of all recruitment 
and service fees and deposits on workers, and by coordinating with 
sending countries to facilitate direct hiring. • Strengthen oversight of 
all foreign worker recruitment and placement agencies and processes 
to screen for abuse indicators, including illegal fee requirements and 
contract discrepancies. • Continue to strengthen efforts to screen for 
trafficking among vulnerable populations, including foreign students 
recruited to for-profit universities; individuals returned to Taiwan 
in connection with alleged overseas criminal activity; and foreign 
workers falling out of visa status within Taiwan after fleeing abusive 
working conditions and/or surrendering to immigration authorities, 
and refer them to protective services. • Increase transparency of the 
fishing vessel monitoring system, including by publishing information 
on vessel ownership and operating locations. • Clearly define roles 
and responsibilities for, and increase coordination between, the 
agencies that oversee Taiwan-owned and -flagged as well as Taiwan-
owned, foreign-flagged fishing vessels. • Enact legislation that would 
address gaps in basic labor protections for household caregivers and 
domestic workers. • Enact a full ban on the retention of migrant 
workers’ identity and travel documentation. • Extend trafficking 
victim identification authority to key stakeholder agencies. • Increase 
resources for and implement anti-trafficking training for police, 
prosecutors, and judges. • Strengthen efforts to publicize the foreign 
worker trafficking hotline number among migrant crewmembers of 
Taiwan-owned and -flagged fishing vessels and train hotline personnel 
on victim-centered approaches.
PROSECUTION
Taiwan authorities increased law enforcement efforts, but they 
did not commit adequate resources to or sufficiently prioritize 
the detection, investigation, or prosecution of forced labor crimes 
in the coastal-offshore or DWF fishing industries. The Human 
Trafficking Prevention and Control Act (HTPCA) criminalized all 
forms of trafficking and prescribed penalties of up to seven years’ 
imprisonment and fines of up to 5 million New Taiwan Dollars 
(NT) ($178,100); these penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with 
respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for 
other serious crimes, such as rape. Observers noted ambiguities in 
HTPCA provisions complicated implementation in cases where victims 
received some financial compensation. Other HTPCA provisions 
protected workers from having to remit “unreasonable payments 
of debt” to brokers or supervisors; observers expressed concern that 
these provisions were too vague to effectively prevent debt-based 
coercion. HTPCA amendments enacted in 2018 increased penalties 
to a maximum of one year in prison and a possible fine of 300,000 
NT ($10,690) for individuals who, “through recruitment, seduction, 
shelter, arrangement, assistance, exploitation, or other means, cause 
a child to act as a host or hostess in a bar or club or engage in acts 
associated with tour escort and singing or dancing companion 
services that involve sexual activities.” The amendment prescribed 
a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment and a possible fine 
of 1.5 million NT ($53,430) for such crimes committed by means of 
“violence, coercion, drugs, fraud, hypnosis, or other means violating 
the free will of the child or youth concerned.” In 2019, authorities 
formed an interagency working group to seek civil society input 
for revising the HTPCA; in December, authorities submitted draft 
amendments to the Executive Yuan, where they remained pending at 
the end of the reporting period. Authorities continued to prosecute 
the majority of trafficking cases under other laws in the criminal 
code and the Child and Youth Sexual Exploitation Prevention Act 
(CYSEPA); some penalties prescribed for child sex trafficking offenses 
under these laws were not sufficiently stringent or commensurate 
with other grave crimes, such as rape, although other laws retained 
appropriate penalties. Authorities prosecuted and convicted some 
traffickers under criminal code provisions proscribing crimes outside 
the standard definition of trafficking, such as Article 231 (forced sexual 
intercourse or obscene acts), Article 296 (“trading or mortgaging of 
humans”), and Article 302 (false imprisonment), some of which 
carried lesser penalties. 
Authorities reported arresting 458 individuals on suspicion of 
trafficking crimes in 2020 (unreported in 2019), culminating in 159 
new criminal trafficking investigations—29 cases of alleged labor 
trafficking and 130 cases of alleged sex trafficking—completed and 
referred to prosecutors for additional processing, compared with 
143 total investigations in 2019. Ten investigations initiated in 2019, 
including eight sex trafficking cases and two forced labor cases, were 
also concluded and transferred to prosecutors; these were ongoing 
at the end of the reporting period. Authorities newly prosecuted 
116 individuals under a total of 120 trafficking charges—25 forced 
labor charges and 95 sex trafficking charges—compared with 122 
total in 2019. This figure included 58 individuals indicted under the 
CYSEPA, 15 under the HTPCA, and 43 under other laws and sections 
of the criminal code (compared with 48 under CYSEPA, 23 under 
HTPCA, and 43 under other laws in 2019). The 15 individuals indicted 
under HTPCA included eight charged with sex trafficking and seven 
charged with labor trafficking (nine and 14, respectively, in 2019). 
Authorities convicted 50 traffickers; this included four individuals 
convicted for forced labor, 45 convicted for sex trafficking, and one 
convicted for both forced labor and sex trafficking (compared with 
seven for forced labor and 43 for sex trafficking in 2019). In prior 
years, authorities ascribed the tendency to impose lenient penalties to 
Taiwan’s judicial evaluation and promotion system, which reportedly 
penalized judges if courts granted convicted individuals’ appeals to 
overturn or shorten their sentences. However, for the third consecutive 
year, sentences imposed on the majority of convicted traffickers (at 
least 43, compared with at least 27 in 2019) were greater than one 
year imprisonment. As in prior years, law enforcement bodies and 
court authorities maintained disparate statistical records on anti-
trafficking cases; as such, the true number of trafficking indictments, 
prosecutions, convictions, and sentences—including those processed 
through appeals in multiple court systems—may have been higher 
than reported. 
Although pandemic-related restrictions on large gatherings curtailed 
some training activities, authorities allocated 1 million NT ($35,620) 
to train more than 3,000 law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and 
judges through a wide range of virtual workshops, seminars, and 




estimated cost of 7.85 million NT ($279,620) in 2019). Nonetheless, 
authorities and NGOs noted court personnel perceiving cases as labor 
disputes rather than trafficking crimes continued to hinder effective 
prosecution of labor trafficking cases. In previous years, labor rights 
groups alleged some low-level corruption among local government 
officials impeded action against forced labor in the fishing industry, 
although no such allegations were reported in 2020. Authorities did 
not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of officials 
complicit in human trafficking offenses. However, the National 
Immigration Agency (NIA) did identify and refer to prosecutors a 
Taiwan-based foreign government official suspected of colluding 
with her Taiwan citizen spouse to recruit three foreign nationals 
for sex trafficking in Taiwan; the case was ongoing at the end of the 
reporting period. Despite coordination obstacles to international law 
enforcement due to Taiwan’s unique diplomatic status, authorities 
continued to conduct joint anti-trafficking investigations with several 
countries, including Kosovo, Montenegro, Paraguay, Serbia, and 
Vietnam. Taiwan’s laws criminalized sexual exploitation of children 
by Taiwan passport holders traveling abroad, but authorities have not 
investigated or prosecuted any child sex tourism offenses committed 
abroad since 2006. Authorities reported one Taiwanese individual 
was investigated in Japan for child sexual exploitation; case details 
were insufficient to determine whether Taiwan cooperated on the 
case, or whether the relevant crime included genuine trafficking 
elements as established in international law. Taiwan authorities 
investigated eight foreign nationals—three from Vietnam and one 
each from South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines, and South 
Africa—for suspected CYSEPA violations, but they did not report 
whether these constituted child sex tourism crimes or other forms 
of exploitation proscribed under CYSEPA. 
Authorities reported 2,617 inspections of recruitment brokers in 2020 
(compared with 2,813 in 2019); authorities ascribed this decrease—the 
first in five years—in part to pandemic-related challenges. They did 
not report any criminal investigations, prosecutions, convictions, 
or incarcerations of brokers engaged in illegal acts contributing to 
trafficking as a result of these inspections. Separately, in December the 
Taichung District Prosecutor did initiate proceedings under the HTPCA 
against an individual affiliated with a licensed recruitment broker 
for allegedly using shell manufacturing companies to fraudulently 
hire migrant workers for informal, unlawfully low-wage positions 
in the construction sector. Also in December, authorities charged 
another licensed brokerage agency in Yilan under the HTPCA for 
falsely reporting migrant fishermen as “missing,” and for registering 
others under falsified employment rosters to facilitate their work 
in separate positions in the informal economy. The FA reported 
conducting random inspections on 124 fishing vessels, including 
102 at domestic ports, 20 at foreign ports, and two on the high 
seas, interviewing a total of 658 crewmembers (compared with 199 
inspections—82 at domestic ports, 74 at foreign ports, and 43 on 
the high seas, interviewing a total of 720 crew—in 2019). Inspectors 
uncovered 141 violations relating to contract issues, excessive overtime, 
and wage discrepancies (88 in 2019); authorities referred eight cases 
to prosecutors—six involving Taiwan-flagged DWF vessels and two 
involving Taiwan-owned, foreign-flagged vessels; six remained 
under investigation, and inspectors did not report whether the 
referrals were the result of the aforementioned inspections (three 
referred under the HTPCA in 2019; three in 2018). In previous years, 
judicial officials noted bureaucratic lags generated by complicated 
reporting hierarchies also impeded timely law enforcement response 
in maritime cases, allowing some alleged perpetrators to flee long 
before the competent authorities could begin formal investigations. In 
an effort to mitigate these delays, Taiwan’s interagency anti-trafficking 
task force worked with the FA to complete and promulgate a policy 
granting police and prosecutors the authority to initiate maritime 
forced labor investigations immediately upon receipt of complaints, 
rather than following lengthier bureaucratic approval processes. 
Civil society groups continued to decry systemic shortcomings in 
Taiwan’s maritime anti-trafficking law enforcement evidenced by 
lack of robust investigations into formal complaints filed by NGOs 
and human rights watchdogs. Only nine of the 32 international 
ports authorized for use by Taiwan DWF vessels had assigned FA 
inspectors (an increase from eight in 2019), and observers noted 
these personnel operated under mandates that were largely limited 
to detection of environmental abuses, rather than labor abuses. 
Taiwan’s unique diplomatic status reportedly complicated ongoing 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and FA efforts to continue placing 
additional personnel in resident FA positions abroad. Division of 
responsibility for foreign fishermen between Ministry of Labor 
(MOL) and the FA continued to hinder the coordination necessary to 
prosecute maritime forced labor cases. The FA attempted to address 
some of these insufficiencies by promulgating new guidelines on 
victim identification and law enforcement notification procedures 
for inspections of fishing vessels operating in both the DWF and 
in domestic waters. The guidelines also included new instructions 
to guide FA personnel on how to identify labor conditions that 
would warrant referral to prosecutors as possible trafficking crimes; 
authorities did not provide specific information on implementation 
of these guidelines during the reporting period. 
PROTECTION
Authorities increased protection efforts, but implementation 
of monitoring and referral procedures remained insufficient to 
adequately identify and provide services to forced labor victims among 
the foreign crewmembers aboard Taiwan-flagged and -owned and 
Taiwan-flagged, foreign-owned fishing vessels. Officials reportedly 
continued to be less proactive in identifying victims of forced labor 
than victims of sex trafficking due to definitional ambiguities in the 
HTPCA. By law, only NIA officials, police, and prosecutors could 
formally identify victims, while MOL and the FA and other relevant 
stakeholders were required to follow notification procedures to report 
possible victim status. NGOs and prosecutors believed some victims 
went undetected under this arrangement; as such, they continued to 
advocate for authorities to allow social workers, labor inspectors and 
other stakeholders to independently identify victims as well. Law 
enforcement authorities used standardized questions and evaluation 
forms when interviewing and referring potential trafficking victims, 
including among foreigners accused of having committed immigration 
violations. During the reporting period, they identified 322 trafficking 
victims (208 exploited in sex trafficking and 114 in forced labor), of 
whom they referred 83 to shelters for assistance, compared with 300 
identified and 202 referred to shelters in 2019. Of the 322 victims 
identified, 143 were foreign and 168 were children (compared with 
169 and 98, respectively, in 2019); this significant increase in the 
identification of Taiwanese and child victims was consistent with a 
reported increase in the commercial sexual exploitation of children 
during the pandemic. At least 48 of the forced labor victims were 
migrant women (unreported in 2019). Seventeen of the victims were 
identified and referred to protection services via Taiwan’s public 
hotline, and at least 13 were referred by the authorities to shelters 
run by the Vietnamese Migrant Workers’ Office. 
MOL and NIA continued to fund civil society organizations to 
provide protection services to trafficking victims as outlined under 
the HTPCA. MOL maintained its annual budget for overall victim 
protection at 18 million NT ($641,160), and NIA allocated 18 million 
NT ($641,160) for operation of the two shelters, equaling its 2019 
earmark; both ministries may have redirected some of these funds 
to pandemic-mitigation activities. Shelters generally continued their 
work unabated by the pandemic in 2020 but assisted fewer victims 
than in previous years; NGO contacts attributed the marked decrease 
in shelter referrals to stakeholder ministries’ pandemic-related 
redirection of resources, rather than to pandemic-related capacity or 
staffing limitations. NIA operated two shelters dedicated to foreign 
trafficking victims who had not acquired work visas. Citing security 
concerns, authorities limited shelter access for victims from the 
People’s Republic of China to NIA shelters, while other nationals 
could access a wider array of NGO shelter services. NIA shelters 
provided both male and female trafficking victims with medical 





small stipends, language interpretation, and repatriation assistance; 
authorities reported offering these services to foreign trafficking 
victims in a total of 1,162 instances, including 517 instances of 
interpretation assistance and nine instances of legal aid (compared 
with 2,697 instances of service provision, including 1,081 cases of 
interpretation assistance and 13 instances of legal aid in 2019). 
NIA administered questionnaires to foreign trafficking victims at 
the conclusion of all publicly-funded short-term care regarding the 
quality of food, healthcare, legal and employment assistance, and 
other such services; in 2020, more than 80 percent of respondents 
reported having been highly satisfied. MOL subsidized an additional 
22 “resettlement facilities” and maintained a separate 24-hour 
migrant worker hotline, from which the FA reported fielding and 
investigating 75 complaints from migrant fishermen. Authorities 
reported not having the jurisdiction to further investigate 27 of these 
calls because they had originated from crew aboard foreign-flagged 
fishing vessels; however, they resolved 42 of the remaining cases, 
leading to the recovery of approximately 870,000 NT ($30,990) 
in improperly withheld or deducted wages in 2020 (compared 
with 568,820 NT, or $20,260, in 2019). Six of the cases were under 
investigation at the end of the reporting period. In previous years, 
observers noted crewmembers aboard vessels in the DWF may have 
had difficulties accessing the MOL hotline due to limited awareness 
of its existence and restrictions on their communication imposed by 
senior vessel crew. Some migrant fishermen have alleged significant 
lags in hotline response times, and that hotline staff had relayed 
expressed complaints directly back to senior vessel crew, thereby 
exposing callers to potential retaliation. The National Police Agency 
(NPA) and NIA each ran its own hotline – the latter in 24-hour 
operation and offering Chinese and English language services. Calls 
to the three hotline systems resulted in the positive identification of 
17 trafficking victims and the initiation of 18 investigations during 
the reporting period (compared with seven victims identified from at 
least 30 calls received and investigated in 2019). Civil society contacts 
continued to call for expansion of formal victim designation authority 
in order to enhance identification through these and other channels. 
Authorities reported granting foreign victims 58 temporary residency 
extensions and 69 work permits in 2020 (compared with 56 new 
temporary residence permits, 107 extended temporary residence 
permits conferred in a previous reporting period, and 57 temporary 
work permits in 2019). During pandemic-related travel restrictions, 
authorities granted immigration extensions to foreign victims unable 
to return to their home countries in order for them to benefit from 
shelter services and other assistance. Authorities also allowed migrant 
workers with residence permits that had been expired for less than 90 
days to renew these permits and avoid deportation through payment 
of a fine. However, this relief did not apply to migrant seafarers, many 
of whom were required to remain on their vessels, face fines if they 
attempted to come ashore, or transfer to employment on other ships 
through informal arrangements that may have catalyzed additional 
trafficking vulnerabilities. NIA officials reportedly worked with shelter 
organizations to facilitate the repatriation of 17 foreign trafficking 
victims in 2020, compared with 59 in 2019; authorities attributed 
this decrease to pandemic-related travel and entry restrictions. 
NIA also issued alien residence certificates to 13 stateless Tibetans 
during the reporting period. No Taiwanese individuals exploited 
in trafficking overseas requested repatriation assistance in 2020 
(compared with repatriation assistance for 21 Taiwan victims with 
work visas and 38 Taiwan victims without work visas in 2019). 
Authorities encouraged victims to participate in their traffickers’ 
criminal investigations by allowing them to testify outside of the 
courtroom or through video equipment. In 2020, the Ministry of 
Interior issued guidelines instructing front-line officers and judicial 
officials handling trafficking cases to provide foreign victims or their 
representatives with all relevant documents, solicit their feedback, 
and confirm they understood the information provided during the 
judicial process, among other considerations. Authorities permitted 
victims to obtain compensation through out-of-court settlements 
or file civil suits against traffickers but required them to provide all 
relevant evidence themselves. District courts concluded four civil 
suits awarding a total of 7.93 million NT ($282,470) to trafficking 
victims in 2020 (compared with four out of five civil suits concluded 
in favor of plaintiffs with compensation orders totaling more than 
18.7 million NT, or $666,100, in 2019); two of the cases were under 
appeal at the end of the reporting period. At year’s end, six Indonesian 
and Vietnamese migrant workers had requested prosecutors settle 
with their alleged traffickers out of court; none of the victims had 
successfully reached settlement or received compensation by the end 
of the reporting period. According to the aforementioned NIA survey, 
the most common complaints among foreign trafficking victims at 
the conclusion of their publicly-funded protection services involved 
the quality of legal counseling, the lengthy duration of judicial 
proceedings, and general difficulty in obtaining compensation from 
their traffickers. 
NGOs and official stakeholders continued to stress the need for Taiwan 
to pass a long-stalled domestic worker protection bill that would 
mandate hours of rest, days off, and annual leave. Amendments to 
the Employment Services Act that entered into force in 2018 required 
employment agencies to report abuses their clients committed against 
migrant workers—especially foreign household caregivers—or 
face severe fines. The amendments also banned employers from 
retaining passports, work permits, or any identity documents of 
migrant domestic workers and fishermen without their consent. 
Civil society groups argued these amendments were insufficient 
to deter forced labor, as employers were reportedly easily able 
to coerce migrant workers into “voluntarily” turning over their 
identity documentation. Lawmakers reported easing respite care 
regulations in 2018 to encourage employers to grant workers annual 
leave, ostensibly mitigating a key freedom of movement concern 
for migrant workers employed as household caregivers. However, 
NGOs claimed these administrative changes did little to enhance 
migrant domestic worker protections in implementation; instead, 
they continued to call for an amendment to bring migrant domestic 
workers under the broader protections and jurisdictions outlined 
in Taiwan’s Labor Standards Act, or to adopt and implement new 
legislation to enhance relevant protections. 
Taiwan’s Labor Standards Act did not protect fishing workers hired 
to work aboard DWF vessels, who instead fell under the jurisdiction 
of the FA. The FA maintained regulations that standardized fishing 
workers’ employment contracts, set a minimum wage with direct 
payment options, provided medical and life insurance, unified 
working hours and rest time, and established access to new complaint 
mechanisms. However, NGOs remained concerned that the minimum 
compensation established in these regulations remained below 
Taiwan’s broader minimum wage, and that senior vessel crew 
continued to delay or withhold salary remittance in violation of 
contractual pay schedules, leaving some foreign fishing workers 
vulnerable to debt-based coercion. Civil society contacts described 
the FA’s purview over Taiwan fishermen’s associations—which 
played a role in the approval of labor recruitment systems—as a 
possible conflict of interest. Observers reported insufficient FA 
staffing and oversight mechanisms in the DWF were permissive of 
forced labor and other abuses. In an effort to enhance this oversight, 
in 2019 authorities agreed to pursue regulatory “harmonization” 
with the contents of the ILO Work in Fishing Convention (C188); 
the language required standardized working conditions and benefits 
and raised the minimum wage for DWF and coastal-offshore migrant 
fishermen. However, implementation measures remained under 
consideration at the end of the reporting period for a second year. 
Proposed amendments to the HTPCA aimed at improving the victim 
identification process and expanding victim benefits, including 
by increasing visa validity to trigger eligibility for national health 
insurance, were also incomplete at the end of the reporting period 
for a third year. During the reporting period, the FA promulgated new 
guidelines on victim identification and law enforcement notification 
procedures for inspections of fishing vessels operating in both the 




indicator questionnaires for migrant fishermen and senior vessel crew 
intended to detect cases of debt-based coercion, restricted freedom 
of movement, wage irregularities, physical abuse, retention of travel 
and identity documents, and other such forced labor indicators. They 
also outlined specific responsibilities among stakeholder agencies 
for the proper detection and referral of potential trafficking cases 
to police, MOFA, and/or foreign government counterpart agencies, 
depending on available evidence. According to NGO observers, 
some migrant fishermen were hesitant to relay their experiences to 
FA or Coast Guard interviewers due to fear of reprisal and concerns 
over personal safety. 
Taiwan law provided victims with immunity for unlawful acts 
traffickers compelled them to commit. However, unlike the previous 
reporting period, there were allegations of victim penalization in 
2020. In one illustrative case, a migrant fisherman attempted to 
file a complaint accusing his employers of forcing him to work 
overtime without pay. He fell ill, after which authorities annulled 
his work permit; police then arrested and detained him for alleged 
immigration violations, screened him without detecting trafficking 
indicators, and deported him. NGO observers disputed the results 
of the screening procedure. Civil society contacts reported limited 
or inconsistent understanding of trafficking among front-line law 
enforcement officers and judges, compounded by high turnover 
impacting institutional memory, continued to constrain victims’ 
access to protective care while leaving them vulnerable to temporary 
detention, fines, and jail time. 
PREVENTION 
Authorities maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. In January 
2021, Taiwan approved a new “2021-2022 Anti-Exploitation Action 
plan” outlining prevention of sex trafficking and forced labor among 
key vulnerable groups. A cabinet-level minister-without-portfolio 
continued to implement the national action plan and oversee an 
interagency working group that met semiannually. The working 
group maintained two subgroups—one to focus on domestic workers 
and the other on migrant fishermen—that convened meetings more 
frequently and included participation from NGOs and academics. 
Various agencies continued to fund advertisements, public service 
announcements, and other materials on trafficking and held trainings 
for vulnerable populations, including youth, foreign workers, and 
fishing sector workers. Due to pandemic-related restrictions on public 
gatherings, many publicly-funded anti-trafficking information and 
education campaigns were held via videoconference; this reportedly 
enabled more than two million people to receive information through 
such awareness-raising activities in 2020. Authorities continued to 
operate international airport service counters and foreign-worker 
service stations around Taiwan to assist foreign workers and educate 
them on their rights. During the reporting period, MOL announced 
new regulations to impose fines between 60,000 NT and 300,000 
NT (between $2,137 and $10,686) for employers who illegally dock 
migrant workers’ pay; authorities did not report implementing this 
new policy in 2020. The FA distributed multilingual cards containing 
information on worker rights and hotline numbers to foreign 
crewmembers during random inspections of ships docking at certain 
foreign ports. It also initiated a pilot program to provide free satellite-
based wireless internet for crew aboard fishing vessels to facilitate 
contact with family members and channels for communication 
of labor and safety grievances. In 2020, FA personnel conducted 
inspections of 102 DWF vessels moored in Taiwanese ports and 
interviewed 560 migrant fishermen—an increase compared to 468 
interviews on 82 vessels in domestic ports in 2019—and detected a 
total of 120 cases of unauthorized employment of foreign crew, 18 
contract violations, and three “illicit acts” by labor brokers, for which 
the FA reportedly imposed a total of 18 million NT ($641,160) in 
fines. It conducted an additional 20 random inspections of fishing 
vessels at foreign ports and two on the high seas, interviewing a total 
of approximately 98 foreign crewmembers (compared with 74 at 
foreign ports and 43 on the high seas, interviewing approximately 
252 crewmembers, in 2019). The authorities required vessel owners 
or brokers to record videos of mandatory discussions informing all 
foreign crewmembers of their basic rights prior to signing employment 
contracts; FA randomly selected 82 such video recordings from 16 
brokers during the reporting period to screen for compliance with 
these required discussions and proof of employee consent. Authorities 
reported a 96 percent compliance rate from this audit but did not 
provide information on the circumstances of, or consequences for, 
the four percent of cases in violation.
Regulations promulgated in 2017 ostensibly aimed at better protecting 
foreign fishermen contained provisions allowing brokers to charge 
unlimited fees for recruitment and unspecified “reasonable service 
items,” which likely perpetuated debt-based coercion. During the 
reporting period, authorities amended the Regulations on the 
Approval of Investment in or the Operation of Foreign Flag Fishing 
Vessels to revoke or deny licensure to Taiwanese individuals who 
owned foreign-flagged fishing vessels engaged in forced labor; they did 
not provide information on the implementation of this amendment. 
Authorities also required all Taiwan-flagged DWF vessels to have an 
International Maritime Organization identification number or Lloyd’s 
Register registration number to obtain a DWF operating license, and to 
log these registration numbers along with their radio callsigns, vessel 
names, license numbers, authorized fishing areas, and crew lists in 
a standardized FA database for 24-hour monitoring. However, these 
regulations did not apply to Taiwan-owned, foreign-flagged vessels. 
While lauding this as a positive step, many civil society observers 
stressed that increasing the transparency of the vessel monitoring 
system—particularly by publishing information on vessel ownership 
and operating location—would significantly improve anti-trafficking 
coordination between the authorities and maritime labor NGOs. 
Civil society groups noted overlapping mandates and procedural 
gaps between the MOL and the FA continued to hinder effective 
oversight of labor conditions in the fishing industry. In 2020, the 
FA sponsored a national university to conduct a field study on labor 
rights within the DWF. In June 2020, Taiwan’s Control Yuan issued 
an investigative report on the impact of insufficient migrant labor 
oversight practices on the October 2019 Nanfang’ao bridge collapse 
that killed several migrant fishermen and injured others. The report 
called on the MOL and FA to improve working conditions and ensure 
employers’ compliance with existing requirements, including on the 
enrollment of migrant fishermen in mandatory labor insurance that 
provides for workers’ compensation. NPA and NIA sponsored and 
conducted internal surveys and evaluations to enhance anti-trafficking 
law enforcement and interagency work. 
In an effort to reduce dependence on recruitment brokers, MOL 
continued to hold informational sessions to educate members of 
various industries on direct hiring options. An online Direct Hiring 
Service Center (DHSC) allowed employers to hire foreign workers 
without utilizing brokers who may charge illegally excessive fees. 
In prior years, NGOs noted the DHSC was not used widely enough 
to significantly reduce brokerage vulnerability; however, in 2020 
more than 5,000 employees and 5,800 employers benefitted from 
the service, demonstrating an annual utilization increase of 14.4 
percent and 16.7 percent, respectively. Authorities made permanent 
a small direct-hire pilot program initiated in 2019 to bring foreign 
workers into Taiwan’s agricultural sector, but civil society contacts 
claimed the program was not designed to adequately screen for 
sending countries’ compliance with recruitment fee elimination 
or other vulnerabilities. Most employers continued to deem it 
easier and more expedient to use brokers, and labor rights groups 
continued to call on the authorities to eliminate legal loopholes 
that enable excessive fees. Taiwan maintained a broker evaluation 
system initiated in 2015 that could revoke the business licenses of 
low-scoring brokerage firms and impose fines for certain violations, 
including imposition of illegal fees. During the reporting period, the 
MOL fined one broker for illegal confiscation of migrant worker’s 
identity documents and 11 brokers for charging illicit recruitment 
fees (unreported in 2019). The FA also reported using a similar 





recruitment agencies (43 in 2019), of which it suspended one and 
revoked the license of another (compared with two suspensions 
in 2019). In 2020, three DWF recruitment agencies received fines 
of 1 million NT ($35,620) each (compared with two in 2019; 
four in 2018; and six in 2017). Civil society observers continued 
to express concern the evaluation system could not be sufficiently 
objective or accurate in detecting abuses, including forced labor, 
because the authorities provided brokers with advance notification 
prior to inspections. Human rights NGOs claimed the system 
would be more effective with unannounced inspections, and if 
the authorities granted NGOs a role in the formal approval and 
licensure review process. 
Despite Taiwan’s unique diplomatic status, it maintained bilateral 
trafficking memorandums of understanding (MOUs) with 22 
foreign countries; this included a new MOU with the Philippines 
on immigration affairs and trafficking prevention signed during the 
reporting period. Among these agreements, some did not outline 
adequate screening for forced labor aboard Taiwan-owned and –
flagged or Taiwan-owned, foreign-flagged fishing vessels docking 
at certain designated foreign vessel harbor areas. Authorities made 
efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts, including 
through Tourism Bureau awareness campaigns and industry training 
sessions. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the last five years, human traffickers subject foreign 
men and women to forced labor and sex trafficking in Taiwan, and 
they subject local men and women to forced labor and local women 
and children to sex trafficking. Traffickers also subject Taiwanese 
people to forced labor in some European countries. Taiwan women 
and children are subjected to domestic sex trafficking, including as part 
of an increasing trend in which traffickers induce and exploit Taiwan 
and foreign women’s and children’s drug addictions. Taiwan traffickers 
increasingly use the internet, smartphone apps, livestreaming, and 
other such online technologies to conduct recruitment activities, 
often targeting child victims, and to mask their identities from law 
enforcement. Taiwan traffickers also exploit persons with disabilities 
in sex trafficking.
Traffickers lure women from China and Southeast Asian countries 
to Taiwan through fraudulent marriages and deceptive employment 
offers for purposes of sex trafficking. Many trafficking victims are 
migrant workers from Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, 
and, to a lesser extent, individuals from China, Cambodia, and Sri 
Lanka. Indonesian, Vietnamese, and Thai nationals continue to 
represent the majority of foreign sex trafficking and forced labor 
victims in Taiwan. Taiwan is host to approximately 714,000 foreign 
workers, most of whom are hired in their home countries through 
recruitment agencies and brokers – including some from Taiwan 
– to perform low-skilled work as home caregivers and domestic 
workers (34 percent), or in farming, manufacturing, meat processing, 
construction, and fishing. In order to pay brokers’ often exorbitantly 
high recruitment fees and deposits, some foreign workers incur 
substantial debts, which the brokers or employers use as tools of 
coercion to obtain or retain their labor. After recruitment fee and 
guarantee deposit repayments are garnished from their wages, many 
foreign workers in Taiwan earn significantly less than the minimum 
wage. Foreign workers who leave their contracted positions—nearly 
50,000 at any given time—are at particularly high risk of trafficking 
because they lose their immigration status and access to formal 
sector employment; some of them initially flee due to abusive 
work conditions, including forced labor. Domestic workers and 
home caregivers are also especially vulnerable to exploitation, since 
they often live in their employers’ residences, making it difficult to 
monitor their working and living conditions. One NGO survey found 
that 90 percent of all migrant domestic caregivers have their travel 
and identity documents withheld by their employers, constituting 
a significant freedom of movement concern. Brokers in Taiwan 
sometimes assist employers in forcibly deporting “problematic” 
foreign employees should they complain, enabling brokers to fill 
the empty positions with new foreign workers facing continued 
debt-based coercion. Some traffickers use Indonesian-owned stores 
in Taiwan as illegal remittance channels, confining Indonesian 
workers and subjecting them to sex trafficking. Traffickers reportedly 
take advantage of relaxed visa requirements under Taiwan’s “New 
Southbound Policy” to lure Southeast Asian students and tourists 
to Taiwan and subject them to forced labor and sex trafficking. 
According to NGOs, more than 200 for-profit universities in Taiwan 
aggressively recruit foreign students—particularly Indonesians—and 
subsequently place them into exploitative labor conditions under 
the pretense of educational opportunities. These students are often 
unaware of the work component prior to arrival and reportedly 
experience contract switching, excessive working hours, and poor 
living conditions contrary to their original agreements. University 
students from Sri Lanka and Eswatini who traveled to Taiwan under 
similarly deceptive circumstances have been subjected to coerced 
labor with extremely harsh working conditions in slaughterhouses 
and meat processing factories. 
Documented and undocumented Chinese, Indonesian, Filipino, 
and Vietnamese fishermen working on Taiwan-owned and -flagged 
and Taiwan-owned, foreign-flagged fishing vessels experience non- 
or under-payment of wages, long working hours, physical abuse, 
lack of food or medical care, denial of sleep and substandard safety 
equipment, and poor living conditions while indebted to complex, 
multinational brokerage networks through the continued imposition 
of recruitment fees and deposits. Migrant fishermen have reported 
senior crewmembers employ such coercive tactics as threats of physical 
violence, beatings, withholding of food and water, retention of identity 
documents, wage deductions, and non-contractual compulsory 
sharing of vessel operational costs to retain their labor. These abuses 
are particularly prevalent in Taiwan’s DWF, comprising 1,140 Taiwan-
owned and -flagged fishing vessels, as well as on 230 Taiwan-owned, 
foreign-flagged fishing vessels operating thousands of miles from 
Taiwan and without adequate oversight. According to FA estimates, 
approximately 8,000 Filipinos and more than 20,000 Indonesians 
work onboard DWF vessels. Senior crew force migrant workers to 
fish illegal stock, including threatened, endangered, and protected 
species, placing them at higher risk of criminal repercussions. Many 
ships remain at sea for years at a time, selectively disabling their 
transponders and stopping at “refrigeration mother ships” or remote, 
uninhabited islands to resupply, transfer victims to other ships, 
and offload illegally caught fish while avoiding detection by law 
enforcement. Owners or operators can easily change their fishing 
vessel’s names and nationality of registry to evade detection by law 
enforcement. Some migrant fishermen subjected to forced labor 
onboard international fishing vessels transit Taiwan ports, especially 
Kaohsiung, en route to other maritime locations. Men and women 
from Taiwan engaged in telephone scams overseas reportedly present 
indicators of trafficking.
TAJIKISTAN: TIER 2
The Government of Tajikistan does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking, but it is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Tajikistan remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
achieving a significant increase in trafficking convictions; providing 
shelter to more victims than the previous year; and continuing 
to conduct and participate in training sessions on legislation, 
investigative methods, and victim identification. However, the 
government did not meet the minimum standards in several key 
areas. The government did not approve standard operating procedures 
(SOPs) for the national referral mechanism (NRM) for the third 
consecutive year, constraining victim identification and interagency 
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anti-trafficking coordination. Despite allegations of possible official 
complicity in some localities, the government did not report any 
criminal investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government 
officials complicit in human trafficking offenses.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Adopt and implement standard operating procedures for identifying 
trafficking victims and referring them to care. • Train law enforcement 
to screen for signs of trafficking among vulnerable groups, including 
adults in commercial sex, LGBTQI+ individuals, foreign and returned 
Tajikistani migrant workers, Tajikistani nationals employed in local 
Chinese enterprises, and children and adults working in the cotton 
sector. • Ensure victims are not penalized for unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit. • While respecting due process, vigorously 
investigate and prosecute suspected traffickers, including officials 
complicit in trafficking, and sentence and incarcerate convicted 
traffickers with significant prison terms. • Continue to contribute 
funding and in-kind support to provide comprehensive care to 
victims and expand available protection services for male victims. 
• Increase oversight of provincial and local authorities’ seasonal 
labor recruitment processes to ensure no adults or children are 
subjected to forced labor in the cotton harvest and hold those in 
violation criminally accountable. • In partnership with international 
organizations, conduct screening among women and children returned 
from Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan for trafficking and child soldiering 
indicators, respectively, and provide them with rehabilitation and 
reintegration support. • Improve the collection of anti-trafficking 
law enforcement data and statistics on labor migration trends. • 
Increase awareness of pre-departure and post-return support services 
available to Tajikistani migrant workers. • Provide anti-trafficking 
training or guidance for diplomatic personnel and other government 
employees, including law enforcement officers, border guards, and 
customs officials, to prevent their engagement in or facilitation of 
trafficking crimes and to increase their capacity to identify and assist 
victims. • Monitor private employment agencies for recruitment fees 
charged to workers and take steps to eliminate employee-paid fees.
PROSECUTION
The government increased anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. 
Article 130.1 and Article 167 of the criminal code criminalized labor 
trafficking and sex trafficking and prescribed penalties of five to eight 
years’ imprisonment, which were sufficiently stringent and, with 
regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as rape. Article 167 defined child 
trafficking broadly to include illegal adoption without the purpose 
of exploitation; as such it was difficult to ascertain how many cases 
investigated, prosecuted, and convicted under Article 167 featured 
elements consistent with the standard definition of trafficking. 
Redirection of government resources for pandemic mitigation 
constrained anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. The government 
investigated 10 trafficking cases involving 21 suspected perpetrators 
in 2020, compared with 19 cases involving 32 suspected traffickers 
in 2019. The government did not provide updated information on 
an investigation initiated in 2017 into four private employment 
agencies suspected of facilitating the trafficking of Tajikistani victims 
in Saudi Arabia, nor on the investigation of a suspected Tajikistani 
trafficker allegedly residing in Germany initiated in a prior reporting 
period. The government prosecuted 14 trafficking cases involving 26 
defendants in 2020, compared with 20 cases involving 35 defendants 
in 2019. Courts convicted all 26 individuals—a significant increase 
from four convictions in 2019; the government did not provide 
sentencing data for these convictions, compared with four traffickers 
receiving reduced sentences of two years’ probation each in 2019. 
Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained 
significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action during the 
year. Some state employees may have been subjected to forced labor 
as part of provincial authorities’ efforts to increase participation in 
the annual cotton harvest, although no information was available 
on compensation, methods of recruitment, or consequences for 
inability or unwillingness to participate. Although authorities opened 
a criminal case into a senior military official for exacting bribes in 
exchange for exempting an individual from mandatory military 
service— an arrangement under which failure to pay has often resulted 
in kidnapping and forcible conscription— the government did not 
report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government 
employees complicit in human trafficking offenses. The Ministry 
of Internal Affairs (MIA) continued to conduct training on human 
trafficking for cadets as part of its training academy curriculum. State 
university law students received training on trafficking legislation 
and investigative techniques as part of a government-mandated 
curriculum. The government also cooperated with an international 
organization to train judicial officials on methods for successfully 
prosecuting trafficking cases in criminal courts. Tajikistan maintained 
a joint law enforcement agreement with the Commonwealth of 
Independent States that included anti-trafficking provisions, but 
authorities did not report information on whether the agreement 
was implemented in 2020. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained protection efforts. Tajikistan continued 
to operate under an NRM that included formal written procedures 
outlining some screening, referral, and assistance protocols, but 
these were generally insufficient to guide interagency anti-trafficking 
work. In 2018, the government established a working group to 
append the NRM with SOPs for victim identification; for the third 
consecutive year, authorities did not take action to adopt these 
guidelines. Authorities identified 24 trafficking victims during the 
reporting period, compared with 53 in 2019, and referred 15 to 
protection services (unreported in 2019). The government did 
not provide additional information on the victims’ nationalities, 
genders, ages, locations, or types of exploitation. Article 30 of 
the trafficking law mandated the creation of governmental and 
private institutions to directly aid victims with food and shelter in 
addition to social, legal, and reintegration assistance; despite these 
provisions, an international organization continued to fund most 
victim protection services. A 2014 victim protection law ostensibly 
formalized the roles of agencies tasked with providing services and 
established standards for service delivery among government and 
NGO providers. However, absent standardized and promulgated 
victim identification procedures, roles and responsibilities among 
key stakeholder ministries remained unclear. In practice, observers 
noted official victim status designation required a complex application 
procedure that may have prevented some victims from accessing care. 
The government’s Trafficking in Persons Center continued to train 
law enforcement and other government employees on screening 
for trafficking indicators, and some government officials benefited 
from additional training sessions on victim support provided by an 
international organization. Gaps remained in the implementation 
of victim protection law; Tajikistani law enforcement agencies did 
not develop procedures to grant legal status to victims, forcing some 
victims to pay for legal and medical services otherwise provided by 
the government. Civil society observers noted Tajikistan’s diplomatic 
presence in key labor migrant destination countries—most notably 
in Russia—were poorly equipped to identify and assist Tajikistani 
trafficking victims and other vulnerable migrants stranded due to 







In January 2021, the Ministry of Health assumed managerial control 
over the country’s sole dedicated trafficking shelter, which formerly 
was run by an NGO. The government provided 253,670 Tajikistani 
somoni ($22,400) for the shelter’s operating costs, medical assistance 
for victims, legal consultations, and partial funding of staff salaries in 
2020; this allocation was renewed to the amount of 250,000 somoni 
($22,080) in 2021, an increase compared with 242,000 somoni 
($21,370) in 2019. The shelter assisted 28 victims in 2020, compared 
with 20 in 2019; all residents were female. The government did not 
report if the shelter could accommodate male victims. Neither the 
government nor NGOs provided residential shelter services outside of 
Dushanbe, and there were no options for longer-term victim support. 
Insufficient human and financial resources reportedly constrained 
delivery of psycho-social care and funding for victim reintegration 
services, respectively. 
Despite provisions in the 2014 law outlining security measures for 
trafficking victims, the government did not keep victims’ personal 
information confidential or provide protection for victim witnesses 
or their advocates. Foreign victims agreeing to cooperate with law 
enforcement agencies had the legal right to request temporary 
residency, subject to a one-year extension upon completion of criminal 
proceedings against their traffickers; no such cases were reported in 
2020 (no cases in 2019). Beyond residency, the 2014 victim protection 
law did not link other benefits to victims’ participation in trials, and 
protection services were available regardless of legal status or prior 
consent to participate in subsequently identified trafficking crimes. 
In February 2021, the government announced plans to repatriate 
hundreds of Tajikistani women and children from camps in Syria, 
some of whom may have been trafficking victims, in continuation 
of a 2019 process that was subsequently suspended in 2020 as a 
pandemic mitigation measure. However, the government did not 
report if it had initiated any of these repatriations at the close of 
the reporting period. The government kept 84 children returned 
from Iraq in 2019 in state custody, allegedly as a public health 
precaution; international organizations were only able to assess the 
living conditions of 25 of these children, and the government did 
not report previously conducting or planning to implement victim 
screening or referral procedures among them or forthcoming adult 
returnees. At the government’s request, an international organization 
assisted in the return of more than 200 Tajikistani nationals formerly 
stranded elsewhere in Central Asia due to pandemic-related border 
closures. This figure represented a small fraction of the 10,000 
migrant workers estimated to have returned to Tajikistan as a result 
of the pandemic in 2020, and authorities reportedly did not have 
sufficient resources to screen any of these returnees for trafficking 
indicators or refer them to protection services. 
Amendments to Tajikistan’s administrative code in 2019 increased 
the penalties for individuals engaged in commercial sex to include 
fines and a maximum detention period of 15 days; absent robust 
identification practices, authorities may have penalized some 
unidentified victims for unlawful acts their traffickers forced them 
to commit. Officials sometimes temporarily detained sex trafficking 
victims with their traffickers but later released and referred them to 
protective care. In previous years, law enforcement officials routinely 
deported foreign migrant workers without adequate screening for 
potential trafficking indicators; with the closure of international 
borders as a pandemic mitigation measure, no information was 
available on such deportations in 2020. Law enforcement officers 
did not attempt to identify sex trafficking victims proactively during 
raids on businesses suspected of engaging in commercial sex, nor 
within sectors known for forced labor. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The 2014 
law outlined a framework for the government to address human 
trafficking and established a national anti-trafficking commission 
tasked with coordinating the government’s anti-trafficking efforts. 
The commission maintained a National Action Plan (NAP) for 
Counteracting Trafficking in Persons for 2019-2021 and reportedly 
began developing a 2022-2025 plan in conjunction with an 
international organization at year’s end. Civil society organizations 
worked with trafficking victims to contribute to the 2019-2021 NAP, 
and the government tasked state ministries to provide implementation 
updates every six months; however, authorities did not report whether 
these meetings took place amid pandemic mitigation measures. 
The government operated a 24-hour hotline for potential victims 
but did not provide information on how many calls led to the 
identification of trafficking cases in 2020, compared with 19 in 2019. 
Authorities referred all cases identified through the hotline to an 
international organization. As a result of pandemic mitigation policies, 
the government did not conduct any awareness-raising campaigns, 
but some local authorities participated in NGO awareness-raising 
activities in several areas of the country. The government continued 
to conduct anti-trafficking courses for officials, school administrators, 
and law students. 
Limited media accounts indicated local government officials in 
at least one locality may have required some state employees to 
participate in the annual cotton harvest during the reporting period, 
but no further information was available on the presence of forced 
labor indicators. Unlike in previous years, authorities did not report 
whether the Ministry of Education disseminated letters to local 
governments highlighting prohibitions against the use of child 
labor in the annual cotton harvest. These prior government-funded 
campaigns targeted potential victims, local officials responsible for 
preventing trafficking, and school authorities who had previously 
mobilized children in the cotton harvest. MIA officials instructed 
local authorities to report incidents of forced or child labor, but no 
such reports were issued in 2020. It was unclear if the government 
assigned inspectors to conduct monitoring for child labor in the 
cotton harvest in continuation of a practice begun in 2010. During 
previous harvests, NGOs independently monitored the fields on 
an informal basis for forced labor concerns; no information was 
available on the extent to which this monitoring took place amid 
pandemic mitigation measures. The Ministry of Labor (MOL) invited 
an international organization to conduct independent inspections 
during the 2020 cotton harvest season, but these inspections did 
not occur due to insufficient funding. 
The closure of international borders as a pandemic mitigation 
measure led to a 76 percent decrease in the number of Tajikistani 
nationals traveling abroad for work. However, endemic corruption 
continued to contribute to the illicit movement of persons across 
international borders; limited accounts indicate some officials 
reportedly accepted bribes to allow foreign nationals to enter and 
exit the country despite these restrictions. Entities engaged in the 
recruitment of workers for employment abroad were legally required 
to obtain licenses from migration authorities, and the law established 
punitive measures for violations; however, Tajikistan did not monitor 
for the imposition of worker-paid recruitment fees. The government 
did not report initiating investigations into labor recruitment firms 
suspected of trafficking, nor did it provide information on the status 
or outcomes of four such investigations initiated in 2019. The MOL 
maintained four pre-departure counseling centers in different regions 
of the country that provided migrants with information on the 
risk of trafficking prior to travel abroad. However, observers noted 
incomplete and disparate data collection on migration among key 
stakeholder agencies, poor interagency coordination, and deficient 
cooperation with destination country counterpart entities continued 
to constrain effective prevention measures among vulnerable labor 
migrants. A survey conducted by a civil society organization found 
only 10 percent of Tajikistani migrant workers were aware of support 
services available to them. In previous years, the pre-departure centers 
sought to assist migrant workers in diversifying geographical options 
for work abroad; it was unlikely this work continued in 2020 due to 
pandemic mitigation measures restricting international travel. The 
government continued to implement a road map for reintegrating 
returning migrants banned from re-entering Russia but did not 
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maintain or provide updated information on how many individuals 
were eligible for this program, nor did it maintain updated statistics on 
the total number of Tajikistani nationals living and working abroad. 
Authorities at times were reportedly uncooperative with foreign donor 
organizations implementing programs to prevent trafficking among 
vulnerable migrant populations. Tajikistan maintained international 
labor agreements with Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). 
The government continued to identify and grant residency to members 
of Tajikistan’s vulnerable stateless population, which consisted 
primarily of former Soviet citizens, in accordance with an amnesty 
law that benefitted 20,000 individuals in 2019. In 2020, authorities 
identified and registered 693 individuals under this program; 44 
among them received residence permits (unreported in 2019). The 
government also worked with an international organization to 
register nearly 3,500 persons of unknown national origin, and it 
confirmed the nationality of over 4,000 Tajikistanis at risk of becoming 
stateless. The government did not report anti-trafficking training for 
its diplomatic personnel. The government made no efforts to reduce 
the demand for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit victims 
from Tajikistan abroad and, to a lesser extent, traffickers exploit 
domestic and foreign victims within Tajikistan. Extensive economic 
migration exposes Tajikistani men, women, and children to the risk 
of human trafficking. Labor traffickers exploit Tajikistani men and 
women in agriculture and construction primarily in Russia, UAE, 
Kazakhstan, and Saudi Arabia, as well as in other neighboring Central 
Asian countries, Turkey, and Afghanistan. Labor traffickers exploit 
men in agriculture, construction, and at markets in Tajikistan; there 
are limited reports of domestic sex trafficking of men. Sex traffickers 
exploit women and children from Tajikistan most commonly in 
Turkey, UAE, and Russia, and also in Saudi Arabia, Kazakhstan, 
Georgia, India, and Afghanistan, as well as within Tajikistan. 
International organizations estimate there are nearly one million 
Tajikistani nationals living and working in Russia, primarily employed 
in construction, agriculture, industry, domestic work, and transport; 
thousands of men, women, and children among them are vulnerable 
to forced labor. Women traveling with their husbands abroad for 
this work are also reportedly at elevated risk of sex trafficking 
and other forms of exploitation. Widespread unemployment and 
economic hardship among Tajikistani migrant workers in Russia 
and Kazakhstan following the closure of businesses and work sites 
during the pandemic have led to a significant drop in earned income 
and remittance transfers, leaving these migrant workers and their 
families in Tajikistan more vulnerable to trafficking. Fearing a ban 
from reentry into Russia if detected, some unemployed Tajikistani 
migrant workers remained in Russia under irregular immigration 
status rather than returning home; traffickers are then able to leverage 
threats of deportation as a coercive tool to secure and retain their 
forced labor or to compel them into sex trafficking. Some men among 
the approximately 2,000 Tajikistanis who have traveled to Syria, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan to fight alongside or seek employment within 
armed groups are subsequently subjected to forced labor in cooking, 
cleaning, and portering. Tajikistani women and children traveling 
with these men, at times under deception, are also vulnerable to sex 
trafficking and forced labor on arrival; some are reportedly placed 
alongside other Central Asian family members in makeshift camp 
communities, where their travel and identity documentation is 
confiscated and their freedom of movement is restricted. Many of 
these women report having lost their husbands to armed conflict, 
after which their economic hardships and confinement in the camps 
make them vulnerable to coercive local marriages that may feature 
corollary sex trafficking or forced labor indicators. Some women 
who have traveled to Syria or Iraq with promises of marriage have 
instead been sold into sexual slavery. Some children of Tajikistani ISIS 
combatants in Iraq and Syria are reportedly trained for deployment 
in combatant roles. Traffickers transport Tajikistani women and girls 
to Afghanistan and force them into marriages that feature elements 
of sex trafficking and forced domestic service, including through 
debt-based coercion. Traffickers exploit Tajikistani children in sex 
trafficking and forced labor, including forced begging, in Tajikistan 
and Afghanistan. 
Some Tajikistani migrant workers in Russia and Kazakhstan abandon 
their families, compounding financial hardships among women and 
their children and thereby increasing their vulnerability to traffickers 
within Tajikistan. Accordingly, children left at home unaccompanied 
for long periods of time while their mothers seek supplementary 
employment are at increasingly high risk of sex trafficking. As of 2020, 
257,000 Tajikistani migrant workers were banned from reentering 
Russia as a result of alleged immigration violations; these individuals 
are vulnerable to trafficking due to unemployment and economic 
hardships. Tajikistani women evicted after suffering intimate partner 
violence—which has reportedly increased amid in-home quarantine 
measures and a significant decrease in the number of Tajikistani 
men able to work abroad during the pandemic—are also at higher 
risk of sex trafficking.
Tajikistani children and adults may have been subjected to forced labor 
in agriculture—mainly during Tajikistan’s fall cotton harvest—and in 
dried fruit production. Some boys, particularly from economically 
disadvantaged rural communities, are vulnerable to kidnapping 
by government personnel for the purpose of forcible conscription 
into military service as part of annual “oblava” recruitment sweeps. 
The government reportedly subjects some citizens to participate 
in manual labor, such as cleaning roads and park maintenance. 
Tajikistani nationals employed by Chinese companies engaged in 
local construction projects experience wage irregularities, threats of 
termination, and other labor rights violations that may be indicative 
of forced labor. Some Afghan and Bangladeshi citizens are victims 
of forced labor in Tajikistan, including in the construction industry. 
Tajikistani nationals may be vulnerable to forced labor in illegal 
artisanal coal mines located near formalized commercial mining 
operations. In past years, police have at times used a punitive registry 
containing the names of LGBTQI+ individuals to blackmail some 
members of these communities into sex trafficking and forced 
informant roles. LGBTQI+ individuals are vulnerable to trafficking 
amid widespread discrimination that often jeopardizes their 
employment status or prospects in the formal sector and complicates 
their access to justice. Widespread social stigma and discrimination 
against LGBTQI+ individuals also compound their vulnerability 
to family-brokered forced marriages that may feature corollary sex 
trafficking or forced labor indicators.
TANZANIA: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Tanzania does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included increasing funding for 
the anti-trafficking committee to implement the national action 
plan and allocating resources to the victim assistance fund. The 
government identified more victims and referred them to shelter 
services; it also repatriated Tanzanian and foreign victims. However, 
the government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts 
compared to the previous reporting period, even considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking 
capacity. The government did not amend its law to remove sentencing 
provisions that allow fines in lieu of imprisonment for sex trafficking 
crimes unlike other grave crimes. Courts convicted fewer traffickers 
and did not impose penalties that were sufficiently stringent. The 
government continued to lack formal victim identification and 
protection mechanisms and a victim witness protection program 
and, consequently, penalized victims and compromised their safety. 






recruitment companies, nor did not make efforts to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex acts. Because the government has 
devoted sufficient resources to a written plan that, if implemented, 
would constitute significant efforts to meet the minimum standards, 
Tanzania was granted a waiver per the Trafficking Victims Protection 
Act from an otherwise required downgrade to Tier 3. Therefore 
Tanzania remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the third consecutive year. 
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Fully implement the provisions of the 2008 anti-trafficking law, as 
outlined in the implementing regulations and the national action 
plan. • Continue to develop and implement standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) for victim identification and referral to services and 
train officials on SOPs, especially to identify vulnerable populations 
including impoverished and orphaned children, Tanzanians migrating 
for work abroad, Burundian refugees, North Korean workers, Chinese 
workers, and Cuban medical professionals. • Amend the 2008 anti-
trafficking law to remove sentencing provisions that allow fines in 
lieu of imprisonment and align the procedural law pertaining to 
trafficking-related arrests within the act with the requirements for 
other serious crimes. • While respecting due process of law and 
human rights, increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict 
trafficking offenders, including complicit officials, and impose 
adequate penalties in accordance with the law. • Institutionalize 
the use of a national centralized anti-trafficking data collection and 
reporting tool and increase information sharing. • Increase funding 
and resources for the Anti-Trafficking Committee (ATC) and Anti-
Trafficking Secretariat (ATS) to combat trafficking. • Draft, adopt, 
and allocate resources to implement a new national action plan to 
combat trafficking. • Implement and enforce strong regulations and 
oversight of labor recruitment companies, including investigating 
and prosecuting fraudulent labor recruitment. • Increase migrant 
worker protections by eliminating recruitment fees charged to migrant 
workers; increasing employer security deposits, minimum salaries, and 
pre-departure training for migrant workers; establishing a mutually 
enforceable standard contract, a complaints mechanism for returning 
workers, and a public blacklist of abusive employers; and requiring 
exit interviews and embassy approval of residency permits of migrant 
workers. • Expand anti-trafficking public awareness campaigns to 
families, schools, and community leaders. • Implement a systematic 
victim-witness support program. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained mixed anti-trafficking law enforcement 
efforts. The 2008 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act criminalized sex 
trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed punishments of two 
to 10 years’ imprisonment, a fine between 5 million and 100 million 
Tanzania shilling (TZS) ($2,160 to $43,220), or both for offenses 
involving adult victims, and 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment, a fine 
between 5 million and 150 million TZS ($2,160 to $64,820), or both 
for those involving child victims. These penalties were sufficiently 
stringent but, with regard to sex trafficking, by allowing a fine in lieu 
of imprisonment, the penalties were not commensurate with those 
for other serious crimes, such as rape. The Anti-Trafficking Secretariat 
drafted an amendment to the 2008 anti-trafficking law; Parliament 
had not yet reviewed the amendment by the end of the reporting 
period. The 2008 anti-trafficking law contained a separate procedural 
provision that required police to obtain a warrant before making a 
trafficking-related arrest; this provision created a higher threshold 
for law enforcement that does not exist for other similarly serious 
crimes, which may hinder prosecution efforts.
The government did not maintain a centralized law enforcement data 
system on trafficking crimes, hindering the government’s ability to 
disaggregate national human trafficking statistics. The government 
investigated 19 trafficking cases and arrested 21 suspected traffickers 
during the reporting period, compared with investigation of 17 cases 
during the previous reporting period. The government initiated 
18 prosecutions involving 18 alleged defendants and convicted 
three traffickers under the 2008 anti-trafficking law; compared 
with 18 prosecutions and eight convictions in the previous period. 
One perpetrator received a three-year prison sentence for child 
sex trafficking, one perpetrator received a fine of 10 million TZS 
($4,320) in lieu of imprisonment for child sex trafficking, and one 
perpetrator received a conditional release instead of a prison sentence 
for attempting to exploit a child, possibly in labor trafficking. The 
sentence of a conditional release and the fine in lieu of imprisonment 
were inadequate and did not reflect the seriousness of the respective 
crimes. In December 2020, a local court arraigned a Somali Tanzanian 
citizen for allegedly trafficking six Burundian women to Saudi 
Arabia for domestic servitude; the case was ongoing at the end of the 
reporting period. Zanzibar, an autonomous state, had yet to adopt 
the 2008 anti-trafficking law and did not report law enforcement 
statistics at the end of the reporting period. Zanzibar police were not 
trained on trafficking investigations and communities in Zanzibar 
generally addressed potential trafficking cases without seeking law 
enforcement intervention. Corruption within the judicial system 
and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant 
concerns and inhibited law enforcement action during the year. The 
government arrested five police officers and initiated investigations 
for complicity in human trafficking compared to zero investigations 
during the previous reporting period; the cases remained ongoing 
at the end of the reporting period. 
Although the government did not maintain a national database on 
human trafficking crimes, the government reported collaborating 
with NGOs to compile law enforcement data. Authorities in police, 
immigration, and the prosecution office provided monthly reports 
on human trafficking crimes to ATS. The government continued 
to provide support for human trafficking modules in ATS training 
curricula, used by law enforcement and other stakeholders, but the 
government did not report how many new police recruits received this 
training during the reporting period. The government collaborated 
with the Government of Mozambique to collect evidence for their 
investigation of a human trafficking case involving a Tanzanian 
defendant. In collaboration with the Government of Botswana, 
the government arranged travel for three Tanzanian witnesses to 
testify against alleged Tanzanian perpetrators in a child trafficking 
case in Botswana. 
PROTECTION
The government increased protection efforts. The implementing 
regulations of the 2008 anti-trafficking law required police and 
immigration authorities to use standardized procedures and forms for 
case investigation and victim identification and referral. The government 
drafted standardized forms for identification and referral in a previous 
reporting period; however, it did not fully implement the procedures. 
The government reported identifying 165 potential trafficking victims, 
compared with 161 victims during the previous reporting period. The 
government referred all of these potential victims to either NGO-run 
shelters or government-vetted and trained host families for assistance 
during the reporting period, compared to only 28 during the previous 
reporting period. Of the 165 identified and referred victims, 145 were 
female, 20 were male, 139 children, and 26 were adults; this compares 
to 159 females, two males, one adult, and nine unknown identified 
and referred victims during the previous reporting period. In January 
2021, the government identified, referred to care, and reintegrated 
into their home communities 38 disabled victims exploited in forced 
begging in Dar es Salaam. Separately, ATS reported reintegrating 42 
child trafficking victims with their families. In 2020, the government 
finalized and launched the National Guidelines for Safe Houses. The 
guidelines established standards for safe houses, which could provide 
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shelter for trafficking victims, and codified a joint plan to create and 
run government-operated shelters, offered guidelines for screening 
shelter residents for trafficking indicators, and provided for protection 
of human trafficking case files. The 2008 anti-trafficking law mandated 
the government provide victims with psychosocial counseling, family 
tracing and reunification, and temporary shelter; the government 
reported providing case management and services to victims it referred 
during the reporting period. The 2008 anti-trafficking law additionally 
mandated the government to provide a central repository of funds 
for victim protection support. In 2020, the government officially 
authorized adoption and implementation of the Anti-Trafficking 
Fund, which was approved in 2019; the government authorized ATS 
to oversee and manage the fund. However, the government did not 
report the number of victims that received support from the fund 
during the reporting period. 
The government coordinated information sharing between ATS 
and the Department of Social Welfare; often social welfare officers 
worked closely with police and designated gender desk officers to 
address issues that impact women and to identify and refer victims 
to assistance. The government continued to rely on government-
vetted NGOs to provide the vast majority of victim assistance. 
The government did not operate any domestic trafficking shelters; 
however, eight government-vetted shelters continued to operate 
in the country. Children’s shelters provided access to government 
schools, vocational training, and separate accommodation for 
boys and girls. The government maintained referral agreements 
with vetted NGOs that managed shelters and NGO-run shelters 
provided medical care, psycho-social counseling, and family tracing 
for victims. The government continued to place children in specialized 
shelters, where they were enrolled in government schools or given 
vocational training, and had separate accommodations for boys and 
girls. Although NGOs continued to report female adult trafficking 
victims could seek assistance at a shelter dedicated to young girls, 
there were no shelters available for adult male trafficking victims. The 
government allowed foreign victims the same access to assistance, 
counseling, medical care, and training as domestic victims; however, 
an international organization reported some NGO-run shelters did 
not accept foreign victims. Civil society, NGOs, and government 
officials reported close collaboration in efforts to identify and refer 
victims to care and assistance. 
The government repatriated two Tanzanian victims from abroad, 
one identified in Malaysia and the other in Iraq, during the reporting 
period; this is compared to 10 total repatriations in the previous 
reporting period. The government additionally collaborated with 
foreign governments and international organizations to facilitate the 
return of 21 Burundian victims identified en route to the Middle East 
and one Mozambican girl exploited in Tanzania. An international 
organization reported identifying 243 Burundian child victims in 
Tanzanian refugee camps and facilitated their return to Burundi. The 
2008 anti-trafficking law provided foreign victims legal alternatives 
to their removal to countries where their safety or that of their 
families may be endangered; however, during the reporting period, the 
government did not grant residency or temporary stay to trafficking 
victims. The government provided assistance to foreign victims by 
facilitating travel documents and providing secure passage to borders. 
The government did not report penalizing victims for unlawful acts 
their traffickers forced them to commit; however, due to a lack of formal 
identification procedures, authorities reportedly deported, detained, 
and arrested some foreign human trafficking victims for working in the 
commercial sex industry and for immigration violations. NGOs and 
religious organizations reported authorities frequently incarcerated 
children and adults in the same detention centers, increasing children’s 
risk of exploitation and abuse. The government did not make efforts 
to screen for victims among refugee, asylum-seeking, and children, 
despite their vulnerability to trafficking. 
Victims typically testified in trafficking cases, but the Whistle Blowers 
and Witness Protection Act of 2015 and the 2008 anti-trafficking law 
gave any victim of a crime, including trafficking victims, the option 
to refuse to participate in prosecution efforts. The government 
did not implement the witness protection program for trafficking 
victims initiated in the previous reporting period, deterring some 
victims from testifying in court. Victims could testify during trial in 
private sessions or via video testimony; however, the government 
did not report victims using these options during the reporting 
period. The anti-trafficking law entitled victims to restitution from 
convicted traffickers; however, the government did not report awarding 
restitution during the reporting period. 
PREVENTION
The government minimally increased efforts to prevent trafficking. 
The government allocated more funding for ATS, the working-level 
national anti-trafficking coordinating body, from 100.5 million TZS 
($43,430) in 2019 to 120.3 million TZS ($51,990) in 2020. Observers 
reported the increased funding was beneficial, but insufficient for ATS 
to undertake all of its anti-trafficking activities. ATC, the government 
entity responsible for the oversight and direction of ATS, had a 
mandate to meet quarterly but only met once during the reporting 
period due to insufficient funds. The government did not report 
continuing to implement efforts, begun in the previous reporting 
period, to restructure ATS and ATC and to expand the anti-trafficking 
roles of other government agencies to more effectively combat 
trafficking. In 2020, the Department of Social Welfare created a new 
position to coordinate anti-trafficking efforts among social welfare 
officers. In collaboration with the Government of Japan and an 
international organization, the government dedicated resources to 
immigration commissioners to monitor known traffickers, including 
labor traffickers in the fishing industry. Additionally, the Ministry 
of Livestock and Fisheries and the Office of the Prime Minister 
allocated 2.1 billion TZS ($907,520) to counter illegal fishing and 
drug and human trafficking in the Indian Ocean and the country’s 
lakes. The Department of Social Welfare, ATS, the Mwanza Police 
Gender Desk, and NGOs developed and mobilized a task force in 
Mwanza to identify child trafficking victims among street children. 
Local governments in Arusha, Dar es Salaam, Kigoma, Tabora, and 
Zanzibar formed task forces to increase local information-sharing 
on trafficking cases. 
The government implemented some aspects of its 2018-2021 national 
action plan. The government collaborated with international 
organizations, NGOs, and civil society to draft a new national action 
plan; however, it remained pending at the end of the reporting period. 
The government collaborated with an international organization 
to organize three high-profile awareness raising events on human 
trafficking in Dodoma and Zanzibar. Activities included media 
campaigns on radio and television, a national dialogue on human 
trafficking, and high-level meetings with relevant stakeholders to 
discuss collaboration to combat human trafficking. ATS continued 
to partner with NGOs to facilitate and provide in-kind support 
for trainings for 400 teachers, community development officers, 
police officers, social welfare officers, immigration officers, religious 
leaders, and representatives from local government on trafficking 
trends in the region and victim identification in refugee camps. 
The Department of Social Welfare collaborated with the Ministry of 
Education to include human trafficking awareness modules in school 
clubs nationwide. The government continued to fund and publicize 
a national hotline operated by a local NGO to report child abuse, 
including child trafficking. In 2020, the government expanded the 
hotline to receive calls on sexual exploitation and accommodated 
both Kiswahili and English. The hotline identified 35 victims of 
human trafficking and 49 child forced labor cases. 
Government agencies in mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar performed 
periodic inspections of large employers in an effort to detect cases of 
forced labor, but they did not report identifying any such cases during 
the reporting period. During the reporting period, the government 
did not report pursuing any investigations or prosecutions for 
fraudulent labor recruitment. To reduce the vulnerability of street 






to facilitate the identification of potential child victims and their 
referral to assistance. In 2020, the government identified, referred to 
assistance, and reintegrated 67 children with their families; however, 
the government did not report the number of children that were 
identified as child trafficking victims. 
The government did not report efforts to implement migrant worker 
protections, such as additional bilateral labor agreements with 
destination countries, a comprehensive labor migration law, pre-
departure and vocational skills training, and funding for labor attachés 
at diplomatic missions abroad. The government reportedly had a 
bilateral labor agreement with Qatar but did not report implementing 
the agreement or signing any new agreements with other destination 
countries. The government continued to require Tanzanians to 
have valid passports and labor contracts with salary, leave, and 
health care provisions to obtain the necessary training certificate, 
a letter of permission, and an exit permit to migrate for work. The 
government continued to suspend the issuance of travel documents 
to departing Tanzanian migrant workers who could not provide a 
relevant training certificate for the overseas job; this step may have 
increased their vulnerability to trafficking when some subsequently 
chose to migrate through unregulated ways. The Companies Act of 
2002 required recruitment agencies to be registered and licensed, and 
the government required recruitment agencies to provide migrant 
workers with training on worker rights and destination countries’ 
laws prior to departure. Tanzanian embassies abroad continued to 
require employers to submit security deposits to the embassy to ensure 
that the employer would present the migrant worker upon arrival, so 
the embassy could verify that the worker arrived and possessed the 
proper documentation, including contract and passport. However, 
the government continued to report that in practice, recruitment 
agencies were not providing pre-departure training to migrant 
workers and an NGO previously argued the deposit amount was too 
small and an insufficient incentive for employers to present migrant 
workers upon arrival to the Tanzanian embassy. Observers continued 
to report ongoing challenges faced by migrant workers, including 
that Tanzanian contracts were often different from the destination 
country contract and usually not enforceable, sometimes migrant 
workers paid recruitment fees, there was no “blacklist” available 
for migrant workers to avoid previously abusive employers, and 
recruitment agencies operating in Tanzania would sometimes use 
“sub-agents,” thereby skirting the registration requirements. The 
government continued to lack a complaint mechanism for returning 
migrant workers. While the government continued to provide anti-
trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel, it did not always 
train the staff at foreign embassies to identify and assist trafficking 
victims. The government did not make efforts to reduce the demand 
for commercial sex acts. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Tanzania, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Tanzania abroad. Traffickers often dupe family members, friends, 
or intermediaries into aiding traffickers’ in their exploitative tactics 
by fraudulently offering assistance with education, offering better 
living conditions, or securing employment in urban areas and 
abroad. The government reported that brokers sometimes enter 
communities to recruit and transport victims into trafficking situations. 
Impoverished and orphaned children from the rural interior, children 
with disabilities, and Burundian and Congolese refugees and migrants 
remain most at risk to trafficking. Traffickers exploit girls in domestic 
servitude throughout the country and in sex trafficking, particularly 
in tourist hubs along the border with Kenya. Women, children, 
internally displaced persons, and migrants may have been victims 
of forced labor or sex trafficking, Cuban medical workers working in 
Tanzania may have been forced to work by the Chinese and Cuban 
government, and Chinese nationals may have been forced to work by 
their employers, including Chinese state-owned enterprises. An NGO 
stated that traffickers target young girls from rural and impoverished 
villages, pay their parents a small fee, and coerce the girls into sex 
trafficking, specifically targeting business people. Traffickers subject 
children to forced labor on farms—including as cattle herders and 
occasionally as hunters—in gold and gemstone mines and quarries, 
the informal commercial sector, and on fishing vessels operating in 
Tanzanian and international waters. Some unscrupulous individuals 
manipulate the traditional practice of child fostering—in which poor 
parents entrust their children into the care of wealthier relatives or 
respected community members—and subject children to forced labor 
as domestic workers. Some women and girls travel to Zanzibar from 
mainland Tanzania with promises of marriage or good jobs and then 
are forced to work as farm laborers. 
Tanzanian fishermen work on fishing vessels with indicators of human 
trafficking. In 2017, an NGO reported 14 Indonesian trafficking victims 
were identified aboard a Malaysian-flagged fishing vessel and in 2018, 
another NGO reported that 12 Tanzanian trafficking victims were 
identified aboard a Chinese-flagged fishing vessel, both in Tanzanian 
territorial waters. Previous media reports indicate traffickers transported 
Tanzanian children with physical disabilities to Kenya and forced 
them to work as beggars or in massage parlors. In 2018, the Kenyan 
government identified 29 female Tanzanian potential victims in 
Kenya; the girls were to be taken to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
and to pay for their transportation fees with a kidney. 
Traffickers sometimes subject Tanzanians to forced labor, including 
in domestic service, and sex trafficking in other African countries, 
the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and the United States. Observers 
reported traffickers and their victims increasingly transited Zanzibar 
en route for forced domestic service in Oman and the UAE. Observers 
reported Ethiopian migrants and victims transit through Tanzania 
en route to South Africa. Observers also reported Burundian victims 
are increasingly transiting Dar es Salaam en route to Oman, UAE, 
and Kenya. Citizens of neighboring countries may transit Tanzania 
before traffickers subject them to domestic servitude or sex trafficking 
in Kenya, South Africa, Europe, and the Middle East. Children from 
Burundi and Rwanda are increasingly subjected to child forced labor in 
Tanzania. Trafficking victims subjected to forced labor in Tabora were 
reportedly from rural areas of Kigoma—a region that hosts refugee 
camps and settlements. In 2019, North Koreans working in Tanzania 
may have been forced to work by the North Korean government.
THAILAND: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Thailand does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included taking steps to improve 
coordination with civil society in trafficking investigations and victim 
protection, organizing trainings and workshops for prosecutors and 
judges on trauma-informed procedures, and initiating investigations of 
nine officials allegedly complicit in trafficking crimes. The government 
created working groups to consider adopting a reflection period for 
victims and a national referral mechanism and institutionalized the 
police division dedicated to combatting the online sexual exploitation 
of children. However, the government did not demonstrate overall 
increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, even 
considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-
trafficking capacity. The government initiated significantly fewer 
trafficking investigations, prosecuted fewer suspects, and convicted 
fewer traffickers than in 2019. Despite widespread reports that forced 
labor was prevalent among migrant workers in many industries in 
Thailand, the government identified a low number of labor trafficking 
victims compared to the scope of the problem, officials often lacked 
an understanding of labor trafficking, and the government lacked 
standard procedures for labor inspectors to refer potential cases to 
law enforcement. Thai authorities have never reported identifying 
a victim of labor trafficking as a result of fishing vessel inspections 




remained inadequate, and some victims residing in government 
shelters lacked freedom of movement. Corruption and official 
complicity continued to impede anti-trafficking efforts, and the 
government convicted five complicit officials in 2020. Therefore 
Thailand was downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Improve the capacity of law enforcement to proactively prosecute 
and convict labor traffickers and identify labor trafficking victims, 
including by finalizing guidelines for Section 6/1 of the anti-trafficking 
law. • Ensure multidisciplinary teams (MDTs) are composed of 
officials who are trained and have sufficient experience working 
trafficking cases to improve the effectiveness of victim identifications. 
• Proactively investigate and prosecute officials allegedly complicit 
in facilitating trafficking, and convict and punish those found 
guilty with adequate sentences. • Increase the ability of victims, 
especially adults, to move freely in and out of shelters and access 
communication devices and reassess shelter placements periodically 
to ensure victims are not required to remain in shelters longer than 
necessary. • Ensure experienced officers respond to trafficking cases, 
including by increasing the capacity of the police anti-trafficking unit 
to assist local districts that do not have experience with investigating 
trafficking. • Extend the period in which officials are required to 
identify a potential victim formally, to allow victims time to obtain 
government services, recover from their exploitation, and recount 
their experiences to authorities. • Ensure government and NGO-
operated shelters provide victims with adequate trauma-informed 
and individualized care, such as legal assistance and psychological 
care. • Increase government coordination to ensure labor violations 
and migrant workers’ complaints that include indicators of forced 
labor are investigated for trafficking crimes, including by establishing 
standard procedures for labor officials to refer potential cases of 
labor trafficking to MDTs and law enforcement. • Consider legal 
alternatives to foreign victims’ placement in shelters, such as enabling 
victims to exit the shelter system when they are ready to pursue 
outside employment opportunities. • Do not make victims’ formal 
identification and access to services dependent on their willingness 
to participate in investigations against their traffickers. • Take steps 
to ensure victims are adequately prepared for court proceedings, 
including by increasing access to public prosecutors or partnerships 
with NGOs to prepare victims. • Continue to support the development 
of victim-centric and trauma-informed approaches among judges 
overseeing trafficking cases. • Enforce regular payment of wages, 
requirements that employers pay recruitment fees of migrant workers, 
and the rights of employees to retain possession of their own identity 
and financial documents. • Increase efforts to ensure employers 
provide workers copies of contracts in a language they understand. • 
Foster an environment conducive to victims and advocates reporting 
human trafficking crimes without fear of facing spurious retributive 
charges pursued by employers, including by utilizing recent legal 
amendments to dismiss cases filed with dishonest intent or to 
intimidate defendants. 
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. Section 6 of the 
2008 anti-trafficking law, as amended, criminalized sex trafficking 
and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties of four to 12 years’ 
imprisonment and a fine of 400,000 to 1.2 million baht ($13,370 to 
$40,110) for offenses involving an adult victim, and six to 20 years’ 
imprisonment and a fine of 600,000 to 2 million baht ($20,050 to 
$66,840) for those involving a child victim. These penalties were 
sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate 
with penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. An 
amendment to the 2008 anti-trafficking law in 2019 included a 
separate provision under Section 6/1, specifically addressing “forced 
labor or services”, which prescribed penalties of six months’ to four 
years’ imprisonment, a fine of 50,000 to 400,000 baht ($1,670 to 
$13,370) per victim, or both. This provision prescribed significantly 
lower penalties for labor trafficking crimes than those already available 
under the existing human trafficking provision of the law. In addition, 
observers reported Section 6/1 created confusion among government 
officials investigating labor trafficking, especially in the absence of 
implementing guidelines. 
During pandemic-related lockdowns, courts did not operate fully and 
postponed many hearings by at least two months. Courts permitted 
some witness testimony through online video platforms; however, 
technical difficulties also contributed to delays in trials. Pandemic-
related border closures and international travel restrictions, and the 
subsequent reduction in both migration and tourism throughout the 
reporting period likely contributed to a reduction in new incidents of 
some forms of trafficking but also reduced the government’s ability to 
detect the crime. In 2020, the government reported investigating 132 
potential trafficking cases (288 in 2019), initiating prosecutions of 302 
suspected traffickers (386 in 2019), and convicting 233 traffickers (304 
in 2019). Courts sentenced approximately 76 percent of convicted 
traffickers to two or more years of imprisonment. During the previous 
reporting period, law enforcement frequently conflated trafficking 
and smuggling crimes, which contributed to an increased rate of 
prosecutors declining to pursue trafficking charges in cases referred to 
them. However this occurred less frequently in 2020; the trafficking 
litigation unit of the office of the attorney general (OAG) did not find 
sufficient evidence of trafficking in approximately 7 percent of cases 
with arrested suspects referred to them by law enforcement in 2020, 
which was a decrease compared to 18 percent in 2019. The number 
of sex trafficking investigations decreased from 185 in 2019 to 118 in 
2020. However, NGOs reported that increasingly frequent and severe 
sentences imposed on sex traffickers in recent years has deterred the 
crime, including among owners of bars, restaurants, massage parlors, 
and other establishments. The government and NGOs reported an 
increase in online sexual exploitation, especially of children, during 
the reporting period. The Thai Internet Crimes Against Children Task 
Force (TICAC) received more than 260,000 tips from a U.S. based 
NGO on potential cases of child sexual exploitation, a significant 
increase compared to approximately 117,000 tips received in 2019. 
TICAC investigated 94 cases of internet crimes against children in 
2020 (77 in 2019), including 22 cases of internet-facilitated child 
sex trafficking (26 in 2019). In September 2020, TICAC was made 
a permanent subdivision within the Royal Thai Police (RTP), with 
17 dedicated officers. 
The government reported investigating 14 potential cases of labor 
trafficking—including two cases involving the fishing sector—a 
significant decrease compared to 77 in 2019. NGOs observed that the 
lack of adequate investigations and prosecutions for labor trafficking 
stemmed in large part from a lack of understanding of forced labor 
among officials. In addition, officials often did not understand 
how to apply Section 6 and Section 6/1 in labor trafficking cases. 
Following the enactment of Section 6/1 in 2019, the Ministry of Labor 
was responsible for drafting implementing guidelines but has not 
done so, which contributed to the lack of understanding of how to 
interpret and implement the law. Observers reported law enforcement 
often did not fully investigate cases and subsequently were unable 
to prove document confiscation or debt were used as a means of 
compelling individuals to work. Labor officials did not consistently 
refer potential cases of forced labor to law enforcement, and there was 
not a standard procedure for labor officials to do so. Some officials 
were reluctant to pursue these cases due to their complexity. Police 
and labor inspectors did not consistently fully investigate migrant 






identified trafficking cases as labor law violations without pursuing 
criminal prosecutions against traffickers. In addition, authorities 
sometimes pressured or intimidated workers to drop cases. Authorities 
often placed the burden on workers to prove their own exploitation 
and encouraged them to informally mediate with their employers, 
despite indicators of trafficking or clear violations such as confiscation 
of identity document and withholding of wages. Labor officials and 
law enforcement sometimes investigated the same cases separately 
for labor violations and criminal violations, rather than coordinating 
and investigating together, which sometimes jeopardized the success 
of criminal prosecutions. The frequent rotation of police officers also 
meant officers with experience working trafficking cases were rotated 
out of their positions and often replaced with inexperienced officers. 
Contacts reported that law enforcement used the results of victim 
identification interviews as the final determination of whether a 
trafficking case existed. This was problematic because these interviews 
often occurred before potential victims had adequate time to recover 
from their exploitation and were dependent on what victims were 
able to remember or willing to disclose. Prosecutors and police did 
not consistently coordinate in the investigation stage of a prosecution, 
which sometimes contributed to trafficking cases failing at trail. In 
March 2021, the OAG created a center within its trafficking litigation 
unit to promote coordination among attorneys, victims, and other 
agencies. In addition, in early 2021 the unit conducted a study to 
assess trafficking prosecutions, which will be used to develop a 
strategy to improve the efficacy of prosecutions. Some victims were 
reluctant to participate in prosecutions due to fears of detention 
and extended shelter stays, a lack of adequate services, and fears of 
experiencing retaliation from traffickers. In an attempt to increase 
victims’ willingness to participate as witnesses, Thai courts admitted 
advance and video testimony as evidence in trials; courts conducted 
11 advanced hearings for 67 witnesses in 2020. Criminal courts 
provided a separate room for child victims to provide testimony 
through a video link during proceedings. Thai authorities also worked 
with authorities in neighboring countries to enable testimony from 
witnesses outside of Thailand, although some local NGOs previously 
reported an unwillingness among local police and prosecutors to do 
so. Prosecutors worked with NGOs to prepare victims to testify, and 
courts allowed NGO lawyers to serve as co-plaintiffs in some cases 
to legally support victims. However, the OAG did not have sufficient 
capacity to enable prosecutors to meet with and prepare all victims 
before trials, and NGOs recommended victims be increasingly 
partnered with NGO or private attorneys to provide this support. 
Government shelters enabled victims to participate in mock courts to 
prepare them for participating in proceedings against their traffickers; 
however, this often only consisted of a basic explanation of the 
court process and courtroom layout. The government provided 
approximately 4.8 million baht ($160,430) for witness protection 
services for 51 witnesses in trafficking cases in 2019, compared to 
2.4 million baht ($80,210) for 93 witnesses in 2019. 
The government operated specialized anti-trafficking divisions 
within the Bangkok Criminal Court, the OAG, Department of Special 
Investigation (DSI), and the RTP. The RTP’s Thailand Anti-Trafficking 
in Persons Task Force (TATIP) specialized in investigating complex 
cases and comprised law enforcement, social workers, and NGOs. 
Some observers reported RTP did not effectively conduct trafficking 
investigations and victim identifications, especially within local police 
districts that lacked experience working trafficking cases. RTP’s anti-
trafficking in persons divisions (ATPD) reportedly did not have a 
sufficient number of officers to respond to the majority of trafficking 
cases throughout the country, including to inexperienced local police. 
While interagency coordination was effective in major cities, in some 
provinces observers reported weak communication among agencies 
and civil society. In collaboration with an NGO, the OAG organized 
a workshop with NGOs to improve collaboration in trafficking cases, 
which resulted in the establishment of points of contact within the 
OAG for with which NGOs were to coordinate. In addition, DSI 
held multiple meetings with civil society organizations to exchange 
information and improve cooperation in investigations and victim 
protection. In 2020 courts issued forfeiture orders in 20 trafficking 
cases litigated by the anti-money laundering office (AMLO) for 
assets valued at approximately 10.6 million baht ($354,280). Thai 
authorities continued to hold bilateral meetings with neighboring 
countries to facilitate information sharing and evidence gathering in 
trafficking cases. In addition, law enforcement officials cooperated 
with foreign counterparts to investigate the trafficking of Thai victims 
abroad. 
RTP continued to hold an annual workshop for police officers 
with experience investigating trafficking cases, as well as seminars 
for police on investigations and victim identification; 580 police 
officers attended these workshops and seminars in 2020. RTP also 
organized a seminar attended by police commanders, Ministry of 
Social Development and Human Security (MSDHS) and Ministry 
of Labor (MOL) officials, and civil society representatives, on 
applying trauma-informed approaches in trafficking investigations. 
The OAG partnered with an NGO to organize trainings for 23 
prosecutors on trauma-informed procedures in trafficking cases in 
July 2020. DSI and the Ministry of Interior organized trainings on 
child sexual exploitation, including internet-facilitated trafficking, 
which included speakers from Thai agencies as well as officials 
from foreign governments. The Courts of Justice collaborated with 
a foreign government to host a roundtable meeting for 49 judges and 
prosecutors to exchange best practices on prosecuting trafficking cases 
and using trauma-informed approaches with victims participating 
in the judicial process. In addition, the Office of the Judiciary held 
three seminars for judges in Chiang Rai, Trang, and Udon Thani 
on addressing evidentiary issues in trafficking cases. While the 
government made efforts to move some trainings online due to the 
pandemic, many trainings, especially in local districts, were not held 
in 2020. In addition, observers reported that trainings did not often 
reach many provincial level officials, which contributed to a lack of 
understanding of trafficking, especially forced labor.
Corruption and official complicity facilitated trafficking and continued 
to impede anti-trafficking efforts. NGOs’ perceptions of corruption 
made them reluctant to work with the government or certain agencies 
in some cases. Some police may have purposely compromised 
investigations and failed to provide prosecutors sufficient evidence 
to prosecute trafficking cases. Some law enforcement officials were 
reluctant to investigate influential boat owners and captains, as well 
as other offenders who were or had connections to high-ranking 
government officials. However, observers reported DSI officers resisted 
intimidation by influential individuals connected to trafficking cases. 
For example, in December 2020, DSI arrested the owner of a fishing 
vessel who was also a local government official, for human trafficking 
charges. The Deputy Prime Minister chaired the National Committee 
on Prevention of Official Complicity in Human Trafficking, which 
created a center for receiving complaints of official complicity, took 
steps to provide rewards for officials who provided information related 
to trafficking cases, and worked with the media to report stories on 
officials working to combat trafficking. Following an outbreak of 
COVID-19 among migrant workers in Samut Sakhon in December 
2020, the Prime Minister ordered police to establish a committee to 
investigate official complicity in the smuggling of migrant workers, 
which led to the investigation of 33 police officers and state officials. 
The government reported initiating investigations of nine officials 
accused of complicity in trafficking crimes in 2020, compared with 
two investigations in 2019. Of these nine, one remained under 
investigation, RTP and DSI completed investigations of eight, 
and prosecutors found sufficient evidence to prosecute two. The 
government reported six were found to be negligent of their duties 
and subjected to disciplinary actions. Among previously reported 
cases, the government initiated prosecutions of eight allegedly 
complicit officials, and convicted and sentenced five to terms of 
imprisonment in 2020 (14 convictions in 2019). AMLO issued orders 
to seize approximately 1.2 million baht ($40,110) in assets from two 




investigated for official complicity since 2012, eight remained under 
investigation, four were under prosecutors’ consideration, eight were 
under the consideration of the court of first instance, 32 were under 
appeal, eight were imprisoned, 11 were acquitted of charges, and two 
fled charges. The government utilized administrative punishments 
against some suspected complicit officials rather than criminally 
investigating and prosecuting them. 
PROTECTION
The government decreased efforts to identify and protect victims; 
officials identified significantly fewer victims in 2020 than in previous 
years, and it continued to make inadequate efforts to protect forced 
labor victims. The government identified 230 trafficking victims in 
2020, compared with approximately 868 victims identified in 2019, 
and 631 in 2018. Of the 230 trafficking victims Thai officials identified, 
81—who were mostly Thai—chose not to reside in government 
shelters, while eight victims resided in NGO government-registered 
shelters. The 148 trafficking victims whom MSDHS reported assisting 
in government and NGO shelters (a significant decrease from 610 
in 2019) included 77 Thai and 71 foreign victims, 57 male and 91 
female victims, and 78 victims of sex trafficking and 70 victims of 
labor trafficking (170 victims of sex trafficking and 440 victims of labor 
trafficking in 2019). The government did not report if immigration 
authorities screened migrants in immigration detention centers for 
victims of trafficking in 2020, compared with 7,156 screened in 2019. 
In the previous reporting period, NGOs reported that authorities 
decreased efforts to cooperate with them to screen for trafficking 
victims among this population. 
MDTs, which comprised government agencies and NGOs, utilized 
standard screening guidelines to formally identify victims and 
refer them to services. Effective implementation of identification 
procedures by MDTs continued to be inconsistent throughout 
Thailand’s 76 provinces, including due to of a lack of understanding 
of trafficking among some officials. In some instances, civil society 
organizations reported identifying trafficking victims among those 
whom government officials screened but did not identify as trafficking 
victims. The government relied on MDTs, which sometimes included 
local police officers, provincial MSDHS staff, and local labor officials 
who did not have sufficient experiences working trafficking cases, to 
confirm an individual as a trafficking victim. The frequent rotation of 
police officers also meant officers with experience working trafficking 
cases were rotated out of their positions and often replaced with 
inexperienced officers, which prevented stable trafficking expertise 
in some MDTs. Some officials utilized practices during MDT victim 
interviews that hindered the ability of victims to recount their 
exploitation. For example, officials have allowed employers of 
potential victims to be present during victim interviews, some MDT 
interviews involved an excessive number of officials, and officials 
did not sufficiently coordinate during interviews. MDTs were also 
sometimes reluctant to make identifications unless a case was likely 
to result in a successful prosecution. Some officials failed to recognize 
trafficking cases that did not involve physical force or overt signs 
of coercion, such as delayed or non-payment of wages, debt-based 
coercion, and document confiscation. Anecdotal reports suggested 
some government officials were reluctant to receive complaints or 
to identify victims due to fears it would indicate law enforcement 
incompetence or a failure of the government’s efforts to combat 
trafficking. The government continued to distribute a handbook in 
seven languages informing victims of their legal rights under the 
trafficking law, including access to services. 
Section 29 of the anti-trafficking law required officials to take 
suspected trafficking victims into the government’s custody for no 
more than 24 hours, or up to eight days with the permission of a 
court. During this period, MDTs conducted victim identification 
interviews, and formal identification by MDTs was necessary for 
victims to obtain a legal right to services, including access to the 
government’s trafficking shelters. This acted as a significant barrier for 
some victims who were not physically or psychologically prepared to 
undergo the MDT identification process to obtain services. Further, 
the absence of a suitable reflection period and where victims could 
access stabilizing services from the government did not allow officials 
sufficient time to build rapport and trust with victims, including to 
obtain sufficient information to make a formal identification and 
to encourage victims’ participation in investigations. Consequently, 
victims frequently sought temporary care from NGOs, which did not 
receive government funding, before they were prepared to undergo the 
MDT interview process. During the reporting period, the government 
created a working group, which included civil society organizations, 
to consider adopting a national referral mechanism and reflection 
period for victims.
The government continued to refer victims formally identified 
by MDTs to government-operated shelters where they had access 
to counseling, legal assistance, medical care, civil compensation, 
financial aid, witness protection, education or vocational trainings, 
and employment opportunities. However, authorities made the 
provision of some services contingent upon victims’ willingness 
to participate in law enforcement investigations. The government 
provided repatriation assistance to some victims regardless of whether 
they participated in law enforcement investigations. MSDHS operated 
76 short-stay shelters and nine long-term regional trafficking shelters, 
including four dedicated to adult male victims and families, four for 
female victims, and one for male child victims. The government only 
permitted foreign victims who held a valid visa or work permit at 
the time of their identification to stay outside government shelters 
during legal proceedings against their traffickers. Undocumented 
foreign victims of trafficking were sometimes required to remain in 
government shelters while the government processed applications 
for permits to temporarily stay and work in Thailand; in some cases, 
after these permits were approved, victims were required to stay in 
government shelters. MSDHS trafficking shelters did not allow some 
victims—including adults—to leave without permission, which 
was determined on a case-by-case basis; only victims who received 
permission to work outside shelters could leave the shelter on a regular 
basis for work. Furthermore, victims were often required to stay in 
shelters until the completion of proceedings or advanced testimony 
against their traffickers, even in cases in which they were physically 
and psychologically ready to exit the shelter system. In addition, 
shelter staff sometimes required victims to obtain permission to 
make personal phone calls and often monitored their calls. While 
some shelters provided victims with routine phone access, it was 
reportedly standard practice to confiscate victims’ personal cell 
phones when they entered shelters and in some cases shelter staff 
did not let victims immediately notify their families of their location 
and status. The government reported victims who had completed 
the process of participating as witnesses in prosecutions against their 
traffickers were permitted to use communication devices without 
supervision. Requiring victims to remain in shelters longer than 
necessary, combined with the restrictions on their movement and 
communication during shelter stays, likely contributed to some 
victims’ re-traumatization and inhibited their ability to earn an 
income. For some foreign victims, especially Rohingya, the government 
did not identify suitable employment opportunities and some shelter 
officials cited fears Rohingya would “flee” shelters as a rationale for 
restricting their freedom of movement. The government permitted 
52 victims to work outside shelters in 2020. While the government 
made efforts to reduce the length of prosecutions and thereby decrease 
the amount of time victims had to stay in shelters, the required 
shelter stays continued to deter foreign victims from cooperating 
with law enforcement, with some preferring to be deported to their 
home countries instead. The government permitted some victims 
to reside at and obtain services at three government-registered NGO 
shelters; although victims obtaining these services could still obtain 
compensation from the government’s anti-trafficking fund, the 
government did not provide these shelters with additional funding 
to support their operations. In addition, observers reported strict 






assist formally identified victims made it challenging for additional 
NGOs to obtain this registration. 
NGOs reported MSDHS shelter directors had significant influence 
over their individual shelters, which often resulted in inconsistent 
policies and provision of care to victims. While MSDHS increased 
the number of social workers and psychologists, government shelters 
often lacked adequate numbers of psychologists and staff trained on 
trauma-informed care, inhibiting victims from obtaining psycho-social 
care. Contacts reported that shelters did not always provide victims 
with individualized care or private counseling, and instead relied on 
group counseling sessions with social workers. Trafficking shelters 
dedicated to assist women primarily served sex trafficking victims 
and were not fully prepared to provide appropriate care to labor 
trafficking victims. MSDHS shelters were not equipped to provide 
adequate accommodations for victims with disabilities and did not 
provide specialized services to boys and LGBTQI+ victims. In 2020, 
MSDHS designated an area in every trafficking shelter to house and 
provide services to LGBTQI+ victims. Government shelters often 
lacked sufficient numbers of interpreters, especially for Rohingya 
victims, which weakened their ability to provide adequate services 
to victims; however the government reported organizing weekly 
schedules for victims to access interpreters while in shelters during 
the reporting period. NGOs reported interpreters who participated 
in victim identification interviews and in court proceedings were not 
always trained to assist in trafficking cases or often inappropriately 
communicated with victims, sometimes by attempting to convince 
victims to not report their exploitation or recommending they confess 
to unlawful acts their traffickers compelled them to commit. MSDHS 
provided vocational training activities in shelters, and victims could 
earn a minor income from activities such as craft-making. However, 
observers reported inadequate options for vocational training and 
work offered in shelters. Thai law permitted foreign trafficking victims 
and witnesses to stay and work in Thailand for up to two years upon 
the completion of legal proceedings against their traffickers; MSDHS 
granted the requests for six victims to obtain this status during the 
reporting period. NGOs reported inconsistent experiences among 
shelters in assisting victims to obtain this right. 
The government continued to identify a low number of labor 
trafficking victims compared to the scope of the problem. Experts 
reported government officials did not take sufficient steps to 
proactively identify labor trafficking victims and varying levels of 
understanding of labor trafficking existed among officials. The 
adoption of Section 6/1, in the absence of implementing guidelines, 
also contributed to confusion among many officials on how to use 
this forced labor provision in addition to the existing trafficking 
provision when assessing labor trafficking cases. In the previous 
reporting period, the government revised the preliminary victim 
identification form to include victims of forced labor, as defined under 
Section 6/1, and reported assigning MSDHS to develop additional 
guidelines for MDT victim interviews and organize trainings on the 
new form. MSDHS reported conducting nationwide trainings on 
the use of the revised form. Labor inspectors and members of the 
Royal Thai Navy screened migrant workers for trafficking during 
inspections, including during inspections of fishing vessels, and 
were required to refer all potential trafficking victims to MDTs for 
formal identification and service referral. However, NGOs reported 
inconsistent interviewing practices during vessel inspections continued 
to result in ineffective efforts to identify labor trafficking victims 
among migrant fishermen. Furthermore, a distrust of inspectors 
deterred workers from reporting exploitation. Officials sometimes 
encouraged exploited workers in various sectors who were likely 
victims of forced labor to mediate their situation with their employer 
or referred their cases to labor courts, rather than recognizing them as 
trafficking victims and recommending criminal investigation of their 
cases. Labor inspectors could be held personally liable for claims of 
abuse of power under Thai law, which may have discouraged them 
from reporting suspected exploitation. 
Authorities facilitated the return of 59 Thais exploited abroad (123 
in 2019), including 10 confirmed trafficking victims (25 in 2019), by 
providing funding for travel expenses, legal assistance, job placement, 
and other reintegration services. MSDHS assisted in the reintegration 
of 127 Thai survivors who completed the protection process in 
Thailand; the government reported it assigned social workers to 
maintain contact with Thai victims for at least one year after their 
reintegration. Officials utilized approximately 1.21 million baht 
($40,440) from the government’s anti-trafficking fund for aiding in 
the repatriation of 262 foreign survivors, mostly from Burma and Laos, 
who completed the protection process in Thailand; the government 
did not report how many victims it repatriated in 2019 but reported 
repatriating 201 in 2018. The government also assisted 20 foreign 
survivors who could not return to their country of origin to resettle in 
a third country. However, experts have reported Thai authorities did 
not always follow procedures for safely repatriating foreign victims. 
The government operated seven child advocacy centers (CACs), which 
served as child-friendly spaces where law enforcement, NGOs, and 
social workers could conduct forensic interviews of child trafficking 
victims. In some cases, the government permitted NGOs to observe 
law enforcement operations and provide assistance to identified 
victims. Some judges lacked sufficient understanding of trauma-
informed care, which resulted in harmful treatment of victims during 
court proceedings; the government postponed a planned training 
for judges due to the pandemic. While courts reportedly followed 
protocols to protect victims and witness in most instances, NGOs 
have reported some incidents where the court failed to provide a 
non-confrontational cross-examining area, despite advance request, 
and asked witnesses to verbally confirm sensitive information in 
front of the suspects during proceedings. The 2016 Beggar Control 
Act provided for health and social services to individuals engaged 
in begging activities, including trafficking victims. The government 
reported identifying only two victims of forced begging in 2020 (nine 
in 2019). In Phuket, officials identified and provided assistance to 
17 child labor trafficking victims who were compelled to sell items 
on the street; however, NGOs reported the government lacked clear 
policies related to the protection of this population throughout the 
country. Despite reports children were exploited in forced labor in 
other sectors, such as agriculture or domestic work, the government 
did not identify any additional child labor trafficking victims in 2020. 
As part of the government’s pandemic response, all agencies were 
required to reduce spending by 10 percent. MSHDS reduced its 
trafficking budget by 42.5 million baht ($1.42 million) as a result; 
however, it reported that the reduction was largely offset by moving 
trainings and other events to online formats and cancelling overseas 
travel, and thus it did not reallocate any funding meant for direct 
victim assistance. In 2020, the government provided 7.63 million 
baht ($255,010) to trafficking victims from its anti-trafficking fund, 
including 849,187 baht ($28,380) that went to victims residing 
outside government shelters, a decrease from 11.87 million baht 
($396,720) in 2019. In some cases in which victims had returned 
to their home countries, the government used electronic transfers to 
enable victims to access funds without returning to Thailand. Thai 
law legally obligated prosecutors to file restitution claims when a 
victim expressed intention to make a claim. The Human Trafficking 
Criminal Procedures Act allowed judges to award compensation or 
restitution to victims, including in the absence of a victim request for 
these funds. The government filed reinstitution claims for 94 victims 
(38 Thai victims and 56 foreign victims) and reported courts ordered 
26 million baht ($868,980) in restitution for victims, a decrease 
compared with 54 million baht ($1.8 million) in 2019. However, 
the execution of court ordered restitution was lacking, especially for 
foreign victims. MSDHS operated a unit under its anti-trafficking 
division to provide victims legal assistance and file compensation 
claims and utilized guidelines to enhance the efficacy of filing 
such claims. The Thai Cabinet approved a draft amendment to the 
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 1999 that would expand the right of 




traffickers; the amendment was pending submission to Parliament 
at the end of the reporting period. 
MSDHS continued to operate a mobile application for trafficking 
victims and witnesses to report exploitation and request protective 
services, including interpretation, and it provided information on 
the rights of trafficking victims in seven languages; 32 potential 
trafficking cases were reported through this application in 2020, 
compared with seven in 2019. MSDHS and MOL operated hotlines 
with operators fluent in 19 foreign languages. In 2020, the MSDHS 
trafficking hotline received calls related to 70 possible trafficking 
cases, including nine involving forced labor (162 cases in 2019); 
officials referred 58 of these cases to relevant authorities for further 
investigation. MOL employed 67 language coordinators (91 in 2019) 
and 118 interpreters (99 in 2019) in 2020. 
The law protected victims from prosecution for unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit; however, flaws in the government’s 
implementation of victim identification procedures increased the 
risk of authorities penalizing victims, including for prostitution and 
immigration violations. This deterred some undocumented foreign 
victims who feared risks of arrests and deportation from reporting 
their exploitation to authorities. Contacts reported some Rohingya 
migrants, including potential trafficking victims, were identified as 
“illegal aliens” by Thai authorities, detained indefinitely or deported 
to Burma where they likely faced retribution or hardship. Observers 
reported the government enabled some employers to retaliate against 
migrant workers and activists seeking to improve working conditions, 
including by dismissing workers. In addition, Thailand’s criminal 
defamation laws continued to allow companies to pursue criminal 
charges against potential victims and advocates, including through 
strategic lawsuits against public participation, which resulted in 
advocates facing years of legal harassment. For example, since 2016 
a company has pursued more than 37 complaints against rights 
advocates for reporting on the exploitation of 14 Burmese workers 
who were subjected to conditions indicative of forced labor. While 
Thai courts overturned or dismissed charges against some of these 
advocates during the reporting period, the company continued to 
appeal the government’s decisions, which leaves these advocates facing 
ongoing judicial actions. Observers continued to report these types 
of cases deterred advocates and victims from reporting exploitation. 
Despite making amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code in 
March 2019 that would enable courts to immediately dismiss cases 
filed with dishonest intent or to intimidate the defendants, as well 
as amendments in February 2019 that strengthened the rights of 
defendants in cases where their employers filed criminal defamation 
charges, the government did not report utilizing these amendments 
to drop criminal defamation charges pursued against advocates. The 
government also amended the anti-trafficking law in 2015 to provide 
protection to whistleblowers but reported that no whistleblowers 
have requested this protection to date. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The Prime 
Minister oversaw the government’s anti-trafficking efforts through the 
Anti-Trafficking in Persons Committee, which coordinated policies 
and strategies across agencies. In addition, the Deputy Prime Minister 
chaired a committee to monitor and evaluate the implementation 
of the government’s anti-trafficking efforts. The government also 
continued to monitor its progress to combat trafficking through 
data collection and annual reports to the Prime Minister and the 
Cabinet. In 2020, the government allocated approximately 4.02 billion 
baht ($134.36 million) towards its prevention and suppression of 
trafficking budget, compared with approximately 3.8 billion ($127.01 
million) in 2019. It conducted campaigns through newspapers, 
television, radio, social media, billboards, and handouts to raise public 
awareness throughout the country. Officials conducted numerous 
outreach activities to raise awareness of trafficking among school 
children, teachers, and community leaders. Addressing an increasing 
occurrence of online sexual exploitation of children, the government 
distributed booklets to parents, teachers, and students on the risk 
of online sexual exploitation and how to report suspected cases or 
to seek assistance. TICAC and CAC’s collaborated with NGOs and 
the OAG to conduct 18 awareness raising talks on online sexual 
exploitation for students and teachers in 2020. In addition, the 
foreign affairs ministry conducted awareness campaigns on trafficking 
risks, including by sharing information through social media, for 
Thai nationals abroad. 
Thai law permitted recruitment agencies to charge a limited 
amount of recruitment fees to Thais seeking overseas employment. 
Excessive fees incurred by some workers charged by unscrupulous 
recruitment agencies made them vulnerable to debt-based coercion. 
Through government-to-government formal migration channels, 
the government assisted 2,978 Thais to obtain employment abroad 
in 2020—which was significantly fewer than the 11,886 assisted in 
2019 due to the impacts of the pandemic—including by providing 
job placement assistance. In addition, 14 provincial employment 
offices provided training, including on trafficking risks, to 1,891 Thai 
workers prior to their overseas employment. In 2020, the government 
conducted 133 inspections of employment agencies that recruited 
Thai workers but did not find any unlawful practices. It investigated 
65 reports of brokers operating without a license. The government 
operated 12 labor offices in countries with high amounts of Thai 
workers; these offices conducted 1,630 inspections, assisted more 
than 7,684 workers, and trained 703 labor volunteers to assist in 
the identification of labor violations and trafficking among Thai 
workers. MOL and RTP collaborated to investigate unauthorized, 
online advertisements for jobs for Thai workers overseas which led 
to the investigation of 128 cases.
The government maintained bilateral memorandums of understanding 
(MOUs) with neighboring countries to recruit migrant workers to 
Thailand, and 111,429 workers were recruited through MOUs in 2020. 
However, high costs, difficulties in obtaining identity documents 
in home countries, and other administrative barriers continued 
to impede greater utilization of these MOUs and also resulted in 
workers relying on brokers’ assistance. The complicated nature of 
the government migrant worker registration process often resulted 
in workers’ reliance on brokers and employers, who often charged 
excessive fees to workers to obtain documents, thereby increasing 
their vulnerability to debt-based coercion. The 2018 Royal Ordinance 
on Management of Migrant Workers regulated the recruitment and 
employment of migrant workers in Thailand. The Ordinance required 
employers to provide workers a copy of their employment contracts 
and to cover some costs, such as recruitment fees and transportation 
costs associated with bringing migrant workers to Thailand and back 
to their home countries when employment ends. However, it did not 
prohibit employers and recruiters from charging migrant workers 
with some costs related to their recruitment, such as expenses for 
passports, medical checks, and work permits. NGOs reported the 
regulations on recruitment fees were poorly defined and enforced, 
and recruitment agencies and brokers still required workers to pay 
recruitment fees and transportation costs. To accommodate Burmese, 
Cambodian, and Laotian workers whose work permits had expired 
but were unable to return due to pandemic-related travel restrictions, 
the Thai Cabinet approved measures to extend their work permits 
to allow them to legally work in Thailand until March 31, 2022. 
However, NGOs reported that fees associated with obtaining renewed 
work permits likely deterred some workers from applying for these 
permits and contributed to debt-based coercion, and that workers 
faced barriers applying due to the requirement or relied on brokers to 
assist them to register. This meant many workers continued to work 
without legal status and were likely at risk of exploitation, including 
debt-based coercion, by brokers and employers. The government 
also facilitated the return of more than 80,000 migrant workers 
from Myanmar to voluntarily return home.
NGOs and international organizations widely reported the 
government did not adequately enforce minimum wage laws and 






employment of migrant workers, such as seasonal agriculture. Labor 
laws prevented migrant workers from forming labor unions which may 
have further contributed to exploitation. The 2018 Royal Ordinance 
prohibited employers from deducting more than 10 percent of 
workers’ monthly salaries for personal expenses and the retention 
of travel or other personal documents; the law prescribed penalties 
of fines ranging from 10,000-100,000 baht ($334-$3,340) and up to 
six months’ imprisonment for employers who violated these rules. 
It enabled employers to retain workers’ documents if they obtained 
their consent and if the employer provided access to the documents; 
however, observers reported that because enforcement was lacking, 
in some cases this facilitated the ability of unscrupulous employers 
to retain workers’ documents, especially in cases in which workers 
were not familiar with their rights under Thai law. The government 
did not report investigating illegal retention of documents or salary 
deductions. Observers reported that while the Department of Labor 
Protection and Welfare (DLPW) was responsible for monitoring for 
illegal deductions, the Department of Employment (DOE) conducted 
labor inspections of recruitment agencies but did not frequently refer 
suspected cases of illegal deductions to DLPW. Many employers and 
brokers who bore the upfront costs associated with bringing workers 
to Thailand indebted workers to pay these fees through illegal salary 
deductions, often without workers’ knowledge. Thai law required that 
employment contracts be provided in Thai, English, and the migrant 
worker’s language. However, research conducted in previous years 
found that employers rarely provided workers a contract to keep in 
their own language in practice. Although government regulations 
permitted exploited migrant workers to change employers, some 
policies restricted their ability to do so in practice. NGOs reported 
the 2018 Royal Ordinance required an employer to submit a letter of 
resignation to the DOE for a worker to change employers; however, 
they reportedly rarely did so in practice. Provincial labor offices 
required workers recruited under MOUs to present many documents 
that workers often could not provide without NGO or brokers’ 
assistance to approve job changes. By law, MOU employers could 
recover costs associated with recruiting a migrant worker from the 
new employer when a worker requested to change jobs before the 
end of their employment contract, and some employers charged 
these workers to obtain their documents, making them susceptible 
to debt-based coercion. The government did not report investigating 
employers who illegally charged fees to such migrant workers. The 
government also permitted migrants to obtain 30-day and 90-day 
border passes to work in non-seasonal agricultural or manufacturing 
jobs, including within 10 developing special economic zones, but 
such temporary working arrangements did not provide workers 
access to social protections. NGOs reported employers increasingly 
encouraged workers to obtain these border passes rather than obtain 
longer term work permits that would provide additional protections. 
The government reported that labor inspectors conducted inspection 
of 161 establishments in border areas in 2020 (146 in 2019), finding 
146 violations of the law (71 in 2019). The government did not report 
identifying any cases of trafficking through these efforts but issued 
corrective orders in 144 cases and initiated prosecution in two cases. 
In 2020, the government inspected 264 migrant worker recruitment 
agencies (compared with 244 in 2019) and found two operating in 
violation of the law. MOL identified labor violations among 2,944 
businesses and employers that employer migrant workers in 2020, 
compared with 2,333 in 2019; of these, the government fined 668 
a total of 3.65 million baht ($121,990). 
Following the passage of the Fishery Workers Protection Act in 
2019, the government enacted two additional subordinate laws 
in 2020, thereby fully enacting all necessary laws required to fully 
implement the Act. The Act aimed to improve the effectiveness 
of labor inspections on fishing vessels, the provision of medical 
care, and regular reporting of violations of the act. In addition, the 
government enacted nine subordinate laws under the 2015 Royal 
Ordinance on Fisheries, to facilitate the issuance and extension of 
identity documents (seaman’s books) for migrant fishermen. A draft 
ministerial regulation would reduce the legal minimum age of relatives 
of a vessel’s captain or owners permitted to work on fishing vessels 
from 18 to 16; NGOs expressed concern that due to inadequate 
oversight to ensure that children working on fishing vessels were in 
fact relatives of adult crew members, this change may put children 
at risk of forced labor on fishing vessels. In addition, there were 
concerns the draft regulation did not ensure adequate work and rest 
hours for fishermen, would not require employers to provide workers 
a contract in their own language, would allow for wage deductions 
without the written consent of the worker, and permitted vessels 
to remain at sea for up to a year, which would limit the ability of 
workers to report exploitation to authorities or to seek assistance. A 
lack of clear guidance to measure work and rest hours for workers 
aboard fishing vessels heightened their risk of trafficking. The 2018 
Ministerial Regulation on Labor Protection for Sea Fishers required 
employers to pay workers’ salaries at least once per month through 
electronic deposits and to share catch profits. While this system 
received overall praise from civil society observers, some continued 
to report concerns that some workers were unable to access their 
funds due to a lack of ATMs near some ports, insufficient training 
on how to use the system, and the withholding of workers’ ATM 
cards and PINs by vessel owners, captains, or brokers. In addition, 
while the electronic payment system increased the ability of labor 
inspectors to verify wage payments, previous reports indicated that 
unscrupulous employers continued to make regular electronic 
payments in their employees’ accounts to satisfy the legal requirement 
but made illegal withdrawals. 
The government operated five post-arrival and reintegration centers 
that assisted migrant workers who entered Thailand through the 
MOU process by providing information on labor rights, Thai 
culture, employment contracts, trafficking awareness, and complaint 
mechanisms; in 2020, these centers assisted 111,429 migrant workers. 
However, due to the limited amount of time workers were present 
at these centers, which was usually immediately after workers had 
completed their travel to Thailand, officials were only able to provide 
them with limited information in practice. In addition, previous 
reports indicated labor officials interviewed workers in the presence of 
their employers and brokers, and armed police, at post-arrival centers, 
which may have deterred workers from reporting exploitation. MOL 
also worked with NGOs to provide services at 10 migrant worker 
assistance centers, including to receive complaints of labor violations, 
assist workers to change employers, and update workers’ registration 
documents. The government continued to work with NGO-operated 
centers located near fishing markets to provide skills training, health 
screenings, and other resources to raise awareness of workers’ rights. 
Provincial labor offices, migrant worker assistance centers, and other 
government agencies did not adequately investigate migrant workers 
complaints, or refer suspected labor violations, including those 
indicative of forced labor, to relevant agencies. In addition, workers’ 
past negative interactions with authorities and a lack of availability 
of interpreters at some labor offices deterred migrant workers from 
reporting exploitation. 
The Department of Fisheries (DOF) oversaw the Command Center 
for Combating Illegal Fishing, which operated 32 port-in port-out 
(PIPO) centers and 19 additional forward inspection points (FIP). 
Some observers reported that since authority of PIPO moved from 
the Royal Thai Navy to DOF in 2019, it has experienced a loss of 
influence and inspections have weakened. PIPO centers performed 
inspections to verify whether fishing vessels were operating legally 
and implemented a risk-based assessment system to identify target 
vessels for inspection. According to one NGO, some PIPO centers 
did not appropriately apply the risk assessment and sometimes failed 
to inspect vessels due to a lack of resources or an assumption that 
some vessels did not require inspection. In addition, an observer 
noted the risk assessment did not include indicators such as a vessel 
previously recorded as failing to record working hours, retaining 
workers’ documents, having labor intensive gear, or experiencing labor 
disputes or crewmembers lost at sea. In 2020, the government reported 




2019) and identifying 19 vessels in violation of labor laws (20 in 
2019). In addition, it conducted at-sea inspections of 842 vessels, 
but found only one case involving labor violations, which involved 
employing workers without seaman’s books. The government has 
never reported identifying trafficking victims as a result of PIPO 
labor inspections. NGOs have reported assisting victims of trafficking 
who underwent PIPO inspections but whom authorities did not 
identify as victims. The Royal Thai Navy, in cooperation with other 
agencies also inspected vessels at sea to identify smuggled migrants, 
and found 466 cases of migrant smuggling in 2020, but it did not 
report screening these individuals for trafficking. At-sea inspections 
did not include sufficient checks for labor violations or consistently 
have interpreters available for interviewing foreign crewmembers. 
Despite using a manual on standardized inspection practices 
introduced in 2019, PIPO labor inspections continued to be 
inconsistent and ineffective at identifying potential cases of forced 
labor on fishing vessels. Some inspection teams did not use victim-
centered interview practices, lacked interpreters for some workers’ 
languages, did not board vessels during inspections, did not interview 
workers or separate workers away from owners, captains, or brokers 
when interviews were conducted, or conduct pre- and post- inspection 
team meetings away from vessel owners or captains. Some of these 
practices likely prevented authorities from identifying trafficking 
victims and deterred workers or inspectors from revealing information 
due to fears of retaliation. Furthermore, PIPO officials sometime 
reportedly ignored complaints made by migrant workers or told 
them to report their exploitation to another agency, and there 
was no standard or required protocol for labor inspectors to refer 
potential cases of forced labor to law enforcement or MDTs. PIPOs 
did not universally apply a standardized procedure for referring 
cases of fishermen who went missing at sea, including to identify 
indicators of trafficking on the vessels in which they went missing, 
and the number of crewmembers who went missing at sea continued 
to increase; in 2020 there were 63 missing fishermen, compared 
with 29 in 2019. 
As a result of the government’s pandemic-mitigation efforts, it 
decreased the budget for labor inspections by 72 percent; however, 
the government increased the number of inspectors and conducted 
a comparable number of inspections as in 2020. In 2020, DLPW 
conducted 1,924 inspections at high-risk workplaces and seafood 
processing facilities (2,116 in 2019), finding 1,629 workplaces 
operating in violation of labor laws (1,017 in 2020). Labor inspectors 
could not enter some business establishments due to pandemic-related 
health precautions. Previous reports indicated some factories received 
advance warning of labor inspections, which may have hampered 
the ability of officials to identify labor violations, including those 
indicative of forced labor. DPLW identified 10 enterprises that violated 
child labor laws, involving 44 children but did not report any cases of 
child labor trafficking. A lack of access to remote workplaces prevented 
sufficient child labor inspections in some informal sectors. Following 
an outbreak of COVID-19 among migrant workers in Samut Sakhon, 
the government instituted extreme measures to contain the virus by 
forcibly quarantining migrant workers, including those who tested 
negative for the virus, in their dormitories with fencing and barbed 
wire. Contacts reported these measures made workers distrustful of 
government officials and likely reduced the likelihood they were 
willing to report exploitation to authorities. The Ministry of Justice 
proposed a plan to recruit inmates with three to five years left in 
prison to work in the seafood sector on a voluntary basis; observers 
expressed concern that it may be difficult to determine if all inmates 
volunteered for this work and that they could face forms of coercion 
to participate in this work. The government continued to grant 
citizenship to stateless persons. The government made efforts to 
reduce the demand for commercial sex acts, including by displaying 
a video in four languages discouraging child sex tourism in Thai 
airports and on Thai airline flights. In addition, the government 
coordinated with foreign governments to deny entry to known sex 
offenders. The government provided anti-trafficking training to its 
diplomatic personnel. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Thailand, and traffickers exploit Thai victims 
abroad. Labor and sex traffickers exploit women, men, LGBTQI+ 
individuals, and children from Thailand, other Southeast Asian 
countries, Sri Lanka, Russia, Uzbekistan, and some African countries 
in Thailand. Members of ethnic minorities, highland persons, and 
stateless persons in Thailand have experienced instances of abuse 
indicative of trafficking. North Koreans working in Thailand may have 
been forced to work by the North Korean government. Children from 
Thailand, Burma, Laos, and Cambodia are victims of sex trafficking in 
brothels, massage parlors, bars, karaoke lounges, hotels, and private 
residences. Traffickers induce young Thai girls and boys to perform 
sex acts through videos and photos on the internet, sometimes 
by blackmailing victims with explicit images. Children are lured 
by traffickers into commercial sex through the internet, chat and 
dating applications, as well as other social networking platforms. 
Children in orphanages are at risk of trafficking. Children of families 
that lost employment due to the impacts of pandemic, including 
among migrant families, were increasingly at risk of trafficking. 
Approximately 177,000 Thai children, mostly boys, are involved in 
child labor, including in agriculture, auto repair and other service 
trades, construction, manufacturing, and in the hospitality industry, 
and were at risk of facing conditions indicative of forced labor. More 
than half of these children are not in school, and many worked in 
hazardous conditions, with long and irregular working hours, and 
were at risk of sexual exploitation. Some parents or brokers force 
children from Thailand, Cambodia, and Burma to sell flowers or 
other items in streets, beg, or work in domestic service in urban 
areas. Elderly persons and persons with disabilities from Cambodia 
are also forced to beg in Thailand. 
Traffickers subject Thai nationals to forced labor and sex trafficking 
in countries in North America, Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle 
East. Thai women and LGBTQI+ individuals were increasingly 
exploited in Switzerland in sex trafficking. Thai citizens who travel to 
Norway for family reunification are at risk of sex and labor trafficking. 
Traffickers subject some Thai men and women to forced labor in 
Israel’s agricultural sector, imposing conditions of long working hours, 
no breaks or rest days, withheld passports, and difficulty changing 
employers due to limitations on work permits. Approximately 185,000 
Thais work in South Korea, where traffickers subject Thai men and 
women to forced labor and sex trafficking, including by forcing 
victims who owe debts to entertainment establishment owners or 
loan sharks into commercial sex. 
Traffickers and smugglers operating between Burma and Thailand 
charge Burmese migrants approximately 10,000 to 70,000 baht ($334-
$2,340) to smuggle them into Thailand. Observers reported these 
smuggling networks are supported by complicit police, military, and 
other local authorities. In early 2020, an estimated 60,000-200,000 
migrant workers departed Thailand prior to and following pandemic-
related border closures. Many of these workers subsequently returned 
to Thailand undocumented throughout 2020, often paying fees to 
smugglers to facilitate their return, increasing their risk to debt-based 
coercion. Smugglers, brokers, employers, and others exploit Thai 
and migrant workers in labor trafficking in commercial fishing and 
related industries, the poultry industry, manufacturing, agriculture, 
domestic work, and street begging. Many workers pay high fees to 
brokers, recruitment agencies, and others before and after they arrive 
in Thailand. Traffickers often use debt-based coercion, deceptive 
recruitment practices, retention of identity documents and ATM 
cards, illegal wage deductions, physical violence, and other means to 
subject victims to forced labor. Employers confiscate workers identity 
documents as a means to compel workers to remain in their jobs, 
especially in agricultural plantations, often in addition to paying 






Workers in the seafood processing and fishing sectors increasingly 
faced forced overtime as a result of increasing demand for shelf-stable 
seafood during the pandemic, as well as unsafe working conditions.
Vessel owners, brokers, and senior vessel crew subject Thai, Burmese, 
Cambodian, Vietnamese, and Indonesian men and boys to forced 
labor on Thai and foreign-owned fishing boats. Some are paid 
little or irregularly, incur debts from brokers and employers, work 
as much as 18 to 20 hours per day for seven days a week, and 
without adequate food, water, or medical supplies. Some boat 
captains threaten, beat, and drug fishermen to work longer, and 
sell fishermen drugs as a means to generate additional debt. Some 
trafficking victims in the fishing sector had difficulty returning 
home due to isolated workplaces, unpaid wages, and the lack of 
legitimate identity documents or safe means to travel. Employers 
in fishing and seafood processing often made confusing wage 
deductions for documentation fees, advances, and other charges, 
making it difficult for workers to account for their wages accurately. 
Research published in 2019 and 2020 found that between 14 and 
18 percent of migrant fishermen were exploited in forced labor in 
the Thai fishing industry, indicating traffickers exploited thousands 
of workers on fishing vessels. 
Corruption continues to undermine anti-trafficking efforts. Some 
government officials are directly complicit in trafficking crimes, 
including through accepting bribes or loans from business owners 
and brothels that exploit victims. Corrupt immigration officials 
facilitate trafficking by accepting bribes from brokers and smugglers 
along Thai borders. Credible reports indicate some corrupt officials 
protect brothels, other commercial sex venues, factory owners, and 
fishing vessel owners from raids, inspections, and prosecutions, 
and collude with traffickers. Some local police reportedly withhold 
information from prosecutors to protect traffickers. Some government 
officials profit from bribes and direct involvement in extortion from 
and exploitation of migrants. 
TIMOR-LESTE: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Timor-Leste does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included investigating some potential 
trafficking crimes, identifying and referring for assistance one foreign 
trafficking victim, taking some steps to establish an anti-trafficking 
commission, and maintaining an anti-trafficking curriculum in 
some of its trainings for officials. However, the government did not 
demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared to the previous 
reporting period, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity. Lack of expertise and 
understanding of trafficking crimes, data collection methods, clear 
leadership roles among ministries, and any devoted budget remained 
serious impediments to the government effectively combating 
trafficking. The government continued to demonstrate decreasing 
efforts to investigate and prosecute traffickers, as well as a failure 
to push longstanding cases forward in the courts. The government 
did not obtain any trafficking convictions during the reporting 
period. The government’s victim identification and referral efforts 
remained ad hoc, and protection services specifically tailored to the 
needs of victims of all forms of trafficking remained inadequate. The 
government did not finalize or approve government-wide standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) for victim identification for the sixth 
consecutive year—a critical need as official understanding of trafficking 
remained low, and some authorities continued to detain and deport 
potential trafficking victims for immigration violations without 
performing screening procedures. Therefore Timor-Leste remained 
on Tier 2 Watch List for the second consecutive year.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase investigations of trafficking crimes, proactively initiate 
prosecutions, and convict and punish traffickers, including complicit 
officials, in accordance with anti-trafficking laws. • Proactively 
identify trafficking victims among vulnerable populations, including 
individuals in commercial sex, domestic workers, and migrant 
workers on fishing vessels. • Develop a current national action plan 
on trafficking and adequately fund its implementation. • Finalize, 
implement, and train all relevant officials on formal procedures for 
victim identification and employ proper screening procedures upon 
detention or prior to initiating deportation. • Strengthen efforts 
to protect victims from arrest, deportation, or other punishment 
for unlawful acts which traffickers compelled them to commit. • 
Establish SOPs on referring victims to appropriate care and train 
officials on their use. • Increase resources for protective services 
focusing on trafficking victims and proactively offer male victims 
the same services offered to female victims. • Establish the human 
trafficking commission. • Improve nationwide law enforcement 
and victim identification data collection. • Screen for trafficking 
indicators among Cuban medical professionals. 
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. Articles 163 and 
164 of the criminal code criminalized all forms of labor and sex 
trafficking and prescribed penalties of eight to 25 years’ imprisonment, 
which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, 
commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, 
such as rape. Law enforcement and judicial officials remained 
unfamiliar with trafficking crimes; thus, it was likely that officials 
inaccurately classified some trafficking cases as immigration or labor 
violations. Furthermore, the government did not collect detailed data 
on trafficking, and the government only collected aggregate data on 
vulnerable persons and not trafficking-specific data. 
The government reported it investigated and detained two suspected 
perpetrators for alleged child sex trafficking of an Indonesian girl in 
June 2020; the case was ongoing at the end of the reporting period. 
The police also reported it apprehended two suspected perpetrators 
in December 2020 for alleged sex trafficking of an Indonesian 
woman, based on a complaint reported in a prior year; the case was 
also pending at the end of the reporting period. This represented a 
decrease from the 13 investigations the government initiated during 
the previous reporting period and demonstrated overall decreasing 
efforts since 2018. The Office of the Labor Inspector General referred 
a potential labor trafficking case to the police in February 2021 
involving a Philippine national recruited to work in a casino where 
her employer withheld her pay and confiscated her passport; the case 
was pending police investigation at the end of the reporting period. 
For the second consecutive year, the government did not initiate any 
new prosecutions during the current reporting period; the Office of 
the Prosecutor General (OPG) reported that two cases first initiated 
in a previous reporting period remained pending. The government 
did not convict any traffickers during the reporting period; it last 
obtained a conviction in 2018. The government did not report any 
investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees 
complicit in trafficking offenses during the reporting period. In 2018, 
a district administrator was accused of raping a child sex trafficking 
victim and attempting to bribe her to not report the case; at the 
end of this reporting period, the case remained with the OPG for 





In a previous reporting period, the government reported referring 
a case of an immigration official who allegedly facilitated labor 
trafficking of Bangladeshi workers to the OPG; the government did 
not report an update on this case. The government acknowledged 
possible trafficking violations in the fishing industry in Timor-Leste’s 
coastal waters and exclusive economic zone to the south; however, 
the government lacked the vessels, training, and human resources 
to patrol, inspect, and interdict vessels in its waters and investigate 
possible trafficking violations on these vessels. 
Government officials reported that pandemic-related restrictions and 
the delayed passing of a federal budget hindered the government’s 
providing anti-trafficking trainings to personnel and the public 
during the reporting period. The Legal Training Center and the 
OPG reported they continued to include anti-trafficking curriculum 
in its training for new judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and 
for current members of the judiciary, but it did not confirm how 
many officials received this training during the reporting period. The 
National Police also included training on how to identify trafficking 
victims as part of their onboarding curriculum, but it did not report 
if any members received this training during the reporting period. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained minimal efforts to identify and protect 
victims. Immigration and police officials reported their ad hoc use 
of trafficking indicators based on the Bali Process to identify victims; 
however—for the sixth consecutive year—the government did not 
finalize or widely disseminate comprehensive, government-wide SOPs 
for victim identification. While relevant ministries collaborated to 
share information on trafficking victims, there was no formal referral 
process for trafficking victims; generally authorities used a process 
based on the referral process for victims of gender-based violence. 
The Ministry of Social Solidarity and Inclusion (MSSI) reported it had 
technical officers in each of the 13 districts of the country that worked 
closely with an NGO to provide victims of gender-based violence and 
trafficking with assistance; however, MSSI did not report any cases of 
trafficking to the NGO during the reporting period. The NGO reported 
it had not received a victim referral from MSSI since 2019. In June 
2020, police identified one child sex trafficking victim from Indonesia 
during the course of an investigation; the police coordinated with 
the Indonesian embassy in Dili to provide the victim with shelter 
services and repatriation assistance after she provided a statement of 
her experience to the authorities. The government was prepared to 
provide and refer to protection services two other potential victims 
involved in two separate cases handled by the police during the 
reporting period; however, the victims opted to utilize local support 
networks for assistance. In comparison to the previous reporting 
period, the government did not report its proactive identification 
of any victims in 2019. The government provided funding to NGOs 
for the provision of victim services when victims were identified and 
availed themselves of government-provided assistance. MSSI reported 
it had $10,000 available to provide for trafficking victims during the 
reporting period, but the government did not utilize this funding 
to provide assistance to the one victim identified by the police as 
the foreign victim sought assistance from her embassy. Although no 
victims received comprehensive care during the reporting period, an 
international organization continued to assess the availability and 
the quality of victim care as poor and below international standards; 
it further noted that the government’s existing victim assistance was 
structured for domestic violence victims, who were overwhelmingly 
female, and therefore did not adequately address the needs of male 
trafficking victims. Article 9 of the anti-trafficking law permitted 
victims to seek compensation for losses and damages incurred as a 
result of the trafficking crime, but no victims received such benefits 
during the reporting period. The government provided foreign victims 
with alternatives to their removal to countries where they may face 
hardship or retribution. 
The government implemented regulations and guidance on the 
2017 Law on Preventing and Combating Human Trafficking, which 
stated trafficking victims may not be detained, accused, or judged 
for having entered or resided illegally in Timor-Leste, nor for having 
perpetrated crimes their traffickers compelled them to commit. 
However, the government and NGOs indicated that immigration 
and law enforcement officials may have detained or deported some 
potential foreign trafficking victims due to a failure to properly identify 
and screen for trafficking indicators. Law enforcement routinely 
performed raids on areas known for commercial sex, which was 
legal in the country, in part to assess immigration status. Because 
of inadequate training on victim identification and screening for 
trafficking indicators, authorities likely detained and deported foreign 
sex trafficking victims during these raids. Furthermore, immigration 
and police officials reported traffickers coached victims to state they 
were voluntarily in commercial sex, which officials reported made it 
difficult for them to identify victims during these raids. 
PREVENTION
The government made minimal efforts to prevent trafficking. Although 
the government did not create a commission to combat trafficking 
as mandated in the 2017 anti-trafficking law, in December 2020 the 
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) presented to the Council of Ministers on 
legislative options to establish the responsibilities of the commission. 
In the absence of a commission, the government continued to use 
the interagency anti-trafficking working group, led by the MOJ, to 
coordinate anti-trafficking efforts. The working group met twice 
during the reporting period. The MOJ previously drafted a national 
action plan in 2018, but it did not finalize an updated plan during 
the reporting period. The government did not conduct research 
to assess the human trafficking problem in the country, nor did 
it systemically monitor its anti-trafficking efforts. The government 
conducted anti-trafficking awareness campaigns in high schools 
and local communities throughout the country with a focus on 
Dili. The government did not have an anti-trafficking hotline. The 
government did not take proactive measures to address fraudulent 
labor recruitment practices, which created significant vulnerabilities 
for Timorese nationals seeking work abroad. The government did 
not take measures to reduce the demand for commercial sex. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Timor-Leste, and traffickers exploit victims 
from Timor-Leste abroad. Poor economic conditions and limited 
educational opportunities create trafficking vulnerabilities for 
Timorese nationals, in particular women and girls. Traffickers lead 
Timorese women, girls, and occasionally young men and boys from 
rural areas to the capital with the promise of employment or education 
and exploit them in sex trafficking or domestic servitude. Traffickers 
exploit Timorese men in forced labor in agriculture, construction, and 
mining. Some Timorese family members place children in bonded 
household and agricultural labor, primarily in domestic rural areas 
but also abroad, to pay off family debts. Traffickers deceive young 
men and women and adult women with promises of scholarship 
opportunities or employment in Indonesia, Malaysia, and other 
countries in the region; often, traffickers take the victim to a different 
country than promised, withhold their passports, pay them little to 
nothing, and force them into labor, including domestic servitude. 
Frequently, Timorese victims overseas first transit through the porous 
border with Indonesia; some remain and are exploited in Indonesia. 
Some routes used by smugglers along the Indonesia-Timor-Leste 
border are also possible routes used by traffickers. Immigration 
and police officials and civil society representatives reported in 
2020 that trafficking of foreign victims through legal points of 
entry, such as airports, ports, and official land border crossings, had 
likely decreased due to the government’s increased scrutiny of those 
entering the country due to pandemic-related limitations on the entry 
of both Timorese and foreign arrivals. Sex traffickers in Timor-Leste 
target foreign women from East and Southeast Asia. Transnational 
traffickers may be members of Indonesian or Chinese organized crime 










of the country for the length of a 30-day tourist visa to avoid raising 
the suspicions of law enforcement officers through visa overstay 
violations. Traffickers also recruit Timorese women, send them to 
China, Indonesia, or Malaysia, and force them into commercial 
sex. Police accept bribes from establishments involved in trafficking 
or from traffickers attempting to cross borders illegally. Traffickers 
exploit foreign fishing crews in forced labor on foreign-flagged vessels 
that transit Timor-Leste waters. There are approximately 100 Cuban 
nationals working as doctors in Timor-Leste. 
TOGO: TIER 2
The Government of Togo does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to do 
so. Despite the documented impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the 
government’s anti-trafficking capacity, the government demonstrated 
overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period; 
therefore Togo remained on Tier 2. Togolese authorities investigated 
more suspected trafficking cases than in previous years, intercepted 
250 potential child victims, and conducted increased outreach on 
child protection through community-based child protection entities. 
Additionally, officials instituted new programs to protect vulnerable 
populations. However, the government did not meet the minimum 
standards in several key areas. Authorities convicted no traffickers, 
identified fewer victims, and failed to update the government’s 
national action plan for the 13th consecutive year. Furthermore, the 
government did not finalize its pending decree to create a national 
anti-trafficking committee, despite the support of law enforcement 
and judicial officials, as well as civil society organizations.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Council of Ministers finalize and adopt the pending decree to create 
a Trafficking in Persons Inter-ministerial Committee to improve 
governmental coordination. • While maintaining the current stringent 
penalties Togo’s law calls for, allow courts outside of the Assize Court 
system to hear trafficking cases to expedite adjudication of pending 
and future cases. • Update existing victim referral manuals to include 
victim identification SOPs, and train law enforcement, justice sector 
personnel, and federated bodies on those procedures to increase the 
number of victims identified and referred to protective services. • 
Provide training and institutional support to law enforcement and 
judicial officials to increase their ability to effectively prosecute 
trafficking cases; disseminate trafficking indicator documents to 
all police stations. • Designate focal points within the Ministry of 
Interior and Gendarmerie to coordinate and lead anti-trafficking 
law enforcement efforts. • Enact anti-trafficking legislation that 
includes provisions for victim protection and implement measures 
that incentivize victims to participate in the law enforcement and 
judicial process, including witness protection as well as the provision 
of shelter, medical care, and psychosocial services. • Work with 
NGOs and international organizations to increase the accessibility 
to shelter and provision of protective services to all trafficking 
victims. • Draft, resource, and implement an updated national action 
plan that incorporates adult victims and increases coordination 
with NGOs, neighboring countries, and regional organizations. • 
Organize awareness-raising campaigns in concert with civil society 
to increase the population’s ability to identify and report trafficking 
crimes, focusing on high-risk areas such as markets and other sectors 
with high numbers of individuals vulnerable to exploitation. • 
Develop a data collection and information management system to 
organize law enforcement and victim referral data, in collaboration 
with NGOs and international organizations. • Increase efforts to 
distribute birth certificates and national identity documents to 
citizens to reduce their vulnerability to trafficking. • Given concerns 
the Cuban government forces its citizens to work abroad in medical 
missions, Screen Cuban medical workers for trafficking indicators 
and refer them to appropriate services, if exploitative conditions are 
determined to exist.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Articles 317 
through 320 of the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking and prescribed penalties of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment 
and fines between 10 million and 50 million West African CFA francs 
(FCFA) ($18,900 and $94,520) for offenses involving an adult victim, 
and 20 to 30 years’ imprisonment and fines between 20 million 
and 50 million FCFA ($37,810 and $94,520) for offenses involving 
a child victim. These penalties were sufficiently stringent, and with 
regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as rape.
The Ministry of Justice’s anti-trafficking cell reported investigating 63 
cases involving 79 suspects (64 male suspects and 15 female suspects) 
in 2020 compared with investigating 60 cases with 95 suspected 
traffickers in 2019. Officials reported prosecuting 51 suspects (42 men 
and 9 women) in 2020 versus 54 in 2019. During the reporting period, 
authorities did not convict traffickers compared with convicting three 
during the previous reporting period. However, the Assize Courts 
in Lomé and Kara responsible for hearing all trafficking cases were 
not operational during the entirety of the reporting period due to 
pandemic-related impacts on government operations. Observers 
noted the Assize Courts have been hindered in the past by inefficient 
operations exacerbated by a substantial backlog of cases resulting 
in some victims waiting years for their cases to be adjudicated. The 
government did not report investigating, prosecuting, or convicting 
any officials complicit in human trafficking offenses, although judicial 
corruption may have hindered some trafficking investigations during 
the reporting period. In past years, officials reported adjudicating 
some forced child labor cases through informal mediation processes. 
The government continued to provide written instructions on victim 
identification to its law enforcement and immigration officials through 
the course of their basic training. In 2020, authorities partnered with 
an international organization to provide anti-trafficking “training of 
trainers” to 25 individuals including media professionals, judges, 
civil society actors, judicial police, and parliamentarians. In the 
previous reporting period, the government trained 10 officers out 
of a 30-person urban law enforcement unit. Observers stated in past 
years, frequent turnover hindered the development of some law 
enforcement units’ institutional knowledge. Officials did not report 
utilizing the country’s 2019 tripartite agreement with Benin and 
Burkina Faso to synchronize law enforcement efforts on transnational 
trafficking cases during the reporting period, although the pandemic 
hindered effective implementation. 
PROTECTION
The government decreased overall efforts to identify victims. In 
2020, Ministry of Justice, Directorate-General for Child Protection 
(DGCP), and other officials reported the government identified a 
total of 132 child victims of trafficking (52 boys and 80 girls) and 
43 adult victims (30 men and 13 women), compared with 225 child 
victims (19 boys and 206 girls) and 87 adult victims (38 men and 
49 women) in 2019. Both government officials and NGOs reported 
pandemic regulations restricting movement as a potential factor in 
the reduced number of trafficking victims identified. Of the 132 child 
victims noted above, the government assisted 48 with psychological 




shelters; officials disclosed they provided similar services to 147 child 
victims in 2019. Additionally, the DGCP reported officers intercepted 
250 vulnerable minors at Togo's borders destined for Nigeria, Gabon, 
Benin, and Burkina Faso, and they returned the children to their 
families in Togo; officials did not report implementing similar 
measures in 2019. For the second consecutive year, the government 
allocated 18 million FCFA ($34,030) to child trafficking efforts, of 
which it designated 11 million FCFA ($20,790) for victim care. The 
government additionally committed to providing 600,000 FCFA 
($1,130) to each of the six NGO shelters that it supports as it did 
in 2019, although the government reported these payments were 
delayed in 2020 due to lack of funds. In 2020, the government 
formed a 5,000-person taskforce to enforce the country’s state of 
emergency due to the pandemic; the participation of officials with 
anti-trafficking responsibilities affected the government’s ability to 
implement protection efforts. 
Officials used written manuals from 2007 to identify and refer victims 
to services in coordination with NGOs; however, the manuals did not 
include SOPs for identifying victims among high-risk populations 
such as women in commercial sex. NGOs reported the government’s 
victim identification and referral processes were effective and the 
ministries of Social Affairs, Labor, and Justice were key partners on 
prevention, protection, and investigation efforts respectively.
In Lomé, the Ministry of Social Affairs (MSA) continued to run a toll-
free helpline, Allo 10-11, 16 hours per day, seven days a week; officials 
reported identifying 13 child victims from hotline tips during the 
reporting period, compared with 97 child trafficking victims during 
the previous reporting period. The MSA provided cell phones to Allo 
10-11’s network of 150 contacts to facilitate nationwide coverage and 
utilized an informal referral system when callers identified potential 
victims. The government did not report repatriating any victims for 
the second consecutive year.
While the government had a shelter for children, there were no such 
shelters specifically for adult trafficking victims, severely limiting 
their access to care and justice. Instead, the government referred 
adult trafficking victims to a center intended for victims of natural 
and humanitarian disasters. MSA continued to operate the Reference 
Center for the Guidance and Care of Children in a Difficult Situation 
(French acronym CROPESDI). The CROPESDI shelter, located in 
Lomé, received victims referred by the Allo 10-11 hotline and provided 
shelter, legal, medical, and social services before transferring them 
to care facilities managed by NGOs. The government reported that 
the CROPESDI shelter served 48 child trafficking victims during the 
reporting period. Officials did not report the number of victims other 
shelters served during the reporting period. Observers reported the 
lack of shelter options for adult victims adversely impacted efforts 
to investigate potential cases; in some cases, officers reported using 
their own resources for shelter and basic necessities for adult victims, 
which disincentivized some police from pursuing viable cases. The 
government reportedly provides foreign trafficking victims the same 
access to shelters as domestic victims and performs a risk evaluation 
before it repatriates potential victims. The government reported 
providing shelter services to 12 Sierra Leonian trafficking victims 
during the reporting period who were in transit to Dubai. 
The government did not have a formal process to encourage victims’ 
participation in the investigation and prosecution of their traffickers 
and did not report providing services to adult victims who testified 
during court proceedings. While there were no reports the government 
penalized any trafficking victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled 
them to commit, there is a risk authorities may have detained or 
deported some victims due to the lack of victim identification SOPs 
and some officials’ limited understanding of the crime.
PREVENTION
The government increased overall efforts to prevent trafficking in 
persons; however, the government’s deficient overall coordination 
continued to hinder its anti-trafficking efforts. The government 
managed its anti-child trafficking efforts and dissemination of 
information through the National Committee for the Reception and 
Social Reintegration of Child Victims of Trafficking (French acronym 
CNARSEVT), though the Committee reported it could not meet during 
the reporting period due to the pandemic. CNARSEVT acted as the 
government’s central hub of information for trafficking in Togo; 
however, data collection and reporting remained weak during the 
reporting period. An NGO reported CNARSEVT faced operational 
challenges due to its lack of financial resources. The government failed 
to finalize a decree initially drafted in 2018 to create a Trafficking in 
Persons National Committee—a key recommendation of NGOs and 
working level officials to mitigate Togo’s coordination challenges—and 
has not updated its anti-trafficking national action plan since 2008. 
In 2020, officials finalized Togo’s five-year national action plan on 
child labor, which partially addressed issues of exploitation; this was 
separate from an overarching anti-trafficking national action plan. 
CNARSEVT reported the government launched an awareness raising 
campaign on the new national action plan on child labor and a decree 
that stated publicly hazardous work was forbidden for children. 
The government allocated 7 million FCFA ($13,230) for the second 
consecutive year to continue a nationwide awareness campaign 
against trafficking in persons. The campaign targeted urban and rural 
areas, used radio interviews, and featured signage in schools, public 
buildings, and traditional chiefs’ halls. Officials estimated the initiative 
reached approximately 15,000 citizens during the reporting period; 
the government reported the campaign reached approximately 30,000 
Togolese over the course of the previous reporting period. Pandemic-
related restrictions on in-person gatherings limited some aspects of 
the government’s awareness raising program. Organizers included 
French, Kabiyé, and Ewe languages in the campaign, which involved 
parents, community-based organizations, government officials, and 
religious leaders. Officials broadcast additional programming during 
the reporting period via community radio stations in Atakpame, Kara, 
and Dapaong, emphasizing the risks of exploitation. In response to 
children’s increased vulnerability to exploitation due to pandemic-
related school closures, the government trained 137 community 
leaders (including 31 women) to identify and report potential 
child trafficking cases in Lomé, as well as in the Plateaux, Kara, and 
Savanes Regions where many trafficking victims originate or transit. 
Officials collaborated with the Governments of Benin and Ghana to 
sensitize communities along the Abidjan-Lagos corridor to enhance 
their awareness of trafficking. Unlike in past years, the government did 
not employ a network of “vigilance committees” to provide education 
on trafficking and report cases to the government. In 2020, officials 
established 84 community-based child protection entities known as 
“federated bodies” in Lomé, Kara, Savanes, Plateaux, and Maritime 
Regions to replace the “vigilance committees.” The new entities held 
community dialogues to raise broad child abuse issues—including 
child trafficking—as well as develop and implement programming 
such as awareness raising, counseling, and reporting. 
Despite past allegations of fraudulent recruiters facilitating 
the exploitation of Togolese abroad, authorities did not report 
investigating any foreign labor recruiters for trafficking crimes. The 
ministries of Labor and Social Action regulated labor recruitment 
firms, but the government’s weak information management systems 
hindered its ability to provide enforcement statistics. The government 
worked to reduce the demand for forced child labor by continuing 
to partner with traditional religious leaders to eliminate exploitation 
in religious “apprenticeships.” These “apprenticeships” involved 
parents entrusting their children to religious leaders for education 
and employment purposes; the religious leaders exploit the children 
in forced domestic work or sexual slavery when parents were unable 
to pay “apprenticeship fees.” The government distributed an unknown 
number of birth certificates in coordination with NGOs; the lack of 
identification documents contributed to an increased vulnerability 





The government did not take any discernible measures to reduce the 
demand for commercial sex acts. Officials provided anti-trafficking 
training to Togolese troops prior to their deployment abroad on 
international peacekeeping missions. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
provided its diplomats with a guide to hiring domestic workers but 
did not report delivering trafficking-specific training.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Togo, and traffickers exploit victims from Togo 
abroad. While travel restrictions intended to slow the spread of the 
pandemic may have decreased transnational human trafficking, 
restrictions such as curfews imposed on the population—and the 
resulting deleterious economic impacts on livelihoods for individuals 
in the service and retail sectors—likely increased the vulnerability of 
many Togolese to exploitation during the reporting period. 
In past years, the western border of the Plateau region, which provides 
easy access to major roads between Lomé and Accra, Ghana, served as 
a primary area used by traffickers to transport victims. NGOs noted the 
Abidjan-Lagos corridor remains a prominent route for cross-border 
trafficking of persons—as well as the smuggling of illicit goods—with 
criminals using Togo as a transit country. Civil society actors and law 
enforcement officers reported that the country’s rise as a regional 
economic and logistics hub has led to a corresponding increase 
in trafficking and smuggling. Families and trusted intermediaries 
take advantage of high levels of poverty throughout the country to 
exploit many Togolese trafficking victims, with the Centrale and 
Savanes regions serving as primary source regions. Traffickers force 
Togolese children to work in the agricultural sector—particularly 
on coffee, cocoa, and cotton farms—as well as in stone and sand 
quarries, where children and adults break rocks by hand. Observers 
stated trafficking networks are predominantly community-based and 
loosely organized by local actors, while syndicates with ties to the 
Middle East are more organized. 
NGOs and government officials reported that markets selling Togolese 
children for commercial sex acts (“small girls markets” or devissime) 
exist in Lomé and elsewhere in the country. Traffickers visit rural areas 
in the north and central regions to recruit children from impoverished 
parents to sell in these markets. These illicit recruiters promise lucrative 
employment for the children and pay parents an advance before 
transporting the minors to Lomé, where traffickers subject the children 
to forced labor as domestic servants, roadside vendors, and porters or 
exploit them in child sex trafficking. Togolese businesspeople exploit 
boys through forced labor in construction, salvage yards, mines, and 
as mechanics, often involving hazardous machinery. 
Transnationally, fraudulent recruiters work with loosely affiliated 
networks to transport victims to Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, and Nigeria by land and to Gabon via ship. Traffickers force 
victims to work in the following sectors: cocoa harvesting in Ghana 
and Cote d’Ivoire; palm wine production in rural Nigeria; gold 
mining in Burkina Faso; domestic service in urban Nigeria; and sex 
trafficking in Beninese and Nigerian bars and restaurants. Traffickers 
recruit children from Benin and Ghana and transport them to Togo for 
forced labor. Illicit networks exploit Ghanaian girls in sex trafficking 
in Togo. From September to April in past years, many Togolese adults 
and children migrated in search of economic opportunities to Benin, 
Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, where criminal elements may exploit 
them in forced labor and sex trafficking. Nigerians force Togolese 
men to labor in agriculture and Togolese women in domestic service 
in Nigeria. Some fraudulent labor agencies recruit Togolese and West 
African women for employment in Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, 
and Saudi Arabia, where wealthy families exploit them in domestic 
servitude or sex trafficking. Officials noted sex tourists from Lebanon, 
France, and Nigeria have exploited children in Togo during previous 
years, although pandemic-related travel restrictions likely minimized 
these risks for most of the reporting period. Cuban nationals working 
in Togo on medical missions may have been forced to work by the 
Cuban government.
TONGA: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Tonga does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts to 
do so. These efforts included training new police recruits on victim 
identification and trafficking investigations and continuing to provide 
funding to an NGO available to assist trafficking victims. However, the 
government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared 
to the previous reporting period, even considering the impact of 
the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking capacity. The 
government did not develop victim identification procedures, take 
steps to proactively identify victims, or conduct awareness-raising 
campaigns. It did not investigate any cases of trafficking for the second 
consecutive year and has not prosecuted or convicted any traffickers 
since 2011. Therefore Tonga was downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Develop and fully implement procedures for proactive identification 
of trafficking victims among vulnerable groups. • Increase efforts to 
proactively investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes. • Amend 
trafficking laws to criminalize all forms of trafficking in line with 
the definition under international law, including offenses lacking 
cross-border movement. • Develop, adopt, and implement a national 
action plan. • Utilize the Asian liaison position to facilitate proactive 
identification of foreign victims and their referral to care. • Provide 
explicit protections and benefits for trafficking victims, such as 
restitution, legal and medical benefits, and immigration relief. • 
Develop and conduct antitrafficking information and education 
campaigns. • Accede to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol.
PROSECUTION
The government continued to make negligible anti-trafficking law 
enforcement efforts. The Counter Terrorism and Transnational 
Organised Crime Act of 2013 did not criminalize all forms of 
trafficking because it required transnationality to constitute a 
trafficking offense. Additionally, inconsistent with the definition of 
trafficking under international law, the law did not include force, 
fraud, or coercion as an essential element of the crime. The law 
prescribed penalties of up to 15 years’ imprisonment for trafficking 
offenses involving adult victims and 20 years’ imprisonment for 
offenses involving children; these penalties were sufficiently stringent 
and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties for 
other serious crimes, such as rape. The government did not investigate 
any potential trafficking cases for the second consecutive year. Since 
convicting its first trafficker in April 2011, the government has not 
prosecuted or convicted any trafficking cases. Law enforcement 
reported language barriers and resource limitations impacted their 
ability to investigate trafficking. The Tongan police force provided 
trafficking training to an unknown number of new police recruits in 
2020, compared with 30 trained in 2019. The government did not 
report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government 





The government maintained weak victim protection efforts 
and did not take steps to proactively identify victims. Since the 
government’s identification of four potential trafficking victims in 
2015, the government has not identified any victims of trafficking. 
The government did not develop or employ systematic procedures 
for victim identification among at-risk groups, such as migrant 
workers or women in commercial sex. Tongan police utilized an 
Asian liaison officer trained to speak Mandarin Chinese to engage 
with Chinese citizens living in Tonga who may be vulnerable to 
trafficking; however, this has never led to the identification of a 
victim of trafficking. The government had procedures to refer victims 
of crime, including potential trafficking victims, to an NGO, but did 
not deploy the procedures during the reporting year due to the lack 
of proactive victim identification. A distrust of Tongan courts, as 
well as low levels of understanding of human trafficking among the 
public, likely contributed to the absence of identified victims. The 
government continued to provide an unknown amount of funding 
to an NGO for operations to assist adult female and child victims 
of crime, including shelter, counseling, and legal services. Although 
no victims were identified during the year, adult female and child 
victims of trafficking would be eligible for these services. There were 
no shelter facilities available to male victims older than 14 years old; 
however, male counselors were available to assist male victims of any 
age. Under the immigration act, the principal immigration officer 
had broad discretionary authority to grant victims permits to stay 
in the country for any length of time necessary for their protection. 
Victims could receive asylum in Tonga if they feared retribution or 
hardship in their country of origin, although no trafficking victim 
has ever requested asylum.
PREVENTION
The government maintained minimal efforts to prevent trafficking. 
The government’s trafficking task force was responsible for leading 
anti-trafficking efforts alongside the transnational crime unit of the 
police force. The government did not develop a national action 
plan, which reportedly continued to hinder governmental anti-
trafficking coordination. The government did not conduct awareness 
campaigns. Authorities provided briefings to Tongans participating in 
seasonal worker programs overseas, which included information on 
workers’ rights. Under Tongan law labor recruiters and brokers who 
used fraudulent recruitment methods were liable to up to 10 years’ 
imprisonment, but the government did not report if it monitored 
or held any recruiters and brokers liable for fraudulent recruitment 
during the reporting year. The government did not make efforts to 
reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government did not 
provide anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel. Tonga 
is not a party to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, some Tongan and foreign 
individuals are vulnerable to trafficking in Tonga, and some Tongans 
are vulnerable to trafficking abroad. As a result of the government’s 
pandemic-related mitigation efforts, entry into Tonga was severely 
restricted during the reporting period. East Asian women, especially 
those from China, who are recruited from their home countries 
for legitimate work in Tonga and often pay excessive recruitment 
fees, are vulnerable to sex trafficking in clandestine establishments 
operating as legitimate businesses. Some Tongan women and children 
are vulnerable to forced labor in domestic work; Tongan children 
are vulnerable to sex trafficking. Reports indicate Fijians working 
in the domestic service industry in Tonga experience mistreatment 
indicative of labor trafficking. Chinese construction laborers working 
on government infrastructure projects in Tonga are vulnerable to 
labor trafficking. Tongan adults working overseas, including in 
Australia and New Zealand, are vulnerable to labor trafficking, 
including through withholding of wages and excessive work hours. 
Employers rush some workers to sign employment contracts they 
may not fully understand, and others are unable to retain copies of 
their contracts, exacerbating the potential for employers to exploit 
these workers in labor trafficking.
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO:  
TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Trinidad and Tobago does not fully meet the 
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making 
significant efforts to do so. These efforts included bringing additional 
trafficking charges against three police officers prosecuted in the 
previous reporting period; producing a guide for frontline officers 
on identifying victims of trafficking; taking steps to expedite and 
streamline cases and expand the use of virtual hearings and testimony; 
providing deportation relief to victims affected; drafting legislation 
that included increased penalties for official complicity in trafficking 
crimes; and drafting an anti-trafficking national action plan (NAP) for 
2021-2023 in consultation with outside stakeholders. However, the 
government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared 
to the previous reporting period, even considering the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity. The government 
conducted fewer investigations, identified fewer victims, and has never 
convicted a trafficker under its 2011 anti-trafficking law. Corruption 
and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant 
concerns. Victim identification and services remained weak. Therefore 
Trinidad and Tobago was downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, 
including complicit officials and staff. • Increase proactive victim 
identification, screening, and protection among migrants, asylum-
seekers, and refugees, especially Venezuelans. • Implement a 
formalized protocol and a functioning and active coordinating 
committee for victim care. • Approve and implement the anti-
trafficking national action plan. • Improve the quality of victim care, 
especially for children, and increase access to certified bilingual social 
workers, counselors, shelter staff, lawyers, and health care workers. 
• Provide adequate funding for robust trafficking investigations and 
victim services, including accommodations. • Train law enforcement 
and prosecutors in proactively identifying, obtaining, preserving, 
and corroborating evidence of trafficking. • Ensure victims are not 
penalized for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit. • 
Improve cooperation between the Counter Trafficking Unit (CTU), 
prosecutors, judiciary, and NGOs to increase the number of cases that 
proceed to trial. • Strengthen oversight, regulation, and inspections 
of private labor recruitment agencies and domestic work locations. 
• Increase trauma-informed training on trafficking for NGO, shelter, 
social services, and law enforcement staff to improve their ability to 
identify and care for potential trafficking victims and increase civil 
society representation on the anti-trafficking task force. 
PROSECUTION
The government decreased prosecution efforts. The Trafficking in 
Persons Act of 2011 criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed penalties of no less than 15 years’ imprisonment and 
a fine of no less than 500,000 Trinidad and Tobago dollars (TTD) 
($74,650) for offenses involving an adult victim, and no less than 












($149,300) for those involving a child victim. These penalties were 
sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate 
with penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. The 
government reported it prepared draft legislation in December 2020 
to increase the penalties for human trafficking, including increased 
penalties for public officials complicit in trafficking crimes; the draft 
legislation remained pending with the Attorney General’s office prior 
to parliamentary debate at the end of the reporting period. 
The government’s anti-trafficking unit reported investigating 12 
cases in 2020, nine for sex trafficking and three for labor trafficking, 
compared with investigating 36 possible cases of sex trafficking or 
labor trafficking in 2019, 39 in 2018, and 38 in 2017. The government 
reported investigating and charging 14 individuals for solicitation 
of a sex trafficking victim under the Trafficking in Persons Act. The 
government reported two ongoing sex trafficking investigations and 
one ongoing labor trafficking investigation from prior reporting 
periods. The government reported arresting and then prosecuting 
two alleged sex traffickers in 2020, compared to two prosecutions of 
eight suspected traffickers in 2019, four prosecutions in 2018, and 
two prosecutions in 2017. The government reported continuing the 
prosecution of six defendants begun in previous reporting periods, 
including three police officers charged with additional human 
trafficking crimes in October and November 2020. The government 
did not report convicting any traffickers in 2020 and has not convicted 
any traffickers since the enactment of the 2011 anti-trafficking law. 
The CTU, under the Ministry of National Security, had the sole mandate 
for investigating human trafficking cases. The government reported 
the Children’s Authority of Trinidad and Tobago (CATT) referred cases 
involving children to the CTU and the Child Protection Unit of the 
police for investigation; the CATT and the Ministry of National Security 
maintained an MOU. The Child Protection Unit developed referral 
and management procedures for cases received from the CTU and the 
Immigration Division, which remained pending finalization at the end 
of the reporting period. Authorities reported that prior to this, more 
informal documented interim procedures were implemented. CTU staff 
were exclusively dedicated to trafficking and covered all jurisdictions 
during the reporting period, but suffered from limited funding, 
staffing resources, and expertise. However, although NGOs reported 
identifying and referring many additional victims to the CTU for the 
purpose of initiating an investigation, the NGOs reported they stopped 
referring them due to the CTU’s failure to act on the information. The 
director of public prosecutions and the judiciary had responsibility, 
respectively, for prosecuting and hearing all cases, including those 
related to human trafficking. Observers noted authorities did not 
pursue a prosecution if the victims were not willing to testify against 
an alleged trafficker. There were no courts dedicated solely to trafficking 
cases. Courts continued to have a backlog and often took five to 10 
years to resolve cases, including trafficking cases, despite adopting 
justice system reforms in 2019 to address the problem. 
The government reported establishing five new courts and specialized 
divisions with 100 new courtrooms for cases including human 
trafficking during the reporting period to reduce delays, streamline 
processes, and enable a more victim-centered approach, especially for 
cases involving children. The government also reported increasing the 
number of high judges from 36 to 64 to hear criminal cases, including 
for trafficking. Due to the pandemic, courts closed in March 2020 and 
began working remotely where possible, including for hearings and 
urgent court applications. The government reported that if deemed 
expedient and safe to so do, many high-profile matters, including 
trafficking cases, were heard in-person or via hybrid hearings. The 
government reported establishing 12 virtual courts at the prisons 
to ensure the efficient continued hearing of criminal cases during 
the pandemic. Authorities also reported accelerated existing plans 
in response to the pandemic to merge magisterial districts for cases 
to be heard in any Magistrate Court in the wider geographic area 
versus being restricted to the previous 13 smaller districts where the 
charge was filed; the government reported trafficking investigations 
could span several geographic areas and the change allowed the 
police to avoid having to file charges in multiple disjunctive districts. 
The government also reported expediting the process to digitize the 
Magistracy for the first time. 
The CTU and other coordinating bodies continued to operate during 
the pandemic on a limited and remote basis. Authorities reported the 
pandemic impacted the ability to collect law enforcement and victim 
identification data and gather evidence. The CTU collaborated with 
specialized units within the national police and the intelligence-led 
task force to identify and monitor suspicious establishments. A civil 
society organization reported authorities rarely raided some venues 
and suggested these venues were connected to corrupt immigration 
officials and police officers. In January 2021, authorities publicly stated 
the government was monitoring two dozen police officers allegedly 
involved in human trafficking; the investigation was ongoing at the 
end of the reporting period and authorities reassigned 40 police 
officers who refused polygraphs. The government also reported 
identifying a number of senior officials potentially involved in 
human trafficking but did not report criminally investigating these 
cases during the reporting period. Authorities reported that in cases 
of alleged official complicity, the Police Complaints Authority could 
receive a complaint against one of the investigating or other police 
officers involved in the inquiry and require the intervention of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions via consultation. The government 
reported the police service also had internal disciplinary procedures 
to suspend officers charged with human trafficking and other crimes. 
Authorities reported that sexual exploitation and trafficking were 
included in the Second Schedule of the Proceeds of Crime Act as 
specified offences from which forfeitures/confiscations/money 
laundering charges could be generated; actions taken under the 
Civil Asset Recovery and Unexplained Wealth laws required citizens, 
including public officials, to account for the source of their wealth. 
The government proposed an amendment to the Police Services Act 
in January 2021 that would allow additional disciplinary action, 
including polygraph testing and dismissal, for officers suspected to be 
involved in trafficking; the proposal was pending parliamentary review 
at the end of the reporting period. The case of a 2017 government 
employee charged with trafficking also was still pending. 
The government did not provide its overall budget allocations for 
trafficking for 2020, 2019, or 2018, compared to a 7 million TTD 
($1.05 million) budget reported in 2017. Authorities reported they 
did not divert anti-trafficking financial or personnel resources as a 
direct result of the pandemic. The government did not report entering 
into any new bilateral, multilateral, or regional law enforcement 
agreements, but reported it worked with Venezuela on child trafficking 
cases and publicly expressed a desire to initiate an extradition 
agreement with the Maduro regime in Venezuela. The government 
reported that in-person trainings moved to virtual platforms due to 
the pandemic. The Police Academy reported it conducted 14 human 
trafficking-related trainings during the reporting period that reached 
790 law enforcement officials. The CTU reported it participated in 
the Turquesa (2) Operation in November and December 2020 along 
with 32 participating countries and in cooperation with international 
organizations and that it screened 37 vulnerable individuals for 
trafficking indicators during the mission. The government reported 
training officials of other governments through a regional security 
initiative. The government also reported developing legislation 
currently before Parliament to allow non-commonwealth countries 
with which it does not have a mutual legal assistance arrangement 
to access assistance in criminal matters to expand the scope of 
international cooperation.
PROTECTION
The government maintained limited protection efforts. The 
government reported identifying six trafficking victims, compared 
with reporting 34 trafficking victims in 2019, 14 victims in 2018, and 
14 in 2017. Of the six identified, three were female, and three were 
male; three were Venezuelans, of which two were children, and three 




children, and three were victims of labor trafficking. The government 
reported the pandemic negatively affected the ability to identify 
victims, particularly due to the inability to meet with potential victims. 
NGOs did not refer any victims. Authorities reported providing 
some assistance to 70 potential victims during the reporting period, 
compared with reporting all identified victims received care in 2019, 
including 22 victims from prior years, 29 victims in 2018 and 14 
in 2017. The government reported the exact number of victims was 
uncertain, as authorities gave some undocumented Venezuelans in dire 
need assistance without screening them first. The government reported 
it provided: accommodation for all potential victims; basic necessities 
for adults; English as a Second Language classes and life skills 
training; psychosocial support and art therapy interventions; medical, 
antenatal care, and parenting classes; counseling; Spanish language 
interpretation and translation services; and social assessments by 
qualified social workers. For potential child victims, the government 
reported it provided specialized care, including medical screenings 
and assessments at the Child Assessment Center and accompaniment 
to appointments, psychosocial support during police interviews, 
appointment of Child Advocates, provision of child reading material 
in English and Spanish, outings and excursions, and placement/
accommodation in community residences and special homes for 
pregnant teens, weekly communication with family members and 
parents, child transition plans, legal representation for children as 
directed by the Family and Children’s Court; and social welfare 
visits and interventions. The government reported services were not 
time-limited or conditional on participation in the prosecution of 
the trafficker; however, victims who cooperated with an investigation 
or prosecution would receive legal aid, transportation, and lodging 
for themselves and their families. 
The government reported the CTU had a dedicated budget of 120,000 
TTD ($17,920) for victim assistance, compared with spending 
120,000 TTD ($17,920) on victim protection and assistance in 2019; 
203,100 TTD ($30,320) in 2018; and 198,900 TTD ($29,700) in 2017. 
The Ministry of Social Development and Family Services reported 
providing funding for 19 NGOs and three statutory boards for up 
to 60 percent of recurrent administrative and operational costs for 
victims of trafficking and other crimes, especially domestic violence, 
but did not disaggregate the amount for trafficking victims. Authorities 
reported the Ministry of National Security had an agreement with 
an international organization to provide support for adult victims. 
The government reported the Ministry of Health assisted foreign 
trafficking victims and funded the assistance from its annual budget. 
The government also reported the CATT funded the provision of 
child advocates for child victims from its general budget, and the 
government continued to provide legal services for children. 
The government reported that during the reporting period the CTU 
produced a Pocket Guide for Frontline Officers, which included 
information on identifying victims of trafficking, and disseminated 
it to all agencies. The Ministry of Health also had policies for victim 
identification and the CATT—which is involved in all cases involving 
child victims—was in the process of finalizing a draft manual for victim 
care at the end of the reporting period. However, the government 
reported that a major challenge was the lack of implementation of 
a formalized protocol and a functioning and active coordinating 
committee for victim care. The government reported it needed to 
strengthen the quality of victim care, including specialized placement 
facilities for children equipped with adequate personnel and services 
and placement facilities for children transitioning out of the care 
system. Experts noted working-level staff at NGOs and shelters required 
more training on trafficking indicators to better identify potential 
trafficking victims. Authorities and an international organization 
also reported a lack of access to certified bilingual social workers, 
counselors, shelter staff, lawyers, and health care workers negatively 
impacted victim care. The government reported that while public 
health services continued during the pandemic for all patients, 
including trafficking victims, it transitioned in-person counseling 
and psycho-social interventions to virtual services. The pandemic 
negatively affected the capacity of authorities and NGOs to provide 
essential services to victims and to give basic protective gear to law 
enforcement officials and service providers when assisting potential 
victims. The government reported it restricted outings and visits 
by external parties at community residences due to the pandemic, 
and it also implemented safety protocols; new admissions at the 
community residences were contingent on the availability of space for 
quarantining. However, the government reported community homes 
did accept new arrivals, with quarantine spaces established based 
on health guidelines and protocols; health care officials provided 
necessary training for shelter staff and conducted social assessments 
for victims virtually. 
Outside experts noted there was insufficient government funding 
and personnel for comprehensive victim care including appropriate 
shelters with adequate staff and security personnel. The government 
did not provide funding for or manage any trafficking-specific shelters. 
Authorities placed adult female victims in domestic violence NGO-run 
shelters funded by an international organization, while they placed 
adult male victims in safe houses operated by the security services. 
Victims did not have a choice of which shelter to use. Outside experts 
noted the shelters had strict rules restricting unchaperoned freedom 
of movement or communication outside, and these restrictions 
caused some victims to run away from shelters or ask to be repatriated 
before authorities completed investigations. The Children’s Authority 
placed child victims in government-funded children’s homes in the 
community, which also could house children who were criminal 
offenders, and observers reported a lack of specialized care. The 
government reported it usually placed child victims in one community 
residence. The government reported children were not allowed to leave 
their residence without permission from the CATT. An international 
organization reported that in the few cases where victims requested 
assistance, they did so through local NGOs, private individuals, 
government agencies working with Venezuelan migrants, or through 
international organizations who then referred the cases to the CTU. 
The CTU screened migrants for trafficking indicators. However, some 
observers indicated that following police actions or immigration raids, 
authorities detained some foreign victims for violating immigration 
laws without screening for trafficking indicators or victim care – even 
though those unlawful acts occurred as part of the trafficking crime 
and traffickers may have compelled victims to commit them. The 
CTU reported intervening on behalf of some foreign victims to have 
them removed from detention centers to alternate sites. According to 
NGOs, the coast guard and local authorities did not screen detained 
refugees or asylum-seekers for trafficking indicators as required by 
international conventions. In addition, NGOs asserted the Venezuelan 
embassy’s involvement in the repatriation process put individuals at 
risk if they had a legitimate fear of persecution. In May 2020, a group 
of 12 Cuban medical professionals arrived to assist with pandemic 
efforts; the government did not report measures to monitor this 
group for trafficking indicators nor to put protection measures into 
its agreement with the Cuban government to prevent forced labor. 
The government reported all foreign adult victims who agreed to 
cooperate with an investigation received a renewable Minister’s 
Permit enabling them to remain in the country for the duration 
of court proceedings, to move about unchaperoned, to work in 
the country legally, and to apply for permanent residency after the 
completion of court proceedings. The government reported victims 
could not leave the country and return on a regular basis, even apart 
from border closures due to the pandemic. The government reported 
providing deportation relief to 23 victims, including six from the 
current reporting period, due to the pandemic. Victims stated they 
feared retaliation from traffickers and re-trafficking if they remained 
in the country; this situation was exacerbated because cases could 
take up to a decade to come to trial. 
The government offered some immigration relief—including for 
potential victims—at the end of the reporting period by extending 
the registration cards for Venezuelan refugees and migrants through 












previously registered in 2019, not for more numerous recent arrivals. 
Authorities said the registration card would not automatically allow 
migrants to obtain drivers’ permits and other official documents 
despite allowing them to work and live in the country. The government 
reported taking undocumented Venezuelan nationals under the care 
of the state who gave birth to babies to the Venezuelan Embassy to 
register the birth and obtain official identity documents; however, 
outside observers reported that many of the children were not 
provided with documentation. Although the government agreed 
that an international organization could conduct refugee status 
determinations, there was no impact on a trafficking victim’s legal 
status in country and refugee children could not access public 
education, heightening their risk for trafficking. During the reporting 
period, the government changed the evidence acts amendment to 
allow legal proceedings of cases without relying uniquely on the 
victim’s willingness to cooperate. The CTU provided 24/7 security 
for victims who participated in court proceedings, along with witness 
protection and support to victims during preliminary hearings based 
on a risk assessment conducted for each victim. As a pandemic 
measure, in October 2020 authorities established several virtual 
hearing centers for judges and judicial officers to take evidence 
by any specific means and from a specific location, including the 
Judiciary’s Virtual Access Customer Center or any court building; the 
law required all court matters to be held in camera, although the 
courts allowed for victim testimony via video or written statements. 
The anti-trafficking law imposed penalties for breach of the victims’ 
and their families’ identities. The CTU previously provided sensitivity 
training to judges and magistrates to avoid re-traumatization of 
trafficking victims but did not report doing so during the reporting 
period. The anti-trafficking law provided for restitution by the court; 
however, no cases had reached the stage where a victim would be 
able to apply for restitution. Between May and December 2020, 
authorities reported the CTU funded 18 virtual trainings for 1,040 
members of the public and private sector on how to identify potential 
victims of human trafficking. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The National 
Task Force Against Trafficking in Persons (Task Force) was the national 
coordinating body and included the Ministry of Social Development, 
the Ministry of Foreign and CARICOM Affairs, the Office of the 
Prime Minister (Gender and Child Affairs Division), the Ministry 
of Labor, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health, the 
Attorney General, and Legal Affairs. The Task Force did not include 
any NGOs, although there was an inter-ministerial working committee 
that included two NGOs, and the government reported it sought the 
input of survivors in crafting its trafficking laws, regulations, policies, 
and programs, specifically for children, and in their implementation. 
Experts continued to note a need for the government to add more 
NGO representation to the Task Force to strengthen government-
NGO partnerships and receive more NGO input into government 
decision-making. 
The Task Force collaborated with the CTU on anti-trafficking efforts. 
The government drafted and began consultations with more than 100 
NGOs, international organizations, foreign embassies, religious bodies, 
and a university on a NAP for 2021-2023; the NAP was still pending 
cabinet approval at the end of the reporting period. Quarterly reports 
of some anti-trafficking activities were submitted to the Task Force, and 
it prepared annual reports on the government’s anti-trafficking efforts, 
although the government did not make these reports available to the 
public. The government reported preparing a parliamentary report 
in July 2020 on its anti-trafficking efforts that was available to the 
public. The CTU had a 24/7 English-language trafficking hotline, which 
reported receiving 47 calls and referring one case for investigation 
during the reporting period. The government also had other contact 
phone numbers and email addresses to report cases; an international 
organization reported the hotline was not widely used, especially in 
cases involving Venezuelan migrants. The government publicized 
the hotline through social media, airport advertisements, billboard 
advertisements, movie screenings, and radio programs. Observers 
noted the need for more Spanish language services in the hotline. 
The Employment Exchange Act prohibited recruitment fees. Labor 
recruiters required a license to operate; the licensing officer could 
accept as equivalent a license issued by the competent authority of 
a foreign country. Forced labor cases could be referred to the labor 
inspectorate for investigation, and the inspectorate met with employers 
about paying employees unpaid wages. The law did not differentiate 
between domestic and foreign employees. Domestic workers were 
covered under the law, but observers noted the oversight and 
regulation of domestic workers remained weak, although employers 
must register domestic workers within 14 days or face a 5,000 TTD 
($746) fine. The government reported reconstituting a labor law body 
to consider reforms to the law to widen the protections for domestic 
workers and to establish a special tribunal to hear disputes between 
domestic workers and their employers. The government reported 
three working groups for an update to the Recruiting of Workers 
Act met in December 2020 and recommended that means of fraud, 
including for the purposes of trafficking, be included in the Act and 
that migrants be included in the definition of “worker.” The Ministry of 
Labor (MOLSED) reported it continued to work on a labor migration 
policy begun in 2019. In March 2021, MOLSED and the Ministry 
of National Security agreed to increase collaboration on human 
trafficking, child labor, and labor exploitation, including training for 
labor inspectors to enable them to refer potential trafficking victims 
to the police or immigration. The government reported all labor 
inspectors were trained to use trafficking screening forms. Authorities 
reported continued efforts to raise awareness on social media about 
the labor rights of migrant workers, responsibilities of employers, and 
available avenues for reporting breaches. The government reported 
one of its Labor Attachés in Canada had specific responsibility for the 
Commonwealth Caribbean Seasonal Agricultural Workers’ Program. 
The government did not report efforts to reduce the demand for 
commercial sex. The government reported its laws allowed for the 
prosecution of suspected sex tourists for crimes committed abroad, 
and it developed draft legislation to strengthen the registration and 
reporting of sexual offenders to aid law enforcement, locally and 
internationally, in apprehending sexual offenders. The government 
provided training on human trafficking issues to staff and officers of 
the Ministry of Foreign and CARICOM Affairs, but did not provide 
training to diplomats during the reporting period.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Trinidad and Tobago, and traffickers exploit 
victims from Trinidad and Tobago abroad. Trinidad and Tobago 
also serves as a transit point for Venezuelan refugees and migrants 
en route to Europe, North Africa, and elsewhere in the Caribbean. 
The ongoing humanitarian crisis in neighboring Venezuela has 
contributed to a large influx of refugees and migrants who are at 
high risk for trafficking. Trinidad and Tobago closed its borders due 
to the pandemic from March 2020 through March 2021, but an 
international organization reported Venezuelans continued to arrive 
in large numbers on a daily basis. Unaccompanied or separated 
Venezuelan children are at increased risk for sex trafficking. Many 
victims enter the country legally via Trinidad’s international airport, 
while others enter illegally via small boats from Venezuela, which 
is only seven miles offshore. Migrants from the Caribbean region 
and from Asia, in particular those lacking legal status, are at risk for 
forced labor in domestic service and the retail sector. Sex trafficking 
victims are women and girls primarily from Venezuela, Colombia, 
the Dominican Republic, and Guyana; traffickers offer employment 
in brothels and clubs, including via social media—which increased as 
a result of the pandemic—along with advertisements in Venezuelan 
newspapers and recruitment by other victims. Traffickers also exploit 
individuals from Puerto Rico, the Philippines, China, India, Nepal, 
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. Traffickers are increasingly 
targeting and accompanying vulnerable foreign young women and 




for sex trafficking. Cuban medical professionals may have been 
forced to work by the Cuban government. Corruption in police 
and immigration has been associated with facilitating labor and 
sex trafficking. Observers report that law enforcement and security 
officials are implicated in human trafficking, including coast guard 
officials who facilitate the transit of women and girls from Venezuela 
to the country; immigration and customs officers who ensure that 
women and girls arrive and receive entry; and members of the police 
who accept bribes to facilitate transport to houses across the country 
and work with brothel owners to protect their establishments from 
police raids, particularly in the southern police districts where most 
Venezuelan refugees and displaced persons attempt to enter the 
country. Transnational organized crime with a link to megabandas—
large criminal gangs with more than 50 members who are part of 
transnational organized crime networks in Latin America—may 
increasingly be involved in human trafficking. Prior to the pandemic, 
Trinidad and Tobago may have been a sex tourism destination. After 
the country closed its borders in March 2020 due to the pandemic, 
more victims arrived by sea through illegal points of entry and 
trafficking moved from brothels to private, clandestine locations.
TUNISIA: TIER 2
The Government of Tunisia does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Tunisia remained on Tier 2. These efforts included providing 
protection services, including medical and psycho-social assistance, 
to more than 160 identified victims and continuing to coordinate 
with civil society organizations to provide additional services to all 
identified victims and to train officials. The government developed 
a contingency plan to manage its crisis response to trafficking amid 
the pandemic and prepare for similar situations in the future. 
The government also formalized and expanded anti-trafficking 
cooperation, including an agreement with the Government of 
Cote d’Ivoire to exchange information on victim support and 
transnational trafficking networks. However, the government 
did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. For 
the second consecutive year, the government did not convict any 
traffickers. Poor understanding of trafficking among judicial and 
law enforcement officials inhibited authorities from effectively using 
the 2016 anti-trafficking law to prosecute and convict traffickers. 
While the government provided some services for victims, overall 
government services appropriate for the needs of all trafficking 
victims—including male, female, and child victims—outside of 
major cities remained limited.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers, and sentence 
convicted traffickers to significant prison terms, using the 2016 
anti-trafficking law. • Implement formal procedures for all relevant 
officials to screen and proactively identify sex and labor trafficking 
victims—particularly among vulnerable groups such as domestic 
workers, undocumented migrants, street children, and persons in 
commercial sex—and train officials on their use. • Train and build 
the capacity of judicial and law enforcement officials on application 
of the anti-trafficking law, investigative techniques, and evidence 
collection specific to trafficking cases, witness and victim protection 
best practices during trial, and alternatives to victim testimony. 
• Fully implement the national victim referral mechanism using 
a victim-centered approach to ensure officials refer all trafficking 
victims to appropriate protection services, and train law enforcement 
and judicial authorities on appropriately referring victims to care. • 
Provide adequate protection services to adult and child victims of all 
forms of trafficking, including appropriate shelter, psycho-social, and 
rehabilitative services tailored specifically to trafficking victims. • Train 
staff at government-operated centers for vulnerable populations to 
provide trafficking victims with appropriate and specialized care and 
increase resources for provision of care at these centers. • Improve 
coordination among government ministries to combat trafficking. 
• Provide funding or in-kind support to NGOs that provide care 
to trafficking victims. • Develop procedures, especially for law 
enforcement, judicial, and border officials, to ensure victims are not 
punished for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit, 
such as prostitution and immigration violations.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained uneven law enforcement efforts. Tunisia’s 
anti-trafficking law, Organic Law 2016-61, enacted in July 2016, 
criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed 
penalties of 10 years’ imprisonment and a fine of 50,000 Tunisian 
dinar (TND) ($18,640) for offenses involving adult victims and 15 
years’ imprisonment and a fine of 50,000-100,000 TND ($18,640-
$37,270) for those involving child victims. These penalties were 
sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate 
with penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as kidnapping. 
The government reported pandemic-related mitigation efforts placed 
restrictions on investigators’ ability to work and hindered interagency 
collaboration. In 2020, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) conducted 
a total of 181 investigations, which included 73 cases of forced 
labor, 62 cases of “economic exploitation” (forced labor), 28 cases 
of sexual exploitation, and 10 cases of child forced criminality. This 
demonstrated a significant decrease from the 775 investigations—361 
forced labor cases, 348 “economic exploitation” (forced labor) cases, 
54 sexual exploitation cases, and 12 “slavery-like practices” cases—the 
government initiated in the previous reporting period. Despite a 
nationwide pandemic-related lockdown from April to June 2020 and 
several judges’ strikes, the National Authority to Combat Trafficking 
in Persons (“National Authority”)—the government’s lead agency 
coordinating anti-trafficking efforts—with the assistance of a legal aid 
NGO, reported the government prosecuted 32 cases involving at least 
36 defendants; however, the government did not try any of the cases 
under the anti-trafficking law. This was similar to the 31 prosecutions 
in the previous year. The government reported 157 prosecutions 
initiated in previous reporting periods remained ongoing. The 
public prosecutor and investigative judge closed 12 cases before 
going to trial for a variety of reasons including lack of evidence and 
victims deciding not to press charges; of those 12 cases, two involved 
Tunisian defendants and 10 cases involved Ivoirian defendants. The 
government did not convict any traffickers for the second consecutive 
year. The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, 
or convictions of government officials complicit in human trafficking 
crimes. During the reporting period, the government continued 
expanding cooperation with the governments of Senegal and Cote 
d‘Ivoire to exchange information about potential trafficking cases. 
The government formalized the partnership with Cote d’Ivoire 
and expanded it to exchange information on victim support and 
transnational trafficking networks between the two countries.
The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) designated a judge at each tribunal of 
first instance, for a total of 28, to serve as focal points to prosecute and 
investigate human trafficking cases. The MOI’s special victims unit, 
established in 2017, included brigades of judicial police and national 
guard officers throughout the country who specialized in cybercrime 
and assistance to victims of trafficking and gender-based violence. 






trafficking cases brought before the judiciary through a specialized 
office; this office also had the authority to conduct research on the 
application of the anti-trafficking law and advise the minister of 
justice on policies related to the implementation of the law. However, 
lack of a judicial database and bureaucratic delays prevented the 
MOJ from providing detailed data on trafficking prosecutions and 
convictions during the reporting period. Throughout the reporting 
period, the government—in coordination with international and civil 
society organizations—conducted a wide variety of anti-trafficking 
trainings for law enforcement and judicial officials, healthcare 
practitioners, and social workers. The National Authority maintained 
an online platform to provide training to legal professionals on how to 
combat and prevent human trafficking established in February 2020. 
Nevertheless, insufficient training of judicial and law enforcement 
officials hindered investigations and victim identification efforts. 
The National Authority reported the lack of an independent budget 
and insufficient capacity building hindered the government’s efforts 
to fully implement the law. Furthermore, civil society organizations 
reported there continued to be a low level of awareness among police 
and judicial authorities on the application of the anti-trafficking law 
and handling of trafficking cases. Due to their lack of familiarity with 
the law, some judicial officials used other laws that had less stringent 
sentences to prosecute and convict trafficking offenders. Observers 
also reported that courts dismissed several potential trafficking cases 
due to lack of evidence on the exploitative nature of the crime; lack 
of victim or witness testimony also created challenges for officials 
to successfully prosecute and convict trafficking offenders.
PROTECTION
The government maintained efforts to proactively identify trafficking 
victims and refer victims to protection services. Pandemic-related 
lockdowns inhibited the government’s ability to identify and assist 
trafficking victims during the reporting period. Between April 2020 
and March 2021, the National Authority identified 907 trafficking 
victims; while this represented a decrease from the 1,313 victims 
it identified in the previous reporting period, it was an increase 
compared with 780 in 2019 and 285 in 2018. More than half of the 
identified victims were women and children, and 366 were foreign 
victims from Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, 
Madagascar, Mali, Uganda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Japan, and 
Philippines. The National Authority reported traffickers subjected 
62 percent of identified victims to forced labor and 32 percent to sex 
trafficking; traffickers subjected 75 percent of identified child victims 
to sex trafficking compared to 59.2 percent in 2019. The government 
referred or directly provided assistance to all identified victims of 
trafficking. The Ministry of Health (MOH) provided healthcare to 93 
trafficking victims, including both Tunisian and foreign victims, and 
the Ministry of Social Affairs (MSA) provided psychological and socio-
economic assistance to 71 victims. NGOs reported the government 
continued to collaborate with civil society organizations to provide 
assistance to the remaining victims in need. The government also 
assisted in the repatriation of 34 female Tunisian trafficking victims, 
who Tunisian authorities identified in Gulf countries in 2018 and 
2019, and provided shelter, medical, and financial assistance to the 
victims upon their return to Tunisia.
The government continued implementing the national victim 
identification and referral mechanism approved in the previous 
reporting period, which streamlined all stages of the referral process 
from victim identification and assistance to civil and criminal 
proceedings. Judicial and border police continued to have practices 
in place to screen for potential trafficking victims among those who 
overstayed their legal residency or who were subject to expulsion 
after serving a prison sentence. The government also provided 
practical guides to security officers and judicial police on victim 
identification techniques. In addition, the MSA continued to train 
all labor inspectors to identify potential trafficking victims; there 
were 26 labor inspectors and 24 social workers in the MSA’s labor 
inspectorate that were trained as specialized points of contact for 
child trafficking victims. Despite these efforts, the national anti-
trafficking commission and MOI special victims unit were the only 
government entities authorized to officially identify trafficking victims, 
thereby allowing victims access to state-run services and providing 
exemptions from exit visas for foreign victims. NGOs continued 
to report that the limited number of ministries who could legally 
identify trafficking victims slowed the process for victims to receive 
care. Moreover, insufficient interagency coordination and resources 
reportedly hindered the timely identification and referral to services 
for trafficking victims. In addition, civil society organizations reported 
the special victims unit did not have sufficient personnel or resources 
to provide adequate assistance to trafficking victims, nor did personnel 
have the cultural understanding or training to communicate with 
vulnerable migrants from the sub-Saharan African population, 
including potential trafficking victims. Civil society organizations 
also expressed concern that the government’s process to provide 
exemption from visa penalties for foreign trafficking victims was 
slow and cumbersome, thereby creating difficulties for civil society 
to assist victims in a timely manner. Civil society noted authorities’ 
current interpretation of the anti-trafficking law limited application 
of identification procedures; authorities may have punished some 
unidentified victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to 
commit, such as prostitution or immigration violations.
The MSA continued to operate two centers in Sousse and Sfax that 
had designated areas available for victims of all forms of trafficking 
where victims could enter and exit freely and return on a regular basis 
for assistance seeking employment. The MSA—in collaboration with 
an international organization—continued to provide training for the 
centers’ staff on rehabilitation and care for trafficking victims. The 
MSA and National Authority continued to uphold an agreement, 
signed in January 2019, for the MSA to dedicate one room in all 
social care centers for victims of trafficking and violence. An MOH-
operated hospital in Tunis continued to have a unit with trained 
personnel dedicated to caring for victims of violence, including 
sexual exploitation, which offered psycho-social support, medical 
documentation, and legal expertise; the government did not report if 
this unit assisted any trafficking victims during the reporting period. 
The government’s rehabilitation center for torture victims could 
also assist trafficking victims with psychological and therapeutic 
support. The government ran 79 youth centers around the country 
that provided psycho-educational services to at-risk children ages 
six to 18, including child trafficking victims, one of which was 
dedicated solely for abandoned or otherwise vulnerable children, 
including child trafficking victims; however, the government did 
not report if any child trafficking victims received assistance at this 
center during the reporting period. Civil society contacts reported 
there were overall limited services throughout the country for child 
trafficking victims, especially long-term, reintegration, and relocation 
services. Despite the centers and services provided by the MSA and 
MOH, the National Authority and civil society partners continued 
to report the country lacked sufficient shelters to support vulnerable 
populations, including trafficking victims. Although the National 
Authority and NGOs partnered to reintegrate victims into society, 
the lack of resources, trained personnel, and sufficient shelter beds 
created challenges in doing so. Additionally, civil society organizations 
reported there were not adequate shelter or safe spaces available for 
male victims of trafficking and other forms of violence; there were 
only three government-run shelters that could accommodate male 
trafficking victims, but those shelters did not provide access to trained 
counselors, economic reintegration programs, or legal support. 
During the reporting period, the National Authority produced, 
in partnership with an international organization, victims’ rights 
cards listing government and non-government services available 
to trafficking victims; the National Authority intended these cards 
to complement the “passport of victims’ rights” cards launched in 
July 2020 that outlined victims’ rights in Tunisia. The government 
offered foreign trafficking victims legal alternatives to their removal 
to countries where they might face hardship or retribution. Under 
the anti-trafficking law, the government offered all identified foreign 
trafficking victims relief from deportation; during the reporting period, 
the government provided temporary relief from deportation for 56 
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foreign trafficking victims. Victims had the right to free legal aid to 
assist them in engaging in civil and criminal proceedings against their 
traffickers and provisions to protect victims’ privacy during court 
proceedings, such as recorded testimony and physical protection. 
The government allowed trafficking victims a 30-day reflection 
period, renewable once, while they decided whether to assist law 
enforcement; victim assistance was not dependent on assisting law 
enforcement. Prosecutors could seek restitution in trafficking cases; 
the government did not report whether courts issued restitution in 
trafficking cases during the reporting period. Trafficking victims could 
request legal aid to assist them in civil suits; the government did not 
report whether courts ordered defendants to pay compensation in 
the form of damages through civil suits during the reporting period. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
government continued to implement its 2018-2023 national strategy 
to combat trafficking, and the MOJ continued to lead the National 
Authority, which included representatives from 13 ministries and 
experts from civil society. In addition, the National Authority developed 
a contingency plan to manage its crisis response to trafficking amid the 
pandemic and to prepare for similar situations in the future. Decree 
law number 2019-653 issued in 2019 established operating procedures 
and guidelines for the National Authority and four specialized 
commissions to focus on monitoring and evaluation, research, 
training and development, and tracking victim cases. The National 
Authority consulted a network of trafficking survivors established 
during the previous reporting period that served as a council to share 
experiences, advise, and present recommendations to the committee 
to help improve its work. During the reporting period, the National 
Authority completed its annual report that detailed its activities and 
recommendations on how to improve the government’s fight against 
human trafficking but did not publicly release the report during the 
reporting period. The government continued to conduct numerous 
anti-trafficking public awareness and information campaigns, at 
times in partnership with civil society organizations, including 
workshops for journalists and media engagements. The National 
Authority also continued to place announcements on social media 
sites and newspapers to inform the public about fraudulent work 
contracts and forced labor. The government continued to operate a 
hotline to report potential trafficking crimes, which was operational 
five days a week during regular business hours and whose operators 
spoke Arabic, French, and English. The government did not report 
the number of calls to the hotline in 2020 but reported identifying 
three potential trafficking victims through the hotline. In response to 
the pandemic, the National Authority established a 24-hour mobile 
emergency line during the reporting period for reporting trafficking 
crimes; the emergency line received approximately 8,000 calls in 
2020 and 47 percent of calls to the hotline resulted in identifying 
trafficking victims. Limited financial and personnel resources remained 
challenges to the government’s overall ability to address trafficking.
The government continued to make efforts to address fraudulent 
labor recruitment practices. The Agency for Placement Abroad in 
Private Establishments (EPPA) filed complaints against 21 private 
employers for cases of fraud, extortion, or abuses of Tunisian workers 
abroad; it also formally requested the MOI to shut down seven private 
employers who recruited workers without proper registration with 
the EPPA. In addition, the EPPA and National Authority continued 
to periodically disseminate announcements in the media to raise 
awareness of unfair or illegal recruitment practices and informed 
the public about information on EPPA facilities and services. In 
addition, the Directorate General for Immigration continued to 
coordinate with the Minister of Vocational Training and Employment 
to combat illegal job recruitment agencies. The National Agency for 
Employment and Independent Work (ANETI) maintained a network 
of 120 approved private recruiting agencies, 1,000 job advisors, and 
an online platform to improve employment searches in Tunisia and 
prevent exploitative work contracts. ANETI raised awareness about 
its work during the reporting period and advised job seekers to 
avoid communicating with unauthorized recruitment agencies as 
they may use exploitative contracts. The government maintained 
bilateral labor migration agreements with France and Switzerland, 
which contained provisions to prevent unfair labor recruitment 
practices and labor trafficking. The government also used a Qatar-
Tunisia visa center to organize the process of recruiting Tunisians 
to work in Qatar and oversee employment contracts. Nevertheless, 
civil society organizations reported concerns the government did not 
provide sufficient initiatives to address the internal child domestic 
servitude problem. The government did not make efforts to reduce 
the demand for commercial sex acts or child sex tourism.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
domestic and foreign victims in Tunisia, and traffickers exploit 
victims from Tunisia abroad. Some Tunisian children are vulnerable 
to forced labor and sex trafficking in Tunisia. Tunisian girls working 
as domestic servants for wealthy families in Tunis and major coastal 
cities are highly vulnerable to trafficking, experiencing restrictions on 
movement, physical and psychological violence, and sexual abuse. 
According to experts in 2017, Tunisian children—any of whom 
had dropped out of school and were between the ages of 11 and 
12 years old—worked in small workshops, auto mechanic garages, 
and domestic work; some of these children may be vulnerable to 
trafficking. International organizations report a continued presence 
of street children selling goods on street corners and rural children 
working in agriculture to support their families in Tunisia; these 
children are vulnerable to forced labor or sex trafficking. Tunisian 
officials reported in 2017 that organized gangs reportedly forced 
street children to serve as thieves and beggars and to transport drugs. 
Tunisian women are reportedly exploited in sex trafficking under 
false promises of work both within the country and elsewhere in 
the region, such as Lebanon, United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. 
Foreign migrants are particularly vulnerable to sex trafficking, domestic 
servitude, and other forms of forced labor in Tunisia. According 
to an NGO, in 2017 and 2018, foreign trafficking victims typically 
arrived in Tunisia on a valid tourist or student visa and remained 
in an exploitative situation for an average of five to 13 months, 
surpassing the validity of their visa. Civil society and international 
organizations continue to report an increase in traffickers exploiting 
women, primarily from West Africa and increasingly from Cote 
d’Ivoire, in domestic servitude in private homes in Tunis, Sfax, Sousse, 
and Gabes. An NGO also reported in 2018 that traffickers forced 
some men from Cote d’Ivoire to work on farms and construction 
sites. Traffickers reportedly coerce Ivoirians to smuggle cannabis and 
opioids into Tunisia. According to a Tunisian NGO, recruiters in Cote 
d’Ivoire target both well-educated and non-skilled individuals in 
the country with false and fraudulent promises of work in Tunisia. 
Well-educated Ivoirians, who pay a recruiter to assist them to find 
work in Tunisia, are promised jobs that do not exist upon arrival 
in Tunisia, are held in debt bondage, and are forced into domestic 
servitude in Tunisian households. Recruiters also target unskilled and 
uneducated individuals primarily from San Pedro, Cote d’Ivoire, to 
work in domestic work, construction, or agriculture in Tunisia; these 
individuals are then required to repay the transportation costs and 
recruitment fees upon arrival and thereby held in debt bondage by 
their employers. Civil society organizations continue to report that 
traffickers appear to coach some of their victims on how to answer 
questions about their trafficking experiences so that victims can access 
benefits, such as a reprieve from exit fines, which would further allow 
the traffickers to exploit their victims. An NGO reported in 2018 that 
female victims of domestic servitude and other forms of forced labor, 
whose employers hold them in debt bondage, are further exploited 
by nightclub owners that cater to sub-Saharan African communities 
in Tunisia. The nightclub owners falsely promise to pay the women’s 
debts in exchange for working in the nightclubs as servers, but the 
owners subsequently force the women into commercial sex for the 
nightclubs’ clientele. Civil society organizations also reported in 






working conditions could be vulnerable to forced labor. Tunisian 
LGBTQI+ rights associations reported in 2018 that migrants and 
asylum-seekers from neighboring countries who escaped violence or 
discrimination due to their gender identity or sexual orientation may 
be particularly vulnerable to sex trafficking and forced labor in Tunisia. 
NGOs and international organizations observed in 2017 a slight 
increase in boys from Sub-Saharan and West Africa, including Cote 
d’Ivoire, who were vulnerable to trafficking after accepting fraudulent 
offers of soccer careers in Tunisia. During the reporting period, Italian 
authorities reported a sharp increase in Tunisian irregular migrants 
arriving in Italy, in part due to pandemic-related economic fallout; 
these irregular migrants were vulnerable to trafficking.
TURKEY: TIER 2
The Government of Turkey does not fully meet the minimum standards 
for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant efforts 
to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing efforts 
compared to the previous reporting period, considering the impact 
of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Turkey remained on Tier 2. These efforts included prosecuting more 
defendants and identifying more victims. The Bureau of Combating 
Migrant Smuggling and Human Trafficking (BCMH) increased 
its number of offices and the Directorate General for Migration 
Management (DGMM) developed and circulated a manual for shelter 
staff with standard operating procedures (SOPs) on victim assistance. 
The government trained shelter staff on pandemic mitigation efforts 
and provided COVID-19 tests and personal protective equipment 
(PPE) to victims staying at the shelters. However, the government 
did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. The 
government convicted fewer traffickers and courts continued to 
acquit most defendants prosecuted for trafficking. Many judges and 
prosecutors lacked experience and resources to prosecute complex 
cases and cases were often dropped, acquitted, or reclassified to 
lesser crimes. DGMM-run shelters’ capacity was stretched with 
victims staying at the shelters for longer than expected due to the 
pandemic, and some domestic civil society groups remained excluded 
from anti-trafficking efforts. The government did not proactively 
identify internal trafficking victims, forced labor victims, and victims 
among migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, raising the possibility 
of penalizing victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them 
to commit. Human rights groups and international bodies reported 
the government provided operational, equipment, and financial 
support to a Turkish-supported armed opposition group (TSO) in 
Syria that recruited child soldiers.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Vigorously investigate, prosecute, and convict traffickers. • Cease 
operational, in-kind, and financial support to armed opposition 
groups in Syria that recruit child soldiers. • Expand and institutionalize 
training to investigators, prosecutors, and judges on victim-centered 
approaches to trafficking cases, including advanced training on 
trafficking investigations and prosecutions. • Increase proactive 
victim identification efforts among vulnerable populations, such 
as refugees and asylum-seekers, persons in LGBTQI+ communities, 
migrants awaiting deportation, Turkish and foreign women and girls 
in commercial sex, and children begging in the streets and working 
in the agricultural and industrial sectors. • Establish procedures or 
specialized units to ensure trafficking cases are handled by trained 
prosecutors. • Expand partnerships with civil society to better identify 
victims and provide victim services. • Strengthen specialized services 
including shelter and psycho-social support for all victims. • Improve 
interagency cooperation and adopt a national action plan. • Encourage 
victims’ participation in investigations and prosecutions, including 
using remote testimony or funding for travel and other expenses for 
victims to attend court hearings.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Article 80 of 
the penal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and 
prescribed penalties of eight to 12 years’ imprisonment and a fine 
equivalent to “10,000 days,” which were sufficiently stringent and, 
with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with those for serious 
crimes, such as rape. The government investigated 269 cases with 
880 suspects. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) prosecuted 68 new 
cases with 347 defendants, compared with 52 new trafficking cases 
with 237 defendants in 2019. The MOJ continued to prosecute 
1,398 cases with 5,221 defendants. Courts convicted 30 traffickers, 
compared with 43 in 2019; judges sentenced 13 traffickers with 
imprisonment ranging from eight years’ to 10 years’, 16 traffickers 
with imprisonment ranging from six years and eight months’ to seven 
years and six months’ imprisonment, and one trafficker received two 
years’ imprisonment. The government did not report the length of 
the sentences in 2019. Courts continued to acquit the majority of 
defendants prosecuted for trafficking; courts acquitted 177 suspected 
traffickers out of 214 defendants (258 of 329 suspected traffickers 
acquitted in 2019). The government closed courts from March to 
June 2020 due to pandemic mitigation measures. 
Turkish National Police (TNP) maintained BCMH with 22 provincial 
offices and increased the number of officers to 114 (30 officers in 
2019). The Gendarmerie also operated the Department of Counter 
Smuggling and Trafficking with 16 provincial offices. The government 
did not designate specialized prosecutors for trafficking cases, and a 
lack of experience and specialization among prosecutors and judges 
regarding trafficking, particularly after the dismissal of more than 
125,000 civil servants during the state of emergency, limited the 
government’s ability and means to prosecute complex crimes like 
trafficking. For example, GRETA and other observers reported that 
law enforcement lacked sufficient resources to fully investigate labor 
trafficking with 94 percent of all trafficking investigations involving 
sex trafficking – disproportionate to a reasonable expectation of labor 
trafficking cases. Experts continued to report misperceptions about 
trafficking among law enforcement authorities, including confusion 
between sex trafficking and “encouragement of prostitution” (Article 
227) or labor trafficking and “violation of freedom of work and 
labor” (Article 117). Judiciary officials reported cases were dropped, 
reclassified to lesser offenses, or acquitted due to a lack of evidence, 
particularly a lack of testimony, as victims and witnesses rarely 
participated in court proceedings. 
The government, independently and with technical and financial 
support from international organizations, provided various anti-
trafficking trainings, including to TNP, coast guard, Gendarmerie, 
prosecutors, and judges. The government cooperated with Moldova 
and Italy on trafficking investigations and filed extradition requests 
for nine suspects with Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, 
Morocco, and United Arab Emirates. The government did not report 
any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government 
employees complicit in trafficking. Additionally, reports and evidence 
from human rights groups and international bodies indicate the 
government provided operational, equipment, and financial support 
to a TSO in Syria that recruited child soldiers. An international 
organization reported in 2020 the recruitment and use of 820 
children (765 boys and 55 girls) in the Syria conflict, including 191 




The government increased victim protection efforts. The government 
identified 276 victims (193 in 2019); 160 were victims of sex 
trafficking and 116 were victims of labor trafficking, including 43 
of forced begging; 221 were female and 20 were male; 165 were 
children; and 272 were foreign victims and 11 were Turkish nationals. 
In 2019, 134 were victims of sex trafficking, 35 of labor trafficking, 
16 were victims of forced captivity, four of forced begging, three of 
domestic servitude, and one of child soldiering; 173 were female 
and 20 were male; 20 were children; 191 were foreign victims 
and two were Turkish nationals. SOPs provided guidelines for 
identifying and referring victims to assistance and required first 
responders to refer potential victims to the DGMM, which officially 
recognized victims. DGMM maintained two identification experts 
in each of the 81 provincial offices to interview victims; DGMM 
interviewed approximately 4,919 potential victims (4,500 in 2019). 
In previous years, DGMM’s ability to identify victims varied among 
provinces. The government operated 134 mobile teams for street 
children in all 81 provinces that conducted outreach work, and the 
Ministry of Family, Labor, and Social Services (MOFLSS) continued 
to deploy specialized staff to government-operated migrant and 
refugee temporary accommodation centers to screen camp residents 
for indicators of trafficking. GRETA and other observers reported 
limited capacity among first responders and inadequate proactive 
identification efforts, particularly for forced labor, Turkish nationals, 
children, and persons in the LGBTQI+ community. Police reported 
difficulties in identifying sex trafficking victims due to their fear of 
deportation and labor inspectors and asylum officers did not receive 
training or guidance on victim identification. In previous years, 
the government faced limitations in identifying victims in highly 
vulnerable refugee and migrant communities outside of camps and 
had insufficient protection resources to address trafficking in these 
communities; media and civil society reports continued to indicate 
forced removals to Syria without screening for indicators of trafficking.
The government did not report the total amount allocated for anti-
trafficking efforts in 2019 or 2020 and did not provide funding to 
domestic NGOs. The government allocated 172,080 lira ($23,180) 
for direct victim assistance but did not report the amount allocated 
to international organizations working on trafficking-related projects, 
compared with 878,000 lira ($118,270) to international organizations 
in 2019. The law entitled officially identified trafficking victims 
to services, including shelter, medical and psycho-social services, 
work options, education, translation services, temporary residency, 
repatriation assistance, vocational training, and legal counseling; 
the government provided support services to 209 victims. DGMM 
operated three specialized shelters for victims of trafficking and began 
construction for a fourth; the shelter in Kirikkale had the capacity to 
accommodate 20 victims, the Ankara shelter could accommodate 
30 victims, and the Aydin shelter could accommodate 40 victims. 
Additionally, the government allocated 7,513 lira ($1,010) for financial 
assistance to victims, compared with 54,000 Lira ($7,270) in 2019. 
The local government of Kirikkale dispersed 100 lira ($13) per 
month to adult victims with an additional 100 lira ($13) for each 
of their children and the local government of Ankara dispersed 
300 lira ($40) per month to adult victims and 50 lira ($7) for each 
of their children; 22 victims received financial assistance. MOFLSS 
operated 145 shelters that provided accommodation for victims of 
violence, including trafficking victims and the government-operated 
monitoring centers for children provided support to child victims 
of violence. The DGMM-run shelters and MOFLSS-run shelters 
required victims to have an escort to leave the shelter during their 
initial stay but allowed victims to leave the shelter voluntarily once 
security officials completed an assessment and deemed conditions 
safe. DGMM developed and circulated a manual for shelter staff 
with SOPs on service provision for trafficking victims and rules for 
shelter operations. The government trained shelter staff on pandemic 
mitigation efforts and provided COVID-19 tests and PPE to victims 
staying at the shelters. The government provided job placement 
support to victims; three victims found employment through job 
placement in 2020. During the reporting period, experts reported 
that victims stayed at DGMM-run shelters for longer than expected 
due to the pandemic and, in previous years, GRETA reported “serious 
concerns” about the limited capacity of specialized shelters to 
accommodate victims and the lack of specialized assistance. As in 
previous years, experts and civil society actors expressed concern 
that the government’s victim protection efforts were not sufficiently 
inclusive of NGOs, including funding of independent organizations 
and the government’s exclusion of some NGOs from identifying and 
providing services to victims. 
In previous years, observers reported that the government penalized 
victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit due 
to inadequate identification efforts. For example, observers reported 
that authorities arrested, detained, and deported sex trafficking 
victims and charged other potential victims with offenses related to 
lacking valid documents. The government did not provide guidance 
on non-penalization of victims to law enforcement authorities. The 
law entitled victims to a temporary residence permit for 30 days, 
which authorities could extend up to three years with the option to 
apply for a work permit; the government issued 41 permits (98 in 
2019). DGMM voluntarily repatriated 21 victims with support from 
an international organization (86 in 2019). In previous years, the 
government placed the majority of undocumented foreign victims 
in removal centers and voluntarily repatriated them within a few 
days; as a result, most victims did not benefit from a reflection 
period or cooperate in court proceedings. Judges and prosecutors 
reported procedural law did not allow victim statements prior to 
repatriation as evidence in court proceedings. The law provided 
witness protection and legal aid, but observers reported that limited 
opportunities to encourage victim cooperation in prosecutions with 
victim-centered approaches, protection measures, and legal assistance 
resulted in a high number of acquittals and downgraded cases. The 
government did not report how many victims participated in criminal 
investigations or legal procedures. The government maintained 106 
Judicial Support and Victims Services Offices dedicated to providing 
legal assistance and psycho-social support and 86 judicial interview 
rooms, which allowed victims to testify in private in order to reduce 
re-traumatization. Criminal courts often did not issue restitution and 
recommended victims to pursue compensation through civil suits; no 
victims received restitution in 2019 or 2020, and the government did 
not report whether any victims filed for or received compensation.
PREVENTION
The government maintained prevention efforts. The government 
did not update its national action plan in place since 2009. The 
Coordination Commission for Combating Trafficking coordinated 
interagency anti-trafficking efforts and convened in December 2020. 
Thirty-six provincial coordinating commissions for anti-trafficking 
implemented anti-trafficking efforts at the provincial level. The 
Commission and DGMM continued to publish annual data reports, 
and DGMM organized an awareness campaign, including the 
production of an anti-trafficking video on social media. DGMM 
maintained a migration-related national hotline that also received 
trafficking-related calls; calls to the hotline launched two investigations, 
and hotline operators referred nine potential victims to DGMM, 
resulting in seven identified victims. The law required recruitment 
agencies to maintain a license and approve all contracts with the 
government. MOFLSS fined 36 employers a total of 1.1 million 
lira ($148,170) in violation of labor law regarding foreign workers. 
However, resources and inspections were insufficient to effectively 
monitor and enforce prohibitions against the use of child labor. 
Inspectors did not generally visit private agricultural enterprises 
employing 50 or fewer workers unless a complaint was filed, resulting 
in enterprises vulnerable to forced labor. 
The law allowed both Syrians under temporary protection and 
non-Syrian conditional refugees the right to work, provided they 
were registered in the province they wished to work in for at least 





responsibility of the employer, and refugee advocates reported the 
procedure was burdensome and costly, resulting in few employers 
pursuing that path. As a consequence, the vast majority of conditional 
refugees and those under temporary protection remained without 
legal employment options, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation, 
including trafficking. The government did not make efforts to reduce 
the demand for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Turkey, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Turkey abroad. Trafficking victims in Turkey are primarily from Central 
and South Asia, Eastern Europe, Azerbaijan, and Syria. Of the 276 
victims identified in 2020, most were Syrian (159), followed by Uzbek 
(38), Kyrgyz (14), and Afghan (11). Traffickers reportedly exploited 
some Georgian men and women in forced labor, and some Turkish 
men in forced labor in Moldova. Romani children from marginalized 
communities often were seen on the streets in major cities where they 
worked as garbage collectors, street musicians, and beggars, raising 
concerns about exploitative conditions and forced labor. Human 
rights groups reported commercial sexual exploitation, including sex 
trafficking, remained a problem in the LGBTQI+ community, which 
faced discrimination and hostility from both authorities and the local 
population. Due to the pandemic, traffickers increasingly focused 
on recruitment of victims for domestic labor and housekeeping and 
increased their use of online recruitment methods.
Turkey continues to host a large refugee population that remains highly 
vulnerable to trafficking and exploitation: approximately 3.6 million 
displaced Syrians, and over 350,000 refugees of other nationalities 
resided in Turkey during the reporting period. Criminal networks 
coerce and pressure Syrian women and girls into sex trafficking. 
NGOs report that refugee camp officials and volunteers collaborate 
with criminal networks to recruit girls with false job offers into sex 
trafficking, while Syrian boys remained vulnerable to sex trafficking 
with allegations of rape and sexual abuse at refugee camps. Syrian 
girls as young as 12 are married to adults in unofficial religious 
ceremonies, particularly in refugee camps and poor and rural regions, 
in which they were vulnerable to domestic servitude and sex trafficking. 
Reports claim the number of Syrian refugee families who married off 
their underage daughters to Turkish men as an “economic coping 
mechanism” increased in the wake of the pandemic. Syrian and other 
refugees, including children, are vulnerable to forced labor from 
engaging in street begging and also reportedly working in agriculture, 
restaurants, textile factories, markets, shops, and other workplaces. 
Experts report children work long hours, with low wages, in some 
cases in substandard working conditions.  The Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party (PKK), a U.S.-designated terrorist organization, recruited and 
forcibly abducted children for conscription.  Reports from human 
rights groups and international bodies indicate the government 
provided operational, equipment, and financial support to a TSO in 
Syria that recruited child soldiers.
TURKMENISTAN: TIER 3
The Government of Turkmenistan does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making 
significant efforts to do so, even considering the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore 
Turkmenistan remained on Tier 3. Despite the lack of significant 
efforts, the government took some steps to address trafficking, 
including by continuing to participate in anti-trafficking awareness 
campaigns and continuing to purchase equipment for mechanization 
of the cotton harvest to reduce the vulnerability to forced labor 
generated by dependence on handpicking. However, during the 
reporting period, there was a government policy or pattern of forced 
labor; the government continued to direct policies that perpetuated 
the mobilization of adults and children for forced labor in the annual 
cotton harvest, in public works projects, and in other sectors in some 
areas of the country. The government’s denial of access to independent 
monitoring missions—coupled with pandemic-related limitations—
prevented robust observation of the cotton harvest. Despite these 
trends, the government did not hold any officials accountable for their 
complicity in forced labor crimes. The government did not report 
any information on investigations, prosecutions, or convictions; 
identified no victims; did not implement legal provisions on victim 
protection; and did not fund any victim assistance programs. 






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Take further action to end government policies or actions that compel 
or create pressure for the mobilization of forced labor, to include 
eliminating the cotton and silk production quotas and mandatory 
participation in public works. • Grant independent observers full 
access to monitor cotton cultivation and cease the harassment, 
detention, and abuse of individuals for documenting labor conditions. 
• While respecting due process, investigate and prosecute suspected 
sex and labor trafficking offenses under Article 129/1 of the criminal 
code and convict, sentence, and incarcerate traffickers, including 
government officials complicit in the mobilization of forced labor. 
• Eliminate the practice of requiring fees for replacement pickers 
or contributions from businesses and entrepreneurs to support 
the harvest. • Provide victim care services directly or by otherwise 
funding organizations to do so, including for male victims, in 
accordance with provisions of the 2016 anti-trafficking law. • Finalize, 
implement, and train police, migration officers, and other relevant 
stakeholders on standard operating procedures to identify and refer 
victims to protection services. • Allocate direct financial resources 
for implementation of the National Action Plan (NAP). • Establish, 
train relevant personnel on, and implement labor inspection and 
recruitment oversight protocols to improve forced labor identification 
and prevention. • Train police to detect and investigate sex and 
labor trafficking crimes. • Establish a trafficking-specific hotline and 
publicize it among vulnerable communities. • Expand training for 
relevant government authorities on implementation of the provisions 
of the 2016 anti-trafficking law and article 129, as amended in 2016. 
• Increase awareness of trafficking among the general public through 
government-run campaigns or financial and in-kind support for 
NGO-run campaigns.
PROSECUTION
The government decreased anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. 
Article 129/1 of the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking and prescribed penalties of four to 10 years’ imprisonment 
for offenses involving adult victims, and eight to 15 years’ imprisonment 
for offenses involving child victims; these penalties were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Unlike the previous 
year, authorities did not report initiating any criminal investigations 
related to trafficking (compared to one investigation in 2019) and, 
for the second consecutive year, they did not report any prosecutions 
or convictions (compared with one prosecution in 2019 and three 
each in 2017, 2016, and 2015; one conviction in 2017, three in 2016, 
and nine in 2015). Authorities reported training law enforcement on 
trafficking prevention and victim identification, but they did not provide 
information on participating agencies or number of personnel trained. 
The government did not provide in-kind support to an international 
organization for law enforcement training, as it had in prior years. 




did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of 
government employees complicit in human trafficking offenses, nor 
did it report any efforts to end officials’ mobilization of persons for 
forced labor in the cotton harvest, public works projects, or domestic 
service. Under direct orders from the provincial government, police 
officers in Mary reportedly began detaining dozens of homeless persons 
and others suspected of being homeless and forcing them to work 
on farms, in domestic service—including in the residences of their 
relatives and friends—and in other capacities. Authorities reportedly 
threatened family members who attempted to locate relatives detained 
under this campaign. Corruption and official complicity in trafficking 
crimes remained significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement 
action during the year. The government did not report any international 
investigations or extraditions of suspected traffickers. State-imposed 
restrictions on the access of independent observers to the cotton 
harvest likely impeded the detection and referral to law enforcement 
of forced labor crimes. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained negligible protection efforts. For the 
second consecutive year, authorities did not identify any trafficking 
victims, compared with eight victims in 2018, one in 2017, and 11 
in 2016. An international organization that works closely with the 
government reported assisting 18 Turkmen victims identified overseas, 
including 13 female victims and five male victims (compared with 
12 female victims and 12 male victims in 2019); it was unclear how 
many of these if any, were children, and there was no information 
available on the types of exploitation they experienced. It is possible 
the total number of victims was significantly higher, considering the 
7,748 calls to the foreign-funded, international organization-run 
trafficking hotlines in Ashgabat and Turkmenabat; however, no victims 
were formally identified through these calls during the reporting 
period. Neither the government nor the foreign donors publicized 
these hotlines as avenues for trafficking victims seeking to report 
their abuses. Despite international organizations utilizing thorough 
victim identification protocols accepted by the wider international 
community, the prosecutor general’s office continued to baselessly 
assert most trafficking claims were fraudulent. Authorities reported 
conducting regular training for law enforcement personnel on victim 
identification; however, the government again failed to adopt and 
implement standard operating procedures for victim identification and 
referral developed in partnership with an international organization 
in 2018, leaving authorities without formal written procedures 
to effectively conduct this work. Observers ascribed the delay in 
part to redirection of resources and attention to the pandemic. 
Migration authorities reportedly continued to interview and refer to 
law enforcement traveling women and minors they deemed to be at 
higher risk of trafficking; in the absence of standardized guidance, it 
is likely that some victims, including adult men, passed unidentified 
through these channels. In previous years, law enforcement agencies 
only designated individuals as trafficking victims if their cases led 
to trafficking convictions. 
The anti-trafficking law required the government to provide a 
wide range of services to trafficking victims; however, for the fifth 
consecutive year, the government did not provide comprehensive 
services to all trafficking victims, nor did it fund international 
organizations or NGOs to provide such services. An NGO operated 
a foreign donor-funded shelter for female and child trafficking 
victims. The shelter could provide psychological counseling and 
local reintegration services, including housing, food, personal 
hygiene products, medical examinations, vocational training and 
job placement, and small grants to support livelihood generation, 
legal services, education, and transportation. Although the shelter was 
in operation during the pandemic, no information was available on 
the number of victims who benefitted from its services (compared 
with five female victims in 2019 and seven in 2018). Victims were 
eligible to apply for physical protection and assistance in obtaining 
free medical care; however, officials did not report details on specific 
cases in which such assistance was provided during the year, and 
NGOs indicated in prior years that some victims were required to 
pay for their own medical treatment.
By law, victims—including those participating in criminal 
proceedings—were exempt from administrative or criminal liability 
for unlawful acts their traffickers compelled them to commit. The 
legal code guaranteed victims the option to seek employment; 
required law enforcement agencies to respect their confidentiality; 
and provided free legal assistance for those who apply for official 
victim status, as well as the option to request temporary residency 
in Turkmenistan for the duration of relevant criminal proceedings. 
As in the previous year, the government did not report providing 
any of these forms of assistance. There were no reports of victims 
seeking or obtaining damages in civil suits. The government made 
no attempts to identify sex trafficking victims among women 
arrested for engaging in commercial sex; consequently, officials 
may have penalized sex trafficking victims for prostitution offenses. 
In prior years, some Turkmen trafficking victims were deported to 
Turkmenistan from other countries after local authorities had failed to 
screen them for trafficking indicators, and Turkmenistan’s migration 
service subsequently blocked them from exiting Turkmenistan for a 
period of up to five years. Civil society groups believed this punitive 
response may have dissuaded some Turkmen nationals exploited in 
trafficking abroad from coming forward with their abuses during 
the reporting period. 
PREVENTION
The government decreased efforts to prevent human trafficking, and 
reports of state-sponsored forced labor continued. The government 
maintained a 2020-2022 NAP developed in conjunction with an 
international organization and approved in 2019; authorities did 
not allocate financial resources or provide in-kind contributions 
to implement the plan, nor did they promulgate key action items 
required for its implementation. In the absence of formal access 
approval for independent monitoring missions, it was difficult to 
ascertain the extent to which the authorities took steps to eliminate 
state policies that perpetuated government-compelled forced labor 
during the cotton harvest or in public works projects. 
According to international media reports, quasi-state agricultural 
associations exploited some farmers in forced labor at local levels 
to meet Turkmenistan’s national cotton production quota. Some 
local government officials continued to mobilize students, teachers, 
medical professionals, and other civil servants for compulsory labor 
in the cotton harvest and in public works, including community 
cleaning and beautification projects. The government continued 
to purchase and receive cotton picking and planting machinery 
from international industry partners as part of ongoing efforts to 
mechanize the harvest and reduce dependency on human labor. 
However, authorities did not provide data on use of the machinery 
and, due to a lack of independent observation, no information 
regarding the impact of these mechanization efforts on forced labor 
was available. According to some reports, tenant farmers often had 
to pay unregulated, bribe-like fees at various parts of the cultivation 
process to access the necessary mechanical equipment, at times 
compounding their financial hardships and disincentivizing its use 
altogether. International media and civil society groups continued 
to report some local government officials required public sector 
workers unwilling or unable to participate in the harvest to pay for 
replacement pickers, thereby establishing an informal penalty system 
through which corrupt officials profited from coercion. Despite 
the absence of formal observation by international organizations, 
informal observers continued to note a discernible decline in recent 
years of forced labor in cotton harvesting and sowing, possibly 
attributable to mechanization and the availability of low-wage labor, 
among other factors. There were reports that some schoolteachers 
who were required by local government mandates to participate 
in the cotton harvest instead compelled their students to serve as 









The 2016 anti-trafficking law outlined roles and responsibilities for 
key stakeholder agencies and placed the cabinet of ministers in charge 
of planning, funding, and implementing anti-trafficking policy. It also 
called for the creation of an interagency anti-trafficking committee 
under the authority of the cabinet of ministers to coordinate, plan, 
monitor, and report on the government’s anti-trafficking efforts 
and analyze trends, improve victim protection measures, raise 
awareness, and monitor implementation of the NAP. The government 
convened its national working group on NAP implementation 
in June 2020; authorities did not provide information on the 
results of this meeting. The law required the Ministry of Internal 
Affairs to record data on trafficking crimes; however, for the fifth 
consecutive year, the government did not report any systematic efforts 
to monitor its anti-trafficking efforts and did not make publicly 
available any government data on trafficking crimes or relevant 
judicial processes. The government cooperated with NGOs and 
an international organization to conduct awareness campaigns in 
rural areas and airports targeting vulnerable populations, although 
fewer of these activities took place in public than in previous years 
due to pandemic-related restrictions. The government reported 
conducting eight virtual seminars on safe migration in conjunction 
with an international organization, along with more than 300 law 
enforcement information campaigns on combating trafficking; 
the government did not provide information on participation or 
specific campaign content. Authorities also noted the number of 
Turkmen citizens departing the country decreased by more than 99 
percent following enhanced exit bans and border closures ostensibly 
instituted as pandemic-related public health measures; according to 
one international organization, these restrictions may have further 
incentivized migration through unregulated channels commonly 
associated with trafficking vulnerabilities. As in prior years, the 
government charged NGOs fees to place anti-trafficking awareness 
material in a government-owned public space. 
Civil society observers noted a slight increase in labor inspections 
conducted by government officials following their participation in 
training sessions provided by foreign donors; however, authorities 
did not provide information on these inspections or their outcomes. 
The government promulgated two orders purporting to improve labor 
inspections, including by establishing permission for unannounced 
visits to work sites, and to increase oversight of recruitment for 
public works during the reporting period. However, the content 
of the orders did not appear to feature language outlining specific 
inspection or remediation methodologies, nor did they contain 
provisions for detecting abuses or punishing those who violate 
recruitment regulations. Neither document featured any mention 
of forced labor indicators. The government did not report efforts 
to punish labor recruiters or brokers involved in the fraudulent 
recruitment of workers. 
The government continued to grant citizenship to members of 
Turkmenistan’s stateless population, which consisted primarily of 
former Soviet citizens; in 2020, authorities granted citizenship to 
2,580 of these individuals, compared with 863 citizenship conferrals 
in 2019 and 735 in 2018. A civil status law passed in 2019 and 
brought into effect in July 2020 newly allowed for the registration 
of, and access to public services for, all children born in the country 
regardless of the legal status of their parents. State migration 
officials continued to prevent Turkmen nationals from departing 
the country via airports; authorities did not provide information 
on how many of these interventions were related to perceived 
trafficking vulnerabilities. The government claimed it restricted the 
international travel of some young women in particular to prevent 
them from being subjected to trafficking abroad. The government 
did not report providing anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic 
personnel in 2020. The government did not make efforts to reduce 
the demand for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
domestic victims in Turkmenistan, and they exploit victims 
from Turkmenistan abroad. State policies continue to perpetuate 
government-compelled forced labor; in 2016 and again in 2020, the 
ILO Committee of Experts noted the continued practice of forced 
labor in the cotton sector. To meet central government-imposed 
production quotas for the cotton harvest, local government officials 
require some soldiers, employees at private-sector institutions, and 
public sector workers—including teachers, doctors, nurses, and 
others—to pick cotton without payment, using coerced statements 
of voluntary participation, and under the threat of such penalties 
as dismissal, reduced work hours, or salary deductions. Local 
officials reportedly impose informal fees on public sector workers 
as a tactic to coerce them into picking cotton or otherwise profit 
from their inability or unwillingness to participate in the harvest. 
Some local authorities reportedly also threaten farmers with land 
expropriation if they attempt to register complaints about payment 
discrepancies or if they do not meet government-imposed quotas. 
Absent government measures to prevent, monitor, or address supply 
chain contamination, some goods containing cotton harvested 
through the use of forced labor may have entered international 
supply chains. In addition, the government compulsorily mobilizes 
students, teachers, doctors, and other civil servants for public works 
and community cleaning and beautification projects, such as the 
planting of trees and the cleaning of streets and public spaces 
in advance of presidential visits. Authorities have also forced 
public servants and students to serve in uncompensated support 
roles during government-sponsored events, such as the 2018 
World Weightlifting Championship; similarly, financial hardships 
stemming from land expropriation, forcible evictions, and home 
demolition in advance of high-profile sporting events may have 
made some communities vulnerable to trafficking. Police reportedly 
conduct sweeps to remove homeless persons and subsequently place 
them in agricultural work or domestic servitude at the residences of 
law enforcement-connected families. Families living in poverty often 
compel children to serve as porters in local marketplaces. Workers 
in the construction sector and at small-scale sericulture operations 
are vulnerable to forced labor. Turkmenistan’s small stateless 
population—primarily consisting of undocumented residents 
with expired Soviet nationality documentation—are vulnerable 
to trafficking. Criminalization of consensual sexual intercourse 
between men makes some members of Turkmenistan’s LGBTQI+ 
communities vulnerable to police abuse, extortion, and coercion 
into informant roles; widespread social stigma and discrimination 
against LGBTQI+ individuals also compound their vulnerability 
to family-brokered forced marriages that may feature corollary sex 
trafficking or forced labor indicators. Residents of rural areas in 
Turkmenistan are at highest risk of becoming trafficking victims, 
both within the country and abroad.
Turkmen men and women are subjected to forced labor after migrating 
abroad for employment in the textile, agricultural, construction, and 
domestic service sectors; Turkmen migrant men are also subjected to 
forced criminality in drug trafficking. Sex traffickers exploit Turkmen 
women abroad. Turkey, Russia, and India are the most frequent 
destinations of Turkmen victims, followed by other countries in 
the Middle East, South and Central Asia, and Europe. Enduring 
government restrictions on freedom of movement preventing citizens 
from leaving the country incentivize some to pursue unofficial 
migration channels rife with trafficking vulnerabilities. Government 
austerity measures limiting certain foreign financial transactions, 
coupled with travel and entry restrictions, may increase the risk of sex 
or labor exploitation among Turkmen university students stranded 
abroad during the pandemic. 
UGANDA: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Uganda does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
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efforts to do so. These efforts included identifying more victims and 
signing the National Referral Guidelines for Management of Victims of 
Trafficking in Uganda (NRG). The government increased prosecutions 
of suspected traffickers and increased training to law enforcement 
personnel, investigated allegations of complicity in trafficking crimes, 
and created human trafficking officer positions within the Ugandan 
Police Force (UPF) and the Criminal Investigative Department 
(CID). The government increased awareness-raising campaigns 
and launched, funded, and implemented the National Action Plan 
for Prevention of Trafficking in Persons Uganda 2019-2024 (NAP). 
However, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, even considering 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity. 
The government did not report referring victims to care for the fifth 
consecutive year. For the seventh consecutive year, the government 
did not allocate resources to NGOs that provide protective services to 
victims. The government did not screen vulnerable populations abroad 
for indicators of human trafficking. The government investigated 
fewer trafficking cases and convicted fewer alleged perpetrators. The 
government suspended international labor recruitment for eight 
months, due to a lack of strong regulations for labor recruitment 
enterprises. Therefore Uganda remained on Tier 2 Watch List for the 
second consecutive year.  
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Implement the NRG to systematically identify and refer trafficking 
victims to appropriate care, including by screening for trafficking 
indicators among vulnerable populations, such as women in 
commercial sex, migrants and Cuban medical professionals. • 
Increase efforts to complete judicial proceedings, while respecting due 
process and the rights of the accused. • Increase coordination between 
police investigators and prosecutors of trafficking crimes. • Expand 
protective services for victims, specifically through partnerships 
with NGOs, including by allocating resources. •While respecting 
due process of law, increase efforts to investigate trafficking cases 
and prosecute alleged traffickers, including allegations of official 
complicity in trafficking crimes. • Increase training for Ugandan 
embassy staff on assisting trafficking victims abroad, including 
victim identification, providing temporary shelter, or identifying 
local NGO shelters for victim referral, and facilitating the repatriation 
of victims. • Cease penalization of victims for unlawful acts their 
traffickers forced them to commit. • Where feasible, assign labor 
attachés to Ugandan embassies to monitor migrants abroad. • 
Further prioritize investigating and prosecuting traffickers who exploit 
children, especially from the Karamoja region, in forced begging and 
child sex trafficking in brothels. • Implement strong regulations and 
oversight of labor recruitment companies and improve enforcement, 
including by continuing to investigate and prosecute those involved 
in fraudulent labor recruitment. • Increase bilateral negotiations 
with neighboring and destination country governments on migrant 
worker rights, including on the release and repatriation of Ugandan 
migrant workers exploited by employers abroad and on mutually 
enforceable standard contracts. • Proactively investigate and punish 
labor recruiters who fraudulently recruit Ugandans and eliminate 
all worker-paid recruitment fees. • Establish a unified system of 
documenting and collecting data on human trafficking cases. • Enact 
witness protection legislation and implement a systematic victim-
witness support program. • Increase national awareness-raising 
efforts, specifically for teachers, parents, and community leaders. • 
Accede to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained mixed law enforcement efforts. The 2009 
anti-trafficking act criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking, 
and it prescribed punishments of up to 15 years’ imprisonment 
for offenses involving adult victims and up to life imprisonment 
for those involving child victims. These penalties were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as kidnapping. 
The law also criminalized the use of a child in any armed conflict 
and prescribed penalties of up to the death penalty. The Children 
Amendment Act of 2016 conflicted with the 2009 anti-trafficking 
act in some respects—for example, it defined child sex trafficking 
to require force, fraud, or coercion, which was inconsistent with the 
definition of trafficking under international law, and it prescribed 
substantially lower penalties for the crime. 
In 2020, the government reported investigating 214 incidents of 
human trafficking involving 154 suspects; of these incidents, 118 
were internal, 93 transnational, and three unknown. This was a 
decrease compared with investigating 252 incidents (19 internal 
and 222 transnational) in 2019. During the reporting period, the 
government prosecuted 283 defendants for trafficking crimes in 
202 cases; of these, 161 cases were domestic and 41 transnational; 
140 were sex trafficking cases, 54 were labor trafficking cases, and 
eight were unknown; and 192 defendants were male, 44 female, 46 
unknown, and one was a labor recruitment company. In 2019, the 
government prosecuted 73 cases involving 87 suspects in court. In 
2020, courts convicted 11 traffickers under the anti-trafficking act 
in nine cases – six for sex trafficking and five for forced labor. This 
was a decrease compared to convicting 16 traffickers in 2019. Two 
traffickers received prison terms of seven years; one trafficker received 
a prison sentence of two years; one trafficker received a sentence 
of three years’ imprisonment and a fine of 1 million Ugandan 
Shillings (UGX) ($274); one trafficker received a sentence of 12 
years’ imprisonment; three defendants received sentences of two 
years’ imprisonment each; and courts gave one trafficker the option 
of two years’ imprisonment or a 2 million UGX fine ($548). Courts 
had not yet sentenced two additional traffickers at the end of the 
reporting period. The penalties imposed in five of these convictions 
were not in line with the requirements of the penal code as they 
did not receive the adequate sentencing outlined by the code. The 
government reported 26 cases remained under inquiry and 129 
remained pending in court at the end of the reporting season. A 
German national charged with multiple counts of human trafficking 
died in custody; the trafficking case remained pending at the end 
of the reporting period. Observers reported authorities were more 
likely to prosecute sex trafficking cases than forced labor cases. NGOs 
reported the government increased the number of human trafficking 
trainings to prosecutors. 
The Coordination Office to Prevent Trafficking in Persons (COPTIP) 
was responsible for compiling law enforcement data; pandemic-
related restrictions limited its ability to collect information from local 
governments. Authorities suspended court hearings and appearances 
in March 2020 due to COVID-19 risks and judicial activities did 
not fully resume until June 2020. NGOs reported court closures 
and delayed court hearings hindered the ability of judicial officials 
and prosecutors to remain in touch with victim witnesses waiting 
for cases to be tried. The government reported insufficient shelter 
space forced authorities to send victims home, making it difficult for 
them to provide testimony in court proceedings and consequently 
impeding completion of trials. CID reported a lack of interpreters 
also hindered completion of trafficking trials. An NGO reported 
authorities misreported child trafficking crimes as “defilement” cases. 
Nonetheless, NGOs reported closed borders allowed law enforcement 
to shift their focus from transnational to domestic trafficking cases. 
Corruption and official complicity in trafficking crimes remained 
significant concerns, inhibiting law enforcement action during the 





sex trafficking after allegations arose that he abducted and sexually 
exploited a 16-year-old girl; the case remained pending at the end of 
the reporting period. In September 2020, an international organization 
launched an investigation into an allegation of the sexual exploitation 
of a female by an international organization’s staff from the Karamoja 
region at a compound in Moroto. The international organization’s 
investigation concluded the allegation was unsubstantiated. In 2019, 
the State House Anti-Corruption Unit launched an investigation 
following complaints of government officials’ involvement in human 
trafficking; however, the government did not publish any reports 
or arrest officials by the end of the reporting period. In 2018, the 
government reported investigating security officers at Malaba Border 
and Entebbe Airport, as well as officials of the Civil Aviation Authority 
and Ground Handling Companies at Entebbe Airport, for alleged 
involvement in trafficking crimes; it did not report any updates on 
these cases, which remained pending at the end of the reporting period. 
Media and senior government officials reported high-level officials 
may have owned or been associated with some labor recruitment 
companies suspected of trafficking. An NGO in 2018 continued to 
report some complicit immigration officers at border crossings assisted 
traffickers, and several NGOs alleged some senior police officials in 
Kampala protected traffickers from arrest and prosecution. 
In 2019, UPF announced the creation of the Anti-Trafficking in Persons 
Department within the Criminal Investigation and Crime Intelligence 
Department; however, the new anti-trafficking department had yet to 
receive final approval at the end of the current reporting period. In 
the interim, the anti-trafficking department utilized CID Sexual and 
Children Offenses Department resources as a short-term solution to 
implement the department’s efforts. In 2020, UPF created seven human 
trafficking officer positions and the CID established human trafficking 
desk officers at border posts and at the Entebbe International Airport. 
The government maintained a trafficking-specific desk in the Director 
of Public Prosecutions’ office responsible for prosecuting trafficking 
crimes. The government, in partnership with an NGO, designated 
136 Trafficking in Persons Focal Prosecutors across the country to 
gather and track human trafficking data. In response to the pandemic 
lockdown, Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions created and 
implemented an electronic application to facilitate communication 
among 350 police and prosecutors and to share resources on effective 
methods for human trafficking investigations and prosecutions across 
the country. The government, in partnership with an NGO, trained 82 
police officers, 32 investigators, and 252 prosecutors in 16 regions, 
compared to zero in 2019. COPTIP reported the training curriculum for 
both new and experienced police and immigration officers incorporated 
modules on human trafficking; however, the government did not 
report how many officials received the training during the reporting 
period. Ugandan police and immigration officers continued to lack an 
understanding of the anti-trafficking law and may have misclassified 
cases or encouraged victims to accept financial compensation from 
traffickers in exchange for dropping their cases. Law enforcement 
officials did not always coordinate with the ODPP, frequently resulting 
in cases that did not proceed to prosecution or that courts dismissed, 
because the investigations were incomplete and did not comply with 
protocols for admissible evidence. The government collaborated with 
Burundi and Kenya to prosecute suspected traffickers; one case involved 
Karamojong girls exploited in Kenya, and a second case involved 
Burundian girls sexually exploited in Uganda. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained mixed protection efforts. The government 
identified 666 victims in 2020 – 497 were transnational, 166 internal, 
and three unknown; 575 female, 88 male, and three unknown; 222 
children and 441 adults, and three unknown. This compares with 
identifying 455 and 650 victims in 2019 and 2018, respectively. A 
majority of the identified victims were subjected to forced labor 
and most transnational cases were identified en route to Kenya, 
Oman, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates (UAE). Authorities 
reported a significant decrease in victims identified between April 
to September 2020 due to the government’s suspension of internal 
and international transportation in response to the pandemic, 
which resulted in a reduced number of screenings for trafficking 
indicators at these border crossings. Authorities reported the number 
of victims identified increased in November and December as a result 
of reopening air travel and the resumption of international travel. 
An international organization reported identifying 20 Ugandan 
victims abroad. An NGO reported identifying 150 child labor and 
sex trafficking victims. Another NGO reported identifying 660 
victims—301 female and 359 male—and providing rehabilitative 
assistance services to 91 victims—25 female and 66 male. 
In July 2020, the government adopted the NRG but had not fully 
implemented it by the end of the reporting period. The NRG 
provided victim referral guidelines for stakeholders—including 
police, immigration officials, the prosecution unit, and NGOs—and 
described social services resources and recommendations for victim 
protection. Observers reported the NRG lacked identification guidance 
for vulnerable populations like women and children. The government 
continued to operate under the implementing regulations of the 
2009 anti-trafficking act; these regulations outlined responsibilities 
for relevant stakeholders, including law enforcement, medical 
professionals, and civil society members, to combat trafficking.
For the fifth consecutive year, the government did not report how 
many victims it referred to care or directly assisted. An NGO reported 
providing shelter, educational, reintegration, and repatriation services 
to 86 victims. The Department of Immigration and Citizenship 
Control submitted draft victim identification and referral procedures 
to the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) for review; the procedures 
remained pending at the end of the reporting period. The government 
reported a lack of short-term human trafficking shelters limited the 
ability to provide adequate protection services during raids and law 
enforcement operations. CID headquarters could only house 10 people 
at any given time, which was insufficient for the number of victims 
requiring assistance. Most shelters were located in the central and 
eastern parts of the country, limiting assistance to victims elsewhere. 
Authorities reported a lack of shelters, limited government vehicles, 
and intimidation from traffickers resulted in authorities dropping 
75 percent of cases. Due to authorities’ inability to place victims in 
shelters, many child trafficking victims exploited by their guardians 
were forced to return to live with them. The government did not 
report allocating resources to NGOs that provide protective services for 
human trafficking victims. The government continued to collaborate 
with NGOs to refer identified victims to care and with international 
organizations to provide the vast majority of victim services via 
referrals to NGO-operated shelters, which provided psychological 
counseling, medical treatment, family tracing, resettlement support, 
and vocational education without contributing in-kind or financial 
support. Victim care, although high-quality, remained inadequate 
in quantity, and available services were primarily for children and 
women, with few NGOs offering shelter for adult males. Adult victims 
had the option to enter or exit shelters on their own accord; however, 
law enforcement placed child victims in shelters and restricted their 
liberties for security and protection purposes. Once deemed secure by 
shelter staff, probation officers, or local officials, shelters reintegrated 
children into their home communities. The government reported 
continuing to fund the resettlement of street children identified by 
officials. The government reported training law enforcement and 
police officers on how to conduct child-friendly rescues of children 
from the street. The government reported difficulty referring victims to 
services due to the pandemic restrictions during the March to October 
2020 lockdown. Due to the pandemic lockdown restrictions, law 
enforcement held child victims in police barracks, at police officers’ 
homes, or at the homes of local government officials. Due to the 
COVID-19 lockdown, the government had difficulty providing food 
to victims. An NGO reported rotating shelter staff to reduce infection 
and staff difficulties commuting during lockdown and curfew hours; 
two of its shelters became quarantine centers for children, further 
limiting the care available for trafficking victims. The government 
and NGOs reported an increase in demand for shelter services due 
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to an increase in domestic trafficking cases and government enforced 
lockdown and movement restrictions.
The government reported insufficient funds and a lack of embassies 
in destination countries hindered its ability to repatriate and provide 
assistance to Ugandan victims identified abroad during the reporting 
period. Ugandan embassies registered workers, organized their 
travel documents, and provided ad hoc shelter and food services to 
identified victims; however, the government did not have sufficient 
resources to provide these services to all workers and victims. The 
government reported repatriating 12 girls from Kenya. The government 
collaborated with foreign governments, international organizations, 
and NGOs to repatriate 2,400 Ugandans in 2020 and reported an 
unknown number were victims of human trafficking; however, the 
government did not report screening or identifying any human 
trafficking victims among this population during the reporting period, 
compared with repatriating four trafficking victims in 2019 and 90 in 
2018. An international organization repatriated 38 human trafficking 
victims from Saudi Arabia and additional NGOs provided services 
to victims abroad. NGOs reported providing services to repatriated 
victims as needed. The government did not report using a temporary 
shelter in UAE or an emergency fund in Saudi Arabia for distressed 
Ugandan nationals, including trafficking victims. In response to 
the continued abuse of migrant workers’ rights abroad, the Uganda 
Association of External Recruitment Agencies, a private sector entity, 
continued to employ a Labor Liaison Office in Saudi Arabia during 
the reporting period; however, some civil society members expressed 
concern about possible conflicts of interest between labor attachés 
and victim assistance due to the nature of the work since labor 
organizations are often represented by private businesses. 
Judicial officers often encouraged trafficking victims to participate 
in the investigation and prosecution of their traffickers to prevent 
the victimization of others, but some reports indicated that law 
enforcement’s limited capacity and inadequate sensitivity in 
engaging trafficking victims discouraged many from cooperating in 
investigations. The absence of victim-witness protection legislation and 
a protection program hindered some investigations and prosecutions 
because perpetrators would threaten and blackmail victims and 
witnesses to discourage their participation in trials. Due to a lack 
of long-term shelters, victims exploited by their guardians returned 
to their exploitative situations before authorities completed trials. 
The government drafted policies that would provide cooperating 
victim-witnesses with assistance, support, and safety; however, the 
policies had yet to be finalized at the end of the reporting period. 
Generally, policies in High Court cases provided victims and witnesses 
with transportation, physical protection, shelter, interpretation 
services and legal counsel, but this was ad hoc and inconsistent 
in practice, and some reports indicated police would temporarily 
shelter cooperating victims in their homes. NGOs and international 
organizations reported providing psycho-social support to child 
victims to ensure protection during court proceedings and sometimes 
reintegrated victims into their home communities. Ugandan law 
permitted foreign trafficking victims to remain in Uganda during 
the investigation of their cases and to apply for residence and work 
permits, but the government did not report granting any victims 
such benefits during the reporting period. The law permitted victims 
to keep their identities anonymous by using voice distortion and 
video link facilities, but the practice had not yet been implemented 
at the end of the reporting period. The law allowed victims to file 
civil suits against the government or their alleged traffickers for 
restitution compensation; the government did not report courts 
ordering restitution or compensation during the reporting period. 
While the 2009 anti-trafficking act prohibited the penalization of 
trafficking victims for unlawful acts their traffickers coerced them to 
commit, NGOs reported cases in which police pursued charges against 
victims who had used forged paperwork to escape their exploitative 
situations and cases where recruitment companies sued victims for 
their breach of contract. In prior years, observers reported police 
sometimes treated street children as criminals and arbitrarily arrested 
and detained them in detention facilities. During the reporting 
period, authorities reported screening 240 children from the streets 
of Kampala for human trafficking, of which 38 were Karamojong 
children, and sending 106 children to shelters where they received 
care and assistance and eventually were returned to their families, 
compared with 725 children identified and two referred to shelters 
in 2019. Many NGOs reported the government did not adequately 
address or prioritize internal trafficking of children from the Karamoja 
region, including forced begging and child sex trafficking in brothels. 
PREVENTION
The government minimally increased prevention efforts. The National 
Task Force, led by the MIA Permanent Secretary, with COPTIP serving 
as its secretariat, continued to coordinate anti-trafficking efforts. In 
July 2020, the government signed and launched the NAP; however, 
the NAP had yet to be fully implemented at the end of the reporting 
period. The government reported the NAP mandated that COPTIP 
should receive annual funding from parliament and complementary 
funding from government agencies. COPTIP received 168 million 
UGX ($46,040) in 2020. COPTIP did not report its budget in 2019. 
COPTIP continued to maintain authority to publish an annual 
report on government and non-government bodies’ anti-trafficking 
efforts, which it published during the reporting period. COPTIP 
hired a data officer to improve data collection and analysis; however, 
the government and NGOs reported poor data collection hindered 
the government’s efforts to plan and implement national efforts to 
combat human trafficking. 
Previously, the Parliament passed the Kampala Child Protection 
Ordinance of 2019, which criminalized giving money, food, or 
clothing to children on the street; criminalized children loitering in 
public places, begging, soliciting, vending, or hawking; and banned 
the sale of alcohol and drugs to children. The law allowed authorities 
to fine offenders 40,000 UGX ($10.96), sentence offenders to up to 
six months’ imprisonment, or both. The solicitor general had yet to 
approve the ordinance by the end of the reporting period, inhibiting 
its implementation, though if enacted, it had the potential to facilitate 
the penalization of child trafficking victims. The government did 
not operate an anti-trafficking hotline during the reporting period; 
however, the government’s child helpline identified 81 potential 
trafficking victims through calls in 2020. The government reported the 
hotline was non-operational for periods of time due to the pandemic. 
Immigration officials continued to scrutinize travel documents, 
passports, and reasons for travel before clearing travelers to depart 
Uganda for work in foreign countries. The government continued 
to implement its ban on Ugandans traveling abroad to Oman 
due to ongoing reports of abuse and human trafficking. The 
government collaborated with the Kenyan government to draft 
a bilateral labor agreement; however, the agreement remained 
pending at the end of the reporting period. Uganda maintained 
two bilateral labor agreements, with Jordan and Saudi Arabia, and 
one memorandum of understanding with UAE; however, officials 
acknowledged the agreements with Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and UAE 
did not adequately protect Ugandan workers. The Ministry of Gender 
Labor and Social Development (MGLSD) encouraged Ugandan 
workers to seek employment only in countries with which Uganda 
has labor agreements. In 2020, the government established Joint 
Implementation Committees to implement the bilateral labor 
agreements; however, pandemic-related travel restrictions limited 
the committees’ activities. The government’s external employment 
management system, which functioned as a “one stop” internet 
portal where Ugandans could search and apply for all pre-vetted 
overseas employment opportunities through licensed recruitment 
companies, remained operational at the end of the reporting period; 
however, the government reported processing a limited number of 
work orders due to the pandemic and did not clear any applicants 
to leave the country during the reporting period. The government 





hindered the government’s ability to monitor the possible labor 
exploitation of workers abroad.
The 2005 Employment Regulations required labor recruitment 
companies to register, undergo a thorough vetting process, and 
maintain a minimum bank deposit and a credit line, to ensure they 
could repatriate workers. The government reported vetting all labor 
requests received by local companies and all contracts executed 
between international employers and Ugandan businesses. The 
government suspended labor migration due to the pandemic in 
March 2020 and announced phased reintroduction of international 
labor recruitment, with the exception of domestic workers, in October 
2020. In November 2020, MGLSD approved labor recruiters to begin 
recruiting domestic workers again. The government investigated and 
prosecuted one labor export and recruitment company during the 
reporting period. The government reported an increase in human 
trafficking amongst labor companies due to the inability of workers to 
find opportunities abroad. Authorities, the media, and NGOs reported 
government officials that owned labor companies were complicit 
in human trafficking. The government lacked worker protection 
provisions and did not prohibit employers, recruiters, and labor agents 
from charging worker recruitment fees, confiscating workers’ passports 
or travel documents, switching contracts without workers’ consent, 
or withholding wages as means of keeping workers in a state of 
compelled service; consequently migrant workers, specifically domestic 
workers, were vulnerable to traffickers. MGLSD, with financial and 
technical support from international organizations, reviewed migrant 
worker regulations and drafted a report with recommendations; 
however, the report remained under review by legal advisors at 
the end of the reporting period. MGLSD, in collaboration with an 
international organization, launched a new project to strengthen 
internal government mechanisms for safe labor migration, build 
capacity, develop a grievance reporting and referral tool, and develop 
ethical practices among labor recruitment companies. Authorities, 
NGOs, and the media reported government regulations remained 
insufficient to prevent human trafficking amongst fraudulent labor 
companies and labor recruitment. Corruption reportedly inhibited 
oversight of labor recruitment firms, as did insufficient staffing and 
funding of government oversight agencies and loopholes in the law. 
In 2018, the government reported unlicensed labor recruitment 
companies were responsible for trafficking more than 90 percent 
of the identified victims, although licensed labor recruitment 
companies were also reportedly involved. The government allowed 
legal placement fees of 50,000 UGX ($13.70). In February 2020, 
the government announced all labor export companies must refund 
any fees in excess of this amount. The government did not report 
suspending any labor companies’ licenses, excepting the suspension 
for all labor recruitment companies from March-October, compared 
with suspending six labor export companies for charging potential 
workers illegal registration and placement fees during the previous 
reporting period. MGLSD contracted private companies to conduct 
mandatory pre-departure training for domestic workers who were 
traveling to the Middle East and utilizing registered labor recruitment 
companies. The weeklong residential training, paid for by the 
recruitment company, trained 60-70 women each week, including on 
domestic work, contract appreciation, understanding of the bilateral 
agreements, how to contact help, and worker rights. To mark World 
Day Against Trafficking in Persons, the government conducted two 
awareness raising campaigns via Kampala radio stations discussing 
methods to reduce human trafficking and partnered with international 
organizations to share human trafficking awareness newspaper articles 
and television broadcasts. The government, in collaboration with 
NGOs, also hosted public sensitization campaigns via newspapers, 
radio, television, and social media that focused on human trafficking 
trends, safe migration, and protection of vulnerable children. As 
mandated by the 2015 Registration of Persons Act, the government 
continued to register its citizens and provide them with national 
identification numbers. The government did not make efforts to 
reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government reported 
an increase in demand for commercial sex due to the pandemic 
lockdown and restricted movement; law enforcement reported a 
shift in commercial sex from bars and brothels to residential homes. 
Uganda was not a party to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Uganda, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Uganda abroad. Ugandan children as young as seven are exploited 
in forced labor in agriculture, fishing, forestry, cattle herding, mining, 
stone quarrying, brick making, carpentry, steel manufacturing, 
street vending, bars, restaurants, gold mining, and domestic service. 
Traffickers exploit children in commercial sex. Women, children, 
internally displaced persons, and migrants may have been victims of 
forced labor or sex trafficking, and Cuban medical personnel working 
in Uganda may have been forced to work by the Cuban government. 
The pandemic and the government’s lockdown measurers, including 
closure of international airports and land borders, a curfew, restrictions 
on travel, restricted movement between districts, and closure of all 
schools, workplaces, and government offices, shifted trafficking 
trends. Authorities and NGOs reported the closure of international 
airports and land borders decreased international trafficking due to 
migrant workers unable to get to their destination; at the same time, 
domestic trafficking, including child sex trafficking increased. In 2020, 
Kenyan authorities identified Ugandan victims en route to Nairobi. 
Recruiters target girls and women aged 13-24 years for domestic sex 
trafficking, especially near sports tournaments and road construction 
projects. In 2018, an international organization estimated there are 
between 7,000 and 12,000 children exploited in sex trafficking in 
Uganda. An international organization and an NGO reported most 
internal trafficking victims are Ugandans, many of whom are from 
the northeastern and eastern region, specifically Karamojong children 
whom traffickers exploit in forced begging and commercial sex in 
brothels. In 2020, the government and civil society reported traffickers 
sold children from Karamoja at markets in the eastern region for 
20,000-50,000 UGX ($5.48- $13.70); traffickers exploited them in 
forced labor as beggars, domestic workers, and in commercial sex. 
Consequently, in 2021, NGOs reported traffickers adjusted their 
methods to avoid apprehension and had children travel alone to 
meet traffickers in other towns or at international borders, where they 
organized the markets. In 2020, researchers reported an increase in 
child labor in the sugarcane industry. In 2019, an NGO reported local 
authorities’ efforts to remove domestic child trafficking victims from 
the streets caused children to move to work as vendors in markets 
where they are vulnerable to exploitation. In prior years, researchers 
reported there were approximately 3,800 children living on the streets 
of Kampala and three other major towns and an additional 11,700 
children working on the streets but sleeping elsewhere. Reportedly, 
traffickers, called “elders,” force some street children to beg and exploit 
girls in commercial sex. The “elders” are a well-organized network 
of traffickers; NGOs alleged complicit officials allow the practice to 
continue. A local organization reported traffickers required parents 
in the Acholi subregion in northern Uganda to have their children 
work on farms to repay debts. In 2018, an NGO alleged traffickers 
recruited children from Napak district, northeastern Uganda, and 
then sold them as domestic workers for 20,000 UGX ($5.48). Media 
reported some parents sell their children to traffickers who resell 
the children for approximately 30,000 UGX ($8.22). In 2018, an 
international organization reported separating four Ugandan children 
from armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). 
In 2018, observers reported the government detained and placed on 
bond some trafficking victims, including children, in an attempt 
to compel them to cooperate with and periodically report to law 
enforcement in support of criminal investigations. In 2017, child 
trafficking victims in need of immediate shelter often stayed at police 
stations, sometimes sleeping in impounded vehicles, or at a juvenile 
detention center while awaiting placement in more formal shelters.
Traffickers compel some children from Burundi, the DRC, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Tanzania, and South Sudan into forced agricultural labor 
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and sex trafficking in Uganda. South Sudanese children in refugee 
settlements in northern Uganda are at risk of trafficking. In 2017, 
individuals from Rwanda and Somalia, including a Somali refugee 
from Nakivale Refugee Settlement, were victims of internal trafficking. 
In 2018, there were several media reports of alleged complicity of 
police officers in the sex trafficking of child and female refugees. 
Young women remained the most at risk for transnational trafficking, 
usually seeking employment as domestic workers in Kenya and the 
Middle East; at times traffickers fraudulently recruited Ugandan 
women for employment and then exploited them in sex trafficking. 
Traffickers exploit Ugandans in forced labor and sex trafficking in 
Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and North America. In 2020, 
victims from Burundi, Kenya, and South Sudan transited Uganda 
en route to other countries, notably, the Middle East. In 2020, 
school closures and financial struggles of caregivers increased the 
vulnerability of children to human trafficking, specifically child sex 
trafficking, during the pandemic lockdown. The pandemic increased 
child sacrifice—a human trafficking crime delineated under the 
Ugandan anti-trafficking law. In 2019, media reported traffickers 
sold girls from markets in Katakwi district and transported the girls 
to Nairobi where they were exploited as domestic workers; some of 
the girls worked for Somali immigrants in Nairobi and were further 
transported to Somalia where they were exploited by the Al Shabab 
terrorist group. In 2018, media and government officials alleged 
Ugandan girls were being sold in a “slave market” in the UAE. 
Extremely high labor recruitment fees sometimes led to situations of 
debt bondage. To circumvent the government ban on migrant work 
in Oman, some licensed and unlicensed agencies send Ugandans 
through Kenya and Tanzania. Official complicity may have hindered 
government oversight of labor recruitment agencies. In 2018, COPTIP 
reported that traffickers appear to be increasingly organized and some 
may have formed regional trafficking networks. The government and 
an NGO reported an increase in victims with university degrees as 
traffickers target graduates with the promise of skilled jobs abroad. 
The government and NGOs reported cases involving victims that 
were recruited by licensed companies in which victims paid high 
administrative fees based on promised high-paid jobs abroad; 
however, upon arrival, they found themselves locked into contracts 
in low-paid domestic work. Traffickers used local radio to announce 
fraudulent job opportunities in Kampala to target children and young 
people to lure them into exploitative situations. NGOs reported 
that traffickers are frequently relatives or friends of victims or may 
pose as wealthy women or labor recruiters promising vulnerable 
Ugandans, frequently from rural areas, well-paid jobs abroad or in 
Uganda’s metropolitan areas. Reportedly, pastors, imams, and local 
leaders at churches and mosques in Uganda have also assisted in the 
recruitment of domestic workers abroad, mostly for Middle Eastern 
countries; these leaders encourage female domestic workers to take 
these jobs and in turn, receive a fee per worker from recruiters. Some 
traffickers threatened to harm the victims’ family or confiscated travel 
documents. In 2020, due to a government ordinance that penalizes 
giving food and money to child beggars, traffickers moved children 
from the streets to work in markets instead.
UKRAINE: TIER 2
The Government of Ukraine does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. Despite the documented impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on the government’s anti-trafficking capacity, the 
government demonstrated overall increasing efforts compared to the 
previous reporting period; therefore Ukraine remained on Tier 2. These 
efforts included raising the amount of financial assistance threefold 
for officially recognized victims; establishing more services available 
to victims of violence, including trafficking victims; and continuing 
to convict traffickers. The government also produced several large 
awareness events, including in partnership with an international 
organization and an NGO. However, the government did not meet 
the minimum standards in several key areas. Authorities investigated 
and prosecuted far fewer suspected traffickers. The restructuring of 
government institutions continued to hamper law enforcement efforts, 
and many newly hired prosecutors lacked trafficking-specific training. 
Courts continued to issue many lenient sentences, likely owing to 
judges’ underestimation of the severity of trafficking offenses, to 
entrenched stereotypes about what constitutes trafficking in persons, 
and in part to corruption; this lenient sentencing resulted in the 
majority of convicted traffickers avoiding imprisonment. These law 
enforcement efforts were inadequate to deter trafficking. Reports of 
officials complicit in human trafficking persisted, including anti-
trafficking police officials. While the government initiated criminal 
investigations and charged several allegedly complicit officials during 
the reporting period, for the fourth consecutive year, it did not secure 
any convictions. The government officially recognized fewer victims 
in 2020, while international organizations continued to identify far 
more victims than the government, highlighting the government’s 
inadequate identification efforts and a continuing lack of trust in the 
government’s ability to protect victims. NGOs continued to identify 
systemic shortcomings in the implementation of the national referral 
mechanism at the regional level, and government funding for local 
budgets for anti-trafficking efforts has remained stagnant since 2016.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Vigorously investigate and prosecute alleged trafficking crimes and 
punish convicted traffickers with significant prison terms. • Increase 
efforts to investigate, prosecute, and convict officials allegedly complicit 
in trafficking crimes under the trafficking statute. • Identify and certify 
the status of more victims to ensure they are afforded their rights under 
the trafficking law and modify the procedure for granting victim status 
to lessen the burden on victims to self-identify and divulge sensitive 
information. • Provide extensive training on the national referral 
mechanism to local officials and service providers throughout the 
decentralization process to minimize disruption in the processes of 
identification, referral, and assistance to trafficking victims. • Increase 
law enforcement investigations and prosecutions of labor recruitment 
firms engaged in fraudulent practices. • Increase government funding 
for anti-trafficking efforts, particularly funding for local communities. 
• Increase training for law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges in 
the investigation and prosecution of trafficking cases, particularly 
on forced labor, a victim-centered and trauma-informed approach, 
and how to gather evidence outside of victims’ testimony. • Increase 
victims’ access to legal assistance throughout the criminal process, and 
mandate victim restitution in criminal cases. • Increase training for 
officials on victim identification, particularly in proactive screening 
for labor trafficking and of vulnerable populations, such as women in 
commercial sex, children in sex trafficking, foreign migrant workers, 
and internally displaced persons. • Establish a dedicated, independent 
national counter-trafficking rapporteur position with support staff.
PROSECUTION
The government decreased law enforcement efforts. Article 149 of 
the criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking 
and prescribed penalties of three to eight years’ imprisonment, 
which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, 
commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such 
as rape. Law enforcement investigated 203 trafficking cases in 2020, 






trafficking cases and 116 labor trafficking cases, of which 36 were 
for forced involvement in criminal activity and 12 for forced begging. 
An international organization stated the pandemic decreased law 
enforcement’s detection capabilities and limited law enforcement’s 
transborder counter-trafficking efforts, resulting in a decrease of more 
than 30 percent in the number of registered trafficking cases from 
2019 to 2020 and limiting the number of prosecutions during the 
reporting period. Prosecutions were also limited by pandemic-related 
restrictions on court proceedings. Authorities investigated and ended 
the operations of nine criminal groups engaged in trafficking. Law 
enforcement referred 159 notices of suspicion, a necessary precursor 
to a court trial, involving 92 suspects in 2020, compared with 233 
cases involving 120 suspects in 2019. Prosecutors pursued 51 of 
these referrals in court, compared with 201 in 2019, and the courts 
considered 32 cases in 2020 compared with 35 cases in 2019. In 
2020, 122 cases remained ongoing in the courts, compared with 85 
in 2019. The government reached final judgment on 25 cases and 
convicted 29 traffickers in 2020 under Article 149, compared with 
35 traffickers in 2019. Of the 29 convicted traffickers sentenced in 
2020, only five (17 percent) received prison sentences, of which four 
received terms of three to five years and one received a term of five to 
10 years; 23 of the remaining convicted traffickers received probation, 
and one was fined. Observers reported many judges underestimated 
the severity of trafficking offenses and continued to hold entrenched 
stereotypes about what constitutes trafficking in persons, while 
some engaged in corrupt practices. These lenient sentences undercut 
efforts to hold traffickers accountable. Authorities cooperated with 
foreign governments on multiple transnational investigations and 
one extradition, including with Russia, Moldova, Italy, Greece, other 
European countries, and Kazakhstan. In one case, law enforcement 
cooperated with Polish authorities to identify 12 Ukrainian citizens 
forced to work in an illegal tobacco production facility in Poland. 
Institutional reforms over the past six years led to widespread turnover 
in many government institutions, most notably within the ranks of 
the National Police, the Ministry of Social Policy (MSP), and the 
judiciary. The government restructured the National Police counter-
trafficking unit and the MSP, leading to a high level of turnover and 
a lack of knowledge about trafficking among many of the officials 
from these institutions. Experts reported these institutional reforms 
created temporary obstacles to anti-trafficking efforts but ultimately 
could lead to improved efforts if changes were properly implemented. 
In December 2020, the National Police placed the counter-trafficking 
unit under the new Migration Police and expanded its mandate to 
address a broader range of trafficking-related issues. The National 
Police stated the intent of this placement was to ensure the unit’s 
focus was not solely on adult sex trafficking but also on forced labor 
and child sex trafficking. The judiciary delayed court cases due partly 
to a lack of judges resulting from a constitutional court decision on 
qualification and hiring processes as well as to pandemic-related 
restrictions. Turnover of personnel led to a lack of qualified prosecutors 
to supervise trafficking cases at the regional level. The government, 
in conjunction with international funding and partners, conducted 
virtual trainings for judges, law enforcement, and other officials. Law 
enforcement took part in several virtual conferences and seminars. In 
collaboration with the National School of Judges, an international 
organization conducted an online training for judges that included 
instruction on international cooperation instruments, non-punishment 
of victims for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit, and 
the rights and interests of victims. Observers reported the National 
Police counter-trafficking unit used outdated online investigative 
tools and collaborated poorly with other financial or cybercrime 
investigations, leading to missed opportunities to identify trafficking 
crimes in money laundering or pornography cases. 
Corruption remained in the police and judiciary, and two cases of 
official complicity in human trafficking were reported. The government 
continued to report investigations of officials allegedly complicit in 
trafficking; however, for the fourth consecutive year the government did 
not report any convictions of complicit officials. Authorities charged 
two officers of the Odesa police counter-trafficking unit with allegedly 
accepting bribes in exchange for not investigating persons for pimping 
and inducement of others into commercial sex and suspended the 
officials pending criminal investigation; however, they were charged 
under Article 368 of the criminal code for receiving illegal benefits. In 
another case, authorities placed law enforcement officers and officials 
from the Children’s Service under pre-trial investigation for child 
trafficking. Other high-profile cases have remained stalled with the 
court for years, including those against the former commander of the 
Kyiv City police counter-trafficking unit, three police officers, recruiters 
for trafficking Ukrainians into a drug-trafficking ring in Russia, and a 
teacher at a government-run boarding school for orphans in Kharkiv 
who attempted to sell one of her students.
PROTECTION
The government made mixed efforts in victim protection; while it 
increased stipends to identified victims and established some new 
services, it decreased its overall inadequate victim identification so 
fewer victims received services. The police identified and provided 
assistance to 146 victims in 2020, a decrease compared with 262 
victims in 2019. Authorities approved 134 of 235 applications 
requesting official victim status, compared with 185 of 283 in 
2019. According to an international organization, the pandemic 
exacerbated existing long-term problems in victim identification and 
assistance. NGOs reported the government nearly ceased targeted 
proactive identification efforts because of the pandemic. Moreover, 
pandemic-related restrictions and the diversion of funding to combat 
the pandemic further limited trafficking victims’ access to state 
assistance. An international organization reported pandemic-related 
restrictions likely limited the number of applications for victim 
status as potential victims must submit applications in person. 
The majority of victims were Ukrainians exploited within Ukraine. 
Officials reported screening undocumented foreign migrants for 
indicators of trafficking and granted official status to two foreign 
victims in 2020; separately, international organizations identified four 
foreign victims in 2020. Almost half of all the identified victims were 
exploited in areas of armed conflict in Donbas. Civil society reported 
the government rejected a higher percentage of applications for the 
second year in a row due to strict internal guidelines for classifying 
cases as trafficking crimes, police pursuing indictments under statutes 
other than the trafficking law, and the government demanding 
additional evidence to confirm victim status contrary to Ukrainian 
law, including confirmation that the victim was recognized as such 
in court proceedings or demanding evidence to show movement 
across a border. The government did not grant official victim status 
to individuals incarcerated abroad in 2020, compared with 40 in 
2019; the government discontinued the use of a simplified application 
process for potential victims incarcerated abroad, which included 
waiving the in-person interview requirement. The government 
continued to rely on international organizations and NGOs, with 
international donor funding, to identify victims and provide the vast 
majority of victim protection and assistance. Civil society reported 
continued systemic shortcomings in the functioning of the national 
referral mechanism (NRM) at the regional level and noted that 
government agencies identified a low number of victims through 
the NRM. An international organization in Ukraine assisted 1,680 
victims, compared with 1,345 in 2019. International organizations 
reported the majority of their identified victims were exploited by 
labor traffickers. The government cooperated with NGOs on victim 
identification through the NRM. Victims not requiring specialized 
services may have chosen not to pursue official victim status, although 
NGOs reported the emphasis on documents requiring the divulging of 
sensitive information likely deterred some applicants from applying, 
as did pandemic-related restrictions. Changes in administration, 
personnel turnover, and ongoing decentralization reforms continued 
to obscure local communities’ chains of responsibility for decisions 
regarding provision of key social services, including identifying, 
referring, and assisting trafficking victims; however, NGOs continued 
to report the strengthening of local self-governance expanded local 
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decision-making powers and secured more solid financing over the 
reporting period. 
The government allocated 548,800 hryvnia ($19,390) to the national 
budget for anti-trafficking measures in 2020, approximately the 
same amount as in 2019 and 2018. For the past five years, funding 
for local budgets remained the same at 219,220 hryvnia ($7,750). 
In December 2020, the government increased financial assistance 
threefold to approximately 6,800 hryvnia ($240) for each officially 
recognized victim. Ukraine’s trafficking law entitled victims to 
housing at a government shelter, psychological assistance, medical 
services, employment counseling, and vocational training, regardless 
of whether a criminal case proceeded, or the victim cooperated 
with law enforcement. The government provided services to victims 
granted official status; specialized NGOs were actively involved in 
facilitating victims’ applications for status and access to services at the 
local level. Some victims requiring shelter stayed at a rehabilitation 
center run by an international organization. Despite the government’s 
stated commitment to assume operation of the center and support 
from the international organization in financial planning and 
establishing operating procedures, the government did not integrate 
the center into the national social and health care system. Adult 
victims could also stay at government-run centers for psycho-social 
assistance for up to 90 days, with the option to extend, and receive 
psychological and medical support, lodging, food, and legal and 
social assistance. Authorities could accommodate child victims in 
centers for socio-psychological support of children for up to nine 
months and administer social, medical, psychological, education, 
legal, and other types of assistance. Authorities identified two child 
victims of trafficking in 2020 but did not report what services they 
received, if any. The government established 70 specialized support 
services in 2020 for victims of domestic violence and trafficking, 
including nine new shelters, and other services like crisis rooms and 
mobile crisis response units, although in practice the latter was used 
primarily in domestic violence cases. The government maintained 
21 centers for socio-psychological assistance, 33 state shelters for 
domestic violence and trafficking victims that assisted 13 trafficking 
victims in 2020, and 796 social services centers. Observers reported 
that state assistance remained insufficient to meet victims’ needs; 
victims continued to rely on NGOs for assistance. Foreign victims were 
entitled to the same benefits as Ukrainian citizens and had additional 
access to interpretation services, temporary legal stay, and voluntary 
repatriation. Authorities could grant permanent residency to foreign 
victims in danger of retribution should they return to their country 
of origin. Foreign victims were able to obtain an immigration permit 
after residing continuously in Ukraine for three years. 
The government, often in partnership with international organizations, 
provided training for officials on victim identification and assistance. 
The government, in partnership with an international organization and 
an NGO, assisted in the repatriation of a Ukrainian trafficking victim 
from Slovenia. The Witness Protection Law provided protections for 
victims, but courts rarely used protection measures. Closed hearings 
and remote procedures for questioning and identification were the 
most frequently used witness and victim protection mechanisms. 
The government did not restrict victims’ movement. Investigators 
granted personal protection to eight victims in 2020 and changed 
the personal data of three witnesses in criminal proceedings. Video 
testimony systems that ensure the complete separation of victims or 
witnesses from the accused existed in 14 courts in various regions; 
the courts used these systems 19 times during hearings of trafficking-
related crimes in 2020. The government did not report cases of courts 
ordering restitution payments for victims in 2020, the same as in 2019. 
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. MSP continued to 
coordinate anti-trafficking efforts at the national and local levels, 
but restructuring and rotation of staff continued to limit its activities. 
The government maintained a 2016-2020 national action plan and 
developed a draft concept for a 2021-2025 national action plan. MSP 
published a report on the implementation of the government’s anti-
trafficking policies for the first half of 2020 and convened a working 
group in August 2020 to improve regulations to counter trafficking 
and to discuss amending legislation to transfer the authority to 
grant victim status from the MSP to the new National Social Service. 
A government-sponsored hotline dedicated to trafficking, gender-
based violence and violence against children became operational in 
January 2020. The hotline received 29,344 calls in 2020, although 
fewer than 40 percent of the calls were from victims or potential 
victims, according to one NGO. The government reported that 38 
victims were identified and referred to services, 13 of whom received 
temporary shelter. A local NGO, with funding from international 
donors, operated a counter-trafficking and migrant advice hotline. 
In 2020, the hotline received 22,921 calls, compared with 22,053 
calls in 2019; 77 potential victims were identified and referred to 
responsible local agencies and NGOs for assistance. Authorities, in 
coordination with NGOs, international organizations, and local 
partners, continued to conduct a wide range of awareness campaigns 
throughout the country, including television, social media, online 
games, public events, and webinars. MSP spearheaded, with assistance 
from other organizations and NGOs, a major traveling exhibition 
touring 16 cities that opened on International Anti-Trafficking Day in 
July 2020. In addition, in December 2020, MSP, in partnership with 
an international organization and an NGO, launched an awareness-
raising campaign on the International Day for the Abolition of 
Slavery; the international organization estimated the campaign 
reached more than 22 million people. Regional governments, with 
support from international organizations and NGOs, held repeated 
trainings throughout 2020 for administrators of newly formed local 
communities to raise awareness of trafficking.
Police continued to monitor and investigate formal and informal 
recruitment networks, including companies advertising jobs abroad, 
and participated with other stakeholders to raise awareness about 
known recruitment schemes. The Ministry of Economic Development 
and Trade oversaw the licensing of labor recruitment agencies and 
conducted regular and random inspections on their activities. In 
June 2020, legislation that banned recruitment companies from 
charging fees to citizens seeking employment abroad was heard 
in parliament; the final vote on the legislation was pending at the 
close of the reporting period. The government suspended routine 
labor inspections at the start of the pandemic; however, authorities 
continued to carry out unannounced inspections throughout the 
year. Labor inspectors conducted 14,803 unscheduled inspections in 
2020. The government increased the number of labor inspectors to 
1,815 in 2020 from 1,138 in 2019; however, NGOs reported that the 
increase was still insufficient to meet their mandate. The government 
made some efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts; 
Article 149 reportedly criminalized the act of knowingly soliciting or 
patronizing a sex trafficking victim, but an NGO noted the language 
in the statute is broad. The government continued to provide victim 
identification and referral training to diplomats. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
domestic and foreign victims in Ukraine, and traffickers exploit 
victims from Ukraine abroad. Ukrainian victims are exploited in 
sex trafficking and forced labor in Ukraine, as well as in Russia, 
Poland, Germany, and other parts of Europe, China, Kazakhstan, 
and the Middle East. Ukrainian victims are increasingly exploited in 
EU member states. Traffickers exploit some Ukrainian children and 
vulnerable adults in forced begging. NGOs estimate 10-15 percent 
of the Roma community lack identification documents, leaving 
them unable to access state social assistance programs and thereby 
increasing their vulnerability to trafficking. Traffickers exploit a small 
number of foreign nationals in forced labor in Ukraine. A growing 
number of forced labor victims in Ukraine and abroad are exploited 
in a variety of sectors, including construction, manufacturing, 
agriculture, criminal activity, and street begging. Traffickers force 






tobacco products and well-established criminal groups force some 
Ukrainian victims to engage in other illegal activities abroad. Some 
traffickers exploited victims in forced labor at rehabilitation centers 
under the guise of providing treatment for alcohol or drug addiction. 
Pandemic-related movement restrictions and border closures resulted 
in traffickers exploiting a larger number of Ukrainians in labor 
trafficking within Ukraine and in commercial sex increasingly 
online. The number of foreign victims in Ukraine fell dramatically 
since the beginning of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, although 
smuggled migrants transiting Ukraine are vulnerable to trafficking. 
Traffickers target low-skilled workers transiting Ukraine. Increasingly, 
well-educated workers are vulnerable to labor exploitation. The 
approximately 104,000 children institutionalized in state-run 
orphanages are at especially high risk of trafficking. Officials of 
several state-run residential institutions and orphanages have 
allegedly been complicit or willfully negligent in the sex and labor 
trafficking of girls and boys under their care.
Fueled by Russian aggression, the conflict in eastern Ukraine and 
Russia’s occupation of Crimea have displaced more than 1.4 million 
people, and this population is especially vulnerable to human 
trafficking throughout the country. In areas of eastern Ukraine 
controlled by Russia-led forces, employment options are limited, 
and Russia’s proxy “authorities” place restrictions on international 
humanitarian aid intended to help meet civilian needs. IDPs, those 
living in Russia-controlled territory or within 20 km of the line of 
contact in the Donbas, and residents of Crimea face significant 
barriers to obtaining or renewing identification documents, increasing 
their vulnerability to exploitation. Traffickers reportedly kidnap 
women and girls from conflict-affected areas for sex and labor 
trafficking in Ukraine and Russia. Traffickers target internally 
displaced persons and subject some Ukrainians to forced labor on 
territory not under government control, often via kidnapping, torture, 
and extortion. International organizations report the demographics 
of Ukrainian trafficking victims has shifted since the beginning 
of the conflict to include more urban, younger, and male victims 
exploited increasingly in forced labor and criminality, such as for 
drug trafficking and as couriers.
Uncorroborated reports of Russia-led forces using children as soldiers, 
informants, and human shields continue, but the number of such 
reports has decreased since the early years of the conflict. Then, 
Russia-led forces in Russia-controlled areas of the Donbas reportedly 
used children to take direct and indirect part in the armed conflict 
to perform armed duty at checkpoints, as fighters, and to serve as 
guards, mailpersons, and secretaries. The recruitment of children 
by militant groups took place in territory controlled by Russia and 
in areas where the government was unable to enforce national 
prohibitions against the use of children in armed conflict.
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES: TIER 2 
The Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) does not fully 
meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but 
is making significant efforts to do so. The government demonstrated 
overall increasing efforts compared to the previous reporting period, 
considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its 
anti-trafficking capacity; therefore the United Arab Emirates remained 
on Tier 2. These efforts included expanding law enforcement training 
on trafficking, increasing oversight of domestic worker recruitment 
by expanding the number of public-private partnership “Tadbeer” 
recruitment centers and closing all non-government-regulated 
recruitment agencies to prevent contract switching and conversion 
of tourist visas to work visas by unregulated agencies. It also expanded 
its efforts to raise awareness of labor exploitation and announced new 
pilot orientation programming for Gulf-bound workers from Africa. 
However, the government did not meet the minimum standards in 
several key areas. The government did not prosecute any traffickers 
for forced labor and has not reported convicting any labor traffickers; 
it also reported fewer convictions for sex trafficking crimes. The 
government did not routinely employ its proactive identification 
and referral mechanism, which resulted in the penalization of some 
potential victims and rendered others without care, specifically those 
arrested for engaging in commercial sex. In addition, it did not regularly 
investigate labor law violations that exhibited trafficking indicators—
such as cases of unpaid or withheld wages, passport retention, and 
related abuses—as potential trafficking crimes, addressing them 
administratively instead of through criminal proceedings.
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Increase efforts to prosecute labor trafficking crimes and convict 
offenders under the anti-trafficking law. • Increase efforts to identify 
and provide protective services for labor trafficking victims. • Expand 
trainings to officials across all emirates to better identify potential 
trafficking cases that originate as labor violations. • Regularly employ 
standard procedures for victim identification and referral to quality 
care among foreign workers, particularly women in commercial 
sex and domestic workers who have fled their employers to ensure 
authorities do not penalize victims. • Report the number of trafficking 
investigations and investigate forced labor indicators—such as 
passport retention, withholding of wages, labor violations reported 
and identified from inspections, and complaints of abuse—as 
potential trafficking crimes. • Continue to expand use of the Wage 
Protection System (WPS) pilot program for domestic workers to ensure 
all workers are covered under the system. • Execute implementing 
regulations for and strengthen enforcement of the domestic worker 
law that expands legal protections for domestic workers. • Increase 
trainings for shelter staff on how to identify and care for labor 
trafficking victims. • Strictly enforce prohibitions on withholding 
workers’ passports.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts 
to address sex trafficking, but efforts to address forced labor remained 
weak, and data collection was insufficient. Federal Law No. 51 of 
2006 and its amendments in Federal Law No. 1 of 2015 criminalized 
sex trafficking and labor trafficking and prescribed penalties ranging 
from five years to life in prison, as well as fines ranging from 50,000 
to 99,100 UAE dirham (AED) ($13,610 to $26,980) and deportation 
for non-citizens. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, 
with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as rape. Federal Law No. 10 of 2017 
provided additional protections for domestic workers, as well as 
regulations for recruitment agencies and employers of such workers, 
including those pertaining to hiring practices, working conditions, 
and employment contracts. Federal Law No. 10 protected workers’ 
rights to retain their own identity documents but did not stipulate 
penalties for employers who confiscated workers’ passports.
The government did not report statistics on investigations of suspected 
trafficking cases for the ninth consecutive year. However, during the 
reporting year the government prosecuted 54 individuals in 19 sex 
trafficking cases, zero individuals for forced labor crimes, and three 
individuals in one child forced begging case across the seven emirates, 
compared with 67 individuals in 38 sex trafficking cases the year prior. 
Officials reported conviction of 15 sex traffickers and administered 
sentences ranging from one to seven years’ imprisonment, with 
the vast majority of perpetrators receiving three years or more with 




sentences. During the previous year, the government convicted 33 
sex trafficking defendants under trafficking laws and handed down 
similar punishments. The government did not report convicting 
any labor traffickers during the reporting period and historically 
has not reported any forced labor convictions. In one specific case 
during the year, the Dubai Court of First Instance convicted four 
Bangladeshi men, two Indonesian women, and a Pakistani male for 
deceiving a female Indonesian domestic worker with a false job offer 
and subsequently forcing her into commercial sex. After the victim 
was able to contact family members, who notified the police, law 
enforcement raided the ring and arrested the alleged traffickers. The 
court sentenced six of the traffickers to seven years’ imprisonment 
and the seventh trafficker to one year and planned to deport the 
convicted traffickers at the conclusion of their sentences.
The government did not routinely investigate as possible trafficking 
crimes violations of Emirati labor laws that exhibited trafficking 
indicators, such as passport confiscation, delayed or nonpayment of 
wages, fraud, and contract switching; generally the government treated 
these cases exclusively as regulatory violations, levying administrative 
fines or cancelling business licenses in lieu of criminal proceedings. 
Labor violations, including those involving forced labor, continued to 
be addressed by the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization 
(MOHRE), which administered dispute resolution processes and labor 
courts instead of specific human trafficking laws. The government 
did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of 
officials complicit in trafficking crimes during the reporting year. 
Relevant authorities including the Ministry of Interior (MOI), Dubai 
Police, and MOHRE reportedly held a series of lectures and training 
programs in workers’ residences and in recruiting offices to raise 
awareness on the types of trafficking crimes and ways to communicate 
with law enforcement authorities and shelters. In October 2020, 
the National Committee to Combat Human Trafficking (NCCHT) 
and Dubai Police inaugurated the sixth iteration of the “Human 
Trafficking Specialist” program at the Dubai Judicial Institute (DJI) 
in collaboration with an international organization; this was a five-
week diploma program on ways to detect and prevent trafficking, 
protect victims, and raise societal awareness of the problem. The 
program was expanded in 2020-2021 to include 99 participants 
representing 30 national police authorities, human rights associations, 
shelters, and federal and government bodies. Additionally, the MOI 
organized nine training courses, workshops, and lectures related to 
combating human trafficking crimes, benefiting 918 police members. 
The Abu Dhabi Judicial Department, in cooperation with the Abu 
Dhabi Judicial Academy, organized special human trafficking-related 
courses benefiting 549 judges and members of the Public Prosecution 
during the reporting year. The Federal Authority of Identity and 
Citizenship created virtual training programs on forgery detection, 
combatting human trafficking, and human rights, benefitting 1,362 
port and passport inspectors during the reporting period; in addition, 
the MOHRE sponsored training workshops on UAE labor law 
and policies that benefitted 337 workplace inspectors. Lastly, the 
NCCHT facilitated a training program, in cooperation with the Dubai 
Foundation for Women and Children (DFWAC) and MOHRE, for 
the staff of a foreign embassy in Abu Dhabi. The program addressed 
labor rights, human trafficking, and how to properly handle cases 
and issues related to these topics. 
PROTECTION
The government made uneven efforts to protect trafficking victims, 
as it continued to identify sex trafficking victims and refer them to 
care but efforts to identify all forms of trafficking, specifically forced 
labor victims and male victims, remained weak and data collection 
remained insufficient. The government identified 23 sex trafficking 
victims and one child victim of forced begging that were involved 
in the 19 cases prosecuted during the reporting period, for a total 
of 24 victims, and referred them to care at government shelters. In 
addition to the 24 victims that had active court proceedings, which 
the government identified and referred to care, the Aman Center 
for Women and Children in Ras Al Khaimah reported assisting 10 
sex trafficking victims (one was referred via the hotline) during the 
year, for a total of 33 sex trafficking victims and one child victim of 
forced begging. This was compared with 32 sex trafficking victims 
identified and referred to care during the previous reporting period. 
The government did not report the number of trafficking victims 
identified and referred to care that were not involved in active 
court proceedings. While the government had standard procedures 
for victim identification among foreign workers, officials did not 
regularly employ these procedures proactively and continued to rely 
predominantly on third-party referrals to identify victims, including 
from foreign embassies, religious institutions, or tips received through 
government hotlines, smartphone applications, and the internet. 
Shelter staff and hotlines reported receiving fewer calls and referrals 
since the start of the pandemic. Authorities continued to implement 
a formal referral process to transfer potential trafficking victims 
from detention centers, hospitals, houses of worship, or facilities 
run by source country embassies or consulates, to government 
shelters. Shelter staff reported that sometimes law enforcement 
only referred individuals that were officially determined to be 
trafficking victims to the shelter, rather than all potential victims. 
Authorities also sometimes held potential victims who encountered 
law enforcement first at a transitional center until they could make 
an official determination of their trafficking victim status. At times, 
female or male police officers in plain clothes—intended to allay 
victims’ anxieties—escorted victims, identified by law enforcement, 
from a government-run detention center to a shelter; however, 
reports persisted that some victims were unwilling to approach 
law enforcement officials due to fear of being sent to prison for 
immigration or other violations rather than being accepted into 
a shelter. Additionally, some diplomatic contacts and community 
leaders reported they were hesitant to refer victims of forced labor 
to shelters, as authorities did not always recognize these crimes as 
trafficking and rather considered them labor violations.
The shelters were largely funded through individual donations, 
notably from the ruling family of Abu Dhabi emirate, as well as 
contributions from public and private companies and religious 
institutions. The government maintained oversight and funding 
for shelters in four of the seven emirates (Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Ras 
Al Khaimah, and Sharjah), offering housing and assistance for all 
female and child sex trafficking and abuse victims across the country. 
The government operated one shelter for men in Abu Dhabi, but it 
did not serve any male victims during the year. Protective services 
included medical, psychological, legal, educational, rehabilitation 
and reintegration, vocational training and certificates, and voluntary 
repatriation that included prolonged follow-up care after the victim 
returned home. The government reported the shelters provided 49 
training courses, in addition to workshops and lectures to victims 
and potential victims residing in the shelters during the reporting 
period. Child trafficking victims and dependents of trafficking 
victims received services tailored to their needs, including separate 
living sections and supervisors, as well as teachers who provided 
age-appropriate educational and psychosocial support. All police 
departments had a special room for interviewing children and other 
vulnerable victims. The Philippine, Indian, and Sri Lankan embassies 
in Abu Dhabi and the Philippine, Indonesian, and Sri Lankan 
consulates in Dubai provided shelter and other protective services 
to an unspecified number of nationals who had been subjected to 
trafficking during the reporting period. Other consulates used “foster 
families” of the same nationality to host victims until their cases were 
resolved. During the reporting year, officials distributed 143,614 AED 
($39,100) through the Victims Support Fund to trafficking victims 
residing at government shelters across the Emirates, which financially 
supported victims by providing housing and education services, and 
covering medical expenses, repatriation, or resettlement. 
Shelter staff claimed that identified sex trafficking victims were not 
jailed, fined, or prosecuted for violations committed as a result of 
their being subjected to trafficking. However, independent observers 












offenses, consensual sex outside marriage, or absconding from their 
employers. MOHRE reported it could reject absconding claims on 
several grounds, including if the claim was filed for vexatious or 
fictious reasons or if the worker already had a pending claim with 
the government; it also did not force the employee to return to his 
or her former place of employment. Because the government did 
not routinely use victim identification procedures or screen for 
potential trafficking crimes among vulnerable populations, it may 
have penalized some unidentified victims during the year. 
In September 2020, the Dubai Public Prosecution announced 
an initiative to encourage employers to report their absconded 
domestic workers to authorities to prevent employers from hiring 
illegal workers and reduce losses incurred by employers whose 
workers flee. Employers could be fined for hiring a worker illegally 
and could be compensated for filing absconding charges against 
a worker; employers had 10 days to report absconding workers or 
risk being fined. This policy may have exacerbated vulnerabilities 
of some workers attempting to leave exploitative situations, and 
officials may have penalized potential trafficking victims whose 
employers filed malicious absconding charges during the year. The 
government reported it exempted from fines forced labor victims 
who had overstayed their visas or sex trafficking victims but did 
not report how many benefitted from this exemption during the 
reporting period. The government did not provide permanent or 
formal temporary residency status to victims; however, it permitted 
victims to stay in shelters and participate in court proceedings, and 
worked with international organizations to resettle, in third countries, 
victims who could not return to their countries of origin. Interior 
officials could amend the status of victims to assist them in seeking 
follow-on job opportunities in the UAE. Laborers whose employer 
had not paid them for 60 days were entitled to legally remain in 
country and search for a new employer. The government reported 
it provided repatriation assistance to trafficking victims who wished 
to return to their home countries but did not report a total number 
of victims that were repatriated during the reporting period. Shelter 
staff noted they assisted an unknown number of trafficking victims 
in finding new employment or sponsors on an ad-hoc basis. The 
government encouraged victims to assist in the investigation and 
prosecution of traffickers and provided victim-witness protective 
services, including private interview rooms, free legal counseling, and 
safe transportation to court hearings. Police took counter-retaliation 
measures and prohibited communication between the victim and 
suspect. Police also enforced two governmental decrees aimed at 
ensuring the media adhered to victims’ privacy and that shelters 
adequately protected victims. According to the NCCHT, victims 
were informed and assured of their rights when giving testimony. 
During the reporting period, the government established a Witness 
Protection Program by expanding Federal Law No. 14 of 2020, 
which gave judicial officials the authority to enroll witnesses in the 
protection program to keep their identities confidential during legal 
proceedings; the government did not report if any trafficking victims 
were enrolled in the program during the year. Both police and shelter 
representatives reported victims often chose immediate repatriation 
at the UAE’s expense rather than remaining in country to testify 
against alleged traffickers or see a case through to final adjudication. 
PREVENTION
The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking. It increased 
oversight over domestic worker recruitment through Tadbeer Centers, 
continued to incorporate domestic workers in the WPS through a pilot 
program, expanded its awareness raising activities, and launched a 
pilot program with the Government of Saudi Arabia and the African 
Union to provide orientation programming to African workers bound 
for the Gulf. The government continued to carry out its national 
action plan to address trafficking, driven chiefly by the NCCHT. The 
plan focused on prevention, protection, prosecution, punishment, 
promotion of international cooperation, redress, rehabilitation, 
reintegration, and capacity building. In July 2020, the NCCHT met 
to review implementation of its anti-trafficking programming and 
the impact that the pandemic had on human rights issues overall 
in the Emirates; the entity subsequently published a public report 
outlining its findings that included recommendations to ensure 
workers’ rights were protected during the pandemic to mitigate 
increased risk of exploitation for workers that had experienced job 
loss, non-payment of wages, or loss of legal status. In October 2020, 
the UAE hosted the second annual Anti-Trafficking Forum in the 
Middle East focusing the efforts of participating governments on 
preventing pandemic-related vulnerabilities for workers, increasing 
protections for victims, and strengthening transparency in foreign 
worker recruitment processes to mitigate potential exploitation. 
The government amplified awareness on trafficking by continuing to 
post informational notices at airports, implement training courses for 
high-risk groups, and disseminate publications in various languages 
directed at the most at-risk communities, effectively reaching tens 
of thousands of individuals during the year. The campaigns raised 
awareness of penalties for trafficking and publicized hotlines for more 
information or direct assistance. Airport banners specifically targeted 
terminals based on nationalities with high workforce numbers in the 
UAE. The government educated passengers at Dubai International 
Airport (DXB) about trafficking through clips, broadcasts, flyers, and 
tactically situated massive banners in nine prominent languages. In 
October 2020, Dubai government-owned Emirates Airline began 
showing an informational film about human trafficking on all flights 
via its inflight entertainment system. Dubai Police, NCCHT, and DXB, 
in partnership with an international organization, continued its two-
year campaign that began in July 2019 entitled “Don’t Turn a Blind 
Eye.” The campaign aimed to raise awareness of airport employees 
and travelers on how to detect trafficking crimes. In addition to 
workshops for airport employees, the campaign also publicized 
information on screens in DXB to educate travelers on how to 
identify potential trafficking victims. During the reporting period, the 
Dubai Foundation for Women and Children and the Aman Shelter 
for Women and Children co-produced a series of leaflets to inform 
vulnerable populations of domestic abuse and trafficking risks, which 
the organizations translated into 10 languages and distributed online 
and via social media. The Aman Shelter also reported producing 
a training film on workers’ rights, trafficking, and domestic abuse 
that was shown to all domestic workers employed through Tadbeer 
Centers—recruitment centers for domestic workers—in Ras Al 
Khaimah. Shelter staff continued a partnership with art galleries for 
visual art exhibits that showcased art made by trafficking victims, to 
both increase awareness and raise funds for other victims. During 
the reporting period, the Federal Public Prosecution published an 
awareness brochure on social media outlining the penalties against 
individuals who knew of the commission of human trafficking 
crimes but failed to inform the competent authorities; the brochure 
was viewed more than 5,600 times. The MOI, in cooperation with 
health, social, and legal bodies, organized 20 lectures, workshops, 
and education seminars benefiting 6,420 workers across the UAE. 
Additionally, the Abu Dhabi Police worked with media outlets to warn 
job seekers about fraudulent internet employment ads that emerged 
as a result of increased unemployment due to the pandemic and 
cautioned laid-off workers to be cognizant of fraudulent job offers 
that charged recruitment fees, which is an illegal practice in UAE. 
The government funded and ran a 24-hour toll-free hotline for 
reporting cases of trafficking, delayed wage payments, or other labor 
violations, which operated in Arabic, English, Hindi, Russian, Tagalog, 
and Urdu. Calls were categorized and automatically alerted police in 
suspected trafficking cases. Additionally, MOHRE, MOI and DFWAC 
had dedicated multilingual toll-free hotlines; MOI continued to host 
a mobile phone application that allowed users to access certain police 
services on their phones, and victims of trafficking or witnesses to 
the crime could use the application to file reports as well. In Dubai, 
law enforcement authorities ran a separate line, and UAE-wide 
there remained a 24-hour toll-free number for migrant laborers to 
vocalize workplace complaints or general inquiries. Analogous to 




or trafficking-related calls any hotline received, how many victims 
were identified, or how many investigations were initiated during 
the reporting year.
Officials continued to employ public-private partnership recruitment 
centers for domestic workers, known as Tadbeer Centers, mandated 
to regulate the recruitment and training of domestic workers, educate 
them on their legal rights, resolve employer-employee disputes, 
and verify worker accommodations for compliance with domestic 
worker law minimum standards. Each center was equipped with a 
room solely for grievance mediation, with a video connection to 
MOHRE for official oversight. In practice, however, these centers 
were inhibited as they were not generally able to enter or inspect 
private homes. The centers were integral to the movement of domestic 
worker recruitment from the Ministry of Interior to MOHRE, a change 
aimed at improving recruitment regulation and standards. NGOs 
continued to raise concerns about the ease with which tourist visas 
could be converted into work visas for workers looking to circumvent 
their home countries’ recruitment ban in the UAE—a practice that 
exacerbated the risk of trafficking for these workers, as they often paid 
fees to multiple recruitment agencies in both their home countries 
and in the UAE and had no protection under UAE law when they 
arrived on tourist visas. Furthermore, some workers were unable to 
switch their visas to employment visas and so continued to work 
illegally, heightening their vulnerability to exploitation. In January 
2021, media reported that dozens of Filipina workers who had been 
promised jobs in the UAE and had entered the country on 30-day 
tourist visas facilitated by two private recruitment agencies in the 
Emirates were confined against their will upon arrival until their 
tourist visas expired; the workers were then transported to Syria to 
work as domestic workers and subjected to conditions of forced labor, 
including physical and sexual abuse and non-payment of wages. In 
a purported effort to address this practice and solely use Tadbeer 
Centers for the recruitment and regulation of all domestic workers, the 
MOHRE announced the closure of 250 private recruitment agencies 
in January 2021; agencies had the option to obtain a Tadbeer license, 
switch to another sector or shut down by March 2021. In the past, 
these private recruitment agencies were accused of violating labor 
and immigration laws and failing to guarantee the rights of workers 
and employers, but they were popular as their services were viewed 
as cheaper, more flexible and more accessible than those offered at 
Tadbeer Centers. MOHRE reported that it was working with Tadbeer 
Centers to lower their operational costs and revise their fees to 
make them more competitive and starting in March 2021, citizens 
and residents would be required to hire domestic workers through 
Tadbeer Centers, an effort to ensure that all domestic workers were 
recruited through government regulated mechanisms and therefore 
were protected under the domestic worker law. At the close of the 
reporting period, 56 Tadbeer Centers were operational across the 
Emirates, an increase from the 23 Centers that were operational at 
the end of the previous reporting period.
The government implemented Federal Law No. 10 of 2017 to 
improve the work conditions and welfare of domestic employees 
and adopted Cabinet Resolution No. 22 of 2019, which granted 
domestic workers the right to terminate their employment if an 
employer failed to meet contractual obligations such as payment of 
wages, or if the employee was subject to sexual harassment or physical 
or verbal abuse by the employer. The government did not strengthen 
regulatory enforcement of in-home inspections and workplace 
grievance resolution. In addition, sociocultural and legal barriers 
against government interference with private households continued 
to hamper monitoring and enforcement efforts of its domestic 
worker law. This law included the right for employees to retain 
personal documents, sign standardized contracts with unequivocally 
designated working conditions, access specialized tribunals for 
settling workplace grievances, and observe mandatory time off. It 
also stipulated in-home inspections on the basis of complaints or 
reasonable evidence of law violations. Under the law’s provisions, 
a recruitment agency or person who hindered law enforcement, 
anyone who disclosed information unveiled in an investigation, or 
anyone who facilitated the abandonment of a domestic worker may 
be jailed for a minimum of six months and ordered to pay a 10,000 
to 100,000 AED ($2,720 to $27,230) fine. Expatriate workers were 
granted the freedom to leave and switch employers at any time without 
employer approval through Ministerial Decree No. 765 and 766 of 
2015; however, this decision included the requirement that the worker 
had to provide between one and three months’ notice, depending 
on the initial contract terms to leave an employer. According to the 
NCCHT, 319,655 workers changed employers during 2020. As with 
domestic workers, in instances where an expatriate employee faced 
physical or verbal abuse or sexual harassment, the worker had the 
freedom to leave the employer without notice. All workers were able 
to terminate employment at any time in the absence of abuse or a 
contractual breach but may be required to forego certain benefits 
including end of service gratuity and a return ticket to their home 
country. In those instances, a domestic worker may have had to pay 
their employer compensation equal to one month’s wages and other 
entitlements deemed necessary by a court. In such instances, MOHRE 
could issue the domestic worker a new work permit to move to a 
new employer; the domestic worker was not subject to immediate 
deportation if they terminated employment, to ensure the worker 
had sufficient time to find a new job. Most workers chose to remain 
in the UAE to work for another employer under a new work permit 
or contract after terminating their previous employment.
MOHRE primarily oversaw, regulated, and enforced labor-related 
complaints. Efforts by MOHRE to combat forced labor across the UAE 
included an extensive labor inspection program that incorporated 
routine and unannounced inspections of company housing and 
work sites by a team of full-time labor inspectors, in addition to 
seven dedicated anti-trafficking inspectors. Authorities generally 
dealt with labor law violations administratively and did not report 
investigating such cases for trafficking indicators or referring any 
for criminal prosecution. Moreover, the NCCHT reported that the 
government conducted 280,728 inspection visits in 2020 but did 
not report how many labor law violations were identified via those 
inspections, and if any were referred for further investigation or 
criminal prosecution as potential trafficking cases. The government 
continued its monitoring and inspection program for regulation 
of private sector laborers, including through the WPS, which 
electronically monitored salary payments via vetted banks, currency 
exchanges, and financial institutions for all onshore companies 
employing more than 100 workers (95 percent of the private sector 
workforce). The WPS automatically flagged delayed salary payments 
of more than 60 days or payments that were less than contractually 
agreed upon, and after a designated period, authorities administered 
fines and other enforcement actions. MOHRE reported that letters 
were issued to companies irrespective of their size and owner and 
sent to the Public Prosecutor for WPS violations; the ministry also 
reported that cases were not dropped until the missing wages were 
paid and the company was up to date with all salary payments. 
For the 13th consecutive year, the government did not report the 
number of complaints of unpaid wages it investigated as a result 
of its dispute resolution process or the WPS, which were intended 
to ensure workers were paid according to their contracts and not 
subjected to forced labor. 
The NCCHT reported that the government issued 8,181 fines to 
companies that failed to provide payments to workers via the WPS 
in 2020 but did not report investigating such cases for trafficking 
indicators or referring any for criminal prosecution. Workplace 
grievances routinely resulted in fines, suspended permits to hire 
new workers, or the cancellation of business licenses though, apart 
from the number of fines issued to companies in violation of the 
WPS, the official number and specifics of other punishments were 
unknown. Media and diplomatic sources continued to report that 
some companies retained workers’ bank cards or accompanied 
workers to withdraw cash, coercively shortchanging the employees 












were difficult to prove in labor courts, given the WPS documented 
accurate payments via designated bank accounts. Furthermore, 
domestic worker salaries were not required to be paid via the WPS; 
this, coupled with cultural norms and the lack of legal provisions 
requiring inspections of domestic worker accommodations, wage 
payment and work hour abuses, among other acts indicative of 
forced labor, rendered domestic workers vulnerable to exploitation. 
However, the government continued its pilot program from the 
previous reporting period to incorporate domestic workers into 
the WPS, and in July 2020, MOHRE signed an agreement with 
First Abu Dhabi Bank (FAB) to integrate these workers under the 
system. The NCCHT reported that the pilot program integrated 423 
domestic workers in 2021; overall, however, less than one percent 
of domestic workers were enrolled in the WPS at the close of the 
reporting period. In practice, the system facilitated monthly salary 
payments and monitored payments for timeliness and transparency, 
and domestic workers received earnings into accounts that could be 
accessed through issued debit cards provided to workers. The NCCHT 
reported that although the enrollment of domestic workers under the 
WPS was currently voluntary, the renewal of domestic worker permits 
will make enrollment mandatory, with the intent that all domestic 
workers will be integrated under the WPS in 2022. The government 
did not enforce a prohibition on employers withholding workers’ 
passports, which remained a pervasive problem and left workers 
vulnerable to exploitation and potentially trafficking. 
In January 2021, the government announced a partnership between the 
UAE, Saudi Arabia and the African Union to pilot and implement an 
orientation program for Gulf-bound workers from Africa. During the 
previous reporting period, the UAE and Government of the Philippines 
signed a trafficking-specific memorandum of understanding (MOU), 
which adopted procedures and created a joint taskforce to combat 
the crime as well as share best practices, exchange information, 
promote human rights, and provide assistance in the protection, 
repatriation, recovery, and rehabilitation of trafficking victims in 
accordance with domestic laws. Since 2014, the Government of 
the Philippines banned the recruitment of domestic workers to 
the UAE; however, in March 2021, the two governments agreed to 
additional protections for Filipino domestic workers that lifted the 
suspension. These protections included ensuring domestic workers 
were given a standard employment contract, remained in possession 
of their passports and mobile phones (employers would be banned 
from holding them), got eight hours of sleep a day, one paid day 
off per week, and the right to hold a bank account; additionally, 
the Philippine’s Embassy in the UAE would be notified if a Filipino 
national sought to change a tourist visa to a work visa. In addition 
to the government’s MOUs with Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, 
Gambia, India, Indonesia, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand, Uganda, and 
Vietnam to regulate recruitment mechanisms and prevent contract 
switching, in 2020, the UAE and the Government of Belarus signed 
an MOU to increase cooperation on trafficking issues. Further, the 
government also held the second bilateral meeting of the task force 
responsible for implementing the MOU between India and the UAE 
on cooperation to prevent and combat trafficking. The government 
did not report any specific results of any of these MOUs during the 
reporting period. The government did not take measures to reduce 
the demand for commercial sex acts in the UAE. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs maintained provision of workshops and awareness 
programs on human trafficking for its diplomatic personnel.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit foreign 
victims in the UAE. Foreign workers comprise nearly 90 percent of 
the UAE’s population and are recruited globally. Lower wage labor, 
including most manual labor and a significant portion of the service 
sector, is provided almost entirely by migrant workers predominantly 
from South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East, with a growing 
percentage from East and West Africa. It is not uncommon for 
employers to subject some of these workers to conditions indicative 
of forced labor, such as passport retention, non-payment of wages 
and unpaid overtime, restrictions on movement, contract switching, 
fraudulent employment promises, substandard food and housing 
provisions, or a failure to meet other contractual agreements. Adults 
from some of these countries travel willingly to the UAE to work 
as domestic workers, security guards, drivers, gardeners, massage 
therapists, beauticians, hotel cleaners, or elsewhere in the service 
sector, but traffickers subject some of them to forced labor or sex 
trafficking after arrival. Reports indicate the UAE serves as a trafficking 
hub where recruiters sell migrants to families who subsequently 
illegally transport them to other countries in the Gulf. The UAE has 
in recent years become a primary destination for Ugandans seeking 
employment as domestic workers and security guards. Many Pakistanis 
are reportedly hired on promises they will receive handsome salaries, 
medical benefits, and accommodations, but after reaching the UAE 
the promises go unfulfilled, with some Pakistanis discovering that 
the companies that hired them are fraudulent. For expatriate workers 
and domestic workers especially, the kafala or sponsorship system 
in the UAE restricts their ability to leave a position without prior 
notice. Despite legal measures allowing workers to change sponsors 
or terminate their employment, some employers continue to exercise 
unilateral power over foreign workers’ movements, deny laborers 
working illegally the ability to change employers, restrict permission 
for them to leave the country, and threaten employees with abuse 
of legal processes, which heightens their vulnerability to trafficking. 
Traffickers subject some women, predominantly from Central Asia, 
South and Southeast Asia, East Africa, Eastern Europe, Iraq, Iran, and 
Morocco, to sex trafficking in the UAE, and most trafficking cases 
registered in the UAE are classified as sexual exploitation despite 
significant labor trafficking concerns. Per media sources, some cases 
of child sex trafficking involve traffickers forging ages on passports 
to facilitate undetected entry into the UAE. Other reporting claims 
recruiters in some source countries work as individual agents rather 
than for regulated companies, complicating law enforcement and 
monitoring efforts. 
Although illegal under UAE law, many source-country labor recruiters 
charge workers exorbitant fees in their home countries (outside of 
UAE jurisdiction), causing workers to commence employment in the 
UAE owing debts in their respective countries of origin, increasing 
their vulnerability to trafficking through debt-based coercion. Despite 
UAE law to prevent the practice, reports of employers engaging in 
the practice of contract-swapping persist, leading to less desirable 
and lower paying jobs for laborers post-arrival in the UAE. Traffickers 
often recruit victims from the large foreign population already in 
the country; they may deceive or compel a migrant worker in the 
UAE, willingly on a tourist or work visa, into forced labor or sex 
trafficking. Additionally, some laborers enter the UAE on tourist 
visas and start working for an employer who subsequently opts 
to not change the tourist visa to a work visa in order to grant legal 
residency, a common method of exploitation. However, due to 
pandemic-related border closures and travel restrictions both in 
the UAE and in other countries, the use of tourist visas as a method 
to circumvent immigration and labor laws lessened, and traffickers 
reportedly focused on targeting workers inside of the UAE instead. 
During the reporting period, workers experienced pandemic-related 
job loss, non-payment of wages, and movement restrictions, which 
heightened their vulnerability to trafficking. These vulnerabilities, 
coupled with the halt in the government issuing new work permits 
from March to October 2020, led to an increase in traffickers using 
illegal online markets on social media to advertise and sell domestic 
workers already residing in the country. Following the temporary 
suspension of Tadbeer Centers—the government’s regulated, privately-
run domestic recruitment centers—due to the pandemic, some 
employers sponsoring domestic workers used online platforms to 
advertise the selling of domestic workers. According to UAE shelter 
staff, migrant workers will sometimes start with one employer and 
for various reasons, including abuse or exploitation, low salary, or 
simple dissatisfaction with the job, will follow alternate employment 
opportunities that ultimately prove fictitious, as traffickers in the UAE 




higher salaries. During the year, traffickers also targeted workers 
already residing in the country who had experienced pandemic-related 
job loss with false promises of better jobs through online platforms. 
Cuban nationals working in the UAE may have been forced to work 
by the Cuban government. 
During the reporting year, there were no allegations the UAE recruited, 
used, or detained any child soldiers, and in September 2019, the UAE 
reportedly ceased providing direct support to Security Belt Forces in 
Yemen who allegedly recruited and used child soldiers. In June 2020, 
the UN Secretary-General delisted the Saudi-led Coalition in Yemen 
from the annexes of the UN report on Children and Armed Conflict. 
During a previous reporting period, an international organization 
alleged the government, a member of a multi-nation coalition 
that commenced military operations against Houthi rebel forces 
in Yemen in 2015, provided training and coordinated operations 
with the Security Belt Forces, Hadhrami Elite Forces, and Shabwani 
Elite Forces—proxy militias fighting Houthi forces and terrorists in 
Yemen that allegedly recruited and used children as soldiers. Media 
also previously reported officers associated with Sudan’s Rapid 
Support Force took bribes from families to permit children to serve 
as combatants in Yemen during that reporting year. Emirati officers 
supposedly trained and commanded some Sudanese combatants 
during the previous reporting period. While the UAE did not directly 
commission those forces, there were Sudanese units under the Saudi-
led Coalition fighting with Emirati and Yemeni government forces 
during those years.
UNITED KINGDOM: TIER 1
The Government of the United Kingdom (UK) fully meets the 
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking. The government 
continued to demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the 
reporting period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 
on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore the UK remained on Tier 
1. These efforts included an increase in the number of referrals of 
trafficking suspects to the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and the 
introduction of minimum standards of care and an inspection regime 
for government-commissioned victim support services. Additionally, 
the government increased support payments to potential victims and 
their child dependents and introduced new payments for pregnant 
and young child victims. Furthermore, the government announced 
measures to strengthen reporting requirements under the Modern 
Slavery Act of 2015 (MSA) to ensure organizations’ operations and 
supply chains were free of trafficking, and it launched an assessment 
tool to assist public-sector organizations in coordinating with 
suppliers to improve protections for workers and reduce the risk of 
exploitation in supply chains. Although the government meets the 
minimum standards, it prosecuted and convicted fewer traffickers, 
and observers reported long-term care and reintegration support 
for victims were inadequate. In addition, many potential victims 
continued to face long wait times to enter the National Referral 
Mechanism (NRM) and begin receiving support, and children in 
the protection system remained vulnerable to trafficking. Observers 
reported the government penalized some victims for unlawful acts 
traffickers compelled them to commit. Foreign victims faced hurdles 
in obtaining residence permits, and workers from the European 
Economic Area (EEA) became more vulnerable to trafficking due 
to confusion around changes to the UK’s immigration standards.  
UNITED KINGDOM TIER RANKING BY YEAR








Expand nationwide the Independent Child Trafficking Guardians 
(ICTG) program and train more social workers and care providers 
to better safeguard child victims. • Vigorously prosecute and convict 
suspected traffickers, including in Scotland and Northern Ireland. • 
Implement reforms to the NRM, including timely determination of 
victim status, to encourage more victims to come forward. • Expand 
long-term care and reintegration support and monitor and assess 
outcomes of post-NRM support. • Ensure victims are not penalized 
for unlawful acts, including immigration violations, their traffickers 
compelled them to commit. • Establish a database on investigations, 
prosecutions, convictions, and prison sentence data across the UK, 
categorized by type of trafficking. • Ensure the statutory definition 
of trafficking under the MSA and similar provisions in Northern 
Ireland do not require movement of the victim as an element of 
the crime. • Continue to provide adequate information to foreign 
workers, especially the most vulnerable, on their legal rights and how 
to maintain their status in the UK post-exit from the EU. • Provide 
a clear route to residency for foreign victims and ensure potential 
foreign victims who are referred into the NRM can work. • Provide a 
trafficking-specific long-term alternative for foreign victims at risk if 
returned to their home country.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained prosecution efforts. The MSA, applicable 
to England and Wales, and similar statutes in Scotland and Northern 
Ireland, criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and 
prescribed penalties of up to life imprisonment, which were sufficiently 
stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with those 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent with 
international law, the laws in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland 
required the element of movement of a victim in the definition of 
“trafficking.” However, these jurisdictions criminalized “slavery and 
servitude, and forced or compulsory labour” in other provisions of 
their law, which could be utilized to prosecute trafficking offenses 
that did not involve victim movement. Scotland, by contrast, did not 
require victim movement in the definition of trafficking.
In June 2020, there were 1,845 active law enforcement investigations 
of suspected trafficking crimes, compared with 1,479 in June 2019. 
The CPS prosecuted 267 defendants on trafficking charges, compared 
with 349 defendants prosecuted in 2019. Courts convicted 197 
traffickers in 2020, a decrease from 251 convictions in 2019. The 
conviction rate increased slightly from 72 percent in 2019 to 74 
percent in 2020. CPS data did not differentiate between sex and labor 
trafficking, nor did the government provide data on the range of 
sentences of convicted traffickers or percentage of convicted traffickers 
serving prison time. Court operations were curtailed throughout 
the reporting period due to the pandemic, leading to a backlog of 
more than 54,000 cases—including trafficking cases—in England 
and Wales by January 2021. The government reported it increased 
its use of intelligence, digital downloads, and financial information 
as investigative techniques for trafficking cases; these often resulted 
in guilty pleas. Police collaborated closely with the CPS and referred 
more cases for early investigative advice, leading to more evidence-
led prosecutions; the government reported that relying on evidence 
over victim testimony was particularly successful in “county lines” 
cases, in which gangs exploited vulnerable individuals to transport 
drugs across county lines. 
Scottish authorities convicted five individuals for trafficking offenses 
under the Scotland Human Trafficking and Exploitation Act (2015) 
between April 2019 and March 2020, the most recent period for 
which data was available. Police Scotland had a specialized anti-
trafficking unit to coordinate information and intelligence and 
work with law enforcement agencies across Europe to investigate 
trafficking cases. In 2020, authorities in Northern Ireland arrested 
eight people and charged three people on trafficking or related crimes. 
Northern Irish authorities continued to prosecute five suspects in four 













In November 2020, media reported police arrested two suspected 
traffickers in Glasgow following police raids at two properties in 
the city; authorities reportedly identified 12 potential victims of sex 
trafficking during the operation. As part of an investigation started in 
2017, courts sentenced one trafficker in 2020 in Northern Ireland to 
12 months in prison—suspended for two years—on multiple counts 
of human trafficking and money laundering; despite the inadequate 
sentencing, this was the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI)’s 
second operation to successfully lead to a conviction without victim 
testimony and the fourth conviction under Northern Ireland’s 2015 
human trafficking law. Observers noted the greatest impediment 
to the timely prosecution of alleged traffickers in Northern Ireland 
remained inherent delays in the legal system, often taking two or more 
years from the time of initial arrest to conviction. The PSNI’s Modern 
Slavery and Human Trafficking Unit, which added five detectives in 
the previous reporting period, added three uniformed constables and 
a financial investigator in 2020. Through Project AIDANT COVID-19, 
the National Crime Agency (NCA) and Gangmasters and Labor Abuse 
Authority (GLAA) launched a series of counter-trafficking operations 
and awareness-raising activities throughout the UK in June 2020 
focused on the food packaging and processing, shellfish, textiles, and 
garment industries; authorities initiated 27 new investigations, made 
16 arrests, and referred 13 potential victims as a direct result of this 
operation. In May 2020, the government released a report noting that 
Project AIDANT had resulted in more than 770 trafficking-related 
arrests from 2017-2019. 
The government provided a wide variety of anti-trafficking training to 
law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and first responders. The Home 
Office committed £2 million ($2.73 million) for law enforcement 
under the new Modern Slavery and Organized Immigration Crime 
program. The government trained prosecutors on building strong 
cases and identifying victims in the criminal justice system who may 
be subject to criminal exploitation; the training for new prosecutors 
included a module on the non-punishment of victims for unlawful 
acts traffickers compelled them to commit. Law enforcement created 
specialized training in May 2020 to raise awareness of trafficking 
among national helpline operators as they came into contact with 
potential victims during the pandemic. The Modern Slavery and 
Organized Immigration Crime Unit created guides for police on all 
elements of a successful trafficking investigation, from identification 
through prosecution. The PSNI hosted two courses for investigators; 
more than 50 officers had completed the course by the end of the 
reporting period. The Independent Anti-Slavery Commissioner 
(IASC) reported training for criminal justice officials had improved 
but was still insufficient. 
The UK participated in 18 Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) with 
eight EU Member States, including a JIT with Romania established 
in December 2020 to investigate the suspected sex trafficking of 
Romanian women by Romanian suspects in Northern Ireland and 
Romania. Police Scotland participated in a JIT with international 
law enforcement partners to investigate a nationwide organized 
crime group involved in trafficking throughout Europe. Given the 
high number of potential trafficking victims from Vietnam, the 
government arranged for the secondment of two Vietnamese officers to 
Police Scotland for a period of six months, starting in October 2020. 
Furthermore, in the wake of the October 2019 incident involving the 
deaths of 39 Vietnamese nationals while being transported in the 
back of a refrigerated truck in Essex, the government engaged with 
Vietnamese authorities to identify and repatriate potential victims, 
share information, and conduct joint investigations. News reports 
highlighted multiple raids on properties in the cities of Glasgow 
and Aberdeen, as well as in England and Romania, in September 
2020, leading to 24 arrests by police from both countries and the 
identification of a number of potential trafficking victims. Following 
the UK’s exit from the EU in December 2020, the government retained 
access to EU fingerprint, DNA, and passenger name record data, 
all of which it could use in trafficking investigations; however, the 
government lost access to some EU databases, which could impede 
some investigations. The 2019 decision by the Employment Tribunal 
that diplomatic immunity did not protect against trafficking charges 
was sent to the Supreme Court and a final decision was pending at 
the end of the reporting period. The government did not report any 
investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government employees 
complicit in trafficking offenses. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained protection efforts. Through the NRM, 
authorities referred 10,613 potential trafficking victims for care 
nationwide in 2020; authorities referred 10,616 victims to care in 
2019 and 6,993 in 2018. The Home Office maintained a detailed 
database online with disaggregated information, including source 
of referral, nationality, jurisdiction handling the referral, type of 
trafficking, and disposition of review. Of the referred victims, 74 
percent were male and 26 percent were female. Authorities identified 
4,946 children, an increase from 4,547 in 2019. Authorities flagged 
1,544 referrals as “county lines” referrals, the majority (1,247) 
of which were boys. The majority of identified victims were UK 
citizens (3,560), followed by Albanian (1,638) and Vietnamese 
(653) nationals. Labor trafficking, including forced criminality, was 
the most common form of exploitation of adults and children. In 
Scotland, 387 potential victims were referred to the NRM, a decrease 
from 512 in 2019. In Northern Ireland, officials reported a significant 
increase in the number of potential victims referred to the NRM from 
91 in 2019 to 128 in 2020.
The NRM was the framework for identifying and providing care and 
support for victims. First responders, such as police, Border Force, 
local authorities, and NGOs, continued to refer potential victims 
into the NRM throughout the pandemic. The Home Office’s single 
case management unit handled all NRM referrals and ensured 
victims continued to receive support. After a “reasonable grounds” 
decision that an individual was a trafficking victim, adult victims 
received a recovery and reflection period during which they could 
access support and protection measures, while awaiting a “conclusive 
grounds” decision, which was made no sooner than 45 calendar 
days after the “reasonable grounds” determination. If authorities 
recognized an individual as a victim per the “conclusive grounds” 
determination, they guaranteed the victim a minimum of 45 additional 
days of move-on support; the government utilized a recovery needs 
assessment to tailor ongoing support to the victim’s specific recovery 
needs and to determine the point at which a victim would exit the 
support services under the Modern Slavery Victim Care Contract. As of 
June 2020, authorities completed 1,132 recovery needs assessments. 
The Home Office published updated guidance in August 2020 that 
incorporated feedback from key stakeholders to improve operational 
processes and provide policy clarity on the recovery needs assessment 
process. In Northern Ireland potential victims received support for 
a minimum of 45 days while authorities reviewed their cases, and 
in Scotland potential victims received support for 90 days or until 
authorities made a conclusive grounds decision. The Wales Anti-Slavery 
Leadership Group’s “Survivor Care Pathway” provided a long-term 
post-NRM individualized plan for survivors. 
NGOs and independent experts expressed concern victims often 
faced long wait times to receive a conclusive grounds determination 
under the NRM and that the current system did not adequately ensure 
victims exiting the system had a plan for sustainable independence, 
particularly foreign victims who may not be allowed to work, putting 
them at greater risk of re-trafficking. According to the Home Office, of 
the 10,613 NRM referrals during 2020, 8,665 were awaiting conclusive 
grounds determinations at the end of the year. Independent experts 
cautioned the end of the Brexit transition period at the end of 2020 
could lead to further restrictions on foreign victims’ ability to work 
while in the NRM. In December 2020, the High Court ruled the 
Home Office’s policy on discretionary leave for trafficking victims 
under the NRM was unlawful; the Home Office planned to appeal 
the ruling. According to NGOs, authorities detained at least 2,914 




January 2019 and September 2020. The government continued to 
explore ways to amend the NRM, including by issuing possible 
reforms via a press release in March 2021; NGOs roundly criticized 
the press release for insinuating criminals were abusing the NRM 
system and conflating immigration and human trafficking, and 
because the proposed changes risked deterring victims from being 
identified and criminalizing some potential victims. In response to 
the pandemic, the government produced e-learning tools on victim 
identification and referral for first responders. The NCA partnered 
with the legal sector to highlight “red flag indicators” to assist in 
victim identification and worked with the health service to improve 
guidance and training on interacting with sex trafficking victims. The 
Modern Slavery Police Transformation Unit continued to deliver 
trainings to law enforcement officers and first responders across the 
UK to identify and safeguard trafficking victims. 
The government awarded a five-year, £281 million ($383.88 million) 
contract to an NGO to coordinate the provision of care for adult 
victims in England and Wales under the NRM. In January 2021, the 
government announced the introduction of minimum standards of 
care in all future contracts for support services to adult trafficking 
victims and an associated inspection regime. In response to the 
pandemic, the government distributed phones and data plans to 
facilitate remote support and appointments, provided payment cards 
for the distribution of pre-paid victim support payments, increased 
cleaning and provided personal protective equipment for safe houses, 
secured transportation for symptomatic victims, and implemented a 
temporary policy to ensure victims could remain in safe houses for at 
least three months. The IASC urged the government to increase efforts 
to provide safe mainstream accommodation for victims after they 
exit a safe house. An NGO further observed many female trafficking 
victims were not offered safe house accommodations, but were 
rather placed in unsafe asylum housing. The government included 
£1.73 million ($2.36 million) for services for trafficking victims in 
its £750 million ($1.02 billion) pandemic-related relief package. In 
July 2020, the government increased weekly payments to potential 
victims receiving other forms of support, such as medical, legal, and 
educational services; increased weekly payments for child dependents; 
and introduced new weekly payments for pregnant and young 
child victims. In May 2020, the Scottish Government announced 
approximately £1.5 million ($2.05 million) in additional funding 
to the two NGOs providing victim protection and support. To avoid 
re-traumatization, authorities encouraged police to use intelligence-led 
investigations, pre-recorded cross-examination for vulnerable victims, 
and allowed victims to apply for reporting restrictions and other 
measures to maintain anonymity. The government encouraged efforts 
of private companies to assist in reintegration, particularly through 
employment of survivors. Under the “Bright Future” campaign, a 
national retail cooperative continued to hire and train survivors in 
partnership with an NGO, a model the government promoted for 
expansion; as of October 2020, Bright Future had successfully placed 
63 survivors into permanent employment. The government engaged 
directly with survivors to better understand their recovery needs and 
experiences with the NRM and worked with the independent regulator 
for health and social care services to solicit survivor feedback for the 
creation of an inspection regime for government-commissioned 
victim support services. 
Children received care through children’s services offices in local 
jurisdictions; social workers worked with potential child victims 
to assess needs and create a care plan that included health, legal, 
education, and accommodation support. The rollout of ICTGs 
continued throughout England and Wales and focused on areas with 
the highest need; these guardians provided an additional source of 
advice, support, and advocacy for child trafficking victims. Nevertheless, 
an NGO noted the government did not provide a timeline for full 
implementation of the ICTG service, which has supported over 900 
children since its inception in February 2017. NGOs highlighted 
concerns about the difficulty of safeguarding children who the 
government relocated away from their home to parts of the country 
where services are available; criminal gangs actively targeted vulnerable 
children who are taken out of their communities and run away or go 
missing. The Home Office launched a pilot program to devolve NRM 
decision-making for children to local authorities. Throughout 2020, the 
IASC collaborated with the Home Office to convene roundtables for 
local authorities to discuss potential approaches to devolved decision 
making. The MSA review committee recommended implementation 
of the ICTG system nationally, along with sufficient duration for 
providing services to child victims, in addition to requiring police 
to track cases of missing children until they are located, regardless 
of timeframe. NGOs continued to express concern that child victims 
who reached the age of 18 and therefore were no longer eligible for 
the ICTG service would be at risk of re-trafficking. The government 
committed to extending the ICTG service to individuals over the 
age of 18 in select sites as part of the continued rollout. In October 
2020, the government assessed the role of the ICTG Regional Practice 
Coordinators (RPCs). RPCs worked with the social workers that 
supported children who had a parental figure, whereas ICTG direct 
workers provided direct support to children without a parental figure. 
NGOs expressed concern children assigned an RPC did not receive the 
full benefits of an ICTG direct worker who could advocate on their 
behalf. Scotland and Northern Ireland also required the appointment 
of independent legal guardians for child trafficking victims and trained 
the guardians on the support services available.
The government did not automatically grant foreign victims legal status 
in the UK; authorities reviewed requests for permission to remain 
in the UK outside the immigration rules, known as “discretionary 
leave” on a case-by-case basis. Discretionary leave decisions were not 
linked to an individual’s status as a confirmed trafficking victim but 
were judged on individual circumstances. Foreign victims who were 
granted a reflection period could not be removed from the UK during 
that period. Foreign victims who assisted with investigations were 
eligible for residency. However, observers reported residence permits 
were only issued in a minority of cases and then often only for 12 
months. NGOs continued to express concern some foreign victims 
may have declined to enter the NRM for fear of deportation upon 
exiting the system. Under the EU Settlement Scheme, EEA citizens 
had to apply for legal status to remain in the UK by June 2021; in 
January 2021, the Home Office published reasonable grounds for 
missing this deadline, of which being a victim of exploitation was 
included. The government increased funding to local authorities and 
organizations who assisted victims with applying for status under the 
scheme and made resources available on the government’s website. 
Foreign overseas domestic workers (ODW) could legally change 
employers during the six-month period of their visa. Workers on the 
ODW visa identified as trafficking victims could apply for a two-year 
visa as a domestic worker, although NGOs contended workers who 
had suffered abuse would be unlikely to want to return to the same 
sector. NGOs urged the government to adopt reforms to the ODW 
visa, particularly in light of the heightened exploitation overseas 
domestic workers faced as a result of the pandemic. Foreign nationals 
identified as trafficking victims could apply for discretionary leave 
to remain in the UK if supporting the investigation of a trafficker, 
seeking compensation through a civil claim against the perpetrator, 
or in some cases, based on personal circumstances. Foreign victims 
could petition for asylum, based on risks faced if returned to their 
country of origin. 
Victims had a statutory defense for most crimes committed as a direct 
result of being subjected to trafficking; the defense did not apply to 
the most serious crimes, such as sexual offenses or offenses involving 
serious violence. In these cases, the CPS had to consider whether it 
was in the public interest to prosecute the trafficking victim. The IASC 
concluded the statutory defense was inadequate to protect trafficking 
victims and police often did not consider the possibility of forced 
criminality at the beginning of an investigation, risking the punishment 
of victims. The European Court of Human Rights ruled in February 2021 
that the UK failed to protect two victims of trafficking by punishing 










another case, the government granted a last-minute reprieve from 
deportation to 10 Jamaican citizens in December 2020, some of whom 
the government identified as potential trafficking victims. Following 
criticism from NGOs and independent observers that the government 
did not sufficiently screen migrants crossing the English Channel for 
indicators of trafficking, the government issued a statement in October 
2020 urging law enforcement authorities not to arrest smugglers who 
showed signs of exploitation by criminal gangs. Observers expressed 
concern the government stripped citizenship from British citizens 
who went to Syria and Iraq to join ISIS without screening them for 
indicators of trafficking, despite indications some of them may have 
been child victims of trafficking. The courts allowed victims to testify 
by video, behind a screen, or with the public removed from the 
courtroom during hearings. Courts could grant restitution, but only 
after conviction of the trafficker and if satisfied that the defendant had 
the means to pay. However, NGOs noted courts infrequently granted 
restitution and although victims could apply for compensation, this 
remedy was difficult to access given the small number of legal aid 
providers available to file such claims. Moreover, traffickers could 
appeal or contest a compensation order and observers noted traffickers 
often moved assets, meaning that awards were often not paid in 
practice. In October 2020, the British Embassy in Slovakia and the 
Slovak government issued a press release informing Slovak trafficking 
victims who had been exploited in the UK about the possibility of 
receiving restitution from the seized assets of convicted traffickers and 
highlighted an August 2020 UK court ruling that convicted two Slovak 
nationals to six-year prison sentences and ordered them to pay £52,000 
($71,040) and £78,000 ($106,560), respectively, to their two victims.
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. The Home Office 
published its 2020 annual report in October, with detailed data 
on anti-trafficking efforts across the UK as well as an outline of 
achievements and remaining challenges to fully implement the MSA. 
The Ministry of Justice produced a draft Modern Slavery Strategy 
for 2021-2022 and opened it to public consultation from October 
2020 to January 2021. In its draft Organized Crime Strategy for 
2020-2021, the government listed human trafficking among the top 
operational priorities for the Organized Crime Task Force. The IASC 
encouraged good practice in the prevention, detection, investigation, 
and prosecution of trafficking offenses as well the identification of 
victims. In May 2020, the Scottish Government published its third 
annual progress report on its anti-trafficking strategy. The Criminal 
Justice Inspection Northern Ireland published its first in-depth 
assessment of how the criminal justice system in Northern Ireland 
addressed trafficking and noted good working relationships amongst 
law enforcement; the report made several recommendations, including 
improving enforcement powers, increasing efforts to counter child 
trafficking and protect child victims, and providing additional training 
for front-line police officers. 
The government invested £10 million ($13.66 million) over a five-year 
period to fund a new Modern Slavery Policy and Evidence Centre to 
better understand trafficking and how to confront it and to develop 
research to inform policy choices. In 2020, the government partnered 
with a university to launch a program to pair policy officials and 
academics to strengthen collaboration to counter trafficking. The 
government conducted awareness campaigns across the UK with a 
wide range of partners. The “Hidden in Plain Sight” campaign targeting 
front-line professionals in the financial, health care, and recruitment 
sectors in four English regions reached more than 17 million people 
and led to a 30 percent increase in calls to the National Modern Slavery 
Helpline. The GLAA coordinated with an NGO to raise awareness 
among job seekers about fake online recruitment advertisements, 
including those placed by gangs to lure young Romanian men to 
nonexistent jobs. Building on established collaboration with the retail, 
construction, and textile industries, the GLAA partnered with an NGO 
to create a hospitality protocol; the launch was postponed due to the 
pandemic. Sixty-five percent of signatories to the GLAA’s construction 
protocol reported implementing reforms to due diligence measures 
to identify and prevent labor exploitation in their supply chains. 
The GLAA coordinated with the Church of England to develop and 
launch an application to combat rural labor exploitation. Following 
allegations of labor exploitation in the garment industry in Leicester, 
England, the government established a multiagency taskforce in July 
2020 to gather and share intelligence, raise awareness, and persuade 
workers to report concerns. Nevertheless, NGOs continued to raise 
concerns that some apparel companies operating in Leicester used 
forced labor in their operations. A parliamentary committee urged 
the creation of a garment industry watchdog that could monitor 
compliance with labor laws, issue recommendations, and impose 
fines for non-compliance. Despite having a national remit, extended 
powers as of 2018, and 50 dedicated investigators, NGOs argued that 
since 2018 the GLAA reported fewer trafficking cases and dedicated 
fewer resources to investigating labor exploitation, focusing instead 
on awareness raising.
The MSA required organizations with annual turnover exceeding £36 
million ($49.18 million) to publish an annual statement detailing 
efforts to ensure its operations and supply chains were free of human 
trafficking. However, observers noted the MSA did not include a 
mechanism to ensure compliance; an NGO report issued in February 
2021 stated that since the law’s inception in 2015, the government 
had not issued any penalties to companies despite approximately 
40 percent of companies not complying with the law. In September 
2020, the government announced measures to strengthen reporting 
requirements, introduced mandatory reporting topics, extended the 
reporting requirement to public bodies with a budget of at least £36 
million ($49.18 million), and required entities to publish statements 
on a new registry launched in March 2021 in an attempt to increase 
compliance. In addition to publishing in March 2020 the world’s 
first government modern slavery statement outlining steps taken 
to encourage responsible procurement practices, the government 
launched the Modern Slavery Assessment Tool to assist public sector 
organizations in coordinating with suppliers to improve protections and 
reduce the risk of exploitation of workers in their supply chains. The 
government extended into 2021 the seasonal workers pilot to ensure 
that fruit and vegetable farmers could legally employ non-EU migrant 
farmers for seasonal work for up to six months, with an expanded 
quota of 30,000 available visas. NGOs noted the pilot left migrant 
workers vulnerable to exploitation; according to an NGO study, many 
of the workers accrued large debts and were limited in their ability 
to change employers. NGOs expressed concern the government’s 
strict immigration policies, which criminalized the act of working 
while undocumented, continued to prevent trafficking victims from 
seeking help. In January 2021, the government published a whole-
of-government strategy to counter all forms of child sexual abuse; the 
strategy included a national action plan on combating international 
child sex tourism. The government did not report making efforts to 
reduce the demand for commercial sex acts but criminalized soliciting 
a sex trafficking victim. 
The government funded a wide range of anti-trafficking programs 
globally, including continued implementation of programs under 
the £33.5 million ($45.77 million) Modern Slavery Fund, of which 
the government committed £7.8 million ($10.66 million) to a range 
of anti-trafficking efforts in 2020. The government has invested more 
than £10 million ($13.66 million) since 2017 in programs in Nigeria, 
Albania, and Vietnam to provide rehabilitation and reintegration 
services, targeted outreach to at-risk communities, and training for 
law enforcement and other first responders on how to apply a victim-
centered approach in their work. In Nigeria, the government delivered 
the second phase of the “Not for Sale” campaign to counter trafficking 
and worked with civil society and government stakeholders in India 
to address bonded labor. Through the Modern Slavery Innovation 
Fund, the government funded projects to strengthen workers’ rights in 
Malaysian factories and provided direct assistance to trafficking victims 
in Ethiopia. The UK’s Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA 
UK) works with Commonwealth countries to pass human trafficking 




capacity. In February 2021, CPA UK organized a virtual anti-trafficking 
workshop for Caribbean countries, the organization’s first focused 
engagement on trafficking with the Caribbean region. Experts reported 
many of the government’s global anti-trafficking aid programs did not 
demonstrate direct impact in reducing the prevalence of trafficking and 
did not adequately include monitoring and evaluation mechanisms. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in the UK, and traffickers exploit victims from 
the UK abroad. Although the government reported 10,613 potential 
victims came through the NRM in 2020, one NGO estimates the actual 
number of victims in the UK is closer to 100,000. The UK, Albania, 
and Vietnam are the leading nationalities of potential victims referred 
into the NRM. Twenty-six percent of potential victims assert their 
exploitation occurred entirely outside of the UK. Labor trafficking, 
including forced criminality, is the most common form of exploitation 
among adults and children. Migrants crossing the English Channel in 
small boats are vulnerable to exploitation; more than 8,000 migrants 
crossed the channel in 2020, many of whom were unaccompanied 
children. Nearly half of all victims identified are children. Children in 
the care system and unaccompanied migrant children are particularly 
at risk of trafficking. Youth trafficked by gangs are forced to act as drug 
couriers from larger cities into rural areas across the UK. Traffickers 
force adults and children to work in agriculture, cannabis cultivation, 
construction, food processing, factories, domestic service, nail salons, 
food services, the hospitality industry, car washes, food supply industry, 
and warehousing, as well as on fishing boats. In Scotland, most 
victims are from Vietnam with many forced to work in agriculture, 
cannabis farms, and nail bars. In Northern Ireland, there are cases of 
perpetrators forcing victims into shoplifting and the cultivation and 
distribution of illicit drugs. Young women and girls from Albania, 
Bulgaria, and Romania, including ethnic Roma, remain vulnerable 
to sex trafficking in Northern Ireland.
UNITED STATES  
OF AMERICA: TIER 1
The Government of the United States fully meets the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking. The government continued 
to demonstrate serious and sustained efforts during the reporting 
period, considering the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its 
anti-trafficking capacity; therefore the United States remained on Tier 
1. These efforts included increasing the number of investigations for 
the second year in a row; increasing the number of victims served by 
federal grantees; granting T nonimmigrant status to more victims; 
increasing enforcement of the prohibition of imports made wholly 
or in part by forced labor; and issuing its first national action plan 
to combat human trafficking. Although the government meets the 
minimum standards, it implemented policies that placed greater limits 
on access to immigration options for trafficking victims for most of 
the reporting period prior to repealing them.  These policies further 
increased some foreign national victims’ distrust in authorities and 
caused them to fear for their safety if they came forward to assist law 
enforcement, pursue these immigration options, or access services.
As a result of the March 2020 Title 42 order related to the pandemic, 
the government began expelling migrants, including unaccompanied 
children. Such unaccompanied children were held in the Department 
of Homeland Security’s (DHS) custody for various lengths of time. 
While Title 8 of the U.S. Code requires the government to screen 
unaccompanied children and follow certain procedures to place 
the children in the least restrictive setting in the best interest of the 
child to combat child trafficking, unaccompanied children were 
processed and expelled pursuant to the Title 42 order and not 
Title 8 until February 2021. The government enforced policies that 
further marginalized communities overrepresented among trafficking 
victims, increasing their risk to human trafficking. It also initiated 
policy changes to certain employment-based nonimmigrant visa 
programs that reduced its ability to prevent trafficking and enforce 
workers’ rights under those programs, and it did not increase efforts 
to hold foreign labor recruiters civilly or criminally liable for criminal 
violations in connection with their recruitment practices. There was 
a continued lack of progress and sustained effort to comprehensively 
address labor trafficking in the United States, including in efforts 
to identify victims, provide specialized services to labor trafficking 
victims, and address obstacles to including high-risk sectors in federal 
labor protection laws. Law enforcement efforts for labor trafficking, 
the top recommendation for the last five years, continued to decline 
with the number of labor trafficking convictions declining each of the 
last three years. The government continued to not mandate human 
trafficking screening for all foreign national adults in immigration 
detention or custody. Officials prosecuted fewer cases for the third 
year in a row and secured convictions against fewer traffickers for 
the second year in a row. Advocates continued to report concerns 
that trafficking survivors were held in immigration detention, and 
survivors continued to be arrested for the unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit. 
UNITED STATES TIER RANKING BY YEAR







Increase investigation and prosecution of labor trafficking cases, and 
increase access to protections for labor trafficking victims. • Strengthen 
rules and regulations to ensure immigration enforcement does not 
hinder human trafficking detection, criminal law enforcement, or 
victim protections. • Screen all individuals in immigration detention 
or custody for human trafficking indicators. • Adopt inclusive policies 
that address aspects of government-run systems or programs that 
have disparate negative impact on marginalized communities and 
increase their vulnerability to human trafficking. • Improve access 
to emergency and long-term housing for all victims. • Increase 
access to and accessibility of specialized victim assistance for men, 
boys, LGBTQI+ persons, and persons with disabilities. • Mitigate 
vulnerabilities in employment-based or other nonimmigrant U.S. 
visa programs, including by holding accountable noncompliant 
employers and their agents, and adopting policies that incentivize 
workers to report program violations. • Increase the number of 
requests by federal law enforcement officials for Continued Presence. 
• Encourage state and local authorities to implement policies not to 
prosecute victims for the unlawful acts their traffickers compelled 
them to commit. • Train investigators, prosecutors, and judges to 
increase the number of forfeiture orders and mandatory restitution 
orders for trafficking victims, and use all available authorities to 
ensure restitution is paid. • Increase survivor engagement, including 
by establishing accessible mechanisms for receiving and providing 
compensation for survivor input when forming policies, programs, 
and trainings. • Increase training for and efforts to pursue financial 
crime investigations in tandem with human trafficking cases. • 
Conduct agency-level risk assessments for contracts connected 
to high-risk regions, industries, or sectors. • Strengthen efforts 
to examine the role of demand reduction in preventing human 
trafficking. As described in the Methodology section of this report, 
these recommendations were drawn from input solicited from 
multiple anti-trafficking stakeholders, such as advocates (which 
includes NGOs and subject matter experts who have survived human 
trafficking), academia, and government agencies, on how the United 
















The government’s prosecution efforts were mixed. The government 
increased the number of investigations, and law enforcement officials 
adapted to pandemic-related restrictions by conducting remote 
forensic interviews. The number of prosecutions decreased for the 
third year in a row, and the number of convictions decreased for the 
second year in a row in the midst of pandemic-related court closures 
and suspension of grand jury proceedings throughout the reporting 
period. The TVPA, as amended and codified at Title 18 U.S. Code 
sections 1581, et seq., criminalizes sex and labor trafficking. U.S. 
law confers extraterritorial jurisdiction for these human trafficking 
offenses, as long as the defendant (whether individual or entity) 
is a U.S. national, U.S. lawful permanent resident, or regardless of 
nationality, present in the United States. The penalties prescribed 
under these provisions, which can include up to life imprisonment, are 
sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate 
with the penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. 
U.S. law prohibits conspiracy and the attempt to violate these 
provisions, obstruction of the statutes’ enforcement, and benefiting 
from such acts. Additionally, a criminal statute prohibits the use 
of fraud to recruit workers abroad to come to the United States to 
work, or to recruit workers to work on a U.S. government contract 
performed outside the United States, on U.S. property, or on military 
installations outside the United States. During the reporting period, 
the U.S. Congress passed several laws that address human trafficking 
and related crimes, including a law requiring certain companies – 
which can be used as fronts for human trafficking and other illicit 
activities – to disclose their beneficial owners to the government 
and enable the tracing of human trafficking networks through 
financial transactions. Congress passed other legislation to extend 
authorization of the U.S. Advisory Council on Human Trafficking 
and to allow for compensation of its members.
The Department of Justice (DOJ), DHS, Department of State (State), 
and Department of Defense (DoD) are the primary investigating 
agencies for federal human trafficking and other related offenses. 
DOJ prosecutes federal human trafficking cases. DOJ, DHS, and 
State support victims by engaging law enforcement victim assistance 
specialists during trafficking investigations and prosecutions, including 
by connecting identified victims to victim service providers. In 
response to the pandemic, DOJ developed a process to conduct 
remote forensic interviews. DHS’s victim assistance program created 
new guidance on conducting remote forensic interviews, including 
safety protocols, which allowed forensic interview specialists to 
continue interviews during the pandemic. DOJ, in coordination with 
DHS and the Department of Labor (DOL), continued to support 
complex human trafficking investigations and prosecutions initiated 
and developed in Phase II of the Anti-Trafficking Coordination Team 
(ACTeam) Initiative. DOJ conducted an assessment of Phase II of 
the initiative to inform preparation for Phase III, including updating 
training materials and revising the operations guide to support 
advanced investigation and prosecution techniques, including 
dismantling transnational organized crime human trafficking rings. 
Preparation for Phase III included efforts to ensure necessary resources 
are in place across all relevant agencies. DOJ provided more than $22.7 
million to support the work of anti-trafficking task forces. More than 
$17.7 million in FY 2020 went to fund 14 Enhanced Collaborative 
Model (ECM) anti-trafficking task forces, which included awards to 
13 state and local law enforcement agencies and 14 victim service 
providers, compared to $21 million for 15 ECM task forces funded 
in FY 2019 (13 state and local law enforcement agencies and 12 
victim service organizations). In addition, DOJ provided almost $5 
million for training and technical assistance focused on building the 
capacity of law enforcement and multidisciplinary teams. Several 
federal agencies participated in other human trafficking task forces 
nationwide consisting of federal, state, and local law enforcement, 
as well as victim service providers.
Advocates called on federally funded task forces to continue to increase 
engagement with local survivor leaders and service providers to 
improve victim services, including by developing and implementing 
a standard set of trauma-informed, victim-centered protocols. NGOs 
called on the government to discontinue ECM task force funding and 
to increase overall funding for NGOs providing victim services, noting 
the current approach has not achieved its goal to build sustainable 
collaboration between law enforcement and service providers on 
human trafficking cases. 
The federal government reports its law enforcement data by fiscal 
year, which may include joint federal and state or local initiatives 
but does not include separate state law enforcement data. In FY 
2020, DHS opened 947 investigations related to human trafficking, 
a decrease from 1,024 in FY 2019. DOJ formally opened 663 human 
trafficking investigations in FY 2020, an increase from 607 in FY 2019. 
Of DOJ’s FY 2020 investigations, 619 involved predominately sex 
trafficking, 41 involved predominately labor trafficking, and three 
involved both sex and labor trafficking. State reported investigating 95 
human trafficking-related cases worldwide during FY 2020, a decrease 
from 134 in FY 2019. In FY 2020, DoD reported investigating 160 
human trafficking-related cases involving DoD military, civilian, and 
contractor personnel, a significant increase from 65 in FY 2019, and 
55 of those cases were referred for criminal investigation. Of the 160 
human trafficking-related cases, 112 were related to forced labor, most 
of which DoD investigated through an administrative process that 
referred cases to criminal investigators if appropriate. The 112 forced 
labor investigations are detailed in the Prevention section below.
DOJ initiated a total of 210 federal human trafficking prosecutions 
in FY 2020, a decrease from 220 in FY 2019, 230 in FY 2018, and 
282 in FY 2017. DOJ charged 337 defendants in FY 2020, a decrease 
from 343 in FY 2019, 386 in FY 2018, and 553 in FY 2017. Of these 
FY 2020 prosecutions, 195 involved predominantly sex trafficking 
and 15 involved predominantly labor trafficking, compared to 208 
and 12 in FY 2019; 213 and 17 in FY 2018; and 266 and 16 in FY 
2017, respectively. 
During FY 2020, DOJ secured convictions against 309 traffickers, 
a significant decrease from 475 convictions in FY 2019 and 526 in 
FY 2018. Of these, 297 involved predominantly sex trafficking and 
12 involved predominantly labor trafficking, compared to 454 and 
21 in FY 2019; 501 and 25 in FY 2018; and 471 and 28 in FY 2017, 
respectively. Federal courthouses closed or operated at limited capacity 
for about six months of the reporting period due to the pandemic, 
and most human trafficking-related trials scheduled for FY 2020 were 
postponed to FY 2021. In addition, some enforcement operations were 
postponed; some witness interviews were postponed or happened 
virtually; grand juries were not able to convene for a period of time, 
delaying presentation of indictments; and some investigative work 
that required travel or in-person contacts was delayed.
These prosecutions and convictions include cases brought under 
trafficking-specific criminal statutes and non-trafficking criminal 
statutes, but they do not include child sex trafficking cases brought 
under non-trafficking statutes. Among the 168 traffickers sentenced 
to prison in cases brought under trafficking-specific criminal statutes, 
which excludes trafficking cases brought under non-trafficking statutes, 
terms ranged from one month to life imprisonment, with more than 
76 percent of defendants receiving prison sentences of five or more 
years. Two traffickers received a probation-only sentence, and six 
received a suspended sentence. 
Advocates continued to call for increased training of relevant officials 
and efforts to identify, investigate, and prosecute labor trafficking cases. 
NGOs noted federal human trafficking cases involve predominately 
sex trafficking despite certain service providers reporting nearly one 
third of their clients were victims of labor trafficking. NGOs called 
for DOJ to develop a process through which human trafficking cases 
that are not prosecuted can be referred to other relevant authorities, 





NGOs called for U.S. law enforcement entities to pursue financial 
investigations as a standard practice when investigating and prosecuting 
human trafficking cases and cited the existence of a strong legal 
framework for such investigations. NGOs reported the government 
has never prosecuted an extraterritorial labor trafficking case with a 
nexus to the United States and urged the government to increase its 
focus on such cases. NGOs noted a trend of criminal proceedings in 
human trafficking cases being delayed due to the pandemic.
DOJ and DHS continued to advance bilateral investigations and 
prosecutions of transnational trafficking enterprises operating 
across the U.S.-Mexico border by facilitating exchanges of leads, 
intelligence, and expertise between U.S. and Mexican anti-trafficking 
authorities, and providing support to 13 Mexican state-level human 
trafficking task forces. DOJ, in collaboration with the Department 
of the Treasury (Treasury), increased engagement with Mexican 
anti-money laundering authorities to enhance capacity to identify 
and combat human trafficking and secure trafficking proceeds for 
victim restitution. Treasury released a human trafficking advisory, 
supplementing its 2014 advisory, to inform financial institutions of 
additional typologies, behavioral indicators, and financial red flags so 
they may better detect and report suspicious transactions indicative 
of human trafficking. Treasury continued to analyze and disseminate 
information received from financial institutions related to human 
trafficking and partnered with domestic and foreign government 
stakeholders to support human trafficking investigations. Treasury 
and State, after consulting with interagency and external stakeholders, 
submitted a report to Congress that examined anti-money laundering 
efforts of the U.S. government and financial institutions with respect 
to human trafficking. DOJ continued to train federal human trafficking 
prosecutors on forfeiture and restitution for victims. 
Advocates continued to call for federal prosecutors to seek, and 
for courts to award, mandatory restitution for both sex and labor 
trafficking cases, citing concerns about both the low number of cases 
in which it was ordered and the low rate of payment of restitution 
to trafficking victims consistent with restitution orders. One NGO 
noted that 50 percent of defendants convicted of a crime that triggered 
mandatory restitution were ordered to pay restitution in 2020, an 
increase from approximately 40 percent in 2019. Advocates also called 
for increased and improved training of investigators, prosecutors, and 
judges on mandatory restitution, and urged the government to use 
its available authorities, such as freezing or seizing assets and seeking 
forfeiture, to ensure compliance with restitution orders. Advocates 
again noted that, while not required by law, many victims lacked 
independent legal counsel to assist them in obtaining restitution. 
NGOs called for DOJ to establish an office to lead government 
efforts to improve access to justice in the civil and criminal justice 
systems for low-income and underserved individuals who are often 
at increased risk of human trafficking. 
State laws form the basis of most criminal actions in the United 
States. All U.S. states and territories have anti-trafficking criminal 
statutes. Forty-six states had laws allowing survivors to seek a court 
order vacating, expunging, or sealing criminal convictions entered 
against them that resulted from unlawful acts traffickers compelled 
them to commit. In three of these states, however, such relief was 
only available to child trafficking victims. At least 35 states had “safe 
harbor” laws, which are meant to prevent child sex trafficking victims 
from being prosecuted for commercial sex.
One NGO reported that some state vacatur laws provided limited 
relief for trafficking victims with criminal records resulting from 
unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit. In addition, 
NGOs continued to call for the adoption of federal vacatur legislation.
NGOs continued to report trafficking victims were arrested at the 
state and local levels for the unlawful acts traffickers compelled them 
to commit including commercial sex and drug-related charges, and 
called for the government to increase efforts to identify victims in the 
context of law enforcement “sting” operations. One NGO noted 89 
percent of its current clients who reported being arrested or convicted 
of a crime were Black, indigenous, or people of color. That NGO 
further stated victims from those communities were more likely to 
be charged for crimes traffickers compelled them to commit and to 
be threatened with charges if they did not cooperate in a case against 
their trafficker. Even in some states with “safe harbor” laws, child 
victims were arrested. One NGO noted child sex trafficking victims 
can still be charged with prostitution in 19 states despite being 
defined as human trafficking victims under federal law, and only 
18 states protect child sex trafficking victims from being prosecuted 
for crimes other than commercial sex, including theft or forgery. An 
NGO expressed concern that some states’ laws require child victims 
to cooperate in identifying their traffickers to qualify as victims of 
sex trafficking, a process that is often re-traumatizing. 
The federal government continued to collect state and local data 
on human trafficking investigations during the reporting period 
through the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program. Data from 
2019 collected from participating jurisdictions are publicly available. 
Ninety-six percent of U.S. states had some participating jurisdictions 
in 2019, compared to 94 percent the previous year, although the 
numbers of participating jurisdictions in each of those states varied. 
Not all agencies within all states have the ability to report data to 
the UCR Program. In 2019, participating jurisdictions reported a 
total of 703 human trafficking offenses resulting in arrest or solved 
for crime reporting purposes, an increase from 548 in 2018. There 
is no other formal mechanism for the federal government to track 
prosecutions at the state and local levels.
The government took actions to address alleged complicity in human 
trafficking by government personnel. A U.S. naval officer was found 
guilty of sex trafficking. A former U.S. Army reserve police officer 
was sentenced to 40 years for sex trafficking crimes. A state attorney 
was charged with human trafficking and is awaiting trial. There were 
reported instances of law enforcement officers engaging in sexual 
acts with known or suspected victims of sex trafficking, in the course 
of conducting criminal investigations. Federal inquiries into these 
incidents remained ongoing as of the end of the reporting period.
Advocates called for federal law enforcement agencies to adopt and 
enforce explicit policies stating that officers should not engage in sex 
acts while acting in an official capacity or conducting an investigation.
The U.S. government continued to build the capacity of law 
enforcement, judges, military personnel, and labor inspectors, among 
others, to respond more effectively to human trafficking cases. DOJ 
conducted more than 24 trainings in FY 2020 for federal, state, and 
local law enforcement, including task forces members and financial 
units, on how to investigate financial crimes and money laundering 
investigations to enhance human trafficking and child exploitation 
cases. DOJ trained more than 2,000 law enforcement, government, 
and NGO partners on effective strategies for identifying human 
trafficking cases and victims, including through proactive labor 
trafficking investigations and best practices in conducting survivor-
centered, trauma-informed investigations and prosecutions. DOJ 
convened a workshop for national human trafficking coordinators, 
delivered regional task force trainings, and introduced a new course 
on trauma-informed victim interviewing and the neurobiology of 
trauma. DOJ continued to provide training to federal, state, local, 
and tribal law enforcement partners on how to proactively investigate 
labor trafficking. DHS provided training on the indicators of human 
trafficking to more than 21,700 federal, state, local, and tribal law 
enforcement officers in FY 2020. DHS separately trained more than 
940 federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement officials and 
stakeholders nationwide through its new online human trafficking 
awareness training. DoD continued to require all its investigative 
professionals to take training on human trafficking investigations. 
The Department of the Interior (DOI) provided training to about 
1,325 of its law enforcement officers, first responders, contracting 
officers, as well as other federal, state, local, and tribal organizations 















investigate and support human trafficking cases to identify networks 
and engage with survivors using a victim-centered approach. 
Advocates called for increased training across all criminal justice 
sectors, including law enforcement, prosecutors, and judges, to 
correct misconceptions about what constitutes a human trafficking 
crime. One NGO called for more training on trauma-informed care 
during the criminal justice process to avoid retraumatizing victims 
who choose to testify against their traffickers and called for training 
on the effect on victims of prosecuting victims for unlawful acts 
their traffickers compelled them to commit. Advocates called on the 
government to ensure that law enforcement trainings, including on 
labor trafficking investigations and cultural sensitivity, are developed 
in consultation with survivor leaders. Advocates called for training 
and technical assistance for law enforcement and judges to recognize 
when individuals with cognitive disabilities are targeted by traffickers. 
One NGO called on the government to provide consistent training 
on conducting financial investigations to all federal law enforcement 
agents tasked primarily with pursuing human trafficking cases.
PROTECTION
During the reporting period, the government decreased overall 
protection efforts. The government increased the number of victims 
served and the number of federally funded victim assistance programs. 
The number of victims granted T nonimmigrant status significantly 
increased, although the median processing time for T nonimmigrant 
status was longer. Despite these efforts, for the majority of the 
reporting period until largely being repealed in the final two months, 
the government implemented policies that increased obstacles for 
foreign national trafficking victims to secure immigration options, 
including T and U nonimmigrant status and asylum. Advocates noted 
for the third consecutive year such policies resulted in increased 
reports of trafficking victims being afraid to report their cases to 
government officials, pursue immigration options, or seek services; 
for those who did apply for an immigration option, they faced 
longer periods of time without support services, legal status, and 
employment authorization. The government did not implement 
screening and processing protocols for unaccompanied children 
intended to prevent child trafficking before expelling them as a 
result of an order related to the pandemic until February 2021, did 
not create a law enforcement victim screening protocol as required 
by law, and did not mandate screening of adult foreign nationals 
apprehended, interdicted, or held in detention pending deportation. 
Advocates again reported concerns that trafficking survivors were 
held in immigration detention facilities and that the government 
still did not provide sufficient services for labor trafficking victims, 
boys and men, and LGBTQI+ persons.
The government had formal procedures to guide officials in victim 
identification and referral to service providers. The government also 
funded several federal tip lines, including an NGO-operated national 
hotline and referral service, as well as victim assistance organizations 
that provided trafficking-specific services. Victim assistance funded 
by the federal government included case management, medical 
care, mental health and substance use disorder treatment, housing 
and shelter, translation and interpretation services, a broad range of 
legal services, employment and training, transportation assistance, 
and other services.
DOJ provided funding for victim-centered services for both foreign 
national and domestic trafficking victims. In June 2020, DOJ 
consolidated its program office’s law enforcement, juvenile justice, 
and victim services human trafficking initiatives into one division 
within the same office to better align its funding, training, victim 
assistance, and other resources. HHS issued Certification and Eligibility 
Letters to foreign national victims of severe forms of trafficking to 
establish eligibility to apply for benefits and services to the same 
extent as refugees, provided grant funding for comprehensive case 
management for foreign national and domestic trafficking victims, and 
funded capacity-building grants for community-based organizations 
and child welfare systems to respond to trafficking. Record-keeping 
systems used by DOJ and HHS did not allow for cross-referencing to 
determine which victims were served by grantees of both agencies. 
During FY 2020, DOJ provided about $74.6 million for 133 awards to 
support victim assistance programs across the United States, compared 
to $73.3 million for 116 awards in FY 2019. Specific programs included 
$35.1 million for 73 housing assistance awards (supported in part 
with funding returned to DOJ by the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development), $23.6 million for 43 victim service awards 
addressing a broad range of case management and specialized service 
needs, and $14.9 million for 15 awards supporting specialized 
services at the state level for child trafficking victims. In addition, 
DOJ provided funding to increase survivors’ access to educational 
and employment opportunities ($300,000) and for training and 
technical assistance to improve housing services offered to trafficking 
victims nationwide (about $643,000). DOJ grantees providing victim 
services reported from July 1, 2019, to June 30, 2020, 9,854 open 
trafficking client cases, an increase from 8,375 open client cases the 
previous year. Of these open client cases, 5,968 were new clients, an 
increase from 5,090 new clients reported the previous year. DOJ’s 
grantees reported 61 percent of clients served during the reporting 
period were U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, 37 percent 
were foreign nationals, and the status of two percent was unknown. 
Grantees reported 62 percent of clients served were victims of sex 
trafficking, 23 percent were victims of labor trafficking, seven percent 
were identified as victims of both sex and labor trafficking, and the 
form of trafficking for eight percent was unknown. 
HHS runs two victim assistance programs – one for foreign national 
victims and the other for domestic victims of human trafficking. 
HHS awarded $5.4 million in FY 2020 for the provision of case 
management services to foreign national victims through a nationwide 
network of NGO sub-recipients, a significant decrease from $10.9 
million in FY 2019. Through this program, HHS supported 96 NGOs 
that served 2,352 individuals, including 1,457 victims of trafficking 
and 895 qualified family members in 41 states and U.S. territories, a 
significant increase from 1,573 individuals served from the previous 
year. HHS’s grantees in its victim assistance program for foreign 
national victims reported 66 percent of clients served were victims 
of labor trafficking, 22 percent were victims of sex trafficking, and 12 
percent were identified as victims of both sex and labor trafficking. 
For the provision of case management services to domestic victims 
of human trafficking, HHS awarded $5.3 million in FY 2020, a 
significant increase from $2.9 million in FY 2019, which served 884 
victims of trafficking in 11 states through collaborative partnerships 
with 245 service providers, an increase from 825 individuals served 
the previous year. HHS’s grantees in its victim assistance program 
for domestic victims of human trafficking reported 95.5 percent 
of clients served were victims of sex trafficking, 0.5 percent were 
victims of labor trafficking, three percent were identified as victims 
of both sex and labor trafficking, and the form of trafficking for one 
percent was unknown. 
In response to the pandemic, DOJ and HHS published comprehensive 
resource guides for grantees that included how to operate, provide 
services, and manage grants during the pandemic. HHS provided 
flexibilities in grant program performance reporting deadlines 
and technical assistance to support grantees’ transition to remote 
operations and phased re-openings.
Advocates noted that while funding for victim services remained high, 
these investments were undermined by policies and practices that 
decreased the availability of protections to trafficking victims and 
support for individuals at heightened risk to trafficking. Advocates 
noted a continued lack of available federal trafficking victim resources 
or specialized services for labor trafficking victims, boys and men, 
LGBTQI+ persons, persons with disabilities, and those who do not 
wish to participate in the criminal justice process. NGOs called on 
DOL to fund employment programs specifically for human trafficking 





NGOs reported the pandemic affected survivors, such as through 
job loss, heightened health issues or reduced access to health care, 
and delays with judicial decisions in their trafficking cases, and 
noted that survivors thus had a greater reliance on services, needed 
services for longer periods of time, or returned to services. NGOs 
called for flexibility in government service grants to meet these needs. 
Advocates reported even more drastic lack of access to housing 
because of the need for shelters and housing facilities to operate 
at limited capacity due to the pandemic, coupled with increased 
assistance requests, including for transitional housing and long-term 
housing options for trafficking victims. One NGO called for grant 
funding for emergency and temporary housing options to meet this 
exacerbated housing need. 
A Certification Letter enables foreign national adult victims of severe 
forms of trafficking in persons to be eligible to apply for benefits and 
services to the same extent as refugees when DHS grants Continued 
Presence or when a victim has a bona fide or approved application 
for T nonimmigrant status, as described further below. An Eligibility 
or Interim Assistance Letter enables foreign national minors to apply 
for benefits and services to the same extent as refugees. HHS issues 
such letters when the Department receives credible information the 
child is or may be a victim of a severe form of trafficking in persons 
under the TVPA. HHS issued 508 Certification Letters to foreign 
national adults in FY 2020, representing a significant increase from 
311 in FY 2019, and issued 673 Eligibility Letters to foreign national 
children in FY 2020, representing a significant decrease from 892 
in FY 2019. Of the 508 foreign national adult victims certified in FY 
2020, 70 percent were labor trafficking victims, 15 percent were sex 
trafficking victims, 11 percent were victims of both sex and labor 
trafficking, and four percent were victims of a severe form of trafficking 
in persons unknown to HHS. Out of 673 foreign national child 
victims certified in FY 2020, 69 percent were labor trafficking victims, 
25 percent were sex trafficking victims, five percent were victims of 
both labor and sex trafficking, and one percent were victims of a 
severe form of trafficking in persons unknown to HHS. In FY 2020, 
HHS launched an online case management system to automate and 
streamline the process for survivors to request assistance, receive 
secure case coordination messages, and check for updates on cases 
and letter verification status.
In FY 2020, a State program reunified 87 family members with 43 
identified victims of trafficking in the United States, a significant 
decrease from 204 family members and 89 identified victims in FY 2019.
DHS provides immigration options specifically for victims of trafficking 
through Continued Presence, a temporary immigration designation, 
and T nonimmigrant status, another temporary immigration 
benefit (commonly referred to as the “T visa”). Both immigration 
options strengthen law enforcement’s ability to investigate and 
prosecute human trafficking by offering foreign national victims 
temporary immigration relief. To qualify for Continued Presence, 
law enforcement must identify an individual as a victim of human 
trafficking who may be a potential witness in the investigation or 
prosecution of the trafficker. To qualify for T nonimmigrant status, 
an applicant must demonstrate that they (1) are a victim of a severe 
form of trafficking in persons; (2) are physically present in the United 
States, its territories and outlying possessions, or at a U.S. port of 
entry on account of trafficking; (3) have complied with reasonable 
requests from law enforcement, unless they are younger than the 
age of 18 or unable to cooperate due to trauma suffered; and (4) 
would suffer extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm 
upon removal from the United States. T nonimmigrant applicants 
may sponsor certain family members, including certain extended 
family members who face a present danger of retaliation as a result 
of the principal applicant’s trafficking situation or cooperation 
with law enforcement. T nonimmigrants and their derivative family 
members are authorized to work and are eligible for certain federal 
public benefits and services. T nonimmigrant status is granted for 
a period of four years and may be extended under certain limited 
circumstances. After three years, or upon the completion of the 
investigation or prosecution, T nonimmigrants may be eligible to 
apply for lawful permanent resident status and eventually may be 
eligible for citizenship. DHS granted T nonimmigrant status to 1,040 
victims in FY 2020, a significant increase from 500 victims in FY 
2019, and granted T nonimmigrant status to 1,018 eligible family 
members of victims in FY 2020, compared to 491 family members 
in FY 2019. The median processing time for T nonimmigrant status 
applications increased to 18.6 months in FY 2020 from 16.2 months 
in FY 2019, 12.1 months in FY 2018, and 9.6 months in FY 2017. 
During the reporting period, the government continued to modify 
its immigration policies affecting certain forms of humanitarian 
relief, such as T nonimmigrant status. A new administration came 
into office in January 2021 and reviewed, rescinded, and announced 
it would not implement a number of these policies. DHS published 
a final rule in August 2020 that changed its fee waiver determination 
process for certain immigration filings, including filings related 
to T nonimmigrant status. Under this rule, applications for T 
nonimmigrant status remained fee-exempt, and applicants were 
still permitted to seek a fee waiver for related filings based on 
their household income, but they could no longer use receipt of a 
means-tested benefit or proof of financial hardship as reasons for 
the waiver request. As of the end of the reporting period, there were 
two preliminary injunctions on the final rule, suspending DHS’s 
implementation of the rule. In February 2021, the new administration 
issued an executive order for federal agencies to review actions that 
fail to promote access to the legal immigration system, including the 
final rule related to DHS’s fee waiver determination process. While 
the fee waiver policy is under review, DHS adjudicated fee waiver 
requests under its 2011 policy, which allows for applicants to qualify 
under the receipt of means-tested criteria. 
In response to the February 2021 executive order, federal agencies 
also began to review actions related to implementation of the 
public charge ground for inadmissibility and to identify steps to 
communicate current public charge policies and changes, if any, to 
reduce fear and confusion among affected communities. In March 
2021, DHS announced the government would no longer defend the 
public charge final rule issued in August 2019 and implemented in 
February 2020. In March 2021, a U.S. district court’s order vacating 
the public charge final rule went into effect. As a result, DHS stopped 
applying the final rule to all pending and future applications and 
petitions that otherwise would have been subject to the rule, issued 
a new final rule removing the regulatory provisions promulgated by 
the August 2019 rule, and began applying the public charge ground 
of inadmissibility consistent with its 1999 guidance. Applicants 
for T nonimmigrant status, T nonimmigrants seeking to adjust 
status, applicants for U nonimmigrant status, and U nonimmigrants 
seeking to adjust status are exempt from the public charge ground 
of inadmissibility. 
Additionally, in January 2021, DHS rescinded its 2018 policy regarding 
notices to appear (NTA). The 2018 policy allowed DHS to generally 
issue NTAs for individuals who were denied certain immigration 
options, including individuals who were removable upon denial 
of T or U nonimmigrant status (after the appeal or motion period 
ended). As a result of the recission, DHS began issuing only statutory 
and regulatory NTAs and those required by court order, settlement 
agreement, or for litigation need.
Advocates again reported increased obstacles to obtaining T 
nonimmigrant status. For instance, advocates again noted a continuing 
rise in the number of requests for additional evidence by adjudicators, 
which tends to increase processing times, and reported increased 
T nonimmigrant status denials that they believed improperly 
interpreted relevant statutes and regulations, such as denials based 
on unlawful acts traffickers compelled victims to commit or narrower 
interpretations of the physical presence requirement. Advocates 
also expressed concern with DHS’s August 2020 final rule regarding 
changes to its fee waiver policy, stating the changes impeded access to 















immigration options. They noted inconsistent fee waiver adjudication 
and increased denials have caused hardships for survivors trying to 
access trafficking-specific immigration options, particularly during 
the pandemic, citing that a large number of survivors – some of 
whom were facing financial insecurity or experiencing homelessness 
– used resources meant for housing and other living expenses to pay 
filing fees. Some survivors chose to delay applying for immigration 
options due to fear they would not have the means to pay for fees 
if their fee waiver request was denied.
Advocates continued to voice concern with lengthy and increasing T 
nonimmigrant status processing times, citing added vulnerabilities for 
survivors who lack legal status or whose time-limited support services 
expire, and they called for removal of policies that unnecessarily 
slow down the adjudication of T nonimmigrant status applications. 
NGOs voiced concern with the DHS position to not conduct bona 
fide determinations for T nonimmigrant status applications, which 
would allow applicants to receive deferred action from removal 
and employment authorization. They reported this practice has left 
trafficking victims in vulnerable situations, whether in immigration 
detention, unable to legally work, or at risk of removal before their T 
nonimmigrant status application is adjudicated, which would make 
them ineligible for the status. NGOs called for DHS to improve 
training for adjudicators that includes detailed guidance on current 
regulations, examples of trafficking situations, information on a 
trauma-informed approach, and instructions for drafting victim-
centered requests for additional evidence developed with input 
from survivors and other nongovernmental subject matter experts. 
Advocates continued to report an increasing number of foreign 
national survivors are afraid to report their cases to law enforcement, 
pursue immigration options, or seek services due to heightened 
immigration enforcement policies and increased fear of removing 
victim witnesses from the United States. Advocates again stated that 
DHS’s November 2018 policy on notice to appear undermined the 
intent of the TVPA to safeguard victims of trafficking. As a result of 
the public charge final rule, survivors were afraid to access public 
assistance programs to which they are entitled and their clients were 
withdrawing from or choosing not to enroll in programs. NGOs 
noted the new administration’s actions in 2021 to review, rescind, or 
not implement prior modifications to certain forms of humanitarian 
relief were a necessary first step to rebuilding survivors’ trust in the 
safety of pursuing immigration options. 
DHS manages all requests from federal, state, and local law 
enforcement for Continued Presence, authorizing foreign nationals 
identified by law enforcement as trafficking victims who may be 
potential witnesses to remain lawfully and work in the United 
States during the investigation and prosecution of the crime. In FY 
2020, DHS issued Continued Presence to 117 trafficking victims, 
who were potential witnesses, compared to 125 in FY 2019. DHS 
granted 56 extensions of Continued Presence, compared to 48 in 
FY 2019. Effective February 2021, DHS streamlined its process to 
review Continued Presence after moving the administration of the 
program to its new center for countering human trafficking, which 
it established in October 2020 to bring together multiple DHS 
components to prioritize human trafficking investigations, victim 
identification, and public outreach. DOJ and DHS convened an 
interagency working group and held listening sessions with victim 
service providers and state and local law enforcement members of 
human trafficking task forces to receive input on improvements to 
the Continued Presence process.
Advocates reported continued concern with the low number of 
Continued Presence requests made by law enforcement and noted 
the heightened importance of this temporary status to access services 
given increased obstacles to obtaining T nonimmigrant status. NGOs 
called for targeted training of law enforcement in geographic areas 
with the greatest disparities between requests for Continued Presence 
and applications for T nonimmigrant status. They also recommended 
the government grant federal victim assistance specialists the authority 
to request Continued Presence. NGOs again reported survivors of 
sex trafficking were more likely to obtain Continued Presence than 
survivors of labor trafficking.
Another immigration benefit available to certain human trafficking 
victims is U nonimmigrant status (commonly referred to as the “U 
visa”) for victims of certain qualifying crimes, including human 
trafficking, who are, have been, or are likely to be helpful in the 
detection, investigation, prosecution, conviction, or sentencing of 
the qualifying criminal activity and meet other specific eligibility 
requirements. While DHS has conducted an analysis on a random 
sample of U nonimmigrant status applications, it is unable to 
accurately track the number of approved applications based on 
the specific underlying crimes for which they were issued. Partly in 
response to litigation, in December 2020, DHS stopped applying its 
December 2019 policy to reject a U nonimmigrant status application 
if any field on the form was left blank. (While DHS posted an alert 
in March 2020 indicating that T nonimmigrant status applications 
could be rejected if required fields were left blank or incomplete, DHS 
never implemented a no blank spaces policy for T nonimmigrant 
status applications.)
Advocates expressed concern with the lack of advance notice of 
the December 2019 DHS policy not to allow applications with any 
blank fields to be accepted at the time of filing, citing that DHS 
communicated it by posting an alert on its website the same day 
the policy took effect. During the first month of the DHS policy, 
the rejection rate for U nonimmigrant status reached 97.7 percent. 
DHS data showed it rejected almost 12,000 U nonimmigrant status 
petitions from December 30, 2019 to July 2020, or about half of all 
applications received during that period. 
 In July 2020, an NGO sued DOL, alleging that July 2019 amendments 
to its policy of certifying applications for U and T nonimmigrant 
status were issued without following proper administrative procedure. 
The July 2019 amendments had required DOL to make a referral 
to criminal law enforcement prior to issuing certifications, among 
other changes. NGOs reported the amended DOL certification 
policy created additional barriers to obtaining U or T nonimmigrant 
status and deterred victims from coming forward. In February 2021, 
DOL withdrew its July 2019 amendments to its policy for certifying 
applications for U and T nonimmigrant status.
To enhance protections for unaccompanied children and combat child 
trafficking, DHS and HHS share responsibility for the processing, 
treatment, and placement of unaccompanied children. This includes 
a screening by DHS within 48 hours of apprehension, transfer of 
certain unaccompanied children to HHS custody within 72 hours, 
and prompt placement by HHS in the least restrictive setting that 
is in the best interest of the child. When foreign national children 
are placed in the care and custody of HHS, they are screened for 
human trafficking. The TVPA also requires any federal, state, or local 
official with information on a foreign national minor who may 
have experienced human trafficking to refer those cases to HHS to 
assess whether the minor is eligible for services to the same extent 
as a refugee. When appropriate, HHS makes a determination of 
eligibility for benefits and services, which may include long-term 
assistance. In FY 2020, HHS assisted 347 foreign national child 
victims of trafficking, including 142 new enrollments, through its 
Unaccompanied Refugee Minors Program, compared to 231 foreign 
national child victims of trafficking, including 70 new enrollments in 
FY 2019. (The FY 2019 number of victims assisted (231) and number 
of new enrollments (70) represent corrections to the numbers cited 
last year (228 and 69, respectively.) This program requires states to 
provide such child victims with the same assistance, care, and services 
available to foster children. 
DHS is required to screen certain individuals for human trafficking, 
including unaccompanied children and some detained individuals. 
In cases where potential victims were identified, DHS referred cases 





national adults apprehended, interdicted, or in detention pending 
removal from the United States, DHS does not mandate screening of 
such individuals for trafficking indicators. The government issued an 
order in March 2020 under Title 42 of the U.S. Code that authorized 
the government to suspend the entry of migrants arriving at U.S. land 
ports of entry through Canada and Mexico who would be subject to 
immigration processing. As a result of the Title 42 order related to 
the pandemic, the government began expelling migrants, including 
unaccompanied children. Such unaccompanied children were held 
in DHS custody for various lengths of time. While Title 8 of the U.S. 
Code requires the government to screen unaccompanied children 
and follow certain procedures to place the children in the least 
restrictive setting in the best interest of the child to combat child 
trafficking, unaccompanied children were processed and expelled 
pursuant to the Title 42 order and not Title 8. In February 2021, the 
government announced that it was suspending the expulsion of 
unaccompanied children pursuant to the order, and such children 
were thereafter processed under Title 8. From March to November 
2020, DHS detained at least 660 unaccompanied children in hotels, 
where they were largely restricted from leaving their room, for various 
lengths of time – some for up to 38 days – when the TVPA requires 
a transfer to HHS custody within 72 hours. During the first part of 
2021, DHS worked with HHS to increase HHS capacity to accept 
arriving children, including increasing transportation capacity, 
co-locating personnel to help with case management and shelter 
management, and creating a new interagency coordination body. 
During the reporting period, the government continued not to 
mandate human trafficking screening for all foreign national adults 
in immigration detention or custody. In some cases, migrants were 
expelled to a country where they were not a citizen and did not speak 
the language, heightening their vulnerability to human trafficking. 
DHS and DOJ did not establish law enforcement victim screening 
protocols for human trafficking cases, as required by laws enacted 
prior to the reporting period. HHS developed a human trafficking 
screening tool for domestic violence shelters and programs. 
A center that provides legal services for children noted DHS’s screening 
mechanisms for unaccompanied children have often failed to identify 
child trafficking cases. One NGO reported that between March and 
November, the government expelled at least 13,000 unaccompanied 
children. Advocates called for a study on the effect of the government’s 
recent policies around unaccompanied children on their trauma 
and vulnerability to human trafficking. NGOs noted that changes 
limiting asylum eligibility and preventing people from applying 
have placed trafficking survivors at increased risk of violence and 
trauma, particularly those fleeing a trafficking situation involving 
family members, intimate partners, or gangs. Advocates also reported 
trafficking survivors are increasingly held in immigration detention, 
which limits their access to critical services needed to begin recovering 
from their trauma and experience and keeps them in unsafe and 
unsanitary conditions. 
The U.S. government continued to provide and fund training to 
federal, state, local, and tribal officials, as well as to NGO service 
providers and health and human service providers, to encourage 
more consistent application of victim-centered, trauma-informed, and 
culturally responsive approaches in all phases of victim identification, 
assistance, recovery, and participation in the criminal justice process. 
In FY 2020, HHS delivered 91 training and technical assistance 
activities to more than 50,000 federal grantees and health and 
human service professionals, including more than 46,000 people 
who completed its online training. In FY 2020, DOJ awarded $3.6 
million in funding under two contracts to deliver training and 
technical assistance to grantees and to organizations building their 
capacity to respond to human trafficking victims. DOJ’s specialized 
training and technical assistance providers assisted organizations 
in strengthening their anti-trafficking responses related to housing, 
employment, legal services, trauma-informed care, courts, and 
identifying labor trafficking victims.
Advocates continued to report that survivors with criminal records 
resulting from unlawful acts their traffickers compelled them to 
commit often remain excluded from employment, housing, and 
higher education; are ineligible for government programs; and face 
difficulties meeting needs essential to their safety and recovery. 
Advocates again called for better trafficking screening of individuals 
with disabilities to improve the identification of potential victims. 
Advocates noted federal efforts around addressing human trafficking 
in the child welfare system focused almost exclusively on child sex 
trafficking and called for equal efforts to address child labor trafficking 
within the system. 
PREVENTION
The U.S. government decreased efforts to prevent trafficking. In 
October 2020, the government issued and began to implement a 
comprehensive three-year national action plan to combat human 
trafficking. Federal agencies conducted numerous educational 
and training activities for their own personnel, state, local, and 
tribal officials, and other stakeholders. To enhance transparency 
and stakeholder input, the President’s Interagency Task Force to 
Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons reported on agency 
accomplishments and future efforts and again invited members of 
the presidentially appointed survivor advisory council, as well as 
members of the presidentially appointed public-private partnership 
advisory council, to join its meeting. However, the government did not 
take sufficient measures to address the factors, government policies, 
and conditions that increase historically marginalized communities’ 
risk to human trafficking, such as the exclusion of domestic and 
agricultural workers from legal worker protections. The government 
repealed housing regulations meant to correct discriminatory housing 
practices and past harms, and it rolled back legal protections for 
LGBTQI+ persons; advocates noted these actions contributed to 
the systemic marginalization and vulnerability of communities 
overrepresented among trafficking victims and disproportionately 
affected by the pandemic. The government again did not increase 
efforts to prevent human trafficking in its employment-based and 
other nonimmigrant visa programs or to hold employers and their 
agents, including labor recruiters, accountable for practices known 
to lead to human trafficking. In addition, it implemented policies 
that reduced its ability to oversee and enforce worker protections in 
these programs, which made it even harder for workers to protect 
themselves from an abusive employer or to access a healthy and 
safe workplace during the pandemic because they were forced to 
continue working or feared losing their job and immigration status. 
The government continued public outreach measures on the causes 
and consequences of human trafficking and continued efforts to 
increase victim identification among vulnerable populations and 
sectors and to seek and incorporate survivor input into policies and 
programs. HHS continued to fund an NGO to operate the national 
human trafficking hotline. In FY 2020, the hotline received 195,100 
calls, texts, chats, online tips, and emails, identified 11,193 potential 
human trafficking cases, and provided 8,701 referrals to potential 
victims. In response to the pandemic, the hotline transitioned to 
fully remote operations with no disruption in services. The number 
of emergency trafficking cases handled by the hotline increased 
by more than 40 percent in the month following shelter-in-place 
orders compared to the prior month. More than 13,000 signals, 
which includes calls, texts, and web chats, came from individuals 
who identified themselves as potential victims of trafficking seeking 
help, with calls being the most common method of communication. 
The U.S. government operated other tip lines that received calls 
or messages related to suspected human trafficking cases. U.S. 
embassies and consulates worldwide continued to provide the “Know 
Your Rights” pamphlet to visa applicants in multiple languages for 
temporary work and exchange visitor categories and play a related 
video in certain consular waiting rooms to help visa applicants better 
understand their rights and raise awareness of human trafficking. In 
FY 2020, the pamphlet generated 113 signals to the national hotline, 















In response to an increased risk of encountering traffickers online, 
DHS partnered with a national NGO to run social media ads directing 
people to internet safety resources. HHS established a grant program 
on creating and implementing strategies to deliver prevention 
education and skills-based training to school communities. For 
the fourth year, HHS continued its leadership academy composed 
of survivors and anti-trafficking professionals that developed 
recommendations for addressing risk factors among migrant families 
to labor trafficking. The HHS advisory committee on child sex 
trafficking, composed of trafficking survivors and other subject matter 
experts, published a report on best practices and recommendations 
for states. The Department of Education supported human trafficking 
prevention awareness for schools, including by launching a webpage 
dedicated to human trafficking; releasing the second edition of 
its guide for school communities on how to use individualized 
interventions for students who have experienced human trafficking 
and suggested steps for reintegrating such students into educational 
environments; and releasing a brief about integrating school-based 
prevention and intervention strategies to combat domestic child 
sex trafficking. The Department of Transportation (DOT) and DHS 
continued to train aviation personnel and, in FY 2020, formed 
27 new partnerships with airlines, airports, and aviation industry 
organizations for a total of 59 partners. During the reporting period, 
DOT’s initiative of transportation leaders aligned against human 
trafficking secured 55 pledges across the transportation sector for a 
total of 533 partners, with a commitment to train their employees and 
raise public awareness. DOT also awarded the first annual $50,000 
grant to incentivize the development of innovative solutions that 
increase human trafficking prevention efforts among transportation 
stakeholders. Domestically, DOJ trained more than 11,000 people 
through its public online training series on trauma-informed and 
victim-centered approaches to human trafficking, and DOJ grantees 
reported providing training to 72,326 anti-trafficking partners and 
stakeholders. DOJ, DHS, and State, along with Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, consulted with six tech 
companies to develop public service announcements to prevent and 
respond to online exploitation, including child sex trafficking, during 
the pandemic. HHS and DOJ held national listening sessions on 
preventing and responding to child trafficking during the pandemic. 
In FY 2020, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC) participated in 120 outreach events that addressed human 
trafficking, reaching 12,020 individuals, and continued efforts to 
increase public awareness about human trafficking with its human 
trafficking resource guide. DOL launched a labor trafficking awareness 
campaign that highlighted the effect of the pandemic on risk factors, 
indicators, and identification challenges. DOL also held a national 
online dialogue for stakeholders to provide ideas and comments 
on DOL’s efforts to combat labor trafficking. Treasury held bilateral 
banking dialogues with foreign partners and financial institutions to 
discuss financial trends, typologies, and how financial tools can help 
combat human trafficking. Congress made available $92 million in 
FY 2020 foreign assistance resources to State and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development to support international anti-trafficking 
initiatives in countries in every region of the world. 
NGOs noted human trafficking prevention efforts must address 
the ways systemic exploitation of Black and Brown communities 
heighten their vulnerability to human trafficking, especially given 
the disproportionate effect of COVID-19 on their health, economic 
stability, and safety. For instance, workers in domestic and agricultural 
sectors, performing duties historically performed by people who were 
enslaved, people who were formerly enslaved, and their descendants, 
were and remained specifically excluded from legal worker protections 
under federal law. Their lack of legal protections combined with the 
heightened isolation, economic uncertainty, and health risks due to 
COVID-19 has increased their risk of human trafficking. Despite the 
pandemic exacerbating housing instability for many individuals, 
which is a vulnerability traffickers often target, the government 
repealed regulations meant to correct and prevent discriminatory 
housing practices. In addition, advocates noted the government’s 
removal of protections from discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation and gender identity by federally funded health and 
welfare programs, efforts to revise the definition of sex in federal 
laws to exclude LGBTQI+ persons, and elimination of data collection 
requirements on LGBTQI+ youth in foster care during the reporting 
period furthered the LGBTQI+ community’s marginalization and 
heightened their risk to human trafficking. Advocates continued to 
call for a more comprehensive and proactive approach to address the 
factors and conditions that increase vulnerabilities, such as creating 
economic opportunities to empower communities at higher risk for 
human trafficking and providing critical support services that human 
traffickers might otherwise offer. 
DOL, DHS, and State screen and approve employers and workers 
for temporary foreign worker programs to ensure compliance with 
program requirements, including worker protections. To reduce 
workers’ vulnerability to exploitation, including human trafficking, 
the United States bars employers participating in these programs or 
their agents (whether or not those agents or others in the recruitment 
chain are in contractual privity with the employer or a recruiter, 
whether or not located in the United States, and whether or not such 
agents are governmental or non-governmental entities) from seeking 
or receiving payments from workers for any activities related to 
obtaining labor certification or employment. These payments include 
job placement and recruitment fees, and salary and wage deductions, 
and the United States requires that the terms of employment be 
disclosed. DOL seeks to ensure employer compliance through audits 
and investigations and does not accept temporary labor certification 
applications if the employer discloses it charges a prohibited fee to 
the worker. State waived interviews for certain first-time H-2 visa 
applicants to avoid labor shortages in U.S. supply chains due to the 
pandemic. The interview waivers reduced the government’s ability 
to verbally ensure applicants know their rights under the program 
and to detect potential cases of fraud that increase an applicant’s 
vulnerability to human trafficking. Workers received the “Know Your 
Rights” pamphlet along with their passport containing an issued 
visa rather than prior to visa approval. In April 2020, DHS issued 
a temporary final rule allowing H-2A agricultural employers with 
the flexibility to immediately hire workers who held H-2A status at 
the time of the petition and extended workers’ maximum allowable 
period of stay. DHS issued a similar rule for the H-2B non-agricultural 
program in May 2020 before a June executive action froze State’s 
issuance of new H-2B visas.
In September 2020, the U.S. and Guatemalan governments expanded 
an agreement that required Guatemala to begin performing labor 
recruitment directly or to create and maintain a registered foreign 
labor recruiter-monitoring program for the H-2A program to include 
the H-2B program.
Advocates again reported weak oversight of employment-based 
and other nonimmigrant visa programs and documented human 
trafficking cases involving workers in the United States on these 
programs. From April 1 to September 30, 2020, the number of 
cases reported to the national human trafficking hotline involving 
a potential victim in H-2A status more than doubled compared to 
the previous six months. Advocates continued to call for enhanced 
protections for workers in temporary worker programs, including 
regulatory changes to uncouple employment visas from an employer 
or sponsor, and to protect individuals in certain temporary worker 
programs to the same extent as other workers. NGOs continued to call 
for increased transparency and accountability for temporary worker 
programs and for agencies to develop a more accessible system to 
share visa applications and job-related information with workers 
in real time, including the names of employer petitioners. NGOs 
noted concern that the DHS temporary final rules regarding the H-2 
programs exacerbate workers’ vulnerability to exploitation, including 
human trafficking, by granting employers more control over workers’ 
employment situation. NGOs and news outlets reported employers 
using threats of job loss, blacklisting, and deportation if workers left 





for COVID-19, despite the high rates of infection in the food and 
agricultural sectors. One NGO expressed concern with State’s policy 
to waive interviews for certain first-time H-2 visa applicants because 
such interviews provided a critical layer of review for fraud concerns 
and allowed State to confirm workers understood their rights.
Formal and informal recruiters, labor contractors, and agents continued 
to charge workers prohibited fees, and the government’s enforcement 
of the ban on worker-paid recruitment fees and other prohibited 
practices meant to prevent workers from experiencing situations of 
heightened risk to human trafficking remained weak. H-2A employers 
increasingly relied on labor contractors to shield themselves from 
liability for any violations, including by intentionally remaining 
uninformed about the recruitment process and the treatment or 
conditions of workers outside of work hours, including housing 
conditions and wage payments. In August 2020, H-2A workers filed 
a class action lawsuit against a farm labor contractor alleging illegal 
wage deductions, underpayment of wages in violation of written 
contracts and the Fair Labor Standards Act, worker-paid recruitment 
fees, and threats of blacklisting and deportation. As of the close of 
the reporting period, the farm labor contractor continued to hold a 
farm labor contractor certification of registration under the Migrant 
and Seasonal Worker Protection Act. 
Advocates called on the government to increase enforcement of 
H-2 program requirements and hold accountable employers and 
their agents who have exploited workers and violated visa program 
regulations. They also recommended the government create a public 
registry of certified labor recruiters and implement a policy that 
incentivizes workers to report experiencing prohibited employment 
or recruitment practices, instead of denying them a visa. 
State continued its oversight of the Exchange Visitor Program (EVP, 
commonly referred to as the “J-1 visa”), which includes among 
others the Summer Work Travel, Camp Counselor, Intern, and Au 
Pair programs. State continued to monitor exchange visitors to 
help safeguard their health, safety, and welfare and to identify and 
investigate program fraud and abuse, and it enhanced its virtual 
monitoring capabilities. State conducted outreach throughout 
2020 to raise program sponsors’ awareness of their administrative 
oversight and reporting obligations to State with respect to the 
health, safety, and welfare of exchange visitors. State requires EVP 
sponsors to provide all exchange visitors with the “Know Your Rights” 
pamphlet during orientation sessions. State continued to liaise and 
collaborate with law enforcement on criminal investigations relating 
to the EVP in 2020. 
Advocates continued to report the need for additional steps to 
reduce the risks of exploitation in some EVP categories, noting 
concerns with fraudulent recruitment practices, exorbitant program 
fees, and exploitative work conditions. A news report featuring 
interviews with former and current EVP au pairs detailed a lack of 
oversight of sponsors and families, including insufficient corrective 
action and frequent sponsor non-compliance with the program’s 
reporting requirements. In June 2020, two former EVP au pairs sued 
their former sponsor agency and host family, claiming the family 
subjected them to forced labor. State is not party to the lawsuit. Two 
groups of international students each separately sued an EVP student 
intern program sponsor alleging forced labor, among other offenses. 
Advocates called for increased protections for EVP exchange visitors 
under U.S. labor and employment laws with oversight by DOL, more 
accountability of sponsors and participating employers, and greater 
transparency about employers and occupations. 
State and the U.S. Mission to the UN continued to implement their 
respective domestic worker In-person Registration Programs for A-3 
and G-5 visa holders employed by foreign mission and international 
organization personnel in the United States. Due to the pandemic, the 
programs temporarily transitioned to phone and video registrations. 
During the reporting period, State found the continued presence in 
the United States of an international organization employee to be 
“undesirable” pursuant to the law, such that if she did not depart 
the United States by a certain date she would no longer be entitled 
to the benefits accorded to employees of designated international 
organizations under U.S. law, including the immigration benefit of 
G nonimmigrant status. This was following an investigation into 
allegations including submission of a fraudulent labor contract and 
participation in a scheme to underpay and overwork a domestic 
worker in violation of contract terms. State also asked a foreign 
government to waive immunity of a foreign mission member 
following an investigation into allegations including fraud in foreign 
labor contracting and collection of data. State subsequently required 
the departure of the foreign mission member from the United States.
During the reporting period, lawsuits in Colorado, Georgia, Texas, and 
California remained pending against privately owned and operated 
detention facilities contracted by DHS. These lawsuits allege the 
contractors forced immigration detainees to work in violation of the 
TVPA during their federal immigration detention. DHS is not party 
to the lawsuits, nor are any of its component agencies. In January 
2021, a U.S. court of appeals ruled in one of these cases the TVPA 
applies to immigration detention facilities.
Advocates asserted that immigration detainee labor and convict 
labor perpetuate slavery and its legacy of racial injustice. They called 
for the government to end its use of labor in immigrant detention 
facilities, whether government-operated or operated through contracts 
with private entities, as these immigration detainees have not been 
convicted of a crime. They also called for the government to amend 
the U.S. Constitution to eliminate the exception to the Thirteenth 
Amendment that allows for slavery or involuntary servitude as 
punishment for those convicted of a crime. NGOs and media reported 
prisons and detention facilities threatened inmates or detainees 
with disciplinary action if they refused to work due to COVID-19.
Civil enforcement of federal laws continued to be a significant 
component of the government’s anti-trafficking efforts. DOL 
investigated complaints and conducted targeted civil labor 
investigations involving workers in industries and sectors known 
to be vulnerable to labor trafficking. Where appropriate, DOL refers 
these cases for criminal investigation. In FY 2020, DOL continued 
such enforcement activities in industries including agriculture, 
landscaping, hospitality, seafood processing, and reforestation. 
In FY 2020, DOL made 14 referrals to federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies or task forces and referred six H visa cases to 
DOL’s inspector general regarding allegations of human trafficking. 
Additionally, one criminal law enforcement agency referred a case 
to DOL, four criminal agencies requested DOL assistance, and 10 
such agencies requested DOL’s case file information. The EEOC 
enforces federal employment discrimination statutes, and it continued 
to investigate civil charges on behalf of and seek compensation 
for victims of trafficking during the reporting period. In FY 2020, 
the EEOC received three new charges of discrimination linked to 
human trafficking compared to six in FY 2019. For the one charge 
of discrimination the EEOC resolved in FY 2020, the EEOC did not 
recover monetary relief, compared to $56,000 in monetary benefits 
it recovered in resolution of charges in FY 2019. In August 2020, the 
EEOC settled a lawsuit with national origin and race claims against 
U.S.-based employers in Washington who hired Thai farm workers 
through a farm labor contractor. In 2016, a federal court entered 
a default judgment against the farm labor contractor and ordered 
damages to the workers who were subjected to “an unrelenting sense of 
imprisonment.” The settlement with the farms provided for $325,000 
to be distributed among 105 workers and required the employers, 
who had denied liability for the farm labor contractors’ actions, to 
institute accountability measures over their contractors, training, 
review of policies and procedures, and reporting of violations. As 
of September 30, 2020, the EEOC had 13 pending charges linked 
to human trafficking. 
NGOs stated DOL’s investigative divisions continued to be significantly 















inhibit meaningful or systematic enforcement of labor laws and 
detection of forced labor in industry supply chains. One NGO report 
released in December 2020 found more than 70 percent of farm 
investigations conducted by DOL uncovered violations, but there 
was only a one percent chance a farm would be investigated by DOL. 
NGOs continued to call for more resources to be allocated to DOL 
to enhance efforts to identify labor trafficking cases.
Federal law also allows a trafficking victim to independently file a civil 
cause of action, and there were cases in which individuals filed and 
successfully pursued civil causes of action during the reporting period.
The government made efforts to reduce the demand for commercial 
sex acts, including by prosecuting individuals for sex trafficking 
who pay or attempt to pay for commercial sex involving children. 
In May 2020, the government established an ad hoc working group 
to examine the role of demand reduction in preventing human 
trafficking. The working group held a listening session with survivors 
in December 2020. The government provided anti-trafficking training 
to its diplomats. 
Advocates called for greater efforts to address demand, including 
increased education and awareness, and called for these efforts to 
encompass sex trafficking and labor trafficking. One NGO called 
for DOJ to increase efforts to pursue the prosecution of those who 
knowingly purchase a commercial sex act with a trafficking victim, 
as well as financial penalties and mandatory restitution. 
The government made efforts to reduce the demand for participation 
in extraterritorial sexual exploitation and abuse (commonly referred 
to as “international sex tourism”) by its citizens, including by 
proactively investigating allegations of child sexual exploitation 
crimes perpetrated overseas by U.S. citizens and partnering with 
foreign law enforcement counterparts to share information regarding 
international travel of registered child sex offenders. At least three 
defendants were convicted federally in FY 2020 of engaging in 
extraterritorial child sexual exploitation and abuse, compared to 11 in 
the previous reporting period. Offenders who abuse children abroad 
may have been prosecuted under other statutes, and prosecutions 
based on other statutes are not reflected in this statistic. 
DOJ and other federal law enforcement agencies received zero 
allegations of forced labor or recruitment fees required of third-
country nationals working on certain U.S. government contracts 
abroad. DOJ initiated zero federal criminal prosecutions of employers 
or labor contractors for such violations in connection with U.S. 
government contracts abroad in FY 2020 and zero prosecutions for 
fraud in foreign labor contracting.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) notified agencies’ 
procurement offices three times of specific concerns regarding human 
trafficking risks in certain supply chains. Additionally, OMB held 
one call to coordinate efforts and share ideas among designated 
procurement officials for how to better protect agencies’ supply 
chains from being connected to human trafficking. Despite a 2019 
directive for certain agencies to designate these points of contact, 
not all had done so by the end of the reporting period. In FY 2020, 
1,050 federal employees completed human trafficking training for 
the acquisition workforce. As stated in the Prosecution section above, 
in FY 2020, DoD reported investigating 112 cases related to forced 
labor, compared to 13 cases in FY 2019. DoD took action against 
noncompliant employers and labor contractors resulting in one 
corrective action report, 50 local corrective actions, 48 other actions 
(including assisting DoD commands to achieve resolution), and 
DoD took no action in 13 cases. Where appropriate, DoD refers these 
cases for criminal investigation or pursues criminal investigations. 
DoD delivered anti-trafficking messaging and materials to more 
than 2,500 foreign workers, who had worked on U.S. bases in 
Afghanistan and were departing the country due to the drawdown, 
and interviewed more than 1,400 such workers to ensure they did 
not experience human trafficking on the base. DHS debarred one 
entity and two individuals convicted of engaging in human trafficking 
from conducting business with the federal government. 
The government increased efforts to prevent human trafficking in 
U.S. private sector supply chains. DHS continued to enforce the 
law that prohibits the importation of goods mined, produced, or 
manufactured, wholly or in part, under forced labor conditions, 
including forced child labor. In accordance with law, the government 
established a task force to monitor enforcement of this law. DHS 
received 50 allegations and issued 16 Withhold Release Orders within 
the reporting period for shipments of goods where information 
reasonably indicated that merchandise within the purview of Title 
19 U.S. Code section 1307 is being, or is likely to be, imported into 
the United States, resulting in the detention of 606 shipments worth 
approximately $90 million, compared to 53 allegations and six 
Withhold Release Orders within the previous reporting period. DHS 
collected $575,000 in civil penalties for violations of U.S. trade law 
regarding goods produced with forced labor. The new DHS center 
for countering human trafficking supported and coordinated the 
initiation of five criminal investigations of individuals and entities 
that may be benefitting from goods produced using forced labor 
overseas, including those importing high-demand goods due to 
the pandemic. 
The government took a series of measures to prevent U.S. businesses 
and consumers from interacting with or purchasing from entities 
engaged in forced labor and other human rights abuses in the 
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region and beyond, including 
issuing a business advisory, imposing export controls, and issuing 
sanctions against officials and entities. The U.S. government, led 
by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, engaged with the 
governments of Canada and Mexico to ensure implementation of 
a provision in the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement that 
entered into force in July 2020 requiring all three countries to prohibit 
the importation of goods produced wholly or in part with forced 
labor. DOJ convened an interagency task force that, after consulting 
external stakeholders, submitted to Congress a report that examined 
the United States government’s legal and regulatory authorities to 
address forced labor in fishing in international waters and the legal 
and jurisdictional challenges preventing it from acting effectively, 
and made recommendations to address gaps in the government’s 
legal and regulatory framework. DOL updated and added more than 
50 examples of promising practices to its mobile application that 
provides companies and industry groups with guidance on how to 
identify risks of forced and child labor in their supply chains and 
mitigate or remediate abuses.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended DHS 
better communicate to stakeholders the types of information that 
could help with forced labor cases related to seafood and other goods, 
as appropriate. GAO also recommended DHS better communicate 
information about its modification and revocation process for 
Withhold Release Orders. NGOs urged DHS to increase enforcement 
of its prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced 
labor, work with DOJ to prosecute violators, and increase transparency 
of its processes so NGOs and unions can monitor workers’ conditions. 
NGOs recommended OMB issue guidance requiring agencies to 
conduct risk assessments to identify contracts providing goods from 
high-risk regions or sectors and recommended greater transparency 
of agencies’ implementation of the federal acquisition regulation 
on human trafficking.
DOJ published an issue of its journal on federal law and practice 
dedicated to the topics of missing or murdered American Indians 
and Alaska Natives, which included discussions on identifying and 
preventing human trafficking. As part of the task force’s work, HHS’s 
operating division released a framework for missing and murdered 
American Indians and Alaska Natives in October 2020 to guide its 
programs for those communities. In FY 2020, HHS funded a new 
grant program in six locations to strengthen the response to victims of 





Survivors and anti-trafficking professionals who identify as Native 
American comprised HHS’s fifth class of its leadership academy, 
which developed recommendations for using cultural practices and 
traditions to prevent human trafficking among Native youth. HHS 
continued to offer online training to educate health care providers 
serving American Indians, Alaska Natives, Native Hawaiians, and 
Pacific Islanders regarding human trafficking and its effect on their 
communities, and 605 people completed the course during the 
reporting period. In FY 2020, HHS funded a new demonstration 
grant program to provide comprehensive case management services 
for indigenous survivors of human trafficking in Alaska, Hawaii, 
Minnesota, North Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin. DOJ 
awarded more than $39 million to tribal governments under its 
program to address domestic violence, dating violence, sexual assault, 
sex trafficking, and stalking.
Advocates from indigenous communities and NGOs highlighted 
the vulnerabilities created by systemic oppression, continued 
underfunding, and historical trauma that have led to significant rates 
of human trafficking among their communities. They recommended 
increased data collection and monitoring, trauma-informed cultural 
humility training for law enforcement and service providers, and 
more culturally appropriate and community-specific support and 
early intervention services. 
U.S. INSULAR AREAS 
Trafficking in persons occurs in the U.S. insular areas, including 
American Samoa, Guam, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana 
Islands (CNMI), Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands (USVI).
In Puerto Rico, DOJ created a working group composed of federal 
and state law enforcement agencies, NGOs, and higher learning 
institutions to assess the threat of and propose measures to protect 
women against violence, including human trafficking. In Guam 
and CNMI, members of DOJ-led human trafficking task forces 
continued to engage with community partners to provide victim 
services, train law enforcement, and share strategies for improving 
victim identification. DOJ also continued to advance an initiative 
that enhances coordination with stakeholders in the Pacific Region 
on victim services, law enforcement responses, training, community 
outreach, and prevention programs. DOJ and DHS continued to 
participate, along with local authorities in Puerto Rico, in the crimes 
against children task force. To increase capacity for DHS to connect 
victims in Puerto Rico and USVI involved in investigations with 
appropriate services, DHS identified anti-trafficking NGOs in the 
continental United States willing to accept victims identified in these 
territories. In addition, DHS provided training on trauma-informed 
and victim-centered investigations for its San Juan field office. 
HHS provided comprehensive case management services to foreign 
national victims of trafficking identified in American Samoa, Guam, 
CNMI, Puerto Rico, and USVI, and two DOJ grantees provided 
comprehensive and legal services to victims of all forms of trafficking 
in CNMI during the reporting period. HHS provided technical 
assistance on human trafficking to government and non-government 
stakeholders in Guam, with virtual participation including NGOs 
from other Pacific Island and Micronesian communities. 
As part of the prosecution statistics previously mentioned, DOJ filed 
one new human trafficking case in CNMI within the reporting period. 
Authorities pursued related non-trafficking charges in one federal 
case in CNMI that involved elements of human trafficking, including 
victims forced to work to repay debts incurred from recruitment 
fees, withholding of wages, forced overtime, confiscation of travel 
documents, verbal abuse, and threats of deportation and physical 
harm, in addition to other criminal and civil actions related to the 
labor scheme during prior reporting periods.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign national victims in the United States, and traffickers 
exploit victims from the United States abroad. Human trafficking 
cases have been reported in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 
U.S. territories. Traffickers compel victims to engage in commercial 
sex and to work in both legal and illicit industries and sectors, 
including in hospitality, traveling sales crews, agriculture, janitorial 
services, construction, landscaping, restaurants, factories, care for 
persons with disabilities, salon services, massage parlors, retail, 
fairs and carnivals, peddling and begging, drug smuggling and 
distribution, religious institutions, child care, and domestic work. 
Individuals who entered the United States with and without legal 
status have been identified as trafficking victims. Victims originate 
from almost every region of the world; the top three countries of 
origin of victims identified by federally funded providers in FY 2020 
were the United States, Mexico, and Honduras. Individuals in the 
United States vulnerable to human trafficking include: children in 
the child welfare and juvenile justice systems, including foster care; 
runaway and homeless youth; unaccompanied children; individuals 
seeking asylum; American Indians and Alaska Natives, particularly 
women and girls; individuals with substance use issues; migrant 
laborers, including undocumented workers and participants in visa 
programs for temporary workers; foreign national domestic workers 
in diplomatic households; persons with limited English proficiency; 
persons with disabilities; LGBTQI+ persons; and victims of intimate 
partner violence or domestic violence. Some U.S. citizens engage 
in extraterritorial child sexual exploitation and abuse in foreign 
countries. NGOs reported an increase in traffickers’ use of the internet 
to recruit and advertise victims during the pandemic. NGOs also 
noted a growing trend of misinformation about human trafficking 
spreading throughout communities and through social media, 
which they reported negatively affected anti-trafficking efforts by 
overburdening law enforcement and victim service providers with 
unactionable, false information.
URUGUAY: TIER 2
The Government of Uruguay does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, if any, on its anti-trafficking 
capacity; therefore Uruguay remained on Tier 2. These efforts included 
prosecuting more traffickers, increasing the number of dedicated anti-
trafficking units in Montevideo, and launching the nation’s largest 
investigation of sexual exploitation crimes, which included trafficking 
crimes and led to the identification of 20 child trafficking victims and 
the prosecution of more than 30 individuals for soliciting a child 
sex trafficking victim. However, the government did not meet the 
minimum standards in several key areas. The government identified 
fewer victims than in the previous reporting period. Law enforcement 
officials did not proactively and systematically identify victims, and 
the government did not provide adequate victim services or consistent 
access to shelters. The government devoted inadequate resources to 
investigating, prosecuting, and convicting labor traffickers and to 
protecting labor trafficking victims. There were no protection services 
accessible to adult male trafficking victims, and officials inconsistently 
referred labor trafficking victims to services. Some victims declined 
to participate in trials against their traffickers due to doubts about 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Provide adequate services and shelter for all victims, especially 
male victims and those outside the capital. • Increase training for 
law enforcement officials, labor inspectors, coast guard officers, 
prosecutors, judges, and social workers to understand human 
trafficking and, as appropriate, proactively identify victims of sex 
and labor trafficking. • Implement a set of routine guidelines for 
the proactive identification of trafficking victims and train officials 
to use them. • Designate an agency responsible for the provision of 
services to male trafficking victims. • Operationalize a centralized 
database to systematically record official statistics on anti-trafficking 
law enforcement efforts and victim identification, including those 
outside the capital. • Refer labor trafficking victims to services upon 
identification, hold labor traffickers criminally accountable, and 
establish standard operating procedures for Ministry of Labor officials 
to combat labor trafficking. • Allocate a dedicated anti-trafficking 
budget, fund the implementation of the national action plan and 
the anti-trafficking law, and increase funding for victim services. • 
Expand long-term and reintegration services, including vocational 
training. • Proactively screen foreign workers for trafficking indicators, 
including through inspections aboard foreign-flagged vessels in 
Uruguayan waters and docked at port. • Establish a facility accessible 
to victims while shelters are closed during the day. • Vigorously 
investigate and prosecute all forms of human trafficking, including 
forced labor and child sex trafficking. • Sentence convicted traffickers 
to adequate penalties, which should involve significant prison terms. 
• Consistently inform victims of their rights under the law, including 
to apply for permanent residence permits and compensation from 
their traffickers, and support those victims who wish to pursue these 
rights. • Revise the definition of trafficking under Uruguayan law 
to align with the definition in the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. • Ensure 
the safety of victims participating in trials against their traffickers as 
required by law and inform victims of available protective measures. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Article 78 of 
the 2008 immigration law criminalized sex trafficking and labor 
trafficking, prescribing penalties of four to 16 years’ imprisonment, 
which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, 
commensurate with penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, 
such as rape. The penalties were increased by one-third to one-half if 
the trafficking offense involved a child victim. Inconsistent with the 
definition of trafficking under international law, the law established 
the use of force, fraud, or coercion as an aggravating factor rather 
than as an essential element of the crime. 
In 2020, the government initiated 22 new trafficking investigations, 
compared with 23 trafficking investigations in 2019 and 23 in 2018. 
In one case involving four suspects and eight potential victims, law 
enforcement investigated whether a mother and daughter partnered 
with a Cuban couple to exploit Cuban women in sex trafficking at 
brothels in Paysandú and Montevideo. The government prosecuted 
eleven accused traffickers in 2020, compared with four in 2019 and 
four in 2018. The government did not report whether these alleged 
traffickers were accused of sex or labor trafficking; it did, however, 
confirm that at least two were foreign nationals. Officials also 
prosecuted 39 individuals for soliciting child sex trafficking victims, 
compared with two such prosecutions in 2019. The vast majority of 
these additional prosecutions stemmed from a coordinated, multi-
jurisdictional law enforcement investigation, called Operation Ocean, 
targeting men – including a former juvenile court judge, a politician, 
and a high school principal – who solicited girls on dating mobile 
apps or online classified pages, which also led to the identification 
of 20 child trafficking victims. The government convicted four 
traffickers in 2020, compared with eight traffickers in 2019 and zero 
in 2018. Judges sentenced traffickers convicted in 2020 to between 17 
months’ and six years’ imprisonment. In one case, courts convicted 
under charges of forced prostitution a sex trafficker who exploited 
her daughters in commercial sex over several years. In the past five 
years, the government reported investigating 55 trafficking cases and 
prosecuting 39 suspected traffickers, but convicted just 15 traffickers. 
The government reported convicting one individual for soliciting a 
child sex trafficking victim. Officials reported courts closed briefly 
in March 2020, but judicial activity was otherwise uninterrupted 
by pandemic-related circumstances. The government collected data 
on active cases, including trafficking cases, via the Accusatory Penal 
Process Information System (SIPPAU). However, it remained difficult 
to obtain comprehensive data, especially on trafficking investigations, 
prosecutions, and convictions outside the capital region, and analyze 
trends across reporting periods. 
The Ministry of Interior’s organized crime division was the primary 
entity responsible for anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts. 
However, the Ministry of Labor (MTSS) directed most efforts related 
to labor trafficking; MTSS primarily responded to labor traffickers 
through administrative processes, although cases it referred to the 
prosecutor’s office could also be criminally prosecuted. The attorney 
general’s office in Montevideo had three gender-based violence units 
that prioritized investigating and prosecuting crimes related to human 
trafficking and the exploitation of children, up from two in 2019; 
there were no specialized units outside of the capital. The government 
did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of 
government officials complicit in trafficking offenses. The government 
offered limited anti-trafficking training to law enforcement officials 
responsible for victim identification and investigation, but it included 
trafficking-specific modules in standard gender-based violence training 
for approximately 375 law enforcement officers in 2020; 62 officials 
opted into an online anti-trafficking training for law enforcement. 
Observers indicated law enforcement officials did not employ 
systematic procedures to identify victims proactively. Uruguayan 
officials coordinated with United States officials in relation to a 
United States citizen convicted of human trafficking and serving a 
term of imprisonment in Uruguay. 
PROTECTION
The government decreased protection efforts. The Ministry of Social 
Development (MIDES) facilitated the care and protection of trafficking 
victims through two entities: the National Institute for Women 
(Inmujeres), which served adult female trafficking victims, and the 
National Institute for Children and Adolescents (INAU), which 
served child trafficking victims. Both institutions primarily catered 
to sex trafficking victims, as MTSS maintained responsibility for most 
labor trafficking victims identified through its inspections. In 2020, 
the Ministry of Social Development reported Inmujeres assisted 37 
newly identified victims in 2020, compared with 83 victims in 2019 
and 95 victims in 2018; it did not report the number of trafficking 
victims assisted by INAU. The 37 victims served by Inmujeres were all 
adult women; they were mostly Uruguayan, Dominican, or Cuban. 
The government did not report identifying any adult male, child, 
or LGBTQI+ trafficking victims in 2020; the government did not 
consider the 20 victims identified through Operation Ocean to be 
trafficking victims and provided them services through the Victim 
Protection Unit of the prosecutor’s office. An INAU program for 
child victims of sexual exploitation operating in Montevideo served 
42 children during the reporting period, but it was not clear how 
many of these children were victims of trafficking, as opposed to 
other forms of exploitation. The government had a variety of victim 
protection protocols and written referral mechanisms on assisting 
victims, including an interagency response system; however, it did 
not have a lead agency or inter-institutional protocols to facilitate 
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the proactive identification of trafficking victims by law enforcement 
or other officials. MIDES was the principal provider of services for 
victims of crimes; specialized services for victims of trafficking were 
very limited in Uruguay and, in practice, only available to adult female 
sex trafficking victims. Inmujeres coordinated with civil society to 
provide services for female sex trafficking victims at its centers in 
Montevideo and Cerro Largo, and INAU had a partial-service center 
for child sex trafficking victims in Paysandú. Inmujeres provided 
some services by phone or video call during the reporting period to 
limit disruption under pandemic-related restrictions, although not 
all services could be administered virtually, and these services were 
unavailable to victims for periods of time. The government adapted 
physical spaces to continue accommodating victims in-person 
where possible, including by installing barriers and screening for 
symptoms. The government primarily provided services to adult 
female victims of sex trafficking; it did not have shelters or services 
designed to accommodate male, LGBTQI+, or labor trafficking 
victims. When officials identified such victims, the government could 
usually arrange ad hoc housing in hotels or non-specialized shelters 
designed to serve other vulnerable populations, such as individuals 
experiencing housing insecurity or recovering from addiction. Some 
organizations expressed concern about the lack of formality in victim 
referral. The government and civil society continued to operate a 
14-member mobile team of psychologists, social workers, and lawyers 
that responded to cases involving child victims in the interior of the 
country. The government offered limited trainings throughout the year, 
often virtually and with the support of international organizations, 
including a four-week course on child sexual exploitation for INAU 
staff and a training for medical professionals on identification and 
referral procedures for gender-based violence, including trafficking. 
The government contracted with NGOs to provide victims services 
similar to those given to other vulnerable populations, such as the 
homeless, refugees, and citizens on welfare; there were no specialized 
services for trafficking victims. Although government officials had 
some facilities that could temporarily house victims, there were 
no dedicated shelters for trafficking victims. Government officials 
expressed concern that victims’ security would be at risk in a centrally 
located, trafficking-specific shelter, due to the country’s small size. 
The government preferred to lodge victims in hotels and occasionally 
referred them to shelters or group homes serving other populations, 
such as victims of domestic violence. Civil society expressed concerns 
about the suitability of these facilities, as they did not meet the needs 
of trafficking victims, and reported challenges finding shelter for 
trafficking victims, particularly for those identified outside the capital. 
Many shelters were overnight-only facilities; observers identified a 
need for daytime facilities and programming. Civil society reported 
government services focused mostly on psycho-social and legal 
assistance, while long-term services, such as housing, vocational 
support, and job placement, were insufficient. Inmujeres provided 
11.37 million pesos ($269,770) to its NGO partners to fund provision 
of services and allocated 304,500 pesos ($7,230) to cover short-term 
hotel stays for victims. The government did not report other budget 
allocations or funding for victim assistance. Although the government 
had a protocol to provide security and protection measures to 
victims, observers reported the government could not ensure victims’ 
physical safety, and fear of retaliation prevented some victims from 
participating in trials against their traffickers. Victims could file civil 
suit to seek compensation from their traffickers, but the government 
did not report whether any victims did so in 2020. Foreign victims 
were entitled to work permits and permanent residency status and 
had 180 days to decide whether to stay in the country, return to 
their country of origin, or resettle in a third country. However, the 
government did not report issuing residence permits to any foreign 
victims during the reporting period, and there was no record it had 
done so since the 2018 legislation establishing this entitlement. 
PREVENTION
The government slightly decreased prevention efforts. The national 
trafficking council, composed of high-level government agencies and 
civil society participants and led by MIDES, met twice during the 
reporting period. The council was responsible for the implementation 
of recommendations from international organizations and 
institutional oversight on the implementation of Law 19.643 and 
the 2018-2020 national action plan. During the reporting period, 
the council began drafting a 2020-2022 national action plan. The 
national trafficking council was required to publish at least one 
public report per year, usually an annual review of its anti-trafficking 
efforts, but did not release a report in 2020. The government did not 
allocate funding to implement the trafficking law or the national 
action plan, and the trafficking council lacked an operational budget. 
The government conducted activities to promote awareness of 
human trafficking in 2020; with the support of an international 
organization, the government conducted one virtual awareness-
raising workshop for officials in communities with an established 
trafficking risk. The government continued to distribute to the public 
informational and awareness-raising materials developed in previous 
reporting periods. Generally, the government’s awareness-raising 
efforts featured trafficking as a sub-topic of wider programming on 
gender-based violence and other related crimes. The government 
operated telephone hotlines and a corresponding cellphone app 
where the public could report crimes; the government did not report 
how many calls involved trafficking cases. In 2020, the government 
launched a hotline dedicated to a nationwide investigation; in 
addition to information related to that case, officials also reported 
receiving tips leading to five new investigations, at least one of which 
involved human trafficking. The Ministry of Labor reported it trained 
its inspectors to identify labor trafficking indicators; these inspectors 
continued to perform regular labor inspections during the pandemic, 
including in establishments known to facilitate commercial sex. 
Labor inspectors lacked specific procedures to identify trafficking, 
although the Ministry of Labor had primary responsibility for labor 
trafficking. The government encouraged private sector actors to engage 
in an anti-child sex tourism campaign but did not otherwise make 
efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Uruguay, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Uruguay abroad. Uruguayan women and girls – and, to a more limited 
extent, transgender adults and male adolescents – are exploited 
in sex trafficking within the country. Traffickers force Uruguayan 
women and LGBTQI+ individuals into commercial sex in Argentina, 
Brazil, Italy, and Spain. Traffickers exploit women from Cuba, the 
Dominican Republic, Haiti, and, to a lesser extent, from South 
American countries, in sex trafficking in Uruguay. Many victims are 
South American women of African descent. Foreign workers, mainly 
from Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and 
Paraguay, are exploited in forced labor in construction, domestic 
service, cleaning services, elder care, wholesale stores, textile industries, 
agriculture, fishing, and lumber processing. Cuban nationals working 
in Uruguay may have been forced to work by the Cuban government. 
Sex traffickers exploited migrants, particularly women, from Cuba 
in border cities; sex traffickers may move victims city-to-city to 
avoid detection and prolong exploitation. From 2018 to 2020, 17 
crewmember deaths were associated with Taiwan-, Chinese-, and 
other foreign-flagged fishing vessels docked at the Montevideo port 
and in Uruguay’s waters; before 2018, observers reported an average 
of 11 crewmember deaths per year. Foreign workers aboard these 
vessels are subjected to abuses indicative of forced labor, including 
unpaid wages, confiscated identification documents, and physical 
abuse, and there are anecdotal reports of murder at sea. Citizens of 
other countries, including China and the Dominican Republic, may 
transit Uruguay en route to other destinations, particularly Argentina, 
where some are exploited in trafficking. There was heightened 
vulnerability to trafficking in the interior of the country, where the 
government’s monitoring and anti-trafficking efforts had limited 
reach. In particular, domestic workers employed in the interior of 







The Government of Uzbekistan does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Uzbekistan was upgraded to Tier 2. These efforts included 
passing a new anti-trafficking law outlining improved victim 
protection protocols; amending the criminal code to explicitly 
criminalize child forced labor in the first offense; identifying more 
victims than in prior years; investigating, prosecuting, convicting, and 
sentencing significantly more traffickers than the previous reporting 
period, constituting the first quantitative enforcement increase in 
six years; and, for the first time, referring potential cases of official 
complicity in cotton harvest forced labor for criminal investigation. 
Authorities also undertook new efforts to repatriate and provide robust 
protection and reintegration services for hundreds of Uzbekistani 
women and children previously stranded in exploitative conditions 
that often amounted to trafficking in armed conflict zones in Syria, 
Iraq, and Afghanistan; mitigated elevated risk among vulnerable 
populations during the pandemic by connecting nearly half a million 
unemployed migrant workers with job opportunities; and significantly 
reduced the incidence of forced labor in the annual cotton harvest—
despite an increase in the size of the work force—through continued 
mechanization and privatization measures, increased oversight 
into labor practices, expanded provision of monitoring access to 
civil society and international organizations, and other factors. 
However, the government did not meet the minimum standards 
in several key areas. Local officials in some districts continued to 
impose cotton production quotas in contravention of the national 
ban on the practice, perpetuating incentives for the mobilization of 
civil servants into cotton harvest forced labor in some areas of the 
country. Although the government continued to fine officials for 
labor violations, for the ninth consecutive year it did not criminally 
prosecute any officials for their alleged complicity in forced labor 
crimes. Existing laws establishing forced labor as an administrative 
violation at first offense continued to constrain effective enforcement. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Continue substantive action to end all government-compelled forced 
labor and hold complicit officials criminally accountable, including 
by increasing enforcement of the national ban on cotton production 
quotas at local levels. • Continue efforts to ensure all citizens are 
aware of their “right to refuse” participation in the cotton harvest or 
other work outside their professional duties, and of the requirement 
to pay for replacement workers, without suffering consequences. 
•Amend legislation to fully criminalize forced labor in the first 
offense. • Respecting due process, increase investigations and, when 
sufficient evidence exists, criminally prosecute, convict, sentence, and 
incarcerate persons complicit in human trafficking, including officials 
involved in mobilizing forced labor. • Establish and implement a 
legal framework to regulate labor brokers involved in the recruitment 
of seasonal agricultural workers. • Continue to grant and expand 
the access of independent observers to monitor cotton cultivation 
and fully cease the harassment, detention, and abuse of activists and 
journalists for documenting labor conditions. • Expand space for 
civil society and freedom of association for labor activists, including 
by streamlining and increasing registration of anti-trafficking NGOs, 
and by ensuring that local governments do not interfere with the 
formation of labor unions. • Continue training law enforcement 
officials and labor inspectors on proper identification and handling 
of trafficking cases, with an emphasis on anti-trafficking legislation 
and evidence gathering procedures. • Improve victim identification 
among, and provision of psychosocial care to, Uzbekistani families 
repatriated from armed conflict in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. • 
Train all first responders to officially identify potential trafficking 
victims and refer them to care. • Improve anti-trafficking coordination 
and communication between government agencies, NGOs, and the 
international donor community by establishing a secretariat within 
the national trafficking in persons commission. • Amend legislation 
to ensure victims are not penalized for any unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit, particularly for illegal border crossings 
or loss of personal identification documents. • Encourage prosecutors 
to proactively seek victim restitution in criminal cases. • Monitor 
private employment agencies for recruitment fees and ensure they 
are paid by employers rather than prospective job applicants.
PROSECUTION
The government increased law enforcement efforts. Article 135 of the 
criminal code criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking and 
prescribed penalties of three to five years’ imprisonment for offenses 
involving an adult victim and eight to 12 years’ imprisonment for 
those involving a child victim, which were sufficiently stringent. 
However, with respect to sex trafficking, by allowing for house arrest 
in lieu of imprisonment, these penalties were not commensurate with 
those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent 
with the definition of trafficking under international law, Article 135 
established the use of force, fraud, or coercion as aggravating factors 
rather than essential elements of the crime. Article 148 (2) of the 
criminal code addressed “administrative forced labor.” Such offenses 
involving adult victims were only considered administrative violations 
for first time offenses; repeated offenses were penalized with a fine or 
imprisonment of up to two years. In February 2021, Article 148 (2) 
was amended to criminalize all “administrative forced labor” offenses 
involving children with a fine or up to three years’ imprisonment. 
Civil society and government contacts alike noted these provisions, 
coupled with limited capacity to identify the crime among judicial 
officials and frontline officers, significantly constrained Uzbekistan’s 
ability to prosecute and convict labor traffickers. 
The government continued to provide increasingly detailed 
law enforcement data compared to previous reporting periods. 
Progress was, at times, constrained by gaps in technical capacity, 
lack of familiarity with existing laws, insufficient evidence gathering 
procedures, and poor coordination between the labor inspectorate 
and judicial officials. Some enforcement efforts suffered as a result 
of the pandemic, during which observers reported an increase in the 
prioritization of cases involving the sale of children, at the expense 
of anti-trafficking work. Some law enforcement officers were hesitant 
to investigate trafficking crimes due to a perception that cases would 
be too difficult to prosecute. Despite this, for the first time in six 
years, investigations, prosecutions, convictions, and incarcerations 
increased. The government reported conducting 566 investigations 
and prosecuting 93 cases – 51 cases of sexual exploitation, 39 of cases 
involving unspecified exploitation of children, and three of forced 
labor – involving 129 suspects, compared with 66 investigations 
and 53 prosecutions involving an unspecified number of defendants 
in 2019. Because of a tendency to conflate cases involving “sexual 
intercourse with a person under the age of 16” with sex trafficking, it is 
possible some of the 566 reported investigations contained elements 
inconsistent with international law. For the second consecutive year, 
these figures included an increase in international investigations 
under the auspices of a tripartite anti-trafficking enforcement initiative 
between the governments of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan; 
28 of the 93 prosecutions featured trafficking crimes committed 
abroad. Authorities also cooperated with Kazakhstani counterparts 
to extradite an Uzbekistani national following reports from labor 
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migrants that the individual had recruited them and subsequently 
withheld their wages; the case was pending at the end of the reporting 
period. The government reported convicting 100 defendants for crimes 
involving trafficking in 2020, including 50 for sexual exploitation, 
six for forced labor, and 44 for “trafficking in minors,” compared to 
64 total in 2019. Of the 100 convicted traffickers, courts sentenced 
33 to imprisonment, 35 to house arrest, one to correctional labor, 
and 20 to probation, compared with 18 imprisoned, 22 put under 
house arrest, and two fined in 2019. Four convicted traffickers 
received unreported sentences, and seven were granted amnesty 
(three amnesties in 2019). Uzbekistan’s State Security Services also 
reported unspecified enforcement actions against 102 criminal 
groups for human trafficking crimes in 2020. Some victims reached 
financial settlements outside of the justice system, in some cases with 
the facilitation of low-level officials.
The Ministry of Interior (MOI) maintained an investigatory unit 
dedicated to trafficking crimes. A 2019 presidential decree mandated 
the MOI to establish a law enforcement trafficking data repository; 
this process was significantly delayed in 2020 due to the pandemic, 
but authorities reportedly resumed the work through a third-party 
organization prior to the end of the reporting period. In partnership 
with international organizations and civil society, the government 
continued to provide trafficking-specific training to police, judges, 
and other authorities, including the labor inspectorate. In addition 
to attending state-funded training, government officials participated 
in seminars and conferences sponsored by the government and led 
by NGOs, international organizations, and foreign governments. 
The labor inspectorate continued to gather evidence against local 
hokims and other officials for their alleged involvement in cotton 
harvest-related crimes, including trafficking, and for the first time it 
reported referring six such cases to the Prosecutor General’s Office 
for further investigation; authorities did not report the status of 
those cases. The government administratively penalized at least 
170 officials—including 46 hokims, deputy hokims, and leaders of 
banks—for cotton harvest labor crimes during the reporting period, 
a decrease from 259 officials in 2019; fines totaled 653.2 million 
soum ($62,380) (compared with 550 million soum, or $52,520, 
in 2019). Amid law enforcement coordination challenges and 
legislative limitations establishing forced labor in the first offense as 
an administrative violation, the government did not criminally charge, 
prosecute, or convict any government officials for their complicity 
in human trafficking cases for the ninth consecutive year. Police 
continued to arbitrarily detain and threaten LGBTQI+ persons under 
legislation criminalizing homosexuality, at times resorting to threats 
and physical abuse to extort bribes or coerce them into informant 
roles or pornography; authorities spuriously charged some LGBTQI+ 
persons under anti-prostitution provisions. 
PROTECTION
The government increased protection efforts. Authorities formally 
identified 150 victims of trafficking in 2020, compared with 95 in 
2019; this marked the first increase in annual victim identification 
figures since 2012. However, 37 of these cases involved the sale of 
children, and the government did not report if these included sex 
trafficking or forced labor indicators in accordance with international 
law. Of the 150 victims, 138 were women and 12 were men (compared 
with 90 and five, respectively, in 2019). Sex traffickers exploited 89 
of the victims, and labor traffickers exploited 12 victims (compared 
with 89 and six, respectively, in 2019); authorities did not report on 
the circumstances of the remaining 49 victims. At least 70 victims 
endured exploitation in Uzbekistan (15 in 2019), with the remainder 
exploited abroad. The government again did not identify any victims 
of foreign origin. NGOs identified and assisted 239 victims during 
the reporting period (579 in 2018 and 676 in 2017); the government 
did not report how many of these it referred (171 in 2019). NGOs 
filed 121 applications to initiate criminal cases on behalf of victims; 
authorities did not report how many of these culminated in official 
investigations (compared with 457 in 2018). 
With the assistance of international partners, the government 
completed and promulgated a law that included provisions 
significantly enhancing victim protection procedures and policies. 
Per Article 27 of the law, victims of human trafficking were exempted 
from civil, administrative, and criminal liability for acts committed 
under coercion. The government also finalized victim identification 
and referral guidelines originally mandated in a 2019 presidential 
decree and initiated in conjunction with international partners, but 
key stakeholder ministries did not report on their implementation in 
2020. International observers argued insufficient implementation of 
these new victim identification guidelines continued to put potential 
victims at risk of penalization, particularly among individuals in 
commercial sex and migrant workers. Current law did not explicitly 
exempt transnational sex and labor trafficking victims from facing a 
criminal penalty for illegally crossing international borders, which 
may have deterred some victims from reporting their traffickers. The 
closure of international borders as a pandemic mitigation measure 
significantly decreased irregular migration; in previous years, some 
victims initially faced criminal penalties for illegal border crossings. 
The new victim identification and referral procedures outlined 
an expanded list of ministries authorized to make initial victim 
identification and approve victims for receipt of government 
assistance, after which cases would be referred to local trafficking 
in persons commissions for final verification. Officials authorized 
to identify trafficking victims could refer them to either a state-
run shelter or NGOs for services. Civil society observers expressed 
concern that this new two-step process was not sufficiently detailed or 
inclusive of NGO roles, lacked victim-centered approaches outlined 
in relevant legislation, and was overly bureaucratic in nature, and 
might therefore incentivize territorial commissions to refer victims 
to NGO services directly rather than confirming victim designation. 
Victims were not required to file a criminal complaint to benefit 
from government-provided protection services; the government did 
not provide information on how many such individuals received 
assistance. Local officials regularly referred victims who did not wish 
to pursue a criminal case to NGO offices for assistance. Some victims 
were reluctant to contact or cooperate with law enforcement due to 
distrust in the authorities and fear for their personal and familial 
safety. Uzbekistan’s diplomatic missions abroad helped repatriate 
50 Uzbekistani victims during the reporting period (compared with 
51 in 2019). The government also worked to repatriate thousands 
of Uzbekistani migrant workers stranded in Kazakhstan and Russia 
due to the pandemic-related closure of businesses and borders; 
authorities did not report specific measures to screen these groups 
for trafficking indicators. As part of its “Mehr” or “Compassion” 
campaign, the government also located and repatriated hundreds 
of Uzbekistani women and children who had traveled with their 
male relatives to Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan and had subsequently 
been confined to camps, often in exploitative conditions. Although 
the government did not positively identify any of these women or 
children as victims of trafficking, it funded and provided them with 
shelter, education, limited psychosocial care, and other medical 
services for five-week cycles throughout the reporting period. Some 
NGO observers claimed capacity was low among psychosocial care 
providers in these facilities. Authorities also held online seminars 
to share best practices on rehabilitation and reintegration of these 
communities for Central Asian and Russian government counterparts. 
In 2020, the government matched its 2019 allocation of 1.2 billion 
soum ($114,590) to operate its Tashkent-based trafficking center for 
men, women, and children with official victim status. The government 
assisted 92 victims at this facility in 2020, compared with 220 
victims in 2019—a decrease attributable to pandemic-related border 
closures and limitations on service availability. This center provided 
shelter, medical and psychological care, legal services, job placement 
assistance, and restoration of lost identity documents. The center had 
the capacity to accommodate foreign victims, but the government 
has not served any foreign victims in the shelter since its opening 







subjected to domestic violence, including trafficking victims; these 
centers were managed and funded by regional governments, some 
of which coordinated with local anti-trafficking organizations. Anti-
trafficking NGOs continued to report favorable cooperation with 
the government. During the reporting period the government issued 
a presidential order affording NGOs additional support and legal 
protections, including expanded annual funding caps from foreign 
donors, increased state funding contributions, and administrative 
penalties for government officials or entities that interfere with 
their activities. However, civil society observers noted ongoing 
delays in NGO registration constrained some service provision. The 
government continued to provide in-kind support to local NGOs for 
the provision of victim assistance, such as food and clothing, and for 
the first time in recent years it reported provision of direct funding 
assistance to some anti-trafficking NGOs. Several NGOs also competed 
for and received a total of 461 million soum ($44,020) in grants 
from a general governmental assistance fund (compared with 817 
million soum, or $78,020, in 2019). New anti-trafficking legislation 
strengthened language guaranteeing victims’ confidentiality, but it 
was unclear if this applied to the divulgence of victims’ identities in 
court proceedings. Although victims could bring civil suits against 
traffickers, such instances were rare due to the high cost of legal 
representation, which was neither provided by the government nor 
affordable to most victims. With the assistance of an NGO, at least 
10 victims received compensation in 2020 (unreported in 2019). 
PREVENTION
The government increased prevention efforts. The government 
maintained its National Commission on Trafficking in Persons and 
Forced Labor (the Commission) with the Chair of the Senate serving as 
the National Rapporteur. The Commission comprised two high-level 
sub-committees: one on trafficking in persons, chaired by the Minister 
of Internal Affairs, and one on forced labor, chaired by the Minister 
of Employment and Labor Relations. The Commission directed the 
activities of regional commissions in 12 regions, one autonomous 
republic, and one independent city (Tashkent). The Commission 
continued to convene monthly, and the regional commissions met 
every 14 days, despite pandemic-related challenges. Members of 
Uzbekistan’s anti-trafficking civil society landscape participated in 
the national and regional meetings. Some international observers 
described insufficient coordination and communication between the 
Commission and civil society partners in the absence of a secretariat 
structure. The government did not centrally allocate funding for the 
Commission, which instead required funding contributions from 
individual member ministries’ budgets; this arrangement reportedly 
led to overreliance on NGO and international assistance. The 
government updated its national action plan to reflect international 
input in 2020 but did not provide information on these updates; it 
also maintained a roadmap developed by an NGO and a series of 
recommendations submitted to the government by an international 
organization during a previous reporting period.
Uzbekistan’s cotton harvest was unimpeded by the pandemic in 
2020. A combination of ongoing robust mechanization efforts, 
continued awareness-raising activities, continued consolidation of 
the cotton sector into a privatized “cluster”-based system, increased 
wages for cotton pickers, some improved recruitment practices, and 
the government-facilitated voluntary participation of hundreds of 
thousands of unemployed migrant workers as a pandemic-mitigation 
measure significantly reduced the incidence of forced labor in the 
2020 harvest. According to the ILO, reports of forced labor in cotton 
picking decreased by 33 percent in 2020. The government continued 
to implement ILO recommendations, further reduced land allocated 
for cotton cultivation, and purchased more machinery to work toward 
the mechanization of the harvest. In 2020, the government reported 
increasing the total number of private textile-cotton clusters to 96 – 
nearly 30 more than the previous year – accounting for more than 
90 percent of arable production land (an increase from 63 percent 
in 2019). The clusters processed cotton from cultivation to finished 
textile products and paid higher wages to workers. Approximately 30 
percent of established cluster sites also provided technical services 
and methodological advice to participating farmers. The government 
reiterated a March 2020 presidential decree banning the imposition 
of cotton production quotas and warned local authorities against the 
harvest mobilization of students, in particular. However, some local 
officials continued to mobilize adults and children into compulsory 
cotton picking to meet local harvest benchmarks established in direct 
violation of the decree. Labor inspectors identified cases in which local 
hokims directed banks to send their employees into the cotton fields 
or find and/or pay for replacements through unregulated, informal 
channels; as in previous years, this de facto penalty system generated 
a lucrative means of extortion for corrupt officials. NGOs continued 
to report that many of the voluntary pickers preferred to be hired as 
replacement pickers by those seeking to avoid the cotton fields, as this 
enabled them to earn income beyond the standard picking wages. 
Farmers who were unable to fulfill illegal quotas risked losing the 
rights to farm their government-leased land. Media reports indicated 
– and some government officials acknowledged – that ongoing 
development of the privatized cluster system inadvertently generated 
other vulnerabilities, including avenues for private businesses to 
subject harvest workers to contract violations, loss of bargaining power 
or choice of cluster-affiliation, coerced cultivation of cotton under 
threat of land loss, wage irregularities, and forced overtime. Some 
authorities reportedly expropriated land formerly leased or owned 
by individual farmers for the creation of new cluster sites without 
adequately compensating them, increasing their vulnerability to 
forced labor at those clusters. NGO observers noted the absence of a 
legal framework to ensure oversight of worker contracts and regulate 
and ensure proper licensing of labor recruitment intermediaries left 
seasonal agricultural workers vulnerable to forced labor in some 
cluster sites. The 2020 harvest marked the seventh consecutive year 
the government conducted a nationwide campaign to raise public 
awareness of its prohibition of child labor in the cotton harvest. 
The government continued to uphold this prohibition; while there 
were isolated reports of children working in the fields—a trend that 
may have increased due to family-directed mobilization of children 
in response to pandemic-related school closures and economic 
hardships—there continued to be no reports of systemic mobilization. 
The government, in coordination with the ILO, continued to conduct 
awareness-raising campaigns to ensure citizens were aware of their 
labor rights. 
For the sixth consecutive year, the government allowed the ILO 
to monitor the cotton harvest for child and forced labor, and ILO 
monitors had unimpeded access to the cotton fields for observations 
and to interview laborers. For the first time, the government also 
issued official monitoring access permits to civil society groups. The 
ILO assessed that government entities compelled approximately 
80,000 pickers out of an estimated two million-member workforce 
to work in the 2020 harvest—a significant decrease compared with 
102,000 in 2019, 170,000 in 2018, and 336,000 in 2017. However, 
as was the case in previous years, in 2020 the annual rate in the 
reduction of forced laborers continued to slow. For the third year, 
authorities granted the ILO access to data acquired through the 
government’s Cotton Harvest Feedback Mechanism, which included 
dedicated telephone hotlines and messaging applications for reports 
of labor violations; this mechanism and Federation of Trade Unions 
system received a total of 970 complaints, including 180 complaints 
related to wage irregularities and inadequate working conditions 
and 790 explicit allegations of forced labor, during the cotton 
harvest season (compared with 1,563 in 2019). The government 
continued to increase the size of the labor inspectorate, bringing 
the total number of labor investigators assigned to look into these 
complaints across the country to 600 (compared with an increase to 
400 in 2019). Inspectors reported these complaints resulted in the 
positive identification of 101 cases of adult forced labor in the cotton 
harvest, leading to fines for at least 170 officials—a decrease from 
259 officials in 2019; fines totaled 653.2 million soum ($62,380) 
(550 million soum, or $52,520, in 2019). Six of these cases were 
sent to criminal courts for additional investigation for the first time. 
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User assessments of the feedback mechanism were unavailable in 
2020; in previous harvests, observers reported concerns about the 
effectiveness of the mechanism, the credibility and efficacy of ensuing 
investigations, and fear of retaliation for its use. For the third year, 
the government included independent human rights activists in 
harvest monitoring, field interviews, awareness raising activities, 
and the review of cases gathered through the mechanism. Observers 
reported isolated incidents in which local government officials 
harassed and temporarily detained independent civil society activists 
who attempted to monitor the cotton harvest, at times under the 
pretext of quarantine requirements. Media, including state media 
outlets, continued to report on forced labor practices, problems, and 
violations, generally without penalization or censorship; however, at 
least one high-profile blogger was subjected to politically motivated 
arrest, detention, and repeat criminal charges after attempting to 
report on farmers’ dissatisfaction with cluster model-related land 
management. As with service provision, delays in or refusal of NGO 
registration constrained some civil society efforts to monitor and 
assist the victims of forced labor in the cotton harvest. During the 
reporting period, local authorities reportedly harassed and threatened 
several activists in response to their efforts to establish Uzbekistan’s 
first independent labor union. 
In a prior reporting period, the government encouraged Ministers 
to use a special fund under the Ministry of Employment and Labor 
Relations to recruit unemployed individuals for public works, instead 
of subjecting civil servants and students to forced labor therein. In 
2020, the government allocated 262 billion soum ($25 million) to 
this fund (unreported in 2019; 714 billion in 2018), through which 
it successfully provided job opportunities to nearly half a million 
Uzbekistani nationals left suddenly unemployed by the pandemic, 
assuaging a significant economic driver of potential exploitation. 
Unlike in 2019, the Ministry of Employment and Labor Relations did 
not provide information on the amount of fines for labor violations 
it contributed to the fund (6.6 billion soum, or $630,260, in 2019). 
An NGO reported the central government continued to set silk 
cocoon production quotas, which may have incentivized government 
officials to coerce in-home silk production in some communities. 
The government continued to call for hashar, or volunteer workdays, 
throughout the country; some local leaders characterized cotton 
picking and street cleaning as hashar.
The government continued to provide support to labor migrants 
abroad, including victims of forced labor, and allocated a budget 
of 8.5 billion soum ($811,690); this significant decrease from 200 
billion soum ($19.1 million) in 2019 was likely attributable to the 
pandemic-related decline in labor migration. Uzbekistan’s Agency 
for Foreign Labor Migration (the Agency) continued outreach to 
prospective labor migrants, serving to reduce potential risks of 
trafficking among this population. The Agency also conducted pre-
departure consultations, through which it provided information on 
primary destination countries’ labor and migration laws – especially 
Russia and Kazakhstan; issued some prospective migrant workers 
health insurance; and provided micro-loans to those who could 
not find work abroad. The government also operated a 24-hour 
hotline in Russia that provided Uzbekistani labor migrants with 
legal advice, advised them of their rights, and directed them to the 
nearest consulate for assistance. The government maintained bilateral 
employment agreements outlining citizens’ labor rights with Japan, 
Poland, Russia, South Korea, and Turkey; during the reporting period, 
it signed a new agreement on migrant worker rights with Kazakhstan, 
negotiated improvements to the aforementioned agreement with 
Russia, and worked with Moscow municipal authorities to establish 
a migrant labor recruitment and training center in Tashkent. Private 
companies, including foreign and local, had official permission from 
the government to recruit Uzbekistani citizens for jobs abroad and 
within Uzbekistan. Although the companies were required to obtain 
recruitment licenses, the government did not report the number of 
such licenses granted. During the reporting period, the government 
banned the imposition of recruitment fees on workers seeking 
employment abroad, addressing a longstanding recommendation 
from international observers; however, it was unclear to what extent 
authorities enforced this ban. 
The government’s expanded labor inspectorate reported conducting 
16,671 inspections and investigations in 2020, although it did not 
specify how many were initiated by worker complaints (compared 
with 21,172 inspections and 8,322 complaint investigations in 
2019). These inspections and investigations culminated in the 
identification of more than 15,000 employment law violations. 
As in previous years, the inspectorate did not report screening for 
trafficking indicators or referring any cases for criminal investigation 
as part of these inspections. Labor inspectors were not empowered 
to bring criminal charges for first time violations of the law against 
forced labor, and international observers noted some inspectors also 
demonstrated limited comfort with their administrative enforcement 
mandate. Authorities continued to conduct public awareness efforts 
on transnational sex and labor trafficking, including through events, 
print media, television, and radio, often in partnership with and 
in-kind support to NGOs. Authorities worked with a diaspora 
organization in Tashkent to secure citizenship documentation for over 
150 previously stateless Uyghur residents. The government maintained 
a 24-hour hotline; in 2020 the line received 318 trafficking-related 
phone calls, from which 93 were identified as trafficking cases (422 
and 75, respectively, in 2019). An NGO maintained a foreign donor-
funded hotline. The government did not conduct efforts to reduce 
the demand for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
Uzbekistani victims domestically and abroad, and some foreign 
nationals may be vulnerable to trafficking within Uzbekistan. 
Forced labor in the annual cotton harvest continues to decrease as 
a function of ongoing national reforms within the sector; however, 
local officials in several areas of the country continue to subject 
thousands of students, teachers, emergency personnel, medical 
workers, soldiers, and other civil servants into cotton picking in 
furtherance of illegal local production quotas. Some adults who 
refuse to pick cotton, are unable or unwilling to pay for a replacement 
worker, or do not fulfill their daily quota, at times face the loss 
of social benefits, termination of employment, or other forms of 
harassment. Some employees and market vendors choose to hire 
a replacement picker directly, pay a fee for the mobilizer to find 
a replacement picker, or pay a fine, rather than pick cotton; this 
generates a coercive arrangement that penalizes those who choose 
not to participate in the harvest while also creating a lucrative 
means of extortion for corrupt managers and officials. Private 
companies in some regions mobilize employees for the harvest 
under threat of increased government inspections of, and taxes on, 
their operations. Farmers forced to vacate and remit their land to 
private cotton operators are at high risk of forced labor, including in 
the cluster sites established on their former land, due to disruption 
of livelihoods and ensuing economic hardships. 
The government subjects adults to forced labor in other sectors as 
well. Some local officials reportedly provide silkworms to farmers 
and force them to sign contracts stating they will agree to cultivate 
silk cocoons in furtherance of national production quotas. Despite 
a 2018 government prohibition on the practice, some local officials 
continue to force teachers, students (including children), private 
businesses employees, and others to work in construction and other 
forms of non-cotton agriculture, and to clean parks, streets, and 
buildings. Officials occasionally cast these compulsory tasks as part 
of Uzbekistan’s traditional hashar system, under which community 
members are expected to perform voluntary work for communal 
benefit. Criminalization of same-sex relationships between men 
makes some members of Uzbekistan’s LGBTQI+ communities 
vulnerable to police abuse, extortion, and coercion into pornography 
and informant roles; widespread social stigma and discrimination 







to family-brokered forced marriages that may feature corollary sex 
trafficking or forced labor indicators. Children in institutions are 
vulnerable to sex trafficking. Traffickers exploit Uzbekistani nationals 
domestically in brothels, clubs, and private residences.
Traffickers exploit Uzbekistani nationals in sex trafficking and 
forced labor in the Middle East, including in Bahrain, Iran, and 
United Arab Emirates; in Europe, including Estonia, Georgia, Latvia, 
Moldova, Russia, and Turkey; and in Central, South, and East Asia, 
including in Kazakhstan, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, respectively. 
Uzbekistani nationals are subjected to forced labor in these regions 
in the construction, transportation, oil and gas, agricultural, retail, 
and food sectors. Hundreds of thousands of Uzbekistani migrant 
workers are at elevated risk of trafficking within Russia, where 
employers and authorities charge high work permit fees that catalyze 
debt-based coercion, subject them to poor living and working 
conditions, and garnish or withhold their wages; these vulnerabilities 
are often compounded by Russian employers’ failure to register 
Uzbekistani migrant workers with the relevant authorities. Over 
half of Uzbekistani migrant workers reportedly forego the complex 
bureaucratic processes required to obtain proper documentation, 
exacerbating their vulnerability within the system. Some Uzbekistani 
men travel to Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan to fight alongside or seek 
employment within armed groups and are subsequently subjected 
to forced labor in cooking, cleaning, and portering. Uzbekistani 
women and children traveling with these men are also vulnerable 
to sex trafficking and forced labor on arrival; many are reportedly 
placed alongside other Uzbekistani family members in makeshift 
camp communities, where their travel and identity documentation 
is confiscated and their freedom of movement is restricted. Many of 
these women report having lost their husbands to armed conflict, 
after which their economic hardships and confinement in the camps 
make them vulnerable to coercive local marriages that may feature 
corollary sex trafficking or forced labor indicators. 
VANUATU: TIER 2
The Government of Vanuatu does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. The government demonstrated overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, considering the 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity; 
therefore Vanuatu remained on Tier 2. These efforts included the 
continued prosecution of the country’s first trafficking case and, in 
partnership with an international organization, continued protection 
services for victims identified in that case. However, the government 
did not meet the minimum standards in several key areas. The 
government did not initiate any new trafficking investigations 
during the reporting period, nor did it conduct public awareness 
campaigns or administer systematic anti-trafficking training for its 
law enforcement officials. Contrary to a victim-centered protection 
approach, in the aforementioned ongoing case, the government 
forced some victims to stay in the country for the duration of court 
proceedings without allowing them to formally work, possibly 
increasing their indebtedness and vulnerability to re-trafficking. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
Amend anti-trafficking legislation to remove sentencing provisions 
that allow for the payment of fines in lieu of imprisonment for 
sex trafficking offenses. • Increase efforts to prosecute and convict 
traffickers under anti-trafficking laws and sentence convicted traffickers 
to adequate penalties, which should involve significant prison 
terms. • In coordination with civil society, develop and implement 
comprehensive standard operating procedures (SOPs) for victim 
identification and referral, including by screening for trafficking 
indicators among vulnerable populations, such as individuals in 
commercial sex, migrant workers, and persons displaced by natural 
disasters. •Allocate increased resources for and implement victim 
protection benefits, including permission to work for foreign victims 
who wish to participate in prosecutions against their alleged traffickers, 
taking into consideration humanitarian and compassionate factors. 
• Ensure all identified victims are referred to services. • Develop 
and implement a formalized process to consider requests for 
trafficking victims to remain in the country permanently. • Provide 
systematic training for all relevant officials on the trafficking law, 
victim identification, and referral mechanisms. • Cease compelling 
foreign victims to remain in Vanuatu for the length of prosecutions 
against their alleged traffickers. • Institute a campaign to raise 
public awareness of trafficking, including among remote and 
vulnerable communities. • Improve anti-trafficking coordination 
with international partners, including by increasing information 
sharing with sending countries and instituting standard repatriation 
procedures. • Accede to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol.
PROSECUTION
The government maintained law enforcement efforts. Vanuatu law 
criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking. Article 34 of the 
Counter Terrorism and Transnational Organized Crime (CTTOC) Act 
criminalized trafficking in persons offenses involving adult victims 
and prescribed penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment, a fine of 
up to 50 million Vanuatu Vatu (VT) ($470,680), or both. Article 35 
criminalized trafficking in persons offenses involving child victims and 
prescribed penalties of up to 15 years’ imprisonment, a fine of up to 
75 million VT ($706,020), or both. These penalties were sufficiently 
stringent; however, with respect to sex trafficking, by allowing fines in 
lieu of imprisonment, these penalties were not commensurate with 
those prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. 
In a prior reporting period, the government arrested and initiated 
prosecution of four Bangladeshi nationals for the alleged forced labor 
of 101 Bangladeshi victims – the first trafficking prosecution in the 
country’s history. Vanuatuan authorities charged the suspects with 
slavery, money laundering, and “threatening” under the Penal Code 
Act (Cap 135), in addition to trafficking-related charges under the 
CTTOC. The case was ongoing at the end of the reporting period, and 
the four alleged traffickers remained in detention. The government 
did not report any new trafficking investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions during the reporting period. 
The National Intelligence Unit (NIU) within the Vanuatu Police 
Force was the lead agency for trafficking investigations; however, 
deficiencies in the country’s anti-trafficking policy infrastructure 
reportedly continued to constrain NIU officials’ ability to adequately 
investigate trafficking cases. An international organization provided 
trafficking-related training to immigration officials and also developed 
for officials’ use a manual with guidance on victim identification; 
however, the government did not provide standardized or systematic 
anti-trafficking training for law enforcement officials. The government 
did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of 
government employees complicit in human trafficking offenses. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained efforts to protect victims. In the previous 
reporting period, immigration officials, in partnership with an 
international organization, implemented border control SOPs 
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that included some guidance on trafficking victim identification. 
However, as a result of pandemic risk mitigation measures, the 
government issued new screening procedures that reportedly 
contained gaps in trafficking victim identification measures. Officials 
expressed concern that the change in procedures may have adversely 
affected the government’s efforts to identify trafficking cases. The 
government continued to lack comprehensive, government-wide 
victim identification and referral SOPs. The government did not 
identify any victims during the reporting period. 
In 2018, with assistance from an international organization, the 
government identified 101 Bangladeshi adult male victims in forced 
labor in construction and domestic service. The government, with 
additional support from partners, provided housing, medical services, 
and food for the victims for the duration of court proceedings. Formal 
shelters were not available to male victims; however, the government 
provided, on an ad hoc basis, shared furnished properties. Officials 
reportedly diverted funds from other government entities, specifically 
from the fuel budget for immigration officials’ vehicles, to provide 
victim services. Protection services were time-limited, and authorities 
conditioned some services on the victims’ participation in court 
proceedings against the alleged traffickers. The government required 
some of the victims to remain in Vanuatu to serve as witnesses in 
the ongoing prosecution and tied their repatriation to a final court 
ruling; an international organization reported this requirement 
may have re-traumatized several victims. Sixteen of the 101 victims 
testified against the alleged traffickers, and the courts took steps 
to protect their identities during the proceedings. The government 
provided interpretation throughout the court proceedings for the 
victims. One of the victims sought restitution, which remained 
pending with the court.
The government provided victims who participated in court 
proceedings with longer-term shelter options, immigration support, 
legal support, and witness protection services and advocacy until the 
end of the proceedings; those who did not participate in the trial 
received only short-term housing. An international organization 
continued to provide support for the victims who participated in the 
court proceedings as they awaited the court’s decision. The government 
did not have a process in place to change victims’ immigration status 
to grant them permission to work until the court reached a verdict, 
which may have compounded some victims’ indebtedness. In the 
previous reporting period, authorities reportedly did not share 
information or coordinate with their Bangladeshi counterparts 
on repatriation options, despite repeated requests for information 
from the Government of Bangladesh. An international organization 
funded and facilitated flights back to Bangladesh for the majority 
of the victims who did not testify in the trial. As of March 2021, 
all but eight of the victims had been repatriated. The government 
did not provide legal alternatives to removal of trafficking victims 
to countries in which victims would face retribution or hardship. 
PREVENTION
The government slightly increased efforts to prevent trafficking. 
The Transnational Crime Unit had an action plan, which included 
anti-trafficking action items; however, it did not address all 
forms of trafficking and limited resources continued to hinder 
its implementation. The government’s national security strategy 
highlighted trafficking and other transnational crimes as a threat 
to national and human security. The government, in coordination 
with partners, undertook efforts to advance the trafficking-related 
equities in the strategy, particularly in the areas of aid for communities 
displaced by natural disasters, support systems for victims of crime, 
and monitoring of Vanuatu’s territorial waters; implementation 
and partner engagement were ongoing at the end of the reporting 
period. The government did not conduct systematic anti-trafficking 
awareness campaigns. The government did not have a trafficking 
hotline and lacked an adequate system to research and assess the 
scope of its trafficking problem or evaluate its anti-trafficking efforts. 
The labor department licensed and monitored agencies that could 
recruit workers from Vanuatu for overseas work. The government 
prohibited recruitment fees for seasonal work outside of Vanuatu 
and issued a notice of “non-compliance” to agents who charged 
migrant workers recruitment fees. During the reporting period, the 
government proposed policy and legislative action to abolish seasonal 
worker recruitment agents and to create a centralized government-
managed process to connect workers with employment; however, 
the proposed actions were not passed or implemented by the end 
of the reporting period. The government did not undertake efforts 
to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government, 
in partnership with an international organization, continued to 
implement a program to digitize and streamline citizen access to 
voter cards, citizenship documents, and national identification cards. 
Vanuatu is not a party to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
Human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Vanuatu, 
and traffickers exploit victims from Vanuatu abroad. Labor traffickers 
exploit individuals from China, Thailand, Bangladesh, and the 
Philippines in Vanuatu. Chinese nationals working in Vanuatu may 
have been forced to work by Chinese companies, including state-
owned enterprises. Traffickers target migrant women in the hospitality 
and tourism sectors and low-skilled foreign workers in high-risk 
sectors, such as agriculture, mining, fishing, logging, construction, 
and domestic service. Chinese and South Asian migrant women 
are particularly at risk for labor trafficking in bars, beauty salons, 
and massage parlors. Bangladeshi criminal groups have reportedly 
lured Bangladeshi individuals with false promises of high-paying 
job opportunities in Australia, transported them through Fiji, India, 
and Singapore, and then subjected them to forced labor in the 
construction industry in Vanuatu. Some of the victims take out 
substantial loans to pay relevant travel expenses, which traffickers 
exploit through debt-based coercion. Foreign fishermen working on 
Vanuatuan-flagged, Taiwan-owned vessels have experienced indicators 
of forced labor, including deceptive recruitment practices, abuse of 
vulnerability, excessive overtime, withholding of wages, physical and 
sexual violence, and abusive living and working conditions on board. 
Natural disasters and climate-induced displacement significantly 
increases Vanuatuans’ vulnerability to trafficking, particularly as 
a majority of the population relies on small-scale and subsistence 
agriculture. Thousands of Vanuatuans who permanently or temporarily 
evacuated from the islands of Ambae and Ambrym due to volcanic 
activity are at higher risk of trafficking due to the economic hardships 
ensuing from their ongoing displacement. Women and girls may 
also be at risk of debt-based coercion in sex trafficking and domestic 
servitude via the customary practice of “bride-price payments” where 
a man’s family gives a woman’s male relatives money or other 
valuables in order for the man and woman to become married. 
The man’s family may at times force the woman to “pay back” the 
money through commercial sex acts or forced domestic service. The 
incidence of bride-price payments is linked to broader economic 
hardship and vulnerability, particularly in the context of the country’s 
frequent natural disasters; increased reports of child marriage, where 
children may be exploited in domestic servitude or sex trafficking, 
occurred immediately after a cyclone in April 2020. Children are 
also subjected to trafficking through “child swapping” – brokered 
as an inter-familial cultural practice or as a method to pay off debts. 
Women in commercial sex face physical and sexual violence and 
are reportedly coerced into forced pregnancy and forced marriage; 
reports acknowledge a correlation between the lack of economic 
opportunities and an increase in commercial sex. The limited ability 
for women and girls in commercial sex to seek justice increases 
vulnerability to trafficking. There were reports of children exploited 
in commercial sex facilitated by taxi drivers. Forced labor and child 
sex trafficking occur on fishing vessels in Vanuatu. Foreign tourists 
aboard boats reportedly approach remote Vanuatuan communities 
and offer money in exchange for marriage with underage girls as a 
ploy for short-term sexual exploitation. Locals onshore, acting as 






subject them to commercial sexual exploitation by foreign workers, 
often for weeks at a time. The local recruiters, and in some instances 
the families, receive payment for recruiting and transporting the girls 
to the boats. Children may also experience conditions indicative of 
forced labor in the illegal logging industry and in newspaper sales.
VENEZUELA: TIER 3
The Government of Venezuela does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making any 
efforts to do so, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic, on its anti-trafficking capacity; therefore Venezuela 
remained on Tier 3. On January 10, 2019, the term of former president 
Nicolás Maduro ended. On January 23, 2019, Juan Guaidó assumed 
the role of interim president; however, former president Maduro 
refused to cede control, preventing interim president Guaidó from 
exercising authority within the country. The United States continues 
to recognize the authority of the democratically elected 2015 National 
Assembly and of Juan Guaidó as the interim president of Venezuela. 
References to a “regime” or “Maduro regime” below are not intended 
to indicate that the United States considers such entity a government. 
Despite the lack of significant efforts, in 2020, according to press 
reports, Venezuelan authorities under the illegitimate Maduro 
issued arrest warrants for seven complicit officials in a notable case 
involving potential trafficking victims who perished at sea. However, 
authorities did not report assisting any victims or prosecuting or 
convicting any traffickers. Venezuelan authorities provided support 
and a permissive environment to non-state armed groups, including 
Colombian illegal armed groups that recruited and used child soldiers 
for armed conflict and engaged in sex trafficking and forced labor 
while operating in Venezuelan territory with impunity. Venezuelan 
authorities did not make sufficient efforts to curb forced recruitment 
of Venezuelan children by non-state armed groups.






2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS: 
Investigate, prosecute, and convict alleged traffickers, including 
complicit officials and anyone involved in the forcible recruitment of 
children into illegal armed groups. • Provide specialized services for all 
trafficking victims, including repatriated victims, child soldiers, men, 
boys, and LGBTQI+ individuals. • Draft and enact comprehensive 
anti-trafficking legislation criminalizing all forms of trafficking, 
including the criminalization of child sex trafficking without elements 
of force, fraud, or coercion, and the trafficking of men and boys. • 
Increase staffing and funding for the office of the special prosecutor 
to combat trafficking. • Proactively inform Venezuelans fleeing the 
country on the risks of human trafficking, as well as where and how 
to seek services. • Train all migration and law enforcement officials 
operating in border crossings to identify and respond appropriately 
to trafficking indicators. • Given significant concerns about forced 
labor indicators in Cuban Medical Missions, screen Cuban medical 
professionals for trafficking indicators and refer those identified 
to appropriate services. • Fund and collaborate with civil society 
organizations and other service providers to increase protection and 
assistance for victims. • Implement formal procedures and training for 
identifying victims among vulnerable populations, such as individuals 
in commercial sex, and for referring victims for care. • Develop and 
publish an anti-trafficking action plan taking into account present 
challenges—such as mass migration and displacement—and allocate 
resources for its implementation. • Enhance interagency cooperation 
by forming a permanent anti-trafficking working group. • Improve 
data collection on government anti-trafficking efforts and make this 
data publicly available.
PROSECUTION
Venezuelan authorities under the Maduro regime maintained very 
weak law enforcement efforts. Venezuelan law did not criminalize 
all forms of trafficking. Venezuelan law criminalized labor trafficking 
and some forms of sex trafficking of women and girls through a 
2007 law on women’s rights that prescribed penalties of 15 to 20 
years’ imprisonment. Inconsistent with international law, the law 
required a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion to constitute 
child sex trafficking and therefore did not criminalize all forms of 
trafficking. Venezuelan law failed to criminalize trafficking of men 
and boys when perpetrators were not part of an organized criminal 
organization. The law addressing organized crime criminalized 
trafficking by organized criminal groups of three or more individuals, 
with penalties of 20 to 30 years’ imprisonment. The penalties for 
trafficking crimes by organized criminal groups were sufficiently 
stringent and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
penalties prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. 
The organized crime office (ONCDOFT), with approximately 24 
employees, focused on trafficking crimes and continued to be the 
lead entity for trafficking issues. According to a press report, regime 
authorities investigated 66 cases of trafficking in 2020. Press reports 
indicated authorities either arrested or indicted 63 individuals for 
trafficking crimes in 2020, compared with 17 in 2019 and 99 in 2018. 
In a notable case, authorities continued to investigate six suspected 
traffickers and issued arrest warrants for seven national guard officers 
suspected of complicity in facilitating trafficking crimes after a ship 
en route to Trinidad and Tobago capsized and killed 28 alleged 
victims. Some observers asserted some of the arrests and investigations 
reported in the media were politically motivated cases of persecution 
by the Maduro regime of individuals helping opposition supporters 
and others depart Venezuela. Reports indicated one additional 
investigation of officials for alleged complicity in trafficking crimes; 
however, authorities did not indicate if any complicit officials were 
prosecuted or convicted for trafficking crimes. Years of corruption, 
incompetence, and abuse weakened the Maduro regime’s capacity 
to govern and hollowed out legitimate institutions, fostering a 
permissive environment for non-state armed groups to operate 
with impunity. According to stakeholders, officials at high levels 
linked to Maduro were complicit in trafficking crimes perpetrated 
by non-state armed groups and provided support and a permissive 
environment. A civil society organization alleged forced recruitment 
of children by non-state armed groups, including the ELN and FARC 
dissidents, was rampant in Venezuela. Colombian illegal armed 
groups recruited and used child soldiers for armed conflict and 
engaged in sex trafficking and forced labor. Another NGO indicated 
school drop-out rates during the pandemic reached 82 percent in 
border states, and 75 percent of those who left school had direct 
or indirect links to irregular armed groups. Contacts reported that 
school closures, lack of access to school lunches, and school supplies 
increased non-state armed groups’ ability to recruit children as they 
sought to fill this gap. A civil society organization indicated FARC 
dissidents and the ELN registered more than 20,000 students to 
receive school supplies as the first step in the recruitment process. 
Representatives of the Guaidó-led interim government estimated that 
non-state armed groups recruited 75 percent of children unable to 
attend school in border regions. The special prosecutor’s office charged 
with investigating trafficking crimes against women, developing 
anti-trafficking policies, and facilitating victims’ access to justice did 
not report updates on its activity. The special prosecutor’s mandate 
did not include trafficking crimes against transgender individuals, 
children, or men, leading to impunity of traffickers, and leaving 
victims unprotected and at risk of re-victimization. Venezuelan 
authorities reported holding one training session, in collaboration 
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with an international organization, in Anzoátegui state; authorities 
also reported conducting additional training activities but did not 
provide additional details.
PROTECTION
Venezuelan authorities did not report making efforts to identify or 
protect victims. In 2020, one civil society organization estimated 
authorities under the Maduro regime had identified approximately 
233 victims exploited by 11 trafficking rings between January and 
June. According to media sources, the ONCDOFT continued to 
operate a 24-hour hotline to receive general reports of abuse against 
women, including trafficking allegations; however, several of the 
numbers provided were often inactive. Venezuelan authorities 
did not report identifying trafficking victims among vulnerable 
populations or referring victims to services. Stakeholders reported 
unemployment caused by the pandemic and quarantine measures 
adopted to mitigate the spread of the virus increased the vulnerability 
of Venezuelans to sex trafficking and forced labor, as many were 
unable to secure employment in the formal or informal sector. Civil 
society organizations reported the regime used resources that would 
otherwise have been dedicated to victim identification and support 
to address the impact of the pandemic. 
Availability of victim services remained limited, and there were no 
specialized shelters for trafficking victims in the country. While civil 
society and religious organizations provided some services to victims 
of trafficking—including assistance for child victims of forced labor in 
Táchira state, outpatient psychological assistance for adult and child 
victims of sexual exploitation, including trafficking, and shelter for 
women victims of sexual exploitation, including trafficking—such 
assistance may have been temporarily suspended or limited as a 
result of the pandemic In addition, these organizations noted the 
pandemic and regime efforts to restrict foreign funding limited their 
ability to provide services to trafficking victims. Historically, victims 
could reportedly access government centers for victims of domestic 
violence or at-risk youth, although services for male victims were 
minimal. Venezuelan law and authorities did not consider males as 
potential victims of trafficking; therefore, it was likely services for male 
victims of trafficking, particularly for men, did not exist. Authorities 
reportedly made psychological and medical examinations available to 
trafficking victims, but additional victim services, such as follow-up 
medical aid, legal assistance with filing a complaint, job training, and 
reintegration assistance, were minimal. International media sources 
continued to report on the growing number of Venezuelan victims 
identified abroad, many repatriated or deported back to Venezuela; 
authorities did not report what assistance, if any, they provided 
victims upon their return or if authorities coordinated with foreign 
governments to ensure the protection of those victims.
PREVENTION
Venezuelan authorities under Maduro maintained inadequate 
prevention efforts. No permanent anti-trafficking interagency body 
existed. Regime authorities did not report any activities carried out 
under a new, media-reported 2020-2025 national action plan; regime 
authorities also did not report on the content of the plan, including 
whether it addressed present challenges, such as the increase in cases 
of forced labor in domestic service, the forced recruitment of children 
into armed conflict, a greater number of victims repatriated from other 
countries, and efforts necessary to mitigate the exploitation of those 
leaving the country as a result of the economic crisis. ONCDOFT 
held a three-week virtual event series that provided presentations and 
training to an unknown number of participants on ways to prevent 
trafficking. Venezuelan authorities did not provide anti-trafficking 
training for its diplomatic personnel and did not report any specific 
activities to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Venezuela, and traffickers exploit Venezuelan 
victims abroad. As the economic situation continued to spiral into 
critical deterioration, more than 5.6 million Venezuelans have 
fled Venezuela to neighboring countries. Traffickers have exploited 
Venezuelan victims in Aruba, The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Curacao, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Haiti, 
Iceland, Macau, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Spain, Suriname, and Trinidad 
and Tobago. Venezuelan women and girls were particularly vulnerable 
to sex trafficking in Colombia, Ecuador, and Trinidad and Tobago. In 
2020, 23 percent of victims identified in the Mexican state of Quintana 
Roo were Venezuelan. In 2019, Spanish authorities reported that 
Venezuela was the number one source country for victims exploited 
in Spain. In 2019, NGOs noted an increase in cases of sex trafficking 
and forced labor in domestic service and, in 2020, an increase in 
cases of sex trafficking and forced labor in the mining sector within 
the country. Traffickers increasingly exploit Venezuelan men in forced 
labor in other countries, including Aruba and Curacao. 
Non-state armed groups, including Colombian illegal armed 
groups, especially near border regions, subjected Venezuelans to 
forced criminality and forced recruitment. In 2019, the UN, foreign 
governments, media outlets, and credible NGOs reported Maduro 
regime officials, including members of security forces and local 
authorities, including those near border regions, colluded with, 
tolerated, and allowed Colombian illegal armed groups to operate in 
Venezuelan territory with impunity. These officials reportedly provided 
support and a permissive environment to non-state armed groups that 
recruited children for armed conflict and forced criminality. These 
non-state armed groups grew through the recruitment of child soldiers 
and engaged in sex trafficking and forced labor. They lured children 
in vulnerable conditions and dire economic circumstances with gifts 
and promises of basic sustenance for themselves and their families 
to later recruit them into their ranks. These groups recruited children 
to strengthen their operations and terrorize border communities in 
Venezuela and neighboring countries, especially Colombia, in areas 
with limited governance. An NGO reported non-state armed groups 
indoctrinated, recruited, and engaged children in five Venezuelan 
states using lectures, brochures, and school supply donations. 
Reports have documented the presence of six dissident movements 
comprising ex-FARC combatants in at least seven of 24 Venezuelan 
states, including Amazonas, Apure, Bolívar, Guárico, Mérida, Táchira, 
and Zulia, five of which are border states. In 2019, Colombian 
authorities estimated there were approximately 36 ELN camps located 
on the Venezuela side of the Colombia-Venezuela border. Members 
of the Maduro regime probably profit from such non-state armed 
groups’ criminal and terrorist activities inside Venezuela, including 
human trafficking, and such funds likely contribute to their efforts to 
maintain their illegitimate control. According to documents reportedly 
from Venezuela’s intelligence agency (SEBIN) and published in 
Colombian press, the Armed Forces in 2019 ordered members of 
the Army, National Guard, and militias present in four states along 
with Colombia-Venezuela border to avoid engaging unspecified allied 
groups in Venezuelan territory and encouraged the armed forces to aid 
and support their operations. These groups threaten to destabilize the 
region, as they grow their ranks exploiting children in sex trafficking, 
forced labor, and forced recruitment. According to NGOs, forced 
labor is a common punishment for violating rules imposed by 
armed groups. Illegal armed groups forced Venezuelans, including 
children, to work in mining areas and women and girls into sex 
trafficking. Traffickers subject Venezuelan women and girls, including 
some lured from poor interior regions to Caracas, Maracaibo, and 
Margarita Island, to sex trafficking and child sex tourism within the 
country. Traffickers, often relatives of the victims, exploit Venezuelan 
children in domestic servitude within the country. Venezuelan 
officials and international organizations have reported identifying 
sex and labor trafficking victims from South American, Caribbean, 
Asian, and African countries in Venezuela. Foreign nationals living in 
Venezuela subject Ecuadorians, Filipinos, and other foreign nationals 
to domestic servitude. Illegal gold mining operations exist in some of 
the country’s most remote areas, including the Orinoco Mining Arc in 







recruit youth to join armed criminal groups, and force children to 
work in the mines under dangerous conditions. In 2019, there was 
an increase in sex and labor trafficking in the informal gold mining 
sector. It was estimated roughly 45 percent of miners in Bolívar 
state were underage and extremely vulnerable to trafficking. Armed 
groups exploit civilians and kidnapping victims in sex trafficking and 
forced labor, including farming, domestic service, and construction. 
Workers recruited from other areas of the country were victims of 
forced labor and manipulated through debt, threats of violence, 
and even death. Traffickers exploited women and girls, especially 
those from indigenous communities. Some doctors participating 
in Cuba’s overseas medical program showed indicators of forced 
labor. The Cuban government may have forced Cubans medical 
workers participating in its government-sponsored medical missions 
in Venezuela to work. Some Cuban medical professionals posted in 
Venezuela indicated Cuban minders withheld their documentation 
and coerced them to falsify medical records. An NGO reported 
failure to obtain adequate personal protective equipment for medical 
workers could have contributed to the death of at least one Cuban 
medical worker. 
VIETNAM: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Vietnam does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included an increase in prosecutions 
of traffickers, and—for the first time—the government reported 
comprehensive disaggregated data on trafficking cases. It also passed 
revisions to a law governing contract-based Vietnamese overseas 
workers which eliminated brokerage fees and expanded worker 
protections. The government also increased its law enforcement and 
victim assistance budgets, continued to identify and refer victims to 
protection services, and carried out large-scale awareness campaigns in 
communities vulnerable to trafficking. However, the government did 
not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared to the previous 
reporting period, even considering the impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity. The government did not 
systematically implement victim identification procedures, and 
officials did not proactively identify trafficking victims among some 
vulnerable groups, such as women and children in commercial sex, 
resulting in a continual decline in identified victims over the last 
few years. As a result, some victims may have been penalized for 
unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit. For the fourth 
consecutive year, the government reported a decline in investigations 
and convictions of traffickers. Because the government has devoted 
sufficient resources to a written plan that, if implemented, would 
constitute significant efforts to meet the minimum standards, Vietnam 
was granted a waiver per the Trafficking Victims Protection Act from an 
otherwise required downgrade to Tier 3. Therefore Vietnam remained 
on Tier 2 Watch List for the third consecutive year.
VIETNAM TIER RANKING BY YEAR







Collaborate with NGOs and civil society to review and revise anti-
trafficking legislation and a national victim referral mechanism. 
• Vigorously prosecute all forms of trafficking and convict and 
punish traffickers, including in cases involving forced labor or 
complicit officials. • Amend the penal code to criminalize all forms 
of sex trafficking of 16- and 17-year-old children, consistent with 
international law. • Continue to train officials on implementing 
guidelines for Articles 150 and 151 of the penal code, with a focus 
on identifying and investigating forced labor and internal trafficking 
cases, including those involving male victims. • In coordination with 
civil society, update implementing guidelines on victim identification 
to reduce bureaucratic obstacles preventing victim detection and train 
cross-sectoral officials on their usage. • Coordinate and effectively 
implement policies across government agencies to identify and assist 
victims among vulnerable groups, such as migrant workers, individuals 
in commercial sex, child laborers, and North Korean nationals and 
train relevant officials on these procedures. • Proactively screen for 
and identify trafficking victims among women and girls discovered 
during police raids and inspections of business establishments that 
facilitate commercial sex. • Take steps to eliminate all worker-paid 
recruitment fees and predatory recruitment practices for workers 
migrating abroad or to Vietnam, including by strengthening efforts 
to monitor labor recruitment companies and third-party sub-brokers 
and prosecuting predatory or illegal sub-brokerage networks. • Expand 
training for social workers, first responders, and the judiciary on 
victim-centered approaches to working with victims of trafficking, 
including trauma-informed care. • Increase national funding available 
to provincial-level authorities to provide services to reintegrated victims 
of trafficking. • Implement and allocate sufficient resources to the 
2021-2025 national action plan. • Invite independent verification of 
the termination of forced labor within drug treatment centers and 
provide results of such verification.
PROSECUTION
The government increased law enforcement efforts. Article 150 of 
the penal code criminalized labor trafficking and sex trafficking of 
adults and prescribed penalties of five to 10 years’ imprisonment 
and fines of 20 million to 100 million Vietnamese dong (VND) 
($867 to $4,330). Article 151 criminalized labor trafficking and sex 
trafficking of children under the age of 16 and prescribed penalties 
of seven to 12 years’ imprisonment and fines of 50 million to 200 
million VND ($2,170 to $8,670). These penalties were sufficiently 
stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with 
other serious crimes, such as rape. Inconsistent with international 
law, Article 150 applied to children between the ages of 16 and 17 
years old and required a demonstration of force, fraud, or coercion 
to constitute a sex trafficking offense; therefore, it did not criminalize 
all forms of child sex trafficking. Civil society previously reported this 
led to confusion on how to treat cases involving 16- and 17-year-old 
children, especially for cases involving labor trafficking, resulting in 
victims being treated as adults.
The government increased the number of alleged traffickers charged 
and prosecuted, but it decreased the number of investigations and 
convictions of traffickers during the reporting period. Throughout 
the reporting period, courts were intermittently closed due to the 
pandemic; however, to ensure that criminal cases—including human 
trafficking cases—were adjudicated in a timely manner, the Supreme 
People’s Court directed the courts to schedule trials on the weekends, 
rent additional space or utilize outdoor locations to hold hearings, 
and prioritize trials set to expire. Despite these challenges, for the 
first time, the government provided disaggregated law enforcement 
data by trafficking type including investigations, prosecutions, and 
convictions of sex and labor trafficking crimes. According to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Public Security, 
authorities investigated 110 cases of human trafficking and arrested 144 
suspects of trafficking during the reporting period. This demonstrated 
a decline in investigations compared with 175 trafficking cases 
investigated during the previous reporting period. In 2020, the People’s 
Procuracies (Prosecutor’s Office) charged 180 suspects for alleged 
human trafficking offenses in 106 cases, compared with 152 suspects 
in 84 cases in 2019, under Articles 150 or 151. The People’s Procuracies 
prosecuted 161 alleged traffickers involved in 102 trafficking cases, 
compared with 156 in 91 cases in 2019. This represented an increase 
in alleged traffickers charged and prosecuted during the reporting 
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period. Of the 102 trafficking cases prosecuted in 2020, 79 involved 
sexual exploitation, 18 involved forced labor, and the remaining five 
cases involved either sex or labor trafficking. In 2020, the court system 
convicted 136 individuals (compared with 174 in 2019) among 
84 cases under Articles 150 and 151, including 71 cases of “sexual 
exploitation,” 10 cases of forced labor, and three cases for either sex or 
labor trafficking. Sentences for convicted traffickers ranged from less 
than three years’ to 20 years’ imprisonment under both Articles 150 
and 151. Vietnam maintained a high conviction rate and continued to 
impose strict sentencing for convicted traffickers. Ha Giang provincial 
officials, a northern border province with trafficking concerns, reported 
notable increases in human trafficking investigations, prosecutions, 
and convictions resulting from increased interagency collaboration 
and NGO technical assistance. Law enforcement authorities reportedly 
participated in an unspecified number of investigations of regional 
trafficking cases and other coordination activities through bilateral 
and regional agreement on an ad hoc basis. The government did not 
receive extradition requests related to human trafficking cases in 2020.
The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or 
convictions of government employees complicit in human trafficking 
offenses. Government officials acknowledged that overall poor data 
collection and management, oversight of businesses that facilitated 
commercial sex, evidence collection of transnational trafficking 
cases, and monitoring trafficking cases and evolving trends impeded 
the government’s efforts to combat trafficking. Nevertheless, the 
government continued to provide multiple anti-trafficking trainings—
at times with support from international organizations, NGOs, and 
foreign governments—to its personnel, including law enforcement 
officers, border guard forces, prosecutors, judges, and social workers 
at the district, provincial, and commune levels.
PROTECTION
The government maintained overall efforts to protect victims, but it 
identified and provided services to fewer of them. The government 
reported its identification of 121 victims in 2020, of which 112 were 
female and nine were male; 32 were children. This represented a 
continual decrease in identified victims in comparison to previous 
reporting periods (300 identified in 2019; 490 identified in 2018; 670 
identified in 2017). The government utilized victim identification 
criteria as part of the Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative 
against Human Trafficking and its own 2014 procedures for victim 
identification; however, neither the criteria nor the procedures were 
reported to be proactively or widely employed, including among 
individuals in commercial sex, individuals transiting border stations, 
workers in the fishing industry and seafood processing industry, 
migrant workers returning from abroad, and child laborers. Moreover, 
ineffective implementing guidelines on victim identification procedures 
prevented border guards, law enforcement, and other officials from 
fully detecting and assisting victims. The victim identification process 
remained overly cumbersome and complex, requiring sign-off from 
multiple ministries before victims could be formally identified and 
assisted. For example, despite conducting more than 31,000 inspections 
of businesses that facilitated commercial sex—such as karaoke bars 
and massage parlors—where individuals in commercial sex were at 
heightened risk of trafficking, authorities did not identify any sex 
trafficking victims during these inspections.
Of the 121 victims identified, 67 were Vietnamese nationals initially 
identified at land borders by border guard forces or Chinese authorities. 
Of these 67 individuals, four were victims of “sexual exploitation,” 60 
were victims of “illegal marriage”—which may have subsequently led 
to sex or labor trafficking, but the government did not report these 
details—and three were victims of “illegal adoption,” which falls 
outside of the international definition of trafficking. The government 
did not report any further details of the 54 other victims it identified. 
Of these 67 individuals, authorities referred 25 to social protection 
centers, 20 to the police, 19 to an NGO, and three to the Vietnam 
Women’s Union Center for Women’s Development. Additionally, of 
the 121 identified victims, 84 requested and received support services 
provided by both the government and NGOs, including medical and 
psychological support, legal aid, stay at social protection centers, and 
vocational training. The government maintained a formal nationwide 
victim referral process; however, it did not systematically refer victims to 
protective services due to inadequacies in the referral process, including 
some local officials’ unfamiliarity with anti-trafficking protocol and 
policies, insufficient inter-jurisdictional cooperation, and limited social 
worker capacity. Despite these challenges, throughout the reporting 
period, Ha Giang authorities—in cooperation with an NGO—created 
provincial-level victim referral procedures and improved the capacity 
of and training for social workers to provide long-term comprehensive 
care to trafficking victims, including healthcare, psycho-social care, 
vocational training, housing and financial assistance, and legal aid; 
through these procedures—for the first time—Ha Giang authorities 
referred or directly provided 35 trafficking victims with various types 
of short- and long-term care, including financial assistance.
The government’s 2020 budget for victim assistance was 15.44 billion 
VND ($669,140), an increase from the 2019 budget of 13.12 billion 
VND ($568,700). Anti-trafficking funding to localities increased from 
4 billion VND ($173,390) in 2019 to 9.8 billion VND ($424,790) 
in 2020. The government continued to operate 94 social protection 
or social service centers, some funded by NGOs, to assist vulnerable 
groups, including trafficking victims, nationwide, but none provided 
services to male or child victims exclusively. Per a circular that went into 
effect in January 2020, victims were allowed to stay at support facilities 
for up to three months with a meal stipend and medical assistance. By 
law, foreign trafficking victims were entitled to four support services: 
essential needs and travel expenses, medical support, psychological 
support, and legal aid. However, NGOs reported the government 
did not have adequately trained or experienced social workers to 
provide appropriate support to trafficking victims. The government 
maintained labor representatives at diplomatic missions in countries 
that host large numbers of documented Vietnamese migrant workers 
such as Japan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE). These missions could provide basic 
provisions, transportation, and health care to Vietnamese citizens 
subjected to trafficking abroad. Vietnam’s diplomatic missions abroad 
repatriated nine Vietnamese female victims of sexual exploitation and 
forced marriage from Burma and China. Vietnamese law guaranteed 
trafficking victims the right to legal representation; victims were not 
required to be present at or testify in-person in court. Trafficking 
victims were entitled to compensation in accordance with the law; 
the government reported that victims requested compensation in 40 
cases during the reporting period. The government did not report 
offering foreign victims legal alternatives to their removal to countries 
where they may face retribution or hardship.
Due to a lack of systematic implementation of victim-centered 
screening procedures during these raids, authorities may have penalized 
some women and children in commercial sex for unlawful acts 
traffickers compelled them to commit. Additionally, foreign victims, 
including children, remained at high risk of deportation without 
screening or referral to protective services. The government encouraged 
trafficking victims to assist in judicial proceedings against traffickers; 
however, NGOs previously reported victims were at times less likely 
to come forward about their abuses in a judicial setting due to fears 
they may face arrest or deportation for crossing the border without 
documentation. Civil society previously reported Vietnamese victims 
who migrated via irregular means, were involved in unlawful acts as a 
result of their trafficking, or had criticized the Vietnamese government, 
feared reprisals from authorities. These victims were less likely to seek 
support and were vulnerable to re-trafficking. International observers 
previously reported government officials often blamed Vietnamese 
citizens for their exploitative conditions abroad or suggested victims 
inflate abuses to avoid immigration violations.
PREVENTION
The government increased efforts to prevent trafficking. A steering 






a vice minister of public security as deputy chairs, continued to direct 
Vietnam’s anti-trafficking efforts. In February 2021, the government 
approved its national anti-trafficking action plan for 2021-2025. 
The central government, including provinces and municipalities 
continued to organize several large-scale public anti-trafficking 
awareness campaigns, many with financial and technical support from 
international organizations and foreign governments. Included in these 
efforts, the Ministry of Information and Communication disseminated 
an anti-trafficking public awareness text message to all 126 million 
mobile users in Vietnam—the first such nationwide campaign in 
Vietnam. The Ministry of Labor, Invalids, and Social Affairs (MOLISA), 
with donor funding, continued to operate a 24-hour hotline—with 
operators who spoke Vietnamese, English, and seven ethnic minority 
languages—for victims of crimes, including trafficking victims. The 
hotline received reports of 59 potential trafficking cases in 2020, an 
increase compared to the previous reporting period; it referred these 
cases to NGO and government services. MOLISA, in coordination with 
other government ministries, international organizations, and NGOs, 
organized public awareness campaigns to promote the hotline during 
the reporting period. The government did not share the full human 
trafficking assessments with the public. During the reporting period, 
the MFA organized trainings for 200 diplomatic and consular officials 
on victim identification and assistance prior to their posting abroad.
In November 2020, the government passed revisions to Law 69 
governing contract-based Vietnamese overseas workers, which 
prohibited charging workers brokerage fees and expanded worker 
protections including the right for a worker to unilaterally terminate 
a contract. Labor recruitment firms, most affiliated with state-owned 
enterprises, and unlicensed brokers reportedly charged workers seeking 
overseas employment higher fees than the law allows. Many workers 
incurred high debts and were more at risk for forced labor, including 
debt-based coercion. In 2020, MOLISA inspected 84 enterprises 
sending workers abroad, fined 32 enterprises for administrative 
violations, and revoked six business licenses for violations of the 2006 
Law on Guest Workers; MOLISA also resolved 160 out of 180 civil 
complaints filed by foreign workers related to labor recruitment. This 
demonstrated an increase in efforts compared to the previous reporting 
period. In 2019, MOLISA inspected 55 enterprises sending workers 
abroad, fined 21 of them, revoked two licenses, and resolved 120 
civil complaints, all related to labor migration. MOLISA coordinated 
with seven provinces to conduct 10 training courses for nearly 800 
officers at the district- and commune- level to improve counseling 
and information-sharing for workers migrating abroad; it also 
conducted three training courses for nearly 250 officers of service 
enterprises sending workers abroad. MOLISA also raised awareness 
on labor laws and safe migration practices among more than 470 
employment services centers and businesses. In 2020, MOLISA 
continued negotiations with the governments of Israel and Kuwait 
to sign labor cooperation agreements. During the reporting period, 
the government collaborated with the Taiwanese government to form 
a direct recruitment center in Taiwan to send Vietnamese workers to 
Taiwan and established a hotline to receive workers’ complaints. The 
government also maintained labor migration agreements—signed 
during the previous reporting period—with the Government of the 
UAE for domestic workers and with the Government of Japan for 
skilled and technical workers and interns. It also maintained a 2017 
Memorandum of Cooperation with the Government of Japan to 
improve protections for Vietnamese participants in Japan’s Technical 
Intern Training Program amid continued reports of severe exploitation 
of Vietnamese workers. The government did not make efforts to 
reduce the demand for commercial sex acts or child sex tourism. 
The government did not take steps to deny entry of known U.S. sex 
offenders. In June 2020, Vietnam’s national assembly ratified ILO 
Convention 105 on Abolition of Forced Labor.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Vietnam, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Vietnam abroad. Vietnamese men and women migrate abroad for 
work informally or through state-owned or state-regulated labor 
recruitment enterprises. Some recruitment companies are unresponsive 
to workers’ requests for assistance in situations of exploitation, 
and some charge excessive fees that trap workers in debt bondage. 
Traffickers subject victims to forced labor in construction, fishing, 
agriculture, mining, maritime industries, logging, and manufacturing, 
primarily in Taiwan, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Laos, Japan, and to 
a lesser extent, some parts of Europe and the United Kingdom (UK) 
(including in nail salons and on cannabis farms). There are increasing 
reports of Vietnamese labor trafficking victims in continental Europe, 
the Middle East, and in Pacific maritime industries. Traffickers exploit 
Vietnamese women and children in sex trafficking abroad; many 
victims are misled by fraudulent employment opportunities and sold 
to brothel operators on the borders of China, Cambodia, Laos, and 
elsewhere in Asia. Some Vietnamese women who travel abroad for 
internationally brokered marriages or jobs in restaurants, massage 
parlors, and karaoke bars—including to China, Japan, South Korea, 
Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and Taiwan—are subjected to forced 
labor in domestic service or sex trafficking. Traffickers increasingly 
use the internet, gaming sites, and particularly social media to lure 
victims, proliferate trafficking operations, and control victims by 
restricting their social media access, impersonating them, and spreading 
disinformation online. Men often entice young women and girls with 
online dating relationships, persuade them to move abroad, then 
subject them to forced labor or sex trafficking. There was one report 
of a trafficker posing as a police officer on social media networks to 
gain victims’ trust. During the migration process, European gangs 
and traffickers often exploit Vietnamese victims in forced labor and 
sex trafficking before they reach their final destination. In 2020, 
Vietnamese government and NGO officials reported an increase 
in Cambodian female adult and child trafficking victims transiting 
Vietnam en route to China. 
Within the country, traffickers are sometimes parents, family members, 
or small-scale networks exploiting Vietnamese men, women, and 
children—including street children and children with disabilities—in 
forced labor, although little information is available on these cases. 
One study suggests 5.6 percent of children in Vietnam may experience 
coercion or exploitation indicative of trafficking or in the context 
of migration, with children from rural and deprived communities 
particularly at risk. Traffickers exploit children and adults in forced 
labor in the garment sector, where workers are coerced to work 
through threats and intimidation. Traffickers force children into street 
hawking and begging in major urban centers. Traffickers subject some 
children to forced or bonded labor in brick factories, urban family 
homes, and privately run rural gold mines. Sex traffickers target 
many children from impoverished rural areas and a rising number of 
women from middle class and urban settings. Traffickers increasingly 
exploit girls from ethnic minority communities in the northwest 
highlands, including in sex trafficking and forced labor in domestic 
service, by channeling their criminal activities through the traditional 
practice of bride kidnapping. In 2020, pandemic-related issues such 
as decreased employment opportunities, restrictions on movement, 
and other socio-economic stressors, increased the vulnerability to 
trafficking, particularly for women and children in rural areas and 
ethnic minorities. Child sex tourists, reportedly from elsewhere in 
Asia, the UK and other countries in Europe, Australia, Canada, and 
the United States exploit children in Vietnam. The North Korean 
government may have forced North Koreans to work in Vietnam.
In years past there were reports of some complicit Vietnamese officials, 
primarily at commune and village levels, who allegedly facilitated 
trafficking or exploited victims by accepting bribes from traffickers, 
overlooking trafficking indicators and extorting money in exchange 
for reuniting victims with their families. In 2019, the government 
reported it had ceased the practice of subjecting drug users to forced 
labor in its 105 rehabilitation centers. A 2014 legal provision requires a 
judicial proceeding before detention of drug users in compulsory drug 
rehabilitation centers and restricts detainees’ maximum workday to 
four hours. There were prior reports that prisoners, including political 
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and religious dissidents, had been forced to work in agriculture, 
manufacturing, and hazardous industries, such as cashew processing.
ZAMBIA: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Zambia does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included increasing investigations 
and prosecutions of trafficking crimes; convening the national 
coordinating committee, in partnership with international 
organizations, to implement anti-trafficking prevention efforts; 
and conducting campaigns to raise awareness of human trafficking. 
However, the government did not demonstrate overall increasing 
efforts compared to the previous reporting period, even considering 
the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity. 
The government did not convict any traffickers and protection services 
for trafficking victims remained inadequate. The government regularly 
held potential victims, including children, in jail or other detention 
facilities for extended periods of time, often alongside traffickers. 
The government did not consistently screen for trafficking indicators 
among vulnerable populations, including foreign nationals and 
individuals involved in commercial sex—an ongoing concern over 
the past four years. Officials continued to conflate human trafficking 
and migrant smuggling, hindering the effectiveness of overall anti-
trafficking efforts. Therefore Zambia remained on Tier 2 Watch List 
for the second consecutive year. 
ZAMBIA TIER RANKING BY YEAR








Fully implement the national referral mechanism and train all 
relevant agencies to proactively identify trafficking victims and refer 
them to protective services. • Systematically and proactively identify 
trafficking victims by screening for trafficking indicators among 
vulnerable populations, including individuals involved in commercial 
sex, refugees, and foreign nationals, such as Rwandans, Ethiopians, 
and Chinese workers, and refer all victims to appropriate services. • 
Amend the anti-trafficking law to define child sex trafficking as not 
requiring force, fraud, or coercion. • Adopt an updated national 
action plan for 2022 and beyond, with resources devoted to its 
implementation. • Consistently investigate and prosecute human 
trafficking cases and sentence convicted traffickers to adequate 
penalties. • Collaborate with NGOs and international organizations 
to increase the government’s capacity to provide shelter and protective 
services to more trafficking victims, including adult males and 
foreign nationals. • Cease the penalization of trafficking victims 
for unlawful acts their traffickers compelled them to commit. • 
Expand training for police, immigration officials, prosecutors, and 
judges on investigating and prosecuting trafficking crimes to ensure 
increased investigations and prosecutions of alleged traffickers. • 
Increase protective services for victims participating in the criminal 
justice process to keep victims’ identities confidential and prevent 
re-traumatization, including the establishment of child-friendly 
interviewing spaces. • Establish a network of interpreters to ensure 
provision of interpretation services for foreign victims to deliver 
comprehensive legal and protective services. • Compile and make 
public information on trafficking cases and trends. 
PROSECUTION
The government demonstrated mixed anti-trafficking law enforcement 
efforts. The Anti Trafficking Act of 2008 criminalized some forms of 
sex trafficking and labor trafficking. Inconsistent with the definition of 
trafficking under international law, the law required a demonstration 
of threats, force, intimidation, or other forms of coercion to constitute 
a child sex trafficking offense, and therefore did not criminalize all 
forms of child sex trafficking. The act prescribed penalties ranging 
from 20 years’ to life imprisonment, which were sufficiently stringent 
and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. For the second 
consecutive year, the government reported that draft amendments 
to bring the law in line with international standards were awaiting 
ratification by parliament.
The government investigated 17 potential trafficking cases, compared 
with 13 investigations in 2019. Of these 17 cases, two were sex 
trafficking and eight were forced labor; the government did not 
report the types of trafficking in the remaining seven cases. The 
government initiated eight new prosecutions involving 11 defendants, 
compared with four prosecutions involving eight defendants reported 
in 2019. Seven of these cases, as well as three prosecutions initiated 
in 2019, remained ongoing at the end of the reporting period. The 
government did not convict any traffickers in 2020, compared with 
four convictions in 2019. Courts acquitted two alleged traffickers in 
2020. The government did not report any investigations, prosecutions, 
or convictions of government employees complicit in human 
trafficking crimes during the reporting period. In 2019, the government 
investigated one government official for alleged complicity in forced 
labor of a child in domestic work; however, the government did not 
provide any updates on this case during the reporting period. In 
February 2019, a federal court in Maryland entered a final judgment 
against a former Zambian World Bank employee and her husband, 
a Zambian diplomat posted in the United States, in a civil lawsuit 
brought by their former G-5 domestic worker. The court found that 
the couple had violated federal and state labor law, and that the World 
Bank employee had breached the employment contract. The court 
ordered the couple to pay approximately $114,000 in damages and 
attorney fees. The World Bank terminated the employment of this 
employee. The judgment appears to remain unpaid. For the second 
consecutive year, the government did not report taking any action 
to hold the diplomat accountable. 
The government did not implement its plan to direct trafficking cases 
to the two fast-track human trafficking courts with trained judges 
established in Lusaka during the previous reporting period. The 
government assisted international organizations and local NGOs 
in facilitating various human trafficking training modules for law 
enforcement officers, criminal justice practitioners and magistrates, 
and immigration officials; training topics included recognizing 
cross-border trafficking crimes, victim identification and referral 
mechanisms, and voluntary repatriation. During the reporting 
period, there were limited police officers, prosecutors, and judges 
trained on trafficking case management, causing national statistics 
on law enforcement efforts to remain difficult to obtain and verify. 
Additionally, officials’ propensity to conflate trafficking and smuggling 
made it likely that some reported cases involved individuals seeking 
to illegally cross international borders via irregular migration (migrant 
smuggling) and other crimes not involving exploitation through 
forced labor or sex trafficking. 
PROTECTION
The government maintained inadequate victim protection efforts. Due 
to officials’ continued conflation of trafficking and migrant smuggling, 
national statistics on trafficking victim identification and protection 
remained difficult to obtain and verify. The government identified 
199 potential victims during the reporting period, compared with 
17 victims identified in 2019; however, it was unclear if traffickers 
had exploited these individuals in sex trafficking or forced labor. 
Of the 199 potential victims identified, 166 were male and 33 were 
female; 73 were adults and 126 were children; 22 victims were 






Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Burundi, 
Malawi, Rwanda, Kenya, Somalia, and Zimbabwe. The government 
identified the majority of potential victims—140 Ethiopians—in two 
instances after police received reports from the local community. The 
government repatriated three Zambian victims identified in Algeria, 
Belgium, and South Africa, compared with two repatriations from 
South Africa in 2019. Observers reported the Zambia Police Service 
and Department of Social Welfare jointly conducted raids in brothels 
where families forced their children to engage in commercial sex; 
however, the government did not report identifying any victims or 
initiating any investigations based on such efforts. While use of the 
national referral mechanism reportedly increased in 2020, some 
front-line officials still neglected to use these methods to identify and 
refer victims to care, especially in cases involving foreign nationals 
or individuals in commercial sex. The government, in partnership 
with an international organization, continued to disseminate an 
updated standard victim identification form to better guide front-line 
officials in proactively identifying trafficking victims; however, law 
enforcement officers did not use forms currently available.
The government partnered with international organizations to offer 
routine assistance to potential victims, including basic needs, medical 
care, and counseling; however, the government did not provide all 
services across Zambia. The Ministry of Community Development and 
Social Services operated one 40-person shelter in Luapula Province 
and other shelters in Central and Western Provinces. Shelters were 
typically designated for survivors of gender-based violence or child 
abuse but were made available to trafficking victims; most shelters 
only assisted women and children, but some accommodated adult 
male victims of trafficking. Shelters across the country, especially in 
rural areas outside Lusaka and Copperbelt Provinces, continued to 
lack available space, training for shelter staff, education opportunities, 
and integration services due to low capacity and training of victim 
support officers, scarce resources, and lack of funding. With assistance 
from an international organization, the government developed 
standard operating procedures and shelter guidelines; however, the 
guidelines were awaiting final approval by the Ministry of Home 
Affairs (MHA) at the end of the reporting period. The government 
provided 282,846 Zambian kwacha ($13,380) to support four 
shelters in 2020, compared with 50,000 kwacha ($2,370) provided 
to one shelter in 2019.
Authorities continued to penalize victims for crimes their traffickers 
compelled them to commit. While the government reportedly 
increased efforts to screen potential victims of trafficking, it did 
not do so consistently in cases that appeared to involve smuggling; 
the government detained, charged, or deported individuals who 
reportedly consented to being smuggled, including potential 
trafficking victims, without screening those individuals for trafficking 
indicators. In some cases involving foreign nationals, the government 
prosecuted potential victims for immigration violations after they 
provided evidence against their alleged trafficker; the government 
also reportedly charged potential sex trafficking victims—adults and 
children—with prostitution violations, rather than investigating 
their trafficker. Given the limited sheltering options and lengthy 
court processes, the government regularly held potential victims in 
detention facilities for extended periods of time, often alongside 
traffickers; authorities often did not separate children from the adult 
population. Of the 199 potential victims the government identified 
in 2020, the government reported 140 of them were placed in jails, 
correctional facilities, or detention. The government rarely provided 
opportunities for victim testimony via video or written statements and 
made no proactive efforts to keep victims’ identities confidential or 
prevent re-traumatization. The Department of Immigration provided 
regularization of immigration status and temporary residency for 
all foreign victims in accordance with the 2008 trafficking law. 
Regularization of stay was not dependent on the victim’s cooperation 
with law enforcement, and the government offered legal alternatives 
to the removal of victims to countries where they may face hardship 
or retribution; however, the government did not report applying this 
alternative to foreign victims during the reporting period. The lack 
of availability of interpreters continued to be a barrier to providing 
timely and comprehensive care for victims, and victims often paid a 
fee to obtain interpretation services, despite the government reporting 
interpretation services were available free of charge. 
PREVENTION
The government maintained efforts to prevent trafficking. The 
MHA continued to oversee a national inter-ministerial committee 
(IMC) and its secretariat, which was charged with oversight of 
national anti-trafficking efforts. With support from international 
organizations, the IMC met three times in 2020 to discuss a review 
of anti-trafficking legislation, coordinate anti-trafficking responses 
in light of the pandemic, and develop trafficking training for law 
enforcement. The government continued to implement the 2018-
2021 national action plan on trafficking and mixed and irregular 
migration. The government, in coordination with an international 
organization, launched various awareness campaigns via billboards, 
radio shows, text alerts, and pamphlets in rural and border areas to 
educate local communities on human trafficking. The government 
did not operate a hotline for potential victims of trafficking and 
did not track trafficking-specific call data from hotlines operated 
by nongovernmental organizations. NGOs reported receiving 47 
calls with trafficking indicators during the reporting period. The 
Employment Act set forth requirements for the regulation of labor 
brokers and prohibited labor brokers from charging prospective 
employees for any services rendered. The Ministry of Labor (MOL) 
continued to conduct inspections and investigations of labor brokers 
on a regular basis throughout the country to regulate recruitment 
practices and prevent fraudulent job offers that may lead to 
exploitation. The MOL reported conducting 922 inspections in 
2020; however, the government did report identifying any trafficking 
victims or potential trafficking violations during these inspections. 
The MOL employed 154 labor inspectors in 2020, compared with 160 
employed the previous year. The government did not make efforts 
to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government did 
not provide anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Zambia, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Zambia abroad. Most trafficking occurs within the country’s borders 
and involves traffickers exploiting women and children from rural 
areas in cities in domestic servitude or forced labor in agriculture, 
textile production, mining, construction, small businesses, such as 
bakeries, and forced begging. Jerabo gangs may force Zambian children 
to engage in illegal mining operations, such as loading stolen copper 
or crushing rocks. Orphans and street children remain vulnerable 
to trafficking; however, children of village families are also at risk of 
trafficking because sending children to the city for work is perceived 
to confer status and may entice families to do so without verifying 
the environment. During the pandemic, a six-month school closure 
increased children’s vulnerability to exploitation, including sex 
trafficking and forced labor. Truck drivers exploit Zambian boys and 
girls in sex trafficking in towns along the Zimbabwean and Tanzanian 
borders, and miners exploit them in Solwezi. Traffickers exploit 
Zambian boys in sex trafficking in Zimbabwe and exploit women 
and girls in sex trafficking in South Africa. Domestically, extended 
families and trusted family acquaintances facilitate trafficking. 
Traffickers exploit Zambians from rural areas in the Western Province 
in forced labor in Namibia.
Traffickers exploit women and children from neighboring countries 
in forced labor and sex trafficking in Zambia, including transiting 
migrants whose intended destination is South Africa. In recent 
years, traffickers lure Rwandan women to Zambia with promises 
of refugee status, coerce them into registering as DRC nationals 
seeking refugee status in Zambia, and subsequently exploit them in 




them to immigration officials for fraudulent refugee claims. Traffickers 
increasingly exploit victims from Tanzania and Malawi in the Zambian 
timber industry. Chinese nationals working in Zambia, particularly in 
the construction, mining, and service sectors, may have been forced 
to work, including by the People’s Republic of China state-owned 
enterprises that employed them. Chinese traffickers bring Chinese 
women and girls to Zambia for sexual exploitation in brothels and 
massage parlors in Lusaka; traffickers use front companies posing as 
travel agencies to lure Chinese victims and coordinate with Zambian 
facilitators and middlemen. Indian-Zambian nationals operating in 
India facilitate illegal adoption of Indian children for the purpose 
of exploiting them in domestic servitude in Zambia. 
ZIMBABWE: TIER 2 WATCH LIST
The Government of Zimbabwe does not fully meet the minimum 
standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant 
efforts to do so. These efforts included convicting one trafficker 
and sentencing him to imprisonment and formally approving 
its 2019-2020 antitrafficking national action plan. However, the 
government did not demonstrate overall increasing efforts compared 
to the previous reporting period, even considering the impact of the 
COVID-19 pandemic on its anti-trafficking capacity. The government 
significantly decreased investigations and prosecutions and did not 
identify a single trafficking victim, while NGOs identified and cared 
for more than 400 trafficking victims. Official complicity in human 
trafficking remained prevalent and widely reported, particularly near 
artisanal mines, but the government did not report any investigations 
into the allegations. For the second year, draft amendments to the 2014 
Trafficking in Persons Act, to bring the law in line with international 
standards, remained pending. The government did not provide any 
support to its NGO partners that provided all protective services to 
victims. Authorities imprisoned for several months three alleged 
trafficking victims identified in a previous reporting period and 
deported them instead of referring them to services. While it had a 
new national action plan, the government’s antitrafficking taskforce 
did not meet during the reporting period and the government did not 
allocate sufficient funding for the plan’s implementation. Therefore 
Zimbabwe was downgraded to Tier 2 Watch List. 
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PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:
 Amend the anti-trafficking law to criminalize all forms of trafficking 
in line with the 2000 UN TIP Protocol. • Increase law enforcement’s 
funding and capacity to conduct more thorough investigations 
of alleged trafficking, particularly enhanced evidence collection. 
• Increase efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking crimes, 
including complicit government officials and individuals who 
purchase commercial sex from children. • Train officials to proactively 
identify trafficking victims among vulnerable populations, including 
migrant workers, Cuban medical workers, and foreign nationals from 
China, and refer them to appropriate services. • Expedite trafficking 
cases in courts to address the significant backlog of cases. • Implement 
and allocate sufficient resources to the antitrafficking national 
action plan. • Increase collaboration with, and provide financial or 
inkind support to, NGOs that assist trafficking victims. • Train law 
enforcement, prosecutors, and judiciary officials on human trafficking 
investigations and prosecutions, particularly as distinct from labor 
law violations, and a victim-centered approach to investigations and 
prosecutions. • Establish safe houses for trafficking victims in each 
province and refer identified victims to care. • Develop mutual legal 
assistance treaties and other agreements to facilitate information 
gathering and sharing with foreign governments. • Collect data 
on human trafficking trends within Zimbabwe to better inform 
government anti-trafficking efforts. 
PROSECUTION
The government maintained mixed anti-trafficking law enforcement 
efforts. Zimbabwean law criminalized some forms of sex trafficking 
and labor trafficking. Inconsistent with international law, the 2014 
Trafficking in Persons Act defined trafficking in persons as a movement-
based crime and did not adequately define “exploitation.” The 2014 
act criminalized the involuntary transport of a person and the 
voluntary transport for an unlawful purpose, into, outside, or within 
Zimbabwe. The focus on transport and the inadequate definition of 
“exploitation” left Zimbabwe without comprehensive prohibitions 
of trafficking crimes. The law prescribed penalties of 10 years’ to life 
imprisonment, which were sufficiently stringent and, with respect to 
sex trafficking crimes, were commensurate with penalties for other 
serious crimes, such as rape. Zimbabwe’s Labor Relations Amendment 
Act criminalized forced labor and prescribed penalties of up to two 
years’ imprisonment, which were not sufficiently stringent. The 
Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act criminalized procuring 
a person for unlawful sexual conduct, inside or outside of Zimbabwe, 
and prescribed penalties of up to two years’ imprisonment; these 
penalties were not sufficiently stringent when applied to cases of sex 
trafficking. The act also criminalized coercing or inducing anyone 
to engage in unlawful sexual conduct with another person by threat 
or intimidation, prescribing sufficiently stringent penalties of one 
to five years’ imprisonment. For the second consecutive year, the 
government made no progress passing its 2019 draft Trafficking in 
Persons Act Amendment Bill. The government did not consult civil 
society during drafting, which several organizations viewed as an 
intentional move to avoid addressing deficiencies in farming and 
mining laws that facilitate forced labor.
The government did not initiate any new trafficking investigations 
or prosecutions. It continued one prosecution from the previous 
reporting period and convicted one trafficker. This was an overall 
decrease from initiating seven potential trafficking investigations, 
six prosecutions, and no convictions in the previous reporting 
period and a continued decrease from prior years. A Harare court 
convicted one individual on six counts of trafficking for luring victims 
to Kuwait and exploiting them in forced labor and sex trafficking; 
he received a sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment. The government 
initially arrested the suspect in this case in 2017; although he later 
absconded, officials brought the suspect back into custody in January 
2020. The government did not report whether the five prosecutions 
reported in the previous reporting period remained pending. Despite 
the continued urging from victims to take action in the 17 alleged 
trafficking cases of Zimbabwean women exploited in trafficking in 
Kuwait in 2016, and their stated willingness to participate in the 
trials, the government did not do so for the fourth consecutive year. 
Moreover, in May 2020, the president granted amnesty, reportedly 
due to the pandemic, to a trafficker who had exploited numerous 
Zimbabweans in Kuwait; she served approximately two years of 
her 50-year sentence. 
While official corruption and complicity in human trafficking 
remained prevalent, the government did not report any investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government officials for trafficking 
or related crimes. Observers reported the government did not have a 
system to investigate and prosecute complicit officials. Four potential 
labor trafficking victims on a member of Parliament’s farm sought 
assistance when they did not receive the agreed upon pay and 
were threatened for requesting it; an NGO removed the potential 
victims from the farm, but the government did not investigate the 







from NGOs to provide information on trafficking and denied them 
access to locations necessary to conduct the NGOs’ anti-trafficking 
research. Media reported violent gangs controlled some artisanal 
gold mines, including by kidnapping workers and forcing them into 
labor, and enjoyed impunity due to their connections to police and 
local politicians. Police that manned checkpoints at defunct gold 
mines allegedly accepted bribes to allow individuals to enter and 
work without oversight, including with forced laborers. For the third 
consecutive year, the government did not investigate serious, credible 
claims that complicit magistrates, judges, and senior government 
officials undermined judicial independence including by bribing 
judges with farms and homes. In past years, civil society reported 
officials at the Beitbridge border crossing into South Africa accepted 
bribes to allow organized criminal groups to cross the border, at 
times likely with trafficking victims. There was no report this practice 
had changed. Officials accepted bribes to not inspect farms and 
businesses that used exploitative labor practices. Trafficking victims 
reported law enforcement threatened and intimidated them when 
they tried to report their cases. 
Because law enforcement and prosecutors lacked training in the 
trafficking law and trafficking cases required long and challenging 
investigations, officials routinely prosecuted trafficking cases for 
subsidiary violations, such as wage infractions. Due to the pandemic, 
the government did not conduct anti-trafficking trainings for law 
enforcement or judiciary officers. The Zimbabwe Republic Police 
had a module on the anti-trafficking law in its police recruit training. 
Observers continued to report the government lacked a systematic 
procedure to investigate cases, and immigration officials lacked 
capacity to detect and investigate trafficking. In addition, many 
investigations lacked sufficient evidence to build strong cases. Courts 
typically expedited sexual offense cases but did not treat trafficking 
cases with the same urgency, so the cases often languished on the 
docket for years. 
PROTECTION
The government decreased victim identification and protection efforts. 
The government did not identify any trafficking victims, compared 
with identifying 32 trafficking victims in the previous reporting period. 
The government stated no organization identified any trafficking 
victims, but two NGOs and one international organization identified 
91 suspected trafficking victims and reported them to the Ministry of 
Public Service, Labor, and Social Welfare’s (MPSLSW) Department of 
Social Welfare. The 91 victims included 17 Zimbabwean adult females 
subjected to a mix of labor and sex trafficking, including in Uganda, 
Iraq, Kenya, and domestically; and 67 children, including 57 exploited 
in sex trafficking. In addition, media and NGOs reported identifying 
350 child sex trafficking victims near the Mazowe mines. Furthermore, 
an environmental group that gathered data and observations of child 
labor and exploitation at diamond and gold mines in Manicaland 
identified more than 38 children as young as 14 forced to sell 
drugs. NGOs provided all trafficking victim care, including shelter, 
food, medical treatment, family reunification and reintegration, 
counseling, and income-generating assistance. The shelters and 
services for trafficking, domestic violence, and gender-based violence 
(GBV) victims were available to both males and females, nationals 
and foreigners, and irrespective of the victim’s participation in legal 
proceedings. For at least the third consecutive year, the government 
relied on NGOs and foreign donors to fund trafficking victim 
services; the organizations struggled to operate without adequate and 
consistent financial support, and some could only provide short-term 
care. While the government had one operational shelter that could 
accommodate 30 GBV and trafficking victims and 24 vulnerable 
children’s homes, these shelters did not care for any trafficking victims 
during the reporting period. The 2014 anti-trafficking act required 
the government to establish service centers in each of Zimbabwe’s 10 
provinces and provide counseling, rehabilitation, and reintegration; 
the government had not established these centers by the end of the 
reporting period. 
In partnership with an international organization, the government 
conducted training on its National Referral Mechanism (NRM) for 
128 government and civil society representatives from seven districts. 
Adopted in the previous reporting period, the NRM outlined standard 
operating procedures in the identification, referral, and assistance 
of trafficking victims. For the second consecutive year, the technical 
steering committee for trafficking victim protection, led by the 
MPSLSW, did not meet. The MPSLSW had a system whereby an 
NGO and a Department of Social Welfare caseworker jointly handled 
each reported potential trafficking case, but it did not use the system 
in practice. The government had policies to encourage victims to 
cooperate in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking cases, 
but lack of understanding of trafficking by police often caused re-
victimization of trafficking victims during the legal process. Some 
law enforcement and judicial officials, however, had training to treat 
victims sensitively, handle cases quickly, and refer victims to post-trial 
support services. Some health service providers had training to collect 
evidence for criminal investigations, prepare medical affidavits, and 
offer immediate and long-term psycho-social support and health 
care. Courts had a separate room for victims to testify separately from 
their alleged perpetrators, and victims could choose to testify via 
video; however, observers reported not every court had access to the 
necessary equipment, especially in rural areas, and the government 
did not report whether any victims utilized these services during the 
reporting period. While the trafficking act required judges to order 
compensation from convicted traffickers to their victims, no judge 
did so. The government did not have legal alternatives to repatriation 
for foreign trafficking victims, even if they would face retribution 
or hardship in their countries of origin. Zimbabwean authorities 
identified three Pakistani individuals as human trafficking victims in 
a previous reporting period and imprisoned them for several months 
and deported them during this reporting period.
PREVENTION
The government decreased efforts to prevent trafficking. The Anti-
Trafficking Inter-Ministerial Committee (ATIMC) served as the 
national coordinating body for all anti-trafficking activities, and its 
secretariat led the government’s anti-trafficking efforts, including 
overseeing awareness-raising events and implementation of the 
national action plan. The government launched its 2019-2021 anti-
trafficking national action plan during the reporting period. It did not, 
however, allocate sufficient funding for its implementation. Despite 
a mandate to meet quarterly, neither the ATIMC nor its provincial 
taskforces met during the reporting period, a continued decrease from 
prior reporting periods. While the pandemic imposed restrictions 
on gatherings, international organizations reported the continued 
lack of political will, resources, and staff were also reasons for the 
ATIMC’s lack of action. In part due to the pandemic, the government 
did not conduct any public awareness events on human trafficking, 
compared with several educational campaigns conducted by police 
and other ministries in the previous reporting period.
The government continued to lack the political will to address 
child and forced labor, particularly in agriculture. While a tripartite 
committee of government, labor unions, and business representatives 
determined the MPSLSW would lead efforts to raise awareness of 
child and forced labor among the tobacco industry and conduct 
regular inspections, the ministry took no steps to do so during the 
reporting period. Due to a lack of capacity and resources, inspectors 
rarely conducted inspections of tobacco farms, despite repeated 
claims of child and forced labor in that sector. When inspectors did, 
observers alleged they underreported negative findings, including 
the presence of child labor. The government reported it conducted 
1,860 labor inspections but did not identify any cases of forced or 
child labor; it did not report the sectors or regions of inspection, and 
most observers were unaware the reported inspections had occurred. 
Inspectors had the authority to monitor private farms and homes for 
underage or forced child domestic labor but did not report doing so. 
With support from an international organization, the government 





collected national data on criminal cases and victims identified and 
shared it with countries in the region. The government did not provide 
anti-trafficking training to its diplomatic personnel. The government 
did not make efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
domestic and foreign victims in Zimbabwe, and traffickers exploit 
victims from Zimbabwe abroad. Internal trafficking is prevalent and 
underreported. Traffickers exploit Zimbabwean adults and children 
in sex trafficking and forced labor, including in cattle herding, 
domestic service, and mining (gold and diamonds). More than 71 
percent of child labor occurs in the agriculture (tobacco, sugarcane, 
and cotton), forestry, and fishing sectors, where children weed, 
spray, harvest, and pack goods. Some of these children are victims 
of forced labor, including some who work on small, unregulated 
farms. Due to pandemic-induced school closures and worsening 
economic conditions, observers reported child sex trafficking and 
child labor likely increased, particularly in agriculture, domestic 
service, informal trading, begging, and artisanal mining. Children 
ages 9 to 14 work as nannies, housemaids, and gardeners in urban 
areas and mining communities; some employers force the children 
to work by withholding wages, denying them access to school, and 
subjecting them to gender-based violence. Several traditional practices 
rendered young girls vulnerable to forced labor and sex trafficking, 
including the practice of trading daughters for food or money; as 
“replacement” brides for a deceased family member; and to avenge 
the spirits of a murdered relative. Traffickers exploit women and 
girls from Zimbabwean towns bordering South Africa, Mozambique, 
and Zambia in forced labor, including domestic servitude, and sex 
trafficking in brothels catering to long-distance truck drivers on both 
sides of the border. 
Traffickers exploit child laborers working as gold-panners and ore 
couriers by providing inadequate compensation, stealing their income, 
exacerbating food insecurity, and forcing them to take drugs to 
perform strenuous tasks; these practices are indicative of forced labor. 
Near gold and diamond mines, traffickers increasingly force children 
to sell illicit drugs. Illegal mining syndicates exploit Zimbabweans in 
trafficking. Experts estimate thousands of children have joined illegal 
diamond mining syndicates in the Marange fields in Chiadzwa since 
March 2020; some syndicates target illiterate people and transport 
them to the mines at night so they do not know their location. Armed 
gangs known as “Mashurugwi” lure young men to abandoned gold 
mines on the promise of self-employment but force them to work 
the artisanal gold mines with threats of violence and death. Child 
vendors, some of whom walk more than 25 kilometers per day to sell 
goods, are exploited by sex traffickers in illegal mining areas. Adult 
women increasingly exploit girls as young as 12 in sex trafficking 
in gold mining communities in Mashonaland East, Mazowe, and 
Shurugwi. During the pandemic, organizations and media identified 
hundreds of children in sex trafficking near the Mazowe mines. 
Miners force girls to enter into coercive “relationships” where they 
have sex in exchange for money and food and sometimes assist with 
mining operations. In Chiredzi, sex traffickers recruit girls as young 
as 11 from surrounding areas. 
Traffickers use false promises of legitimate employment opportunities, 
including through social media and messaging applications, to lure 
Zimbabwean adults and children into sex trafficking and forced labor 
in neighboring countries, particularly South Africa. In South Africa, 
traffickers exploit Zimbabweans for months of labor without pay in 
agriculture, construction, factories, mines, information technology, 
and hospitality businesses. South African gangs fraudulently recruit 
undocumented Zimbabwean migrants with promises of legitimate 
employment in mining and force them into labor in the illegal 
mining industry. Due to the pandemic, Zimbabwean women and 
children increasingly travel illegally to South Africa for employment, 
where their lack of legal status increases their vulnerability to 
traffickers. International criminal organizations have intercepted 
some Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa and subjected them 
to sex trafficking, including in Musina, Pretoria, Johannesburg, 
and Durban. Traffickers have exploited Zimbabwean women in 
domestic servitude, forced labor, and sex trafficking in Iraq, Kenya, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Uganda. In previous years, traffickers 
lured Zimbabwean women to China and the Middle East for forced 
labor. Traffickers have used fraudulent scholarship schemes to lure 
Zimbabwean students to Cyprus ostensibly for educational purposes 
and exploited them in forced labor and sex trafficking. Media has 
reported Zimbabweans living abroad, particularly in the United 
Kingdom and Ireland, trick Zimbabweans to travel abroad under 
the pretenses of tourism or legitimate employment and force them 
into domestic work. Traffickers have recruited Zimbabwean girls 
into neighboring countries with promises of marriage and, during 
marriage, forced them into domestic work. 
Zimbabwe is a transit country for Somalis, Ethiopians, Malawians, 
and Zambians en route to trafficking in South Africa. Zimbabwe is 
a destination for forced labor and sex trafficking. Traffickers subject 
Mozambican children to forced labor in street vending, including 
in Mbare. Mozambican children who work on relatives’ farms in 
Zimbabwe are often undocumented and cannot enroll in school, 
which increases their vulnerability to traffickers. In prior years, there 
were reports refugees from Somalia and Democratic Republic of the 
Congo traveled from Zimbabwe’s Tongogara Refugee Camp to Harare, 
where traffickers exploited them and, in some cases, coerced them 
into commercial sex. Traffickers force some Chinese nationals to 
work in restaurants in Zimbabwe. Chinese construction and mining 
companies in Zimbabwe reportedly employ practices indicative of 
forced labor, including verbal, physical, and sexual abuse, as well 
as coercion to induce work in unsafe or otherwise undesirable 
conditions. Cuban nationals working as doctors in Zimbabwe may 
have been forced to work by the Cuban government.
SPECIAL CASE: LIBYA
Libya is a Special Case for the sixth consecutive year. The Libyan 
Government of National Accord (GNA) struggled to govern large 
swaths of Libyan territory, as it did not exercise control in several parts 
of the country. The judicial system was not fully functioning, as courts 
in major cities throughout the country have not been operational 
since 2014. Violence continued during the reporting period due 
to the conflict between the Tripoli-based GNA and the self-styled 
Libyan National Army (LNA), which has sought to establish a rival 
government in eastern Libya. Financial or military contributions 
from other states in the region further enabled the conflict, with 
Turkey supporting the GNA and Russia, the United Arab Emirates, 
and Egypt supporting the LNA, although some military support 
abated following a nationwide ceasefire signed on October 23, 2020. 
Extra-legal armed groups continued to fill a security vacuum across 
the country; such groups varied widely in their make-up and the 
extent to which they were under the direction of state authorities. 
These disparate groups committed various human rights abuses, 
including unlawful killings, forcible recruitment, forced labor, 
and sex trafficking. Impunity for those committing abuses against 
civilians was a pervasive problem. During the reporting period, 
an international organization verified the GNA and GNA-aligned 
armed groups recruited and used child soldiers; the international 
organization also verified the LNA and LNA-aligned armed groups 
recruited and used child soldiers. There were continued reports that 
criminal networks, militia groups, government officials, and private 
employers exploited migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers in sex 
and labor trafficking. Endemic corruption and militias’ influence 
over government ministries contributed to the GNA’s inability to 
effectively address human trafficking. On March 15, 2021, the GNA 











through a UN-led process; the LNA ceded power to the GNU on 
March 23, 2021.
GOVERNMENT EFFORTS 
Lack of institutional capacity, as well as lack of Libyan law 
enforcement, customs, and military personnel, especially along its 
borders, hindered authorities’ efforts to combat human trafficking 
crimes. Libyan law criminalized some forms of sex trafficking but 
did not criminalize labor trafficking. Articles 418, 419, and 420 of 
the penal code criminalized some forms of sex trafficking involving 
women and prescribed penalties of up to 10 years’ imprisonment and 
a fine between 100 and 500 Libyan dinars ($75-$375), which were 
sufficiently stringent and commensurate with penalties prescribed 
for other serious crimes, such as rape. However, inconsistent with 
international law, the definition of trafficking within these provisions 
required transnational movement of the victim and did not criminalize 
sex trafficking acts that were induced through fraudulent or coercive 
means. The law did not criminalize sex trafficking involving adult male 
victims. Article 425 criminalized slavery and prescribed penalties of 
five to 15 years’ imprisonment. Article 426 criminalized the buying 
and selling of slaves and prescribed penalties of up to 10 years’ 
imprisonment. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with 
respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with penalties prescribed 
for other serious crimes.
Libya’s criminal judicial system was not fully functioning in 2020, 
nor were there administrative units and courts specifically dedicated 
to overseeing human trafficking cases. Law enforcement and judicial 
authorities often lacked the knowledge and understanding of the 
crime of human trafficking. The Ministry of Interior (MOI), which 
was nominally responsible for anti-trafficking law enforcement efforts, 
was limited in its ability to carry out anti-trafficking operations during 
the reporting period. Although entities such as the Ministry of Justice 
(MOJ) and Office of the Attorney General issued arrest warrants for 
alleged perpetrators of various crimes including trafficking during the 
reporting period, limited policing capacity hindered the government’s 
ability to pursue these trafficking cases. Law enforcement functions 
sometimes fell to disparate armed groups, which received salaries from 
the government and performed their activities without formal training 
and with varying degrees of accountability. The MOI and MOJ’s human 
rights directorates, which continued to function throughout the 
reporting period, were mandated to raise awareness of human rights 
violations including human trafficking crimes; however, international 
NGOs reported the directorates lacked the capacity to carry out their 
mandates. Perpetrators committing human rights abuses, including 
human trafficking crimes, generally operated with impunity. The 
government did not publicly report statistics on prosecutions or 
convictions of trafficking offenders, including government officials 
and government-aligned militias that were allegedly complicit in 
trafficking crimes. The government did not report if it prosecuted 
or convicted any individuals involved in the investigation of 205 
suspected traffickers that the attorney general’s office initiated in 
2018, nor did it report if any of the 35 arrest warrants that it issued 
in January 2019 resulted in trafficking prosecutions or convictions 
during the reporting period. GNA security forces conducted several 
raids during the reporting period on known trafficker and smuggler 
hideouts, including in Bani Walid; the government did not report 
whether any criminal trafficking investigations or prosecutions 
were initiated following these raids or whether victims found in 
these raids were referred to any services. In January 2021, the MOI 
announced the launch of “Operation Snake Hunt” against human 
traffickers, migrant smugglers, gangs, drug traffickers, and other 
criminals; preparations for the operation were ongoing at the end of 
the reporting period. As in previous years, international organizations 
and foreign governments facilitated anti-trafficking training for some 
MOI and MOJ officials during the reporting period.
International observers continued to report complicity of government 
officials involved in human trafficking, including Libyan Coast Guard 
(LCG) officials, immigration officers, security officials, Ministry 
of Defense (MOD) officials, members of armed groups formally 
integrated into state institutions, and officials from the MOI and MOI’s 
Department to Combat Illegal Migration (DCIM). Various armed 
groups, militias, and criminal networks infiltrated the administrative 
ranks of the government and abused their positions to engage 
in illicit activities, including human trafficking and alleged child 
soldier recruitment and use. Several credible sources continued to 
report that DCIM detention center guards and administrative staff 
forced detained migrants to work at these detention centers and at 
third locations, such as farms and construction sites. There were 
anecdotal reports that DCIM staff at detention centers contracted 
armed groups and militias—some of whom likely had ties to human 
trafficking networks— to provide security services at individual 
detention centers. Reports also suggested staff in some GNA-affiliated 
migrant detention centers in western Libya sold detainees to local 
armed groups or otherwise coerced detainees to transport and clean 
weapons. During the reporting period, an international organization 
verified GNA forces used a 15-year-old boy abducted from Syria by 
Syrian opposition groups in hostilities; reports indicated the boy 
was still associated with a GNA-affiliated brigade at the end of the 
reporting period. There were also anecdotal reports that children 
in GNA-affiliated migrant detention centers in western Libya were 
coerced to work in support roles for GNA-affiliated armed groups. In 
western Libya, numerous armed groups, including some GNA-aligned 
units, continued to engage in the trafficking of detained migrants. 
In addition, some LCG units, which were under the authority of the 
MOD, allegedly were composed of former human traffickers and 
smugglers or coordinated with groups involved in human trafficking, 
migrant smuggling, and other crimes. Militia members operating 
the Zawiya detention center reportedly physically abused detained 
migrants and sold some female migrants into sexual slavery; in late 
2019, the center was transformed into an army barracks for militias, 
further endangering detained migrants and trafficking victims. In 
2018, the UN sanctioned a commander of the Zawiya LCG for 
perpetrating violence against migrants and the GNA subsequently 
suspended him from his duties as the LCG commander. Credible 
sources reported he continued to work on LCG missions in Zawiya 
port through September 2020. However, in October 2020, authorities 
arrested the former LCG commander, and he remained in detention 
at the end of the reporting period. 
The government arrested, detained, or otherwise punished victims 
for unlawful acts traffickers compelled them to commit, such as 
immigration and prostitution violations and alleged affiliation to 
armed groups. As of April 2021, DCIM managed 15 operational 
detention facilities throughout Libya where it arbitrarily and 
indefinitely detained adult and child migrants and refugees— 
many of whom were unidentified trafficking victims. During the 
reporting period, the DCIM announced it would begin closing 
coastal detention centers and transferring the remaining detainees 
to two large inland facilities; DCIM did not report whether it would 
screen detainees for trafficking indicators as part of this process. 
DCIM-run detention facilities suffered from massive overcrowding, 
lack of basic infrastructure, dire sanitation problems, and food 
shortages. Detainees, including trafficking victims, had limited access 
to medical care, legal aid, and other forms of protective services. 
However, during the reporting period, the MOI allowed international 
organizations and NGOs to conduct limited protection monitoring 
and medical visits to DCIM detention centers. Detainees did not 
have access to immigration courts or other forms of due process. 
DCIM staff continued to subject detainees to severe abuse, forced 
labor, unlawful killings, and rape and other forms of sexual violence. 
No DCIM detention centers employed female guards, except for 
the Tariq al-Sekka detention center; the lack of female personnel 
at the majority of detention centers and climate of impunity for 
sexual violence contributed to the increased vulnerability of female 
detainees to abuse and exploitation. There were reports that GNA 
armed forces used some detention centers as recruitment or training 
grounds and to store weapons and equipment, further endangering 
detainees and trafficking victims. 
SPECIAL CASE: LIBYA
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The government did not have any policy structures, institutional 
capacity, widespread political will, or resources to proactively 
identify and protect trafficking victims among vulnerable groups, 
such as foreign migrants, refugees, and asylum-seekers; women in 
commercial sex; and children recruited and used by government-
aligned militias or other armed groups. The government did not report 
identifying any victims or provide foreign trafficking victims with 
legal alternatives to their removal to countries where they could face 
hardship or retribution. Libyan authorities continued to cooperate 
with international organizations to repatriate, resettle, or evacuate 
some migrants, which likely included unidentified trafficking victims; 
however, COVID-19 pandemic-related travel restrictions temporarily 
suspended the program during the reporting period. The government 
allowed an international organization to be present at some of the 
official disembarkation points along the western coastline where 
migrants arrived after the LCG intercepted or rescued them at sea; 
however, the government’s procedures for disembarked migrants 
remained unclear and put migrants further at risk of exploitation. 
During the reporting period, the government continued to cooperate 
with international organizations, international NGOs, and diplomatic 
missions to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance to 
refugees and migrants, a population highly vulnerable to trafficking, 
in DCIM-run detention centers. The government continued to 
operate a limited number of social rehabilitation centers for women 
in commercial sex and victims of sex trafficking and other forms 
of sexual abuse; however, these centers reportedly operated as de 
facto prisons, and international observers continued to document 
incidents of abuse in these centers.
Libya is a party to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol, but the government 
lacked the institutional capacity and resources to prevent human 
trafficking. The GNA’s lack of acknowledgement of the scope of 
human trafficking concerns in Libya contributed to an environment 
of impunity that further enabled trafficking; MOI and DCIM officials 
acknowledged that migrant smuggling occurred in Libya but continued 
to insist trafficking was not a widespread phenomenon. The GNA did 
not have a national coordinating body responsible for combating 
human trafficking. The government did not conduct any public 
anti-trafficking awareness campaigns, nor did it take actions to 
reduce the demand for commercial sex acts or child sex tourism. 
The government did not report steps to prevent the recruitment and 
use of children by militia groups, armed groups affiliated or aligned 
with the government, or other armed groups operating throughout 
the country. During the reporting period, the GNA continued to 
partner with some European countries to disrupt human trafficking 
and migrant smuggling operations, substantially reducing the flow 
of irregular migrants crossing the Mediterranean over previous years. 
However, some European and international NGOs criticized this 
cooperation, citing severe security and human rights conditions 
and an increased risk of trafficking for migrants forced to remain in 
Libya. The government did not provide anti-trafficking training for 
its diplomatic personnel. 
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit 
domestic and foreign victims in Libya. Instability, conflict, and lack 
of government oversight and capacity in Libya continued to allow 
for human trafficking crimes to persist and be highly profitable for 
traffickers. Trafficking victims—including adults and children—are 
highly vulnerable to extreme violence and human rights abuses 
in Libya by governmental and non-state armed groups, including 
physical, sexual, and verbal assault; abduction for ransom; extortion; 
arbitrary killings; inhumane detention; and child soldiering. Credible 
reports since 2013 indicate numerous armed groups and militias, 
some of which are used as combat forces or security enforcement by 
the government, recruit and use children. During the reporting period, 
an international organization verified the GNA, LNA, GNA-affiliated 
armed groups, and LNA-affiliated armed groups all recruited and used 
child soldiers. In 2018, an international organization documented 
incidents in which local armed groups forcibly recruited boys 13-15 
years old. Uncorroborated media reports in 2018 also claimed that 
ISIS trained and used children in suicide attacks, to fire weapons, 
and to make improvised explosive devices. Children associated with 
armed groups in Libya are also reportedly exposed to sexual violence. 
IDPs, including both Libyans and foreigners, are vulnerable to both 
labor and sex trafficking. There were an estimated 278,177 IDPs in 
Libya at the end of 2020, of whom 94 percent were displaced due 
to the deterioration of security conditions in the country.
Migrants in Libya are extremely vulnerable to sex and labor trafficking, 
including those seeking employment in Libya or transiting Libya en 
route to Europe. Migrants living in Libya are vulnerable to exploitation 
by state and non-state actors, including employers who refuse to pay 
laborers’ wages. As of the end of 2020, international organizations 
estimated there were at least 574,000 migrants and 43,000 refugees 
and asylum-seekers in Libya. Labor migrants in Libya typically come 
from sub-Saharan and Sahel states. An international organization 
estimated 80,000 migrants left Libya for neighboring countries 
since the start of the pandemic. The country continued to serve as a 
departure point for migrants, including unaccompanied children, 
crossing the Mediterranean to Europe from North Africa; the numbers 
of sea departures from Libya to Europe increased in 2020 nearly 
threefold, in part due to pandemic-related decreased economic 
opportunities in Libya and the region. Elements of the LCG reportedly 
work with armed groups and other criminals, including traffickers, 
to exploit migrants for profit. There are financial incentives for 
smugglers and traffickers to prevent the disembarkation of migrants 
transiting the Mediterranean and to re-transit migrants back to Libya 
for detention and further exploitation. Throughout 2019 and 2020, 
due to violence and localized clashes, as well as pandemic-related 
border closures and movement restrictions, traditional smuggling 
and trafficking routes became more clandestine, creating greater risks 
and dangers for migrants.
Various armed groups, criminal gangs and networks, tribal groups, 
smugglers, and traffickers, have cooperated and competed in the 
smuggling and trafficking of migrants to and through Libya, while 
carrying out serious human rights abuses and violations against 
migrants, including torture, sexual abuse and exploitation, rape, 
extortion, ransom, theft, and forced labor. International organizations 
report smugglers and traffickers trade migrants and refugees within 
illicit networks, while holding them in inhumane conditions. Highly 
organized trafficking networks subject migrants to forced labor and 
sex trafficking through fraudulent recruitment, confiscation of identity 
and travel documents, withholding or non-payment of wages, debt-
based coercion, and verbal, physical, and sexual abuse. In some 
cases, migrants reportedly pay smuggling fees to reach Tripoli, but 
once they cross the Libyan border they are sometimes abandoned 
in southern cities or the desert where they are susceptible to severe 
forms of abuse, including human trafficking. 
Several credible sources continue to report that migrants held in 
detention centers controlled by both the DCIM and non-state 
armed groups and militias were subjected to severe abuse, rampant 
sexual violence, and forced labor. As of February 2021, international 
organizations estimated there were more than 1,550 migrants and 
refugees in detention centers affiliated with either the GNA or rival 
LNA. There are an unknown number of migrants and refugees 
detained in informal detention facilities across the country affiliated 
with various non-state armed groups. An unknown number of 
migrants are also held in criminal prisons affiliated with the MOJ, 
MOI, and MOD. Private employers and DCIM officials use detained 
migrants for forced labor in domestic work, garbage collection, 
construction, road paving, and agriculture. According to international 
observers, detention center operators also force migrants to provide 
ancillary services to armed groups, such as offloading and transporting 
weapons, cooking food, cleaning, and clearing unexploded ordnance; 
armed groups also forcibly recruit detained migrants. Once the work 
is completed, employers and detention center officials return the 
migrants to detention. In some cases, detained migrants are forced 











2017, an international media outlet released a video depicting 
unidentified individuals selling African migrants reportedly for labor 
in an undisclosed location in Libya. Furthermore, an international 
organization reported in 2017 that many militias in Libya fill their 
ranks with migrants from Niger, Nigeria, and Chad to perform labor 
or to serve in other non-combat roles. In November 2020, an NGO 
reported a UAE-based private security firm fraudulently recruited 
more than 390 Sudanese nationals to fight in Libya for the LNA and 
guard oil facilities in Ras Lanuf; the Sudanese recruits believed they 
would be working as security guards in the UAE.
There is reportedly a high prevalence of sexual assault and other 
forms of sexual violence and exploitation of female migrants along 
the migration routes to Libya and in DCIM-run and militia-run 
detention facilities in Libya; perpetrators of sexual violence against 
female migrants include various armed groups, smugglers, traffickers, 
and MOI officials. International NGOs also report that migrant men 
and boys are increasingly vulnerable to rape and other forms of sexual 
abuse. Prostitution rings reportedly subject sub-Saharan women and 
girls to sex trafficking in brothels, particularly in the towns of Ubari, 
Sebha, and Murzuq in southern Libya; Nigerian women and girls are 
at increased risk of sex trafficking in Libya. According to a European 
NGO, Nigerian gangs recruit Nigerian girls from rural regions of the 
country and facilitate the transportation of the girls through Libya 
for sex trafficking in Italy and other European countries. 
SPECIAL CASE: SOMALIA 
Somalia remains a Special Case for the 19th consecutive year. The 
country continued to face protracted conflict, insecurity, and ongoing 
humanitarian crises during the reporting period, while the COVID-19 
pandemic exacerbated the crises and further hampered government 
and NGO operations. The Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) 
controlled its capital city, Mogadishu, and Federal Member State 
(FMS) governments retained control over local capitals across the 
country. The self-declared independent region of Somaliland and 
the Puntland FMS retained control of security and law enforcement 
in their respective regions. The FGS had limited influence outside 
Mogadishu. The al-Shabaab terrorist group continued to occupy and 
control many rural areas and maintained freedom of movement 
in many other areas, including south-central Somalia. The group 
exploited the local population by collecting illegal taxes, conducting 
indiscriminate attacks against civilians and civilian infrastructure 
across the country, and perpetrating human trafficking. The sustained 
insurgency by al-Shabaab continued to be a significant obstacle 
to the government’s ability to address human trafficking. The 
government continued nascent improvements to civilian judicial 
systems and criminal investigation programs to address most crimes; 
however, it also conflated human trafficking and migrant smuggling, 
hindering the effectiveness of its anti-trafficking efforts. Overall, the 
government continued to demonstrate minimal efforts in all regions 
on prosecution, protection, and prevention of human trafficking 
during the reporting year.
GOVERNMENT EFFORTS
The FGS, Somaliland, and Puntland authorities sustained 
minimal efforts to combat trafficking during the reporting period. 
Law enforcement, prosecutorial personnel, and judicial offices 
remained understaffed and undertrained and lacked capacity to 
effectively enforce antitrafficking laws. The FGS continued to lack a 
comprehensive legal framework to address human trafficking. The 
pre-1991 penal code—applicable at the federal and regional levels—
criminalized labor trafficking and some forms of sex trafficking. 
Article 455 criminalized slavery, prescribing penalties of five to 
20 years’ imprisonment. Article 464 criminalized forced labor, 
prescribing penalties of six months to five years’ imprisonment. 
Article 457 criminalized the transferring, disposing, taking possession, 
or holding of a person and prescribed penalties of three to 12 
years’ imprisonment. All these penalties were sufficiently stringent. 
Article 408(1) criminalized compelled prostitution of a person 
through violence or threats, prescribing penalties of two to six 
years’ imprisonment, which were sufficiently stringent but not 
commensurate with those prescribed for other serious crimes, such 
as rape. The provisional constitution prohibited slavery, servitude, 
trafficking, and forced labor under Article 14. Article 29(6) under 
the provisional constitution prohibited the use of children in armed 
conflict. In September 2017, Somaliland endorsed a draft human 
trafficking law designed in consultation with an international 
organization; however, the Somaliland Parliament did not pass it for 
the fourth consecutive reporting period and relied predominantly on 
immigration legislation to prosecute trafficking crimes. In November 
2017, Puntland ratified a human trafficking legislative framework 
after three years of consultations with an international organization. 
The legal framework was composed of new penal and criminal 
procedure codes and a law that specifically prohibited trafficking; 
however, international organizations continued to report authorities 
had not yet implemented the anti-trafficking law.
Similar to previous years, neither the federal nor the regional 
governments within Somalia gathered or shared comprehensive 
statistics on investigations, prosecutions, or convictions related to 
trafficking. During the reporting year, the FGS Office of the Attorney 
General (AGO) reported 479 arrests related to immigration violations, 
which may have included potential trafficking crimes or penalized 
potential unidentified victims, compared with 17 arrests in 2019. The 
AGO reported that 129 of these arrests involved individuals attempting 
to travel to Turkey with suspicious passports; the government did 
not provide further information to indicate if these were trafficking 
cases or implicated potential unidentified victims. Authorities in 
Somaliland did not report any anti-trafficking law enforcement 
actions during the reporting period, compared with the arrest of 
six individuals in connection with an alleged dual trafficking and 
smuggling case in 2019. In July 2020, local officials in Garowe—the 
capital of Puntland—investigated an alleged case of forced labor 
among Bangladeshi workers at a construction company after workers 
reported a wage dispute to the local police; the government did not 
report any further case details or the outcome of the investigation. 
Puntland authorities reported prosecuting two trafficking-related 
cases during the reporting period, compared with an international 
organization reporting two trafficking cases involving six suspects in 
2019. Authorities did not report if the cases reported in 2020 and 2019 
were related. The FGS, Somaliland officials, and Puntland authorities 
did not report any information regarding ongoing cases from prior 
reporting periods. The government did not report any investigations, 
prosecutions, or convictions of government employees complicit 
in human trafficking offenses, including military officials for the 
unlawful recruitment and use of children; however, corruption and 
official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, 
inhibiting law enforcement action during the year. The Somali Police 
Force (SPF) Criminal Investigations Department maintained a 
specialized anti-trafficking and migrant smuggling unit, supported by 
an international organization, and mandated to investigate potential 
cases of trafficking, which employed an unspecified number of police 
officers. The unit did not report investigating any potential trafficking 
cases for the second consecutive year, compared with 43 investigations 
in 2018. Observers previously reported that the SPF regularly tasked 
the anti-trafficking unit to undertake other assignments unrelated 
to human trafficking. During the reporting period, an international 
organization provided training to civil society organizations operating 
in the region, as well as five Somali officials, on the identification of 
and assistance to vulnerable migrants, including potential trafficking 
victims. Foreign donors supported training for police officers on 
investigating and prosecuting cases of human trafficking and training 
for police recruits and NGOs on migration and trafficking issues.
Similar to previous years, the government did not systematically gather 





largely anecdotal. The government did not have standardized 
procedures to identify or refer trafficking victims to protective services 
at any level and all levels of government relied fully on international 
organizations and NGOs to provide victim assistance and reintegration 
services. The FGS did not possess sufficient financial resources to 
provide direct services or auxiliary support to organizations assisting 
victims and vulnerable populations. The SPF Airport Police Task Force 
reported identifying five potential victims of child trafficking—four 
girls were en route to Kenya and one girl, who was accompanied 
by her parents, was en route to the United Arab Emirates (UAE); it 
was unclear if suspected traffickers exploited any of the children in 
forced labor or sex trafficking or intended to do so. In Puntland, 
officials reported identifying 324 potential trafficking victims in 2020; 
according to media reports, the government identified 150 of these 
victims in Bosasso and all 324 victims were children. International 
NGOs provided the Somaliland Immigration and Border Control 
Agency with two buses to transport migrants and potential trafficking 
victims from remote to more populated areas where they could be 
provided with services. Potential trafficking victims in Somaliland 
received assistance at an international organization-run Migration 
Response Center (MRC) in Hargeisa until the MRC could reunite them 
with their respective families; the same international organization 
operated another MRC in Bosasso in Puntland. In December 2020, 
the FGS, with support from an international organization, established 
an MRC in Mogadishu. The MRCs were not dedicated solely to 
trafficking victims and provided services broadly for the vulnerable 
transiting migrant population. The government and international 
organizations did not report the number of potential trafficking 
victims who received assistance at MRCs during the reporting period; 
however, the government reported that referrals to them were minimal 
due to decreased resources at MRCs, such as staffing and service 
availability, because of pandemic-related funding cuts. Puntland 
authorities maintained a regional referral mechanism for trafficking 
victims with support from an international organization; however, 
officials did not report the extent of its use during the reporting 
period. Victim support varied significantly across the country and 
specialized care was sporadic due to limited practitioners in country; 
victims in areas not serviced by the MRCs had irregular access to 
protective provisions. Authorities routinely detained potential victims 
for immigration violations, including possession of fraudulent 
visas; however, the government reportedly screened some detained 
individuals for trafficking indicators at ports of entry, particularly 
in Mogadishu. The government did not have a legal alternative to 
the removal of foreign trafficking victims from Somalia to countries 
where they may face hardship or retribution.
Authorities across Somalia demonstrated decreased efforts to prevent 
trafficking during the year. The government’s lead anti-trafficking 
official remained the special envoy for children and migrants’ rights, 
who previously directed a staff of five under the office of the prime 
minister and was responsible for coordinating efforts on migration, 
trafficking, and reintegration across federal and regional governmental 
jurisdictions. Observers noted that the special envoy’s role was 
possibly reduced during the reporting period. While the Office of the 
Special Envoy served as the secretariat, the FGS Ministry of Women 
and Human Rights and representatives from Galmudug previously 
served as the co-chairs of a technical task force on trafficking. The 
task force was inactive during the reporting period, whereas it had 
conducted monthly meetings and training in 2019. A lack of technical 
expertise and limited capacity continued to hinder the secretariat’s 
efforts to develop and coordinate effective anti-trafficking policy. In 
Somaliland, the Ministry of Justice, in partnership with international 
organizations, maintained a mixed migration task force that could 
oversee trafficking-related issues; however, officials did not report the 
task force undertaking anti-trafficking efforts during the reporting 
period. In Puntland, the state government maintained an inter-
ministerial mixed migration task force and the Puntland Counter 
Trafficking Board; however, officials did not report these entities 
undertaking antitrafficking efforts during the reporting period. In 
2019, the Office of the Special Envoy developed a strategic, quasi-
national action plan (NAP) that outlined three priorities: policy, 
coordination, and outreach; however, the government did not report 
implementing the NAP following the removal of the prime minister 
in July 2020. The FGS did not report conducting anti-trafficking 
awareness campaigns during the reporting period, compared with 
multiple campaigns targeting first responders in 2019. The government 
did not operate a hotline to report human trafficking during the 
reporting period. Authorities across Somalia did not make efforts 
to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts. The government did 
not provide anti-trafficking training for its diplomatic personnel. 
Somalia was not a party to the 2000 UN TIP Protocol.
The dire security situation and restrictions on movement of 
humanitarian actors continued to hamper comprehensive efforts to 
address the recruitment and use of child soldiers during the year. Al-
Shabaab continued to commit the vast majority of violations, although 
there were reports of the Somali federal defense and police forces—
which included the Somali National Army (SNA) and SPF—Puntland 
forces and police, Jubaland forces, Galmudug forces and police, 
federal and state gendarmes, and clan militias unlawfully recruiting 
and using both male and female child soldiers (between 10 and 17 
years old). An international organization verified the recruitment 
and use of 213 children (including 12 girls) by all actors between 
April and June 2020; 532 children (including 12 girls) between June 
and September 2020; and 426 children (including 15 girls) between 
October and December 2020. During the previous reporting period, 
an international organization documented the recruitment and use 
of at least 710 children. According to an international organization, 
the state and non-state actors implicated in reporting had used 
67 percent of children for unknown purposes in the conflict; 22 
percent of children as combatants in hostilities; and 11 percent of 
children in support roles such as security escorts, checkpoint guards, 
messengers, and cleaners. During the reporting period, observers also 
reported three instances in which security forces had recruited and 
armed children (two boys and one girl) to guard public buildings 
and government officials in Mogadishu. 
The government continued to implement the 2012 action plan to end 
the unlawful recruitment and use of children by the SNA; however, the 
FGS exercised inconsistent command and control of SNA forces. The 
Ministry of Defense’s Child Protection Unit (CPU), in partnership with 
international organizations and foreign donors, reported screening 
4,899 SNA personnel in Galmudug, South West State, Jubaland, and 
Mogadishu. The CPU did not report identifying child soldiers among 
those ranks, but it did identify 11 child soldiers recovered from al-
Shabaab and referred an unspecified number of these children for 
further assistance. In collaboration with an international NGO and 
foreign donors, the CPU continued to conduct training and awareness 
campaigns targeted toward hundreds of military and community 
leaders to prevent recruitment and use of child soldiers during the 
reporting period. International organizations continued to report 
some government forces had detained children for their actual or 
alleged association with al-Shabaab and did not apply juvenile justice 
standards or adhere to international obligations. Specifically, from 
April to September 2020, an international organization reported 
Somali federal and regional security authorities (primarily the police) 
arrested and detained 108 children (including one girl) aged 11 to 17 
years for their alleged association with armed groups. Purportedly, 
officials eventually released 61 of the children, while 46 children 
remained in detention; the status of one boy was unknown.
In early 2019, an international organization supported a consultative 
meeting on the Somalia strategy and operational framework on 
the prevention of and response to child recruitment, release, and 
reintegration; the strategy was awaiting parliamentary approval 
for the second consecutive reporting period. Most Somalis lacked 
birth certificates, and in the absence of established birth registration 
systems or standardized methods for recruitment, verifying claims 
of child soldiering remained difficult. In 2018, the FGS undertook 
a process of biometric registration of SNA soldiers to validate their 















registered weapons to increase transparency and accountability in the 
security sector and curb the recruitment and use of child soldiers in 
the SNA. The government did not report implementing this biometric 
registration mechanism for the second consecutive reporting period, 
though some SNA units have reportedly enrolled in the system.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Somalia and traffickers exploit victims from 
Somalia abroad. Information regarding trafficking trends and victims 
in Somalia remains challenging to obtain or authenticate. Traffickers 
most commonly use four cross-border routes, mirroring migration 
flows: a northern route to Europe via Libya; an eastern route to Europe 
via Turkey; a direct southern path to Kenya, Tanzania, or South Africa; 
and a path from south-central Somalia through Puntland onward to 
Yemen via the Bab el-Mandeb strait. In previous reporting periods, 
in Somaliland some women acted as recruiters and intermediaries 
who transported victims to Puntland, Djibouti, and Ethiopia for 
the purposes of forced labor in domestic service or sex trafficking. 
In prior years, the FGS anecdotally reported fewer Somalis arrived in 
their intended destination countries but rather became stranded in 
transit countries. Anecdotal evidence indicates al-Shabaab continues 
to facilitate human trafficking crimes, using deception, infiltration of 
madrassas and mosques, coercion or harassment of clan elders or family 
members, school raids, and abductions to recruit and subsequently 
force victims—including children hailing mostly from south-central 
Somalia and Kenya—into sexual slavery, military support roles, direct 
combat, and marriages to al-Shabaab militants. In 2018, al-Shabaab 
reportedly conducted numerous “handing-over” ceremonies in the 
presence of village and clan elders, during which the terrorists forced 
communities to “volunteer” hundreds of their children to fight 
among its ranks. Al-Shabaab continued to enslave an indeterminate 
number of young girls and exploited them in forced marriage and 
sexual servitude during the reporting period.
IDPs, certain marginalized ethnic minorities, people residing in 
al-Shabaab territory, and youth remain the most vulnerable to sex 
trafficking and forced labor. During the reporting period, authorities 
noted the age of vulnerable migrants appeared to be much lower 
than previous years, to include children as young as 15 years old. 
Somali children working in the informal sector are vulnerable to 
trafficking, as they often are driven by familial or economic pressure 
to seek employment opportunities abroad. These economic migrants 
sometimes incur debts under the trafficking scheme dubbed “go 
now, pay later” or through economic exploitation. According to an 
international organization, traffickers extort payments from families 
left behind or exert threats if they refuse or are unable to pay. In 
general, the predominant factors that compel migrants to leave 
Somalia are poverty, insecurity, and natural disasters. As of February 
2021, an international organization registered more than 900,000 
refugees and 2.6 million IDPs from Somalia. Some Somalis willingly 
surrender custody of their children to people with whom they share 
familial ties and clan linkages and who may subsequently exploit 
some of these children in forced labor or sex trafficking. While many 
children work within their own households or family businesses, some 
traffickers may force children into labor in agriculture, domestic work, 
herding livestock, selling or portering khat, crushing stones, or the 
construction industry. Although there is a lack of reliable statistics, in 
prior years Somaliland and Puntland continued to receive an influx 
of economic migrants and refugees from war-torn Yemen and the 
Oromia region of Ethiopia, in addition to returnees primarily from 
Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
Most trafficking networks continue to be organized by a combination 
of Somali, Djiboutian, Eritrean, and North African traffickers. Typically, 
traffickers employ deception as the predominant recruitment method, 
although al-Shabaab often uses coercion and force. Traffickers 
increasingly recruit individuals through social media platforms 
and travel agencies, with a growing level of network sophistication. 
Traffickers also target and recruit children, without their parents’ 
awareness or support, using false promises that no payment will be 
demanded until they reach their targeted destinations. Traffickers and 
smugglers reportedly take advantage of the vulnerability of IDP women 
and children, mostly from southern and central Somalia, at times 
using false promises of lucrative jobs in Europe and North America. 
Traffickers transport Somali women, sometimes via Djibouti, to the 
Middle East, where they frequently endure forced labor, including in 
domestic service, or sex trafficking. Traffickers subject Somali men to 
forced labor in farming and construction in the Gulf States. Traffickers 
transport children to Djibouti, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE and force 
them to beg on the streets. Dubious employment agencies facilitate 
human trafficking by targeting individuals desiring to migrate to the 
Gulf States or Europe for employment.
SPECIAL CASE: YEMEN
Yemen remains a Special Case for the sixth consecutive year. The civil 
conflict and humanitarian crisis continued during the reporting period, 
while the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the crisis and further 
hampered both government and NGO functioning. Information 
on human trafficking in the country has been increasingly difficult 
to obtain since March 2015, when much of the Republic of Yemen 
Government (ROYG) took refuge in Riyadh following the takeover of 
Sana’a by Iranian-backed Houthi rebels and lost control of significant 
portions of the country. Although a ROYG and Southern Transitional 
Council (STC) powersharing agreement returned the ROYG to its 
temporary capital of Aden in December 2020, it remained unable 
to adequately combat trafficking or collect data on trafficking during 
the reporting period. NGOs reported vulnerable populations were 
at an increased risk of human trafficking due to the protracted 
armed conflict, civil unrest and lawlessness, and worsening economic 
conditions. Migrant workers from the Horn of Africa who remained or 
arrived in the country during the reporting period may have endured 
intensified violence. Due to pandemic-related border closures and 
movement restrictions, many migrants traveling through the country 
to Gulf countries remained trapped in Yemen, heightening their risk 
to trafficking. The international organizations and NGOs remaining in 
the country focused primarily on providing humanitarian assistance 
to the local population and lacked adequate resources and capacity 
to gather reliable data on human trafficking. The vast majority of 
Yemenis required all types of assistance and basic social services, as 
the national infrastructure had collapsed.
GOVERNMENT EFFORTS
Due to the protracted conflict and tenuous political situation, the 
government faced serious challenges to combat trafficking, including 
substantial internal security threats, weak institutions, systemic 
corruption, economic deprivation, food insecurity, social disintegration, 
limited territorial control, and poor law enforcement capabilities. The 
ROYG exercised only nominal control over government-controlled 
areas; ROYG authorities that oversaw migrant flows, provided 
services and protection to migrants, and assisted vulnerable groups 
– which may have interacted with victims – did not function. The 
government did not report efforts to address trafficking in persons 
during the reporting period. The absence of a law criminalizing 
all forms of trafficking and the government’s conflation of human 
trafficking and migrant smuggling hindered government efforts to 
investigate and prosecute trafficking offenders. Article 248 of the 
penal code criminalized slavery and prescribed penalties of up to 
10 years’ imprisonment; these penalties were sufficiently stringent 
and, with respect to sex trafficking, commensurate with the penalties 
prescribed for other serious crimes, such as rape. However, Article 248 
narrowly focused on transactions and movement and therefore did 
not criminalize many forms of labor and sex trafficking, as defined 
under international law. Article 279 criminalized child sex trafficking 
under its prostitution provision and prescribed penalties of up to seven 
years’ imprisonment, which could be increased to up to 15 years’ 
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imprisonment under aggravating circumstances; these penalties were 
sufficiently stringent and commensurate with those prescribed for 
other serious crimes, such as rape. In 2014, the government adopted 
a bill that it subsequently referred to the Parliament, which aimed to 
combat all forms of trafficking, protect and assist victims, generate 
societal awareness of the risks of trafficking to reduce the incidence of 
the crime, and promote national cooperation. However, the bill had 
not been taken up by parliament by the close of the reporting period. 
The ROYG did not have full oversight of the courts and therefore 
did not report efforts to prosecute, convict, or punish trafficking 
offenses during the year. In addition, the government did not report 
any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government 
officials complicit in trafficking offenses; however, corruption and 
official complicity in trafficking crimes remained significant concerns, 
including the alleged recruitment and use of child soldiers by the 
ROYG Armed Forces, inhibiting law enforcement action during 
the year. The government did not report efforts to conduct training 
on trafficking for any government officials or provide support to 
NGOs or international organizations that may have conducted anti-
trafficking training.
The government did not have the access or capacity to identify and 
provide adequate protection services to trafficking victims among 
vulnerable groups, such as women in commercial sex and migrant 
laborers, some of whom were in transit to the Gulf States. To mitigate 
its inability to ensure trafficking victims were not inappropriately 
incarcerated, fined, or otherwise penalized for unlawful acts traffickers 
compelled them to commit, such as commercial sex or immigration 
violations, the government initiated measures to protect migrants, 
including potential trafficking victims, during the previous reporting 
period; this included creation of a committee led by the Ministry 
of Interior’s Immigration, Passport, and Naturalization Authority 
(IPNA) to assure the security and protection of the legal and human 
rights of migrants. However, the government did not report on the 
committee’s actions during the reporting period to screen vulnerable 
migrant populations for potential trafficking victims and so was unable 
to ensure it did not wrongfully penalize victims. Although formal 
standard operating procedures for proactive identification of trafficking 
victims existed, efforts to implement or train law enforcement on 
these procedures were suspended due to the prolonged unrest. 
Furthermore, the government was not able to encourage victims to 
assist in investigations or prosecutions of their traffickers and was 
financially unable to provide assistance to its nationals repatriated 
after enduring trafficking abroad. During the reporting period, both 
government-aligned forces and militia forces continued to unlawfully 
recruit and use child soldiers. 
Due to its broad lack of access and capacity limitations, the government 
did not make sufficient efforts to prevent trafficking during the 
reporting period. The government maintained the National Committee 
to Combat Human Trafficking pursuant to Council of Ministers 
Decision No.46 of 2012; its members included governmental and 
nongovernmental interlocutors. A draft national strategy to combat 
trafficking initiated by the ministry of human rights in a previous 
reporting period, in coordination with an international organization, 
remained pending. The draft included plans for raising awareness, 
increasing cooperation between Yemen and neighboring countries, 
training officials in victim identification, and instituting procedures 
to protect victims. The government did not provide anti-trafficking 
training to its diplomatic personnel and did not make efforts to 
reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.
Since the escalation of armed conflict in March 2015, human rights 
organizations reported all parties to the conflict continued their 
unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers. However, verification 
of such cases remained challenging during the reporting period due 
to intensified security threats against the monitors and communities 
of interest, in addition to more restrictive humanitarian access and 
pandemic-related movement restrictions. As a result of its limited 
capacity and the ongoing conflict, the ROYG has not implemented 
a 2014 UN action plan to end the recruitment and use of child 
soldiers, although it continued to express interest in revitalizing 
the discussion on implementation. During the previous reporting 
period, the government entered into an agreement with the UN on a 
roadmap for implementation of the existing action plan to prevent the 
recruitment and use of child soldiers; however, no progress was made 
on its implementation during the reporting period, due to intensified 
conflict and ongoing tensions between the ROYG and the STC. Due 
to continued military activity by government and Houthi forces, 
tribal elements and other foreign-backed militias during the year, the 
recruitment, training, and mobilization of children as participants in 
the conflict by nongovernmental forces and by affiliated governmental 
forces continued. An international organization reported armed groups 
used boys mostly in combatant roles or to guard checkpoints and 
forced other children to carry out support duties such as cooking, 
washing clothes, and gathering intelligence during the reporting period. 
During the reporting period, international organizations noted the 
increased recruitment by the Houthis of girls between the ages of 13-
17, used mostly as recruiters, guards, and spies, and in more formal 
roles as educators and medics. Reportedly, some girls were recruited 
to a specific all-female force and some survived sexual violence 
and/or forced early marriage linked to their recruitment. During the 
reporting period, verified cases of the unlawful recruitment and use 
of child soldiers occurred with some familial knowledge or consent; 
monetary and material support was utilized as an incentive for joining 
the Yemeni Armed Forces and to a lesser extent forced enrollment via 
abductions. Recruiters continued to target schools across the country. 
An international organization also reported that recruitment from 
both male and female detention centers, used as a condition for 
release particularly by the Houthis, increased during the reporting 
period. According to an international organization, between April 
and September 2020, armed groups unlawfully recruited and used at 
least 65 children between the ages of 12-17, compared with 23 from 
the previous reporting period. Despite challenges in documenting 
and verifying information due to continued persistent security threats 
and pandemic-related movement restrictions, the number of children 
recruited and used increased during the reporting period, indicating 
the deeply concerning effect of the ongoing conflict on children in 
the country. Recruitment and use of child soldiers were reportedly 
attributed to Houthis and affiliated factions, the government’s Yemeni 
Armed Forces, and Security Belt Forces. In 2020, officials did not report 
demobilizing any child soldiers; however, the government operated 
a Saudi-funded interim care center in Marib to assist former child 
soldiers during the reporting period.
TRAFFICKING PROFILE 
As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic 
and foreign victims in Yemen, and traffickers exploit victims from 
Yemen who reside abroad. The ongoing conflict, lack of rule of law, 
economic degradation, pervasive corruption, and fractional territorial 
control have disrupted some trafficking patterns and exacerbated others. 
Prior to the conflict, Yemen was a transit point and destination for 
women and children, primarily from the Horn of Africa, who were 
exploited in sex trafficking and forced labor. Many Ethiopians and 
Somalis traveled voluntarily to Yemen with the hope of employment 
in Gulf countries; traffickers exploited some of these migrants in forced 
labor and sex trafficking in transit countries, reportedly most often in 
Yemen. Prior to the conflict’s escalation and the government’s departure 
from Sana’a in March 2015, Saudi Arabia allegedly deported Yemeni 
migrant workers and returned them to Yemen through the al-Tuwal 
and al-Buq border crossings. Most deportees reportedly returned 
to the impoverished Tihamah region located on the west coast of 
Yemen, many of whom remained displaced and highly vulnerable 
to exploitation, including trafficking. During the reporting period, 
pandemic-related movement restrictions and border closures led to 
a very low rate of migrant arrivals in Yemen; a total of 37,535 people 
arrived in 2020, mostly from Ethiopia and Somalia, as in previous 
years. However, as Yemen is generally a transit point for migrants 
traveling to the Gulf for economic opportunity, restrictions, border 











migrants for several months in dire living conditions and with 
minimal access to assistance and support. With limited options for 
survival and decreased support from local communities in Yemen, 
migrants were forced to look elsewhere to meet basic needs, which 
traffickers exploit. Moreover, during the reporting period there 
was an increase in reports of migrants subjected to sex trafficking, 
forced labor, physical and sexual abuse, and abduction for ransom. 
Additionally, due to a significant decrease in migrants transiting 
through Yemen, an international organization reported that traffickers 
were increasingly forcing migrant women to work off debts on farms 
or moving them to cities to work as domestic laborers, subjecting them 
to debt bondage. During the reporting period, both the pandemic 
and the country’s civil war continued to generate a substantial flow of 
reverse migration for migrants who originated in the Horn of Africa, 
as well as Yemenis fleeing the country to Djibouti. An international 
organization reported that since May 2020, 7,652 migrants made 
their way from Yemen to Djibouti, traveling on smuggling boats 
or by foot, although the number could be higher as some arrivals 
may have not been officially captured due to arrivals at coastal 
locations. The Government of Djibouti, in coordination with an 
international organization and the Ethiopian Embassy in Djibouti, 
reported facilitating the voluntary return of 537 migrants in 2020, 
the large majority of whom were Ethiopian. Since the escalation of 
armed conflict in March 2015, human rights organizations reported 
all parties to the conflict continued their unlawful recruitment and 
use of child soldiers. However, verification of such cases remained 
challenging during the reporting period due to intensified security 
threats against the monitors and communities of interest, in addition 
to more restrictive humanitarian access. Civil society organizations 
and media outlets assessed in the previous reporting period that 
trafficking of Yemeni children gradually increased since the civil 
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Chile 2004 2003 2003 1933 2020 (will enter into force on 16 November 2021) 1999 2000 2015
Comoros 2020 (23 June) 2007 — 1978 — 1978 2004 —
Costa Rica 2003 2002 2003 1960 2020 (will enter into force on 16 November 2021) 1959 2001 2014
Kyrgyzstan 2003 2003 2003 1992 2020 (will enter into force on 16 November 2021) 1999 2004 —
Mexico 2003 2002 2002 1934 — 1959 2000
2020 (will enter 
into force on 3 
July 2021)
Namibia 2002 2002 2002 2000 2017 2000 2000
2020 (will enter 
into force on 9 
December 2021)
Nepal 2020 (16 June) 2006 2007 2002 — 2007 2002 —
Portugal 2004 2003 2003 1956 2020 (will enter into force on 23 December 2021) 1959 2000 2015
Sudan 2014 2004 2005 1957 2021 (will enter into force on 17 March 2022) 1970 2003 —
Tonga — — — — — —
2020 (will enter 
into force on 4 
August 2021)
—
Vietnam 2012 2001 2001 2007 —
2020 (will 
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The chart below shows the Ratification, Accession (a), or Acceptance (A) of relevant international conventions for those 
countries that have ratified, acceded to, or accepted any such conventions between April 2020 and March 2021. A complete 























Total Number of 
Peacekeeping and 
Support Personnel
81,932 (including 5,763 women) 3,795 15,621 
Total Number of 
Missions
13 16 3
Prevention Policy “Special Measures for Protection from Sexual 
Exploitation and Sexual Abuse” (SEA) (2003)
“Code of Conduct for Staff and Mission 
Members”
“NATO Policy on Combating 
Trafficking in Human 
Beings” (2004 and 2007)
“NATO Policy on 
Combatting Sexual 





Department of Management Strategy, Policy 
and Compliance
Office of Human Resources Human Security Unit
Prevention 
Training
Pre-deployment and at mission, including a 
new e-learning program
Pre-deployment Pre-deployment and at 
mission
“NATO Guidance for 
the development of 
training and educational 
programmes to support 
the policy on combating 




65 allegations were made against military, 
police, and civilian personnel. The majority 
of the allegations were in the Central African 
Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, and 
South Sudan. 
13 of the allegations affected children. 
No reported allegations No reported "allegations." 
NATO relies on contributing 
countries to report 
allegations as early as third 
quarter 2021
STOPPING HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND SEXUAL 
EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE BY INTERNATIONAL 
PEACEKEEPERS AND CIVILIAN PERSONNEL
As required by law, this section summarizes actions taken by the UN, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and 
the OSCE to prevent trafficking in persons or the exploitation of victims of trafficking.
622
UN OSCE NATO
NEW INITIATIVES The Secretary-General has institutionalized 
mechanisms to continue engagement and 
cohesion across the United Nations system, 
and prioritized leadership accountability 
relating to sexual exploitation and abuse 
through mandated action plans and personal 
certifications. 
To maintain momentum and coordination 
in implementation, the Secretary-General 
extended the mandate of the Special 
Coordinator on improving the UN response 
to sexual exploitation and abuse until 31 
December 2021.
The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) 
and the World Food Programme (WFP) 
conducted consultations with staff in high-
risk duty stations on the prevention of sexual 
exploitation and abuse during COVID-19.
The integration of a victim-centered 
approach into system-wide efforts on sexual 
exploitation and abuse, including risks to 
beneficiaries and others associated with the 
COVID-19 pandemic, was strengthened in 
2020.
The OSCE provides workshops and training 
to participating States on preventing 
trafficking in the organization's supply 
chains, and identifying and protecting 
trafficking victims.
Internally, the Office of the Special 
Representative and Co-Ordinator for 
Combating Trafficking in Human Beings 
(OSR/CTHB) helped develop and adopt 
contract and tender provisions for 
OSCE procurement; conducted a pilot 
assessment of TIP risk in procurement 
of the OSCE field operation in Serbia, 
results from which were published in an 
analysis report; developed guidance for 
OSCE procurement to prevent TIP, and 
developed training for OSCE procurement 
and program staff and launched 
implementation.
Leading by example, the OSR/CTHB's 
collaboration with the Secretariat's 
Procurement and Contracting Unit 
provided for the development of internal 
measures and capacities to prevent TIP in 
the OSCE's procurement. As tasked by MC 
Decision 6/17, the OSR/CTHB contributed 
to the development of Guidance for OSCE 
Procurement on Combating Human 
Trafficking and Labour Exploitation in 
Supply Chains as well as to the OSCE 
Procurement and Contracting Workshop 
and a pilot training. It also organized a 
workshop on managing and mitigating TIP 
risks in procurement for ODIHR.
In line with MC Decision 6/17, in 2020 the 
OSR/CTHB, in co-operation with anti-
trafficking Focal Points and DHR, finalized 
the development of a learning module 
on combating TIP for the OSCE executive 
structures as part of the new All OnBoard 
programme. In 2021, the roll out of the 
module in Field Operations has started.
Finally, as co-chair of the Task Force 
mandated by the UN High-Level Committee 
on Management to develop a common 
approach to combat TIP and forced labor 
in supply chains, the OSCE has closely 
worked with the UN system to coordinate 
these efforts among all major IOs.
NATO Sexual Exploitation 
and Abuse Action Plan to be 
adopted by October 2020.
NATO Human Trafficking 






















ORGANIZATIONS AND SELECTED 
LINKS OF INTEREST FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT RELEVANT TO TIP TIP FOCAL POINT
United Nations (UN) 
www.un.org 
United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) – Trafficking in Persons 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/
human-trafficking/index.html
United Nations Office of the High 
Commissioner  
on Human Rights  
www.ohchr.org 
High-level Political Forum on SDGs 
https://sustainabledevelopment.
un.org/hlpf 
The Inter-agency Coordination Group 
against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT):  
www.icat.un.org
International Labour Organization 
(ILO)  
www.ilo.org 
UN Convention and Protocol:
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations 
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (A/RES/55/25) 
(2000)
United Nations Global Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking in 
Persons (A/RES/64/293) (2010)  
Political Declaration on the Implementation of the Global Plan of 
Action to Combat Trafficking in Persons (2017) (A/RES/72/1)
UNSC Resolutions:
UNSC Resolutions on Trafficking in Persons in Conflict Situations 
2331 (2016) , 2388 (2017) and 2493 (2019 S/RES/2493 )
UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons (2020)
Legislative Guide for the Implementation of the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and 
Children (2020)
Model Legislative Provisions against Trafficking in Persons (2020)
Female Victims of Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation as Defendants 
(2021)
UNODC Toolkit for Mainstreaming Human Rights and Gender Equality 
into Criminal Justice Intervention to Address Trafficking in Persons 
and Smuggling of Migrants (2021)
UN Sustainable Development Goal targets 5.2, 8.7,  
and 16.2 (SDGs) 




-C29 Forced Labour Convention (1930) 
-P029 Protocol of 2014 and Recommendation R203, supplementing 
the Forced Labour Convention (1930) 
-C105 Abolition of Forced Labour Convention (1957)
-C182 Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention (1999)
-C189 Domestic Workers Convention, and its Recommendation R201 
(2011)
ILO training package on inspection of labour conditions on board 
fishing vessels (2020)
UN Special Rapporteur 
on Trafficking in 
Persons, Especially 
Women and Children
UN Special Rapporteur 
on Contemporary 
Forms of Slavery 
UN Special Rapporteur 
on the Sale of Children, 




Ouagadougou Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings, 
Especially Women and Children (2006) 
AU Commission Initiative against Trafficking Campaign (AU.COMMIT)
October 1, 2020, Virtual Event, 2nd Virtual Technical Meeting on Data 
Collection on Irregular Migration and Associated Protection Risks 
towards the Production of a Statistical Report on Human Trafficking 
and Migrant Smuggling in the Horn of Africa and Surrounding Region 
January 23-24, 2020, Bishoftu, Ethiopia, National Stakeholder 
Workshop on the AU-Horn of Africa Mainstreaming Initiative for 
Countering Human Trafficking and Migrant Smuggling
N/A
INTERNATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND SUB-REGIONAL 







































NS ORGANIZATIONS AND SELECTED LINKS OF INTEREST FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT RELEVANT TO TIP TIP FOCAL POINT
Khartoum Process 
(EU/Horn of Africa Migration Route 
Initiative)
Khartoum Process Factsheet
Khartoum Declaration on AU-Horn of Africa Initiative on Human 
Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants (2014)
Valletta Summit Action Plan (2015) 
Valletta Summit Political Declaration (2015)
EU-Africa Action Plan on Migration and Mobility (2014-2017)
Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN)
www.asean.org
ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons, Particularly Women 
and Children (2004)
ASEAN Convention Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women 
and Children (2015)
ASEAN Plan of Action Against Trafficking in Persons, Especially 
Women and Children (2015)  
ASEAN Senior 
Officials Meeting on 
Transnational Crime
Bali Regional Ministerial 
Conference On People Smuggling, 
Trafficking in Persons and Related 
Transnational Crime (Bali Process)
www.baliprocess.net
Co Chairs’ Statements of the first (2002), second (2003), third (2009), 
fourth (2011), fifth (2013), sixth (2016) and seventh (2018) Declaration 
of the Seventh Ministerial Conference of the Bali Process on People 
Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime 
(2018) Policy Guides & Handbooks:
The Bali Process Guidelines for Information Sharing to Address 
People Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational 
Crime
The Bali Process Handbook on Addressing Irregular Migration 
through Effective Information Campaigns
The Bali Process Policy Guides on Criminalizing Migrant Smuggling 
and Trafficking in Persons 
The Bali Process Policy Guides on Identification and Protection of 
Victims of Trafficking 
The Bali Process Policy Guide on Following the Money in Trafficking in 
Persons Cases
The Bali Process Policy Guide on Returns and Reintegration
Protecting Migrants at Sea: Practical Guide to Fulfilling International 
Obligations
Corruption as a facilitator of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in 
persons (2021)
Bali Process Working 
Group on Trafficking 
in Persons
Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS)
www.cis.minsk.by/ (in Russian only)
Agreement on the Cooperation of the CIS Member States in 
Combating Trafficking in Persons, Human Organs and Tissues (2005)
Program of Cooperation between the CIS Member States against 
Trafficking in Persons for 2014–2018
N/A
Coordinated Mekong Ministerial 
Initiative against Trafficking 
(COMMIT)
http://un-act.org/
COMMIT Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation Against 
Trafficking in Greater Mekong Sub-Region (2004)
COMMIT 4th Sub-Regional Plan of Action (COMMIT SPA IV 2015-2018)
Victim Identification and Referral Mechanisms: Common Guidelines 
for the Greater Mekong Sub-region
Supporting the Reintegration of Trafficked Persons: A Guidebook for 
the Greater Mekong Sub-Region:  
United Nations Action 
for Cooperation 
against Trafficking in 
Persons
Regional COMMIT Task 
Force (TF)




A Vision for the Baltic Sea region by 2020, CBSS Summit 2010
Task Force against Trafficking in Human Beings Strategic Plan 2020-
2025
Human Trafficking 2020 – Baltic Sea Round-up Report
Guidelines for journalists reporting on cases of human trafficking: 
Media and Trafficking in Human Beings (2019)
Task Force against 
Trafficking in Human 
Beings (TF-THB)
Expert Group on 
Children at Risk
Task Force Against 
Trafficking in Human 
Beings 
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HELP Online Training Course: 
9th General Report on GRETA’s Activities (2019)
https://www.coe.int/en/web/anti-human-trafficking/general-reports
HUDOC-GRETA Database 
Guidance Note on the entitlement of victims of trafficking, and 
persons at risk of being trafficked, to international protection 
GRETA meetings 
Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) 
www.ecowas.int
Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS) 
wwww.ceeac-eccas.org/
ECOWAS Initial Plan of Action against Trafficking in Persons 
ECOWAS Declaration on the Fight against Trafficking in Persons (2001)
Joint ECOWAS/ECCAS Regional Plan of Action to Combat Trafficking 





Directive 2011/36/EU on Combating and Preventing Trafficking in 
Human Beings and Protecting its Victims EU Anti-Trafficking Action 
2017-2019
Third report on the progress made in the fight against trafficking 
in human beings (2020) as required under Article 20 of Directive 
2011/36/EU on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings 
and protecting its victims
European Union Anti-
Trafficking Coordinator
Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
FATF REPORT Financial Flows from Human Trafficking (2018)
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/content/images/Human-
Trafficking-2018.pdf
League of Arab States (LAS)
http://arableague-us.org/wp/
Arab Framework Act on Combating Trafficking in Persons (2008)
Arab Initiative to Combat Trafficking in Persons, 2010
Comprehensive Arab Strategy for Combating 
Trafficking in Human Beings (CASCTHB), Council of Arab Ministers of 
Justice Resolution 15/2/2012
N/A




Work Plan to Combat Trafficking in Persons in the Western 
Hemisphere 2010-2012 (AG/RES. 2551 (XL-O/10)
Second Work Plan against Trafficking in Persons in the Western Hemi-
sphere 2015-2018 (extended to 2020) 
Hemispheric Efforts against Trafficking in Persons “Declaration of 
Mexico” (2018)
Advancing Hemispheric Security: A Multidimensional Approach (AG/
RES. 2950 (L-O/20) 
Progress Report: II Work Plan Against Trafficking in Persons In The 
Western Hemisphere 2015-2018
Recommendations of the Sixth Meeting of National Authorities on 
Trafficking in Persons "Challenges in the Fight against Trafficking in 
Times of Pandemic" (2021)
Department of 
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Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 
(OECD)
The OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains in 
the Garment and Footwear Sector(2017) 
OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of 
Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas(2016)
Trafficking in Persons and Corruption Report (2016) 
OECD Task Force on 
Countering Illicit Trade
Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) 
http://www.osce.org/secretariat/
trafficking




OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings (2003) 
Decision No. 1107 Addendum to the OSCE Action Plan to Combat 
Trafficking in Human Beings, Decision No. 1107, 6 December (2013)
Handbook - How to prevent human trafficking for domestic servitude 
in diplomatic households and protect private domestic workers 
(2014):
Uniform Guidelines for the Identification and Referral of Victims 
of Human Trafficking within the Migrant and Refugee Reception 
Framework in the OSCE Region
Model Guidelines on Government Measures to Prevent Trafficking for 
Labour Exploitation in Supply Chains (2018)
The Critical Role of Civil Society in Combating Trafficking in Human 
Beings (2018)
From Reception to Recognition: Identifying and Protecting Human 
Trafficking Victims in Mixed Migration Flows (2018)
Child Trafficking and Child Protection: Ensuring that Child Protection 
Mechanisms Protect the Rights and Meet the Needs of Child Victims 
of Human Trafficking (2018)
2020 Report of the Special Representative and Coordinator for 
Combating Trafficking in Human Beings
OSCE Compendium Database, an easy way to access information on 
prevention of labour exploitation in supply chains, now accessible 
online (2021)
OSCE: International Survivors of Trafficking Advisory Council (2021)
Special Representative 
and Co-ordinator for 
Trafficking in Human 
Beings
Regional Conference on Migration 
(RCM) (Puebla Group)
www.rcmvs.org
Regional Conference on Migration Plan of Action (updated in 2009) The Liaison Officers 
Network to Combat 
Migrant Smuggling and 
Trafficking in Persons
Southern African Development 
Community (SADC)
www.sadc.int/ 
SADC Strategic Plan of Action on Combating Trafficking in Persons, 
especially women and Children (2009-2019) 
Trafficking in Persons in the SADC Region: A Baseline Report (2016)
Trafficking in Persons in the SADC Region: Policy Brief (2016)
Preventing and Combating Trafficking in Persons: Lessons from the 
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This report is submitted in accordance with section 405(c) and (d) of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (22 
U.S.C. 2370c-2(c) and (d)) (CSPA). Section 1 lists the countries identified as being in violation of the standards under 
the CSPA in 2020. Section 2 provides a description and the amounts of assistance withheld pursuant to section 
404(a) of the CSPA. Section 3 provides a list of waivers or exceptions exercised under the CSPA. Section 4 contains 
the justifications for such waivers. Section 5 provides a description and the amounts of assistance provided to 
countries pursuant to such waivers. 
SECTION 1. COUNTRIES IN VIOLATION OF THE STANDARDS UNDER THE CSPA IN 2020.
The Secretary of State identified the following countries as having governmental armed forces, police, or other 
security forces or government-supported armed groups that recruited or used child soldiers within the meaning 
of section 404(a) of the CSPA during the reporting period of April 1, 2019 – March 31, 2020: Afghanistan, Burma, 
Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Iran, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, 
Syria, and Yemen.
SECTION 2. DESCRIPTION AND AMOUNT OF ASSISTANCE WITHHELD PURSUANT TO SECTION 404(a).
State withheld $850,000 in FY 2021 International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds for Mali pursuant 
to section 404(a) and other applicable restrictions. 
SECTION 3. LIST OF WAIVERS OR EXCEPTIONS EXERCISED UNDER SECTION 404(a).
On October 14, 2020, the President determined that it is in the national interest of the United States to waive the 
application of the prohibition in section 404(a) of the CSPA with respect to Afghanistan, Cameroon, Iraq, Libya, 
and Nigeria; and to waive the application of the prohibition in section 404(a) of the CSPA with respect to the DRC 
to allow for the provision of IMET and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) assistance, to the extent that the CSPA would 
restrict such assistance or support; to waive the application of the prohibition in section 404(a) of the CSPA with 
respect to Somalia to allow for the provision of IMET and PKO assistance and DoD support provided pursuant to 10 
U.S.C. 333, to the extent that the CSPA would restrict such assistance or support; to waive the application of the 
prohibition in section 404(a) of the CSPA with respect to South Sudan to allow for the provision of PKO assistance, to 
the extent that the CSPA would restrict such assistance or support; and, to waive the application of the prohibition 
in section 404(a) of the CSPA with respect to Yemen to allow for the provision of PKO and IMET assistance and DoD 
support provided pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 333, to the extent that the CSPA would restrict such assistance or support. 
The President further certified that the governments of the above countries are taking effective and continuing 
steps to address the problem of child soldiers.
SECTION 4. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR WAIVERS AND EXCEPTIONS.
Pursuant to section 404 of the Child Soldiers Prevention Act of 2008 (CSPA) (22 U.S.C. 2370c-1), the President 
has determined that it is in the national interest of the United States to waive the application of the prohibition in 
section 404(a) of the CSPA with respect to Afghanistan, Cameroon, Iraq, Libya, and Nigeria; and to waive, in part, 
the application of the prohibition with respect to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia, South Sudan, 
and Yemen. The President has further certified that the governments of the above countries are taking effective and 
continuing steps to address the problem of child soldiers. The justification for this determination and certification 
with respect to each country is set forth in this Memorandum. 
Afghanistan
The President has determined it is in the national interest of the United States to waive the application of the 
prohibition in section 404(a) of the CSPA with respect to the Government of Afghanistan (GOA) and has certified 
that the GOA is taking effective and continuing steps to address the problem of child soldiers.
Security assistance to Afghanistan subject to the CSPA restriction fulfills critical U.S. counterterrorism objectives 
and fosters conditions that enable an end to the conflict in Afghanistan. For example, the International Military 
Education and Training (IMET) program funds professional military education and training for the Afghanistan 
National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) that improves their capabilities, promotes respect for human rights, 
SECTIONS 405(c) AND (d) OF THE CHILD SOLDIERS 














improves defense resource management, civil-military cooperation, and education on gender-based violence and 
women’s health, and enhances interoperability for U.S.-Afghan joint operations.
This sustained assistance to the ANDSF through IMET plays an important role in preserving Afghanistan’s security, 
political, and economic gains, including by enhancing awareness of and respect for human rights across the ANDSF. 
Continuing to bolster Afghan military capability and professionalization through military education and training 
of Afghan security forces will contribute to a climate that is more favorable for achieving a political settlement and 
implementing its outcomes.
The GOA is taking effective and continuing steps to address the problem of child soldiers. In 2019, the Afghan 
Ministry of Interior expanded child protection units (CPUs) to all 34 provinces, an increase from the 27 CPUs in 2018, 
to prevent the recruitment of children into the Afghan National Police. According to international organizations, 
the CPUs prevented the recruitment of 439 children in 2019. The Ministries of Interior and Defense also issued 
directives meant to prevent the recruitment and sexual abuse of children by the ANDSF. 
The United States will continue engaging with Afghan security forces to encourage implementation of the policies 
and legal frameworks in place, such as the Ministry of Defense’s Protection of Children in Armed Conflict Policy.
Cameroon
The President has determined it is in the national interest of the United States to waive the application of the 
prohibition in section 404(a) of the CSPA with respect to Cameroon and has certified that the Government of 
Cameroon is taking effective and continuing steps to address the problem of child soldiers.
The U.S. government's current military assistance goals with Cameroon are to increase: 1) military professionalization, 
2) maritime security capabilities, and 3) counterterrorism capabilities. The limited U.S. military assistance to 
Cameroon plays a role in its ability to support regional stability and security, including in the strategically important 
Gulf of Guinea, and to address the threat in the Lake Chad region from Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa. Current 
military assistance to Cameroon includes IMET and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funding. IMET funding for 
Cameroon increases the professionalization of the military through professional military education (PME) training 
in the United States. Along with overall PME training, IMET funding for Cameroon also strengthens military justice 
and civil-military relations, helping make Cameroon’s armed forces more transparent and accountable. PKO funded 
counter-terrorism assistance to Cameroon helps improve its capabilities to combat Boko Haram and ISIS-West 
Africa, which increases stability and protects civilians in the Lake Chad region. PKO funding may also support 
Cameroon’s maritime security capabilities to combat piracy, a growing regional economic threat. This waiver will 
allow the U.S. government to provide security assistance to make Cameroon’s military more professional through 
an appreciation of the importance of human rights and rule of law. It will promote peace and security in the region 
through maritime security and counterterrorism capacity building. 
The Government of Cameroon is taking effective and continuing steps to address the problem of child soldiers. 
In November 2018, President Biya announced the creation of a National Disarmament, Demobilization, and 
Reintegration (DDR) Committee. Although the DDR Committee is not specifically dedicated to removing child 
soldiers from the field of battle, its mission is to facilitate the disarmament and reintegration of ex-fighters of Boko 
Haram and ISIS-West Africa and armed separatist groups in the Southwest and Northwest Regions, irrespective of 
their ages. In 2018, the president created regional disarmament centers in Bamenda, Northwest Region, Buea in 
the Southwest Region, and Mora in the Far North Region. The DDR Committee works to equip former child soldiers 
with resources for income-generating activities and reintegrate them into their communities. During an early July 
2019 evaluation meeting in Yaoundé, the Head of the DDR Committee, Francis Fai Yengo, stated that at least 56 
armed separatist fighters in the Northwest and Southwest Regions were reported to have laid down their arms and 
joined DDR centers, while 109 Boko Haram fighters had laid down their weapons in the Far North Region and were 
being housed at the DDR center in Mora. The Government of Cameroon also acknowledges that recruitment and 
use of child soldiers by armed Anglophone separatists and Boko Haram is a problem. 
Cameroon has laws and regulations that prohibit the recruitment and use of child soldiers and the government 
generally enforces these provisions. We are engaging with the government of Cameroon to encourage an 
investigation of the single case of Cameroon’s security forces using a child for the gathering of intelligence that 
resulted in their inclusion on the 2020 CSPA list and to prevent similar situations from occurring again.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
The President has determined it is in the national interest of the United States to waive in part the application 
of the prohibition in section 404(a) of the CSPA with respect to DRC to allow for the provision of IMET and PKO 
assistance and has certified that the Government of the DRC is taking effective and continuing steps to address 
the problem of child soldiers.
The DRC plays a critical role in regional stability and security as malign influences continue to expand their influence 





instability and conflict in DRC, but needs U.S. security assistance to succeed in defeating armed groups threatening 
local populations, including the ISIS-affiliated Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Unlike during the years under former 
President Kabila, senior Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) leadership now welcomes increased military cooperation 
with the United States. The country faces numerous longstanding challenges, including: inadequate infrastructure 
and human resources; the government’s inability to project authority across the sizable country; corruption; a 
limited capacity to raise and manage revenues; outbreaks of infectious disease; as well as the destabilizing activity 
of numerous armed groups. PKO and IMET funding for DRC would enable the United States to continue to work to 
increase professionalization of the military, allowing it to provide security within its territory without resorting to 
violations or abuses of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law (IHL). In addition, PKO and IMET 
funding has supported areas such as military justice, civil-military relations, human rights training, IHL training, 
English language training, military engineering, and resource management and logistics, which not only enhances 
security provision, but also helps make the FARDC a more transparent, accountable institution. President Tshisekedi 
has stated that he believes that improved security will enable health workers to counter COVID and other global 
health threats stem illicit mineral smuggling, other illicit trafficking of natural resources and transnational criminal 
organizations, catalyze regional economic integration, and provide a much-needed boost to DRC’s development.
A secure DRC is essential to attracting the foreign investment and business necessary to leverage the country’s 
estimated $24 trillion in mineral wealth and improve the welfare and livelihood of millions of Congolese people. 
Greater stability and self-reliance is one of our top strategic objectives in the DRC, such that our more than half a 
billion dollars in annual bilateral assistance can be wound down, and our focus turned more fully toward trade and 
investment. U.S. security assistance supports a more stable, democratically-governed nation through improving 
the capacity and governance of core national-level security institutions, creating an environment conducive to 
economic opportunities, responding to urgent humanitarian needs, and addressing the root causes of conflict. 
As the DRC’s principal partner in ending its devastating almost 2-year Ebola outbreak in the East and a major 
contributor to humanitarian assistance overall, the United States can leverage existing relationships to multiply 
and synergize the impact of PKO assistance. This waiver will allow the United States to provide security assistance 
that will support improving governance and the rule of law, promoting peace and security, combating corruption, 
advancing human rights, and creating conditions for greater U.S. investment and economic growth. It also offers 
an opportunity to improve civil-military relations and influence the next generation of FARDC leadership at a time 
when the government is undertaking initiatives to transform that historically strained relationship.
The Government of the DRC is taking effective and continuing steps to address the problem of child soldiers and 
these efforts have accelerated since President Tshisekedi took office in January. The number of prosecutions of 
both state and armed group actors for human rights violations and abuses, including unlawful recruitment and 
use of children, is at an all-time high, as are the number of separations of children from armed groups. For the fifth 
consecutive year, there were no cases of unlawful recruitment or use by FARDC. Reports of human rights violations 
attributable to state security forces is on a downward trend. The government established a formal anti-trafficking 
inter-ministerial committee that monitored shelters, coordinated with NGOs and international organizations to 
identify and protect victims and drafted and launched the government’s first national anti-trafficking action plan. 
In partnership with international organizations, the government also continued to undertake measures to prevent 
and end the use of child soldiers, including separating child soldiers from non-state armed groups, and conducting 
age verification screening of recruits. The government convicted a former colonel in the FARDC and the leader of 
an armed group for trafficking crimes, among others; sentenced them to penalties, including significant prison 
terms; and ordered the leader of an armed group and two accomplices to pay restitution to over 300 victims of 
sexual enslavement and other crimes. When the FARDC justice system received credible reports that soldiers in 
the 2105th regiment had abducted underage girls, they quickly opened an investigation and detained suspected 
abusers. While COVID-19 restrictions have slowed the investigation, two soldiers have been charged and are in 
prison awaiting trial, while the local prosecutor is pursuing charges against another eight soldiers. 
Iraq
The President has determined it is in the national interest of the United States to waive the application of the 
prohibition in section 404(a) of the CSPA with respect to Iraq and has certified that the Government of Iraq (GOI) 
is taking effective and continuing steps to address the problem of child soldiers. 
U.S. strategy in Iraq is focused on working with the GOI to achieve a unified, democratic, peaceful, and inclusive 
Iraq by: defeating the terrorist entity known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS); promoting good governance 
and reform; supporting the increased capacity and professionalization of Iraq’s security forces to bring them more 
in line with international best practices; promoting human rights; and promoting the protection of Iraq’s diverse 
and often marginalized communities, regardless of their ethnicity, religion, or gender. This waiver will allow the 
United States to continue to provide the assistance, support, and human rights training necessary to achieve these 
goals, and to help Iraq build its capacity to conduct effective, sustained counterterrorism operations against ISIS. 
The GOI is taking effective and continuing steps to address the problem of child soldiers. Iraqi law requires all 













and Iraq is a party to the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC). The number 
of incidents of child soldier recruitment and use continue to decline, according to data from an international 
organization in 2019. In December 2019, Iraq presented a proposal to prepare a comprehensive plan to reduce 
unlawful child recruitment operations in armed and terrorist conflicts to an intragovernmental committee headed 
by the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs. This proposal was approved by the committee with funding. According 
to an international organization, in December 2019, the GOI discharged 40 boys who had been recruited by Tribal 
Mobilization Forces (TMF) and provided them with rehabilitation and integration program in coordination with the 
international organization. A UN body also reported that the GOI provided training to security forces against child 
soldiering during the reporting period. In addition, the GOI has made progress centralizing payment systems, 
including for the PMF, which helps to prevent government salaries from being paid to children. 
As part of this effort, the United States government will continue working to encourage the GOI to monitor progress 
and take additional actions to prevent the unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers, and to identify, demobilize, 
rehabilitate, and reintegrate children serving in militias associated with the PMF. The United States government 
urges the GOI to continue its ongoing attempts to assert command and control over all elements of the PMF.
Libya
The President has determined it is in the national interest of the United States to waive the application of the 
prohibition in section 404(a) of the CSPA with respect to the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya and 
has certified the GNA is taking effective and continuing steps to address the issue of child soldiers. 
The Department of State assesses that immense social and economic insecurity caused by the current conflict 
is the primary driver for the ongoing unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers in Libya. In addition to GNA-
aligned units, others, including the self-styled Libyan National Army, have engaged in the recruitment and use of 
child soldiers. The Department of State further assesses that the most durable solution to the unlawful recruitment 
and use of child soldiers will be a negotiated political settlement that ends Libya’s current conflict. As the UN-
recognized government of Libya, the GNA and its military leaders are critical interlocutors in these discussions. 
Withdrawing security sector assistance at a pivotal stage of negotiations could undermine the U.S. government’s 
ability to achieve a durable cessation of hostilities in Libya. In the absence of a political settlement, the war in 
Libya will continue to destabilize the broader region, creating space for violent extremists to regroup. 
The United States provides targeted assistance to strengthen key Libyan institutions and build security capacity, 
promote political reconciliation, and increase Libya’s capacity to stand on its own through more effective governance. 
Security sector assistance to Libya, while nascent, is used exclusively to tackle the underlying causes of the 
Libyan conflict and shape Libya's security institutions in a positive direction. Our current PKO-funded programming 
supports planning and capacity building for electoral security as well as planning for an eventual security sector 
reform (SSR) in the country. These initiatives, as well as any near-term security sector programming, will be used 
to support the security sector reform/disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (SSR/DDR) and governance 
needed to end the conflict and the recruitment and use of child soldiers. 
The Department of Defense intends to re-engage with and build the capacity of the Libyan armed forces under 10 
U.S.C. 333 in support of U.S. national interests in fighting terrorism, countering violent extremist organizations 
and illicit smuggling. This support would be intended to provide carefully calibrated capacity-building for units not 
directly engaged in the current conflict. 
The GNA is taking effective and continuing steps to address the problem of child soldiers, including by working 
closely with the U.S. government in the context of our recurring bilateral Security Dialogue to disarm and demobilize 
the militias, which engage in their recruitment and use. GNA security sector leaders are also closely engaged in 
UN-led efforts to negotiate the terms of a ceasefire agreement, which could remove the impetus for the unlawful 
recruitment and use of child soldiers. The U.S. government will continue to engage with the Libyan government 
to urge militias to cease the unlawful recruitment of children and to make proper referrals for such children. The 
GNA has also committed to providing unhindered access to an international fact-finding mission created under the 
auspices of the UN Human Rights Council in June 2020 to document human rights abuses in Libya. The fact-finding 
mission has a mandate to document abuses by GNA and non-state militias, including child soldier recruitment or 
use.
Nigeria
The President has determined it is in the national interest of the United States to waive the application of the 
prohibition in section 404(a) of the CSPA with respect to the Government of Nigeria (GON) and has certified that 
the GON is taking effective and continuing steps to address the problem of child soldiers.
The U.S. government's current security assistance goals with Nigeria are to: 1) increase the professionalism of 
the Nigerian armed forces, including respect for human rights and mitigating civilian harm; 2) reduce the threats 





Guinea. These goals are directly aligned with the National Security Strategy, Africa Strategy, Africa Bureau, and 
Mission Nigeria goals for security assistance. Accordingly, it is in the United States’ national interest to continue 
to pursue these lines of effort.
Security assistance subject to the CSPA restriction that is currently provided to Nigeria includes IMET, Foreign 
Military Financing (FMF), PKO, Excess Defense Articles (EDA) and Department of Defense support provided pursuant 
to 10 U.S.C. 333. IMET funding supports the training and education to increase the professionalization of the military 
through professional military education (PME) training in the United States. FMF has supported Nigeria’s ability to 
participate in peacekeeping, counterterrorism and maritime security operations. Funds typically support training 
and equipment sustainment, including spare parts for Nigeria’s C-130 fleet. We also expect that FMF may support 
elements of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program for the Super Tucanos. Section 333 is used to support the 
Air-to-Ground Integration (AGI) program, which integrates intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), 
precision strike, and military intelligence to increase the effectiveness of the Nigerian Air Force while reducing 
the potential for civilian harm through human rights and IHL training in support of the nationally-funded FMS 
Super Tucano A-29 lines of effort. Section 333 is used to support a related ISR effort to provide tactical Unmanned 
Aerospace Systems (UAS). Lastly, section 333 is used to support counter-improvised explosive devices (C-IED) or 
route clearance programming which enables the Nigerian military to escort humanitarian assistance convoys in 
the volatile Northeast where the violence wrought by ISIS-West Africa and Boko Haram has displaced 1.8 million 
civilians and rendered 9.8 million in the Lake Chad region in need of humanitarian assistance. Nigeria may receive 
EDA for maritime security improvements in the form of former U.S. Coast Guard vessels, which have been used 
to improve maritime navigation and counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Guinea and Niger Delta. PKO-funded 
assistance to Nigeria includes AGI advisory support to increase Nigerian Air Force effectiveness and reduce civilian 
harm; advisory support for Nigerian military intelligence institutions; development of a Fast-Rope Insertion and 
Extraction System; and Civil-Military Operations training. In FY 2020, support is expected to expand to include 
efforts to strengthen Nigerian cadre and training facilities at their basic and advanced infantry schools. A full waiver 
the application of the prohibition in section 404(a) of the CSPA with respect to Nigeria allows the U.S. government 
to continue to provide security assistance in delivery of the above lines of efforts. 
The Government of Nigeria is taking continuing and effective steps to address the problem of child soldiers. The 
steps include continuing to support during the reporting period the UN - Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF) Action Plan 
to end use and recruitment of child soldiers. Recruitment and use of child soldiers by the CJTF, a non-governmental 
self-defense force that receives limited support from the Borno State government, contributed to Nigeria’s listing 
under the CSPA from 2015-2018 due to its past use of children. In September 2017, the Borno State government 
witnessed the signature of, and provided administrative support to help implement, an action plan between the 
CJTF and the UN to end the CJTF’s recruitment and use of children. The UN and the CJTF, with the support of the 
government, have since identified and formally separated over 1,700 children, including 894 in May 2019. Since 
the signing of the action plan in 2017, the UN has not reported any further use of children by the CJTF. The Nigerian 
military has also responded to end the unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers when isolated incidents are 
brought to their attention. In October 2019, at least two children (under the age of 15) were recruited and used in 
supporting roles at a remote checkpoint in Northeast Nigeria. Following community-level engagement by UNICEF, 
the use ended. Some military personnel are participating in training programs on children’s rights. There were no 
other reports of child soldier use in 2019.
The Government of Nigeria should continue to make progress in combating the unlawful recruitment and use of child 
soldiers. In compliance with the Action Plan signed with the UN, the Borno State government should continue to 
support the CJTF to release any remaining child soldiers and cease to recruit any new ones. The Embassy will press 
the Nigerian government to improve the education of its armed forces on the laws and policy against the unlawful 
recruitment and use of child soldiers and to pay particular attention to remote outposts where such incidents are 
more likely to occur. The Embassy will continue to collaborate with UNICEF and other NGOs and encourage the 
government to view them as a resource in the joint effort to eliminate the unlawful recruitment and use of child 
soldiers. 
Somalia 
The President has determined it is in the national interest of the United States to waive in part the application of 
the prohibition in section 404(a) of the CSPA with respect to Somalia to allow for the provision of IMET, PKO, and 
support provided pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 333 and has certified that the Government of Somalia is taking effective 
and continuing steps to address the problem of child soldiers. 
The U.S. strategy in Somalia focuses on achieving a unified, peaceful, and democratic Somalia, with a stable 
and representative government able to defeat the foreign terrorist organization al-Shabaab; prevent terrorists 
and pirates from using its territory as a safe haven; provide for its own internal defense; and facilitate and foster 
development, growth, and political inclusion, while progressing towards long-term stability and prosperity. The 













the U.S. government to continue to fulfill its goal of assisting the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) to build 
effective and rights-respecting security forces, which are indispensable to achieving greater military effectiveness. 
The waiver for PKO assistance, used in assisting efforts to form broad-based, multi-clan Somali security forces, will 
also support this goal. Further, a waiver for support provided by the Department of Defense pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 
333 will allow for U.S. government assistance to build the Somali military's capacity to conduct effective, sustained 
counterterrorism operations against al-Shabaab and, through cooperation, help reinforce U.S. values including 
those related to preventing and responding to the unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers.
The FGS is taking effective and continuing steps to address the problem of child soldiers. The FGS agreed on an 
action plan with the United Nations in 2012 to end the recruitment and use of children by the Somali National 
Army (SNA). While implementation of the action plan at the subnational level was limited until 2016, the SNA’s 
Child Protection Unit (CPU), which is partially funded by the United States, put particular emphasis on screening, 
training and an aggressive media campaign. With U.S. support, the CPU carried out six screening missions that 
examined over 1,500 SNA troops in 2019, and identified four minors within the SNA, according to the 2019 CPU 
annual report. They also trained 176 officials in the identification of child soldiers and have training focal points 
in each SNA sector regarding the prohibition against children in armed conflict. The CPU raised awareness of child 
protection activities, through inter-ministerial meetings with the Ministry of Women and Human Rights, Internal 
Security, Justice, Health and Education, and developed and disseminated radio and print media content regarding 
the prevention of child recruitment and conscription in armed conflict. 
In June 2019, the Minister of Justice and Judiciary launched Somalia’s version of a UN advocacy and action campaign 
called “ACT to Protect,” aimed at protecting children affected by armed conflict, and the CPU established a “Children 
Affected by Armed Conflict” working group.
The United States continues to work with the FGS, including through the CPU, and the UN to monitor progress on 
the 2012 action plan and urge additional actions to prevent the unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers 
and to demobilize, rehabilitate, and reintegrate children identified in the SNA or associated groups, or children 
previously associated with al-Shabaab.
South Sudan
The President has determined that it is in the U.S. national interest to waive in part the application of the prohibition 
in section 404(a) of the CSPA with respect to South Sudan to allow for provision of PKO assistance and has certified 
that the Government of South Sudan is taking effective and continuing steps to address the problem of child 
soldiers. 
PKO funds will be used to continue to support the Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and 
Verification Mechanism (CTSAMVM), which includes regional and international personnel that monitor, identify, 
and report on parties responsible for violations of the December 2017 Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities 
(COH) and the ceasefire provisions of the September 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict 
in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). PKO funds will also be used to continue support to the Reconstituted 
Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (RJMEC), which oversees overall implementation of the R-ARCSS. 
Notably, the R-ARCSS requires the Government of South Sudan to refrain from the recruitment and/or use of child 
soldiers. PKO funds have been used to support UNICEF child soldier prevention efforts in South Sudan. They may 
also be used to support the Community of Sant’Egidio’s facilitation of South Sudan peace talks. PKO funds may 
also support International Code of Conduct Association efforts to improve oversight of private security contractors 
at the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) to ensure that UNMISS is able to fulfill its mandate of 
protection of civilians to help enable the peace process to succeed. Given the essential role that these monitoring 
mechanisms or efforts play as the parties to the R-ARCSS continue to work to implement the peace agreement and 
form a transitional government, waiving restrictions to PKO assistance is in the U.S. national interest. 
The Government of South Sudan is taking effective and continuing steps to address the problem of child soldiers. 
By signing the R-ARCSS it has affirmed its intent to end the recruitment and use of child soldiers. The government’s 
efforts to address child soldiers are continually discussed at regular RJMEC and CTSAMVM meetings. South Sudan 
is party to the OPAC, and in 2019, armed groups released an additional 259 child soldiers, and established a 
process for identifying others to UNICEF through the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) 
commission, established under the R-ARCSS. The Government of South Sudan has engaged with the UN on creating 
an action plan to address “six grave violations against children,” including unlawful recruitment and use. Despite 
commitments from South Sudan armed groups in February 2019 to prevent and end the “six grave violations” 
against children, the UN continues to verify reports of such “grave violations” against children committed by all 
parties to the conflict. Significant work needs to be done to address this practice in South Sudan, and the U.S. 
government will continue to urge the government to take additional steps to prevent the unlawful recruitment or 
use of child soldiers. Multiple NGO reports indicate the continued unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers 
by governmental armed forces and that the collection and verification of information pertaining to child soldier 





to support CTSAMVM and RJMEC will help maintain accountability regarding the Government of South Sudan’s 
unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers by allowing critical funding for the continued operation of these key 
oversight and monitoring mechanisms. 
Yemen
The President has determined that it is in the national interest of the United States to waive in part the application 
of the prohibition in section 404(a) of the CSPA with respect to Yemen to allow for provision of PKO, IMET, and 
support provided pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 333 and has certified that the government of Yemen is taking effective and 
continuing steps to address the problem of child soldiers. 
It is in the U.S. national interest to support efforts to bring about a negotiated political settlement led by the United 
Nations Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen. This waiver will allow assistance that directly 
contributes to efforts to advance the UN-led political process. Additionally, a critical element of ending the conflict 
in Yemen is our counterterrorism campaign and efforts to counter Iranian arms smuggling to the Houthis. Building 
the capacity of the Republic of Yemen Government to meet these goals furthers important U.S. government security 
interests to include enhancing homeland security, while simultaneously moving toward the goal of ending the war 
in Yemen. An end to the conflict will be critical in ending the further deterioration of socio-economic and security 
conditions, ensuring long-term stability, and securing the space for restoring effective governance institutions 
that are capable of partnering with the United States and the international community in combatting terrorism. 
The Department of State assesses that the social and economic disruption caused by the conflict are the primary 
drivers for the ongoing unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers in Yemen by all parties to the conflict. 
To that end, PKO funding may be used to support UN Special Envoy efforts, including the participation of Yemen’s 
military leadership, to reach an agreement to end the Yemeni conflict and allow for the resumption of a peaceful, 
inclusive, and Yemeni-led political transition. 
IMET funding will be used to build capacity within the Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) military by sending 
selected military officers for the United States for non-technical training. These PME courses would focus on the 
professionalization of military forces, and would bolster the rule of law within the Yemeni Armed Forces. In turn, 
this training would support our efforts to prevent recruitment of child soldiers. 
The Department of Defense intends to use its authority under 10 U.S.C. 333 to re-engage with and build the capacity 
of the Yemeni Armed Forces – the military of the recognized government of Yemen – in support of U.S. national 
interests in fighting terrorism, countering violent extremist organizations and illicit smuggling, and ensuring 
freedom of navigation through the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait. Critically, this focused support would increase Yemeni 
capacity to counter malign Iranian activity, including the smuggling of lethal weapons that are contributing to the 
continuation of the conflict. This carefully calibrated support would be provided to the Yemen Border Guard, Yemen 
Coast Guard, and Yemen Special Operations Forces units not directly engaged in the current conflict, but rather 
involved in efforts against malign third party influences contributing to the on-going conflict and crisis. 
The ROYG is taking effective and continuing steps to address the problem of child soldiers. In 2019, the Yemeni 
government took concrete steps to raise awareness of risk factors for child soldier recruitment and use, to 
rehabilitate child soldiers, and to amplify activists’ calls for the Houthis to stop recruiting and using children. A 
February 2020 seminar in the government-controlled city of Ma’rib, held by ROYG ministries and NGOs with support 
from Saudi Arabia’s King Salman Humanitarian Aid and Relief Center (KSRelief) addressed strategies to reduce 
unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers, taking into account the social and political contexts of the practice. 
In March 2020, the government launched a rehabilitation program for Houthi-recruited child soldiers in Ma’rib, 
in collaboration with NGOs and funding support from KSRelief. In November 2019, the government used official 
media platforms to amplify calls by Yemeni human rights activists at the UN Human Rights Council for the Houthis 
to end child recruitment and use, and radicalization to violence. 
Public statements by government officials against the unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers and 
improvements in reporting, prevention, and protection mechanisms demonstrate that even with its limited capacity 
the Government of Yemen continues to address the issue. Significant additional work remains to eradicate this 
practice across Yemen. The most durable solution to the unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers will be a 













SECTION 5. DESCRIPTION AND AMOUNT OF ASSISTANCE PROVIDED PURSUANT TO A 
WAIVER.
The information provided below only includes assistance obligated as of April 5, 2021. Additional 
assistance will be obligated during FY 2021. 
Afghanistan
International Military Education and Training $540,950
As of April 5, IMET funding was obligated for the following activity: military professionalization training. 
Excess Defense Articles (EDA)           $3,821,000 
As of April 5, $3,821,000 worth of EDA equipment was transferred to Afghanistan.
Cameroon
International Military Education and Training         $205,775 
As of April 5, IMET funding was obligated for the following activity: military professionalization training. 
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) 
As of April 5, no PKO funding was obligated in FY 2021. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo
International Military Education and Training       $76,098
As of April 5, IMET funding was obligated for the following activity: military professionalization training.
Peacekeeping Operations         
As of April 5, no PKO funding was obligated in FY 2021. 
Iraq
International Military Education and Training        $197,433
As of April 5, IMET funding was obligated for the following activity: military professionalization training.
Libya
As of April 5, no funds subject to CSPA have been obligated.
Nigeria
International Military Education and Training      $394,066 
As of April 5, IMET funding was obligated for the following activity: military professionalization training. 
Peacekeeping Operations     
As of April 5, no PKO funding was obligated in FY 2021.
10 U.S.C.333           $3,705,772 
As of April 5, DoD section 333 funding was obligated for the following activities: training and equipment. 
Somalia
International Military Education and Training       $155,282
As of April 5, IMET funding was obligated for the following activity: military professionalization training. 
Peacekeeping Operations           $12,692,025 
As of April 5, PKO funding was obligated for the Somali National Army and Somali Ministry of Defense for 
the following activities: logistical support; stipends; advisory support; training; equipment; and program 
oversight. 
10 U.S.C. 333         $2,957,240 
During FY 2021, DoD section 333 funding was obligated for the following activities: training and equipment. 
South Sudan
Peacekeeping Operations
As of April 5, no PKO funds have been obligated in FY 2021.
Yemen
International Military Education and Training       $154,921






ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 
EU European Union
EUROPOL European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
FARC Revoluntionary Armed Forces of Colombia
GRETA
Council of Europe’s Group of Experts on Action against  
Trafficking in Human Beings
IDP Internally displaced person
ILO International Labour Organization
INTERPOL International Criminal Police Organization
IOM International Organization for Migration
ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
LGBTQI+ Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and Intersex
NGO Nongovernmental organization
OAS Organization of American States
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
UN United Nations 
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund 
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UN TIP Protocol 
Palermo Protocol))
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especial-
ly Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention 






NOTES: Local currencies have been converted to U.S. dollars ($) using the currency exchange rates reported by the 
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